Illegal Legitimacy' of Kosovo Intervention

Amjad Nazeer

Bertha Chakawarika

Isidora Stakic

November 2009

University of Gothenburg, Sweden

2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction............................................................................................3

1. The Socio-political Context............................................................3

2. The Kosovo Crisis.............................................................................4

3. NATO Intervention and the Question of illegality...........................5

3.1. Jus ad bellum.............................................................................6

3.2. Jus in bello..................................................................................8

4. NATO Intervention and the Question of Moral legitimacy..............9

Conclusion................................................................................................12

References................................................................................................14

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Introduction:

In theoretical terms, humanitarian intervention has been defined as, “the threat or use of force across state

borders, by a state (or a group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of

fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state

within whose territory the force is applied”1. According to Roland Dannreuther, the NATO coalition that

waged the war against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter FRY) essentially decided that the Yugoslav

authorities had forfeited, at least temporarily if not permanently, the right to political and territorial control

over Kosovo due to the systematic abuse of human rights of the Kosovar Albanians2. The decision for the

humanitarian intervention in Kosovo has perhaps been the most controversial of the post-cold war period

and has raised fundamental and divisive questions about the nature and form of the emerging international

order3. The aim of this essay is to examine and evaluate the (Il)legality and at least the legitimacy of the

NATO intervention in Kosovo, and also to discuss the implications of this operation to the international law

and the future of humanitarian intervention. In order to do so, a short review of the historical background

of Kosovo and the roots of the crisis will be needed.

1. Socio-political context:

History reveals that ethnic Albanians and Serbs had competed for power in the region of Kosovo all through

the 20th Century. As a part of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter SFRY), Kosovo had a status

of Socialist Autonomous Province within the Socialist Republic of Serbia. In March 1981 Kosovar Albanian

students of the University of Pristina organized protests demanding that Kosovo become a republic within

SFRY, but the protests were brutally suppressed by the Yugoslav police and army4. During the 1980s, ethnic

tensions continued with frequent violent outbreaks against SFRY authorities resulting in a further increase

in emigration of Kosovo Serbs and other ethnic groups5. However, after the amendments to the Serbian

Constitution in 1989, Kosovo's autonomy was drastically reduced and the political and cultural oppression of

Kosovar Albanians intensified. As a consequence, Albanian nationalism and separatisms in Kosovo,

combined with the economic factors, such as high rate of unemployment, led to growing ethnic tensions

between the Serbs and Albanians. Belgrade policy aimed at changing the ethnic composition of Kosovo and

1 Buchnan, A., 2003. Reforming the international law of humanitarian assistance, in ed. Holzgref, J.L. & Keohane, R.O., Humanitarian intervention: Ethical, legal and political dilemmas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 130.

2 Buckley, M. & Cummings, S.N., 2001. Kosovo: Perceptions of War and its Aftermath. London: Continuum, p. 12-13.

3 Ibid. 4 Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, Kosovo (Kosovo in Communist Yugoslavia). [Online], Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kosovo#Kosovo_in_Communist_Yugoslavia [Accessed 31 October 2009].

5 Ibid.

4

creating an apartheid-like society6, resulted in thousands of refugees fleeing to Albania.

Kosovo’s population in 1998 stood at 1.3 million of which 90% was ethnic Albanian, most of them Muslims7.

On the other hand, Serbia argues its claims on Kosovo on the fact that the centre of Medieval Serbia was to

be found in this particular province. Serbs consider Kosovo the cradle of their culture, religion and national

identity8.

2. The Kosovo Crisis:

When Slobodan Milosevic took power in Serbia in 1989, he began to build his power-base as defender of

Serbian minorities throughout SFRY, especially in Kosovo9. His aim was to protect the Serbs in Kosovo, being

discriminated at the hands of Kosovar authorities. In 1989 Milosevic abolished Kosovar autonomy, re-

asserted Serbian direct rule and purged Kosovars from jobs in government and education10. As a result,

Kosovar Albanians, led by Ibrahim Rugova, began non-violent campaigns which were aimed at creating a

parallel network of schools, health-care centres and municipal government run by the Kosovars

themselves11. However, there was no support for the non-violent resistance movement and this very fact

led many Kosovar Albanians to conclude that violence was the only way to attract international attention12.

During 1991-1992, the European Union appointed the Badinter Arbitration Committee to establish the state

recognition guidelines for the former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, according to the Committee, Kosovo did not

meet this standard, since it did not have the status of federal republic13. Kosovo was also by-passed in the

1995 Dayton talks, and after that the Kosovar Albanians lost any realistic hope of outside help14.

In the year 1998 Kosovar Albanians formed the Kosovo Liberation Army (hereinafter KLA) which was

comprised of small armed groups that started with guerilla fighting in rural areas, hoping for the

international intervention15. Consequently, the retaliation by Serbian Security Forces became heavier,

leaving 300 000 Albanians homeless. In October 1998, a ceasefire was agreed and the international OSCE

6 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000. Kosovo report. [Online], Available at: http://www.temple.edu/lawschool/drwiltext/docs/The%20Kosovo%20Report.pdf [Accessed 18 October 2009], p. 1.

7 Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, Demographics of Kosovo. [Online], Availble at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Kosovo [Accessed 31 October 2009].

8 Anon, Flashback on Kosovo's war. BBC News, [Online], Last updated: 10 July 2006. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5165042.stm [Accessed 31 November 2009].

9 Ignatieff, M., 2000. Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond. London: Chatto & Windus, p. 13. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Caplan, R., 1998. International Diplomacy and the Crisis in Kosovo. International Affairs: Royal Institute of

International Affairs, [Online]. 74(4), p.747. 13 International Crisis Group, 2008. Report on Kosovo. [Online], Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1243 [Accessed 30 October 2009].

14 Ibid. 15 Supra note 12, p. 749.

5

monitoring mission was inserted, but in February 1999 the fighting resumed. The six-nation Contact Group

comprising of US, UK, France, Germany, Italy and Russia summoned both sides to talks in Rambouillet,

France. The core of the Contact Group plan included the disarming of the KLA and the withdrawal of Serb

forces with supervision from an “enabling force” of 30 000 NATO troops. The plan also provided for a

restoration of Kosovo's autonomy and its independent institution16. However, the Serbian delegation

refused the proposal.

3. NATO Intervention Interventions and the Question of Illegality:

In March 1999 NATO launched a bombing campaign over Kosovo without UN Security Council authorization.

The use of force followed several years' escalation of violence between Serbian forces and KLA, and failed

negotiations culminating in Serbia's refusal of the international Contact Group's plan for Kosovo during the

negotiations in Rambouillet, France. The rationale for military intervention by NATO rested not on the

immediate threat of humanitarian catastrophe in early 1999, but rather on a mix of past experiences and

future concerns17, combined with the principal goal of preventing further oppression of Kosovar Albanians

and ensuring the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and paramilitary forces. In the period

March 24, 1999 to June 11, 1999, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (hereinafter: the

Commission) estimates the number of killings in the neighbourhood of 10 000, with the vast majority of the

victims being Kosovar Albanians killed by FRY forces; approximately 863 000 civilians sough or were forced

into refuge outside Kosovo and an additional 590 000 were internally displaced18.

NATO intervention within the territory of the FRY in 1999 has risen questions of fundamental importance to

the international society, specifically with regard to the international law concerning the use of force and

“the weight of modern international human rights principles in modifying traditional international law on

that subject”19.

3.1. Jus ad bellum:

Providing for clear regulation of use of force in international relations has been an aim of international law

for long time, and was one of the main concerns leading to the establishment of the United Nations20.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter generally prohibits the use of force in international relations. However, the

framers of the Charter were aware that armed conflicts between states would not disappear by legislative

16 Supra note 6, p. 29. 17 Supra note 6, p. 57. 18 Supra note 6, p.1. 19 Joyner, D.H., 2002. Kosovo Intervention: Legal Analysis and a More Persuasive Paradigm. EJIL, [Online]. 13(3), p. 597.

20 Ibid, p. 599.

6

decree, thus they did not naively pursue the goal of permanent and universal peace, but rather tried to

create a global system that would make armed conflicts exceptional events21. The UN Charter permits uses

of force in three instances22.

First of all, article 39 (Chapter VII) confers on the Security Council the responsibility to “determine the

existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression”, and to “make

recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken [...], to maintain or restore international peace

and security”. Further, articles 43-49 concern the modalities of taking such measures, including the use of

military force. However, on March 1999 NATO decided to proceed with a military intervention without

obtaining, or even seeking UNSC authorization, and without making any sort of secondary appeal to the

General assembly23. On the other hand, it was clear that UNSC Resolution 1199 was not sufficient in itself to

provide a legal basis for the use of armed force by UN Member States or international organizations24.

Secondly, the right to use force in collective self-defence is set out in Article 51 of UN Charter. This right is,

however, limited by the authority of UNSC, and lasts only “until the Security Council has taken measures

necessary to maintain international peace and security”25. Furthermore, the ICJ in its decision in the

Nicaragua Case clarified other parameters of collective self-defence26, by stating that this right may be

exercised only by the State having been the victim of an armed attack27, and only if the victim-State

explicitly request collective defence28. It is clear that in the case of intervention in Kosovo, none of the above

mentioned criterias has been met by NATO.

Thirdly, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter permits regional arrangements (including regional security

arrangements) but subject them to the authority of the UNSC. As established by the Article 53, “[...] no

enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the

authorization of the Security Council [...]”. “Although there is a subsidiary argument about implied

authorization to use force once a conflict has been formally treated by the UNSC as a threat to international

peace and security […], it remains difficult to reconcile NATO's recourse to armed intervention on behalf of

21 Baaz, M., 2009. The Use of Force and International Society. Stockholm: Jure Förlag AB, p. 112. 22 O'Conell, M.E., 2000. The UN, NATO, and International Law After Kosovo. Human Rights Quarterly, [Online]. 22, p. 58.

23 Supra note 6, p. 59-60. 24 Simma, B., 1999. NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects. EJIL, [Online]. 10, p. 7. 25 Charter of the United Nations, Art. 51. 26 Supra note 22, p. 59. 27 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgement [1986] ICJ, p. 103, 195.

28 Ibid, p. 105, 199.

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Kosovo with the general framework of legal rights and duties which determines the legality of the use of

force”29.

On the other hand, it can be argued that, despite restrictions on the use of force imposed by the UN

Charter, there has developed in customary international law an independent right of military intervention in

the affairs of other states for purpose of protecting individuals from grave violations of human rights30.

Proponents of this view point to the provisions in the UN Charter and other legal instruments that support

international promotion and protection of human rights. However, international law on these matters is not

yet settled, and it remains open to question whether NATO intervention in FRY can be legally grounded in

the “right to intervene” or possibly in the responsibility to protect31.

In addition, it should be noted that, although NATO intervention in Kosovo was not authorized by UN, UNSC

chose not to condemn it. Russia tabled a draft UNSC resolution on 26 March 1999 condemning NATO's use

of force, but only Russia, China and Namibia voted in favour, leading to the defeat of the resolution32.

3.2. Jus in bello:

Situations of armed conflicts are governed primarily (but not exclusively33) by International Humanitarian

Law (IHL). One of the fundamental principles of IHL is the principle of distinction between civilians and

combatants, as well as between civilian and military objects, and this principle is nowadays codified in

Articles 48, 52 and 53 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. Although Protocol I has not

been ratified by all members of NATO, the above mentioned articles are widely considered as the rules of

customary international law, thus impose obligation on all start.

According to the Amnesty International report “Collateral Damage or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the

Laws of War by NATO during Operation Allied Force”, NATO did not always meet its legal obligations in

selecting targets and in choosing means and methods of warfare34. Air attack on the headquarters of

Serbian state radio and television in which 16 civilians were killed, represents “a deliberate attack on a

29 Supra note 6, p. 60. 30 Supra note 19, p. 601. 31 See: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001. The Responsibility to Protect. [Online], Available at: http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp [Accessed 19 October 2009].

32 Bellamy, A.J. & Wheeler, N.J., Humanitarian intervention in world politics, in Baylis, J., Smith, S. & Owens, P., 2004. The globalization of world politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 530.

33 Human Rights Law does not cease to be applicable in times of war. 34 Amnesty International, 2000. Collateral Damage or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Laws of War by NATO

during Operation Allied Force (Summary). [Online], Available at: http://www.arnehansen.net/000609nato.htm [Accessed 20 October 2009].

8

civilian object and as such constitutes a war crime”. Moreover, in various attacks on bridges, which generally

may be considered as the legitimate targets, NATO forces failed to suspend their attacks after it was evident

that they had struck civilians35. Finally, in several cases, including the attacks on displaced civilians in

Djakovica, “sufficient precautions were not taken to minimize civilian casualties”36. Summing up, the

position of Amnesty International on the intervention in Kosovo is that “civilian deaths could have been

significantly reduced if NATO forces had fully adhered to the laws of war”37.

However, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo is of the view that NATO succeeded in

selective targeting, complying with the principles of the IHL, “with only relatively minor breaches that were

themselves reasonable interpretations of military necessity in the context”38. The Commission has taken into

account and given great weight to the Final Report of the ICTY in which the Tribunal concluded that “the

most serious allegations against NATO relating to the law of war were not of sufficient merit to warrant

further investigation”39. Nevertheless, the Independent Commission has also taken into account the above

mentioned Amnesty International report, and admitted that “some practices do seem vulnerable to the

allegation that violations might have occurred, and depend for final assessment upon the availability of

further evidence”40.

Finally, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo concluded that the NATO intervention in FRY

was illegal but legitimate41.

4. Kosovo Intervention and the Question of Moral Legitimacy:

Kosovo operation, at least in official circles of the allied forces, has been portrayed as if a ‘new era of moral

rectitude’ has commenced, ending the old practices of human rights abuse and crimes against humanity.

The ‘new humanism’ along with the ‘new world order’, fortuitously at the turn of the ‘new millennium’ is

about to rescue ailing humanity from the burden of the oppression and tyrannical governments. That was a

sense conveyed by the allied forces at the various occasions, while the reality was often quite contrary. By

enforcing the ‘new humanism’ with force, a kind of old order i.e. an order of awe and authoritarianism was

reinforced. “Peace lost, power won”42 and sidelining United Nations43, the aggressors strengthened old rules

35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 Supra note 6, p. 66. 39 Ibid, p. 64. 40 Ibid, p. 66. 41 Ibid, p. 2. 42 The comment was actually made by the head of the Centre party of Israel and the wife of the ex-Chief of staff as

9

of the game i.e. of power and aggression, in the “cloak of moral righteousness”44. And in this tale of tragedy

there is no good and evil but only evil and less evil. Besides all reservations, however, the fact of protecting

number of human lives through this mission can never be undermined45.

The overall approach that we have adopted in analysing Kosovo crisis is predominantly humanitarian but it

must not be neglected that USA and its allied forces had very strong political motives behind that we would

not go into details save cursory mention. The aerial strikes were made with scientific precision, but up in the

air, to avoid any possible loss of NATO soldiers46. The staff was strictly advised to fly at higher altitude,

unapproachable for any surface to air missiles. Naturally, the targets remained less precise and less accurate

at the expense of greater risk to civilian lives on earth47.

Despite the harmful effects and the threats that a humanitarian intervention might pose to the stability of a

state whose sovereignty is being violated, it is being increasingly realised amongst the experts that heinous

‘crimes against humanity’ should be no longer permissible at the pretext of national security or state

sovereignty. “If humanitarian intervention is indeed an assault on sovereignty”, as described by Kofi Anan

shortly after Kosovo crisis, “then how should we respond to a Rwanda and a Srebrenica on gross and

systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?”. The Genocide

convention from 1951. also recognizes the need for humanitarian intervention, where justified, to protect

people from the human rights abuses48.

UN Security Council faced a severe disagreement over the questions of using force in Iraq, mindful of the

fact that it might set precedence for unlawful intervention in other states, which is no less than a war of

aggression against the weaker states. Any act of humanitarian intervention is assumed to be illegal, if it is

not authorised by UN Security Council. But if the UNSC fails either to seek endorsement or effectively

discharge its duty to protect humanity, is there a possibility to initiate any such action without the sanction

of UN authority or are there certain principles outside the UN system that can be employed to protect a

group of people being massacred by its own state? Knowing the intricacies, it is more than likely to suppose

cited in: Chomsky, N., 1999. The new military humanism: Lessons from Kosovo. London: Pluto Press, p.11.

43 As described by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, cited in: ibid. 44 As commented by a prominent military and strategic commentator (the name is not mentioned), cited in: ibid. 45 Chomsky, N., 1999. The new military humanism: Lessons from Kosovo. London: Pluto Press, p.11. 46 Back in 1993 USA had lost 18 of its soldiers in Somalia when a black Cobra Helicopter was shot down by an anti-air craft missile. Under pressure from the soldiers parents and the public USA had withdrew its troops from the peacekeeping operation.

47 Seybolt, T.B., 2007. Humanitarian Military Intervention: The condition for success and failure, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 83.

48 Foley, C., 2008. The thin blue line: How humanitarianism went to war, London: Verso, p. 150.

10

that a humanitarian crisis occurs somewhere but UN fails to reach a consensus, usually hampered by the

irrational veto power held by its five permanent members. Therefore, experts incline to think of a possibility

to morally justify a humanitarian intervention without UN authorization, as the last resort, save the action is

not politically motivated49.

Others, such as Henry Shue and Geoffery Robertson, argue that UN sanction for a humanitarian intervention

need not to be inevitable. Alternatively, there should be an impartial and democratic body, knowing that UN

has failed to become a democratic or impartial body, mandated to decide for a humanitarian intervention in

response to conscious shocking atrocities inflicted by a state upon its own nationals. Robertson argues that

though Kosovo intervention was a breach of Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, it could be justified under the

following reasons: ample evidence is available that long before NATO air strikes, Belgrade was bent upon a

genocidal mission against Kosovar Albanians causing severe humanitarian crisis and massive influx of

refugees in neighbouring countries threatening prospects of peace in the region. Tantamount to ‘crimes

against humanity’, the very act called for a humanitarian action under the Article 7 of the Rome Statute

constituting International Criminal Court50.

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), established after the Kosovo

crisis, stipulates the need for ‘use of force’ if circumstances desire so, to put an end to a genocidal war,

crimes against humanity or an expedition of ethnic cleansing. In response to the recommendation made by

the Commission's report, a resolution on ‘the responsibility to protect’ was adopted by UN World Summit in

2005. Amidst divergent views, the Commission adopts a middle course by advocating the respect for

‘internal affairs of the state’ and simultaneously highlights the ‘responsibility to protect’. It acknowledges

and reaffirms that external interventions might set off anti-state elements, disturb internal order of the

state and ensue chaos. It also encourages the states to settle its internal disputes in a peaceful manner51.

Finding no way out, humanitarian NGOs have also been influencing interventionist decisions in the times of

similar crisis. Oxfam lobbied for humanitarian intervention in Zaire (1996) and in Sierra Leone (2000).

Human Rights Watch and World Vision were in favour of armed intervention in Kosovo to protect Albanian

Muslims. CARE International mobilized support for humanitarian intervention in Haiti to restore its elected

government (1991) and in Somalia (1993). Regarding Kosovo, Oxfam wrote a letter to the British prime

minister urging him to use the threat of force, “as the only remaining option to uphold citizen’s rights in

49 Ibid, p. 149-152. 50 Robertson, G. & Shue, H. in Foley, C., supra note 49, p. 152-153, and Chomsky, N., supra note 45, p. 17. 51 Supra note 6, p. 3.

11

war”. “This may not be the ideal option but it is the least worst option”, Oxfam said52.

Given the constrains in winning over consensus for humanitarian intervention, the illegal acts of

intervention, directed towards legal reforms, seem to be a rational choice to several experts. Obviously any

such acts need to be rational and morally justifiable as well. Allan Buchanan53 recommends eight such

preconditions for illegal acts directed towards legal reforms, coupled with rational justifications. These could

be summed up as: “the more a system approximates its normative ideals, greater the difficulty to justify

illegal acts of intervention or to justify a violation to the existing norm; the less defective the system in

terms of substantiating justice, greater the challenge to justify illegal acts; closer the system to the ideals of

a legitimate system, greater the burden to justify; the more an act violates the fundamental and morally

defensible principles of the system, greater the burden to justify it; greater the improvement in the system

or stronger the system, the greater the burden to justify the illegal acts that are likely to improve the

legitimacy of the system of international law; the illegal acts that succeed to change dimensions of

substantive justice are easier to be justified and finally the illegal acts that are more likely to contribute in

making the system consistent with its morally defensible principles are easier to be justified”.

Any such intervention, e.g. abolishing slavery, introducing the principles of non-discrimination, and even

fighting for freedom from the colonial oppression, should result in fundamental reforms in the international

law or constituting a new customary international law at best. While making a responsible choice, certain

illegal acts could be advisable if such acts are directed towards the essentially required reforms. However it

depends of the conscientious choice of the actor whether breaking of domestic law is committed towards

the change that is demanded for the larger good54.

Conclusion:

Several conclusions could be drawn from Kosovo case such as: Early warning alone rarely helps. A strong

political will to commit substantial resources is also necessary. A humanitarian intervention involves serious

risks of escalating tension and atrocities but eventually it does more good than harm. It was not the NATO

bombing that provoked Serbian attacks, rather FRY military was unfolding an elaborate plan for torture,

ethnic cleansing and large scale expulsion of Kosovar Albanians. However, bombing did provide an excuse in

which Serbian army could intensify its mission to operationalize its brutalities. Indecisiveness of the

52 Supra note 48, p. 159-169. 53 Supra note 1, p. 159-160. 54 Holzgref, J.L. & Keohane, R.O., 2003. Humanitarian intervention: Ethical, legal and political dilemmas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 158-163.

12

international society, multiple and multifarious political agendas and mixed signals always hamper effective

diplomacy. Threat and coercive diplomacy, the mode that was adopted in negotiations with Serbian

administration, violates the norms of UN Charter and is more than likely to fail55.

A disproportionate veto power, in this case Russian, makes things problematic for humanitarian

intervention. Hence NATO went for its humanitarian mission without UN approval. The Kosovo intervention

is believed to be illegal, for not being sanctioned by the Security Council, but morally legitimate given the

scale of humanitarian crisis. Before that, all possible diplomatic efforts had been exhausted. The mission

was inevitable to protect Kosovar civilians from Serbian oppressive regime.

Underfunded and understaffed, the humanitarian support fell far short of the need on the ground, creating

problems for resettlement and administrative arrangement at the end of the operation56. As a natural

consequence of all humanitarians crisis, hundreds of thousands of people fled to the neighbouring Albania

and Macedonia putting immense relief and rehabilitation pressures on the respective governments. Lack of

preparedness and poor coordination aggravated the crisis further. Despite this all, the conditions of the

camps and the level of supplies were much better than we normally see in response to the crisis in Africa

(and Asia). It is quite evident that the political objectives were more or less achieved but humanitarian loss

afforded was more than NATO leaders had probably imagined57.

Kosovo intervention can be judged effectively and successfully only if we see things from an empirical

approach. Precisely put, it was a success from realist political perspective, but from a ‘normative’ and

‘constructivist' angle it was no less than a disaster. It was rather a blow to humanitarian progress. More an

expression of ethnocentrism and arrogance than a collective progress towards humanitarian cause. Failing

to create gemeinschaft society and a collective sense of “we-ness” at international level, the very act has

opened up new avenues to the relativist eccentricities. It is also clear that states rarely operate purely for

humanitarian aims. Kosovo operation did achieve a lot in terms of saving hundreds of thousands of lives and

restoring peace and stability in the region but profoundly damaged the development of ‘international

society’ and ‘international humanitarian regime’. Post September the 11, 2001 - interventions in

Afghanistan and Iraq, based on parochial and self serving agenda of the powerful few, was another fatal

blow to the evolution of international society and humanitarian law58.

55 Supra note 47, p. 3-4. 56 Supra note 6, p. 3. 57 Supra note 47, p. 82-84. 58 Baaz, M., 2008-09. Human Rights or human wrongs? Towards a “thin” universal code of international human rights

13

References:

Books:

1. Baaz, M., 2009. The Use of Force and International Society. Stockholm: Jure Förlag AB.

2. Baylis, J., Smith, S. & Owens, P., 2004. The globalization of world politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

3. Buckley, M. & Cummings, S.N., 2001. Kosovo: Perceptions of War and its Aftermath. London: Continuum.

4. Chomsky, N., 1999. The new military humanism: Lessons from Kosovo. London: Pluto Press.

5. Foley, C., 2008. The thin blue line: How humanitarianism went to war, London: Verso.

6. Holzgref, J.L. & Keohane, R.O., 2003. Humanitarian intervention: Ethical, legal and political dilemmas.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

7. Ignatieff, M., 2000. Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond. London: Chatto & Windus.

8. Seybolt, T.B., 2007. Humanitarian Military Intervention: The condition for success and failure, Oxford:

Oxford University Press.

Articles:

1. Baaz, M., 2008-09. Human Rights or human wrongs? Towards a “thin” universal code of international

human rights for the twenty first century. Sartryk Ur Jurisdisk Tidskrift.

2. Caplan, R., 1998. International Diplomacy and the Crisis in Kosovo. International Affairs: Royal Institute of

International Affairs, [Online]. 74(4).

3. Joyner, D.H., 2002. Kosovo Intervention: Legal Analysis and a More Persuasive Paradigm. EJIL, [Online].

13(3).

4. O'Conell, M.E., 2000. The UN, NATO, and International Law After Kosovo. Human Rights Quarterly,

[Online]. 22.

5. Simma, B., 1999. NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects. EJIL, [Online]. 10.

Reports:

1. Amnesty International, 2000. Collateral Damage or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Laws of War by

NATO during Operation Allied Force (Summary). [Online], Available at:

http://www.arnehansen.net/000609nato.htm [Accessed 20 October 2009].

2. Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000. Kosovo report. [Online], Available at:

http://www.temple.edu/lawschool/drwiltext/docs/The%20Kosovo%20Report.pdf [Accessed 18 October

2009].

for the twenty first century. Sartryk Ur Jurisdisk Tidskrift, p. 423-426 & 432.

14

3. International Crisis Group, 2008. Report on Kosovo. [Online], Available at:

http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1243 [Accessed 30 October 2009].

International Instruments and Court Cases:

1. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 1977.

2. Charter of the United Nations 1945.

3. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1951.

4. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),

Judgement [1986] ICJ.

Websources:

1. Anon, Flashback on Kosovo's war. BBC News, [Online], Last updated: 10 July 2006. Available at:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5165042.stm [Accessed 31 November 2009].

2. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001. The Responsibility to Protect.

[Online], Available at: http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp [Accessed 19 October 2009].

3. Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, Kosovo (Kosovo in Communist Yugoslavia). [Online], Available at:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kosovo#Kosovo_in_Communist_Yugoslavia [Accessed 31 October 2009].

4. Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, Demographics of Kosovo. [Online], Availble at:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Kosovo [Accessed 31 October 2009].