Humanitarian International NGOs in War: Facilitators or Inheritors of CSR Guidelines?

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Humanitarian International NGOs in War: Facilitators or Inheritors of CSR Guidelines?

A Review of Humanitarian International NGOs and African Conflicts

by Wafula Okumu

By: Aanjalie Collure, 06065844

It has been argued that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play an integral role in

ensuring that multi-national corporations (MNCs) operating in impoverished regions abide by

standards of human rights, environmental sustainability and safe employment, as outlined in

corporate social responsibility (CSR) guidelines (Winston 2002: 71). This is because MNCs are

inherently motivated by private corporate interests rather than the public good, and thus need tobe cautious of the impact they have on different communities. However, as Dr. Wafula Okumu,

the Head of the African Security Analysis Programme demonstrates in his article, Humanitarian

International NGOs and African Conflicts, NGOs active in intrastate conflicts may have

detrimental effects in the environments they are operating in (Okumu 2003: 120). This is because

like businesses, some NGOs are also primarily driven by market forces (in the aid industry

specifically), rather than the long-term needs of beneficiaries during war (ibid: 129). Thus, this

review essay will use Okumus article to argue that because humanitarian international non-

governmental organizations (HINGOs) tend to operate like businesses, a CSR-like framework is

necessary to regulate and monitor their actions as well. First, Section I of this article will provide

a summary of Okumus article and main arguments. Next, Section II will demonstrate the

articles strengths in problematizing NGO activity, and drawing parallels between HINGOs and

MNCs. Finally, Section III wil l argue that Okumus article stops too short in recommending

solutions for the accountability-deficit among HINGOs, and demonstrate why a CSR-like

framework would be more effective. Thus, Okumus article provides an evidence -based


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foundation with which to start building a framework of social responsibility for HINGOs.

Section I: Summary of Article

In Humanitarian International NGOs and African Contexts, Okumu examines the way

in which humanitarian international non-governmental organizations (HINGOs) have operated in

providing aid to civilians experiencing intrastate conflict in Africa. By HINGOs, Okumu is

referring to the private, not for profit organizations which attempt to relieve human suffering

during humanitarian emergencies like wars and natural disasters (Okumu 2003: 121). HINGOs

like CARE, Save the Children, and the Emergency Medical corps work to facilitate the spending

of humanitarian aid on providing basic rights like shelter, water and food which ar ecompromised during complex humanitarian emergencies (ibid). Okumu focuses on HINGO

activity during intrastate conflicts specifically, because the international distrust of politically-

motivated (and sometimes corrupt) governments during civil wars creates a situation where the

provision of basic goods is administered by HINGOs (ibid: 123). This, coupled with HIN GOs

promise of neutrality when delivering aid to civilians (ibid) creates a level of global confidence

for HINGOs that goes unquestioned. However, Okumu argues that as externally-funded

organizations, HINGOs altruism is driven primarily by market forces in the aid indust ry (ibid:

129). In order to maintain survival in a competitive environment where a number of

organizations are vying for scarce funding, HINGOs must always consider how to best attract

and sustain donors funds and attention (ibid). Okumu argues that it is a result of this business-

like model of operation that HINGOs tend to unintentionally exacerbate and prolong intrastate

conflict.

Using the African context, Okumu demonstrates how the business -like actions of

HINGOs aggravate violence during intrastate conflict. First, HINGOs promise to donors that


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they will be impartial to foreign political tensions when providing aid creates an environment

that may support and enhance the activities of offenders. The external pressure for HINGOs to

remain neutral in their affairs abroad is mandated by Article 70 of the Geneva Conventions,

which stipulates that aid must be humanitarian and impartial in character (ibid: 123).

However, because HINGOs working to provide food and safety to Rwandan refugees in 1994

did so impartially, they failed to recognize that HINGO safe havens became areas where

genocidal offenders went to eat and regroup before re -launching attacks (ibid: 124). Similarly,

there have been various cases where the building of humanitarian infrastructure like roads and

bridges has been done with little consideration of local political contexts, thereby allowing rebelsto take advantage of these goods for their operations as well (ibid: 128). This demonstrates that

although HINGOs retain international donor support by maintaining impartiality, it has adverse

consequences on their beneficiaries. Furthermore, because of institutional demands to provide

aid, HINGOs have asserted that they are ready to compromise so that [they] can get through

when dealing with offenders (ibid: 123). However, although this meets the HINGO s short -term

goals of providing aid to recipients (and therefore appeasing donors), it provides material support

and legitimacy to rebel groups. For example, in Somalia, HINGOs paid, rented and entered

contracts with warlords in order to be granted access to groups of civilians in need (ibid: 127).

This resulted in warlords earning large amounts of money from HINGOs that could be used to

purchase weapons and perpetuate abuses (ibid: 126). In addition, engaging with offenders in this

way has given g roups like Charles Taylors National Patriotic Front of de facto recognition that

could be used to inspire, entrench and expand their activities further (ibid: 128). Finally, the

technical method used to distribute aid can aggravate existing tensions. In Southern Sudan, for

example, dumping aid in Southern Sudan with little attention to the local economic dynamics


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and had the effect of ruining local agricultural production, perpetuating famine, reducing

indigenous people to the status of internationa l beggars, andcreating a states of dependence

(ibid: 124). Although it could be quantifiably proven to external donors that a large sum of aid

distributed, resulting poverty and dependence created an environment where ethnic

antagonisms were heightened locally (ibid). Thus, by striving to meet donor criteria for

appropriate intervention and sustained support, HINGOs may actually aggravate and prolong

intrastate conflicts.

In concluding the article, Okumu lists a number of recommendations for improving

HINGO operations during intrastate war, including adopting stricter moral standards, better training and evaluation of humanitarian work, and greater coordination among organizations

(ibid: 133). This aspect of the article will be elaborated on in Section III, when this paper will

more thoroughly discuss appropriate policy prescriptions for improving HINGO behaviour

abroad. Thus, Okumu s article shows that HINGO s self- interest in competing with other

organizations to raise the most money and save the most people may actually be detrimental

(ibid: 130). Thus, the article provides the foundation for analyzing HINGOs as business-oriented

organizations that ought to be more seriously scrutinized.

Section II: Okumu: Providing the Linkages between MINGOs and MNCs

One of the greatest strengths of this article is its ability to demonstrate the ways in which

HINGOs share several characteristics with corporations in their operations abroad. This essay

argues that Okumu s ability to demonstrate, with evidence, th e business -like way in which

HINGOs operate is particularly strong because it challenges existing literature that suggests that

NGOs are driven by altruism exclusively or even primarily (Arvidson 2005: 5). This section

will evaluate two main characteristics of MNCs (their unaccountability to local populations and


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recognize detrimental effects of their behaviour, l eft to their own accord, MNCs private interests

in maintaining operations as-is will prevail (ibid). Similarly, Okumu states that rather than

recognizing the dangerous effects of negotiating with offenders, HINGOs now see the

manipulation of their aid as normal practice (ibid: 130). As a result, allocating budgetary funds

to pay rebels who would otherwise attack their lorries has un critically become part of many

HINGOs normal practice despite the way in which this legitimizes rebel organizations and

perpetuates violence, as mentioned above (ibid). This demonstrates that despite awareness raised

to hold HINGOs accountable to detrimental impacts of their activities, similar damages will only

perpetuate. Thus, Okumus awareness of the business -like accountability -deficit amongstNGOs is one that is significant and deserving of attention.

Furthermore, Okumu provides evidence to note the parallels between MNCs and

HINGOs in their tendency to be guided by market principles. Analyses of MNCs contend that

these corporations actions tend to be guided primarily by what would make them most

profitable and competitive in the market (Rondinelli and Berry 2000: 73). For example, it has

been argued that MNCs are more likely to abide by laws and regulations on their activity when

it serves their commercial self -interest i n the market; that is, when it directly contributes to

their competitiveness in the market (ibid). In this regard, Okumu draws an explicit parallel

between MNCs and HINGOs when he argues that the zeal of HINGOs to reach victims

(despite the questionable methods used to do so) is also driven by market forces. HINGOs must

compete with one another for donor funding and attention, often done by showing, quantifiably,

that they have saved the most people during the conflict (Okumu 2003: 129). Okumu does not

provide the context into the aid industry that is necessary to explain why HINGOs are so driven

by market forces, so necessary background reading is required. Western donors, where most


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funding for NGOs originates, have increasingly promoted two trends in the aid industry: a

growing number of NGOs and increased marketization (Cooley and Ron 2002:74). This creates

an environment where an ever-growing quantity of NGOs are competing for scarce donor

dollars, being packaged in more competitive project tenders tha t require greater marketing and

self-validation to donors (ibid). The enhanced competitiveness of the aid industry is predicated

on assumptions that competition between NGOs will increase the efficiency of their operations

(ibid).

However, just as with MNCs, functioning primarily in accordance with market principles

has adverse effects on the populations and contexts one is working in. For example, with MNCs,if regulation or a sense of corporate citizenship is not recognized by t he corporation, several

businesses tend to practice environmentally-unsafe practices that are more affordable (and more

conducive to establishing their competitive edge in the market) (Cooley and Ron 2002: 82).

Similarly , Okuma demonstrates how some HINGO s desire to maintain a competitive position in

the aid industry can be detrimental to the communities they are operating in. For example, in

order to attract funds, HINGOs have often displayed unbearable images of starving African

children which cross the line of common decency (Omaar cited in Okuma 2003: 129). This

perpetuates stereotypes about African people as backwards, helpless, and as the most

unfortunate of the human race (ibid). In addition, because HINGOs are constantly trying to

quantifiably demonstrate that they have saved the most lives, or provide the most aid, they

fail to note how providing excessive amounts of aid may open up the possibilities for aid to get

extorted by militias or bartered to obtain weapons (ibid: 125-7). In other words, because of the

constant need to prove themselves to donors, many HINGOs are unable to see that less aid or

even a complete withdrawal in some areas is necessary to ensure the long-term safety of civilians


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(ibid). Thus, Okuma provides div erse evidence demonstrating how HINGOs adherence to

market principles can impact local communities directly (in perpetuating violence) and indirectly

(in perpetuating stereotypes). Of course, this is not to state that HINGOs have not played a

significant role in saving thousands of lives during complex humanitarian emergencies (Okuma

2003: 130); however, Okuma provides a strong argument for recognizing how institutional

demands within the aid industry may cause HINGO operations to have unintended and negative

results, too. Therefore, although MNCs are competing in a market where profit-earning is the

primary goal and NGOs are driven by competition for donor funds, they share a similar

dependency on markets to guide their actions and considerations.Section III: Corporate Social Responsibility and HINGOs

Before concluding his article, Okumu offers a few recommendations for how to

remediate HINGO behaviour. This section will briefly summarize these recommendations, and

then argue that they are inadequate in addressing some of the main issues associated with

HINGOs, as laid out in the article. It will then suggest that a CSR-like framework for regulating

the activities of HINGOs would be more appropriate and effective.

Okumu briefly lists six major recommendations for HINGOs to reduce the negative

impact they may have on local communities when working during civil conflicts. First, HINGOs

should avoid being pawns of the in terests of external actors like Western governments (Okumu

2003: 132). Secondly, HINGOs should realize their operational limits and work within realistic

objectives. In other words, they should not aim to participate in conflict management and

resolution by working with offenders, but rather participate in feeding the hungry and treating

the sick exclusively (ibid). Thirdly, HINGOs should adopt strict moral standards in their

fundraising act ivities to ensure they are not showcasing images that go against ones basic


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human dignity (ibid: 133). Fourth, HINGOs should reconstruct their evaluation criteria for

projects t o be judged not necessarily by how many lives they save but also how they avoid

perpetuating and exacerbating violence (ibid). Fifth, humanitarian agents should be more

thoroughly trained to understand the cultural, political, social and religious contexts of war and

local communities to ensure that projects are appropriate to each context (ibid). Finally, rather

than competing with other organizations, HINGOs should work to coordinate actions with each

other as well as with local capacities for peace . This is meant to support long-term local

capacity-building, as well as ensure that aid is supporting local peace initiatives rather than

offenders (ibid). Thus, it can be argued that Okumu focuses on restructuring the internalstructures and operations of individual HINGOs to ensure that they are aware of the diverse

impacts they may have during complex humanitarian emergencies.

However, this essay argues that although initiatives like increased training for

humanitarian agents and better coordination are sound recommendations, Okumu underestimates

the degree to which HINGOs are limited by external actors and phenomena. For example,

HINGOs are regulated by binding international laws within the 1949 Geneva Conventions which

explicitly state that HINGOs ought to be completely neutral in their operations and provide

adequate relief to adversary populations as well (Okumu 2003: 123). In this way, unless these

overarching external international structures regulating HINGO behaviour is reformed to

consider how maintaining strict neutrality may be detrimental in some contexts, individual

HINGOs will be limited in their ability to support local capacities for peace and not the forces

of war (ibid 133) as Okumu recommends. Contemporarily, although the Organization of

African Rights has launch ed severe criticism of the neutralism of humanitarianism during war,

neutrality continues to be upheld as one of the four essential operational principles alongside


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humanity, impartiality, and independence ( Slim 1997: 342). Thus, Okumu undermines the

degree of external pressure present to adopt principles like neutrality and impartiality. In

addition, if it is the responsibility of the HINGO to educate agents, coordinate activities and set

moral standards, evidence has shown that there have been great discrepancies among NGOs in

the degree to which such policies are adopted. For example, although organizations like the Red

Cross have been stricter in their adherence to neutrality, others have found that it imposes an

unacceptable silence up on them in the face of grievous violations of human rights and thus

ought to be taken more lightly in their operations (ibid: 348). Thus, when there is no overarching

framework defining how neutrality ought to be considered in different operations, leaving NGOsto educate themselves is more complicated than Okumu suggests. Similarly, some NGOs who

have adopted Okumus suggestion of increasingly evaluating the impact of their intervention

tend to focus on exaggerated short -term results of their activit ies, in order to avoid a loss of

donor funds and confidence (Ebrahim 2003: 825). Thus, Okumus underestimation of the

importance many NGOs place on the marketability of their organizations to donors means that

his recommendations would be faced with mixed results. Although this obviously does not

explain the actions of all NGOs, it does provide evidence to show the limitations of Okumu s

recommendations in considering external factors regulating HINGO s actions.

Thus, this essay asserts that a CSR-like framework for HINGOs would be better suited to

address the negative impacts HINGOs may have when operating in intrastate conflicts. This is

because Corporate Social Responsibility guidelines originate from explicit awareness of the self-

interested way corporations may operate in competitive environments (Klein and Dawar 2004:

203-4). For example, scholars have argued that the value in the United Nations Global Compact

is its ability to provide a clear framework of the criteria corporations ought to abide to in order to


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be socially responsible (Whitehouse 2003: 305). In other words, by creating ten distinct

principles of corporate social responsibility, the Global Compact provided all corporations with a

less ambiguous understanding of what being socially -responsible actually meant (ibid). The

need for a similar international framework for HINGOs is exemplified by the discrepancies

between HINGOs in their conflicting definitions of neutrality and human rights, as mentioned

above. Furthermore, a s mentioned in the previous paragraph, precisely what Okumus

recommendations were lacking was an awareness of external pressures HINGOs (from either

external norms or funding requirements). Contrastingly, a CSR-like framework for HINGOs

would begin with the assumption that HINGOs are primarily self-interested agents operatingunder competitive market conditions. Alnoor Ebrahim of the Harvard Business School asserts

that a combination of self-regulation and social auditing of NGO activities based on agreed-upon

norms of behaviour would increase NGOs interests in recognizing the detrimental impacts of

their actions (Ebrahim 2003: 822). Agreeing to self-regulation based on new international

criteria appeals to some NGOs desire to uplift their public image to donors, while promoting

long-term changes in their conventional operations (ibid: 824). In addition, being subject to

social audi ting of NGOs performances abroad would make NGOs more thoroughly consider the

social, environmental and ethical impacts of their involvement (ibid). This is because external

social auditing of NGO involvement may bring up diverse impacts of interventions that are not

readily demonstrated in NGO s self -evaluations that tend to stress the quantity of people saved or

aid distributed exclusively (Okumu 2003: 129). Furthermore, like international CSR doctrines, a

framework for regulating HINGO behaviour on the international scale would need to involve the

collaboration of numerous bilateral donor agencies, multilateral organizations, government

agencies, and international and local NGOs, thereby offering a more comprehensive approach


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than that offered by Okumu (Ebrahim 2003: 821). Thus, unlike Okumus recommendations, a

CSR-like framework premised on clear guidelines, self-regulation, social auditing and multi-

sector collaboration is more likely to prevent the detrimental impacts of HINGOs self-interested

behaviour abroad.

Conclusion

Thus, it can be argued that Okumus article provides the necessary foundation for

analyzing the similarities between HINGOs and corporations, but stops too short in making

appropriate recommendations based on these similarities. After summarizing the main arguments

of Okumus article, Section I argue that it was particularly strong in providing evidence forcomparing HINGOs to corporations. This is evident in the similarities between the two in their

accountability-deficit and adherence to market principles. However, Okumus recommendations

for remediating the detrimental impacts HINGOs may have during intrastate conflicts were

narrowly defined. His suggestions focused on enhancing HINGO self-regulation of their

operations, but ignored the fact that the absence of an international framework for HINGO

involvement creates an environment where self-regulation takes completely different forms

across HINGOs. In addition, the recommendations underestimate the pressure HINGOs face

from external forces: namely, international norms and competitiveness in the aid industry.

Finally, Section III analyzed why a CSR-like framework for HINGOs would be more

appropriate. By providing a new, unambiguous international guidelines for intervention,

encouraging self-regulation and social auditing, and promoting multi-sector cooperation, CSR-

like frameworks would be better su ited to address concerns raised about HINGOs in Okumu s

article. Thus, moving forward, this paper suggests that policymakers interested in remediating


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the negative impacts of HINGOs learn from the developers of CSR guidelines in their initiatives.

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Humanitarian International NGOs in War: Facilitators or Inheritors of CSR Guidelines?

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