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Issue 1/10 August 5, 2010

 AFGHANISTAN

Humanitarian Security in Afghanistan August 2010

Rens de Graaff  – Security Knowledge Managerrens.degraaff@cimicweb.org 

Erin Foster – Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being Knowledge Managererin.foster@cimicweb.org 

Stefanie Nijssen – Assistant Knowledge Managerstefanie.nijssen@cimicweb.org 

www.cimicweb.org 

This document is intended to provide a brief examination of security issues and how they affect humanitarian assistance personnel in Afghanistan. More comprehensive information is available on the Civil- 

Military Overview (CMO) at  www.cimicweb.org.1   Hyperlinks to original source material are highlighted in blue and underlined in the embedded text. Several articles are linked to more than once.

What is the reality of the security situation for humanitarian workers in Afghanistan? Non-governmental

organisations (NGOs), United Nations (UN) agencies, and international organisations (IOs) have beenproviding humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan for many decades, responding to the various wars andnatural disasters that have affected the country. Such organisations are by their very nature focused on

humanitarian issues, and therefore their capacity to provide for and focus on their own security has, untilrecently been a secondary concern. However, since the security situation in Afghanistan is so precarious,security issues can no longer be sidelined in the way they once were. Following an intensification of attacks on humanitarian workers over the past decade, aid organisations have been forced to reassesstheir attitudes to security issues, radically altering their safety policies in order to ensure the protection of 

their staff members. Nowadays, humanitarian organisations are developing staff training, resources andmanpower to make the delivery of assistance safer in response to the changing operational environment.

This paper seeks to (1) describe and analyse trends in attacks on humanitarian personnel, (2) give anoverview of the training and education humanitarian personnel receive before entering a conflict zone, and(3) explain how security issues have impacted humanitarian organisations working in Afghanistan.

1 A CimicWeb user account is required to access some of the links in this document. 

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The provision of humanitarian assistance has

presented a significantchallenge during the past 30years of turmoil in

  Afghanistan, yet accordingto the Feinstein

International Center report “Humanitarianism UnderThreat,”  security problems

were not always as severeas they are now: deliberate

attacks against aid workerswere almost non-existent inthe 1980s. The article

indicates that during theyears of Taliban rule,humanitarian workers wereseldom targeted and usuallyperceived as neutral.However, following theintervention by US-ledcoalition forces in 2001 andthe formation of the  Afghanistan TransitionalGovernment in 2002 and the

Islamic Republic of 

  Afghanistan in 2004, thesituation changed dramatically. Humanitarian aid workers became closely associated with the UnitedNations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA)2. UNAMA is known for its support for projects run byPresident Hamid Karzai‟s government; as a result, the humanitarian community‟s reputation for neutrality

has been called into question. One of the major challenges humanitarian workers now face is in combatingmisconceptions about their role in Afghanistan. The Integrated Regional Information Networks  (IRIN)  article  “High Risk Humanitarianism”  highlights the difficulty rural Afghans in particular have in

distinguishing between NGO staff members and other private and military actors; this in turn may causethem to be suspicious of  – and therefore reluctant to accept - aid in general, regardless of their needs.The article goes on to suggest that any collaboration with the Afghanistan government is seen as a justification for attacks by the Taliban. There has been a reported increase in attacks against aid workerssince 2006, according to the Feinstein International Center, something they attributed not only to theincrease in troop levels but also the perception that humanitarian assistance is no longer neutral.

Figure 1 (above) reveals several key areas, predominantly in the vicinity of Kabul and in urban centres,where humanitarian organisations have been especially vulnerable to security-related dangers this year.Humanitarian worker fatalities, (see Figure 2, page 3), occurred primarily  in the second quarter of 2010,with most attacks targeting UN organisations rather than INGOs and NGOs.

2 The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA ) was established in Afghanistan in 1988 but closedin 2002 and was only re-established January 2009.

Figure 1. Security Incidents Involving Humanitarian Aid Workers in

2010. 

Red markers added by CFC indicate the security incidents as reported by UNDSS fromJanuary 1, 2010 through July 27, 2010. Map: UN Cartographic Section, July 2009.

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The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office( ANSO) reports that attacks by

armed opposition groups (AOGs)have  increased by 51% and civiliancasualty figures have risen by 23%

since 2009. According to the UNOffice for the Coordination of 

Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA ), theincrease in security incidents can beattributed  to several factors,

including an increase in troopnumbers, security force operations

in the southern region, andsignificant Armed Opposition Group(AOG) activity in the south and

south-east. While incident data fromthe daily UN Department of Safetyand Security (UNDSS) incidentreports show a general deteriorationin the security situation, OCHA and  ANSO reported that the number of security incidents involvinghumanitarian aid workers appeared

to show a general decline when compared to thesame time period in 2009.

The decline has been

attributed to the AOGs‟  preoccupation with theFebruary 2010 Marjahcampaign in the south and

the possibility that some AOGs are learning to value the aid community. UNDSS

and ANSO both indicatethat the most common types of security incidentagainst the aid communityare abductions, followed bythreats, and entry of 

compound or school.

The Overseas DevelopmentInstitute (ODI) report  “Providing Aid in InsecureEnvironments: Trends inviolence against aidworkers and the operational response,” also highlights the trend in kidnapping of aid workers by criminalgroups and AOGs, either carried out separately or in collaboration with one another. Of the security

Figure 3. Incident indicators relative to transit routes. 

Map: WFP, July 15, 2010. Emphasis added on roads and national border 

Figure 2. Fatalities 

Each box, added by CFC, indicates a separate incident with the respective fatality

count. Map: UN Cartographic Section, July 2009.

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incidents reported to ANSO in 2007, criminal groups and AOGs were responsible for 61% and 39% of attacks respectively, with 65% of security incidents involving AOGs in 2008. Notable security incidents

include the 02 July suicide attack   in Kunduz in which an AOG initiated a complex attack against thecompound of Development Alternatives, Inc., killing eight people, two of whom were NGO employees.  Additionally, in April this year, five UN staff members were abducted  and later released by AOGs in

Badghis province. When combined with geographic pinpoints of specific attacks, the latest logistical roadmap (see Figure 3 page 3) of Afghanistan issued by the World Food Program (WFP) clearly shows the

reliance by AOGs on major roadways that connect certain urban hubs such as Kunduz, Kabul, andKandahar. Furthermore, many aid organisations focus their efforts on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)who became homeless due to natural disasters (such as floods) and conflict. Many attacks aimed at aid

organisations are consequently located near large groups of IDPs or disaster-prone areas such as in Khostprovince, neighbouring districts of Kandahar City, Rodat in Nangarhar, and Lashkar Gah in Helmand

province.

  As shown in Figure 4, the number of incidents in a given area may also be a result of the density of 

humanitarian presence in that location. For example, in March 2010 the north and northeast of  Afghanistan accounted for 40% of all incidents, in part because of the  increased humanitarian presence inthose regions. For instance, a high percentage of aid organisations committed to interventions ineducation are located in particularly volatile areas such as Kunduz and Khost province. According to theUNESCO report “Education Under Attack ,” more than 260 attacks against schools were carried out in both

Figure 4. Humanitarian Interventions

Map: OCHA, Who-What-Where, 31 January, 2010. 

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2006 and 2007, but the figure more than tripled to 670 in 2008, thereby suggesting that humanitarianworkers focused on education programmes are at a higher risk of being attacked than those working in

other sectors. This phenomenon can vary according to the degree of local input into humanitarianprojects, for instance, in Mandozai District, Khost province, local communities have been providing supportfor the NGO Partnership for Education in Afghanistan (PECA) and are closely involved in the establishment

of  schools. To date, none of the schools have been targeted by attacks, and PECA attributes this to theinclusion of the local communities in development schemes.

Figure 5 provides an insight into the total number of security incidents involving NGOs between 2006 andearly 2010, as reported by ANSO, showing periods of increase and decrease of attacks over time. ANSO

also reported a spike in   AOG initiated  attacks during the 2009 election period. At this point, furtherresearch into factors influencing attacks on aid workers could include an examination of opium cultivation

levels and harvesting times.

Judging by the ongoing insurgent attacks on personnel from NGOs, the UN, and IOs, the security situationfor humanitarian workers in Afghanistan remains dangerous, and preventing such attacks from takingplace continues to pose a significant challenge for humanitarian aid workers. To improve personal securityand enhance survival in the event of a security incident, such as an attack or abduction, humanitarian aidworkers need to be prepared before entering a potential conflict zone. Security training is therefore vitalfor the safe execution of humanitarian assistance and to ensure that workers are able to return to saferareas upon completion of their duties. To accomplish this task, many organisations offer some form of internal training intended to create situational awareness of the region where personnel will be deployed,as well building as a skill set which teaches them how to handle situations where personal safety might be

 jeopardised. In addition, NGOs rely more and more on security training  from external sources, either in

their respective home countries, or on arrival in Afghanistan if pre-deployment training is not sufficient orunavailable.

 Although many external organisations offer security training for NGO staff, it is not always possible forhumanitarian agencies to provide such training to their staff, as funding priority is given first to theprovision of humanitarian assistance. Security briefings  for humanitarian workers typically focus on

preventing violence and responding to threats, and training is often limited to theoretical instruction. According to Aid Workers Network, a UK based organisation, the following skills need to be trained prior todeployment:

Figure 5. Total Number of Security Incidents per month involving NGOs since 2006 

Graph:  ANSO 2010 

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Understanding the local 'humanitariansystem‟ including the UN agencies, Red

Cross/Crescent Movement and NGOs Assessing security threats  Awareness of the most common types of security threat

Understanding the „acceptance approach‟ to securityRespecting culture and custom

Basic language skills, if possiblePrecautions at home and officeDriving a 4-wheel drive vehicle

Precautions when drivingProcedures at checkpoints

Reacting to the most common types of security incident

Interaction with the militaryInteraction with rebel/irregular troopsRadio handling and voice procedureEquipment for vehicles

Basic vehicle checksChanging a wheelHealth and hygiene in the fieldStress management

Programme suspension, hibernation andevacuation

Medical evacuation

It is often the case that many of these skills cannot be trained or are omitted for the sake of saving money

and resources. According to ANSO, the key to guaranteeing NGO safety is by maintaining their perceivedneutrality  amongst local communities, as well as through developing an understanding of local culturesand traditions. This way, personnel get a unique and local Afghan perspective of security. To mitigate risk 

and enter dangerous areas NGOs must adhere to humanitarian principles, says ANSO. Judging by the vastnumber of security related incidents involving NGO personnel no one is immune to violence. Propertraining can increase the safety and survival of NGO personnel. According to the Humanitarian PolicyGroup3 (HPG), the increasing security challenge and related training have resulted in some humanitarianorganisations offering contracts to external security companies  in order to ensure the protection of theirstaff members, using either armed or unarmed guards. This has been increasingly common over the  pastfive years. Nonetheless, armed security guards still seem to be the exception, and most major NGOs haveused local unarmed guards at one time or another in addition to offering security training, carrying out risk 

assessments, and receiving security management consultation from international companies.

 An example of an organisation with a proactive approach to security awareness is the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which has developed a UNHCR eCentre, or training centre, that

provides week-long real life simulations covering field communications, checkpoints, hostile crowds,minefields and the effect of bullets. The centre is based in Tokyo, Japan and currently targets workers inthe Asia-Pacific region, with more than 2,700 UN staff, NGO staff and government officials trained since2000. Some organisations, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), have specific measures listed ontheir website informing staff of how to plan for crises, though just how systematic and proactive security

training and awareness for staff is in the UN and NGO community merits further study.

 Attacks against humanitarian workers in Afghanistan, coupled with NGO concerns about the „militarisation

and polarisation‟ of aid led to the development of the Guidelines for the Interaction and Coordination of 

Humanitarian Actors and Military Actors in May 2008. IRIN reports that the guidelines were approved bythe UN, NGOs, NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)-led troops, and Afghan governmentforces and are intended to clarify the role  of the various actors in Afghanistan and attempt to correctmisperceptions about neutrality of aid. Some key elements of the guidelines include: (1) the creation of 

 „compliance areas‟ for humanitarian and military actors to ensure the sustainable access by humanitariansto all populations; (2) for Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to abstain from humanitarian assistanceunless requested (in the case of an emergency); and (3) for military actors to stop using white vehicles, a

3The Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) is a programme of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI).

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traditional humanitarian form of transport that provides a critical role in differentiating betweencombatants and non-combatants. As stated by IRIN, NATO ISAF agreed to stop using white vehicles as of 

01 June 2009 in order to adhere to the agreed guidelines. As a further safeguarding measure, the Afghanistan civil-military working group has been set up as a forum where violations of the guidelines canbe reported and discussed. Reports of violations can also be presented to OCHA and the Agency Co-

ordinating Body for Afghan Relief ( ACBAR ).

 Attacks against humanitarian actors have also led to a new phenomenon in humanitarian assistance called „remote management‟ of projects, where international staff make limited, if any, visits to insecure areasand instead rely on national staff or implementing organisations to complete projects. According to the

CARE report   „Aid and Civil-Military Relations in Afghanistan,‟  if it is poorly planned, remote managementcarries great risks for national staff and employees and creates distance between recipients of aid and

international staff, potentially leading to distrust amongst communities. The CARE report further highlightsthe possible dangers in the fact that a new generation of armed opposition group fighters lack understanding of aid agencies, due to the diminished presence of humanitarian workers in their area. The

practice of remote management can be planned for, according to the Humanitarian Exchange  report “Humanitarian Security Management,” and should include training and resources for more effective andsecure remote management. The CARE report also states that security awareness and preparedness needsto be incorporated into pre-deployment activities, given that approximately one-third of humanitarianworker fatalities occur in the first three months of their employment.

In the new millennium, attacks against aid workers globally have increased, with Afghanistan, Sudan(Darfur), and Somalia now considered the three most dangerous locations in the world for humanitarianassistance, according to the Overseas Development Institute (ODI). Though there are differing statisticsand reports about when, where and how often attacks are occurring against humanitarian workers in Afghanistan, these attacks still continue, whether for opportunistic criminal reasons or as part of politically

motivated, pre-meditated attacks. The development of security policies and the protection of humanitarian

workers continue to evolve with the global operating environment. For instance, the establishment  of UNDSS in January 2005 came in direct response to the bombings of the UN Headquarters in Baghdad in2003. In Afghanistan,  ANSO was formed in 2002 to address the specific safety concerns of NGOs, whosestaff members are working in complex conflict areas, and therefore need their security issues to be fully

considered. In practice, Security Risk Assessments (SRAs) are undertaken in each country to develop a setof Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS), the recommended security measures that may includethe hiring of security officers, security equipment, and communications requirements, amongst other

things. However, the ability for organisations to meet MOSS requirements and balance programmeassistance needs against staff security at the field level is an ongoing process, according to the ODIreport. 

 As long as humanitarian needs exist in Afghanistan, there will be aid organisations dedicated to providingassistance, though hopefully the humanitarian workers tasked to this complex environment will receive the

necessary security preparation and training to avoid attacks and fatalities in the future.

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