Humean Scepticism as an Alternative in the …...Humean Scepticism as an Alternative in the...
Transcript of Humean Scepticism as an Alternative in the …...Humean Scepticism as an Alternative in the...
HumeanScepticismasanAlternativeintheTraditionalMoralRealismand
MoralAnti-RealismDebate
by
CourteneyCrump
AthesissubmittedtotheFacultyofGraduateandPostdoctoralAffairsin
partialfulfillmentoftherequirementsforthedegreeof
MasterofArtsin
Philosophy
CarletonUniversityOttawa,Ontario
©2018,CourteneyCrump
ii
Abstract Traditionally,therealismandanti-realismdebatewithinmetaphysicshas
beenrestrictedtoadichotomybetweenrealismandanti-realism.Thisdichotomy
tricklesdowntomorespecificareaswithinthedebate.Oneoftheseareaseffected
bythetraditionalrealismandanti-realismdichotomyismoralrealismandmoral
anti-realism.Thisthesisfocusesonmoralrealismandmoralanti-realism,and
showsthatrestrictingthedebatetoonlymoralrealismandmoralanti-realismisa
falsedichotomy.Itdoesthisthroughprovidinganalternativeoptiontothetwo
traditionallygiven:HumeanScepticism.Thegoalofthisthesisistoarguethat
HumeanScepticismisaviablethirdoptioninthemoralrealismandmoralanti-
realismdebate.Thisthesisdemonstratesthatscepticismshouldsometimesbe
takenseriouslyandacknowledgedinsomedebatesthatithastraditionallybeen
excludedfrom.
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Acknowledgements
TheyearsofmyMaster’sdegreehavebeenastressfulrollercoasterfullof
highsandlows,andIwouldnotbewhereIam,orwhoIam,todaywithoutthe
followingpeople.
Tostart,Iwouldliketothankmyco-supervisorsDr.GordonDavisandDr.
MelissaFrankelforthehourstheyputintohelpingme,andforsuchquickfeedback
turnaroundtimes.IwouldalsoliketothankDr.AnnieLarivéeforallhersage
advice,andDr.ChristineKoggelforherclearfeedbackandguidanceduringthe
ResearchSeminar.Thisthesisalsowouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutthe
DepartmentofPhilosophyAdministrator,SandraKirkpatrick,andtheDepartment
ofPhilosophyGraduateAdministrator,KristopherWaddell.Ihavesaidthismany
times,butIwillsayitagain:SandyandKrisareliketheparentsofthedepartment,
keepingusallorganized.
Secondly,Iwouldliketothankmycohort,andtheCarletonUniversity
DepartmentofPhilosophy.ThemembersofmycohortandIexperiencedalot
together,andtheyallgaveconstructivefeedbackduringtheResearchSeminarand
duringdiscussionsconcerningourthesesoutsideofclass.Morespecifically,Ineed
tothankBrandonSmithandRebeccaRobbforalwaysbeingwillingtolendanear,
andforhelpingtokeepmegrounded.
Thirdly,Iwouldliketothankmyparents,andfriendsoutsideofacademia.
Myparentshavesupportedmethroughoutmylife,andcontinuetodoso(nomatter
howlongIstayinschool).Myfriendsoutsideofacademiahaveremindedmethat
thereisalifeoutsideofacademia,andthatIneedtoenjoyittolivemylifetothe
iv
fullest.Iwouldliketoextendaspecialthankyoutotwoofmybestfriends,Victoria
MabieandRogerKorth,forstickingwithmethroughthickandthin.Iknowthe
stressofmyMaster’sdegreeandmyworkloaddidnotalwaysmakemethefriendI
shouldhavebeen.
Last,butdefinitelynotleast,Iwouldliketothankmydog,Charlie—even
thoughhecannotreadthisorunderstandwhyIamthankinghim.Thereisnothing
quiteliketheunconditionalloveofacompanionanimal.Hemademegooutsideand
getfreshairwhenIwasfeelingoverwhelmedanddepressed,andIdonotknow
whatIwouldhavedonewithouthim.
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TableofContentsAbstract.......................................................................................................................................iiAcknowledgements...............................................................................................................iiiTableofContents.....................................................................................................................v1.LiteratureReview...............................................................................................................1
1.1.Introduction.............................................................................................................................11.2.Realismvs.Anti-Realism....................................................................................................51.3.MoralRealismvs.MoralAnti-Realism…...................................................................131.4.Quasi-Realism…...................................................................................................................201.5.“Empiricism,Semantics,andOntology”byRudolfCarnap...............................251.6.Pyrrhonian,Academic,orMethodologicalScepticism?......................................271.7.Naturalism..............................................................................................................................341.8.Hume:Realist,Anti-Realist,orSceptic?.....................................................................411.9.AnInterpretationofHume’sPhilosophy..................................................................44
2.Chapter….............................................................................................................................57
2.1.Introduction….......................................................................................................................572.2.HumeanScepticisminATreatiseofHumanNature….........................................582.3.HumeanScepticisminAnEnquiryconcerningHumanUnderstanding........722.4.Hume’sMoralPhilosophy................................................................................................782.5.Hume’sMethodinAnEnquiryconcerningthePrinciplesofMorals..............862.6.TheMoralRealismandMoralAnti-RealismDebate:HumeanScepticismasanAlternative................................................................................................................................902.7.PotentialImplications.......................................................................................................95
Bibliography...........................................................................................................................97
1
1.LiteratureReview1.1.Introduction
WhileIamfascinatedbymetaethics,Ihavediscoveredthatitisquite
unpalatableformanypeople.So,whenIdecidedtowritemyMaster’sthesis
onmetaethics,Istruggledtothinkofawaytomakemythesisinterestingtoa
wideraudience.IhopethatIcanmakemetaethicsinterestingandaccessible—
ifonlyforthedurationofmythesis.Iamnotsurewhy,butAncientGreek
philosophyisthefirstthingthatjumpedintomymindwhileIwasconsidering
howbesttoapproachthetopicofmythesis.Uponfurtherreflection,itseemed
tobeorganictostartwiththebeginningoftheWesternPhilosophical
Tradition,andthentracetheconceptualframeworktoHumeandEarly
Modernphilosophy.
Tobeginthemetaethicaljourneyofmythesis,Iwillgiveaquotefrom
oneofPlato’sdialogues.Mygoalinthisintroductionistostartwitha
conceptionofknowledge,workmywaytowardsmetaphysics,andthenfinally
gettometaethics.IntheTheaetetus,Plato’sSocratessaysat160e,
Sowefindthevarioustheorieshaveconvergedtothesamething:thatofHomerandHeraclitusandalltheirtribe,thatallthingsflowlikestreams;ofProtagoras,wisestofmen,thatmanisthemeasureofallthings;andthatofTheaetetusthat,thesethingsbeingso,knowledgeprovestobeperception.Whataboutit,Theaetetus?Shallwesaywehavehereyourfirst-bornchild,theresultofmymidwifery?Orwhatwouldyousay?1
Towhich,TheaetetusrepliestoSocratesinapositivemanner:indeedthisishisfirst-
born‘child’.Knowledgeisperception,accordingtoTheaetetus,andeachperson
perceivesthingsdifferently.Thiscanbeseenasarelativisticunderstandingof
1Plato,Theaetetus,inCompleteWorksofPlato,ed.JohnM.Cooper,trans.M.J.Levett
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knowledge,andthedialoguegoesontotrytoshowthatitisafalseunderstandingof
knowledge.
WhatIfindinterestingisthatknowledgeofcold,onthisunderstandingof
knowledge,isbasedonthesubjectiveperceiverfeelingcold—samegoesforheat,
andmultipleotherphysicalsensationsandobjects.Itcouldbesaidthatour
knowledgeofphysicalsensationsandobjectsismind-dependentinthesensethat
ourknowledgeofthesethingsisdependentonusperceivingthem.Plato’sSocrates
goesonintheTheaetetustoargueforadifferentunderstandingofknowledgethatis
notmind-dependent.Socratestriestoleadustoalessrelativeunderstandingof
knowledgethat,itcouldbeargued,ismind-independent—i.e.notdependentona
perceiverperceivingit.Forexample,theconceptsof‘love’and‘beauty’canbe
thoughtofasabstractforms—unchangingandcontainingtheperfectionofthose
concepts.
Forme,thecontemplationofwhatknowledgeisthroughoutthedialogue
leadsawayfromthedialoguejustbeingaboutknowledge,andmovestowards
contemplationsofwhatthereisintheworld(i.e.ontology).Contemplating
perceptionssuchasseeing‘whitesnow’or‘abrowntable’quicklydevelopinto
contemplatingmoreabstractconceptssuchas‘love’,anddebatingwhetherthese
abstractconceptscanbeperceivedinthesamewayasthe‘whitesnow’or‘abrown
table’.Questionslike,“Doesthis[insertabstractconcept]existintheworld?”
absolutelyfascinateme.And,sothediscussionisnotjustaboutknowledge,butis
alsoaboutmetaphysics—or,perhapsmoreaccurately,whatwecanknowaboutthe
natureofmetaphysics.
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Movingintomorecontemporarymetaphysicallanguage,thediscussion
becomescentredonrealismandanti-realism.Realism,looselyconstruedwhen
contemplatingabstractconcepts,canbeseenasstatingthatabstractconceptsare
mind-independent.SomerealistsgoasfarasPlato,andstatethatnotonlyarethese
abstractconceptsmind-independent,butthattheyalsoexistintheworld—evenif
therewasnopersontheretoperceivethem.Anti-realism,then,istheoppositeof
realism.Itgenerallystatesthatabstractconceptsaremind-dependent,and
potentiallycontingentonhumanbeings.
Mythesisisonthisrealismandanti-realismdebate,or,Ishouldsay,whatI
seetobeafalsedilemma.Mythesislooksattherealismandanti-realismdilemma
fromwithinamoralcontext,andsoIamparticularlyinterestedinthestatusof
moralfacts(orclaims,orpropositions)andwhethertheyaretruth-apt(ornot).
Therefore,thetopicofmythesis,mostgenerallyconstrued,ismetaethics.More
specifically,thetopicofmythesisisdealingwiththetraditionalmoralrealismand
moralanti-realismdebateinmetaethicswhiledenyingthatwemuststaywithinthis
dichotomytofindanswerstometaethicalquestions.TheprimaryquestionIaskis
this:aremoralrealismandmoralanti-realismtheonlyoptionsopentous?My
answerisno.Iproposethatscepticism,morespecificallyHumeanScepticism,isa
thirdoptionavailable.
ThereasonwhyIcallthetraditionaldebateafalsedilemmaisbecause,even
asfarbackasPlato,thescepticalpositionwasnottakenseriously,and,foratleast
2500years,thedebatehasbeenstructuredassolelyabackandforthbetween
realismandanti-realism.ThebigissuethatIfindstartlingisthat,eventhough
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argumentshavebecomemorecomplicatedandfine-tuned,realismandanti-realism
havenotreallyprogressedoverthepast2500yearsofthedominantWestern
PhilosophicalTradition.Ithinkthatthisshowsthedilemmatobegettingus
nowhere.So,Iproposethattakingascepticalpositionconcerningtheontological
statusofmoralfacts(orclaimsorpropositions)mightbeanalternativetothe
traditionaldichotomy,andcouldpotentiallyhelpthedebatealong.
AsImentioned,IthinkthatHumeanScepticismcouldbethissceptical
alternative.Isay‘Humean’ratherthan‘Hume’s’,because,asisthenormwithHume
scholarship,nooneagreesonanyoneinterpretationandIhaveaparticularwayof
readingHume.MyinterpretationofHumeattributestohimamoreancientwayof
understandinghisscepticism.ThewayIseeHumeanScepticismismoreinlinewith
aparticularAncientGreekunderstandingofscepticismasepochēoragnostic(i.e.the
suspensionofjudgement).Thisisincontrasttothemorecommonunderstandingof
scepticismasamethodologicaltool(forexample,Descartes’useofscepticisminhis
MeditationsonFirstPhilosophy).
MythesisfocusesonHume,hisscepticism,hisnaturalismasmethodological,
andareadingofHumeasakindofconsequentialist.Istresstheimportanceof
interpretingHume’snaturalismwithinthecontextofhisscepticisminordertohelp
keephisphilosophycohesive,andIthinkasimilarapproachcanbetakenwhen
consideringconsequentialisminHume’smoralphilosophy.Thegoalistoshowthat
HumeanScepticismisatruethirdoptioninthemoralrealismandmoralanti-
realismdebate,andtogiveanaccountofamoraltheorythatmayworkwell
consideringHume’sscepticalapproachtometaphysics.Ithinkthatitisimportantto
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demonstratethatanormativeethicaltheorycanfunctionwhilemaintainingan
ontologicallyscepticalposition,becauseitdemonstratesthatscepticismis
somethingtotakeseriouslyandthatitdoesbelonginthemoralrealismandmoral
anti-realismdebate.
InthewordsofsomeoneIconsidertobewise,obviouslynotme(andIdare
saynotPlatoeither),
[A]llknowledgedegeneratesintoprobability;andthisprobabilityisgreaterorless,accordingtoourexperienceoftheveracityordeceitfulnessofourunderstanding,andaccordingtothesimplicityorintricacyofthequestion.2
Knowledge“degenerates”intoprobability.Probabilitydoesnotgetyoucertainty.
Youcannotbecertainofrealismoranti-realism,soitwouldseemthatyoualso
cannotbecertainofmoralrealismormoralanti-realism(sincetheyjustoffera
morespecificcaseofrealismandanti-realism).Whynotremaintrulysceptical,and
takeanagnosticstance?
1.2.Realismvs.Anti-Realism StuartBrockandEdwinMaresbegintheintroductionoftheirbookRealism
andAnti-Realismwiththefollowingsentences,
Questionsabouttheultimaterealityofthingssometimesseemlikesillyquestionstonon-philosophers,buttophilosopherstheyarequestionsoftheutmostimportanceanddeepestsignificance.Itisnoteasyorstraightforwardtoknowwhensomecontentiousrealmofentitiesisreal,ortounderstandandappreciatewhatisatissuebetweenthoseoneachsideofthedispute.3
2DavidHume,ATreatiseofHumanNature,eds.DavidFateNortonandMaryJ.Norton(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),1.4.1.3StuartBrockandEdwinMares,RealismandAnti-Realism,inCentralProblemsofPhilosophy,ed.JohnShand(MontrealandKingston:McGill-Queen’sUniversityPress,2007),1.
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Iwillmakeastrongstatement,andassumethatthevastmajorityofpeopletakefor
grantedthattheexternalworldisReal4anddonotquestionparticularaspectsor
domainsinthe,potentially,externalworld.Mostpeople,ornon-philosophersas
BrockandMarescallthem,takeforgrantedthatthechairoverthereReallyexists.
Theappliedphysicistthinksthatcertainnaturallawsgoverntheexternalworld,and
areReal.ThebiologistbelievesthatthecellstheyarestudyingareReal.The
mathematicianmightthinkthatnaturalnumbersareReal.Questioningwhether
somethingReallyexistsintheworldonthesurfaceseemslikesomethingthatdoes
notneedquestioning—afterall,sometimeswejustneedtoliveourlives(andthat
canbehardenoughwithoutquestioningwhethercertainfactsorentitiesReallydo
exist).
But,whenwehaveamomenttoreflect,andthinkaboutwhatwethinkis
Real,questionsdobegintoarise.Perhapsquestionsaboutwhetherourperceptions
areaccurateaccountsoftheRealworld.Canwetrustthatoureyesightisnot
deceivinguswhenwemakeeverydaymistakeswhenjudginghowfaranobjectis
fromus?HowmuchoftheRealworlddoweactuallyperceive?Now,consider
numbers.DonumbersexistintheRealworld?Wecanalsoconsiderwhethermoral
factsexistintheRealworld.Doesthemoralfact,‘Itiswrongtokill,’existintheReal
world?Perhapsitisthephilosopher’sjobtoquestionsuchthingsinrelationto
metaphysics,morespecificallyontology,buttheseabstractquestionsendup
affectingbeliefandbeliefcanaffectthewayweliveourlives.Abstractmetaphysical
4WhenIusethewordRealwithacapital“R”,Imeanmind-independentlyrealintheontologicalsense(i.e.thatsomethingexistsintheexternalworld,andisnotconstructedbymentalstatesorisnotmind-dependent).
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questionsendupbeingofimportance,andthousandplusyeardebatesoftenstem
fromthem.
WhiletherearemanydifferentsubsectionsofthedebateconcerningtheReal
world,theoverarchingdichotomyhashistoricallybeenbetweenrealismandanti-
realism.Realistsandanti-realistshavedebatedeachothersinceHellenistictimesin
theWesternPhilosophicalTradition,andthedebateisfarfrombeingresolved.The
realistsattacktheanti-realists(andviceversa),andboththerealistsandanti-
realistsdebatedefinitionsandintricacieswithintheirowncamps.Definitionsand
thefine-tuningofargumentsarefarfrombeingsettledforbothrealismandanti-
real-ism,butIthinkitisimportanttogiveadefinitionforboththesetermsinorder
togivecontexttothedebatethatIamtryingtosituatemyselfwithin.
IthinkthatBrockandMares’generaldefinitionofrealismisagoodplaceto
start,
Realismaboutaparticulardomainistheconjunctionofthefollowingtwotheses:(i)therearefactsorentitiesdistinctiveofthatdomain,and(ii)theirexistenceandnatureisinsomeimportantsenseobjectiveandmind-independent.Letuscallthefirstthesisthe“existencethesis”andthesecondthesisthe“independencethesis”.5
BrockandMaresadmitthatthisdefinitionisnotwithoutcontroversy,6butitwill
workfinetogiveageneraldefinitionthatallowsunderstandingofwhatismeant
whenIusethewordrealism.7Intheirdefinition,BrockandMaredistinguish
betweenfactsandentitieswhenitcomestothe“existencethesis”.Theydothisto
5BrockandMares,RealismandAnti-Realism,2.6Ibid,3.7Iacknowledgethatothersmayusedifferentdefinitions—thisisfinebecausethebasicinformationthatthisdefinitiongivesusispresentinmanyotherdefinitionsofrealism.
8
distinguishbetweenthosewhomightberealistsaboutfactsfromthosewhomight
berealistsaboutentitieswithinaparticulardomain.Oneexamplethattheyuseto
showthisis,“Onemightbelieveitisafactthateverythingthatgoesupmustcome
downwithoutbelievingingravitationalfields[…].”8Inthisexample,Icouldbelieve
inafactwithoutassertinganythingabouttheentitiesorpropertiesofadomain.So,
Icanbearealistaboutfacts,butnotbearealistaboutanentity(orentities)ofa
domain(andviceversa).
Thesecondthesisoftheirdefinitionisthe“independencethesis”.Thisthesis
statesthatthefactsorentitiesfromthefirstthesisare,insomeway,objectiveand
mind-independent.Objective,inthisunderstanding,meansuniversal(andnot
subjective),andmind-independentmeansthattheyexistinsomewayinanon-
reliantrelationshipwithahumanmind(orminds).Thissecondthesiscangoasfar
astoassertthatthefact(s)orentity/entitiesinagivendomaincanexistintheReal,
externalworld,butitdoesnothavetogothisfar.Somerealistsarecontentjustto
saythatafactorentityisobjectiveandmind-independentwithoutasserting
anythingaboutthestatusofsaidfactorentityintheRealworld—asIsaidabove,
thereisnoconsensuswhenitcomestodefiningrealism.
Defininganti-realismisjustasdifficultasdefiningrealism,because,again,
thereisnoconsensus.Youcouldjustsaythatanti-realismistheoppositeofrealism,
butthatisdifficulttofigureoutgiventhelackofconsensuswhenitcomesto
realism.Theantithesisoftheabovedefinitionofrealismcouldlooksomethinglike
denyingtheexistencethesis,denyingtheindependencethesis,ordenyingboth.An
8BrockandMares,RealismandAnti-Realism,2.
9
anti-realistcandenythatthereare“factsorentitiesdistinctiveofthat[particular]
domain,”theycandenythethesisthatthesefactsorentitiesofaparticulardomain
areobjectiveandmind-independent,ortheycandenyboththesetheses.
SimonBlackburngivesamoredetaileddefinitionofrealismintheOxford
DictionaryofPhilosophy,ThirdEdition(though,stillalongthelinesofBrockand
Mare’sdefinitionofrealism),
Arealistaboutasubject-matterSmayhold(i)thatthekindsofthingsdescribedbySexist;(ii)thattheirexistenceisindependentofus,ornotanartefactofourminds,orourlanguageorconceptualscheme;(iii)thatthestatementswemakeinSarenot*reducibletootherkindsofstatement,revealingthemtobeaboutsomedifferentsubject-matter;(iv)thatthestatementswemakeinShave*truthconditions,beingstraightforwarddescriptionsofaspectsoftheworldandmadetrueorfalsebyfactsintheworld;(v)thatweareabletoattaintruthsaboutS,andthatitisappropriatefullytobelievethingsweclaiminS.9
Blackburnthengoesontoexplainthatthereare“differentoppositions”thatcan
takeissuewithone(ormore)ofanyoftheaboverealistclaims,
*EliminativiststhinktheSdiscourseshouldberejected.Scepticseitherdeny(i)ordenyourrighttoaffirmit.*Idealistsand*conceptualistsdeny(ii),*reductionistsdeny(iii),while*instrumentalistsand*projectivistsdeny(iv).*Constructiveempiricistsdeny(v).Othercombinationsarepossible,andinmanyareasthereislittleconsensusontheexactwayarealist/anti-realistdisputeshouldbeconstructed.10
Blackburninterestinglylumpsanti-realismandscepticismtogetherinhislistof
oppositionstotherealistclaimshementionsfirst,whichisproblematic.11ThoughI
9SimonBlackburn,“realism/anti-realism,”intheOxfordDictionaryofPhilosophy,ThirdEdition(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2016),404.10Ibid.11Thiswillbecomemoreclearinsection1.6.“Pyrrhonian,Academic,orMethodologicalScepticism?”But,Iwillbrieflyaddresswhygroupinganti-realistsandscepticstogetherisproblematichere.Someformsofscepticismareusedasamethodortool,andcanbegroupedwitheitherrealismoranti-realism.Otherformsofscepticismremainagnostic,andcannotbegroupedwitheitherrealismoranti-realism.
10
takeissuewithaspectsofthismoredetaileddefinition,itgivesfurtherinsightinto
theintricaciesoftherealism/anti-realismdebate—andshowswhyitisdifficultto
givedefinitionsofrealismanditsantithesis.
Iwouldliketogiveanexampletohighlightabitofthetensionbetweenthe
realistsandtheanti-realistswhenitcomestotheontologicalstatusoffactsor
entitieswithinaparticulardomain.Iwillgiveanexampleconcerningpure
mathematics.JamesNicholsondefinespuremathematicsinTheConciseOxford
DictionaryofMathematics(FifthEdition)asfollows,
Theareaofmathematicsconcerningtherelationshipsbetweenabstractsystemsandstructuresandtherulesgoverningtheirbehaviours,motivatedbyitsintrinsicinterestoreleganceratherthanitsapplicationtosolvingproblemsintherealworld.Muchmodernappliedmathematicsisbasedonwhatwasviewedasveryesotericpuremathematicswhenitwasdevised.Forexample,matrixalgebraisnowthecornerstoneofvideo-gametechnologies,computer-aideddesign,etc.12
Startingwiththisdefinition,Ithinktwodifferent,thoughtraditional,ideascould
emerge:onerealist,theotheranti-realist.Therecouldbeamathematicianwho
worksonmatrixalgebrawhoisarealistaboutmathematics.Duetothepractical
applicationofmatrixalgebra,themathematiciancouldbelievethatmatrixalgebra
existsintheRealworld,mind-independently.Therecouldalsobeapure
mathematicianwhostrictlyworksinpuremathematics,andonlyworkswithinthe
abstractrealmofpuremathematics(anddoesnotworkonanypracticalapplication
ofpuremathematics).Thismathematiciancouldbelievethatnumbers,saynatural
12JamesNicholson,“puremathematics,”inTheConciseOxfordDictionaryofMathematics,FifthEdition(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2016),http://www.oxfordreference.com.proxy.library.carleton.ca/view/10.1093/acref/9780199679591.001.0001/acref-9780199679591-e-2307.
11
numbers,areconstructedandmind-dependent,andthereforewouldbeananti-
realistaboutnaturalnumbers.Bothmathematiciansworkonpuremathematics,but
holddifferentviewsabouttheontologicalstatusoffactsorentitieswithinthat
domain.
JesseM.Mulderinhispaper“WhatGeneratestheRealism/Anti-Realism
Dichotomy?”,saysthatonewayofexpressingthedisagreementbetweenrealistsand
anti-realistsis
[that]realistsurgethattheirtheoriesdescribetheworldasitmind-independentlyis,whereasanti-realistsarguethattheverycategoriesemployedinsuchpurporteddescriptionsare,afterall,ourowncategories,andhencethattheveryideaofamind-independentrealityintherealist’ssenseisdeeplymistaken.13
So,inthecaseofthetwomathematicians,therealistmathematicianwhoworkson
matrixalgebramightthinkthattheirworkonmatrixalgebradescribestheworldas
itReallyis,mind-independently;whiletheanti-realistmathematicianmightthink
thatnaturalnumbers,orevenmatrixalgebra,arejustmind-dependentdescriptions
basedon“ourowncategories.”
Sofar,thedebatehasbeenbetweenrealismandanti-realism,andagood
questiontoaskis‘Whatcauses,orforces,thisdichotomy?’Itdoesseemoddthat
realismandanti-realismhavebeenthefocusedonoptionsforthousandsofyears
(withintheWesternphilosophicalcanon).Muldersuggeststhatwhatcausesthis
dichotomyhastodowith“[…]findingskepticismunsatisfactory,”
[W]ecaneitherbecomerealistsbutbeatalossastohowwecanadjudicatebetweenhighlydivergentrealistmetaphysicaltheories,orwecanadmitourallegedinabilitytodiscoverthenatureoftheworldasitisinitselfandmakedo
13JesseM.Mulder,“WhatGeneratestheRealism/Anti-RealismDichotomy,”Philosophica84(2012):57.
12
withtheanti-realistrestrictionofourknowledgetotheworldasitisforus—whichinturnquicklyleadstoseriousissues,suchasacommitmenttotheideaofareality-itselfthatisdeniedanycontent,thatagainmotivatesareturntorealism.14
Itisthisviewthatscepticismisunsatisfactorythatspursthedichotomybetween
realismandanti-realism,accordingtoMulder.Thescepticismhastodowith,touse
Mulder’slanguage,“theworldasitisinitself.”Themetaphysicalscepticthinksthat
wecannotknowwhetherourperceptionsof‘theworldasitisinitself’(orReal,
externalworld)areaccuraterepresentationsornot,andsothescepticsuspends
theirjudgementabout‘theworldasitisinitself.’Mulderthinksthatscepticismis
unsatisfactoryfortherealistandfortheanti-realistinseparateways.Therealist
takesissuewiththesceptic’sclaimthat“we[cannot]justifyknowledgeoftheworld-
in-itself,”andtheanti-realisttakesissuewiththesceptic’sclaimthat“truth
involve[s]correspondencewiththeworld-in-itself.”15
Thescepticalmetaphysicalpicture,accordingtoMulder,lookssomethinglike
wecannotjustifyknowledgeoftheRealworldandtruthcorrespondstotheReal
world,sothereforewecannothavetruth.16Therealist’sclaimisthatwecanjustify
knowledgeoftheRealworld(andhavetruthcorrespondtotheRealworld),andthe
anti-realists’claimisthattruthcorrespondswith“theworldasitisforus”(andso
truthdoesnotcorrespondtotheRealworld—buttoourperceptionsoftheReal
world).17Idotakeissuewiththisunderstandingofscepticism(whichwillbecome
moreclearinsections1.6,2.2,and2.3),butitdoesseemtobeanaccurateaccountof
14Ibid,71-72.15Ibid,71.16Ibid.17Ibid,72.
13
whathasforcedthetraditionaldichotomybetweenrealismandanti-realism.The
realistandtheanti-realistbothbelievethat,insomeway,metaphysicalscepticism
(asdescribedbyMulder)isproblematic;theyjustdisagreeonhowitisproblematic.
1.3.MoralRealismvs.MoralAnti-Realism
Onesubsection,ordomain,withintherealismandanti-realismdichotomyis
moralrealismandmoralanti-realism.GeoffreySayre-McCordsaysinthe
introductiontoEssaysonMoralRealism,
[…]thedebatebetweenrealistsandantirealistsisdeepandimportant.Itaffectsourontology,epistemology,andsemantics.Andinethics,itmakesasignificantdifferencetoourunderstandingofwhat(ifanything)isvaluable,toouraccountofmoraldisagreement,andtotheimportanceweplaceonmoralreflection.18
GiventheimportanceSayre-McCordplacesontherealismandanti-realism
dichotomy,particularlyinreferencetoethics,itmakesitexceptionallypertinentto
clarifythedichotomyasitrelatestomoralrealismandmoralanti-realism.
Therefore,itisimportanttodefinewhatismeantbymoralrealismandmoralanti-
realism,andgiveanexampleforeach.
IwillstartbygivingSayre-McCord’sdefinitionsforrealismandanti-realism,
but—duetohowbroadtheyare—Iwilladdmoreclarifyingdefinitions.Sayre-
McCorddefinesrealismasfollows,
Whereveritisfound,I’llargue,realisminvolvesembracingjusttwotheses:(1)theclaimsinquestion,whenliterallyconstrued,areliterallytrueorfalse(cognitivism),and(2)someareliterallytrue.Nothingmore.19
18GeoffreySayre-McCord,“Introduction:TheManyMoralRealisms,”inEssaysonMoralRealism,ed.GeoffreySayre-McCord(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,1988),2.19Ibid,5.
14
Thesethesespertaintotruth-aptness,andwhatismeantisthataclaimcanbetrue
orfalseinreferencetowhatIhavebeencallingtheRealworld(i.e.thereis
somethingintheexternalworldthatmakestheclaimtrueorfalse).Hethendefines
anti-realism,
Correspondingly,therearetwowaystobeananti-realist:embraceanon-cognitivistanalysisoftheclaimsinquestionorholdthattheclaimsofthedisputedclass,despitetheirbeingtruth-valued,arenoneofthemtrue(say,becausetheyallshareafalsepresupposition).20
Here,Sayre-McCordismainlyalludingtoEmotivism(andrelatedtheories)and
ErrorTheory.Emotivistsarenon-cognitivistswhileErrorTheoristscanbeclassified
ascognitivistswhobelieveintruth-aptness(butdonotthinkthattruthvalues,like
trueorfalse,correlatetotheRealworld—orthattheyalwayscorrelatetotheReal
worldfalsely).Thisisanarrowaccountofanti-realism,butdoesalludetotheissues
ananti-realistmaytakeissuewith(inthisdefinitionofrealism).Thenon-cognitivist
(i.e.Emotivist)wouldtakeissuewiththesis(1),andtheErrorTheoristwouldtake
issuewiththesis(2).
InhisbookMoralRealism:ADefence,RussShafer-Landaugivesamore
specificdefinitionofmoralrealismaswellasgivingexplicitdefinitionsof
cognitivismandnon-cognitivism.Shafer-Landauinitiallysaysthat“[realists]
endorsetherealityofadomainanddosoinoppositiontoconstructivists.Realismis
sometimescontrastedwithconstructivismbyinvokingtheclaimthat,forrealists,
moralityismind-independent.”2122Though,hesaysthatthisisalackingdefinition
20Ibid.21RussShafer-Landau,MoralRealism:ADefence(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),15.
15
whenitcomestomoralrealism.23Hesubsequentlygoesontogiveamorecareful
definitionofmoralrealism,
ThewayIwouldprefertocharacterizetherealistpositionisbyreferencetoitsendorsementofthestance-independenceofmoralreality.Realistsbelievethattherearemoraltruthsthatobtainindependentlyofanyperspective,inthesensethatthemoralstandardsthatfixthemoralfactsarenotmadetruebyvirtueoftheirratificationfromwithinanygivenactualorhypotheticalperspective.Thatapersontakesaparticularattitudetowardaputativemoralstandardisnotwhatmakesthestandardcorrect.24
“Stance-independence”is,forShafer-Landau,awayofarticulatingthatthereisan
aspectof“something’srightnessoradmirability[depending]cruciallyonanagent’s
attitudes,”but“thedependence[…]isnotafunctionofwhatanyonehappensto
thinkofit.”25So,thereisanaspectofmind-dependence(givenmoralitybeingagent-
based),butthetruthofmoralclaimsthemselvesisnotdependentonanyone
particularagent(inthisway,theyaremind-independent).
Thisdefinitionofmoralrealismhighlightsthecognitiveaspectofit.And,on
thecognitivetheme—generallyconsideredinlinewithrealism(thoughsomeanti-
realists,likeErrorTheorists,arecognitivists)—mostsimplyput,cognitivismisthe
viewthatafact(orclaimorproposition),likeamoralfact(orclaimorproposition),
canbetrueorfalse.26Shafer-Landausaysofcognitivism,
[A]viewiscognitivistifitallowsforacentralclassofjudgementswithinadomaintocountasbeliefs,capableofbeingtrueorfalseinvirtueoftheirmoreorlessaccuraterepresentationofthefactswithinthedomain.Moralrealism
22By“constructivists”/”constructivism”here,Shafer-Landaumeansanti-realists/anti-realism.23Ibid.24Ibid.25Ibid.26Or,‘truth-apt’—cognitiviststhinkthatclaims,orfacts,leantowardstruth(orfalsity),evenifnoclaims,orfacts,endupbeingultimatelytrue(orfalse).
16
satisfiestheseconditions.Realistsseemoraljudgementsasbeliefs,someofwhicharetrue,andtrueinvirtueofcorrectlyreportingmoralfacts.27
Inotherwords,amoresophisticatedrenditionofmyverysimpledefinitionof
cognitivism.MypointinquotingShafer-Landau’sdefinitionofcognitivismis
becauseitveryexplicitlybiasescognitivismtowardsmoralrealism,andthisisnot
somethingthatisnecessarilyagreeduponwithinthemetaethicalliteratureonmoral
realismandmoralanti-realism.28Shafer-Landau’sbiaseduseofcognitivismin
contrasttootherheldviewsoncognitivismreinforcesthatthereisnoagreedupon
definition.Thisconstantdisagreementisareoccurringthemethroughoutall
domainsofrealismandanti-realism.
Gettingbacktodefinitions,Shafer-Landaudefinesmoralanti-realism,or
whathecalls“constructivism”,moregenerallyas
[…]theideathatmoralrealityisconstitutedbytheattitudes,actions,responses,oroutlooksofpersons,possiblyunderidealizedconditions.Inshort,moralrealityisconstructedfromstatesoractivities(understoodverybroadly)undertakenfromapreferredstandpoint.29
Thisistomeanthatmoralrealityfortheanti-realistisnotstance-independent(i.e.a
complicatedwayofsayingthatmoralrealityfortheanti-realistisnotobjective).He
associatestheconstructivist(anti-realist)viewwithnon-cognitivism,andstates
that,accordingtonon-cognitivism,“therearenomoralfactsortruths.”30So,Shafer-
27Shafer-Landau,MoralRealism:ADefence,17.28Thisiscontroversial.AsIhavepreviouslysaid,ErrorTheoristscanclaimtobecognitivists.But,also,viewssuchasSimonBlackburn’squasi-realismmightchallengetheideathatonlyErrorTheoristanti-realistscanbecognitivists(thereforecognitivismshouldnotbesostronglyassociatedwithrealism).29Shafer-Landau,MoralRealism:ADefence,14.30Ibid,18.
17
Landauclaimsthatfortheanti-realisttherearenomoralfactsortruths(i.e.that
moralclaimsfortheanti-realistcannotbetruth-apt).31
NowthatIhavegivensomepossibleunderstandings(i.e.definitions)of
moralrealismandmoralanti-realism,Ithinkitwouldhelptonotonlyclarifythe
views,butalsothedivide,bygivinganexampleofamoralrealisttheoryandan
exampleofamoralanti-realisttheory.Iwillstartwithanexampleofamoralanti-
realisttheorybeforegivinganexampleofamoralrealisttheory(thereasonwhyI
havechosenthisorderwillbecomemoreapparentonceIhavearticulatedthe
theories).
Themoralanti-realisttheoryIhavechosenasanexampleisGilbertHarman’s
theorythathearticulatesinhisbookTheNatureofMorality:AnIntroductionto
Ethics.Harman’smainpositionisthatethicsisrelative(i.e.hesupportsmoral
relativity),andheisananti-realistconcerningethics.Toshowthis,heusesthe
differenceinobservationbetweenphysicsandethics.Harmansays,
Theobservationofaneventcanprovideobservationalevidencefororagainstascientifictheoryinthesensethatthetruthofthatobservationcanberelevanttoareasonableexplanationofwhythatobservationwasmade.Amoralobservationdoesnotseem,inthesamesense,tobeobservationalevidencefororagainstanymoraltheory,sincethetruthorfalsityofthemoralobservationseemstobecompletelyirrelevanttoanyreasonableexplanationofwhythatobservationwasmade.32
Oneoftheexamplesthatheusestoshowthisdifferenceinobservationisthe
differencebetweenascientistobservingaproton’svapourtrailandyoujudgingthat
childrensettingacatonfireiswrong.Inthecaseofthescientist,theirobservation
31Again,Irecognizethatthisiscontroversial.32GilbertHarman,TheNatureofMorality:AnIntroductiontoEthics(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1977),7.
18
ofthevapourtrailseemstoexplainwhattheyareobserving.Inthecaseofyou
judgingthatchildrensettingacatonfireiswrong,yourjudgmentisbasedonbelief
thatdoesnotseemtodirectly,orindirectly,explainwhatyouareobserving.Inthe
caseofscience,thereseemstobedirectobservationofevents(ortheRealworld)to
justifyatheory(orforcetheadaptionofatheory).Inthecaseofethics,itseems
completelybasedonbelief,andnotobservation.
Harmangoessofarastosaythatethicsisnotonlynotbasedondirect
observation,butalsonotbasedonindirectobservation.Hedoesthistowardsthe
endofhisintroductionbyintroducingmathematics.33Hesaysthatmathematicscan
indirectlysupportphysics,andthereforeobservation,butethicsdoesnotseemto
evenbeabletodothis.
IncontrasttoHarman,NicholasL.Sturgeonarticulatesamoralrealistviewin
hispaper“MoralExplanations”.34Sturgeon’smainprojectinthispaperistodeny
thatHarman’stheoryleadstothekindofmoralscepticismthatHarmanthinksit
does(somethingmorealongthelinesofmoralanti-realismthanmoralscepticism).
SturgeonthinksthatHarman’sbasicviewactuallyleadstoSturgeon’sownkindof
moralrealism.Sturgeonisanethicalnaturalist(inhistypeofmoralrealism),but
onethatthinksthatmoralclaimsarenotnecessarilyreducibletophysicalclaims
(sincehethinksthatwedonothavelanguageforallphysicalclaims,moralclaims
couldactuallybedescribingphysicalthings).And,eventhoughmoralclaimsarenot
necessarilyreducibletophysicalclaims,moralclaimsstillfactorintoour
33Ibid,9-10.34NicholasL.Sturgeon,“MoralExplanations,”inEssaysonMoralRealism,ed.GeoffreySayre-McCord(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,1988),229-255.
19
explanationoftheworld.Sturgeonwrites,“…Ishallarguethatmoralfactsdofit
intoourexplanatoryviewoftheworld,andinparticularintoexplanationsofmany
moralobservationsandbeliefs.”35
Sturgeonthengoesontosay,“…itseemsplausibletocitemoralfactsaspart
ofanexplanationofnonmoralfacts,andinparticularofpeople’sformingthemoral
opinionstheydo.”36Sturgeon’semphasisisnotona‘perfect’moraltheorythat
existsindependentlyofus(asisthefocusofsomemoralrealists).Surgeonthinks,
[If]ourmoraltheoryweresomehowhopelesslymistaken,butallthenonmoralfactsremainedexactlythesameastheyinfactare,then,sincewedoacceptthemoraltheory,wewouldstilldrawexactlythemoralconclusionsweinfactdo.[…][W]eshoulddenythatitfollowsthatmoralfactsplaynoroleinexplainingourmoraljudgments.37
ForSturgeon,evenifthereisapossibilityofourmoraltheorybeingwrong,thisdoes
notmeanthatweshouldthinkourmoraltheoryisgenerallymistakenandwe
shouldstillthinkthatourmoraltheoryis“roughlycorrect”.38Thereisnoreason,
accordingtoSturgeon,todoubtourmoraltheorysomuchastothinkthatitis
completelywrong.39So,wecanuseourmoraltheorytomakejudgmentsabout
eventsandpeople’scharacters.
SturgeonisreactingtoHarman,andthisdifferenceofinterpretationover
particulardetailswithinthemoralrealismandmoralanti-realismdebate
emphasizesthediscordthroughoutrealismandanti-realismmoregenerally.There
35Ibid,236.36Ibid,243.37Ibid,251.38Ibid,253.39Ibid,253.
20
seemstobelittleagreementevenonwhichfeaturesarerealistandwhichfeatures
areanti-realist.Thishasencouragedanumberofphilosopherstoattempttocreate
ameta-physicaltheory,orametaphysicaltheoryconcerningmoralityormoral
claims(i.e.ametaethicaltheory),thatattemptstosolvetheapparently
irreconcilableargumentsbetweenrealismandanti-realism.Oneoftheseattempts
isSimonBlackburn’squasi-realism.
1.4.Quasi-Realism
BeforeoutliningBlackburn’squasi-realism,Iwouldliketomakehis
metaphysicalpositiononthenatureofethics(ormoralfacts,claims,etc.)more
clear.Blackburnsaysofhisowntheory,
Thistheoryisvisiblyanti-realist,fortheexplanationsofferedmakenoirreducibleoressentialappealtotheexistenceofmoral'properties'or'facts';theydemandno'ontology'ofmorals.Theyexplaintheactivityfromtheinsideout—fromthenaturallyexplicableattitudestotheformsofspeechthatcommunicatethem,challengethem,refinethem,andabandonthem,andwhichsomisleadtheunwary.40
Blackburnisananti-realistaboutethics—sothoughhecallshisviewquasi-realism,
heisnotarealist.And,whilehistheoryisdifferentfromotheranti-realisttheories,
itisnotanalternativetothetraditionalmoralrealismandmoralanti-realism
debate.41Heusesaspectsofrealisminaninternal(touseCarnapianlanguage)42
way,andthisiswhyhecoinshisviewquasi-realism(theCollinsPocketReference
EnglishDictionary,CanadianEditiondefinesquasias“seemingly,resemblingbutnot
40SimonBlackburn,“HowToBeanEthicalAnti-Realist,”inEssaysinQuasi-Realism(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1993),175-176.41Iwouldliketoclarifythatmystandardforanalternativeoptionneedstobeeitheroutsideofmoralrealismandmoralanti-realism,orneedstonotpartakeinthemoralrealismandmoralanti-realismdebate.42Thiswillbecomeapparentinthenextsection,1.5,onRudolfCarnap’spaper“Empiricism,Semantics,andOntology.”
21
actuallybeing”43).But,hedoesnotthinkthattherearemoralfactsthatexistinthe
world(completelymind-independentlyorobjectivelyinthesenseofShafer-
Landau’s“stance-independence”).Hethinksthatmoralfacts,orclaims,aremind-
dependenttoanextent(whichisseeminglyananti-realistpositionontheontology
ofmoralfacts).
Connectingthisbacktothedefinitionsofmoralrealismandmoralanti-
realismwillmakeBlackburn’spositionmoreexplicit.Themoralrealistbelievesthat
therearemoralfacts,andthatthesemoralfactscanbeverifiedastrueorfalse(in
someobjectiveor“stance-independent”way).Traditionally,moralanti-realism
deniesthemoralrealistviewinsomeway(forexample,theycandenythatmoral
factscanbeverifiedastrueorfalse).Blackburn’squasi-realismdoesnotdenythat
moralfactscanbetrueorfalse,butitdoesdenythatmoralfactsareobjectivein
eitheramind-independentor“stance-independent”way.
Onp.169,ofhispaper“HowToBeAnEthicalAnti-Realist,”Blackburngives
thefollowingexample,
Wecansumupthiscontrast[betweenspatialperceptionandethicalstances]bysayingthatalthoughtheteleologyofspatialperceptionisspatial,theteleologyofethicalcommitmentisnotethical.Thegoodofspatialperceptionistoberepresentative,butthegoodofethicalstancesisnot.44
Blackburnisdemonstratingthecontrastthat,thoughhethinksthatspatial
perceptioncorrespondstosomethingthatexistsintheworld,hedoesnotthinkthat
moralfacts(orclaims,orstances)correspondtosomethingthatexistsintheworld.
43CollinsPocketReferenceEnglishDictionary,CanadianEdition,s.v.“quasi.”44Blackburn,“HowToBeanEthicalAnti-Realist,”169.
22
Heis“visibly”ananti-realistwhenitcomestomoralfacts,becausehethinksmoral
factsaremind-dependent.
BlackburngoesontoexplainamoralrealistpositionheassociateswithJohn
McDowellandDavidWiggins.Hesaysthattheirpositionhassomesimilaritiestohis
ownprojectivism(quasi-realism),butthattheydifferinthatMcDowellandWiggins
think“thatsentimentshavesomethingtodowithourcapacitytomakeethical
judgements,”and“yet[want]toretaina‘perceptual’andcognitiveplaceformoral
opinion.”45ThistiesintoBlackburn’stalkaboutspatialperceptionbeingforspatial
representationinthe‘real’world,whileethicalstancesarenotforethical
representationinthe‘real’world(i.e.theydonotrepresentsomethingtangiblein
theworldoutsideofthemind).
Blackburnfoundshismoralanti-realistview,quasi-realism,onakindof
naturalismandonprojectivism.HisnaturalismbeingwhatIwouldhaveattributed
toempiricism:everythingcanbeexplainedthroughscience(i.e.thenatural,physical
world).Hisprojectivismismorecomplicated.Blackburnthinksthat“a‘projective’
theorycanbedevelopedtogiveasatisfyingwayofplacingourpropensitiesfor
values.”46Hedoesnotgointoverymuchdetailbywhathemeansby“‘projective’
theory,”but,fromtherestofthepaper,Ithinkhemeansthathumanbeingshave
natural(referringbacktothenaturalism)reactionsandthatthesereactionsare
attitudes(orattributes,oremotions).Theseattitudestowards(oragainst)
45Ibid,170.46Ibid,167.
23
somethingarenaturalandethical.Theyaretheprecursortorationalreflection(i.e.
whatwebaseourrationalreflectionon).
Therefore,Blackburnisananti-realist,butnotarelativist.He’sananti-
realist,becausehethinksmoralfacts(ormoralpropositions,claims,etc.)areour
attitudes(notsomepropositionthatexistsindependentofthemind).He’snota
relativist,inpart,duetohisnaturalism.FromwhatItakehispositiontobe,he
thinksthatwehavenaturalreactions(orverdicts)tothingsandthisisnecessarily
so.Hesays,insupportofmyunderstandingintheprevioussentence,“Theexistence
oftheverdict,ofcourse,dependsontheexistenceofthosecapableofmakingit
[…].”47HegoesontouseHumeanmetaphysicstounderpinthisnaturalnecessity—
naturalnecessityisnaturalregularitybasedonourformingofdispositionstowards
expectation.48
WhileBlackburnusesnaturalismaspartofhisquasi-realism,itisnotmeant,
atleastnotin“HowToBeanEthicalAnti-Realist”,tomeanthatourlanguageis
reducibletoordirectlydescriptiveofthenaturalstateofphysicalaffairs.
Blackburn’snaturalismistogroundthathumanshaveevolvedtohavecertainmoral
reactionsorattributes.Moralfacts,forBlackburn,requirethefurtherstepof
reflectingonthesemoralreactionsandattributes,andsoarenotnecessarily
descriptiveofthephysicalstateofaffairsintheworld.Thefurtherconditionof
quasi-realism,projectivism,addsthatwethenprojectourmoralreactions(or
attributes)ontotheworldmakingthemcontingentonus(humanbeings),and
attributesoftheRealworld.47Ibid,178.48Ibid,179.
24
Inanefforttobecharitabletoquasi-realismanddifferentiateitfrommoral
realismandmoralanti-realism—andprobablyexplainpartlyhowitgotitsname—
quasi-realismdrawsonpartsofbothofSayre-McCord’sdefinitions,whichIthink
emphasizesthatthereissomethingoffaboutthetraditionalmoralrealismandanti-
realismdebate.Theviewshavetraditionallybeensplit,butBlackburn’squasi-
realismhighlightsthatthisisproblematic.Quasi-realismabidesbytheseaspectsof
moralrealism:“(1)theclaimsinquestion,whenliterallyconstrued,areliterallytrue
orfalse(cognitivism),and(2)someareliterallytrue.”49But,itisalsocontingenton
humanbeingsandournaturalevolutionarybiologicalreactionstothings,and
“embrace[s]anon-cognitivistanalysisoftheclaimsinquestion”50makingitvery
muchananti-realisttheory.Quasi-realismincorporatingaspectsofbothmoral
realismandmoralanti-realismmayseemcontradictory,butitisnot.Itisamoral
anti-realisttheoryonitsfoundation,butthendevelopsaninternal(or
epistemologicalorcognitive)theorythatresemblesrealismafterwereflectonour
moralreactionsandmakeourmoralreactionsintomoralfacts(orclaims).
Perhapsquasi-realismhighlightsthatthetraditionalmoralrealistandmoral
anti-realistdebatehasfailedtocapturewhatisreallygoingonwhenwemakemoral
claims.Itmightnotmatterwhatourbeliefsareonthemetaphysicallevelofrealism
andanti-realism.Whatmattersiswhatwecanshowonaninternal(or
epistemological)levelthatitisherethatwecanseewhetheramoralclaimistrueor
false—itisherethatmoralclaimsgettheirmeaning.
49Sayre-McCord,EssaysonMoralRealism,5.50Ibid,5.
25
1.5.“Empiricism,Semantics,andOntology”byRudolfCarnap
Theproblemmayjustbethatwecannotadequatelycapturewhatisgoingon
inanyrealismandanti-realismdebate(includingthemoralrealismandmoralanti-
realismdebate).Thisapparentstalematedoesnotmeanthatthedebatehastoend
here.Thereareotherwaysofapproachingthedebatethatmayhelpfurtherit.
WhileRudolfCarnapwasananti-realist,heprovidedatheoryoflinguist
frameworksthatcouldverywellhelp.
Carnap,inhispaper“Empiricism,Semantics,andOntology”says,
[…][W]emustdistinguishtwokindsofquestionsofexistence:first,questionsoftheexistenceofcertainentities[…]withintheframework;wecalltheminternalquestions;andsecond,questionsconcerningtheexistenceorrealityofthesystemofentitiesasawhole,calledexternalquestions.51
ThefirstquestionCarnaparticulatesinthisquoteisconcerning“theexistenceof
certainentities”withinalinguisticframework:“internalquestions”.Internal
questionsarequestionsthatareepistemologicalinnature,orquestionsaboutwhat
wecanknowfromwithinagivenframework.ThesecondquestionCarnap
articulatesis“concerningtheexistenceortherealityofthesystemofentitiesasa
whole”:“externalquestions”.Externalquestionsarequestionsthatareontologicalin
nature,andarenotquestionsaboutwhatwecanknowfromwithinagiven
framework—theyarequestionsthatareaskedfromoutsideoftheframework.
Carnap’smainprojectinthispaperistoshowthatthroughusingalanguage
framework(bracketedfromanyontologicalstatementsaboutreality52)wecan
51RudolfCarnap,“Empiricism,Semantics,andOntology,”inMeaningandNecessity:AStudyinSemanticsandModalLogic,SecondEdition(Chicago:TheUniversityofChicagoPress,1956),206.52BracketedfromanystatementsabouttheRealworld.
26
avoidtheissuethatarisesforsomeanti-realists(orempiricistsinCarnap’s
language,sinceheassociatesempiricismwithanti-realism/nominalism)whenusing
“certainexpressionsinalanguage…[to]designate(ornameordenoteorsignifyor
referto)certainextra-linguisticentities.”53Theissuearisesforanti-realistswhen
these“extra-linguisticentities”areabstractentities,becausetheydenythatthese
expressionsinlanguage(suchastheadjective“red”orthenumber“five”)refertoa
realentityintheworld.54
Carnapbuildshisframeworkthroughusingexamplesofdifferentlanguages
ofabstractentities(suchasthelanguagesof“Theworldofthings”and“Thesystemof
numbers”).Heistryingtoshowthatwecanstillspeakmeaningfullyaboutabstract
entitieswhenweaskquestionsaboutthemofwhathecallsan“internal”nature—to
bedifferentiatedfromquestionsofanexternalnature.55Asareminder:internal
questionsare“questionsoftheexistenceofcertainentities[…]withinthe
framework,”whileexternalquestionsare“questionsconcerningtheexistenceor
realityofthesystemofentitiesasawhole.”56
IthinkCarnap’sinternalframeworktheoryin“Empiricism,Semantics,and
Ontology”showsthatwecanstillhaveinternalphilosophywithouthavingtostate
anythingaboutmetaphysics.WhileCarnap’spaperishelpfulfortheanti-realist,itis
alsohelpfulforthescepticconcerningtheontologicalstatusofabstractentities
(includingmoralfacts).Though,Carnap’sinternalframeworktheoryisnotactually
problematicfortherealist,becauseinternalframeworksdonotassertanything53Carnap,“Empiricism,Semantics,andOntology,”216.54Ibid.55Ibid,206.56Ibid.
27
abouttheRealworld(or,inCarnap’slanguage,“theworldofthings”57).So,itseems
possibleforinternalquestionstobeaskedwithouthavingtoaskexternalquestions,
whichmeansthatwecanknowthingsonaninternallevelwithinagivenframe-
work—withoutrunningintotheproblemofnotbeingabletoproperlycapturewhat
isgoingoninanyrealismandanti-realismdebate(includingthemoralrealismand
moralanti-realismdebate)duetotheexternalnatureofthequestionswithinthe
realismandanti-realismdebate.
1.6.Pyrrhonian,Academic,orMethodologicalScepticism?
IntheOutlinesofPyrrhonismbySextusEmpiricus,hestatesthatthereare
three“natural[results]ofanyinvestigation”andthoseresultsarethefollowing
threepositions:“Dogmatic,”“Academic,”and“Sceptic.”58The“Dogmatists,”
accordingtoSextusEmpiricus,“speciallysocalled—Aristotle,forexample,and
EpicurusandTheStoicsandcertainothers;”thinkthattheyhave“[discovered]the
objectof[their]search.”59The“Academics,”suchas“CleitomachusandCarneades,”
“denythat[theobjectoftheirinvestigation]isdiscoverableandconfessittobe
inapprehensible.”60And,“theScepticskeeponsearching”61—theScepticsalso
remainagnostic(epochē)intheirsearching.
NeilGascoigneexplainsinhisbookScepticism,
ForSextus,theDogmatistandtheAcademicpresentmirrorimagesofeachother:whereoneassertsthatknowledgeispossible(thatthingscanbeapprehended),theotherdeniesit.Toputthismoreprecisely,theDogmatist
57Ibid.58SextusEmpiricus,OutlinesofPyrrhonism,trans.R.G.Bury(Cambridge,Massachusetts:LoebClassicalLibrary,1933),1.1-1.4.59Ibid.60Ibid.61Ibid.
28
assumesthatwecanhavethephilosophicalknowledgethatshowsthatknowledgeispossible.Equally,theAcademicassumesthatwecanhavethephilosophicalknowledgethatshowsthatknowledgeisnotpossible.62
TheideaisthatforSextusEmpiricus,boththeDogmatistandtheAcademicare
dogmatic,becausetheydonoremainagnosticandbothasserttheirpositionstobe
true.TheScepticcannotassertthattheirpositionistrue,butcansaythattheydo
notknowwhethertheDogmaticpositionortheAcademicpositionistrueorfalse.
AsGascoignegoesontosay,
HowevertheScepticcomestotheviewthathemustgoalongwithappearancesinordertoachievehappiness,itcannotbeonthebasisofaclaimto[…]knowwhatthingsarereallylike(intheiressentialnature).63
Thatis,thatthoughtheScepticgoesalongwithappearances,64theirgoingalong
withappearancescannotbefoundedonanyclaimstoknowwhattheRealworldis
reallylike.
GascoignefurtherdistinguishesbetweenPyrrhonianScepticismand
AcademicScepticism.AccordingtoGascoigne,ArcesilausfoundedAcademic
Scepticism,around270BCE,whenhewasHeadoftheAcademy—around75years
afterPlato’sdeath.65ArcesilausthoughtthatbothStoicismandEpicureanism
(prominentschoolsofphilosophyinAncientGreece)were“Dogmaticperversionsof
theSocraticlegacy;”66andsoforwarded1)“thatheknewnothing”,and2)his
method“[suggested]alinkbetweenthe‘way’inwhichSocratesarrivedathis
‘admissionofignorance’andArcesilaus’sexplicitengagementwiththeopinionsof
62NeilGascoigne,Scepticism,inCentralProblemsofPhilosophy,ed.JohnShand(MontrealandKingston:McGill-Queen’sUniversityPress,2002),33.63Ibid,41.64Or,perceptions.65Gascoigne,Scepticism,41.66Ibid,42.
29
theDogmatistsofhisowntime.”67Arcesilaus’methodissimilartoSocrates’method
inPlato’sdialogues.68ThemethodPlatodetails:Socratesgoesaroundaskingpeople
whattheyknow,andthroughaseriesofquestionsshowsthepeopleheasksthat
theyactuallyknownothing.Thegoalbeingtoshowthattoonlyknowthatyou
knownothingisbetterthanthinkingyouknowsomethingwhenyoudonot.69
But,thisgetsbacktowhatSextusEmpiricussaidabouttheAcademicsinthe
OutlinesofPyrrhonism:they“denythat[theobjectoftheirinvestigation]is
discoverableandconfessittobeinapprehensible.”70AcademicScepticsdenythat
theyknowanything(concerningtheRealworld).Thisseemstobestilldogmatic,
evenifArcesilaustookissuewiththeDogmatists,andSextusEmpiricusisrightthat
AcademicScepticismistheflipsideor“mirror”(asGascoignesays)ofDogmatism.
Therefore,tousemorecontemporarylanguage,itseemsliketheDogmatistsare
realists,theAcademicsareanti-realists,andtheScepticsareactualagnosticsceptics.
UsingAcademicScepticismasatooliswhatturnsintothe‘MethodofDoubt’,
whichgetsassociatedwithRenéDescartes(specificallyhisFirstandSecond
MeditationsinhisMeditationsonFirstPhilosophy)intheEarlyModernperiod.
SimonBlackburnsays,oftheMethodofDoubt,intheOxfordDictionaryof
Philosophy,“Itattemptstoputknowledgeuponasecurefoundationbyfirstinviting
ustosuspendjudgementonanypropositionwhosetruthcanbedoubted,evenasa
67Ibid,43.68Ibid.69‘Toknow’meaningtoknowsomethingabouttheRealworld.70SextusEmpiricus,OutlinesofPyrrhonism,1.1.
30
barepossibility.”71TheMethodofDoubtistoquestionanythingyouthinkyouknow
togetridofbeliefsfoundedonafalsefoundation.But,Descartesarguablydoesnot
actuallydoubtthattheextended,orReal,worldexists.HesaysintheSixth
Meditation,
[O]ntheonehandIhaveaclearanddistinctideaofmyself,insofarasIamsimplyathinking,non-extendedthing;andontheotherhandIhaveadistinctideaofbody,insofarasthisissimplyanextended,non-thinkingthing.[…]OfcourseIalsorecognizethatthereareotherfaculties(likethoseofchanging
position,oftakingonvariousshapes,andsoon)which,likesensoryperceptionandimagination,cannotbeunderstoodapartfromsomesubstanceforthemtoinherein,andhencecannotexistwithoutit.Butitisclearthattheseotherfaculties,iftheyexist,mustbeinacorporealorextendedsubstanceandnotanintellectualone;fortheclearanddistinctconceptionofthemincludesextension[…].72
ThisseemstoindicatethatDescarteswasnotanAcademicScepticoraPyrrhonian
Sceptic.HedidthinkhecouldknowsomethingabouttheReal(i.e.extended)world,
anddidnotremainagnosticeither.Forthisreason,theAcademicheritagethat
DescartesreliesonintheMethodofDoubtisonlyusedasatool,andnotused
seriously.Duetoitonlybeingusedinstrumentally,orasa“method”,IcallDescartes’
utilizationofscepticism‘MethodologicalScepticism’ratherthanAcademic,or
agnostic/PyrrhonianScepticism.
Therethenseemstobethreedifferenttypesofscepticismthatwecan
distinguishbetween:Pyrrhonian(oragnostic)Scepticism,AcademicScepticism,and
MethodologicalScepticism.IhavealreadyexplainedhowMethodologicalScepticism
differsfromPyrrhonianScepticismandAcademicScepticism,butitwouldbeagood
71SimonBlackburn,“methodofdoubt,”intheOxfordDictionaryofPhilosophy,ThirdEdition(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2016),304.72RenéDescartes,MeditationsinFirstPhilosophy,inThePhilosophicalWritingsofDescartes,VolumeII,trans.JohnCottingham,RobertStoothoff,andDugaldMurdoch(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1984),54-55.
31
ideatomakethedistinctionbetweenPyrrhonianScepticismandAcademic
Scepticismalittlemoreclear.InBookI,ChapterXXXIII—“WhereinScepticism
differsfromtheAcademicPhilosophy”inOutlinesofPyrrhonism,SextusEmpiricus
explainshowPyrrhonianScepticismdiffersfromAcademicScepticism.At1.223,
SextusEmpiricussays,
AndifPlato[fromthefirstof,potentially,fiveschoolsofAcademicScepticism]doesreallyuttersomestatementsinascepticalwaywhenheis,astheysay,“exercising,”thatwillnotmakehimaSceptic;forthemanthatdogmatizesaboutasinglething,oreverprefersoneimpressiontoanotherinpointofcredibilityorincredibility,ormakesanyassertionaboutanynon-evidentobject,assumesthedogmaticcharacter[…].73
InBookI,ChapterXXXIII;SextusEmpiricusliststhreemainschoolsofAcademic
Scepticism,andliststwomoreschoolsthathealsothinksshouldbeincluded.74He
goesthroughexplaininghowthefivedifferentschoolsofAcademicScepticismare
notPyrrhonianScepticism,buttheabovequoteattackingPlato’s(orSocrates’)
‘scepticism’getstotheheartofthedistinctionbetweenAcademicScepticismand
PyrrhonianScepticism.
EvenAcademicScepticslikeArcesilaus,endupmakingaclaim:“allthingsare
non-apprehensible”75(i.e.thatallthingsarenotknowable).Theproblemwiththis,
SextusEmpiricussays,isthat“[Academics]affirm[thatallthingsarenon-
apprehensible]positively,whereastheScepticregardsitaspossiblethatsome
thingsmaybeapprehended.”76AssoonastheAcademicScepticaffirmsthatthey
knownothing,theyaremakinganassertionaboutsomething(inawaythatentails
73SextusEmpiricus,OutlinesofPyrrhonism,1.223.74Ibid,1.220-221.75Ibid,1.226.76Ibid.
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thattheydoknowsomething:thattheyknownothing),andthisisdogmaticandnot
actuallyScepticismaccordingtoSextusEmpiricus.
OnelastmajordifferencebetweenAcademicScepticismandPyrrhonian
ScepticismisthatforthePyrrhonians,agnosticism,orthesuspensionofjudgement
(epochē),iswhatleadstotranquillityofmind(ataraxia)andthegoodlife
(eudaimonia).RichardH.PopkinandJoséR.MaiaNetosayintheintroductionto
theiranthologySkepticism:AnAnthology,inregardstoPyrrhonianScepticism,
Theinvestigationdoesnotendwiththeinquirerfindingthetruth(whichiswhattheskepticstechnicallycall“dogmatism”),butinasituationofequipollencebetweenthedoctrinesorphenomenaexamined(thatis,onedoctrinedoesnotappearasmorecrediblethanaconflictingone)andso,unabletoassenttoeitherofthem,thePyrrhoniansuspendsjudgement(epoché).Contrarytotheinitialperspectiveofgettingridofthedisturbancebyfindingtruth,itiswhentheinquirersuspendsjudgementthatheorshefindsthetranquillitybeingsought.77
WhiletheAcademicScepticsaysthattheyabidebythesuspensionofjudgement
(epochē),theirprimarygoalistousethe‘Socraticmethod’togetridoffalsebeliefs.
ThePyrrhonianSceptic’sprimarygoalistranquillityofmind(ataraxia).
Toaddtothecomplexityofthedifferenttypesofscepticism,thereisalso
somethingcalledModeratePyrrhonism.Inhispaper“ModerateClassyPyrrhonian
MoralScepticism”andmoreelaboratelyinhisbookMoralSkepticisms,Walter
Sinnott-ArmstrongarticulatesakindofModeratePyrrhonism(inamoralscepticism
context).Sinnott-Armstrongsays,
Myscepticismisalsomoderate.Isuspendbeliefonlyaboutwhetheranyoneisjustifiedwithoutqualification.Thissuspensioniscompatiblewithrelativizedepistemicjudgements,suchasthatSueisjustifiedinbelievingthatherpetisadogasapposedtoacat,andthatsheisnotjustifiedinbelievingthatherpetisa
77RichardH.PopkinandJoséR.MaiaNeto,eds.,Skepticism:AnAnthology(Amherst,NewYork:PrometheusBooks,2007),22-23.
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dogasopposedtoadingoorhyena.78
Sinnott-Armstrong’sModeratePyrrhonismreinsintheuniversalaspectof
Pyrrhonism.Itstillremainsagnosticwhenitcomestojudgementsthatarenot
“justifiedwithoutqualification,”but“relativizedepistemicjudgements”canstillbe
madeonthisview.
Ithinkitisimportanttonowgiveageneral,contemporarydefinitionof
scepticism,andanalyseit.PartofBlackburn’sdefinitionofscepticismintheOxford
DictionaryofPhilosophystates,
AlthoughGreekscepticismcentredonthevalueofenquiryandquestioning,scepticismisnowthedenialthatknowledgeorevenrationalbeliefispossible,eitheraboutsomespecificsubjectmatter(e.g.ethics)orinanyareawhatsoever.79
ThispartofBlackburn’sdefinitionseemstobeheavilybiasedtowardsAcademic
Scepticism.IfyoucontinuereadingthedefinitionBlackburngives,itseemsattimes
thatheactuallyconflatesPyrrhonianScepticismwithAcademicScepticism.There
seemstobealotofconfusionoverthedifferenttypesofscepticismincontemporary
philosophy,andIthinkalotofthisisduetoconflatingthedifferenttypesof
scepticism.ItshouldbenotedthatPyrrhonian(oragnostic)Scepticismisnot
AcademicScepticism,andPyrrhonianScepticismandAcademicScepticismareboth
notMethodologicalScepticism.Theuseofscepticismasatoolinphilosophy(i.e.
MethodologicalScepticism)—sincetheEarlyModernperiodtopresentday—has
alsobeenconflatedwithbothPyrrhonianScepticism,orwhatIliketothinkofas
78WalterSinnott-Armstrong,“ModerateClassyPyrrhonianMoralScepticism,”ThePhilosophicalQuarterly58,no.232(July2008):454.79SimonBlackburn,“scepticism,”intheOxfordDictionaryofPhilosophy,ThirdEdition(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2016),429.
34
‘actual’agnosticscepticism,andAcademicScepticism.Ifindthisproblematic,
especiallywhentryingtounderstandspecificphilosophies(likeKant’s,orHume’s).
Ithinkitisimportanttokeepinmindtheproblematicconflationsofthedifferent
typesofscepticismwhilereadingallegedly‘sceptical’writings,andthecriticismsof
thosewritings,inordertodecipherthewritingsthatareactuallyscepticalandthe
criticismsthatshouldbetakenseriously.
1.7.Naturalism
Definingnaturalismisatrickyendeavour(notunlikedefiningrealismand
anti-realism).Theterm‘naturalism’hasbeenusedinphilosophybymanypeople
supportingmanydifferentvarietiesofideasandtheories.AsP.F.Strawsonstatesat
thebeginningofSkepticismandNaturalism:SomeVarieties,
Theterm“naturalism”iselasticinitsuse.ThefactthatithasbeenappliedtotheworkofphilosophershavingaslittleincommonasHumeandSpinozaisenoughtosuggestthatthereisadistinctiontobedrawnbetweenvarietiesofnaturalism.80
WhileStrawsongoesontodistinguishbetweenhardnaturalismandsoftnaturalism,
IwouldprefertodistinguishbetweenMethodologicalNaturalismandOntological
Naturalism(sometimesalsoconjoinedwithMetaphysicalNaturalismandreferredto
asPhilosophicalNaturalism).
Tostart,IwillfirstoutlineMethodologicalNaturalism.PaulKurtz,inhis
paper“Darwinre-crucified:whyaresomanyafraidofnaturalism,”defines
MethodologicalNaturalismasfollows,
First,naturalismiscommittedtoamethodologicalprinciplewithinthecontextofscientificenquiry;i.e.,allhypothesesandeventsaretobeexplainedand
80P.F.Strawson,SkepticismandNaturalism:SomeVarieties,TheWoodbridgeLectures1983(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1985),1.
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testedbyreferencetonaturalcausesandevents.Tointroduceasupernaturalortranscendentalcausewithinscienceistodepartfromnaturalisticexplanations.Onthisground,toinvokeanintelligentdesignerorcreatorisinadmissible.81
DavidPapineau,intheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophyarticle“Naturalism”,
moresimplysays,“Methodologicalnaturalistsseephilosophyandscienceas
engagedinessentiallythesameenterprise,pursuingsimilarendsandusingsimilar
methods.”82TheideabeingthatMethodologicalNaturalismfollowsthesame
methodasscience:usingnaturalexplanationwithoutappealtoanything
supernatural(suchGod,forexample).
Now,IwilloutlineOntologicalNaturalism.Papineaustates,withregardto
OntologicalNaturalism,
Acentralthoughtinontologicalnaturalismisthatallspatiotemporalentitiesmustbeidenticaltoormetaphysicallyconstitutedbyphysicalentities.Manyontologicalnaturaliststhusadoptaphysicalistattitudetomental,biologicalandothersuch“special”subjectmatters.Theyholdthatthereisnothingmoretothemental,biologicalandsocialrealmsthanarrangementsofphysicalentities.83
Addingtothis,Kurtzsaysmorebroadly,
Accordingtothenaturalists,natureisbestaccountedforbyreferencetomaterialprinciples,i.e.,bymassandenergyandphysicalchemicalpropertiesasencounteredindiversecontextsofinquiry.84
81PaulKurtz,“Darwinre-crucified:whyaresomanyafraidofnaturalism,”FreeInquiry,Spring1998,accessedApril22nd,2018,AcademicOneFile,http://link.galegroup.com.proxy.library.carleton.ca/apps/doc/A20633103/AONE?u=ocul_carleton&sid=AONE&xid=e7e2f9f7.82DavidPapineau,"Naturalism",TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy,ed.EdwardN.Zalta(Winter2016Edition),accessedonApril22nd,2018,https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/naturalism/.83Ibid.84PaulKurtz,“Darwinre-crucified:whyaresomanyafraidofnaturalism.”
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And,so,MethodologicalNaturalismstatesthatitfollowsthesamemethodas
science,andOntologicalNaturalismstatesthateverythingintheuniversecanbe
explainedby“materialprinciples,”andisconstitutedof“physicalentities.”
Bothrealistsandanti-realistscanadoptMethodologicalNaturalismquite
easilyasitmakesnoontologicalclaimsabouttheRealworld—itmakesexplanatory
claims.Wherethingsgetmorechallengingfortheanti-realistiswhenitcomesto
OntologicalNaturalism.Though,ananti-realistmaynottakeissuewithOntological
Naturalismforeverydomain.Ananti-realistdoesnothavetobeananti-realist
whenitcomestoneuronsfiringexplainingbrainstates,buttheycanbeananti-
realistaboutabstractentitiessuchasmoralfacts(orclaims)—asHarmanis.85
But,IwouldliketogoastepfurtherandsaythatOntologicalNaturalismdoes
nothavetoentailanontologicalcommitmenttoattributingscientificexplanations,
likeneuronsfiringexplainingmentalstates,totheRealworld.Youcanverywell
explainmentalstatesbywayofneuronsfiring,evenifyouareanagnosticsceptic,
becausetheexplanationyougivecanbebasedonappearancesratherthanon
makingastatementabouttheRealworld.Thescepticcansay,“Itappearsthat
neuronsfiringexplainbrainstatesasfarasIcanknow.”Thisdoesnotassert
anythingabouttheRealworld,butrathermakesaclaimbasedonappearances
allowingthesceptictoremainagnosticabouttheRealworld.Thescepticcannotsay
thatthisishowtheworldis;theycanonlysaythatthisishowtheworldappears.As
quotedinsection1.6,inreferencetoPyrrhonianScepticism,“theScepticcomesto
85Referbacktosection1.3.
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theviewthathemustgoalongwithappearancesinordertoachievehappiness.”86
Thescepticstillneedstolivetheirlife,anditisunrealisticforthemtolivenot
acknowledginganything.So,ratherthanmakeclaimsrelatingtotheRealworld,
theymakeclaimsrelatingtoappearances.87
InSection2.2,thatfollows,natureismentioned,“Naturehasnotleftthisto
hischoice,andhasdoubtlessesteem’ditanaffairoftoogreatimportancetobe
trustedtoouruncertainreasoningsandspeculations.”88Humereferencesnature
countlesstimesthroughoutATreatiseofHumanNature,andAnEnquiryconcerning
HumanUnderstanding.Hume’snaturalismplaysaroleinhowtherestofhis
philosophyisinterpreted.OnewayofreadingHumeasarealistisbyusinghis
naturalismtodiscredit,orreducethepowerof,hisscepticism.Anotherwayof
readingHumeisthroughacceptingthatheendorsesbothscepticismandnaturalism,
butthathisphilosophyisnotcohesiveattimes.Ithinkitisimportanttounderstand
howHumeisusingnatureinordertounderstandwhatkindofnaturalismarisesin
hisphilosophyinanefforttobetterunderstandtherelationshipbetweenhis
scepticismandnaturalism.IfindthatHumeusesnatureintwoways:1)toreferto
humannature,and2)torefertoourunderstandingoftherulesofnaturethrough
ourperceptionsandexperiences.Thefirstuseofnatureisdependentonan
understandingoftheseconduseofnature.
86Gascoigne,Scepticism,41.87Appearancesarebasedonperceptions,andmay,ormaynot,beaccuraterepresentationsoftheRealworld—butthescepticcannotmakeaclaimaboutwhetherappearancesareaccuraterepresentationsoftheRealworldornot.88Treatise,1.4.2.1(p.125).
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IntheTreatise,Humesays,“Wemaydrawinferencesfromthecoherenceof
ourperceptions,whethertheybetrueorfalse;whethertheyrepresentnaturejustly,
orbemereillusionsofthesenses.”89Wemakeinferencesviatheknowledgewegain
throughoursenses,andtheimplicationhereisthatwecannotknowwhetherour
perceptionsgiveusaccurateknowledgeofnature(intheReal,externalworld)or
not.90ThisisinterestinggivenhowfrequentlyHumefallsbackonnatureinhis
explanationsthroughoutboththeTreatiseandtheFirstEnquiry.Iwillattemptto
reconstructHume’sunderstandingofnatureinordertounderstandhowitfitsinto
Hume’sphilosophyasawhole.
Tostartwith,Humedifferentiatesbetween“RelationsofIdeas”and“Matters
ofFact”.91RelationsofIdeas“arethesciencesofGeometry,Algebra,andArithmetic;
andinshort,everyaffirmation,whichiseitherintuitivelyordemonstratively
certain.”92Hegivesexamplesofwhathemeansbytherelationofideas,suchas,
“Thatthreetimesfiveisequaltothehalfofthirty,expressesarelationbetweenthese
numbers.”93Relationsofideasexpressarelationshipbetweentwoideasthatwecan
knowwithouthavingtorelyonexperience(perceivingsomethinghappenmultiple
times),andwhosenegationimpliesacontradiction.
89Ibid,1.3.5.2(p.59).90ItshouldbenotedthateventhoughwecannotknowwhetherornotourperceptionsgiveusaccurateknowledgeofaReal,externalworldornot;thecoherenceofourperceptionsstillallowsustomakeinferences,andassessthetruthorfalsityofperceptions.91WhyIambeginningwiththisdistinctionwillbecomemoreclearatthesectionprogresses.92FirstEnquiry,4.1(p.18).93Ibid.
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Mattersoffact,ontheotherhand,arenotdemonstrable94,andsosomething
anditsnegationcanbothbetrue.TheexampleHumegivesisthat“thesunmaynot
risetomorrow”,orthatthesunwillrisetomorrow.95Bothstatementscan
potentiallybetrue,andacontradictioncannotbederived.Theothermainfeatureof
mattersoffactisthat“[a]llreasoningsconcerningmatteroffactseemtobefounded
ontherelationofCauseandEffect.”96Humesaysthatitisbythis“relation[ofcause
andeffect]alonewecangobeyondtheevidenceofourmemoryandsenses.”97
Reasoningconcerningtherelationofcauseandeffect“arisesentirelyfrom
experience.”98Humegoesontomaketheevenstrongerclaim“thatcausesand
effectsarediscoverable,notbyreason,butbyexperience.”99Hume,then,goesonto
giveafewexamples.Oneoftheexampleshegivesisof“theexplosionof
gunpowder.”100Theideabeingthatyoucannotknowthatgunpowderexplodes
priortoexperiencewithit.101
Iamnotsomuchconcernedwithrelationsofideas,butwithmattersoffact.
Mattersoffactarehowwegainperceptualknowledgeofthenaturalworld(i.e.
94Alogicalproofcannotbegiven.95FirstEnquiry,4.1(p.18).96Ibid,4.4(p.19).97Ibid.98Ibid,4.6(p.19).99Ibid,4.7(p.20).100Ibid.101Imean,youcanreadaboutitinabook,butthepersonwhowrotethebookwouldneedtohavegainedknowledgeofgunpowdersomehowandthewaytodosowouldbetohaveexperiencewithgunpowder.Though,Idothink,forHume,thatreadingthatgunpowderexplodesinthebookisnotexactlyknowledgethatgunpowderexplodes.Youwouldneeddirectexperiencewithgunpowder,preferablymultipleexperienceswithit.
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externalworld).102So,itwouldappearthatthenaturalismfoundinHume’s
philosophyisonebasedonperceivedexperientialrelations(suchascauseand
effect)ratherthanconcreteknowledge,andthereforeallyoucanhavearenatural
relations(orrulesorfacts)thatcanonlyeverleadtoprobabilityandnotcertainty.
Thisisaverydifferentpicturethansomemodernreductionistformsofnaturalism
whereitisbelievedthatnature(andthewholeexternalworld)isreducibletothe
smallestdiscoverabledenominationinscience(forexample,quarks).ForHume,
onecanreducenaturetothesmallestdenominationdiscoverableinscience,butthis
wouldallbeconjecture—becauseitisbasedonexperience(i.e.senseimpressions/
perceptionscombinedwithourexperienceofthesesenseimpressions/perceptions)
andhasthepotentialtobetrueorfalse(wecannotknowforsurethetruthorfalsity
ofsomethingbyattemptingtoreferenceittotheexternalworld,wecanonlyassess
truthorfalsitywithinagivenframework).103
Itisworthadding,givenHume’sscepticalviewsconcerningmetaphysics,that
wecanneverhaveaccesstotheknowledgeofwhatanyultimatecausesorfirst
principle(s)are,makingnaturealwaysprobableandnot100%certain,
Hencewemaydiscoverthereason,whynophilosopher,whoisrationalandmodest,haseverpretendedtoassigntheultimatecauseofanynaturaloperation,orshowdistinctlytheactionofthatpower,whichproducesanysingleeffectintheuniverse.Itisconfessed,thattheutmosteffortofhumanreasonis,toreducetheprinciples,productiveofnaturalphaenomena,toagreatersimplicity,andtoresolvethemanyparticulareffectsintogeneralcauses,bymeansofreasoningsfromanalogy,experience,andobservation.But
102Thecontentofourknowledgeoftheexternalworldconsistsofperceptions.Thismeansthatwehavenodirectknowledgeoftheexternalworld,weonlyhaveknowledgeofourperceptions.DirectknowledgeoftheexternalworldisnotsomethingwehaveaccesstoforHume.103Itdoesnotgiveyouthecognitivistrequirementthatwecanknowthatatleastsomeclaimsaretrue.
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astothecausesofthesegeneralcauses,weshouldinvainattempttheirdiscovery;norshallweeverbeabletosatisfyourselves,byanyparticularexplanationofthem.Theseultimatespringsandprinciplesaretotallyshutupfromhumancuriosityandenquiry.104
So,thoughwecanreducenaturetogeneralrulesforgreatersimplicitythroughour
experiencesandobservations,theultimatecausesandfirstprinciple(s)ofnature
canneverbeknowntous(humans).ThisemphasizesthatReal,externalrules(or
laws)ofnaturearenotthingsthatcanbedirectlyknown.Therules,orlaws,of
naturethatwecanknowthroughperceptionandexperiencearebasedon
probability,notcertainty.ThisthenentailsthatHume’snaturalismisnotbasedon
assertinganythingintheexternalworldwithcertaintythatcanbeknowntobe
true—thatis,Hume’snaturalismisnotarealistorcognitiveassertion.Natural,or
physical,objectsthatwebecomeawareofviaperception,thethingsweperceivein
theworld,cannotnecessarilybeequatedwithReal,externalobjects—wecannot
knowtheconnectionbetweentheobjectofourstudy(thephysicalobjectofour
perception)andtheReal,externalobject.
1.8.Hume:Realist,Anti-Realist,orSceptic?
DifferentpeoplehaveinterpretedHumeasarealist,ananti-realist,ora
scepticintheireffortstounderstandhisphilosophy—thereisnoconsensusasto
whichHumeactuallywas.Becausethereisnoconsensusintheliterature,Iwill
havetogivemyowninterpretationofHumewithsupportinthefollowingchapter.
Inthissection,toshowthelackofconsensus,Iwillbrieflygiveanaccountofeachof
thedifferentinterpretationsofHume.Tostart,IwilllookatBarryStroud’srealist
interpretationofHume.Secondly,IwilllookatThomasReid’santi-realist104FirstEnquiry,4.12(p.22).
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interpretationofHume.And,thirdly,IwilllookatRobertJ.Fogelin’ssceptical
interpretationofHume.
WhileBarryStrouddoesacknowledgeHume’sscepticalpassages,hethinks
thatHumeisultimatelyarealist,
‘Obstinatenature’canobliterateourscepticaldoubtsinamoment,and‘carelessnessandin-attention’affordaneasyremedyforourdistress(p.218).Thisisnottosaythatnaturesomehowrefutesscepticismandshowsthatitisnottrue.Ournaturalinstinctsdonotsuccessfullymeetorresolvethescepticaldoubts;theysimplysubmergethem.Manissoconstitutedthathemustbelieve,forexample,intheexistenceofbodies,eventhoughhecannotdefendthatbeliefwithanygoodreasons.Norwillanyaccountofgoodreasoningfreehimfromthescepticaldoubtsarisinginevitablyoutofreflectiononthegroundsforthatbelief.But,wedogetfreefromsuchdoubts,nevertheless.105
StroudthenquotesHumeandcarriesonbysaying,
Wecannotavoidseeingtheresultsofourphilosophicalreflectionasartificialandcontrived,andwewillinevitablyyieldtonatureandaccept‘thegeneralmaximsoftheworld’(p.269)despiteaconvincingphilosophicaldemonstrationoftheunreasonableness,oreventhefalsity,ofthosebeliefs.106
AccordingtoStroud’sinterpretationofHume’sphilosophy,wecannothelpbutto
fallintodoubtwhenwereflectandphilosophize,but,intheend,werevertbackinto
arealistpositionaswe“yieldtonature”.ItisarealistinterpretationofHume,
because,accordingtoStroud,Humethinksthathumansnaturallythinkthatbodies
existintheexternalworld—notjusttheappearanceofbodiesintheexternalworld,
butReal,externalbodies.
ThomasReid,ontheotherhand,seemstohavehadananti-realist
interpretationofHume’sphilosophy.ReidwasacontemporaryofHume,andwas
highlycriticalofHume’sphilosophy.ReidinterpretedHumeasallowinghis,
meaningHume’s,philosophytoleadHume“todisbelievetheexistencebothof105BarryStroud,Hume(NewYork:Routledge&KeganPaulplc,1977),115.106Ibid,116.
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matterandofmind.”107AccordingtoReid,Humedeniedthatanythingexistedinthe
externalworld,whichaPyrrhonianScepticwouldcallnegativelydogmatic,
AcademicScepticism,oranti-realism.108Tofurtherelaborate,Reidsays,
MrHUMEadoptsLOCKE’Saccountoftheoriginofourideas,109andfromthatprincipleinfers,thatwehavenoideaofsubstance,corporealorspiritual,noideaofpower,nootherideaofcause,butthatitissomethingantecedent,andconstantlyconjoinedtothatwhichwecallitseffect;and,inaword,thatwecanhavenoideaofanythingbutoursensations,andtheoperationsofmindweareconsciousof.110
Again,ReidsaysthatHumenegativelyassertsthatwehavenoideaofsubstance
(thisalsomeansthatwehavenodirectideaoftheexternalworld).Reidalsosays
thatHumeassertsthatallwecanhaveideasof,knowledgeof,are“oursensations,
andtheoperationsofmindweareconsciousof”—thiswouldmeanthatourideas
aremind-dependent.Thecombinationofnothavinganyideaofexternalsubstance
andallourideasbeingmind-dependentmakesReid’sinterpretationofHume’s
philosophyananti-realistinterpretation.
RobertJ.FogelinarticulatesaninterpretationofHumeasatruescepticinhis
paper“TheSkepticsAreComing!TheSkepticsAreComing!”,
Hume,whomItaketobeanurbanePyrrhonian[ModeratePyrrhonianSceptic],explicitlymakesthismove[toshowthatthedogmatists’program,suchasAcademicScepticism,“actuallygeneratesaradicalskepticismratherthanavoidsit”]intheTreatisewhenhetellsus:“Itisimpossible,uponanysystem,todefendeitherourunderstandingorsenses;andwebutexposethemfurtherwhenweendeavourtojustifytheminthatmanner.Asthescepticaldoubtarisesnaturallyfromaprofoundandintensereflectiononthosesubjects,it
107ThomasReid,EssaysontheIntellectualPowersofMan(Edinburgh:PrintedforJohnBell,ParliamentSquare,andG.G.J.&J.Robinson,London,1785),187.108ReidisalsotakingissuewithHume’stheoryofmindinthepreviousquote,butIamfocusingonReid’sinterpretationofHume’stheoryofperceptionandmetaphysics.109ReidsaysinthepreviousparagraphthattheoriginofideasforLockeissensationandreflection.110Reid,EssaysontheIntellectualPowersofMan,189.
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alwaysincreasesthefurtherwecarryourreflections,whetherinoppositionorconformitytoit.”SinceHumeheldarustic111interpretationofancientPyrrhonism,hedistancedhimselffromitinthesewords:“ButaPyrrhoniancannotexpect,thathisphilosophywillhaveanyconstantinfluenceonthemind:orifithad,thatitsinfluencewouldbebeneficialtosociety.Onthecontrary,hemustacknowledge,ifhewillacknowledgeanything,thatallhumanlifemustperish,werehisprinciplesuniversallyandsteadilytoprevail.Alldiscourse,allactionwouldimmediatelycease;andmenremaininatotallethargy,tillthenecessitiesofnature,unsatisfied,putanendtotheirmiserableexistence.”Takingitasrustic,Humerecommendsaphilosophicaltoniccontaining“onlyasmalltinctureofPyrrhonism.”IfhehadinterpretedPyrrhonismasurbane,hecouldhavecounseledafullquaffoftherealstuff.112
Fogelin’sinterpretationofHume’sphilosophyintheabovequoteunderstandsHume
asmitigated,ormoderate,PyrrhonianSceptic—thekindthatassentsto
appearances,butremainsagnosticaboutthemetaphysicalstatusoffacts,objects,
etc.,intheexternal,Realworld.HumeisnotaradicalPyrrhonianSceptic,according
toFogelin,anditispreciselyradicalPyrrhonianScepticismthatHumespeaks
against.But,tobeaPyrrhonianSceptic,Humeneednotberadicalinhisviews.He
canacceptamitigatedPyrrhonianScepticism,orModeratePyrrhonianScepticism,
andstillbeatruesceptic(intheAncientGreekunderstandingofscepticismas
withholdingjudgement,epochē).
1.9.AnInterpretationofHume’sPhilosophy
IdothinkthatHume’sscepticismandnaturalismarecohesive,113andthathis
moralphilosophyisalsocohesive.Notonlythat,butthatHume’sphilosophyis
cohesiveacrosshisscepticism,naturalism,andmoralphilosophy.Inthissection,I111“Treatedasrustic,thePyrrhonistispicturedassettingasidesubtletyandflatfootedlyseekingsuspensionofbeliefonallmatterswhatsoever,includingthepracticalbeliefsconcerningeverydaylife.”RobertJ.Fogelin,“TheSkepticsAreComing!TheSkepticsAreComing!,”inPyrrhonianSkepticism,ed.WalterSinnott-Armstrong(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2004),163.112Ibid,164.113BycohesiveImeanconsistentandmutuallysupporting,andnotresultinginacontradictionorincompatibility.
45
willbeprimarilyusingsecondarysupportfromDonGarretttohelpshowthatthese
componentsofHume’sphilosophyarecohesive.IwillfirstlookatapaperbyDon
Garrettcalled“‘ASmallTinctureofPyrrhonism’:SkepticismandNaturalismin
Hume’sScienceofMan”(withsomereferencetoRobertJ.Fogelin’spaper“The
SkepticsAreComing!TheSkepticsAreComing!”)beforeturningtoChapter9:
“MoralEvaluation”inGarrett’sbookCognitionandCommitmentinHume’s
Philosophy.Afterconsidering“‘ASmallTinctureofPyrrhonism’:Skepticismand
NaturalisminHume’sScienceofMan”and“MoralEvaluation”,Iwillshowthe
connectionsbetweenthemwiththegoalbeingtodemonstratethatHume’s
philosophyiscohesiveacrosshisscepticism,naturalism,andmoralphilosophy.
InthefirstpaperIreferredto,Garrettsays—attheveryendofhis
introduction—”Hume’snaturalismandhisskepticismaremutuallysupporting.”114
ItishisgoalinthispapertoshowthatHume’snaturalismandscepticismarenot
inconsistent.Garrett’salternativegoalistoshowthatyoudonothavetosupport
oneattheexpenseoftheother—forexample,youdonothavetoholdthatHumeis
actuallyanaturalistattheexpenseofhisscepticism;bothnaturalismandscepticism
canholdsimultaneously.115Afterhisintroduction,Garrettexplainsaclassification
systemofscepticism.UsingRobertJ.Fogelin’sclassificationofscepticismtostart
114DonGarrett,“‘ASmallTinctureofPyrrhonism’:SkepticismandNaturalisminHume’sScienceofMan,”inPyrrhonianSkepticism,ed.WalterSinnott-Armstrong(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2004),69.115OnceitisestablishedthatHume’sscepticismandnaturalismarecohesive,Iwillthenshowthathisscepticismandnaturalismarealsoconsistentwithhismoralphilosophy.IstartwithsupportingHume’sscepticismandnaturalismfirst,becausetheyinformhismoralphilosophy.
46
with,Garrettdiscusses“sixdifferentdimensions”thatscepticismcanbebroken
downinto:domain,character,object,origin,degree,andpersistence.116
GarrettdefinesFogelin’s“sixdifferentdimensions”ofscepticismasfollows.
OfdomainGarrettsays,
[T]hesetsofpropositionstowardwhich[varietiesofskepticism]aredirected.Thedomainofagiveninstanceofskepticismmaybeeithergeneralorlimited.Generalskepticismconcernsallpropositionswhatsoever;limitedskepticismisdirectedonlytowardpropositionsofaparticularsubjectmatterorotherkind.117
Garretdefinescharacter,ashesaysFogelindefinesit,bysplittingitintothree
subcategories,
[Character]maybetheoretical,prescriptive,orpracticing.Theoreticalskeptic-ismisapositivestancetowardtheviewthatthatthereisalackof“rationalgrounds,warrant,orjustification”forassentingtothepropositionsofaspecifieddomain.Prescriptiveskepticismisapositivestancetowardstheviewthatoneoughtnottoassent—typicallyissuinginarecommendationtoresistorrefrainfromassent—tothepropositionsofaspecifieddomain.Practicingskepticismisastanceofactualdoubting,orrefrainingfromassentto,thepropositionsofaspecifieddomain.118
Hethensaysthatobjectcan“beeitherepistemologicalorconceptual,”
[E]pistemologicalskepticismdoesnotconcerntheintelligibilityofadomainofpropositionsbutonlythebasisforassentingtopropositionswithinit,whereasconceptualskepticismconcernstheveryintelligibilityofadomainofpropositions.119
Afterobject,Garrettsaysthatoriginis“eitherantecedentorconsequent,”
ThedistinctionbetweenantecedentandconsequentskepticismisoneoftwodistinctionsthatHumehimselfdrawsandemphasizesinsection12ofAnEnquiryConcerningHumanUnderstanding.AsHumeexplainsit,theformeris“aspeciesofscepticism,antecedenttoallstudyandphilosophy,which…recommendsanuniversaldoubt,notonlyofallourformeropinionsandprinciples,butalsoofourveryfaculties”(EHU12.3).Hecontraststhiswith
116Garrett,“‘ASmallTinctureofPyrrhonism’:SkepticismandNaturalisminHume’sScienceofMan,”69.117Ibid,69-70.118Ibid,70.119Ibid,71.
47
“anotherspeciesofskepticism,consequenttoscienceandenquiry,whenmenaresupposedtohavediscoveredeithertheabsolutefallaciousnessoftheirmentalfacultiesortheirunfitnesstoreachanyfixeddeterminationinallthosecurioussubjectsofspeculation,aboutwhichtheyarecommonlyemployed”(EHU12.5).120
Thesecondtolastdimension,ordifferentiation,isdegree.Degreecan“beeither
unmitigatedormitigated,”
Forexample,anunmitigatedtheoreticalskepticismaboutadomainembodiestheviewthatassenttoanypropositionwithinitisutterlywithoutrationalground,warrant,orjustification;amitigatedtheoreticalskepticismembodiesonlytheviewthattherationalground,warrant,orjustificationofassenttosuchpropositionsislimited,orminimal,orlessthangenerallysupposed,orlessthandesirable,orotherwisefallsbelowsomespecifiedorimpliedstandard.121
And,finally,GarrattsaysofFogelin’sdimensionofpersistence,
[T]hepersistenceofskepticismmaybeeitherconstantorvariable.Itisconstantiftheskepticmaintainsthesamedegreeofskepticismthroughtimeandreflection;itisvariableifthedegreeofskepticismincreasesordecreaseswithchangesintheskeptic’sperspectiveorfocusofattention.122
Garrettusesthese“sixdifferentdimensions”todissectHume’sscepticismin
ordertoclassifyit(viahowheunderstandsHume’sscepticism).Though,Garrettis
notcompletelysatisfiedwithFogelin’sinitialsixdifferentiations,andtothemhe
figuresintwomoreformsofscepticismthataremeanttoreplacewhatFogelincalls
“theoreticalskepticism”—whichfallsunderthecharacterdimensionofscepticism.
Thesetwonewdifferentiationsare“rationalsupportskepticism”and“epistemic
meritskepticism”.123Garrettdefines“rationalsupportskepticism”as“theviewthat
assenttopropositionsinagivendomainwilllackrationalsupport.”124,125And,
120Ibid.121Ibid,71-72.122Ibid,72-73.123Ibid,80.124Garrettsaysthat“[a]beliefhasrationalsupportifandonlyifithasepistemicmeritbecauseofthemannerinwhichitisproducedbyreason.”And,“[a]beliefis
48
“epistemicmeritskepticism[…]istheviewthatassenttopropositionsinagiven
domainwilllackepistemicmerit.”126,127
Hereplacestheoreticalscepticismwithhisdistinctionbetweenthesetwo
newcategoriesinanefforttosupporthisconclusion.Garrettconcludesattheendof
“‘ASmallTinctureofPyrrhonism’”,
Thus,naturalismleadsnaturallytoacrisisofunmitigatedpracticingscepticaldoubt,andthepsychologicaldefeatofthatunmitigatedpracticingdoubtincorporatestheadoptionoftheonlyprincipleofepistemicmeritthatcannowsustainareturntonaturalism.Thisreturntonaturalismcanoccur,however,onlyinconjunctionwithaprescriptiveandepistemicmeritskepticismthatisbothconstantandgeneral—butmitigated.128
Leadinguptotheabovequote,Garrettwrites,“Hume’sprocedureisnaturalistic
fromthestart[…][and]amitigatedandlimitedendorsementof[Hume’s]own
relianceonreasonandthesenses,anendorsementthatcanwithstandhis
awarenessofthemanylimitationsofhumancognitivenature[is]discovered.”129
Though,this“mitigatedandlimitedendorsement”isqualifiedbythelimitednature
ofhumancognition,whichnaturallyleadstodoubt(bywhichImeanscepticism).
Interestingly,Humedoesnotidentifyhimselfasamoderateormitigated
PyrrhonianScepticasGarrett’sdiagnosisofHume’sscepticismas“aprescriptive
andepistemicmeritscepticismthatisbothconstantandgeneral—butmitigated”
producedbyreasonifandonlyifitresultsfromanoperationoftheinferentialfaculty[theabilityforrationalinference].”Ibid.125Ibid.126Garrettsaysthat“[a]beliefhasepistemicmeritifandonlyifitdeservesorisworthyofbelieforassent.”Ibid.127Ibid.128Ibid,90.129Ibid.
49
wouldimplythatHumewas.Though,GarrettandFogelinbothagreethatHume
maynothavehadextensiveknowledgeinancientformsofscepticism.Garretsays,
Humerecognizestwoancientscepticalschools:PyrrhonianskepticismandAcademicskepticism.AsJuliaAnnashasrecentlyargued,Humedoesnotexhibit,andevidentlydidnotpossess,deephistoricalknowledgeofthesetwoschools.130
So,whileHumeknewthatthereweretwoAncientGreekschoolsofscepticism,he
didnotknowthedifferentiatingfactorsbetweenthem.
AsFogelinemphasizesinhispaper“TheSkepticsAreComing!TheSkeptics
AreComing!”,
Hume,whomItaketobeanurbanePyrrhonian[ModeratePyrrhonianSceptic],explicitlymakesthismove[toshowthatthedogmatists’program,suchasAcademicScepticism,“actuallygeneratesaradicalskepticismratherthanavoidsit”]intheTreatisewhenhetellsus:“Itisimpossible,uponanysystem,todefendeitherourunderstandingorsenses;andwebutexposethemfurtherwhenweendeavourtojustifytheminthatmanner.Asthescepticaldoubtarisesnaturallyfromaprofoundandintensereflectiononthosesubjects,italwaysincreasesthefurtherwecarryourreflections,whetherinoppositionorconformitytoit.”SinceHumeheldarustic131interpretationofancientPyrrhonism,hedistancedhimselffromitinthesewords:“ButaPyrrhoniancannotexpect,thathisphilosophywillhaveanyconstantinfluenceonthemind:orifithad,thatitsinfluencewouldbebeneficialtosociety.Onthecontrary,hemustacknowledge,ifhewillacknowledgeanything,thatallhumanlifemustparish,werehisprinciplesuniversallyandsteadilytoprevail.Alldiscourse,allactionwouldimmediatelycease;andmenremaininatotallethargy,tillthenecessitiesofnature,unsatisfied,putanendtotheirmiserableexistence.”Takingitasrustic,Humerecommendsaphilosophicaltoniccontaining“onlyasmalltinctureofPyrrhonism.”IfhehadinterpretedPyrrhonismasurbane,hecouldhavecounseledafullquaffoftherealstuff.132
130Ibid,77.131“Treatedasrustic,thePyrrhonistispicturedassettingasidesubtletyandflatfootedlyseekingsuspensionofbeliefonallmatterswhatsoever,includingthepracticalbeliefsconcerningeverydaylife.”RobertJ.Fogelin,“TheSkepticsAreComing!TheSkepticsAreComing!,”inPyrrhonianSkepticism,ed.WalterSinnott-Armstrong(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2004),163.132Ibid,164.
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Hume’sapprehensionofPyrrhonismcomesdowntohimnothavingathorough
understandingofAncientScepticism,and,though,hedeniesbeingaPyrrhonian,he
isaModeratePyrrhonianSceptic.And,ModeratePyrrhonianScepticismis
compatiblewithHume’s“scienceofman”(naturalism).133Iinviteyoutothinkback
toGarrett’sargumentthatHume’sscepticismandnaturalismarecompatibleatthis
point.
Garrettarticulates—inmorewordsthannecessary—thatHumeespousesa
kindofmitigated,ormoderate,formofPyrrhonianScepticism.And,thismitigated
Pyrrhonismiscompatiblewith“[t]henaturalisticcognitiveandconativepsychology
thatconstituteswhatHumecalls“thescienceofman”,because“thescienceofman”
isaninvestigationoftheoperationsofhumanfaculties,whichfacultiesinclude(amongothers)imagination,memory,thesenses,thepassions,themoralsense—andreason.ItisoftenclaimedthatHumeusestheterm“reason”inmanydifferentsenses.Infact,however,heconsistentlyusesitinasinglesense—asatermincognitivepsychologydesignatingthefacultyofmakinginferencesandengaginginargument.134
Hume’sscepticismandnaturalismareinterconnected,andreliantoneachother.
ThisgivesHumetheaddedbonusthathisscepticismdoesnoteliminatereason(or
rationalinference)duetohisnaturalism(whichentailsthecognitivepsychologyof
humans).135
133Hume’s“scienceofman”(naturalism)canbedefinedjustas“theprogramofprovidingcausalexplanationsformentalandotherphenomena.”Garrett,“ASmallTinctureofPyrrhonism,”68.134Ibid,79.135Thecognitivepsychologyofhumansisthementalabilityofhumanstohaveaccesstocertainknowledge.ThisharkensbacktotheCarnapianunderstandingofinternalinthatwecanonlyaskcertainkindsofquestionsbecauseweonlyhaveaccesstocertainkindsofanswers—inthecaseofhumans,wecanonlyhaveaccesstointernalquestionsandcanonlygiveinternalanswers.
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Hume’sscepticismandnaturalismareinterconnected,butwhatabouthis
moralphilosophy?Atthisstageinthesection,Ithinkitwouldbeagoodideato
switchovertoChapter9:“MoralEvaluations”inDonGarrett’sbookCognitionand
CommitmentinHume’sPhilosophy.Garrettstartsthechapterbydistinguishingbe-
tweentwocompetinginterpretationsofHume’smoralphilosophy(focusingon
moralevaluations).Oneinterpretation,Garrettcalls“nonpropositionaltheories”,
andtheotherinterpretationhecalls“propositionaltheories”.136,137Ofthe
nonpropositionalandpropositionaldistinction,Garrettwrites,
[The]questioniswhethermoralevaluationsdoordonotaffirmgenuinepropositions—thatis,dotheymakeassertionsthataresusceptibleoftruthorfalse-hoodandthatcouldthereforeprovidetheobjectsofgenuinebeliefs?138
Nonpropositionaltheoriesassert,insomeway,thatmoralevaluationsdonotaffirm
thetruthorfalsityofmoralpropositions,whilepropositionaltheoriesassertthat
moralevaluationsdoaffirmthetruthorfalsityofmoralpropositions.
Hume’sposition,withinhismoralphilosophy,hasbeeninterpretedaseither
nonpropositionalorpropositional,orseenasinconsistent(inthathe,onthesurface,
seemstocontradicthimself).ThecontradictionthatHumegetsaccusedofisthat
“thefirstsectionofBookIIIoftheTreatise[isdevoted]toestablishingthat‘moral
distinctions(are)notderiv’dfromreason,’”139while“inTreatiseIII.iii.1(“Ofthe
originofthenaturalvirtuesandvices”),Humedescribesvariouswaysinwhichwe
136DonGarrett,CognitionandCommitmentinHume’sPhilosophy(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1997),188.137Garrett’s“nonpropositional”vs.“propositional”distinctionsoundsquitesimilartothenoncognitivevs.cognitivedistinctionmorebroadlyintherealismvs.anti-realismdebate.138Garrett,CognitionandCommitmentinHume’sPhilosophy,188.139Ibid,187.
52
‘correct’ourmoralsentimentsbyreflection”140(whichseemstoimplythatmoral
distinctionscouldbederivedfromreason).TherolethisplaysinGarrett’schapteris
thatHumesometimesappearstobetakinganonpropositionalpositiontowards
moraldistinctions,andsometimesHumeappearstobetakingapropositionalposit-
iontowardsmoraldistinctions(inthecontextofmoralevaluation).Garrett
concludesthatHume’stheoryisbothnonpropositionalandpropositional,andthatit
isnotcontradictoryforHumetoholdboththeseseeminglycontradictorypositions.
GarrettclarifieswhatHumemeans“[…]whenHumedeniesthatmoral
distinctionsarederivedfromreason,”infirstsayingthatHume“doesnotusethe
term‘reason’inavagueormerelyhonorificsense”:
Rather,[Hume]usesitasatechnicalterminhiscognitivepsychology.Itis,hereaselsewherethroughouthiswritings,thetermthatspecificallydesignatesthefacultyofmakinginferences.Heisnot,therefore,askingwhethermoraldistinctionsarewarrantedorjustifiable;instead,heisaskingwhethertheiroccurrencecanbeexplainedasaproductofinferenceoperatingonrepresentationsoftheobjectsofevaluation,orwhetherwemustinsteadrecognizetheoccurrenceofsomespecificallymoralnoninferentialelement.141
Therefore,accordingtoGarrett,Hume’sunderstandingofreason“designatesthe
facultyofmakinginferences.”ForHume,reasonisnotjustavaguerationalfaculty.
Thisisimportant,becauseinferencetiesbacktoHume’smetaphysics(especiallyhis
scepticismandnaturalism).Followingthisfirstclarification,Garrettmakesasecond
clarification,
Hume’sargumentsaredirectedtowardansweringthegeneralquestionofwhethertheoriginofthecapacitytomakemoraldistinctionsdependsonlyonreasonoronsomethingelse(suchasdistinctivelymoralimpressions).Heisnotaddressingthemoreparticularquestionofwhetherornotsomeonewho
140Ibid,190.141Ibid,193.
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alreadyhasthiscapacity,basedpartlyonhisorhernoninferentialendowments,couldinferthecorrectnessofamoralevaluation.142
ThesecondclarificationisaimedatshowingthatHumeisaddressingwhetherthe
source,ororigin,“ofthecapacitytomakemoraldistinctions”reliessolelyonthis
inferentialreasoning,orifthesourcecouldpossiblyrelyonsomethingelse(i.e.what
Garrettcallsmoralimpressions;Humealsousestheterm‘sentiment’).
And,asGarrettalsoremarksintheabovequote,Humeisnotaddressing
whethersomeonewhohasinferentialrationalendowments(partlybasedonmoral
impressions/sentiments)couldmakeamoralevaluationabouttherightnessor
wrongnessofamoralproposition,etc..Humeisconcernedwiththeoriginofthe
moralevaluation,notwhetherrationalanimalscanassesstherightnessor
wrongness(i.e.correctness)ofamoralproposition(moralfact,act,etc.).What
spursthemoralevaluationtobe‘moral’?AfterHumearticulateswhathethinksis
theoriginofmoralevaluation,hecanthengoontoarticulateafurther,more
developedunderstandingofmoralevaluation(whichincludesreflectionand
inferentialreasoning).
ForHume,theoriginofmoraldistinctionismoralimpression/sentiment.As
Garrettsays,“Humeinsiststhattofeelamoralsentimentisitselfamoralevaluation
andthemakingofamoraldistinction(e.g.,atTHN471).”143But,thekeyastowhy
Humeisnotcontradictinghimself,assomeinterpretersmistakenlythink,liesin
Hume’smovementfrommoralsentimenttoreason.Garrettexplainsthismoveas
follows,
142Ibid.143Ibid,196.
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Oncewehavefunctioningabstractideasofvice,virtue,andtheirvariousdegreesandspecies,wecanformulatepropositionaljudgmentsorbeliefstotheeffectthataparticularpersonisvirtuous,orthataparticularmentalcharacteristicisespeciallyvicious,orthatanactionoughttobedone.[…]Althoughsuchjudgmentsarepropositionalincharacter,theyareneverthelessdependentontheexistenceofmoralfeelings[i.e.sentiments]intwoways.First,themostcommonwayofmakingsuchajudgmentinvolves,asapreliminary,imaginativelytakingupasteadyandgeneralpointofview,soastohavemoralfeelingsasaresultofthesympatheticreactionsthatareelicited.Second,andevenmorefundamentally,nopersoncouldhavethenecessaryabstractmoralideasinthefirstplaceunlessthatpersonhadpreviouslyhadmoralsentimentsfromwhichsuchabstractideascouldhavedeveloped.Moreover,itismoralfeelings,notthemoraljudgmentsthatresultfromthem,thataredirectlyandindependentlymotivating.144
Wefirsthavemoralsentimentbeforewecanhavemoraljudgmentsthatare
propositionalinnature(andthereforebasedoninference—andrational).Thisis
whyHumesays,asGarrettquoteshim,“moraldistinctions(are)notderiv’dfrom
reason.”145Moraldistinctionsarenotderivedfromreason;theyarederivedfrom
moralsentiment.But,thisdoesnotmeanthatmoraldistinctionscannotbecome
propositional,basedoninferentialreasoningforHume,oncetheinitialmoral
sentimentsarefelt.InordertoknowsomethingforHume,wemustexperienceit
first,andpreferablymultipletimesbeforewecanformamoreabstractideaofit.
Oncewehaveamoreabstract,orgeneral,ideaofwhatwehaveexperienceof,we
canthenreflectonitmakingitpropositionalandrational.146ForGarrett,thismeans
144Ibid,197-198.145Hume,Treatise,III.i.1.146Apotentialproblemcouldarisehere,butIcannotgointogreatdetailinexplainingoransweringtheproblemduetotimeandspaceconstraints.Theproblemisthis:itcouldbesaidthatapropositionthatonlyreportsone’sownsentiment(basedonone’sownexperiences)isnotamoralproposition,becauseitdoesnotreportwhatisrightorwronginanuniversallyapplicableway.Aquickanswer:theissuewiththisproblemisthatitignorespartofwhatHumewastryingtosay.Ourexperienceofsentimentisonlypartofthemoralpropositionstory.Itbeginswithsentiment,butafterthesentimentwecanthenreflectonthatsentimentinordertoweighwhetheritisrightorwrong.
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that“Humerecognizesbothnonpropositionalmoralevaluations(moralfeelings)
andpropositionalmoralevaluations(moraljudgmentsasdistinctpsychological
events.”147Nonpropositionalmoralfeelings(i.e.sentiments)donotconflictwith
propositionalmoraljudgements,forHume,becausewemustfirsthavethemoral
feelingbeforewecanhavethemoraljudgement(theyareinterconnectedrather
thancontradictory).
AfterechoingGarrett’swordsthatHume’sscepticismandnaturalism
“aremutuallysupporting”;IwouldaddthatHume’sscepticism,naturalism,and
moralphilosophyareallmutuallysupportingandcohesive.Hume’smoral
philosophyisbasedincognitivepsychology,asGarrettsays,whichrelatesbackto
Hume’s“scienceofman”(i.e.naturalism)andHume’sdesiretounderstandwhat
makeshumans‘human’.Hume’snaturalisticapproachisthatof,whatwewouldcall
inmorecontemporarytimes,anaturalscientistandpsychologist.Hisgoalwasto
lookforthesourceofknowledge,andthesourceofmorality.But,interestingly,
Hume’ssinceritytowardsnaturalism(or,perhaps,moreaccurately,akindof
scientificmethod)makeshimacknowledgethelimitsofhumanknowledge,and
doubtoccursintherealmsthatsurpasswhatisimmediatelyknowablethrough
experience.Thismakesdoubtnatural.But,thisdoesnotmeanthatthekindof
doubtthatDescarteswasfamousfor,suchastheMethodofDoubt(Academic
Scepticism),isnatural.Naturaldoubt,forHume,isthesuspensionofbeliefdueto
thelimitsofhumancognitiveabilities(or,asGarrettreferstoit,cognitive
psychology).
147Garrett,CognitionandCommitmentinHume’sPhilosophy,199.
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Naturaldoubt,orthesuspensionofbelief,orPyrrhonianScepticismdoesnot
meanthatwecannotliveourlives—thiswouldentailamuchmoreradicalformof
scepticism.Itmeansthatwemustacceptappearancesduetothelimitednatureof
humancognition.We(humans)shouldsuspendbeliefwhenitcomestomattersthat
gobeyondourlimitedcognitiveabilities;butthisdoesnotmeanthatwecannot
makejudgements,haveknowledge,ormakemoralevaluationsbasedon
appearances.Itonlymeansthatinoursearchforthesourcesofsuchthingsas
knowledgeandmorality,forexample,wemustkeepinmindthatwearelimitedto
humanabilities(andcannotknowanythingbeyondhumanabilities).Hume’s
philosophyboilsdownto:naturalismasthemethod,knowledgeandmoralityasthe
result,andscepticismasasideeffectduetothelimitsofhumancognitiveability.
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2.Chapter2.1.Introduction TherearemanydifferentinterpretationsofHume’sphilosophy.Hehasbeen
interpretedasarealist,ananti-realist,andascepticineffortstoexplainhis
metaphysics,andreconcileitwithhisnaturalismandmoralphilosophy.148Different
approacheshavealsobeenused:fromacceptingthatthereare‘twoHumes’to
effortstoreconcilehisphilosophyascohesivetoacceptingthathisphilosophyisnot
cohesive.149ManyaspectsofHume’sphilosophyarehotlydebatedstill,242years
afterhisdeath.Itwillbemyeffortinthispapertojointhedebatesurrounding
Hume’sphilosophyinanefforttobetterunderstandHume’sphilosophyasa
cohesivewhole.InordertobetterunderstandHume’sphilosophyasacohesive
whole,Iwillneedtoaddresshismetaphysics,naturalism,andhismoralphilosophy.
IwillbeginbysupportinganunderstandingofHumeasascepticthrough
usinghiswritingsinATreatiseofHumanNature(2.2.)andAnEnquiryconcerning
HumanUnderstanding(2.3.)assupport.Afterwhich,IwilltouchonHume’sposition
concerningmoralfacts(2.4.).IwillthenmakesomequalificationsonHume’smoral
philosophy(2.5.),whichwillhelpsupportHumeanScepticismasanalternativein
themoralrealismandmoralanti-realismdebate(2.6.).Finally,Iwillventuresome
thoughtsonotherpotentialimplicationsHumeanScepticism,giventhatitisan
148Humehasbeeninterpretedasarealist,ananti-realist,andascepticwithregardtohisviewsoncausation,theexternalworld,theself,andmoralfacts.149JaniHakkarainendiscussesthisbrieflyinhispaper“Hume’sScepticismandRealism”.JaniHakkarainen,“Hume’sScepticismandRealism,”BritishJournalfortheHistoryofPhilosophy20,no.2(2012):283–309.
58
alternativeinthemoralrealismandmoralanti-realismdebate,mayhavefor
metaethicsingeneral(2.7.).
2.2.HumeanScepticisminATreatiseofHumanNature
IwillstartoffbyconsideringHume’spositiononscepticismwithregardto
theexternalworld.Therearemanywaysinwhichsomeonecanbeasceptic;they
donothavetobeaglobal,orradical,sceptic.But,Ithinkthatthefoundationformy
interpretationofHume’sscepticismstartswithhisscepticismoftheexternalworld,
andmovesforwardfromthere.Scepticismwithregardtotheexternalworldisthe
foundationformyinterpretationofHume’sscepticismforonemainreason:it
providesahelpfulframeworkforthinkingaboutscepticismasanalternativeinthe
realismandanti-realismdebate.
InHume’sinfamousBookI“OftheUnderstanding”inATreatiseofHuman
Nature,hesaysinPart4“Ofthescepticalandothersystemsofphilosophy”,Section
2“Ofscepticismwithregardtothesenses”;
[T]hescepticstillcontinuestoreasonandbelieve,eventho’heasserts,thathecannotdefendhisreasonbyreason;andbythesamerulehemustassenttotheprincipleconcerningtheexistenceofbody,tho’hecannotpretendbyanyargumentsofphilosophytomaintainitsveracity.Naturehasnotleftthistohischoice,andhasdoubtlessesteem’ditanaffairoftoogreatimportancetobetrustedtoouruncertainreasoningsandspeculations.150
Humeisaddressingscepticismwithregardtotheexternalworldinthisquote.In
myreadingoftheabovequote,Iunderstandwhatisbeingarticulatedtobeaformof
ModeratePyrrhonianScepticism.151WhileHumedoessaythatthesceptic“must
150DavidHume,ATreatiseofHumanNature,eds.DavidFateNortonandMaryJ.Norton(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),1.4.2.1(p.125).151Isay“ModeratePyrrhonianScepticism”here,thoughthiswouldjustfallunderwhatSextusEmpiricuscalls“PyrrhonianScepticism”.Iusetheword“Moderate”
59
assenttotheprincipleconcerningtheexistenceofbody,”hequalifiesthisstatement
whenhesays,“tho’[thesceptic]cannotpretendbyanyargumentsofphilosophyto
maintainitsveracity.”Thescepticcannothelpbutgiveintotheappearanceofbody,
“Naturehasnotleftthisto[thesceptic’s]choice,”butthatdoesnotmeanthatthe
scepticcangiveanargumentfortheexistenceofbody(ortheReal152world).153A
ModeratePyrrhonianScepticcangiveintoappearances,solongasthey
acknowledgethattheyarejustappearancesandremainagnosticwithregardtoany
argumentfororagainsttheseappearances—since,accordingtoHume,our
“reasoningsandspeculations”concerningthissubjectareuncertain.
deliberatelyinordertodistinguishthescepticismIamreferringtofromthemoreradicalPyrrhonianScepticismofPyrrhohimself.Pyrrho,accordingtoanecdote,didnotgiveintoappearances,whichresultedinhisfollowershavingtolookafterhimsothathedidn’tdie.ThisisnotthePyrrhonianScepticismIamreferringto.Iamreferringtotheagnostic,suspensionofjudgement(epochē)kindofscepticismstartedbyPyrrho,butamoremoderateformthatacknowledgesthatonemustgiveintoappearancestolivetheirlife.152WhenIusethewordRealwithacapital“R”,Imeanmind-independentlyrealintheontologicalsense(i.e.thatsomethingexistsintheexternalworld,andisnotconstructedbymentalstatesorisnotmind-dependent).153AccordingtoHume,thescepticcannotgiveaphilosophicalargumentfortheir“assenttotheprincipleconcerningtheexistenceofbody,”thoughthisdoesnotexplicitlymeanthatthescepticmustgiveintotheappearanceoftheexternalworld.Itmeansthatwhatwenaturallygiveintoistheidea,orprinciple,oftheexternalworld(i.e.“theexistenceofbody”),thisidea,orprinciple,issomethingthatwecannothelpbutbelieving—eventhoughwecannotprovideanyphilosophical,orrational,argumentforourbelievingintheexternalworld.Itendsupbeingthecasethatthescepticgivesintoappearances,becausewhentheyreflect,orphilosophize,theybecomeawarethattheycannotgiveanargumentforwhytheythinkthattheexternalworldexists.Oncetheyhavethisrealization,theyacknowledgethatwhattheycanknowisonlythattheyhaveideas,orperceptions,oftheexternalworld,andwhattheycando,whiletheycannotgiveanargumentasforwhy,isassent(orgiveinto)theseideasorperceptions(otherwisecanbecalledappearances).
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InsupportofmyunderstandingofwhatHumesaysinthepreviousquote,we
cangobacktoBookI,Part2,Section6ofATreatiseofHumanNature(theTreatise
fromhereon),
Alikereasoningwillaccountfortheideaofexternalexistence.Wemayobserve,that’tisuniversallyallow’dbyphilosophers,andisbesidesprettyobviousofitself,thatnothingiseverreallypresentwiththemindbutitsperceptionsorimpressionsandideas,andthatexternalobjectsbecomeknowntousonlybythoseperceptionstheyoccasion.Tohate,tolove,tothink,tofeel,tosee;allisnothingbuttoperceive.Nowsincenothingiseverpresenttothemindbutperceptions,andsinceall
ideasarederiv’dfromsomethingantecedentlypresenttothemind;itfollows,that’tisimpossibleforussomuchastoconceiveorformanideaofanythingspecificallydifferentfromideasandimpressions.Letusfixourattentionoutofourselvesasmuchaspossible:Letuschaceourimaginationtotheheavens,ortotheutmostlimitsoftheuniverse;weneverreallyadvanceastepbeyondourselves,norcanconceiveanykindofexistence,butthoseperceptions,whichhaveappear’dinthatnarrowcompass.154
“Perception”canbereplaced,insomeinstances,bywhatIhavebeencalling
“appearance”tobetterunderstandtheconnectionbetweentheabovequoteandmy
descriptionofthepreviousquote.155Humestatesthatallwehaveaccessto
(“presentwiththemind”)areourperceptions,impressions,and/orideas—Iwillput
theseallundertheumbrellaoftheword“appearances”,anduse“appearances”and
“perceptions”interchangeably.156,157Therefore,ifallwehaveaccesstoareour
perceptions(appearances),theneverythingweexperienceisnothingbutperception154DavidHume,ATreatiseofHumanNature,eds.DavidFateNortonandMaryJ.Norton(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),1.2.6.7-8(p.49).155Theterm“perception”isanumbrellatermforHumethatincludesawiderangeofmentalphenomena.Theterm“appearance”isoftenmorestrictlyusedtojustrepresentphysicalobjects(forexample,torepresentinformationgainedviathesenses,sensoryimpressions).156MentalideasandimpressionsareperceptionsforHume;justasanythingperceivedviathesensesareperceptions.157“Appearances”areoftenassociatedwithsenseimpressions(perceptionsgainedviathesenses),though“appearances”canbeusedmorebroadlytohavethesamemeaningasHume’sunderstandingof“perceptions”(andareusedmorebroadlyinthecontextofAncientorPyrrhonianScepticism).
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(whetherourperceptionsbeoftheReal/externalworldorofourownemotions/
affects/thoughts/ideas).
Interestingly,partoftheabovequote,
Nowsincenothingiseverpresenttothemindbutperceptions,andsinceallideasarederiv’dfromsomethingantecedentlypresenttothemind;itfollows,that’tisimpossibleforussomuchastoconceiveorformanideaofanythingspecificallydifferentfromideasandimpressions,158
expressesadirectattackonrealism.Hume’sconclusionfromonlyperceptions
being“presenttothemind”,andsomethingcomesfromsomethingbeforeit,is
thatwecannoteventhinkofanythingexternal,ordifferent,fromthemind
(perceptions,orappearances).Wecanonlythinkofperceptions,becausewe
onlyhaveaccesstoperceptions.Thisisanattackonrealism,becausethereis
nowayforustohaveaccesstoanythingmind-independent.Forexample,the
chairthatIperceivemyselftobesittinginis,andcanonlybe,knowntome
throughmyperceptionsofit.Thereisnowayformetohaveknowledgeofthe
chairoutsideofmyownperceptions.Realismrequiressomestatementabout
mind-independenceorobjectivity,but,accordingtoHume,thereisnowayfor
ustoknowanythingbeyondthemindandthatisalwaysbiasedsincethemind
consistsofourownperceptions.
Humemakestheclaimthatperceptionsarecausedbyotherperceptions(ina
kindofantecedent-consequentrelationship),and,therefore,wecannoteventhinkof
anythingotherthanperceptions(“ideasandimpressions”).Hetriestoemphasize
hispointbyimploringustothinkabouttheheavensorthefarthestreachesofthe
universe—ourthoughtsofthesethingsarejustthat,thoughts(orperceptions).This158Hume,ATreatiseofHumanNature,1.2.6.8(p.49).
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isbecause“weneverreallyadvanceastepbeyondourselves,norcanconceiveany
kindofexistence,butthoseperceptions,whichhaveappear’dinthatnarrow
compass.”159Wearestuckwithintherealmofourperceptions(ortherealmof
appearances).Duetothis,wecannothelpbutgiveintotheseperceptions/
appearancesinordertoliveourlives.But,thatdoesnotmean,asHumesaysat
1.4.2.1.,thatwecangiveanyreasoningforthoseperceptions(concerningthe
existenceoftheexternalworld)—atleastnot“byanyargumentsofphilosophy”,by
whichItakeHumetomeanexternalarguments(ormetaphysical/ontological
arguments).160Wecannotgivethesekindsofargumentsforourperceptions,be-
causewedonothaveaccesstothem(sincetheproof/justificationforthemseemsto
bebeyondourperceptions).
At1.4.2.4.,Humesays,
Thatoursensesoffernottheirimpressionsastheimagesofsomethingdistinct,orindependent,andexternal,isevident;becausetheyconveytousnothingbutasingleperception,andnevergiveustheleastintimationofanythingbeyond.Asingleperceptioncanneverproducetheideaofadoubleexistence,butbysomeinferenceeitherofreasonorimagination.Whenthemindlooksfurtherthanwhatimmediatelyappearstoit,itsconclusionscanneverbeputtotheaccountofthesenses;anditcertainlylooksfurther,whenfromasingleperceptionitinfersadoubleexistence[…].161
By“doubleexistence”,Humeisaddressingthedistinctionbetweentheperception
itselfandtheexternalobjectthattheperceptionwas,apparently,perceivedfrom.
159DavidHume,ATreatiseofHumanNature,eds.DavidFateNortonandMaryJ.Norton(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),1.2.6.8(p.49).160SeeRudolfCarnap’spaper/chapter“Empiricism,Semantics,andOntology”foradetaileddistinctionbetweeninternalandexternalquestions.RudolfCarnap,“Empiricism,Semantics,andOntology,”inMeaningandNecessity:AStudyinSemanticsandModalLogic,SecondEdition(Chicago:TheUniversityofChicagoPress,1956).161Hume,ATreatiseofHumanNature,1.4.2.4(p.126).
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Theproblembeingthatoursenseimpressions(perceptionsgainedviathesenses)
donotgiveustheexistenceofboththesenseimpressionandtheexternalobject—
senseimpressionsonlygiveussenseimpressions,wedonothaveaccesstothe
externalobjectthatwehavecometobelieveindueto“reasonorimagination”.I
interpretHumetobereferringtospecifically—whenheexpressesthatno
philosophicalargumentsfortheexternalworldcanbegiven—metaphysical
argumentsthattrytoargueforsomethingbeyondourperceptions.And,thisseems
tobeafurtherattackonrealism,aswellasanattackonanti-realism.Itattacksboth,
becausebotharedogmaticinassertingsomethingabouttheexternalworldthat
Humedoesnotthinkwehaveaccessto(becausetheirassertionsarebeyondour
perceptions).Therealistassertsthatthereissomethingbeyondourperceptions
andwecanknowit,andtheanti-realistassertsthatthereisnothingbeyondour
perceptionsandwecanknowthatthereisnothingbeyondourperceptions.
ItisalsoimportanttonotethatHumeaddressestheimpressions(i.e.
perceptions)wegainfromoursensesspecifically,
Astothoseimpressions,whicharisefromthesenses,theirultimatecauseis,inmyopinion,perfectlyinexplicablebyhumanreason,and’twillalwaysbeimpossibletodecidewithcertainty,whethertheyariseimmediatelyfromtheobject,orareproduc’dbythecreativepowerofthemind,orarederiv’dfromtheauthorofourbeing.Norissuchaquestionanywaymaterialtoourpresentpurpose.Wemaydrawinferencesfromthecoherenceofourperceptions,whethertheybetrueorfalse;whethertheyrepresentnaturejustly,orbemereillusionsofthesenses.162
ItisclearthatHumeistakinganagnostic(sceptical)stancewhenitcomestowhatis
the“ultimatecause”oftheimpressions(i.e.perceptions)wegainfromthesensesin
sayingthatthe“ultimatecause”is“inexplicablebyhumanreason”—thereisno
162Ibid,1.3.5.2(p.59).
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philosophical(metaphysical)reasonwecangivetojustifytheultimatecauseofour
perceptions(thatwegainviathesenses)beingdirectlyfromtheexternalobject
itself,createdbyourmind,orcreatedby“theauthorofourbeing”(forexample,
God).Humethentakeshispositionastepfurtherbysayingthattheultimatecause
ofourperceptionsisnotimportanttoourpresentpurposes,becausewecan“draw
inferencesfromthecoherenceofourperceptions.”And,thatitdoesnotactually
matterwhetherourperceptionsaretrueorfalse,163representtheRealworld
correctly,oraremerefigmentsofourimagination(mentalthoughts/ideas).The
import-antpointisthatwecanassenttotheseperceptions(orappearances)viathe
inferenceswemake“fromthecoherenceofourperceptions”.
Humeseemstobeingsayingthatwecanmakeinferencesviathe“coherence
ofourperceptions”,andnotbotherourselveswiththeultimatecauseofour
perceptions.ForHume,itdoesnotmatterwhattheultimatecauseofour
perceptionsis,becausewehavenowayofknowingwhattheultimatecauseis.But,
thisdoesnotmeanthatwecannotmakeinferencesviathecoherence,orregularity,
ofourperceptions—thoughtheseinferenceswillnevergiveyou100%certainty.
IntheTreatise,Humemakesadistinctionbetweenphilosophyandthevulgar
(orthephilosopherandthevulgar/commonperson).Humemakesthisdistinction
163TrueorfalseinthesenseofcorrespondingtotheReal,externalworld;aswellasverifiablytrueorfalsewithrespecttothiscorrespondencetotheReal,externalworld(andwecanknow/haveaccesstowhetherourperceptionsaretrueorfalsewithrespecttothiscorrespondence).Thisdoesnotmeanthatthroughsomeothermeans,suchasthecoherence(orconstantconjunction)ofourperceptions,wecannotprovideanalternativegroundsforourperceptionsinwhichwecanassesswhethertheyaretrueorfalse.Humecanbeinterpretedassayingexactlythat:wecanassessourperceptionstobetrueorfalse(orsomeperceptionstobemoretruethanothers)withreferencetothecoherenceofsomeperceptions,forexample.
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toshowthatthephilosopherandthenon-philosopherarebothinakindoftrouble.
Thephilosophertriestogiveargumentsforbeliefs(suchasthebeliefoftheReal
existenceoftheexternalworld)thattheycannotgiveargumentsfor,whilethe
vulgar,orcommonperson,cannotgiveanyargumentsatallfortheirbeliefs.Ofthe
twopositions,Humesays,
[W]hateverconvincingargumentsphilosophersmayfancytheycanproducetoestablishbeliefofobjectsindependentofthemind,’tisobvioustheseargumentsareknownbuttoveryfew,andthat’tisnotbythem,thatchildren,peasants,andthegreatestpartofmankindareinduc’dtoattributeobjectstosomeimpressions,anddenythemtoothers.[…]Forphilosophyinformsus,thateverything,whichappearstothemind,isnothingbutaperception,andisinterrupted,anddependentonthemind;whereasthevulgarconfoundperceptionsandobjects,andattributeadistinctcontinu’dexistencetotheverythingstheyfeelorsee.[…][A]slongaswetakeourperceptionsandobjectstobethesame,wecanneverinfertheexistenceoftheonefromtheother,norformanyargumentfromtherelationofcauseandeffect;whichistheonlyonethatcanassureusofmatteroffact.Evenafterwedistinguishourperceptionsfromourobjects,’twillappearpresently,thatwearestillincapableofreasoningfromtheexistenceofonetothatoftheother:Sothatuponthewholeourreasonneitherdoes,norisitpossibleitevershou’d,uponanysupposition,giveusanassuranceofthecontinu’danddistinctexistenceofbody.ThatopinionmustbeentirelyowingtotheIMAGINATION[…].164
Alongwiththedistinctionbetweenphilosophyandthevulgar,hemakessome
interestingclaimsintheabovequote(allfromthesameparagraph).Ataninitial
glance,thetwopositions,thephilosophicalandthevulgar,arenotcompatible—
philosophyproducesarguments,whilethevulgarnaturallyconfoundperceptions
andobjectstoproducethebeliefof“adistinctcontinu’dexistence”(ofexternal
objects/theexternalworld)withoutmuchthoughttothematter.
Thevulgarposition,theconflationofperceptionsandobjects,165doesnot
allowus,accordingtoHume,todifferentiatebetweenperceptionsandobjects,or
164Ibid,1.4.2.14(p.129).165Real,externalobjects.
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giveusanargumentforcauseandeffect.Itdoesnotallowustoinfercauseand
effect,becausethevulgarviewdoesnotallowustoinfertheantecedentandthe
consequent(whichiswhatgivesuscauseandeffect,accordingtoHume).166Evenif
wecoulddistinguishbetweenperceptionsandobjects,ourreasoningislimited,and
cannotactuallygiveusanadequateargumentfor“thecontinu’danddistinct
existenceofbody”(ortheReal,externalworld).167Thephilosophicalposition,for
Hume,isnotonstronggroundseither.AsHumesays,
[W]hateverconvincingargumentsphilosophersmayfancytheycanproducetoestablishbeliefofobjectsindependentofthemind,’tisobvioustheseargumentsareknownbuttoveryfew,andthat’tisnotbythem,thatchildren,peasants,andthegreatestpartofmankindareinduc’dtoattributeobjectstosomeimpressions,anddenythemtoothers.168
Whateverargumentsphilosopherscanproduceinordertoproveexternalobjects
areknowntoveryfew;thevastmajorityofpeopletakethevulgarposition.Though,
again,thevulgarcannotprovideanyargumentsfororagainsttheirposition(ofthe
conflationofperceptionsandobjects).Boththephilosopherandthevulgarperson
areinbadpositions—botharenotjustifiedingivingarguments(evenifthe
philosopherthinkstheyare),butatleastthevulgardoesnotattempttogivean
argumentfortheirposition.
Humegoesontosay,
Nowwehavealreadyobserv’d,thathoweverphilosophersmaydistinguishbetwixttheobjectsandperceptionsofthesenses;whichtheysupposeco-existentandresembling;yetthisisadistinction,whichisnotcomprehendedbythegeneralityofmankind,whoastheyperceiveonlyonebeing,cannever
166Thinkbackto1.2.6.8(p.49).167Duedohumanreasonbeinglimited,whetheryouareeducatedasaphilosopherornot,thephilosophicalpositionandthevulgarpositionbothcannotgiveadequateargumentsfor“thecontinu’danddistinctexistenceofbody”.168Treatise,1.4.2.14(p.129).
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assenttotheopinionofadoubleexistenceandrepresentation.Thoseverysensations,whichenterbytheeyeorear,arewiththemthetrueobjects,norcantheyreadilyconceivethatthispenorpaper,whichisimmediatelyperceiv’d,representsanother,whichisdifferentfrom,butresemblingit.Inorder,therefore,toaccommodatemyselftotheirnotions,Ishallfirstsuppose,thatthereisonlyonesingleexistence,whichIshallcallindifferentlyobjectorperception,accordingasitshallseembesttosuitmypurpose,understandingbybothofthemwhatanycommonmanmeansbyahat,orshoe,orstone,oranyotherimpression,convey’dtohimbythesenses.169
Thevulgar(or“generalityofmankind”or“commonman”),canonlyconsenttotheir
impressions(orperceptions)ofexternalobjects.Thevulgarcannotdistinguishbe-
tweenanexternalobjectandtheirperceptionofthatobject,andcannotgivean
explanationastotheconnectionbetweensaidexternalobjectandtheirperception
ofit.Thismeansthatthevulgarpersongivesintoappearance.But,givinginto
appearancesdoesnotmeanthatonecangiveanexplanationandsodoesnotassert
knowledgeofthecauseoftheperception.ThisisstillaformofModerate
PyrrhonianScepticismthatHumeisarticulatinghereforthevulgarposition—itis
justthatthevulgarpersondoesnotrealisethattheyaregivingintoappearancesto
livetheirlives.170
Returningbacktothephilosophicalposition,Humewrites,
Therearenoprincipleseitheroftheunderstandingorfancy,whichleadusdirectlytoembracethisopinionofthedoubleexistenceofperceptionsandobjects,norcanwearriveatitbutbypassingthro’thecommonhypothesisoftheidentityandcontinuanceofourinterruptedperceptions.Werewenotfirstpersuaded,thatourperceptionsareouronlyobjects,andcontinuetoexistevenwhentheynolongermaketheirappearancetothesenses,weshou’dneverbe
169Ibid,1.4.2.31(p.134).170Thevulgarpersongivesintoappearancewithoutargumentationorexplanation,whichiswhattheModeratePyrrhonianScepticdoes.TheonlydifferencebetweenthevulgarpersonandtheModeratePyrrhonianScepticisthattheModeratePyrrhonianScepticrealizesthattheygiveintoappearance,becausetheyhavereflectedandacknowledgethattheycannotgiveanargumentfortheirbeliefintheappearanceoftheexternalworld.Itisanappearanceofanexternalworld,becausetheyonlycanknowtheirperceptions(andperceptionsareappearances).
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ledtothink,thatourperceptionsandobjectsaredifferent,andthatourobjectsalonepreserveacontinu’dexistence.171
Thephilosophicalpositionisactuallyinaworsesituationthanthevulgarposition,
becauseitstartsfromthevulgarpositionandthentriestogiveanargumentforthe
separateexistenceofperceptionsandobjects.Thephilosophicalpositionstartsoff
fromthevulgarposition,becauseeveryonestartsfromthesameposition:unableto
distinguishbetweenexternalobjectsandtheirperceptionsofthem.But,thevulgar
positionstopsthere,itdoesnottrytogiveanargumentfortheexistenceofexternal
objects.Wherethephilosophicalpositiongoeswrongisintryingtogivearguments
fortheexistenceofexternalobjects—andHumedoesnotthinkthatsucharguments
canrationallybegiven.Thevulgarmaynotbeabletogiveanargumentfortheir
position,butthisisactuallybetter,atleasttoHume,becauseinnotgivingprinciples
(orproof)theyalsodonotmakeupsomethingthatisnotfoundedonproperreason
(asHumeaccusesphilosophersofdoing).
ItactuallyappearsasthoughHumeisarguingagainstrealisminhisargument
againstthephilosophicalposition.Directlyaftertheabovequote,Humecontinues
hisargumentagainstthephilosophicalposition,
Astothefirstpartoftheproposition,thatthisphilosophicalhypothesishasnoprimaryrecommendation,eithertoreasonortotheimagination,wemaysoonsatisfyourselveswithregardtoreasonbythefollowingreflections.Theonlyexistences,ofwhichwearecertain,areperceptions,whichbeingimmediatelypresenttousbyconsciousness,commandourstrongestassent,andarethefirstfoundationofallourconclusions.Theonlyconclusionwecandrawfromtheexistenceofonethingtothatofanother,isbymeansoftherelationofcauseandeffect,whichshows,thatthereisaconnexionbetwixtthem,andthattheexistenceofoneisdependentonthatoftheother.Theideaofthisrelationisderiv’dfrompastexperience,bywhichwefind,thattwobeingsareconstantlyconjoin’dtogether,andarealwayspresentatoncetothemind.Butasnobeingsareeverpresenttothemindbutperceptions;itfollowsthatwemayobservea
171Ibid,1.4.2.46(p.140).
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conjunctionorarelationofcauseandeffectbetwixtdifferentperceptions,butcanneverobserveitbetwixtperceptionsandobjects.172
Atthispoint,Humemovesawayfromexplicitlytalkingaboutthescepticismwith
regardtotheexternalworld,andmovesmoretowardsscepticismwithregardto
causation.Itisimplicitlyaboutscepticismwithregardtotheexternalworld,
becauseitisnotthatHumedoubtsthatthereiscausation;hedoubtsthatwecan
knowcausationotherthanfromthe‘constantconjunction’ofcauseandeffect.
Humere-emphasizesthatwecanonlybecertainoftheexistenceofperceptions.
Thisisknowledgeonaninternallevel,andstatesnothingontologicalaboutthe
externalworld.Wecaninferfromcauseandeffecttheexistenceofonethingto
another,butsincethisisbasedonpastexperience(ofconstantconjunction),andall
pastexperienceisbasedonperception,allthisgivesusistheexistenceofone
perceptiontotheexistenceofanotherperception—nottheexistenceofaperception
totheexistenceofanexternalobject.ForHume,youcannotjumpfromexperiencing
theperceptionsofseeingapenfalloffadeskontothegroundtostatingthatthepen
Reallyexistsjustbecauseyouexperiencedperceptionsofit.Throughseeingthepen
falloffthedeskmultipletimes(theeffect),perhapsyoucaninferthatthereisaforce
actinguponthepen(thecause)—butyoucannotgiveanargumentoranaccountas
towhatisbeyondyourperceptionsintheexternalworld(theultimate,Realorigin
ofthecause).So,whileyoucaninfer,basedonyourperceptions,acauseandan
effect,thatcauseandthateffectarestillonlywithinyourperceptions.
Thisseemstobeanargumentagainsttherealistposition,becauseitargues
thatwearenotfounded,byreason,toasserttheexistenceofexternalobjects—and172Ibid,1.4.2.47(pp.140-141).
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mostrealistsrequirecognitivism(thataclaimcanbetrueorfalse,andsomeclaims
canbeverifiedastrue),whichgenerallyrequiresbeingabletoverifythetruthor
falsityofsomethingagainsttheRealworld.IfweneverhaveaccesstotheReal,
externalworldandallwehaveaccesstoareourperceptions,thisseemstostate
that,intheveryleast,realismisnotbasedonreasonforHume.Ifrealismisnot
basedonreason,thenitisanirrationalpositiontohold.Intheveryleast,the
burdenofproofisontherealisttoproveaReal,externalworld,andhowwe
(humans)haveaccesstoit(i.e.canacquireknowledgebeyondourperceptions).
Itwouldseemthatsinceallwehaveareourperceptions,wemustrelyon
inference(notcertainty),andthatwecannothelpbutliveourlivesbywayof
appearancesthatHume’spositionisanagnosticpositionwhenitcomestotheReal
world.173ItisagnosticinthesenseofModeratePyrrhonianScepticism,andisa
formofscepticisminrelationtometaphysics—morespecificallyontology.Hume
doesnotthinkthatwecanassertanythingabouttheRealworld(i.e.external
objects).ThislackofabilitytorationallyconstructanargumentfortheRealworld
under-minesanydogmaticposition174towardstheRealworld.Itdoesso,because
therealistcannotrationallyargueforexternalobjectsoutofonlyperceptionsand
theanti-realistcannotassertanythingalongthelinesthatourperceptionsdonot
matchtheRealworld(becausetheycannotknowthateitherfromonlyperceptions).173Hume’spositionisagnostic,orsceptical,becauseassertingthatwecanhaveknowledgebeyondourperceptionsisnotrationalforHume.Wehavelimitedknowledgebasedonexperiencegainedthroughperceptions(whichdonotgiveusdirectaccesstotheexternalworldbeyondourperceptions).Theagnostic,orsceptical,positiondoesnotproveordisproverealismoranti-realism.But,itdoestrytoshowthatassertinganythingdogmatic(viarealismoranti-realism)isnotbasedonanythingwehaveaccessto,andisnotrational.174Dogmaticpositionsreferringtoarealistoranti-realistposition.
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Theonlyrationalpositionisthescepticalposition,becauseitdoesnottryto
overstepitsbounds.
HefurthersupportsthathisunderstandingoftheReal,externalworldis
understoodthroughascepticallenstowardstheendofBookI,Part4,Section2;
Ibegunthissubjectwithpremising,thatweoughttohaveanimplicitfaithinoursenses,andthatthiswou’dbetheconclusion,Ishou’ddrawfromthewholeofmyreasoning.Buttobeingenuous,Ifeelmyselfatpresentofaquitecontrarysentiment,andammoreinclin’dtoreposenofaithatallinmysenses,orratherimagination,thantoplaceinitsuchanimplicitconfidence.Icannotconceivehowsuchtrivialqualitiesofthefancy,conductedbysuchfalsesuppositions,caneverleadtoanysolidandrationalsystem.Theyarethecoherenceandconstancyofourperceptions,whichproducetheopinionoftheircontinu’dexistence;tho’thesequalitiesofperceptionshavenoperceivableconnexionwithsuchanexistence.175
Humestatesthathehasnofaithinhissenses,andItakethistomeanthathehasno
faiththathissensesgivehimknowledgeoftheexternalworld.Hissensesgivehim
perceptions,andperceptionsmaybeaccurateornot—wecannotknow,atleastnot
ontologically(withreferencetotheexternalworld).Anyphilosophicaltheoryor
systembasedonfalseattributionstotheexternalworldisnotmetaphysically
foundedandnotrational.Itistheregularityofourperceptionsthatgiveusour
understandingofthecontinuedexistenceofexternalobjects,thoughwehaveno
wayviaourperceptionstoprovethecontinuedexistenceofexternalobjects.
Though,Humedoesindicatethatpeoplewilloscillatebetweendifferentpositionson
theReal,externalworld,butsays,“Carelessnessandin-attentionalonecanaffordus
anyremedy.”176Itakethistomeanthatthevulgar,orcommon,positionistheonly
easyanswertoontologicalproblems.Thevulgarpositionallowsustoassentto
175Ibid,1.4.2.56(pp.143-144).176Ibid,1.4.2.57(p.144).
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appearanceswithoutargument,andliveourlives.Eventhough,thevulgarposition
isnotanymorerationalthanthephilosophicalposition,exceptthatthevulgar
positiondoesnotattempttogivephilosophical,ormetaphysical,argumentsforthe
externalworld(whichredeemsthevulgarpositioninthatthevulgarpositiondoes
nottrytoargueforthingsbeyondanyhuman’scognitiveabilityoranyhuman’s
accesstoknowledgeviaperceptions).
2.3.HumeanScepticisminAnEnquiryconcerningHumanUnderstanding
AtthebeginningofSectionXII“OftheAcademicorScepticalPhilosophy”,
HumeaddressesAcademicScepticism,andDescartes’MethodofDoubt.Humedoes
notthinkthatAcademicScepticism,orradicaldoubt,isfeasible,becausehedoesnot
thinkthatitispossibleviaachainofreasoningtodeduceanyfirstorfoundational
principlethatisnot“fallaciousordeceitful”(sincealltheotherprinciplesappearto
be“fallaciousordeceitful”).177Ifyouaregoingtodoubtalmostallyourprinciples,
whywouldyounotalsodoubtyourfoundationalprinciple(s)?Ifyoucandoubtmost
things,wheredoesthedoubtstop?AsHumesays,
TheCartesiandoubt,therefore,wereiteverpossibletobeattainedbyanyhumancreature(asitplainlyisnot)wouldbeentirelyincurable;andnoreasoningcouldeverbringustoastateofassuranceandconvictionuponanysubject.178
Thiskindofradicaldoubtis“incurable”,andtherewouldbenowaytoknowany-
thing—noteveninternally.179But,weneedtobecarefulwhenconsideringthis
criticismofAcademicScepticism,orradicaldoubt,becausethiscriticismdoesnot
177DavidHume,AnEnquiryconcerningHumanUnderstanding,ed.PeterMillican(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2008),12.3(p.109).178Ibid.179“Internally”hereismeanttobeunderstoodintheCarnapiansenseof“internal”.
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meanthatHumeiscriticizingallformsofscepticism.Humecanstillbeopentothe
ideaofPyrrhonianScepticism,though,aswe’llsee,heendorsesModerate
PyrrhonianScepticism.Humeshowsapprehensiontowardsanykindofradical
philosophythroughoutthewholeofAnEnquiryconcerningHumanUnderstanding
(referredtoastheFirstEnquiryfromhereon).
Humewritesthat,accordingtothecommonorvulgarposition,peopleare
boundtoassumethattheexternalworld“wouldexist,thoughweandeverysensible
creaturewereabsentorannihilated;”180and
philosophy,[…]teachesus,thatnothingcaneverbepresenttothemindbutanimageorperception,andthatthesensesareonlytheinlets,throughwhichtheseimagesareconveyed,withoutbeingabletoproduceanyimmediateintercoursebetweenthemindandtheobject.181
PhilosophyappearsatconflictwiththecommonopinionatthispointintheFirst
Enquiry,becauseitgoesbeyondbeingboundtothinksomethingandattemptsto
giveanexplanationforsomethingthatitcannotactuallyexplain.But,then,Hume
goesontosay,
But[…]philosophyfindsherselfextremelyembarrassed,whenshewouldjustifythisnewsystem,andobviatethecavilsandobjectionsofthesceptics.Shecannolongerpleadinfallibleandirresistibleinstinctofnature:Forthatledustoaquitedifferentsystem,whichisacknowledgedfallibleandevenerroneous.Andtojustifythispretendedphilosophicalsystem,bychainofclearconvincingargument,orevenanyappearanceofargument,exceedsthepowerofallhumancapacity.182
Theproblemforphilosophyariseswhenittriestojustifyitselfby“chainofclear
convincingargument”,becausethisisbeyondthehumancapacityforreason(we
cannotgetoutsideofourselves,ortracebacktoanyfoundationalprinciple,toseeif
180Ibid,12.7(p.110).181Ibid,12.9(p.111).182Ibid,12.10(p.111).
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ourchainofreasoningiscorrect).183Thisiswhythephilosophermustendorsethe
scepticalposition,orfallbackintothecommon,orvulgar,position.Thephilosopher
mustendorsescepticismorfallbackintothevulgarpositionduetoalackof
grounding184foranydogmaticposition.Thescepticalposition,meaningthe
agnosticposit-ionrecognizesthatwecannotgiveametaphysicalargumentforthe
externalworld/basisofourperceptions,whilethevulgarpositiondoesnoteventry
togiveametaphysicalargument.
Thephilosophicalposition,whenascepticalphilosophicalposition,isnotin
conflictwiththecommon/vulgaropinion,becauseneitherattempttogivea
metaphysicalargumentfortheexistenceoftheexternalworld.Hume’ssceptical
approachisarticulatedinSectionXII,PartI,Paragraph12ofhisFirstEnquiry,
Itisaquestionoffact,whethertheperceptionsofthesensesbeproducedbyexternalobjects,resembling:Howshallthisquestionbedetermined?Byexperiencesurely;asallotherquestionsofalikenature.Buthereexperienceis,andmustbeentirelysilent.Themindhasneveranythingpresenttoitbuttheperceptions,andcannotpossiblyreachanyexperienceoftheirconnexionwithobjects.Thesuppositionofsuchaconnexionis,therefore,withoutfoundationinreasoning.185
Whileweperceivethe‘external’worldviaoursenses,weneverperceivethe
connectionbetweenourperceptionsandtheexternalworld.And,so,noaccount,
noteventhroughexperience,cangiveusanargumentorfoundation,becauseallwe
183ThisbothsupportsthecriticismfoundintheTreatisethatwecannotgetbeyondourperceptions,butitalsoisacriticismagainstAcademicScepticismintheformofCartesianScepticism/Doubt.ItendsupbeingacriticismofCartesianScepticism/Doubt,becauseCartesianScepticism/Doubtendsupbeingdogmaticinthatittriestoassertafoundationalprinciplethatwesomehowknowwithcertainty.Humedoesnotlikeanydogmaticphilosophythatoverstepsitsbounds,andtriestoassertthingsthatarebeyondwhathumanbeingscanknowviasolelyperceptions.184Bygrounding,Imeanphilosophical,ormetaphysical,argument.185Ibid,12.12(p.112).
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perceiveareourperceptions—andnottheconnectionbetweenourperceptionsand
theexternalworld.Nomatterhowmanytimesweperceiveabookthatweownor
thepenthatweliketouse,weneverperceivetheconnectionbetweenour
perceptionofthatbookorpen,andtheRealbookorpen.Allwehaveaccesstois
ourperception(s)ofthatbookorpen.Experiencecanhelpusmakeinferences,like
thatofcauseandeffect,butitcannotgiveusanexplanationforanyconnection
betweenperceptionandtheRealworld.Thisassertionthatwecannotgivean
explanationorargumentorproofofanysortdoesnotmeanthattheconnectionmay
notbethere.Itmeansthatwemustnotmakeanargumentforsomethingthatis
outsideofour[human]reasoning.Therefore,Paragraph12assertsanagnostic,or
Pyrrhonian,formofscepticism.186
Hume,interestingly,giveswhatlookslikeaseriouschallenge,onthefaceof
it,toPyrrhonianScepticisminSectionXIIoftheFirstEnquiry—whichcouldbeone
ofthereasonswhysomepeopledonotinterpretHumeasasceptic.Hesays,
ThegreatsubverterofPyrrhonismortheexcessiveprinciplesofscepticism,isaction,andemployment,andtheoccupationsofcommonlife.[Sceptic]principlesmayflourishandtriumphintheschools;whereitis,indeed,difficult,ifnotimpossible,torefutethem.Butassoonastheyleavetheshade,andbythepresenceoftherealobjects,whichactuateourpassionsandsentiments,areputinoppositiontothemorepowerfulprinciplesofournature,theyvanishlikesmoke,andleavethemostdeterminedscepticinthesameconditionasothermortals.187
186Paragraph12doesnotassertananti-realistposition,becausetheanti-realistpositionstilltriestoassertsomethingtoomuchabouttheexternalworld—forexample,thatweknowthatourperceptionsarenotproducedbytheexternalworld.ForHume,reasondoesnotsupportanyclaim,positiveornegative,abouttheRealexistenceoftheexternalworld.,and,therefore,wecannotsayanythingaboutitorgiveanymetaphysicalargumentforsuchdogmaticclaims.187Ibid,12.21(pp.115-116).
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IthinkitisimportanttoclarifythatHumeisreferringtoexcessive,orradical,
Pyrrhonism,morealongthelinesofwhatPyrrhohimselfwasreportedtopractice.
CommonlifetakesoverevenforthosewhoendorseradicalPyrrhonianScepticism,
whethertheylikeitornot.Theyhavetoassenttosomeperceptions,forexample,or
theydie.188And,so,Hume’schallengetoradicalPyrrhonismmakesagoodpoint
thatisdifficulttorefute.
Though,thisdoesnotmeanthatHumeisnotstillasceptic.AsIsaidbefore,
Humedoesnotseemtohavelikedanykindofradicalopinion;thisincludesradical
scepticalopinion.HumehighlightsthatradicalPyrrhonismisnotviable,whilealso
highlightingthatcommonpeoplestillcannotjustifytheirbeliefs:
When[theradicalPyrrhonianSceptic]awakesfromhisdream,hewillbethefirsttojoininthelaughagainsthimself,andtoconfess,thatallhisobjectionsaremereamusement,andcanhavenoothertendencythantoshowthewhimsicalconditionofmankind,whomustactandreasonandbelieve;thoughtheyarenotable,bytheirmostdiligentenquiry,tosatisfythemselvesconcerningthefoundationoftheseoperations,ortoremovetheobjections,whichmayberaisedagainstthem.189
Mankind,orbothcommonpeopleandphilosophers,cannotjustify“thefoundation
of[their]operations,”andsoendupinamoderatescepticalposition:theycannot
justifytheRealworld,theymustjustassenttoappearances(i.e.perceptions)and
livetheirlives.
This“mitigatedscepticism,”accordingtoHume,can“bebothdurableand
useful.”190Itisusefulbecauseitshowsthat
188Likeeatinganddrinkingduetohungerandthirst,orthecommonbeliefthatyouarealivesinceyouareperceivingandexperiencing(suchasyouarehungryorthirstyandneedthesethingstocontinuebeingalive).189Ibid,12.23(p.117).190Ibid,12.24(p.117).
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[t]heilliteratemayreflectonthedispositionofthelearned,who,amidstalltheadvantagesofstudyandreflection,arecommonlystilldifferentintheirdeterminations:Andifanyofthelearnedbeinclined,fromtheirnaturaltemper,tohaughtinessandobstinacy,asmalltinctureofPYRRHONISMmightabatetheirpride,byshewingthem,thatthefewadvantages,whichtheymayhaveattainedovertheirfellows,arebutinconsiderable,ifcomparedwiththeuniversalperplexityandconfusion,whichisinherentinhumannature.Ingeneral,thereisadegreeofdoubt,andcaution,andmodesty,which,inallkindsofscrutinyanddecision,oughtforevertoaccompanyajustreasoner.191
Thisharkensbacktothephilosopherandthecommonpeople.Though,the
philosopheriseducated,thisdoesnotmeanthattheyareinapositionthatisany
betterthanthecommonperson.“[A]smalltinctureofPYRRHONISM”canshowthe
educatedthattheyarenotanybetteroffthantheuneducated.Noneofuscan
explainorgiveanargumentfortheconnectionbetweenourperceptionsandthe
externalworld—wecannotstepoutsideofourperceptionstoreceivesomespecial
knowledge.Weareallonthesameplayingfield.Whilethecommonperson
automaticallydoesnotattempttogiveanexplanationofhowourperceptions
correlatetotheexternalworld(ornot),theeducatedperson(thephilosopher)
requiresModeratePyrrhonianScepticisminordertounderstandthattheycannot
giveanexplanationofhowourperceptionscorrelatetotheexternalworld(ornot).
TowardstheendofSectionXII,Humewrites,
Theexistence,therefore,ofanybeingcanonlybeprovedbyargumentsfromitscauseoritseffect;andtheseargumentsarefoundedentirelyonexperience.Ifwereasonàpriori,anythingmayappearabletoproduceanything.Thefallingofapebblemay,foroughtweknow,extinguishthesun;orthewishofamancontroultheplanetsintheirorbits.Itisonlyexperience,whichteachesusthenatureandboundsofcauseandeffect,andenablesustoinfertheexistenceofoneobjectfromthatofanother.192
191Ibid,12.24(pp.117-118).192Ibid,12.29(pp.119-120).
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Thisisagainaboutcauseandeffect,andagainhasitsrootsinHume’sscepticism
abouttheexternalworld.Howwegainknowledgeofcauseandeffectispurely
throughexperience,andnotthroughhavingdirectaccesstotheexternalworld.
Experienceisgainedthroughperception,andthereforeanyexistenceweperceiveis
basedonperception.Wecannotreasonaprioriabouttheexistenceofexternal
objects,likeDescarteswouldhaveusattempt,becausethatwillleadusdowna
worseroad.Wecannotrelyonanyultimatecauseorfirstprinciple(s),becausewe
havenowayofaccessing/knowingthem.
2.4.Hume’sMoralPhilosophy
Thepurposeofmorality,forHume,issocialinconstitution.Moralfacts(or
claimsorpropositions)areasetofrules(orlaws)tolivebywithinagivensociety.
Theontologicalstatusofmoralfacts(orclaimsorpropositions)issimilartothe
statusofnaturalfactswithinHume’sphilosophy.Arguably,Humeespousesatypeof
consequentialism,morespecificallyatypeofindirectconsequentialism,inhisAn
EnquiryconcerningthePrinciplesofMorals(IwillalsorefertoitastheSecond
Enquiry).193And,so,tobeginwith,Iwillgivebriefdefinitionsofconsequentialism
andindirectconsequentialismbeforeoutliningmyinterpretationofHume’smoral
philosophy.
WalterSinnott-ArmstrongintheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophyarticle
titled“Consequentialism”,definesconsequentialismasfollows,
193Istartmysentenceoffwith“arguably”,becausethereisnoconsensusonwhetherHumewasanykindofconsequentialist.IamreadingHumeasaconsequentialist,becauseithelpsfurthermypurposeofusingmyspecificinterpretationofHumetogiveanalternativeoptioninthemoralrealismandmoralanti-realismdebate.
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Consequentialism,asitsnamesuggests,istheviewthatnormativepropertiesdependonlyonconsequences.Thisgeneralapproachcanbeappliedatdifferentlevelstodifferentnormativepropertiesofdifferentkindsofthings,butthemostprominentexampleisconsequentialismaboutthemoralrightnessofacts,whichholdsthatwhetheranactismorallyrightdependsonlyontheconsequencesofthatactorofsomethingrelatedtothatact,suchasthemotivebehindtheactorageneralrulerequiringactsofthesamekind.194
Theemphasisinconsequentialismisontheconsequencesofanaction,andlikein
mostformsofconsequentialism,theactitselfhasonlyinstrumentalvalue,whereas
desirableconsequenceshaveintrinsicvalue(thevaluethatultimatelyjustifiesthe
actwithsuchconsequences).Thisputsanemphasisonutility(insofarasactsare
concerned),becauseifanactisnotusefulinbringingaboutacertainend—thenit
hasnovaluewithinaconsequentialistframework.Underthebroaderheadingof
consequentialism,thereareanumberofdifferentforms.Oneoftheseformsof
consequentialismissomethingcalledindirectconsequentialism,andSinnott-
Armstrongsaysthat
anindirectconsequentialistholdsthatthemoralqualitiesofsomethingdependontheconsequencesofsomethingelse.[…]Themostcommonindirectconsequentialismisruleconsequentialism,whichmakesthemoralrightnessofanactdependontheconsequencesofarule.195
Therefore,underindirectconsequentialism,theconsequencesarenotjust
dependentontheact,butonsomethingelseoutsideoftheact(thatinfluencesthe
consequencesoftheact).Astheabovequotesays,ruleconsequentialismisthemost
commonformofindirectconsequentialism.Ruleconsequentialismtriestoassess
thedifferentconsequencesofdifferentsetsofrules(intermsoftheimpact(s)of
194WalterSinnott-Armstrong,"Consequentialism",TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy,ed.EdwardN.Zalta(Winter2015Edition),accessedonMay29th,2018,https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/consequentialism/.195Ibid.
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possiblesystemsofrules),andtheconsequencesofanactare,therefore,dependent
onasetofrules(orlaws).Thissetofrulesischosenbythesocietyitgoverns,andis
whatmakestheact(andtheconsequencesthatfollow)morallyrightorwrong.The
goalofconsequentialism,ingeneral,istoproduceoptimalconsequences.Oftenthis
getstranslated,asitdoesinutilitarianism,asanact(whethergovernedbyrulesor
not)needstoproducethemosthappinessorpleasureforthesociety.Themost
happiness,orpleasure,isthemostdesirableconsequence.196
IdothinkthatHumeexpressesakindofindirectconsequentialisminthe
SecondEnquiry.197Preparingus,thereaders,attheendoftheFirstEnquiryforthe
SecondEnquiry,Humesays,
Itisonlyexperience,whichteachesusthenatureandboundsofcauseandeffect,andenablesustoinfertheexistenceofoneobjectfromthatofanother.Suchisthefoundationofmoralreasoning,whichformsthegreaterpartofhumanknowledge,andisthesourceofallhumanactionandbehaviour.198
IthinkitisimportanttonoteherethatIthinkthatHume’sconsequentialismis
dependentonhisunderstandingofmetaphysics(whichhisunderstandingof
perceptionsandtheirroleinourunderstandinginhowweknowtheexternalworld
196Forexample,itcouldbearguedthat,forHume,theoverallhappiness,orpleasure,ofagivensocietyisthemostdesirableconsequence.Inaddition,itcouldfurtherbearguedthatHumeeithermeansthistobeappliedtoaparticularsociety(eachsocietycouldhavethesamegoalofhappiness,buttheformulationcouldbeslightlydifferentineachseparatesociety)ortothewholeofthehumanspecies(orfuturehumanity).197Though,consequentialismisa,potentially,problematictermtorefertoHume’snormativemoralphilosophyas,becauseitisatermthatcameafterHumewasalive.198FirstEnquiry,12.29(p.120).
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isalsobasedon).Experienceisthefoundationofmoralreasoning,andtherefore
moralreasoningisintherealmofmattersoffact(notrelationsofideas).199
Incontemporarymoralphilosophy,wetendtoseparatenormativemoral
theoriesfrommetaphysics(ormetaethics),butIdonotthinkthatissoeasilydone
inHume’sphilosophy.200Hume’sprojectintheTreatise,aswellasintheFirst
EnquiryandSecondEnquiry,istogiveacomprehensiveunderstandingofphilosophy
(especiallythephilosophicalissuesthatwereprominentduringhistime).Todo
this,hebeginswithmetaphysics(i.e.theexternalworld,andhowwecometo
associateourperceptionswithexternalobjects),andusesthisasabasistobuild
bothhisnaturalismandmoralphilosophyon.
ItwillbemygoalinthissectiontogiveanarticulationofHume’smoral
philosophy.MyultimategoalinthispaperistoshowthatHumeisconsistent
throughhisunderstandingofmetaphysics(i.e.thatheisaModeratePyrrhonian
Scepticwhenitcomestometaphysics),andhisunderstandingofmoralphilosophy
inordertogiveanalternativepositioninthemoralrealismandmoralanti-realism
debate.Hismoralphilosophycannotbeunderstoodwithoutunderstandinghis
metaphysicalpositionthatunderpinsthemboth.Therefore,Hume’smoral
philosophycannotonlybeunderstoodthroughanormativelens,butmustalsobe
understoodthroughametaethical201lensaswell(sinceitsunderpinningsaremore
199Isaynotintherealmofrelationsofideas,becauserelationsofideasareaprioriforHume.Mattersoffactarebasedinexperience,andexperience“isthefoundationofmoralreasoning.”200Or,inanyone’sphilosophywhoistryingtogiveacomprehensiveandwholeanalysisofmostofthemajorareaswithinphilosophy.201Definitionofmetaethics:“Thesecond-orderactivityofinvestigatingtheconceptsofmethodsofethics,ratherthandirectlyengagingwithpractical(‘first-order’)
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abstract).Morality,forHume,isdefinitelywithinthepracticaldomain,butits
foundationinmetaphysicsistheoretical.
InSection1“OftheGeneralPrinciplesofMorals”oftheSecondEnquiry,Hume
laysoutthemetaethicaldebatethatheissituatinghimselfwithinasfollows,
Therehasbeenacontroversystartedoflate,muchbetterworthexamination,concerningthegeneralfoundationofMORALS;whethertheybederivedfromREASON,orfromSENTIMENT;whetherweattaintheknowledgeofthembyachainofargumentandinduction,orbyanimmediatefeelingandfinerinternalsense;whether,likeallsoundjudgmentoftruthandfalsehood,theyshouldbethesametoeveryrationalintelligentbeing;orwhether,liketheperceptionofbeautyanddeformity,theybefoundedentirelyontheparticularfabricandconstitutionofthehumanspecies.202
ThedebatethatHumeislayingoutisametaethicaldebate:howmoralsareformed,
orwhatthesourceofmoralityis.Hepositionshimselfwithinthemetaethical
debatebeforegoingontoarticulatehisnormativemoraltheorybasedonhis
positionwithinthemetaethicaldebate.
Moralphilosophyhasoneaim,andtwomainaspectsforHume.Itsaim“isto
teachusourduty;and,byproperrepresentationsofthedeformityofviceand
beautyofvirtue,begetcorrespondinghabits,andengageustoavoidtheoneand
embracetheother.”203Thisaimisachievedbytheunderstanding,andbythe
affections(oremotions/passions).InsupportofthisHumesays,
[Inferencesandconclusionsoftheunderstanding]discovertruths:Butwherethetruthswhichtheydiscoverareindifferent,andbegetnodesireoraversion.
issuesofwhattodoandhowtobehave.Thedistinctionisapttoblur,inthatdifferentviewsaboutthestructureofethicsusuallyhaveimplicationsforthefirst-orderdecisionmaking.”SimonBlackburn,“metaethics,”intheOxfordDictionaryofPhilosophy,ThirdEdition(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2016),302.202DavidHume,AnEnquiryconcerningthePrinciplesofMorals,ed.TomL.Beauchamp(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),1.3(pp.73-74).203Ibid,1.7(p.75).
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Theycanhavenoinfluenceonconductandbehaviour.Whatishonourable,whatisfair,whatisbecoming,whatisnoble,whatisgenerous,takespossessionoftheheart,andanimatesustoembraceandmaintainit.Whatisintelligent,whatisevident,whatisprobable,whatistrue,procuresonlycoolassentoftheunderstanding;andgratifyingaspeculativecuriosity,putsanendtoourresearches.204
Aftersayingthis,Humegoessofarastosay,intheSecondEnquiryat1.8,thattoget
ridoftheaffections,astheypertaintomorality,wouldmakemorality“nolongera
practicalstudy,nor[have]anytendencytoregulateourlivesandactions.”205Then,
at1.9oftheSecondEnquiry,Humemakesthestrongclaimthat“reasonand
sentimentconcurinalmostallmoraldeterminationsandconclusions.”206Hegoeson
toexplainin1.9howreason(theunderstanding)andsentiment(affections)both
playaroleinmorality,andinvestigatingthisistheoverarchingfocusoftheSecond
Enquiry.
Inhissearchfortherolesthatreasonandsentimentplayinmorality,Hume
saysthatthereisoneprinciple,aconsequentialistprinciple,thatmoralityisguided
by,andthatprincipleisutility.207Inregardtothisprincipleofutility,Humewrites,
Inalldeterminationsofmorality,thiscircumstanceofpublicutilityiseverprincipallyinview;andwhereverdisputesarise,thequestioncannot,byanymeans,bedecidedwithgreatercertainty,thanbyascertaining,onanyside,thetrueinterestsofmankind.Ifanyfalseopinion,embracedfromappearances,hasbeenfoundtoprevail;assoonasfartherexperienceandsounderreasoninghavegivenusjusternotionsofhumanaffairs;weretractourfirstsentiment,andadjustanewtheboundariesofmoralgoodandevil.208
204Ibid.205Ibid,1.8(p.75).206Ibid,1.9(p.75).207Notallofmoralityisguidedbythisprinciple,forexample,religiousformsofmoralityarenot,butHumethinksthatarationalsystemofmoralityshouldbeguidedbyit.208Hume,SecondEnquiry,2.17(p.81).
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MoralityforHumeisnotunchanging,andisbasedonexperience.Weneedto
experiencemultiplecasesofmoralitytobeabletomakeinferencespertainingtothe
goodorevilofaparticularmoralactorfact(i.e.claim),andthemoreexperienceswe
havethebetter(astheyinformourinferences).Givennewexperiences,wecan
changeourinferencesconcerningwhetheraparticularactorfactisgoodorevil.
And,theprinciplethatguidesourinferences(thatwemakeviaexperiences)is
verifyingbasedonwhetheranactorfactisgoodorevilthroughitspublicutility.
ToreiteratewhatIsaidtowardsthebeginningofthissection:
consequentialismemphasizestheconsequencesofanact,theactitselfisnotso
muchimportantastheconsequencesorendsthatitbringsabout.Thisputsan
emphasisonutility,becauseifanactisnotusefulinbringingaboutacertainends—
thenithasnoutilitywithinaconsequentialistframework.Theconsequencesofany
moralaction,forHume,areweighedinlightoftheirpublicutilitywithinasociety.If
experienceshowsus[withinthesociety]thataparticularactionisnolongergoodin
accordancewithpublicutility,thenwecanchangeourguidelineswithrespectto
suchactions.
Humebasesthevalueofhistwomainvirtuesforthebettermentofsociety,
benevolenceandjustice,onpublicutility.But,Humedoesnotmeanvirtueinthe
moretraditionalvirtueethics,orAristotelian,understandingofvirtue.Avirtuefor
Humeisavirtueonlybecauseitisusefulinhelpingtocreateoverallhappiness
withinasociety.Humesaysat2.22oftheSecondEnquiry,
[It]seemsundeniable,thatnothingcanbestowmoremeritonanyhumancreaturethanthesentimentofbenevolenceinaneminentdegree;andthata
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part,atleast,ofitsmeritarisesfromitstendencytopromotetheinterestsofourspecies,andbestowhappinessonhumansociety.209
Benevolenceisavirtue,becauseofitsutility;itisusefulinpromotingtheinterests
andhappinessof“humansociety”.Humegoesontosayofjusticeat3.1,
Thatjusticeisusefultosociety,andconsequentlythatpartofitsmerit,atleast,mustarisefromthatconsideration,itwouldbeasuperfluousundertakingtoprove.Thatpublicutilityisthesoleoriginofjustice,andthatreflectionsonthebeneficialconsequencesofthisvirtuearethesolefoundationofitsmerit[…].210
Humeagainstressespublicutility.Justiceisonlyavirtue(orvaluable),becauseof
its“beneficialconsequences”forsociety—ithasnoothervaluethanitspractical
applicationandthebeneficialconsequencesthatarisefromit.
Thesetwovirtues,benevolenceandjustice,helpsocietyfunctioninsucha
wayastocreatethemosthappinessforthepeoplewithinsociety.Againreferring
backtowhatIsaidatthebeginningofthissection:forindirectconsequentialism,the
consequencesaredependentontheact,butinsuchawayastoaccountforoutside
influencesontheact.Therefore,underHume’smoralphilosophy,itisnotjust
performingabenevolentactthathasdesirableconsequences(forexample,
happiness),but,wheneveryonewithinasocietyseesbenevolenceasavirtue,it
becomesaguideforaction(andthegoodconsequencesstemnotonlyfromthe
benevolentactsbutfromthevirtueofbenevolenceaswell).Inthisway,Humeis
expressingakindofindirectconsequentialism,becausetheconsequencesstemnot
justfromactsbutalsofromsomethingexternaltotheactsguidingthemaswell.
209Ibid,2.22(p.82).210Ibid,3.1(p.83).
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ForHume,morality211hasitsoriginsinsentiment.Sentimentiswhat
motivatesustobemoral(i.e.“Whatishonourable,whatisfair,whatisbecoming,
whatisnoble,whatisgenerous,takespossessionoftheheart,andanimatesusto
embraceandmaintainit”212).Reason,though,isstillneeded,becauseitisonly
throughmanyexperienceswithacts,etc.,withinsocietythatwecanthencometo
inferwhatismoralthroughtheunderstanding.Whatitcomesdowntoisthatwe
needreasontomakeinferencesfromexperiences,butwhatmotivatesustobe
moralissentiment.
2.5.Hume’sMethodinAnEnquiryconcerningthePrinciplesofMorals
DespitethewayIdescribedHume’spositionintheprevioussection(2.4.
Hume’sMoralPhilosophy),thereisnoconsensusonwhetherHumewasanykindof
consequentialistornot.ItisdifficulttopigeonholeHumewithregardtohis
normativemoraltheory.Inthissection,IwillqualifyHume’smoralphilosophyby
givinganaccountofhowonecanunderstandHume’smethodinAnEnquiry
concerningthePrinciplesofMorals.Thisqualificationisimportantfor
understandingscepticism’sreachinHume’sphilosophy,andtyingtogetherHume’s
understandingofmetaphysicstohisunderstandingofmoralphilosophy.
Hume’smethodthroughouttheSecondEnquiryisareflectivecomparisonof
casesthatdoesnotseemtohaveanyintenttoassumethatitwilladduptoanything
intheend.FromHume’smethodofcomparisonofcases(orinstancesofwhatmight
bemoral),hedrawsakindofgeneralaccountofwhatmoralitymightconstitute—
211IamreferencingthemoralitythatHumeprescribesto—notallofmorality(generallyspeaking).212Hume,SecondEnquiry,1.7(p.75).
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andlookstoseehowreasonandsentimentmightfactorintomorality.Thiskindof
methoddoesnotassumethatitwillfindtheultimatefoundationofmorality,butis
moreofacontemplativeguessataframeworkthatmoralitycouldpossiblyoperate
within.Sinceitdoesnotseektofindtheultimatefoundationofmorality,itdoesnot
makeanydefiniteassertions.Inthisway,Hume’smethodkeepshismoral
philosophyinlinewithaModerate,ormitigated,PyrrhonianScepticism
understandingofhismetaphysics,whichunderpinsHume’sphilosophymore
generally.
In1.10oftheSecondEnquiry,Humelaysouthismethod,
Theonlyobjectofreasoningistodiscoverthecircumstancesonbothsides,whicharecommontothesequalities;toobservethatparticularinwhichtheestimablequalitiesagreeontheonehand,andtheblameableontheother;andthencetoreachthefoundationofethics,andfindthoseuniversalprinciples,fromwhichallcensureorapprobationisultimatelyderived.Asthisisaquestionoffact,notofabstractscience,wecanonlyexpectsuccess,byfollowingtheexperimentalmethod,anddeducinggeneralmaximsfromacomparisonofparticularinstances.213
Humehimselfsaysthatmorality“isaquestionoffact”,meaningthatmorality
pertainstoexperience,andisnotsomethingthatwecandeduceapriori(priorto
experience).TheexperimentalmethodbasedonexperiencethatHumespeaks
aboutintheabovequoteisnotperfectandinfallible.Wecannotgettoanapriori
foundationofmoralitythroughreasoning.Thereneedstobe“acomparisonof
particularinstances”(or“cases”asIsayinthepreviousparagraph)—whichcan
onlybeaccomplishedthroughexperience—andthiscomparisonwillonlyeverallow
ustoinfer“generalmaxims”ofmorality.214
213Ibid,1.10(pp.76-77).214Ofmorality,butmoralityasHumeunderstandsit—notmoralityatlarge.
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Thisisamethodologythataimstogeneralize.215Youhavethismethod,its
objectistofindgeneralizations,butdoesitfindgeneralizations?Ifitdoes,dothose
generalizationsamounttoanykindofcertaintyorultimatefoundation?Hume
seemstoinfersomegeneralizations(suchabenevolenceandjustice),butthereisno
certaintythatthesearetherightgeneralizations—whichmeansthatthereisno
certaintywhenitcomesmoralgeneralizations.Thesegeneralizationsareinferences
tothebestexplanationthatHumecanfindthroughhiscomparisonofcases.There
isnothingthatwouldpreventfurthercomparisons,andfurthergeneralizations.
EvenHume’suseofutilitycannotbeusedasafoundation,becauseallitisisa
potentialcandidateforafoundationthatseeminglyhasthepotentialtoproduce
desirableconsequences(whenacomparisonofcaseshasbeendone,itseemsthat
utilitycanhelpexplaincertaingeneralmaximsthatpeopleseemtotakeasvirtues,
likebenevolence).But,whileutilitymighthelptoexplainmoralitywhencomparing
certaincases,Hume’sattitudeintheSecondEnquiry,isstilloneofuncertainty—an
attitudethatisunderpinnedbyscepticism.AsHumesays,attheveryendofSection
1oftheSecondEnquiry,
The[…]scientificmethod,whereageneralabstractprincipleisfirstestablished,andisafterwardsbranchedoutintoavarietyofinferencesandconclusions,maybemoreperfectitself,butsuitslesstheimperfectionofhumannature[…].Menarenowcuredoftheirpassionforhypothesesandsystemsinnaturalphilosophy,andwillhearkentonoargumentsbutthosewhicharederivedfromexperience.Itisfulltimetheyshouldattemptalikereformationinallmoraldisquisitions;andrejecteverysystemofethics,howeversubtileoringenious,whichisnotfoundedonfactandobservation.216
And,then,finishesSection1oftheSecondEnquirywith
215Like,consequentialism,orutilitarianism.216Hume,SecondEnquiry,1.10(p.77).
89
Weshallbeginourenquiryonthisheadbyconsiderationofthesocialvirtues,benevolenceandjustice.Theexplicationofthemwillprobablygiveusanopeningbywhichothersmaybeaccountedfor.217
ThisisthetonethatHumesetsfortherestoftheSecondEnquiry.Hecontraststhe
experimentalmethodthatheseeshimselfasusingwiththescientificmethodmore
associatedwiththerationalistswhotrytofoundtheir“generalabstractprinciples”
orfoundationalprinciplesonsomethingthatisnotbasedinexperience.
Hisemphasisonexperience—thathedoesmakesoundlikethebetter
option—isnotsomethingthatwillgetyoucertaintyinthewaythatarationalist
wouldwant.ThebestHume’smethodisgoingtogiveusis“probably”and“may”.
Thissupportforamethodthatcanonlygiveusuncertaintyatbestisunderpinned
byanunwillingnesstoacceptaprioriprinciplesthatwehavenojustificationfor
(basedonwhatwecanknow).Hume’smethodleadstoakindoftentative
hypothesis,notasurething.Humeistellingus(thereaders)inadvancethat
whateverhecomesupwithforafoundationistentative.Thisisakindoffallibilism:
providingtentativeanswersthatmayormaynotberight(withtheawarenessthat
theanswersmayormaynotberight,andtheacceptancethatwemaynotever
knowtherightanswer).Whilefallibilismdoesnotnecessarilyentailscepticism,it
doesopenupthepathtoscepticism(orcantendtowardascepticalposition);
especiallyforsomeonelikeHume,who,throughouthisphilosophy,isfavourably
disposedtowardsscepticism.
217Ibid,1.11(p.77).Myitalics.
90
2.6.TheMoralRealismandMoralAnti-RealismDebate:HumeanScepticismasanAlternative
Therealismandanti-realismdebateinmetaphysicsisnotanewtopicof
discussion.IntheWesternPhilosophicalTradition,ithasrootsbacktoPlato’s
dialogues.Thedebateisentrenchedinmostotherfieldsofphilosophy.Takethe
philosophyofperception,forexample.Assoonasweaskwhetherourperceptions
arerepresentationsoftheexternalworldornot(orifourperceptionsareaccurate
representationsoftheexternalworldornot),webecomeembroiledintherealism
andanti-realismdebate.Realismstates,generally,thatfacts(orentities)exist,and
thatthesefacts(orentities)areobjectiveandmind-independentinsomeway.218
Anti-realismdeniesatleastoneaspectofrealism;itcandenythatfacts(orentities)
exist,itcandenythatfacts(orentities)areobjectiveormind-independent,oritcan
rejectbothoftheaforementionedrealistclaims.
Thedebateisfurthermadecomplexbythecognitivismandnon-cognitivism
differentiation.Cognitivismistraditionallyassociatedwithrealism,andnon-
cognitivismistraditionallyassociatedwithanti-realism.Cognitivismistheview
thatafact(orclaim,orproposition),likeamoralfact(orclaim,orproposition),can
betrueorfalse.Non-cognitivism,broadlydefined,istheviewthatafact(orclaim,
orproposition),likeamoralfact(orclaim,orproposition),isnottruth-apt(cannot
betrueorfalse).Theimportanceofthisdistinctionismostnoticeableinlogic-based
arguments,becauselogic-basedargumentstreattruth-aptnessandtruepremises
(andsoundarguments)ashighlyimportant.Therefore,forcognitivismtobe
218Iacknowledgethatthisdefinitionisnotwithoutcontroversy,butitsufficestooutlinethedichotomybetweenrealismandanti-realism.
91
associatedwithrealismandnon-cognitivismtobeassociatedwithanti-realismhas
itsconsequences.Realiststhinkthattheyhavetheupperhand,becausetheycan
giveargumentswithtruth-aptmoralfactsmakingtheirlogic-basedarguments
stronger.Theproblemisthattherearesomeanti-realistswhoarecognitivists,
thoughsometimesinqualifiedways(forexample,ErrorTheorists).Overall,the
associationbetweencognitivismandrealism,andnon-cognitivismandanti-realism
ismisleading—andcognitivismandnon-cognitivismshouldnotbeassociatedwith
realismoranti-realisminparticular.
Ithinkthatthisalsoholdstruewhenitcomestoscepticism,specifically
ModeratePyrrhonianScepticism.Scepticsintherealismandanti-realismliterature
oftengetlumpedinwiththeanti-realists,andsoareassociatedwithnon-
cognitivism.But,associatingModeratePyrrhonianScepticismwithnon-cognitivism
isnotanexplicitassociation,andneedsfurtherexplanation(whichisnotusually
given).APyrrhonianScepticremainsagnostic(withholdsjudgement,epochē)when
itcomestofacts(orclaims,orpropositions)concerningmetaphysics.Thisdoesnot
meanthattheyoutrightdenycognitivismortruth-aptnesswhenitcomesto
metaphysicalfacts(orclaimsorpropositions).Italsomeansthattheydonotassert
cognitivismortruth-aptnesswhenitcomestometaphysicalfacts(orclaimsor
propositions).ItistheiragnosticismthatputsPyrrhonianScepticsinaposition
wheretheycannotaffirmordenyanythingabouttheReal,externalworld.Now,this
doesnotmeanthattheycannotassertmoralclaims.Itjustmeansthattheycannot
argueoverthemetaphysicalstatusofmoralclaims.
92
AModeratePyrrhonianScepticwhilemaintainingagnosticismaboutthe
externalworlddoesconsenttoappearancesinordertolivetheirlife.Inconsenting
toappearances,theycanconsenttotheappearanceofclaims.Theissuetheyhaveis
withassertingametaphysicaloriginofthoseclaims.Inthecaseofmoralclaims,the
sameistrue.AModeratePyrrhonianScepticcanassertthemoralclaimthat
“Murderiswrong,”butwhatneedstobeunderstoodisthattheyarenotasserting
anythingmetaphysicalabouttheputativemoralclaim.Whattheyaredoingis
sayingthatbasedonappearances,murderappearstobewrong—thisisaninternal
endeavour,notanexternalendeavour(touseCarnapianlanguage).
ThistypeofModeratePyrrhonianScepticismcanbeattributedtoHume.
HumesaysinBookI,Part4,Section2oftheTreatise,
[T]hescepticstillcontinuestoreasonandbelieve,eventho’heasserts,thathecannotdefendhisreasonbyreason;andbythesamerulehemustassenttotheprincipleconcerningtheexistenceofbody,tho’hecannotpretendbyanyargumentsofphilosophytomaintainitsveracity.Naturehasnotleftthistohischoice,andhasdoubtlessesteem’ditanaffairoftoogreatimportancetobetrustedtoouruncertainreasoningsandspeculations.219
Eventhoughthescepticcontinuesto“reasonandbelieve”andcannothelpbutgive
into“theexistenceofbody”(i.e.theexternalworld),theydosowithoutthesupport
ofmetaphysicalarguments.Duetothefalliblenessofthehumanmind—something
thatcannotbehelped(asisthewaythathumansare)—theexternalworldis
deemedbythesceptictobesomethingthatcannot“betrustedtoouruncertain
reasoningsandspeculations.”Thescepticisleftwithassentingtotheworldof
appearances,thoughtheycannotgiveanargumentforthemetaphysicaloriginof
thoseappearances.ThescepticismthatHumearticulatesisaformofModerate
219Hume,ATreatiseofHumanNature,1.4.2.1(p.125).
93
PyrrhonianScepticism,but—sinceHumehimselfshiedawayfromattributing
PyrrhonianScepticismtohisownphilosophy(duetoalackofknowledgeof
PyrrhonianScepticism)—IwillcallHume’sModeratePyrrhonianScepticismjust
HumeanScepticism.220
Onthefaceofit,itwouldseemlikeHumeanScepticism,aswithModerate
PyrrhonianScepticism,wouldhavetotakeanon-cognitivestanceonthetruth-
aptnessoffacts(orclaimsorpropositions)—giventhataHumeanScepticwouldnot
beabletojustify,basedonanymetaphysicalargument,thetruthorfalsityofthe
facts.But,aHumeanScepticcoulduseCarnap’smove(whenitcomestoabstract
entities)tobeabletoapplyakindofqualifiedtruth-aptnesstofactswithinan
internalframework.Carnap’sinitialmoveistodifferentiatebetweeninternaland
externalquestions.Internalquestionsarequestionsthatcanbeaskedwithina
specifiedframework(i.e.epistemologicalquestions),whileexternalquestionshave
todowithaskingabouttherealityorexistenceoftheframeworkasawhole(i.e.
metaphysicalquestions).AHumeanScepticcannotaskexternalquestions,butthey
canaskinternalquestions.
Tobringthisbackintoamoralcontext,takethemoralclaim,“Murderis
wrong,”again.Perhapsthesocietyyouareapartofpracticesaformof
consequentialism.Murderiswrongwithinyoursociety’sconsequentialistmoral
framework,becausealawwascreatedstatingthatmurderiswrong.Thislawwas
createdinordertobringaboutthemostpleasureorhappinessforthesocietyasa
220IalsocallitHumeanScepticism,becauseitisbasedonmyinterpretationofHume’sphilosophytofurtheranargumentinmetaethicsratherthananinterpretationofthehistoricHumeasapieceofHumescholarship.
94
whole,becauseotherwisepeoplemightliveinfearthattheymaybemurdered
(whichisanunpleasantandunhappywaytolive).So,fortheoverallbenefitofyour
society,murderwasdeemedtobewrong.Withinaspecifiedframework,inthiscase
yoursociety’sconsequentialistmoralframework,afact(orclaimorproposition)can
berightorwrong,ortrueorfalse.Itcanbetrueorfalse,becauseforsomeone
withinyoursocietytostatethat“Murderisnotwrong,”forexample,wouldbefalse
giventheagreeduponlawwithinyoursociety’sconsequentialistmoralframework.
Thiskindofqualifiedtruth-aptnesswillnotgiveyouthetruthorfalsityofafact,etc.,
with100%certainty—itcanonlygiveyouaprobabletruthorfalsitybasedonthe
conditionswithintheframeworkatagiventime,andcannotstatewhetherafactis
trueorfalseintheexternalworld(inametaphysicalsense).
ToconnectbacktoHume,letusthinkbacktosections2.2,2.3,and2.4ofthis
paper.ForHume,moralityisasocialconstruct,andhowwelearnitisbasedon
inference(aftertheexperienceofsomethingisexperienced,preferably,multiple
times).Thisinferenceviaexperienceisbasedonourexperiencesoftheappearance
oftheexternalworld(i.e.ourperceptionsoftheexternalworld)—sinceourhuman
facultiescanonlygiveus“uncertainreasoningsandspeculations”221andcannotgive
uscertainmetaphysicalarguments.ForHume,wecannotknowwithanycertainty
thatourperceptionsoftheexternalworldaretrueorfalse.But,wecanassess
whetherafact(orclaimorproposition)istrueorfalsebasedonourinferencesand
theframeworkweareoperatingin(sinceframeworks,inthisunderstanding,area
221Hume,ATreatiseofHumanNature,1.4.2.1(p.125).
95
social,internalconstructionanddonotstateanythingabouttheReal,external
world).
UnderHumeanScepticismandHume’smoralphilosophy,themoralclaim,
“Murderiswrong,”istrue.Itistruebasedonappearances,andwithinagiven
internalframework.Itcannotbeknownwhetheritistrueorfalsefromanexternal,
metaphysicalstance—theshortcomingsofhumanreasoning(cognitiveability)do
notallowustoknowthis.Inaninternalsense,moralfactsarecognitive(though,
withanon-cognitiveorigin).Inanexternalsense,wecannotknowtheultimate
metaphysicaloriginofmoralfacts.But,whatisimportantisthatmoralfactsare
truth-aptforHume(justinaqualifiedwaybaseduponaconsequentialistmoral
frameworkthatissociallyconstructed).Ifthisistrue,andHume’sphilosophyis
cohesive,itlookslikeHumeanScepticism(combinedwithHume’smoral
philosophy)providesuswithanalternativetothetraditionalmoralrealismand
moralanti-realismdichotomymakingthetraditionaldichotomyanactualdebate.
2.7.PotentialImplications
ThepurposeofthissectionistoconsiderpotentialimplicationsofHumean
Scepticism,Hume’sphilosophybeingcohesive,andHume’slackofcleardistinction
betweenhisabstract,metaethicalmoralphilosophyandpractical(normativeand
applied)philosophy.IfHume’sphilosophyisanactualalternativetothetraditional
moralrealismandmoralanti-realismdebate,andhisphilosophyiscohesive;thenit
isimportantthatwetakeseriouslyhowweseparatefieldsinmoralphilosophy.
HumeconflateshismetaethicsandpracticalphilosophythroughouttheSecond
Enquire,but,asshowninsection2.6ofthispaper,thisdoesnotimpedethe
96
cohesivenessofhisphilosophy,nordoesitproduceanycontradictioninhismoral
philosophy.
Thepotentialimplicationbecomesaquestionforethics:istheseparationof
metaethicsandpracticalethicsanarbitraryseparation?Ifitisanarbitrary
separation,thelinebetweenmetaethicsandpracticalethicsisblurryatbest,and
theyinterconnectinwaysthatmakethemnotsoeasilyseparable.Thisisatopicfor
futurethought,butaquestiontoaskiswhatarethemetaethicalconsequencesfor
practicalphilosophy,ifthereareany?And,whatisthesignificanceofthose
consequencesforethicsingeneral?Mysecrethopebehindthispaperwastobring
attentiontohowwetraditionallyviewandunderstandtopics(orfields)in
philosophy,andquestionthosetraditionalviews.Goingforward,Iwouldlike
readerstoconsideralternativewaysofapproachingatopic(orfield)—notonlyin
philosophy,butalsoinallareasofstudyandknowledge.
97
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