Humanitarian Pandemic Preparedness and Response

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Humanitarian Pandemic Preparedness and Response Phnom Penh 12 October, 2009 Ron Waldman, MD

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Humanitarian Pandemic Preparedness and Response. Phnom Penh 12 October, 2009 Ron Waldman, MD. What does an influenza virus look like?. Fig.1 Electron micrograph. H emagglutinin protein Allows virus to stick to cells Determines cell and species specificity N euraminidase protein - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Transcript of Humanitarian Pandemic Preparedness and Response

Page 1: Humanitarian Pandemic Preparedness  and Response

Humanitarian Pandemic Preparedness and Response

Phnom Penh

12 October, 2009

Ron Waldman, MD

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What does an influenza virus look like?

• Hemagglutinin protein– Allows virus to stick to cells

– Determines cell and species specificity

• Neuraminidase protein– Releases new virus

particles from cells

• Genetic material divided into 8 separate segments

Fig.1 Electron micrograph

Fig.2 Schematic of influenza virus

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Three Different Kinds of Influenza

Seasonal Influenza“The Flu”

Seasonal Influenza“The Flu”

Avian Influenza“Bird Flu”

Avian Influenza“Bird Flu”

Pandemic Influenza“A Pandemic”

Pandemic Influenza“A Pandemic”

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Why does a pandemic occur?

Antigenic shift

Sudden change in antigenic structure of microorganisms, especially viruses, which produces new strains of the microorganism; hosts previously exposed to other strains have little or no acquired immunity to the new strain.

“Novel Influenza A (H1N1)”

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What is required for a pandemic of influenza to occur?

• Novel virus to which population has little or no immunity

• Virus that is pathogenic and virulent in humans

• Virus must be capable of sustained person-to-person transmission

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• A pandemic will result in larger numbers of all types of cases than in seasonal flu.

• The proportions of types of cases in a pandemic will depend on the severity of the pandemic.

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How does the virus spread?

• Pigs? (why is it called “swine flu”)

• Airplanes? (yes, but…)

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Rapid transition from Phases 3 to 6, followed by quick spread around the world, may leave us little time to prepare.

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New WHO Phases of Pandemic Alert

• Phase 6 = Sustained community transmission of a new flu virus in 2 or more WHO regions.

• “Designation of this phase will indicate that a global pandemic is under way.”

(www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/phase/en/index.html - See notes below)

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First H1N1 Death in Cambodia28 September 2009

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Why We Should Care

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Reason #3:

Pandemics have happened before; one is happening now. They can be severe. They are always important.

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What were past flu pandemics like?

1918: “Spanish Flu” 1957: “Asian Flu” 1968: “Hong Kong Flu”

20-40 million deaths

675,000 US deaths

1-4 million deaths

70,000 US deaths

1-4 million deaths

34,000 US deaths

Credi: US National Museum of Health and Medicine

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Reason #2:

The humanitarian consequences of a pandemic could be devastating in terms of lives lost, economic disaster, and societal upheaval.

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Life expectancy-USA, 1900-28

30

40

50

60

70

1900

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1903

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1906

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1909

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1912

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1915

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1918

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1921

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1924

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1927

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Reason #1:

More than ever before, we can save lives during a pandemic!

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H2P – Humanitarian Pandemic Preparedness and Response

To limit excess mortality during a pandemic

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New Tools for Intervention during a Pandemic

• Non-pharmaceutical (community mitigation) measures

• Strain-specific influenza vaccine

• Antiviral drugs (Tamiflu, Relenza)

• Antibiotics

• Infection control measures

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Community Mitigation

• Isolation of those ill

• Voluntary quarantine of household members

• Social distancing of children (close schools?)

• Social distancing of adults (stagger working hours, close places of employment, places of worship, places of amusement) – those ill should stay home

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Days Since First Case

Dai

ly C

ases

Pandemic Outbreak:No Intervention

Pandemic Outbreak:With Intervention

Delay outbreak peak

Decompress peak burden on hospitals/infrastructure

Diminish overall cases and health impacts

2

1

3

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WHO/IFRC/UNOCHA/UNICEF “Call to Action”

1. Identify populations at increased risk of disease and death

-- health care workers and other critical personnel

-- pregnant women

-- children

-- underlying illness

-- poor access to health care

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WHO/IFRC/UNOCHA/UNICEF “Call to Action”

2. Reduce death by treating acute respiratory illness and pneumonia

-- train, supervise and ensure health care workers, including CHWs, can identify, classify and treat acute lower respiratory illnesses

-- plan for a 30% buffer stock of antibiotics, O2, etc.

-- educate communities about home-care, when to seek care outside the home, and when anti-virals are appropriate

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WHO/IFRC/UNOCHA/UNICEF “Call to Action”

3. Reduce spread of disease

-- prepare and disseminate risk communication messages

-- map and train social mobilization networks to promote prevention

-- identify target groups to receive first doses of vaccination and advocate for their access

-- develop operational plans for mass vaccination

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Current Knowledge Regarding H1N1 Vaccine

• A single dose of non-adjuvanted vaccine induces an immunogenic response in healthy young and middle-aged adults

• More people can be vaccinated with a fixed amount of vaccine

• Antibody responses will develop more rapidly than with two doses

• Vaccination campaigns will be easier to conduct

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Current Knowledge Regarding H1N1 Vaccine

• Many countries have not developed plans for use of H1N1 vaccines:

-- high-priority groups

-- cold chain requirements

-- points of distribution and delivery

-- post-vaccination surveillance

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WHO/IFRC/UNOCHA/UNICEF “Call to Action”

4. Continue critical services and plan for the worst

-- review or create business continuity plans

-- prioritize continuation of critical health and other essential services as part of a whole of society approach; build on existing multi-hazard, multi-sector plans

-- ensure 8-12 weeks of buffer stocks of essential medicines to continue treating priority conditions

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WHO/IFRC/UNOCHA/UNICEF “Call to Action”

5. Plan and coordinate efforts

-- incorporate pandemic activities into existing coordination mechanisms

-- recognize that no one agency can provide all of the priority interventions. Build on capacities and comparative advantages of each partner

-- do not allow “lack of coordination” to become a cause of death

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Aceh, Indonesia, December 2004

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Recommendation (2005)

“An improved seismic detection system should be developed and implemented in the region as quickly as possible.”

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The only thing more difficult than planning for a pandemic would be explaining why you did not do it.