Hurricane Irma (FEMA DR-4337) (Florida EM-3385) After ...€¦ · (AAR) Real World Event: Hurricane...

Hurricane Irma

(FEMA DR-4337)

(Florida EM-3385)

After-Action Report /

Improvement Plan

(AAR / IP)

After-Action Report (AAR) Real World Event: Hurricane Irma

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Project /

Event Hurricane Irma After Action Report

Date(s) December 18, 2017

Purpose

The purpose of this After Action Report / Improvement Plan is

to detail the preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation

activities, conducted by Citrus County Emergency Support

Functions / Policy Group / Operations before, during, and after

Hurricane Irma.

Mission Excellence in Public Safety

Sponsor Citrus County Sheriff’s Office Emergency Management

Participating

Organizations Emergency Support Functions (ESF) 01-18

Point of

Contact

Event Coordinator:

Captain David M. DeCarlo

Emergency Management Director

Citrus County Sheriff’s Office

3549 Saunders Way

Lecanto, Florida 34461

352-249-2738

[email protected]

Prepared by:

Chris Evan

Deputy Director of Emergency Operations


3549 Saunders Way

Lecanto, Florida 34461

352-249-2703

[email protected]


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Hurricane Irma Event Summary…………..………..

Executive Summary……………………………....…

State of Emergency Declaration Timeline...….....

EOC Specific Procedures……………………....….

Analysis of Objectives & Core Capabilities…....

Summary of Core Capability Performance….…

Preparedness……………………………..................

Response…………………………………………...…

Recovery…………………………………………..…..…

Mitigation…………………………………………….…..…

Improvement Plan……………………………..…..…

Unusual Incidents During the Event………..………...

Summary…………………………………………....…..

Appendix:

1. ALERT Citrus Data……………..…………..

2. Shelter List……………..…………………..

3. Power Outages…………………………………

4. Flooding / River Data…………………..……

5. Federal Assistance……………………..…….

6. FEMA DSAT Summary………………………….

7. Debrief Participants…………………………

Supplemental Information:

1. ESF Staffing………………………………………..

2. Calls for Service………………………………

3. Mutual Aid……………………………………..

4. Citizen Information Lines (CIL)…………….

Photographs………………………………………..….

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HURRICANE IRMA EVENT SUMMARY:

(Source: NOAA 2017)

Hurricane Irma was a classic Cape Verde hurricane that will long be remembered

for its severity and wide-ranging impacts to several islands in the Caribbean Sea

and Florida. Like many of the most notorious Atlantic hurricanes, Irma began as a

weak wave of low pressure accompanied by disorganized showers and

thunderstorms which emerged off the west African coast on August 27th, near

the peak of the Atlantic hurricane season (Fig. 1). Such disturbances move off the

African coast every few days during August and September, however, most of

them fail to develop into tropical cyclones. This can be due to a number of

factors, including blasts of dry, stable air from the Saharan desert, strong upper-

level westerly winds, or a lack of the necessary atmospheric “spin” needed to

generate a counterclockwise circulation.

In late August and early September, however, the atmospheric and oceanic

conditions in the tropical Atlantic were favorable for tropical cyclone

development. Sea surface temperatures were above average (generally in the

lower to mid 80s F across the tropical Atlantic), and there was an area of light

winds in the upper atmosphere, which allowed the developing storm circulation

to grow vertically deep (Fig. 2).

Fig. 1 National Hurricane Center’s 5-day forecast probability for a tropical disturbance

emerging off the west African coast on August 27th. Image courtesy of NHC.

https://www.weather.gov/images/tae/events/2017_0911_Irma/two_Irma.png


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Fig. 2 Upper-level flow (white lines with arrows), based on satellite estimates of 200 mb winds

(40,000 ft AGL). Image is vertical wind shear in knots, with black and dark blue being most

favorable for tropical cyclone intensification (i.e. light wind shear). Hurricane Irma shown using

red hurricane symbol. Image courtesy of UW CIMMs.

Tropical Storm Irma formed in the far eastern Atlantic Ocean, just west of the

Cape Verde Islands, on the morning of August 30th. Over the following 30 hours

Irma intensified into a major hurricane with highest sustained winds of 115 MPH, a

category-3 storm on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale. Such rapid

strengthening is unusual for storms in the far eastern Atlantic. Irma’s intensity

remained fairly steady for the next few days while moving into a region with drier

air aloft (Fig. 3)

Fig. 3 Water vapor image. Image courtesy of UW CIMMs.

https://www.weather.gov/images/tae/events/2017_0911_Irma/Irma_upper_level_flow.png

https://www.weather.gov/images/tae/events/2017_0911_Irma/Irma_wv_CIMMs.png


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As Irma began to approach the northern Leeward Islands on September 4th and

5th, the hurricane rapidly intensified while moving over warmer water and into a

more moist atmosphere. The storm became a rare category-5 hurricane on

September 5th, with maximum sustained winds of 185 MPH. This made Irma the

strongest hurricane ever observed in the open Atlantic Ocean, and one of only 5

hurricanes with measured winds of 185 MPH or higher in the entire Atlantic basin.

Over the next few days Irma continued moving west, passing through the

northeast Leeward Islands, Virgin Islands, and just north of the islands of Puerto

Rico and Hispaniola, while maintaining its category-5 winds. While category-5

hurricanes are rare, it is even more rare for such storms to maintain this status for

such a long period of time. Irma was a category-5 hurricane for 3 days (Fig. 4).

Fig. 4 Satellite montage of Irma using GOES IR images and NHC advisories. Courtesy of UW

CIMMS.

While it will take time to realize all of the impacts from Irma, some were

immediately apparent, even from space. Fig. 5 shows the massive defoliation

across some of the Virgin Islands which were struck by Irma at peak intensity. The

islands, which used to appear green to the special satellite sensor due to their

dense coverage of plants and trees, are now brown.

https://www.weather.gov/images/tae/events/2017_0911_Irma/satellite_montage.png


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Fig. 5 NASA’s landsat-8 satellite images, before & after Irma.

The storm finally “weakened” to a category-4 hurricane on September 8th, but

still had devastating winds of 155 MPH while moving through the southern

Bahamas. Irma intensified to a category-5 level once again that evening, with

top winds of 160 MPH, as it approached the northern coast of Cuba. Irma moved

west along or just inland from the northern coast of Cuba on September 9th. This

interaction with land disrupted Irma’s structure a bit, as a hurricane requires plenty

of deep warm water beneath the storm’s center to maintain the extremely low

pressure and strong winds. Thus Irma weakened slightly to a category-3 hurricane

with winds of 125 MPH.

For many days Irma had been steered steadily westward across the tropical

Atlantic and Caribbean islands by a strong ridge in the mid to upper atmosphere

(10k to 30k ft AGL) to Irma’s north. The numerical weather prediction models,

which are used by forecasters to help them predict the future track and intensity

of hurricanes, had consistently forecast this ridge to weaken somewhere around

Florida. However, these models differed as to exactly when or where this would

occur, so that Irma’s forecast tracks ranged from just off the east coast of Florida

to the extreme eastern Gulf of Mexico. This breakdown in the high pressure ridge

finally began to develop September 9th, and Irma made its much anticipated

turn to the northwest, into the Florida Straits (Fig. 6).

https://www.weather.gov/images/tae/events/2017_0911_Irma/before_after_Irma.png


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Fig. 6 Estimated steering currents for Hurricane Irma on the afternoon of September 9th. White

lines with arrows indicate direction of steering, image indicates forward speed. Note Irma’s

location over the north coast of Cuba, between the Bermuda ridge to the east and a ridge

over the western Gulf of Mexico. The mid-upper trough between these ridges steered Irma to

the northwest, then north. Image courtesy of UW CIMMs.

Resilient Irma made a final attempt to re-intensify while crossing the open waters

of the Florida Straits. The storm quickly reached category-4 intensity with 130 MPH

winds early in the morning of September 10th, while approaching the vulnerable

Florida Keys. Fortunately for much of the rest of Florida, Irma finally began to

encounter unfavorable atmospheric conditions for hurricanes. The shear, which

had been so light for so long, was rapidly increasing in Irma’s path as a trough of

low pressure developed in the Gulf of Mexico (Fig. 7). Additionally, dry air

associated with this trough was beginning to disrupt Irma’s inner core.

Fig. 7 Upper-level flow (white lines with arrows), based on satellite estimates of 200 mb winds

(40,000 ft AGL). Image is vertical wind shear in knots, with yellows and reds being unfavorable

for tropical cyclones (i.e. strong wind shear). Note Irma’s location over southwest Florida on

the afternoon of September 10th. Image courtesy of UW CIMMs.

https://www.weather.gov/images/tae/events/2017_0911_Irma/Irma_steering_flow.png

https://www.weather.gov/images/tae/events/2017_0911_Irma/Irma_upper_level_flow2.png


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The major hurricane made landfall near Marco Island in southwest Florida around

3 pm EDT on September 10th, as a category-3 storm with 115 MPH. Naples, Florida

reported a peak wind gust of 142 MPH. Irma moved quickly northward, just inland

from the west coast of Florida on September 10th and 11th. When Irma first

developed in the far eastern Atlantic, despite its strength, its wind field was quite

small. As the storm approached Florida, however, its wind field expanded

dramatically. As Irma hit Florida, tropical storm force winds extended outward up

to 400 miles from the center, and hurricane force winds extended up to 80 miles.

Hurricane force wind gusts (i.e. 74 MPH or more) were reported along much of

the east coast of Florida, from Jacksonville to Miami. In addition to the long

periods of heavy rain and strong winds, storm surge flooding also occurred well

away from the storm center, including the Jacksonville area, where strong and

persistent onshore winds had been occurring for days before Irma’s center made

its closest approach.

By the time the minimal hurricane reached northwest Florida (on the morning of

September 11th), the wind gusts across south Georgia and northwest Florida were

generally in the 45 to 60 MPH range (Fig. 8). Conditions improved rapidly once the

storm center passed by as strong, dry southwest winds aloft made the system

asymmetric, with nearly all of the rain and most of the strongest winds being along

and north of the poorly-defined center. Irma weakened to a tropical storm in

south Georgia in the afternoon, and further into a tropical depression while

moving north across central Georgia in the evening.

Fig. 8 Measured local wind gusts associated with Irma.

https://www.weather.gov/images/tae/events/2017_0911_Irma/Peak_Gusts.png


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The residents of northwest Florida and south Georgia were fortunate compared

to much of the rest of Florida. Had Irma taken its turn to the north slightly later, the

center of Irma would have remained offshore the Florida west coast. Irma would

still have weakened due to the increasingly unfavorable atmospheric conditions,

but this weakening trend may have been slower with the center still over the warm

waters of the eastern Gulf of Mexico. A slightly more western track could also have

allowed for a brief period of onshore winds in Apalachee Bay, increasing the risk

for storm surge. Irma’s track to the east of Tallahassee resulted in a prolonged

period of strong offshore winds, which actually kept the tides in Apalachee Bay

lower than normal for much of the event.

Fig. 10 Satellite IR image showing Hurricane Irma, one of the strongest hurricanes ever in

the Atlantic basin, near peak intensity on the afternoon of September 6th, just north of Puerto

Rico. Maximum sustained winds are 185 MPH, and central pressure is 914 mb on the 5 pm EDT

NHC advisory. Image courtesy of UW CIMMs.

Coldest clouds are shown in white, warmest surface temperatures in blue. Note

the perfectly circular cloud pattern, the warm spot (the eye of the hurricane,

where the satellite sensor can “see” to the warm ocean surface) surrounded by

the symmetrical ring of extremely cold (tall) thunderstorm cloud tops, and the

fanning out of thin, high-level clouds indicative of air being evacuated from the

core of the storm. This is a textbook image of how an intense hurricane appears

in a low shear, moist atmosphere with very warm water below.

https://www.weather.gov/images/tae/events/2017_0911_Irma/Irma_IR_6sep.png


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Fig. 11 Satellite IR image showing the center of Hurricane Irma, as a minimal hurricane, along the

northwest Florida coast just inland from Cedar Key early in the morning of September 11th.

Maximum sustained winds are 75 MPH, and central pressure is 965 mb on the 5 am EDT NHC

advisory. Image courtesy of UW CIMMs.

Note how the coldest cloud tops (white) are north and east of the storm center.

This is due to strong wind shear (from strong southwest winds in the upper

atmosphere), and dry air in the mid and upper levels of the atmosphere wrapping

into the storm, and the fact that the hurricane’s center had been over land for at

least 12 hours.

https://www.weather.gov/tae/Irma_technical_summary (2017)

NOTE: (Inserted with no grammatical corrections from original posting)

https://www.weather.gov/tae/Irma_technical_summary

https://www.weather.gov/images/tae/events/2017_0911_Irma/Irma_IR_11Sep.png


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

Citrus County, Florida, was one of the many Florida counties impacted by

Hurricane Irma. In response to this severe weather event, the Emergency

Operations Center eventually stood up to full activation. During the time of

activation, Emergency Support Function (ESF) personnel staffed key positions. The

policy group, led by Emergency Management Director, Captain David DeCarlo,

met multiple times in preparation for the storm. (See associated supporting data and SITREP’s in

WebEOC)

Hurricane Irma prompted a local state of emergency and mandatory

evacuations of the following areas: West of Hwy 19, 1.5 miles east of Hwy 19

excluding Sugarmill Woods Subdivision, the City of Crystal River, all low lying areas

of the county and persons residing in mobile homes, manufactured homes and

all unsafe structures throughout the county.

The evacuation of south Florida placed stress on the roadways and fueling

stations throughout the state. Many Citrus County fuel stations ran out of fuel.

Residents were not able to obtain fuel, which made it even more challenging for

emergency and utility personnel to maintain adequate fuel onboard to respond

to normal calls for service and needs. The state of Florida was providing law

enforcement fuel escorts however these were going to the lower portions of the

peninsula or larger cities. That response did not account for smaller counties or

cities that were taking the brunt of the evaluation traffic through their jurisdictions

and the fuel demands. Whenever a fuel station refueled, it was empty a short

time later.

The Alert Citrus system, provided by the State of Florida and supported by

EverBridge, was used a total of 17 times and was a valuable asset for notifying

residents and businesses of evacuations, situations and general updates before

and after the impact of Hurricane Irma (Appendix 1).

Shelters, including general population, pet friendly and special needs were

opened as mass care was required (Appendix 2). Due to lack of American Red

Cross personnel, the shelters were opened and operated by the Citrus County

School District, with the exception of the College of Central Florida where it was

operated by college staff and members of Citrus County Community Emergency

Response Team (CERT). Thanks to the Florida National Guard, troops were

dispatched to some schools to assist with shelter operations. The Florida

Department of Health operated the Special Needs Shelter. Many more people

than those who had previously registered showed up at the Special Needs Shelter,

causing serious strain on space, equipment and personnel. The Pet Friendly

shelter was unable to maintain the inflow of animals so they were displaced to

other overflow areas. Equipment to house the animals was scarce.


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Citrus County was expecting to see hurricane force winds strike its jurisdictional

boundary. Fortunately, there was a dry front that moved in to the west side of our

coastline, matching it almost ‘perfectly.’ The hurricane force winds moved north-

northwest towards the east county boundary, causing this ‘sandwich’ effect.

Overall, Citrus County fared well, with almost no significant winds, with the

exception along that eastern boundary. The east side, which included Floral City

and Inverness, experienced winds that were more significant. In the end, many

trees fell.

Based on a significant threat of dangerous winds, Law, Fire and EMS ceased

response at a certain point due to the risk to emergency responders. This risk was

ascertained from the monitoring of National Weather Service information, wind

gauges and field reporting.

Power was lost to many homes and businesses (Appendix 3). Several homes and

structures did receive damage from trees striking or impaling the structure. There

were no reports of homes, businesses or structures that were collapsed or

destroyed due to high winds. A portion of Turner Camp Road was washed out

and county officials had to respond along with supporting state agencies. It

should be noted that very few people reported information to Emergency

Management regarding damage. Unlike a flood or surge event where the areas

are quite clear, the damage was so sporadic that pinpointing specific areas was

challenging.

Excessive rainfall from Hurricane Irma caused the Green Swamp to overflow its

boundaries. That water flowed into the Withlacoochee River. It took over two

weeks after Hurricane Irma passed for the water to flow from the Green Swamp

to Citrus County along the river. Several homes in the Istachatta area, Turner

Camp Road and Arrowhead community were inundated with floodwaters. It

took almost two and a half weeks after the peak of the flooding, well over nine

feet at Arrowhead, to recede (Appendix 4).

Warnings were broadcast along the lower section of the Withlacoochee River

due to increased water turbulence and flow. No reported damage or injuries

occurred. Boat ramps and entry points were closed.

After the storm passed, Citrus County Sheriff’s Office Emergency Management

made direct request through the State of Florida for Federal Assistance. Citrus

County, along with many other Florida counties, were immediately made eligible

for both Individual (IA) and Public Assistance (PA) through FEMA (Appendix 5 &

6).

Due to the overwhelming nature of the storms impact on the state of Florida and

ongoing disasters throughout the United States, FEMA personnel staffing for Citrus

County was limited. For example, a fixed Disaster Recovery Center (DRC) was

requested immediately post storm, however, it was not deployed. Subsequently,


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a FEMA Mobile DRC was dispatched and established at the Citrus County

Resource Center, but only until the beginning of November, well past post storm

time. This did not preclude residents in the county from signing up for disaster

assistance. The DisasterAssistance.gov web address and toll free number were

provided by several media methods to residents and business owners right after

the storm. Presentations to citizens and businesses were conducted to get the

word out. The Citrus County Sheriff’s Office and Board of County Commissioners

had computer work stations set up in county libraries and CCSO offices to allow

citizens to come in and make application to FEMA. DSAT teams also assisted at

several events to provide sign up capability along with in the field contact.

In response to that request, Citrus County received the following Federal

assistance:

1. FEMA DSAT or Disaster Assistance Survivors Team (Deployed September 21,

2017) (Statistics – see Appendix 1)

2. FEMA Blue Roof Team (for temporary roof coverings)

3. FEMA Mobile Disaster Recovery Center (DRC)

4. FEMA Individual Assistance (IA) and Public Assistance (PA) granted along

with Small Business Association (SBA) loans.

5. Food for Florida Disaster Food Assistance Program (USDA and Florida DCF).

6. USDA Farmers and Ranchers Assistance Program.

Social media outlets was utilized heavily before, during and after the disaster.

Static information, along with live streaming to keep the citizens informed, were

utilized. Sheriff Prendergast did appear on radio stations discussing Hurricane

Irma.

One operation and one community outreach were conducted in response to

Hurricane Irma. The operation was performed in Arrowhead, where Sheriff’s

Volunteers and Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) went door to door

informing residents of the impending flooding of the Withlacoochee. The

community outreach was conducted in Arrowhead after the flood waters

receded. Members of CCSO Emergency Management and Community

Emergency Response Team (CERT), along with the American Red Cross and FEMA

distributed 280 American Red Cross cleanout kits.

The Salvation Army, churches and not for profits provided food, water and other

basic necessities for Citrus County residents who did not have power or the ability

to go to work to earn a living.

On October 27, 2017, a Post Hurricane Irma Debrief was conducted at the EOC

in Lecanto, Florida, to discuss the four main objectives (Appendix 7).


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STATE OF EMERGENCY DECLARATION TIMELINE

September 4, 2017 State of Florida declared by Governor Rick Scott

September 5, 2017 Citrus County federally declared for Category A and B

September 6, 2017 Citrus County declared a Local State of Emergency by

Citrus County Board of County Commissioners

September 10, 2017 Citrus County BOCC declares a curfew

September 13, 2017 Citrus County federally declared for Individual

Assistance and Small Business Administration Assistance

EOC SPECIFIC PROCEDURES

The Citrus County Emergency Operations Center moved to the following levels in

response to the storm: (Level 1 Full) (Level 2 Partial) (Level 3 Monitoring)

To Level 2: September 8, 2017 14:00 hours





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Analysis of Objectives & Core Capabilities

Objective

Addressed

in Current

CEMP?

Performed

without

Challenge

s (P)

Performed

with Some

Challenge

s (S)

Performed

with Major

Challenge

s (M)

Unable to

be

Performed

(U)

Preparedness

(Activation, sheltering,

staffing, equipment)

YES X

Response

(Personnel and

Equipment)

YES X

Recovery

(Response & Assistance

from local, county,

state, federal partners)

YES X

Mitigation YES X

Ratings Definitions:

Performed without Challenges (P): The targets and critical tasks associated with the core capability were completed

in a manner that achieved the objective(s) and did not negatively impact the performance of other activities.

Performance of this activity did not contribute to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for

emergency workers, and it was conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, procedures, regulations,

and laws.

Performed with Some Challenges (S): The targets and critical tasks associated with the core capability were

completed in a manner that achieved the objective(s) and did not negatively impact the performance of other

activities. Performance of this activity did not contribute to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for

emergency workers, and it was conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, procedures, regulations,

and laws. However, opportunities to enhance effectiveness and/or efficiency were identified.

Performed with Major Challenges (M): The targets and critical tasks associated with the core capability were

completed in a manner that achieved the objective(s), but some or all of the following were observed:

demonstrated performance had a negative impact on the performance of other activities; contributed to

additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers; and/or was not

conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, procedures, regulations, and laws.

Unable to be Performed (U): The targets and critical tasks associated with the core capability were not

performed in a manner that achieved the objective(s).

Table 1. Summary of Core Capability Performance

The following section(s) provide an overview of the performance related to

each objective, highlighting strengths, areas for improvement and / or general

information.


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[Preparedness] Shelters:

1. Further Department of Health involvement in Special Needs registry

screening.

2. Possible change of Special Needs shelter to Citrus High School.

3. Design a systematic procedure for the opening of shelters and tracking of

those in shelters.

4. Open shelters throughout the county, such as the east side, to

accommodate those living in those areas.

5. More staffing and support for shelter operations.

6. Better preplanning by Assisted Living and Nursing Homes for evacuation,

transportation and alternate locations.

7. Year round information provided to the community on preparedness and

shelter information.

General:

1. Use more public radio broadcasts for information.

2. Review traffic signal timing for protracted evacuations.

3. Review network for better data connection between EOC and Lecanto

Government Building (LGB).

4. Review the amount of sand bags that are handed out county wide for

possible flood / surge events.

5. Develop a ‘search’ capability for certain fields in WebEOC. (Complete)

6. Work with the utilities to develop an updated critical facilities list.

7. Ensure that the courthouse and other government offices are

communicated with regarding closings, etc.

8. Train personnel and utilize C-STAR.

9. Review ESF / Policy Group briefing schedule.

10. Maintain all tree trimming schedules and do not deviate.

11. Strategic placements of law enforcement at grocery stores and fueling

locations.

12. Develop contingency plan for additional fuel reserves.

[Response] General:

1. Reconfigure Citizen Information Lines room with more desk space and

phones. (Complete)

2. Better educate the community on non-functional traffic signals at

intersections (how to understand and drive safety).

3. Reminder that the FDLE agent assigned to the EOC is the state clearing

house officer for mutual aid for law enforcement.

4. Enhanced Emergency Support Function and WebEOC training.


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5. Review the expansion of radio interoperability in the county especially with

out-of-state resources.

6. Provide a way to mark downed power lines, poles, etc., to prevent

duplicate response to calls for service.

7. Need enhanced ESF transportation support at the EOC.

[Recovery]

1. Enhance the pairing of public works and power utility contractors in

clearing key areas.

2. Create working groups to provide solutions to issues including sleeping

quarters.

3. Explore the acquiring of resources, storage and transportation for Special

Needs shelter equipment.

4. Review potential enhancement to the documentation in WebEOC

regarding the ordering of resources.

[Mitigation]

The Citrus County Board of County Commissioners has a Local Mitigation Strategy

(LMS) Group that works to perform mitigation within the county, based on any

available funding. No information has been provided at this time. The LMS Group

will be meeting in 2018 and will review mitigation strategies based upon the

lessons learned during Hurricane Irma.


Improvement Plan

The Citrus County Director of Emergency Management will be responsible

for establishing and delegating authority to manage the following

committees to discuss improvements as determined by this AAR and make

recommendations:

Mass Care / Sheltering – to include high populations of special needs, pet

friendly and general population needs. In addition, the need for shelter

training and adequate personnel to facilitate shelter operations.

Housing – to include housing of citizens displaced in the future by

damaging storms.

Communication – to include interoperability.

Privacy / Media – to include HIPPA act and special needs.

Fuel / Power – to include providing adequate fuel and resources to operate

vehicles, generators and equipment.

Preparedness – to include sand bag and other preparedness exercises.

Technology – to include networking, printing and other technology issues.

Deadlines / Timelines to be set forth by the Director of Emergency

Management.

Kings Bay - Crystal River

Extreme Low Tide Experienced 19


Citrus County Sheriff’s Office Emergency Management FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Unusual Incidents During the Event:

1. Rainwater was driven into the EOC fresh air intake vents. This caused water

to enter the HVAC room, which in turn caused water to flow into one of the

ground floor rooms. This poses an issue for future storms.

2. Due to power failures, the main weather reporting sites within Citrus County

failed. Emergency Management utilized live feeds from independent

systems to monitor weather and wind speeds.

Summary:

Hurricane Irma was an unprecedented storm that caused death and destruction

to many parts of Florida. Citrus County fared well as we were sitting between two

weather fronts.

The members of local government, private and nonprofit groups such as

churches, did an outstanding job preparing and responding to the needs of our

community.

Many areas of improvement were identified and will be addressed, however

none negatively impacted the preparedness, response or recovery to Hurricane

Irma.

END OF REPORT

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Appendix 1: ALERT CITRUS DATA

Number of Alert Citrus

Messages Sent: 17

Number of Contacts

Sent to: 536,666

Total for all 17

messages (includes

repeats)

Appendix 2: SHELTER LIST

Shelter Total # of Persons Type

Lecanto Primary School 405 Pet Friendly Shelter

Lecanto Middle School 426

General Population &

Pet Overflow

Forest Ridge Elementary School 453 General Population

Central Ridge Elementary School 192 General Population

Lecanto High School 969 General Population

Renaissance Center 265 Special Needs

College of Central Florida 125

Shelter of Last Resort &

Pet Friendly

Citrus Springs Community Center Varied

Shelter Needs Transition

Location

Total number of pets at all shelters: 622

Appendix 3: POWER OUTAGES (Residential and Commercial)

Utility # Reported at Peak

Duke Energy Florida 46,697

Withlacoochee River

Electric Company & Sumter Electric

Company Combined 41,017

TOTAL: 87,714

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Appendix 4: FLOODING - RIVER DATA

The Green Swamp received an excessive amount of water during

Hurricane Irma. Excessive water from the Green Swamp flows into the

Withlacoochee River. Weeks following the passing of Hurricane Irma, Citrus

County received the excess flow causing flooding along the banks of the

river.

Green Swamp WMA consists of 50,692 acres in Lake, Polk, and Sumter counties. Also known as Green Swamp East, this area is part of the approximately 110,000 acres purchased to protect the land and water resources of the Green Swamp Basin. Green

Swamp is a critical recharge area for the Floridian aquifer as well as the source of the Hillsborough, Withlacoochee, Ocklawaha, and Peace rivers. Most of the landscape is pine flatwoods, cypress domes, and hardwoods swamps. (FWC 2017)

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Withlacoochee River at Dunnellon

Rainbow River near Dunnellon



Withlacoochee River at Holder

Withlacoochee River at Croom (Hernando County)

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Appendix 5: Federal Assistance Program Total

Operation Blue Roof

53 Right of Entry Forms Completed

32 Assessments

27 ‘Blue Roofs’ Provided

Temporary Housing Assistance

# of Registrants Eligible: 4,545

# of Households ‘Checked In:’ 90 persons

# of Persons in Extension Period: 96

# of Persons still checked in as of 12/15/2017: 9

# of Persons Checked Out: 81

Individual Assistance (IA) Total Number of Applicants for Federal assistance:

14,335

Total of amount of money paid for Citrus County as of

12/20/2017: $4,334,130

Disaster Supplemental Nutrition

Assistance Program (D-SNAP)

Pre-registered applications: 6202

Pre-registered approved: 6171

Pre-registered denied: 31

APPENDIX 6: FEMA DSAT SUMMARY

Homes Visited 3650

Survivor Interactions 4118

Survivor Registrations 158

Case Inquires 87

Case Updates 21

Whole Community Referrals 93

Unresolved Needs 0

Community Locations Visited 274

Private Sector Visited 50

Rental Resources Provided 0

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APPENDIX 7: EVENT PARTICIPANTS (DEBRIEF)

Participating Organizations

Citrus County

Florida Department of Health in Citrus County

Citrus County Sheriff’s Office, Emergency Management

Citrus County Board of County Commissioners

Citrus County School District


Citrus County Clerk of the Court

Citrus Memorial Hospital

City of Crystal River

City of Inverness

Florida Department of Law Enforcement

Duke Energy Florida

Citrus County Fire Rescue (Formerly Citrus County Sheriff’s Office Fire Rescue)

Nature Coast EMS

Citrus County Clerk of the Court

Nature Coast Volunteer Center

Citrus County Community Emergency Response Team

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Supplement 1: ESF Staffing During Hurricane Irma

Emergency Support Functions Staffed

ESF 1 Transportation Yes

ESF 2 Communication Yes

ESF 3 Public Works Yes

ESF 5 Information and Planning Yes

ESF 6 Mass Care Yes

ESF 7 Logistics Yes

ESF 8 Health and Medial Yes

ESF 9 Search and Rescue Yes

ESF 10 Hazmat Yes

ESF 11 Food and Water Yes

ESF 12 Energy Yes

ESF 13 Military Support Yes

ESF 14 Public Information Yes

ESF 15 Volunteers and Donations Partial

ESF 16 Law Enforcement Yes

ESF 17 Animal Service Yes

ESF 18 Business, Industry and Economy No

Supplement 2: Calls for Service Date Law Fire EMS TOTAL:

09/10/2017

(Pre Storm) 259 71 63 393

09/11/2017

(Post Storm) 798 346 97 1,241

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Supplement 3: Mutual Aid

Team / Unit Location Situation

Sheriff’s SMART

(Sheriff’s Mutual Aid

Response Team)

Collier County

Santa Fe River flooding

between Columbia

and Alachua

Counties.

Tanker 7 (Fire Rescue) Naples, Florida

Key West, Florida

Fire and Rescue

assistance.

Supplement 4: Citizen Information Lines Number of Calls Received Approximately 7,000

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Hurricane Irma (FEMA DR-4337) (Florida EM-3385) After ...€¦ · (AAR) Real World Event: Hurricane...

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