Humanitarian Agenda 2015: Politics and Humanitarian Action in the Georgia Conflicts

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Strengthening the humanity and dignity of people in cr isis through knowledge and practice

Humanitarian Agenda 2015:Politics and Humanitarian Actionin the Georgia Confictsby Greg Hansen

N o v e m b e r 2 0 0 9



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Cover photo: Jose Stalin gazes over Italian Red Cross trucks in the direction o an IDP camp in Gori inSeptember 2008, soon a ter the departure o Russian Forces. In the background, a giant television screen

ashes a nationalist message rom the Georgian government. Photo by the author.



Acknowledgements ..................................................................................... 4Note on Nomenclature ............................................................................... 5Acronyms .................................................................................................. 6

Executive Summary .................................................................................... 71. Introduction .......................................................................................... 9

Methodology ...........................................................................................................10

2. Confict and Humanitarian Action ........................................................... 11Background to the Con icts .....................................................................................11Open War are ...........................................................................................................12Humanitarian Fallout ...............................................................................................13Dominant Features o the Con ict ...........................................................................14Behavior o Combatants ...........................................................................................14Spinning the War ......................................................................................................15Partisans, Militias, Paramilitary Forces: an Enduring Threat to Sa ety and Wel are .......16Humanitarian Action ................................................................................................17“Old” and “New” Displaced .....................................................................................18The Response Measured Against Accepted Norms and Standards ..............................20Coordination ............................................................................................................21Security or Aid Operations and Personnel ................................................................23Real and Imagined Barriers to Humanitarian Access .................................................24Whither the EU Monitoring Mission? ......................................................................26Donor Excesses and Militarization o the Humanitarian Response ............................27A “Humanitarian Tripwire?” .....................................................................................30

3. Conclusions and Recommendations .......................................................... 31What Does the Humanitarian Future Hold? .............................................................31Recommendations ...................................................................................................33

Annex A .................................................................................................... 34Annex B .................................................................................................... 38Annex C .................................................................................................... 40Footnotes .................................................................................................. 46

contentsHumanitarian Agenda 2015:Politics and Humanitarian Action in the Georgia Confictsby Greg Hansen 1


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Acknowledgments

I am grate ul to the many individuals and organizations who contributed time and support duringthis research. Particular thanks to Ox am (GB) and Première Urgence or their assistance arrangingaccess to volatile areas and or support on eld visits. I’m very grate ul to my colleague andco-researcher Mikheil Svanidze who provided valuable assistance and support along the way.

About the AuthorGreg Hansen is a Canadian aid worker and independent researcher. Hansen is the author o theHA2015 country study on Iraq. He has worked in con icts throughout the Caucasus and in 1998authored Humanitarian Action in the Caucasus: A Guide or Practitioners or the Humanitarianism andWar Project and Local Capacities or Peace Project o the Collaborative or Development Action.


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5

Note on Nomenclature

As in many con icts the spelling o place names in a particular way is viewed as choosing up sides ina given dispute, eliciting strong reactions. This is particularly true in the Caucasus. Accordingly, inthis report, multiple spellings are used such as Gal/i, Tskhinval/i or Sukhum/i.



Acronyms

DRC Danish Re ugee CouncilECHO European Community Humanitarian O ceEMERCOM Emergency Situations Ministry, Russian FederationEU European UnionEUMM European Union Monitoring MissionGTZ Deutsche Gesellscha t ür Technische ZusammenarbeitHDRs Humanitarian Daily Rations (US military)ICRC International Committee o the Red CrossIDMC Internal Displacement Monitoring CentreIDPs Internally Displaced PersonsMREs Meals Ready-to-EatNRC Norwegian Re ugee CouncilOCHA (UN) O ce or the Coordination o Humanitarian A airsOSCE Organization or Security and Cooperation in EuropePKF Peacekeeping ForceTI Transparency InternationalUSAID United States Agency or International DevelopmentUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNHCR United Nations High Commissioner or Re ugeesUNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

UNOMIG United Nations Observer Mission in GeorgiaUNOSAT Operational Satellite Applications Programme o the United Nations,

Institute or Training and Research (UNITAR)WFP World Food Programme



7

Executive Summary

T he Humanitarian Agenda 2015 project o theFeinstein International Center undertook eldresearch in September 2008 and August 2009

to examine the humanitarian situation in Georgia, SouthOssetia, and Abkhazia and the responses to it. Theresearch was prompted by renewed ghting over SouthOssetia in August 2008 and was in ormed by theauthor’s extensive previous research in the region. ThisCase Study assesses the humanitarian landscape, updatingprevious ndings also gleaned rom eld-basedresearch. 2 It culminates in a series o recommendations

or operational humanitarian agencies, donors, the UN,the EU, and Russian, Georgian, Abkhaz, and Ossetianauthorities.

Based on extensive eld interviews and backgroundresearch, the ollowing major ndings emerge:

Although in human terms the humanitarian allout romthe August 2008 war has caused great su ering and hardship

or those directly a ected, it has been a relatively small part o a much broader and protracted crisis o violence and insecurity

aced by many Georgians, Abkhaz, and South Ossetians or nearly two decades. At the heart o this insecurity is thecontinuing political ailure o authorities in Georgia,Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Russia to assert law andorder responsibly in contested areas and a ailure o international political authorities, including the UN,OSCE, and EU, to press or this. Poorly-disciplinedmilitias, paramilitary orces, and sel -styled partisansconstitute enduring con ict resources or all parties.

Civilians in contested areas continue to pay the priceor cynical power politics in threats to their sa ety andwel are;

Georgia has decisively lost its wars with South Ossetia and Abkhazia both militarily and politically. Contrary to mostwestern media coverage in August 2008, this was duelargely to the misconduct and poor judgement o itscurrent government. Georgia has or eited the possibilityo regaining either territory or the oreseeable utureand, as a consequence, the prospect o returning home

has evaporated or most o the people who have beendisplaced rom secessionist areas. Absent massive new-ound goodwill rom all parties to the con icts, there is

little to no possibility that ethnic Georgians will be able

to return to Abkhazia north o the Gal/i Region or tomost o South Ossetia. This underscores anew the needto ully integrate most o Georgia’s remaining displacedpopulation;

Whether or not Russia’s reassertion o political in uence and military power in the contested areas is regarded aslegitimate or illegitimate, its de acto occupation and ensuing responsibilities under international humanitarian law o er the best chance in years that instability will end or people living inor returning to contested areas in and around Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This will depend on Russia’s willingness todeliver on its responsibilities under International HumanitarianLaw and use its new disposition to en orce law and order in aresponsible way in the areas it now e ectively controls. In light o IHL and agreements reached between Moscow and the secessionist areas, Russia must now institute a meaning ul and

pro essional policing presence that enhances, rather thandetracts rom, the sa ety and wel are o all civilians living inthese areas;

The EU Monitoring Mission has ailed to ul ll important aspects o its mandate and is largely impotent and irrelevant or securing contested areas.With deployments only on theGeorgian side o con ict lines, the operational modalityo the EUMM has e ectively become partial and adver-sarial and is counterproductive to building con dencebetween protagonists. Increasingly, the EUMM is seenby Abkhaz, South Ossetians, and Russians as aninstrument o the Georgian side in the con ict withwhich the EU has been aligned politically;

The humanitarian response was demonstrably more political than humanitarian. Although operational agenciesdelivered a timely and e ective response and averted large-scale loss o li e, the behavior o donors in response to the August 2008 war was, by their own accounts, generally inconsistent with the principles o Good Humanitarian Donorship.Needsemerging rom the 2008 war, including humanitarianneeds, were ultimately oversubscribed by western donors,most o whom took the Georgian side in the con ict;

The humanitarian response was skewed toward the Georgianside o the con ict.Real and perceived access constraintsimposed by Georgian and South Ossetian authorities,and reticence among humanitarian actors, donors, and



the diplomatic community to push back against theseconstraints inhibited responses to needs inside SouthOssetia. Accordingly, the aid response e ectively mirroredthe divisions o the con ict itsel . This prevailingpartiality and resulting isolation o persons in contestedareas echoes earlier humanitarian responses in the 1990sthat undermined livelihoods and hardened resentmentsin Abkhazia and South Ossetia, con ounding con ict

resolution and the easing o tensions;

The evidence suggests that western military orces attempted to lay a “humanitarian tripwire” in Georgia through injudiciousmilitary “humanitarian” missions so as to repel a urther Russian advance into Georgia. This occurred in spite o ample humanitarian capacity on the ground and in re-serve. Military involvement in the humanitarian responsewas not needed on humanitarian grounds. In act, theapproach taken undermined the accepted principleso civilian management o humanitarian resources and

transparency in humanitarian action;

The UN’s lead role in the humanitarian response su ered rom lackluster management rom the UN’s HumanitarianCoordinator in Tbilisi. The UN per ormed poorly inproviding stewardship o the donor response, managingthe civil-military inter ace, sa eguarding humanitarianprinciples, and asserting access with authorities andcombatants. UN OCHA and UNHCR acquittedthemselves e ectively in humanitarian response, but theOCHA role was ended prematurely;

Positive innovations have helped to make humanitarianaction more accountable, responsive, and timely.Theseinnovations included: initiatives by UNOSAT to providesatellite imagery o limited access areas almost in realtime; independent oversight o donor and recipientbehavior by Transparency International (Georgia); andassistance to and advocacy or bene ciary access to aidresources by the Georgian Young Lawyers Association.These initiatives are worthy o wider discussion andreplication elsewhere.



9

1. Introduction

T he humanitarian allout rom the August 2008war over South Ossetia is just one part o amuch larger and much longer story that contin-

ues to un old more than a year a ter the o cial cease-re between Georgia and Russia. Threats to the sa ety,

wel are, and dignity o many thousands o Georgians,Ossetians, and Abkhaz have estered like old woundssince the earlier wars over Abkhazia and South Ossetiain the early 1990s that occurred amid the political,social, and economic tumult that ollowed the collapse o the Soviet Union. The longstanding ailure o local andinternational politics, diplomacy, and con ict resolutioncontinues to result in violence, and the threat o it, or tens o thousands o vulnerable people in Georgia,South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. Although assistance needspersist on a limited scale, there is no humanitarian solu-tion to the enduring protection gap. Rather, what isneeded most is political stability and, in particular, areassertion o law and order to rid the region o militias,sel -styled partisans, and paramilitary groups.

Many o the estimated 233,000 internally displacedpersons (IDPs) who ed their homes during these earlier con icts3 have been maintained in deplorable conditionssince then. In the absence o political settlements andreal political will to stabilize contested areas, many IDPshave been unable or unwilling to return, o ten becauseo persistent dangers rom undisciplined militias, para-militaries, and partisans that have been tolerated and, attimes, nurtured by Abkhaz, Georgian, Russian, andSouth Ossetian authorities. Other IDPs who have re-

turned, notably the some 45,000 that have gone back toGal/i Region o Abkhazia, live under constant threat o new violence and harassment. For more than teen

years, protracted law and order gaps in places o returnhave remained un lled by any o the protagonists or bythe ormer UNOMIG and OSCE missions. Some dis-placed persons have returned only to be displaced againby new violence or the threat o it. Needs among oth-er war-a ected Abkhaz, Ossetians, and Georgians wereonly partially addressed in the years that the two con-

icts remained unresolved.

It was in this context that new assistance and protec-tion needs and a renewed humanitarian responseemerged during and a ter the sharp escalation o armed

hostilities in and around South Ossetia in August o 2008. This Case Study examines the humanitarianlandscape prevailing in Georgia, South Ossetia, and Ab-khazia since hostilities ared in 2008. It assesses actualand orthcoming changes to the humanitarian contextthat have resulted—or are likely to result— rom thenew war and related political events.

The frst section o the paper describes the researchmethodology and scope. Highlighting positive innova-tions as well as shortcomings, the second section sum-marizes the events that preceded the August 2008 war,then examines the politically-charged humanitarian re-sponse that ensued. In ormed by what has been learnedabout con ict and humanitarian action in the regionover nearly two decades, the third section ruminates onlikely developments in the humanitarian landscape andposits a series o recommendations or operational hu-manitarian agencies, donors, the UN system, and po-litical authorities. A more thorough accounting o the

background to the Georgia/South Ossetia and Georgia/Abkhazia con icts, which may be o particular interestto donors and operational agencies concerned withcon ict-sensitive programming, is presented in AnnexesA and B. A companion timeline o events in the SouthOssetian and Abkhazia con icts and signi cant human-itarian developments is included as Annex C.

Consistent with other reports o the HumanitarianAgenda 2015 project, the Case Study aims to contributeto the e orts o operational agencies, donors, and poli-

cymakers to discern the major trends in the humanitar-ian system by identi ying threats and opportunitiesemerging in our inter-related issue areas, or “petals,” o research: the thrust toward coherence between humani-tarian, political, and military agendas; the e ects on hu-manitarian action rom terrorism and counter-terror e orts;the universalityo humanitarian action; and the security o bene ciaries and aid workers. These are summarized in thebox on page 19. As with many HA2015 reports, thisone also delves into the various ways that aid and hu-manitarianism has been instrumentalized or conditioned

by political and military actors, and casts a particularlycritical eye upon the behavior o donors in the region.It underscores the our issue areas as posing genericchallenges in settings o internal armed con ict, at the



0

same time identi ying the particular permutations o these challenges in the Georgia setting.

In short, ndings drawn rom our earlier studies inother humanitarian contexts were synthesized in our

nal report, The State o the Humanitarian Enterprise ,issued in 2008. 4 Many o the ndings rom this studyecho and rein orce this earlier work. In particular, the

humanitarian response during and a ter the August 2008war over South Ossetia con rms our view that thehumanitarian system is under threat. As with allTu ts/FIC research work, we value comments and sug-gestions. These can be sent to the author at [email protected] or to Antonio Donini, the HA2015 teamleader, at antonio.donini@tu ts.edu.

Methodology

Original eld-based research was conducted duringtwo visits to the region in September 2008 and July2009. The rst visit, which preceded the deploymento the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM),was limited to Tbilisi and Gori, where many displacedpersons and aid agencies were concentrated at the time.The second visit, which ollowed the closure o theOrganization or Security and Cooperation in Europe(OSCE) mission in Georgia/South Ossetia and coincidedwith the end o the United Nations Observer Mission inGeorgia (UNOMIG) in and around Abkhazia, involvedinterviews and more extensive exposure to conditions in

the areas immediately adjacent to South Ossetia and inWestern Georgia and Abkhazia. Operational humanitar-ian organizations assisted the author with gaining accessto bene ciary communities in di cult-to-reach areas.

Some 55 interviews were conducted among aidbene ciaries and other a ected people, aid agency sta ,donors, government and de acto authorities, currentand ormer members o the EUMM, and others. Dueto time and logistics constraints – and to obstacles put inplace by the Government o Georgia and South Osse-

tian authorities barring access rom Georgia proper – South Ossetia itsel was not visited. Instead, in ormationon humanitarian conditions and response there wasgathered and care ully triangulated rom three di erentsources on the ground and urther cross-checked within ormation drawn rom secondary sources. The paper is urther in ormed by previous work in the region bythe author and by others a liated with the HumanitarianAgenda 2015 project o the Feinstein Center, and bythe Center’s Humanitarianism and War Project (basedearlier at Brown University). 5 A number o additionalsecondary sources were consulted or the research,notably recent surveys compiled by the ICRC andCARE International on perceptions among aid recipientsand others.



11

2. Confict and Humanitarian Action

Background to the Conficts 6

T he outbreak o war in August 2008 had its ori-gins in geopolitical and local actors. Politicaltensions between Georgia and Russia had been

increasing steadily over a our-year period prior toTbilisi’s ailed attempt to reassert its authority inTskhinval/i by orce. To the chagrin o Russia, Georgia

under President Saakashvili invested heavily in realigningGeorgia out o the orbit o post-Soviet Russia andtoward Europe and the United States. Georgia engagedwith the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO)through the Partnership or Peace program beginningin 1994, but Saakashvili lobbied hard or membership inNATO when he came to power in 2004. At the BrusselsNATO Summit in 2008, the hopes o Georgia or NATO membership were dealt a setback rom NATOmembers Germany, the UK, and France, despite stronglobbying rom the US in whose Iraq coalition Georgiahad the third largest contingent o troops. 7 NATO didcon rm its intention to con er membership on Georgialater, however, eliciting continued strong resistance

rom Moscow. 8 Georgia’s military spending had alsoincreased sharply since 2004, unding arms purchases

rom the US, Ukraine, Israel, and other countries.

Georgia’s positioning o itsel in relation to the Westhas taken ostentatious orms since the Rose Revolution.Public buildings and government o ces in Georgiahave both the Georgian and the EU ag on display.Georgian President Saakashvili ordered that the roadbetween the airport and Tbilisi centre be renamed“George W. Bush Street.” Saakashvili has o ten criticizedthe Russian leadership in taunting and insulting tones,eliciting equally personal insults in return rom Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev.

Russia’s stance toward Georgia was also conditionedby events in Kosovo. From Moscow’s perspective, theUS-led “humanitarian intervention” there and thesubsequent US and European drive to recognize Kosovo’sindependence rom Serbia negated American and

European objections to its own subsequent interventionin Georgia and, urther, provided a precedent or Moscow’s ormal recognition o Abkhaz and South Os-setian independence.

Against this geopolitical backdrop o realpolitik,historical and contemporary local grievances betweenGeorgia and South Ossetia, and between Georgia andAbkhazia, have a long history. These originated be ore the

ormation o the Soviet Union but took on new orms asa result o Soviet management o its regions and by eventssurrounding the collapse o the Soviet Union in 1989.Resurgent nationalism and ethnic chauvinism, combinedwith an enduring distrust o Tbilisi’s motives in and allo-cation o resources to the two regions, erupted in armedcon ict in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the early1990s, characterized by brutality and ethnic cleansing onall sides and, in South Ossetia, the shelling o Tskhinval/iby Georgian orces (see Annexes A and B or detailedbackground on the South Ossetia and Abkhazia con icts).

Notably, shortly a ter Saakashvili’s “Rose Revolution”in late 2003, the new government in Tbilisi embarkedon a high-pro le campaign to rein in smuggling activityand other aspects o the underground economy inGeorgia. Just outside South Ossetia, the sprawlingillicit market at Ergneti was a lightning rod. Since themid-1990s, the market and the commerce related toit had provided many thousands o Ossetians andGeorgians with scarce jobs and income related toprocuring, transporting, and selling all manner o uel,

ood, and other goods. The buying, selling, and relatedactivity contributed to interdependence and no smallmeasure o normalization o relations between the twoethnicities. When Georgian authorities began clampingdown on Ergneti in mid-June 2004 by arresting traders

and blowing up roads providing access to the market,the e ect was to deprive South Ossetians (and nearbyGeorgians) o perhaps the most important source o their livelihoods. 9

Tensions between Tbilisi and Tskhinval/i roseconsiderably. Much o the progress that had been madetoward reconciliation and normalization since 1992/3 wasnegated. South Ossetians, many o whom held Russianpassports, thus had their last remaining ties with Georgiasevered. The Russian government stepped in to ll the

gap with aid to South Ossetia. South Ossetians gravitatedincreasingly toward Russia and the more stable economicpossibilities it o ered. Clashes between South Ossetian andGeorgian ghters became steadily more requent.



2

Open War are

Rancorous debate persists between Russia and Georgiaover the circumstances surrounding the beginning o the war, but the preponderance o evidence indicatesthat Georgia initiated military operations that were thenresponded to by Russian orces that were already poisedto move. Close to midnight on 7 August 2008, hoursa ter Georgian President Saakashvili decreed a unilateralcease- re ollowing several months o escalating ten-sions and low-level violence, Georgian orces unleashedartillery and multiple rocket launcher bombardment onthe South Ossetian capital o Tskhinval/i that lasted untilthe morning o 8 August. Georgian shelling destroyedsome three hundred homes and several public buildings.Casualty gures are a matter o politicized debate, butaid agency estimates put the number o dead inTskhinval/i at around 300 persons. 10 Some thirteenRussian peacekeeping troops were also killed at a garri-son on the edge o Tskhinval/i. One aid worker notedthat when news o the Georgian military o ensive againstTskhinval/i reached the streets o Tbilisi, the reactionwas jubilant: “Thousands and thousands o cars lled thestreets o the capital, honking their horns and with their passengers waving Georgian ags.…It was as i Georgiahad won the World Cup and was celebrating.” 11

Russia’s response was swi t, acilitated by a largepresence o more-or-less combat-ready Russian military

orces already in the North Caucasus or a major annualmilitary exercise. Georgian ground orces initiallygained control o Tskhinval/i, but a ter three days andnights o erce ghting, which involved more use byGeorgia orces o artillery and rocket re, su cientRussian orces had crossed into South Ossetia through

the Roki Tunnel to orce Georgian troops out o thecity, with help rom South Ossetian militia and volunteers.Russia continued a military advance through Goritowards Tbilisi, also launching air and ground actions inother parts o Georgia aimed at disrupting Georgia’scommunications and military in rastructure. Russian

orces halted their southeastward advance at the villageo Igoeti, scarcely 35 kilometers rom the Georgian capital.The east-west highway that traverses Georgia was closed

or several days during the Russian operation, e ectivelycutting Tbilisi o rom its sources o supplies rom the

port at Poti, which ell temporarily under Russiancontrol. Meanwhile, South Ossetian militias rampagedthrough ethnic Georgian villages inside South Ossetia,burning many homes and orcing inhabitants to ee.

Meanwhile, Abkhaz militia ejected Georgian orcesrom the disputed Kodori Valley in Abkhazia. Russian orc-

es took positions in Poti, Zugdidi, and Senaki in the westernpart o Georgia proper, entering through Abkhazia.

Sta o Russian EMERCOM assist a resident o Tskhinval/i ollowing the Georgian withdrawal. EMERCOM travelled into SouthOssetia embedded in Russian military convoys, and quickly mobilized an operational group in Tskhinval/i. The group’s main tasks wereprovision o medical assistance to victims, conducting o search-and-rescue operations, provision o essential oodstu s, as well asrestoration o vital unctions o human settlements in South Ossetia. Later, EMERCOM carried out extensive clearance o unexplodedmunitions and helped to establish a South Ossetian EMERCOM. EMERCOM emerged out o Soviet civil de ense structures andprovides a ormidable frst response capacity or the Russian government. It is organized as a quasi-military organization.

Photo by EMERCOM o Russia, www.mchs.gov.ru.



13

Humanitarian Fallout

In and around South Ossetia, Ossetians and Georgianswere orced to ee their homes and there was substantialdamage to civilian housing and in rastructure. Anestimated 36,000 South Ossetians ed across the inter-nationally recognized border into Russia, most to NorthOssetia. The vast majority o these returned homequickly a ter the cease- re.

“Thousands o re ugees, mostly women and children headed tothe territory o the Russian Federation. The situation in SouthOssetia, was on the verge o humanitarian catastrophe. As aresult o military aggression by Georgia in South Ossetia,2,522 residential homes were destroyed. Social in rastructure and housing, communal services were practically destroyed; the li e conditions o tens o thousands o people were violated. In

particular, 29 educational objects, 17 health care objects, 10 transport objects as well as utilities and energy networks were destroyed.”12

EMERCOM o Russia,“South Ossetia, How it Was,” 2008.

The Russian invasion and the resultant ghting thatquickly ollowed the Georgian attack, as well as reprisalsagainst Georgian villagers in and around South Ossetiaby ill-disciplined Ossetian militias, produced the suddendisplacement o an estimated 128,000 people to Georgiaproper, 13 many to Tbilisi. Most were housed temporarilyin collective centers and tent camps in urban areas, butwere able to return to their homes adjacent to SouthOssetia or in Gori within weeks or months o the short

war. Within our months o the cease- re, some 18,000ethnic Georgians displaced rom within South Ossetiawere provided with cottages built hastily by the Georgiangovernment in a tacit recognition that there was littlelikelihood o their return home. The remaining 12,000IDPs were housed in collective centers or with host

amilies.

In sum, UNHCR estimated that a total o 163,000people were orced to ee their homes as a result o thecon ict. 14 In Georgia proper, the humanitarian conse-

quences o displacement caused by the August 2008ghting were or the most part dealt with quickly ande ectively. According to aid agencies in the region, therewas no known loss o li e resulting rom displacement. 15

One o the new settlements o some 18,000 cottages built by the Georgian government a ter the August 2008 war to house peopledisplaced rom South Ossetia. Western donor pledges included substantial budgetary support to the Georgian government, allowingministries exibility to implement such initiatives quickly. Aid agencies and inhabitants criticize the settlements or their lack o plan-ning and shoddy construction. They are o ten situated ar rom economic and social in rastructure on land that could not be soldduring Georgia’s privatization schemes because it was o poor quality.

Photo by the author, July 2009.



4

Dominant Features o the Confict

The 2008 war bore many o the hallmarks o armedcon ict in the post-Soviet Caucasus: 16

• great-power politics and its cross-fertilization withragile domestic politics;

• moribund international diplomacy;

• ongoing posturing, provocations, and promotion of insecurity both locally and internationally;

• ill-disciplined military and paramilitary forces;

• indiscriminate use of heavy weapons in urban areas,and;

• systematic ethnic cleansing, including destruction of homes and civilian in rastructure, in order to render areas uninhabitable.

Behavior o Combatants

Both the Russian and Georgian sides were ound byHuman Rights Watch to have used cluster munitions inthe 2008 war. 17 More seriously, however, at the outseto the war Georgian orces unleashed a barrage onTskhinval/i using imprecise heavy weapons includingmultiple rocket launchers and artillery. The e ects o us-ing such weapons in urban areas are entirely predictablesince they are known to be lethal within a large radius.This raises serious questions about the legality o Geor-gian actions under the Laws o Armed Con ict as thesere er to proportionality and the need to discriminate be-tween military and civilian targets. Moreover, theseweapons were used on populated areas despite theGeorgian military having received several years o mili-tary assistance and training rom the US and NATOunder bilateral military agreements and NATO’s Part-nership or Peace program. The ICRC had also under-

taken concerted e orts or many years to disseminateInternational Humanitarian Law in the Georgian military.

“The quality o construction in the new settlements [ or IDPs rom the recent war with Russia] is quite poor. They didn’t respect technical standards. By comparison, the homes being built by GTZ near Gori are up to very good standards and the settlement is economically sustainable.”

Interview with Georgian aid worker,Gori area, July 2009.

“The settlements built by the Ministry o Interior were rushed and poorly planned: they o ten have poor drainage, lackadequate water and sanitation in rastructure, no decent land or

gardens or not enough, and no schools. Some o them became a sea o mud in the rain. They were o ten sited on state-owned land that no-one was interested in buying when the state

privatized land in past years.”Interview with representative o INGO,

Gori, July 2009.

“The government pushed or quick solutions to the new

displaced, and had the eeling that the international agencieswould be too slow. It was partly political – they needed to be seen to be doing something. And their response was quick.Maybe too quick. Why else would people be returning to suchabysmal conditions in their home areas?”

Interview with INGO representativein Gori, July 2009.

“Government compensation was used by many amilies tomeet their basic survival needs or to buy agricultural equipment.

So now they have a burnt-out house and a poorly built cottage.”Interview with international aid worker in Tbilisi, July 2009.



15

Spinning the War

“Ever since Georgia invaded its break-away province o SouthOssetia earlier this month, there has been a concerted attempt by both Georgia and its allies to portray its subsequent ght with Russia as a con ict between “David and Goliath”.Georgia is the small David ghting the Goliath o the ruthlessRussian army.”

Andy Rowell, Spinwatch, 26 August 2008.

Vigorous public relations and lobbying by Georgiain the US and Europe helped ensure that the attention o media and policymakers quickly turned rom Georgia’sattack and its use o heavy weapons in Tskhinval/i tothe Russian incursion. 18 At the outset o the war, Georgiamounted an aggressive media campaign in the US andEurope to promote its version o events and the notiono an imperialist aggressor (Russia) bullying its tinyneighbor (Georgia). Spin paid or by the Georgiangovernment tended to emphasize graphic images o thehuman impacts o the Russian incursion, while Russianspin e orts tended to be somewhat more muted.

“Russia continues to attack civilian population.” The capital Tblisi [sic] was “intensively” bombed. A downed Russian

plane turned out to be “nuclear”. European “energy supplies”were threatened as Russia dropped bombs near oil pipelines. A“humanitarian wheat shipment” was blocked. Later, “invading Russian orces” began “the occupation o Georgia”. Saakashvi-li’s government led allegations o ethnic cleansing to The Hague.

Note the use o terms that trigger western media interest: civilianvictims, nuclear, humanitarian, occupation, ethnic cleansing.”19

Peter Wilby, Georgia has won the PR war,The Guardian, 18 August 2008.

Focused on the Russian advance toward Tbilisi,most western media outlets were slow to question theo cial Georgian line. A New York Times report o theobservations o OSCE monitors that called intoquestion the Georgian account o the start o the war appeared ully two months a ter the attack on

Tskhinval/i.20

Arguably, given the enthusiasm withwhich western donors pledged an embarrassment o riches, including budgetary support, 21 to Georgia, thecampaign was hugely success ul.

By most authoritative accounts, including interviewswith aid agency sta with rsthand exposure to Russian

orces be ore, during, and a ter the war, the behavior o Russian military orces during their 2008 invasion o Georgia was markedly improved (at least rom ahumanitarian perspective) compared with their conductin the North and South Caucasus in the mid-1990s.Then, Russian military conduct was characterized bya lack o military pro essionalism. Poor re control,training, discipline, and leadership, inadequate supply

lines leading soldiers to loot or subsistence, weak chain-o -command, and proli c drunkenness were all major recurring problems that resulted in increased threatsto the sa ety o the civilian population, and greater insecurity and access di culties or humanitarian actors.

Evidenced by reports o Russian military behavior during the Russian incursion in August 2008 and by the

behavior o Russian troops in Abkhazia since then, theconduct o Russian orces has improved considerably.In interviews, aid agencies reported that their interactions with Russian military orces were generallypro essional, unthreatening and, in some cases,constructive. According to one large humanitarianorganization with access throughout the con ict-a ect-ed areas, Russian orces were care ul to target militaryobjects, although there was some damage to civilianobjects that were adjacent to military targets. Russian

orces were also criticized in interviews or not doing

more in the rst days o the con ict to rein in SouthOssetian militias when it became clear that the latter were rampaging through Georgian villages, evictingethnic Georgians and burning homes.

Further, as in the past, it remains di cult or aidagencies to discern the relevant points o contact in theRussian military needed or establishing liaison arrange-ments on questions o access, de-con iction o militaryand humanitarian operations, and so on. When ap-proached by aid agencies on such operational matters,

Russian orces have directed humanitarian agencies tode acto authorities in Tskhinval/i or Sukhum/i, whothemselves experience a lack o clarity in their dealingswith Russian orces at the operational level. The situa-tion recalls similar dilemmas aced by aid agencies inestablishing liaison arrangements with Russian orces inChechnya. 22

Since their deployment in 1994, Russian peacekeep-ers had occasionally mitigated some o the excesses o Abkhaz militia and Georgian partisans in Gal/i Regionon behal o civilians who complained o ill-treatment,but such assistance was episodic and unreliable and oc-curred in combination with abuses o civilians (such aslooting) by the peacekeepers themselves. The conductin 2009 o newly-deployed Russian border guards inAbkhazia contrasted with that o Russian peacekeepingtroops deployed since the early 1990s in both con ict-a ected areas under the now-de unct cease- re agree-ments. The PKF has vacated outposts and garrisons insouthern Gal/i Region and Zugdidi. As is the trend inwestern military orces, Russian border guards have re-portedly engaged in ad hoc civil a airs assistance e ortsamong the population in the vicinity o their new basesalong the de acto border with Georgia, includingschool repair and medical clinics or inhabitants.



6

Partisans, Militias, Paramilitary Forces:an Enduring Threat to Sa ety and Wel are

What remains as a serious threat to the sa ety o civilians and to aid agencies is the behavior o irregular

orces and armed groups. As be ore in the Caucasus,criminality and politics are o ten allowed to cross- ertilizewhen it serves the interests o political actors to destabilizean area or to keep adversaries on edge. 23 According toan aid agency active in the border areas o South Ossetiain September 2008, South Ossetian irregulars or militiamembers engaged in looting and red on civilians andtheir homes. 24

A house east o Ochamchire in Abkhazia, destroyed during ethniccleansing in the early 1990s. Photo by the author, July 2009.

BOX 1

The enduring Law and Order gap in gaL/i regiOn

The author toured parts o Gal/i Region in southern Abkhazia in July 2009 a ter aprolonged absence. In the intervening decade-and-a-hal since he rst worked in the region,little has changed or the better and much has gotten worse. Roads and in rastructure have

allen urther into disrepair, making it more di cult or people in outlying villages to bringtheir produce to market or to visit clinics, obtain needed medicines, collect pensions, or conduct other business. Schools that had been rehabilitated in lower Gal/i in 1995 have

allen into an even deeper state o decrepitude than years ago, and it remains a challenge tond su cient teachers willing to live and work in the area’s schools. As in 1995, many

inhabitants o the region are elderly, isolated, and unable to access aid resources.

Most seriously, however, is the palpable and enduring insecurity resulting rom ill-disciplinedand o ten drunk or drugged quasi-o cial Abkhaz militiamen and Georgian partisans whocontinue to be tolerated and used by the authorities in Sukhum/i and Tbilisi as con ictresources. People in Gal/i Region live in ear o violence and arbitrary mistreatment. Thishas gotten worse now that the UNOMIG patrols have stopped and since Russia vacatedthe garrisons ormerly used by its peacekeeping troops. Moreover, some gamgabelis

(mayors) o Mingrelian 25 villages in lower Gal/i have been replaced by ethnic Abkhazinstalled by Sukhum/i, leaving ew possibilities o redress or Mingrelians when Abkhazmilitiamen behave badly.

The international aid presence in Gal/i Region isthin on the ground. Although a ew internationalNGOs, the ICRC, and UNHCR are nominally present,the region is large and the aid presence is small. Someorganizations are restricted by security rules rom enteringparticularly volatile parts o lower Gal/i, urther reducinginternational eyes and ears on the ground that mightserve to deter some abuses or to make abuses known

through international channels. As a result o the waninginternational presence over the years, local inhabitantswho have borne the brunt o events and the ebb and

ow o international support have become accustomedto going it alone, and o ten express a certain contempt

or the use ulness o international actors ranging romaid agencies to the ormer UNOMIG mission.

As o August 2009, there were no indications thatthe more robust and pro essional Russian militarypresence in the region was yet assuming a policing role

in order to ll the protection gap. Nor was there anyindication that the Sukhum/i or Russian authoritieswere attempting to rein in the behavior o Abkhazmilitiamen. Residents o the region reported thatharassment and violence was continuing, includingextortion o payments by Abkhaz border guards andmilitia manning the unpredictable crossing points intoGeorgia proper. Threats o physical violence have beenmade against at least one INGO working in the regionby an Abkhaz gamgabeli .



17

BOX 2

SaTeLLiTe imagery TO infOrm humaniTarian reSpOnSe: unOSaT 26

Soon a ter the outbreak o con ict on 7 August, made-to-order satellite imagery o strickenareas in and around South Ossetia was procured, processed, and delivered to humanitarianagencies on the ground by UNOSAT in Geneva. The imagery provided aid agencies suchas UNICEF, UNHCR, OCHA, the ICRC, Halo Trust, and Human Rights Watch withobjective in ormation almost in real time or compiling damage assessments and projectinglikely humanitarian needs in a limited-access environment.

UNOSAT is a unction o the UN Institute or Training and Research (UNITAR),comparable to a UN common service. Imagery is ree or UN agencies and most other humanitarian organizations. The imagery it can procure allows or time-stamped objectivein ormation on developments on the ground (e.g., a building was standing on this date, butnot two days later). The process or requesting imagery rom UNOSAT is in ormal to savetime: UN eld sta can typically make a request with an e-mail, a ter which UNOSATtakes care o the ormal requests or imagery rom its stable o providers. Due to standingagreements between UNOSAT and a number o civilian providers o imagery (includingnational space agencies and commercial satellite operators), turnaround time is usually very

ast. In the last ew years, there has been an exponential growth in the demand or satelliteimagery in humanitarian crises, largely a result o greater awareness o its value in responsesto large-scale disasters such as the Pakistan earthquake and Myanmar cyclone. UNOSATwas also activated to provide imagery in support o responses to the recent Lebanon andGaza con icts.

Humanitarian Action

The humanitarian consequences o displacementcaused by the August 2008 ghting were or the mostpart dealt with quickly and e ectively. The RussianEmergency Situations Ministry (EMERCOM) wascredited during interviews with aid agency sta withresponding to urgent needs in South Ossetia quicklyand reasonably e ectively. The ICRC is the only inter-national humanitarian organization that is currentlyoperational in South Ossetia, with an international andlocal sta . It suspended operations or two weeks inearly August 2008, re-entering Tskhinval/i rom NorthOssetia on 20 August with a war-wounded kit, more or less simultaneously with distributions in North Ossetiain southern Russia and Kutaisi in Georgia. An ICRCo ce was opened in Gori on 21 August. At least one

European NGO has recently opened an o ce inTskhinval/i and is currently seeking donor support,with others exploring the possibility o doing so. DanishRe ugee Council (DRC) has made a two-day visit toSouth Ossetia rom Russia. UN High Commissioner

or Re ugees Antonio Guterres visited South Ossetiarom the north in Russia on 22 August 2008, ollowed

by a joint needs assessment mission led by UN OCHA

in September 2008.

“In January 2009 the government gave its assent to interna-tional programs helping rst generation IDPs to integrate.This was a tacit acceptance o the idea that those IDPs, or most o them, would not be going home. The government is giving ownership to IDPs o their ats.”

Interview with UNHCR o cial in Tbilisi, July 2009.



19

BOX 3

fOur inTer-reLaTed ThemeS

Case studies and other research conducted by the Humanitarian Agenda 2015 project havebeen organized around our cross-cutting themes. On most counts, the case o Georgiaresonates strongly with ndings in other settings:

In regards to universality , there has been an evident improvement since the mid-1990s inthe amiliarity o combatants, authorities, and bene ciary communities with the means andmotives o humanitarian action. However, as indicated by the prevailing di culties o establishing liaison arrangements with Russian orces in Abkhazia, gaps and suspicionsremain. Further, the greater amiliarity o actors in the region with the workings o international assistance seems to have led to more sophisticated attempts to instrumentalizehumanitarian action or political or military purposes, as evidenced by the humanitarianthrust o Georgian public relations e orts undertaken during and a ter the war.

The impacts o terrorism and counter-terrorism on humanitarian action – soprominent elsewhere – do not gure prominently in the Georgia/South Ossetia/Abkhaziacase. Georgian orces received counter-terrorism training rom the US beginning in 2004in order to exert greater control over alleged Chechen ghters sheltering in the PankisiGorge area. Georgia was a main troop-contributing member o the US-led coalition inIraq (and will soon be dispatching troops to A ghanistan to ght alongside US orces there).However, links between the “Global War on Terror” and humanitarian action are tenuous.

The prevailing thrust toward coherence between political, military, and humanitarianagendas in the international humanitarian “system” is a recurring issue in the Georgia case.

The responses to the crisis o western donors were, by their own account, heavily politi-cized. Political authorities in the West were quick to mount militarized “humanitarian”responses to Georgia in August and September 2008 in spite o these not being needed onhumanitarian grounds, lending credence to the notion that the implicit purpose was to lay a“humanitarian tripwire” to deter a urther Russian advance into Georgia. There is noevidence o pushback against these developments rom the UN’s humanitarian apparatus.Further, the role o international political actors in pressing or humanitarian access at theGeneva Talks has raised questions in the humanitarian community about the wisdom o

joining humanitarian ortunes to political processes that are ragile and perhaps partial. Areluctance o some donor agencies to und activity in secessionist areas or ear o angeringTbilisi re ects a continuing subjugation o humanitarian to political agendas.

Finally, regarding security o aid operations and bene ciary communities, the law-and-order gap aced by tens o thousands o people in and around the secessionist areas hascontinued unaddressed since the early 1990s. This may well change i Russian orces beginasserting a policing unction or the bene t o civilians o all ethnicities in the areas under their e ective control. In general, the operating environment or humanitarian actors hasimproved markedly in the southern Caucasus since the early-to-mid-1990s, but there is apossibility that operating space could contract in Georgia and the secessionist regions i relations with local communities deteriorate in response to political developments o i realor perceived a liations with out-o - avor donors or home governments are not e ectivelymanaged.



0

The Response Measured AgainstAccepted Norms and Standards

Unlike in the early-to-mid-1990s, when the Caucasuswas largely new and uncharted territory or humanitarianactors, donors, and policymakers, by mid-2008 thevarious actors had accumulated more than a decade o experience in the region. As a result, they were well-positioned to anticipate renewed hostilities, assert thehumanitarian agenda with combatants and authorities,gain access to a ected populations, and mount e ectiveneeds-based humanitarian responses that avoidedmirroring or rein orcing the divisions caused by con ict.

Nevertheless, the per ormance o the internationalhumanitarian system in 2008 in Georgia le t much to bedesired. To the consternation o experienced aid actorson the ground, a sudden in ux o new and inexperi-enced aid actors arrived on the scene while political anddiplomatic actors – who o ten used donor agencies astheir proxies – seemed to use their greater awarenessand understanding o the Caucasus more or instrumen-talizing humanitarian action in the service o politicalagendas than or acilitating an e ective humanitarianresponse.

“We responded quickly: it was a political decision. There wasvery little conversation among donors and in embassy circlesin Tbilisi about how Georgia intervened or the dangers o rewarding bad behavior….The West took the side o Georgia.”

Representative o a major European donor,Tbilisi, September 2008.

The research reveals that the aid response to ahumanitarian crisis that was relatively limited in scale was

ar more political than humanitarian. In contrast tohumanitarian crises elsewhere that were under unded atthe time o a February 2009 donor con erence in Brussels,donor responses to a joint needs assessment or post-war Georgia, organized by the UN and World Bank,resulted in a remarkable US$1 billion over-subscription in

pledges o scarce donor resources. Donors pledged a totalo US$4.5 billion or post-war assistance to Georgia.This amount included allocations or direct budgetsupport to the Georgian government, in rastructure repair,development assistance, and humanitarian action. Theamount allocated to humanitarian action representedonly a raction o pledges. However, although somespoke o needing to tap into their own resources in theearly days o the humanitarian response in August 2008,most aid agencies interviewed or this research reportedan overabundance o resources available to humanitarian

agencies and, in the words o one interviewee, “acutepressure to spend and spend quickly.” 28

“The August events changed donor interests dramatically.Huge resources were made available or a relatively small case-load. Compare the situation in Georgia with that in Congo.Be ore the August war donor support in Georgia was low and declining. Our own budget doubled almost immediately, and the government received a lot o budget support.”

Interview with manager o an established INGOin Tbilisi, July 2009.

In general, donors and operational actors largely ailedto respond in a neutral, impartial, and independentmanner. Good Humanitarian Donorship 29 was largelyignored by donor governments, and there is no evidencethat the UN’s humanitarian apparatus attempted tomitigate donor excesses. Military assets were usedinjudiciously or aid delivery (see below), and the donor response was not commensurate with needs. Likewise,INGO behavior was o ten inconsistent with the RedCross/NGO Code o Conduct. 30 Aid agencies or the

most part e ectively took sides in the con ict by acqui-escing in the political and geopolitical divisions andmachinations that prevailed at the time and continue todominate the humanitarian landscape. Few systematicattempts were made to assert humanitarian access acrosscon ict lines. Little diplomatic energy was expendedon pushing back against obstructions o access bycombatants and authorities such as the controversialGeorgian Law on Occupied Territories 31 or the barringo access to Tskhinval/i rom Georgia proper by SouthOssetian authorities. (See “Real and Imagined Barriers

to Humanitarian Access” on page 24.)

The relationship between INGOs, the UN, donors, and the Government o Georgia (GoG) is ar more open and cooperative than the majority o other countries. Lots o time and e ort hasbeen spent building the capacity o the GoG, an inordinate number o GoG sta and ministers are previous employees o INGOs/UN/donors, and most o them know the inner work-ings o the humanitarian and development community quite well. This turned out not to be such a great advantage whenit came time to hold the GoG accountable—there were toomany past and uture bridges to risk burning. In addition, the GoG in many cases was able to anticipate many o our arguments and objections, and dealt over our heads with donorsby pre-empting our own positions. There was a very difcult line to discern between wanting the GoG to succeed and prove the troth o our e orts, and the need to hold them accountable when they pursued political rather than purely humanitarianends.

Feedback rom INGO Head o O ce,Tbilisi, September 2009.



21

Coordination

“There was a huge number o agencies or the geographic areaand number o people a ected.”

INGO Emergencies Manager.

There was a delay o several weeks rom the onset o the war in appointing a UN Humanitarian Coordinator,and it likewise took several weeks or the UN to send insu cient experienced personnel to handle the workloade ectively. UNHCR’s representative in Tbilisi was thepre erred choice or the HC role among many operationalactors, but eventually the appointment went to the UNResident Coordinator (in keeping with standard UN practice).

In interviews, aid agencies expressed misgivingsabout the appointment. Although he came rom a stronghumanitarian background, the Resident Coordinator was elt by some to have displayed a lack o dynamism inthe HC role: indeed, he had done little to press access toSouth Ossetia rom Georgia proper with Ossetian andGeorgian authorities, and de erred to UN Headquartersin New York on questions o assessing needs inside SouthOssetia. Nor did he attempt to visit Tskhinval/i, (whichwas ully considered by the UN system to be part o Geor-gia), despite it having been targeted with heavy weaponsby Georgian orces. He also opted not to eld a civil-military coordination o cer or liaison purposes withcombatants or with US and other outside military orceswho were engaged in sizeable “humanitarian” operations.

This was a stark example o the UN’s utter reliance on donor priorities. Having limited resources o its own, even i the response community – led by the UN – had gained access toSouth Ossetia, donor unds would unlikely have been made available to address needs there anyway. But that ailure alsospeaks to the general ambivalence in regards relationships withthe GoG. I it had been a government with whom we were used to disagreeing, and con ronting openly and regularly, and with whom there was no love lost or uture activities anyway,the response might have been quite di erent.

Feedback rom Senior NGO Head o O ce,Tbilisi, September 2009.

This sta ng gap contributed to a number o short-comings in the response, including a Georgian govern-ment decision to eed IDPs with military rations airli ted

rom the US and other countries, rather than with oodaid available rom humanitarian agencies as would beconsistent with the UN’s Oslo Guidelines on the Use o Military and Civil De ense Assets (MCDA) Guidelines. 32 As one INGO worker observed, “…only once theHDRs and MREs were exhausted did [the government]start to let proper ood be released. In collective centers,MREs and HDRs were literally scattered all over, withpeople not wanting to eat them.”

INGO representatives interviewed or this reportindicated that the UN was quick to set up an in ormalcluster system but slow to resource it: a UNICEF protec-tion o cer, or example, was initially designated as cluster lead on water and sanitation. By most accounts, the HCwas less than ully supportive o OCHA’s coordinating

unction in Tbilisi. An OCHA o ce in Tbilisi was re-opened soon a ter the onset o the crisis, and sta were

eventually placed in the eld in Gori in order to acilitateeld coordination. There was a sense among some OCHAeld sta that the HC was too restrained by his Resident

Coordinator role and the possibility o o ending Georgianand other authorities by being more assertive on pressinghumanitarian matters.

“I remember one WASH 33 meeting where about six o us were present. Collectively we had up to 100 years o rst response experience, but we still could not nd a way to push the sector and coordination orward. We probably stayed with the UN or

way too long and didn’t go independent soon enough – but eventually all agencies did go o alone or in mini consortiums.”

Interview with senior INGO sta ,Tbilisi, November 2008.

On a more strategic level, the closure o the OCHAo ce in Tbilisi and the turnover o some o its key

unctions to UNDP in December 2004 was highlyquestionable on several counts. First, OCHA initiativesin the mid-to-late 1990s were instrumental among theUN amily, the NGO community, and donors in calling

attention to – and mobilizing resources to address – inadequately-met needs prevailing in and around thecon ict areas at the time. Second, OCHA’s downsizingand eventual closure in Georgia was ill-advised in a countrywith such a large population o displaced people and withtwo unresolved “ rozen” con icts whose consequenceswere still weighing heavily – and which the mountingevidence suggested were threatening to again become hot.There was a continuing need or an OCHA presence tocoordinate humanitarian action among the populationa ected by past con icts, and a preparedness role to play inanticipation o urther violence. For example, no databaseon the housing reconstruction e orts in Gal/i Region(dating back to the inception o those e orts in 1994) couldbe consulted by agencies undertaking reconstruction in thesame areas, o ten with the same amilies. More importantly,the absence o OCHA led over the years, as in the early-to-mid-1990s, to a certain blindness to needs in Abkhazia andSouth Ossetia among Tbilisi -based agencies. Closing theOCHA o ce in March 2009 was similarly ill-advised, withso much remaining to be done: access, military-humanitar-ian interactions, maps, databases (such as or homereconstruction e orts in Gal/i Region as well as in the areasa ected by the August 2008 war).



2

BOX 4

COOrdinaTiOn – miXed reviewS

“We want more coordination with the government and with international NGOs. Things are coming,but not quickly enough. We’re grate ul or the assistance we get, but it’s not enough. We’re not getting enough in ormation about the government’s housing reconstruction scheme. We went to the GeorgianYoung Lawyers Association (GYLA) or in ormation about the compensation payments rom the

government. We didn’t know what the $15,000 payments were or. We’re looking or lasting solutions.Maybe things are being centrally planned somewhere but it is better to do things individually. Sometimeswe receive things so late that we don’t need them anymore. And lots o barriers are being erected betweenus and the local administration. The Gamgeoba’s ofce (Governor’s ofce) is like a ortress. They’ve got

guards standing at the entrance and when we have a problem, we can’t get past them. From what we’re seeing on the TV we know that the money is there but it either comes too late or it’s a lot less than we expect. Maybe our perceptions are wrong but this is our reality. Why isn’t there more monitoring over this help? Even journalists come to visit and promise they’ll write about us, but either that doesn’t happen or it comes too late to help. Our suggestions are: we want to choose our representatives to deal with the NGOs, instead o the NGOs dealing with the municipality. We don’t trust the government. We would rather go through the Patriarchate. When we were living in camps and shelters the Patriarchate did a lot. We need an emphasis on jobs and sel -sufciency.

Discussion with ethnic Georgian villagers north o Gori,adjacent to South Ossetia, July 2009.

“There were too many coordination meetings. We would have needed a ull-time liaison person to attend all that were relevant to our work.”

Interview with INGO representative in Tbilisi, September 2008.

“The cluster leads meetings worked very well, because they were closed meetings. OCHA insisted that the heads o clusters attend.”

Interview with ormer OCHA sta er, Tbilisi, July 2009.

“OCHA’s closure was too abrupt. We made arrangements to have two Georgian sta continue in the HC’s ofce [to provide some continuity], and unding was in place or this. But it didn’t happen.”

Interview with ormer OCHA sta er, Tbilisi, July 2009.

“Only the ICRC and CARE assessed conditions in the ‘bu er zone’ be ore October 10 2008.”Interview with donor representative, Tbilisi 2009.

“Coordination between agencies in Gori happens airly e ectively in an in ormal way—it is a small cityand the sta o organizations interact airly regularly.”

Interview with INGO representative, Gori, July 2009.

“The government’s response was very quick, but not well coordinated between ministries or down to the implementation level. It took [INGOs] a month to discover that the government intended to build settlements, or example. It was very difcult to assess the di erent in ormation we were getting romdi erent parts o the government. We had been dealing with the Ministry or Re ugees and IDPs, but the announcement o the settlements came rom the Ministry o Interior.”

Interview with INGO representative in Gori, July 2009.



23

BOX 5

faCiLiTaTing aCCeSS TO aSSiSTanCe and mOniTOring perfOrmanCe Of LOCaL

auThOriTieS: The wOrk Of The geOrgian yOung LawyerS aSSOCiaTiOn 34

Di culties experienced by bene ciaries in gaining access to aid, government compensation,and other entitlements were widespread in areas near Gori and adjacent to South Ossetia.These di culties provided the motivation behind an innovative project implemented by theGeorgian Young Lawyers Association (GYLA), a national NGO started in 1994. Theproject, operated through GYLA’s legal assistance clinic in Gori, aimed to clari y or potential bene ciaries what they were entitled to by way o government compensation andto see redress on their behal when di culties were encountered. GYLA sta visited “all152 villages o Shida Kartli” and others close to the administrative boundary with SouthOssetia to hear complaints and guide those in need through the process o receiving theassistance due to them.

Along a second track, GYLA sta actively monitors how local administrations distributehumanitarian assistance and compensation, observing that there are no clearly de nedcriteria or government distributions o compensation or damaged or destroyed housing,

ood, or cash assistance. GYLA hosts a monthly roundtable meeting to present its observa-tions and suggestions or improvement to local o cials.

A third track involves publishing GYLA’s observations about corruption problems inassistance activities in local newspapers.

Security or Aid Operationsand Personnel

When Russian orces were advancing towards Tbilisiin the ew days ollowing the start o the war, a number o embassy sta s and donor representatives were evacuatedto Yerevan and other locales or were put on notice tobe prepared or evacuation. 35 Rumors were spread bySMS message among the international community inTbilisi that the US was sending troops, heightening

ears o a ull-on military con rontation in Tbilisi andadding to a climate o con usion. In the views o onedonor, the uncertainty led to several days o responsetime being lost to the prevailing con usion.

As it transpired, the Russian advance stopped shorto Tbilisi and the main security problems identi ed bymost o those interviewed related to “wrong place – wrong time” incidents and tra c accidents. Still, agencybehaviors re ected vastly di erent sta security rulesand procedures, ranging along a spectrum rom anirresponsible “none” on one extreme to over-the-toprisk aversion on the other. Virtually all operationalorganizations reported in interviews that their sta had

withdrawn or hibernated temporarily during andimmediately a ter the ghting in and around SouthOssetia, while in Abkhazia several NGOs took a similar approach o temporarily suspending operations or adopting very low pro le modalities. A major US-based NGO, which was unded by USAID, permanentlywithdrew its sta rom Abkhazia within days o thecon ict’s escalation, and did not return. This wasinterpreted by authorities in Sukhum/i as a punitivemeasure, 36 but in an interview NGO sta explained thatits projects were ending at the time anyway. Other

NGOs, such as NRC, scaled down programming andmovements or about a month but resumed activitywhen things calmed down.

One telling example o di erent approaches tosecurity, related in an interview with an internationalNGO, was the way that UN security rules preventedWFP rom being operational in the Svaneti area o western Georgia above Zugdidi (which had absorbedsome IDPs rom the Kodori Valley). InternationalNGOs, however, were able and willing to implement

programs there with no di culty.



4

Real and Imagined Barriers toHumanitarian Access

“I you call the Russians the day be ore, you will have accessto Russian-controlled areas.”

Interview with major donor representative inTbilisi, September 2008, commenting on purported

access di culties claimed by the UN agencies.

“Once again, the Commission calls upon all concerned partiesto allow ree and unhindered access or international organiza-tions to all the con ict-a ected areas (including those whichwere indirectly a ected), rom all directions, at all times, so that the population can be provided with all the necessary humani-tarian assistance and human rights support and the work o con dence-building can proceed. The region and its people must not continue to be isolated; they are part o Europe and are bound to have a European uture once an appropriate settle-ment is reached.”

Thomas Hammarberg, Council o EuropeHuman Rights Commissioner. 37

Political and, regrettably, sel -imposed barriers to accesswere ar more evident than security-related barriers toaccess. First, the bi urcation o the relie e ort ongeographic lines that mirrored the con ict was nearlycomplete. On the ground, this bisection took on somesurreal dimensions: at a UN-led health coordinationmeeting at the Gori tent camp or IDPs, attended by theauthor in September 2008, not a single mention was

made throughout the ninety-minute meeting o healthneeds or responses in shell-shattered Tskhinval/i, a mere

eighteen kilometers down the road. Only those ewagencies with regional operational presence (i.e., insouthern Russia and Georgia, or Abkhazia and Georgiaproper) had a theoretical and, in even ewer cases, a realcomparative advantage or gaining access to all areas.For example, the ICRC was present with delegations inTbilisi and Moscow and a subdelegation in NorthOssetia, enabling it to reopen operations and an o ce

in Tskhinval/i very quickly. On the other hand, theUN did not gain access to Tskhinval/i until 22 Septem-ber 2008 – and then only or an assessment mission – despite having an unparalleled political capacity to push

or it and aid sta and resources on the ground in all keylocations.

Second, access to Tskhinval/i and other parts o South Ossetia rom the direction o Georgia proper hasbeen o cially barred rom both sides. Only the ICRCwas able to cross the con ict line between Tbilisi and

Tskhinval/i, and then only or speci c purposes such asprisoner exchange and amily reuni cation. Georgia’sMinister or Reuni cation Jakobashvili circulated a letter (see Box below) soon a ter the war’s onset puttinghumanitarian agencies on notice that i they sought toassist Tbilisi’s adversaries in Abkhazia and South Ossetia,this would be regarded as an “un riendly act,” andwarning o legal consequences. Following up on thissentiment, the Georgian Parliament passed the “Law onOccupied Territories” on 28 October 2008, stipulatingthat oreigners could only enter the contested areas rom

within Georgia.

BOX 6

geOrgian gOvernmenT puTS aid agenCieS On nOTiCe

“We would like to implicitly [sic] underscore that any attempt rom international governmental and/or non-governmental organisations, State and private companies to legitimize criminal regimes in Sokhumi and Tskhinval/i through cooperation and engagement with them by avoiding the Georgian Govern-ment will be considered as an utmost un riendly step and will bear consequences according to Georgianlegislation and international law. The Government o Georgia under no circumstances will accept that regimes which committed ethnic cleansing and war crimes will enjoy recognition rom [the] international community.”

Excerpt rom a letter to international NGO signed by Dimitri Manjavidze,Georgian Deputy State Minister on Reintegration, 3 September 2008.



25

Aid agencies and others have been critical o the lawor impeding their ree movement into secessionist ar-

eas. At the request o the Georgian government, theCouncil o Europe’s Venice Commission issued anopinion on the law, nding ault with it or, amongother things, not explicitly exempting humanitarian aid

rom its provisions, legislating against economic activityneeded or livelihoods in Abkhazia and South Ossetia,

and observing that questions o the internationalresponsibilities o Russia could only be regulated on thebasis o international law. 38 Although the law banseconomic and related activity in these areas, the wordingo the law does stipulate exemptions or humanitarianpurposes. Likewise, exemptions or humanitarianpurposes are mentioned in the case o oreigners enteringthe secessionist areas at other-than-approved crossings( rom Georgia proper). The problem appears to be:a) a lack o clarity among humanitarian agencies aboutwhat the law actually says; b) lack o concerted e ort by

the humanitarian community to respond to the law andseek clarity about procedures or receiving exemptions;and c) lack o streamlined and transparent procedures toreceive exemptions in a timely and e cient manner

rom the Georgian government.

For their part, South Ossetian authorities (as theydid in 1993/4) have stated consistently that humanitarianagencies are “welcome” in South Ossetia, but only i they enter rom Russia in the north, rather than throughGeorgia proper. This stipulation places an undue logistics

burden on humanitarian agencies: Tskhinval/i is a mere80 km rom Tbilisi where the vast majority o aidagencies in the region are headquartered. Relatively

ew international organizations have any sizeable pres-ence in southern Russia, and the programming thrust o most o those is Chechnya.

Several agencies interviewed during this research eltthat the issue o access to South Ossetia had not beenpressed as assertively as it could have been by the INGOcommunity, the UN, and donors. Indeed, the aid re-sponse has been e ectively bisected, mirroring the con-

ict itsel .

The UN stumbled badly in its early attempts to gainaccess to the stricken areas in and around South Ossetia.The UN Secretary General’s spokesperson MicheleMontas claimed in the UN Daily Brie ng on 9 Septem-ber 2008 that a humanitarian assessment mission romWFP had been denied access at the town o Karaleti tothe Russian-controlled rontier region around SouthOssetia by the Russian military, prompting a sharp re-buttal the next day rom Russia’s Ambassador to theUN, who rightly pointed out that UN humanitariano cials had ailed to contact either the Russian ForeignMinistry or any other Russian agencies about their planned aid activities. The Ambassador also alluded to

“disin ormation” about Russia’s activities in Georgiabeing spread by the UN Secretariat, and slammed a per-ceived anti-Russian bias in western reporting on thecon ict. 39

The incident re ected more an appalling lack o planning, basic humanitarian skills, and ignorance o UN procedure at several levels than a genuine ailure to

gain access a ter pursuing systematic e orts to achieve it.Notably, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator or Georgiahad not asked or deployment o a UN Civil MilitaryCoordination (CMCoord) O cer to identi y militarypoints o contact among combatants and to take chargeo relatively routine negotiations or humanitarianaccess, even though military orces deployed in the theatreon both combat and “humanitarian” missions includedtroops rom two key members o the UN SecurityCouncil: neither did UN OCHA in New York or Geneva take the initiative to sta such a key role at such

a critical time in the UN’s e orts to scale up aid activityin the a ected areas.

However, Russia’s government used the incident tounderscore that humanitarian access to South Ossetiawould be acilitated by Russia through North Ossetiaalong the Vladikavkaz–Tskhinval/i route, validatingstatements by the de acto South Ossetian leader Kokoitythat South Ossetia welcomed international assistance,provided that it did not enter through Georgia.

Humanitarian access was highlighted as a priority bythe Council o Europe’s Human Rights Commissioner ollowing successive act- nding missions to the region.

The Commissioner has stressed the need to de-linkpolitical discussions occurring under the auspices o the Geneva Talks rom “e orts to address the veryconsiderable and urgent humanitarian problems.” 40

Some aid workers interviewed during the researchexpressed concern that humanitarian access had becomean issue in the Geneva Talks. Although they elt that itwas generally positive to have questions o humanitarianaccess raised at a political level, (and presumably pressed

or by international political authorities at the GenevaTalks), there was a perceived danger that such discussionscould replace – or reduce the space or – assertions o access by humanitarian agencies themselves. Some aidworkers worried that a number o humanitarianorganizations had evidently decided to de er to politicalactors in the UN, EU, OSCE, or home governmentsto make access decisions on their behal , rather thanasserting access independently and directly withcombatants and authorities.

Di erent orms and degrees o unease with this co-herence between humanitarian and political agendaswere expressed in interviews. First, rom the somewhat



6

dogmatic perspective o humanitarian principles, it wasseen as an unnecessary subordination o humanitarianactors to political actors and an unacceptable compromiseo the humanitarian community’s independence. Second,out o concern or how their a liations could beperceived, some aid workers saw it as a potentiallydangerous development given UN, EU, and OSCEstewardship o the talks, antagonistic Russia-EU relations,

and Russia’s recent rejection o UN, EU, and OSCEattempts to intercede in the con ict. Third, there wasan expressed ear that humanitarian access couldbecome another pawn in the chess game o politicaltalks that could be negotiated away or sacri ced to whatpolitical negotiators regarded as more important issues.And ourth, some aid workers elt that it was oolhardyto join the humanitarian community’s ortunes to apolitical process that was demonstrably ragile and proneto disruption or even ailure.

Although it was not raised by those interviewed or this study, it bears mention that a much earlier attemptat such coherence ended badly. 41 The 1994 QuadripartiteCommission, consisting o Russia, Georgia, Abkhazia,and UNHCR, became a venue or political pressureson UNHCR to acilitate a dangerously premature returno IDPs to Gal/i.

Opinions were mixed as to whether the humanitarianspace available or operational agencies would shrink inresponse to political developments. Some agencies

expressed the concern that organizations known to bea liated with the EU or USAID could experience acontraction i relations between Moscow and the EUand Washington worsened. As one INGO worker inSukhum/i cogently put it,

“Everything here is saturated in a political stupor. You have local agencies willing to politicize assistance by rejecting it, and

political authorities ready to menace or threaten us. The Abkhazhave acilitated our work in ways that they wouldn’t do i theydidn’t want us here. We’ve seen good aith rom the authorities.But it’s totally conceivable that we could be used as stooges.The EC could pull our unding, or we could be kicked out bythe Abkhaz as a protest vote against the EU’s political position.I a point was to be made about politics they would toss us out.Or Georgia could penalize us or working with the Abkhaz.We’re being laid siege to rom all sides, but everyone has avested interest in keeping us around. I don’t know how to read the tea leaves in this place. It’s labyrinthian: bizarre.”42

Whither the EU Monitoring Mission?

“The EUMM has no mandate to share humanitarian in or-mation with the humanitarian community, but they sometimesdo it in ormally. We’ve heard that EUMM wants to start doing civil a airs projects.”42

Interview with INGO sta in Gori, July 2009.

On 1 October 2008, the European Union MonitoringMission (EUMM) began deploying internationalmonitors to provide oversight o the implementation o the cease- re agreement brokered earlier by FrenchPresident Sarkozy between Moscow and Tbilisi. Themission, initially comprised o 200 unarmed monitorsand later expanded to some 350 monitors, consistedprimarily o police o cers and military personnel, withonly a hand ul o civilian human rights specialists andhumanitarian pro essionals. The EUMM is based inTbilisi, but regional eld o ces operate out o Tbilisi/Mtskheta, Khashuri, Gori, and Zugdidi. Its monitorscompile reports based on their eld observations whichare sent to the mission’s headquarters in Tbilisi, whichthen compiles reports or Brussels, which reports to the

oreign ministries o EU member states. Observationsrom the eld are not made public, nor shared with aid

agencies, re ecting the essentially political purpose andnon-executive nature o the mission.

The EUMM was intended to provide a patrollingpresence on both sides o the lines o con ict in and

around both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. However,the execution o the EUMM’s mandate has been dealt aseemingly atal blow by the re usal o Russian, Ossetian,and Abkhaz authorities to allow it to enter the secessionistterritories. Accordingly, the mission is unable to executeessential parts o its normalization and con dence-building mandate.

A ormer EUMM observer with extensive experi-ence in other observer missions was intensely critical o the mission or ailing to anticipate its lack o access to

both sides o con ict lines, and it consequent inability tocarry out its mandate. 43 In his view, the mission’s mandatehad been gutted by lack o access to the secessionistareas, and this warranted consideration o an earlydownsizing o the mission while holding in reserve thepossibility o expansion should access to South Ossetiaand Abkhazia be granted.



29

BOX 8

inTeraCTiOn On uS deCiSiOn TO aSSign Lead humaniTarian rOLe

in geOrgia TO uS miLiTary

(excerpted rom InterAction Press Release, “Humanitarian Principles at Stake in Georgia,” 3 September 2009) 47

“The 170 member alliance o international development and humanitarian organizationsthat comprise InterActionbelieves that it was wrong to put the US military in charge o theAmerican government’s humanitarian response in Georgia. Despite the insistence o senior U.S. o cials that the U.S. Agency or International Development (USAID) is leading thehumanitarian response, the reality on the ground continues to be in uenced by PresidentBush’s statement that it is a U.S. military-led humanitarian operation. InterAction members’ability to stay true to their humanitarian mission to provide assistance to people in needwithout distinction o any kind, without political criteria, and without support or aparticular government or political movement is at risk.

First, the U.S. military is not set up to know the needs o populations in distress or workwith them on a daily basis to address those needs. It is providing assistance that is notappropriate to the situation and does not acilitate the local population’s ability to care or itsel .

Second, a military-led humanitarian response in a con ict zone tends to avor one side. I international relie agencies work with the military in this environment, their impartialityand ability to obtain access to all people in need are compromised. Linking the militarywith assistance in a con ict zone also lends credence to charges by some governments and

non-state actors who claim the humanitarian action is being undertaken to urther politicaland strategic objectives.

Finally, military-led U.S. humanitarian assistance hurts America’s image abroad. It gives theimpression that the United States does not care about the well-being o all people a ectedby con ict and that it is not particularly concerned about the development o vibrantcivil societies capable o caring or themselves i given the opportunity. The Georgiangovernment actually has considerable experience in disaster relie . It, and the numerouscivilian humanitarian organizations working in Georgia, has the ability to involve the localpopulation in those projects rom which they will most bene t.

InterActionmembers believe this situation can be remedied by ensuring that the militarystick with its mandate while the U.S. government agency best equipped to support humani-tarian responses around the world, USAID, is the leader during the next phase o the o cialU.S. response in Georgia – and in uture relie e orts around the world. Independent relie agencies working in partnership with USAID and other civilian U.S. Government agencies,U.N. organizations, and the Red Cross have the expertise, credibility, and impartiality tolead the recovery and reconstruction phases o the response. While the U.S. military has avaluable role to play in humanitarian response, it is most e ective when supplementingassistance available rom civilian agencies rather than supplanting it….”



0

A “Humanitarian Tripwire?”

“Why is this aid being delivered with warships armed withmodern missile systems?”48

Vladimir Putin, 2 September 2008.

“Back-ofce program ofcers at some big NGOs in the US didn’t really see anything wrong in the military taking a lead role in an emergency.”

Interview with US-based INGO representativein Sukum/i, July 2009.

Military orces, notably rom the US and other NATO countries, were dispatched on high pro le “hu-manitarian” missions shortly a ter the beginning o theAugust 2008 war. Given that there was ample humani-tarian capacity already on the ground at the time, as wellas considerable surge capacity among major humanitar-ian actors such as the ICRC, USAID/OFDA, the UNagencies, and several INGOs, it is di cult to dismisssuggestions that the US and NATO intent was to lay a“humanitarian tripwire” 49 in order to deter a deeper Russian advance into Georgia.

A high-pro le US military air and seali t o relie items was initiated to the Georgian port o Poti and tothe main airport in Tbilisi. Within hours o Bush’sannouncement, Saakashvili called the US decision a“turning point” in the war, describing the US interventionas a “military-humanitarian mission” to place the portand airport under US military control. 50 Saakashvili’sclaim was quickly denied by the Pentagon, but Bush’s

decision to have the US military lead the US responsee ectively created a “humanitarian tripwire” which, i triggered, could have led to an explosive expansion o the con ict, pitting US orces against Russian troops.

“We didn’t know until October that Bush had issued anexecutive order making the response the purview o the DoD.However, many donors and the GoG clearly did. This meant that much o our e ort to hold the GoG accountable wasutterly misdirected – they and others knew that they held cardsthat we didn’t realize existed.”

Feedback rom Senior NGO Head o O ce,Tbilisi, September 2009.

The US guided missile destroyer USS McFaul arrives in Batum, Georgia on 24 August 2008, carrying 80 tons o humanitarian suppliesrom the US Department o De ense. The ship was part o a US military sea and air operation ordered by George W. Bush.

Photo by US military.



31

What Does the HumanitarianFuture Hold?

At a macro level, the humanitarian response to theAugust 2008 events highlighted that the humanitariansystem is largely ine ective at pushing back against blatantand dangerous politicization o humanitarian responseswhen donor undertakings to Good HumanitarianDonorship are disregarded. There was a dearth o e ective stewardship o donor behavior rom the UN andother actors in the international community. The responsewas ultimately ar more political than humanitarian.

Perhaps even more seriously in a world o scarce donor resources or humanitarian action, donor response was

ar out o proportion to assessed needs but still su eredrom distribution problems that le t some organizations

with strong eld presence with under unded programs.On a more positive note, shortcomings in transparencyand accountability among donors and the Georgiangovernment were con ronted head-on through thee orts o Transparency International (TI) Georgia. TheTI initiative merits replication in other contexts wheredonor behavior is wanting. Iraq, Pakistan, and A ghanistancome to mind.

The bridge over the Inguri River, which orms the present de acto border between Abkhazia and Georgia, viewed rom the Abkhazside. Russian border troops with armored vehicles are based just to the le t, not visible in the photo, while Abkhaz militia and“customs” o fcers man a control point just to the right. Georgian police man a checkpoint at the ar end o the bridge, which is asclose to Abkhazia as EUMM monitors can get.

Photo by the author, July 2009.

3. Conclusions and Recommendations



2

What does the uture hold or humanitarian actionin Georgia, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia? In terms o the context, domestic political instability in Georgiacontinues to pose threats o a downward spiral into

actional violence that would be likely to producehumanitarian allout. 51 Against this backdrop, however,three actors combine to create a vastly changedhumanitarian landscape. First, Georgia has now decisively

lost the wars in South Ossetia and Abkhazia politically( or the rst time) and militarily ( or the second time).Second, there is a new Russian imperative to stabilizethe Caucasus region along its southern border, particularlyas the Sochi Olympics approach. Third, Russia isrobustly reasserting its military power and politicalin uence in the region – including its recognition and

acilitation o Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence – as a pushback against NATO and EU expansion.

“There’s a very distinct di erence in Russian stewardship o

Abkhazia vs. South Ossetia. In the ormer, Russia seems tobe investing more heavily in permanent military and civilianin rastructure and Russian investment is being encouraged.”

Interview with INGO Head o Missionin Sukhum/i, July 2009.

“UNOMIG’s departure will have a big economic e ect.Maybe people will seek income in other ways.”

Interview with INGO sta active in Abkhazia,Tbilisi, July 2009.

Looking to the humanitarian uture, the new politicalrealities on the ground are likely to yield a mix o goodand bad outcomes or the people in and around Abkhaziaand South Ossetia. I past is prelude, a number o developments are plausible:

1. Over the past 15 years it may have served Russianinterests to promote instability in Abkhazia andSouth Ossetia by allowing a degree o lawlessnessand impunity or militias and criminal activity. Itno longer does so. Regardless o whether Georgia,the EU, and US agree or disagree with Russia’snew posture in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, thestrengthened Russian presence is now a durable

act on the ground that has potential to deliver long-awaited improvements in the daily lives o thepeople who live there. Russia’s decision to bolster its military presence, border security, and nancialinvestments in the two regions promises to bringwelcome stability and normalization to their popu-lations, chie among them the Georgian/Mingrelianinhabitants o Gal/i Region. However, this will becontingent on Russia taking responsibility or along-overdue assertion o law and order or thebene t o the civilian population. In particular, itis now entirely within Russia’s capabilities in thenear term to put an end to the protracted protection

problems that have aficted the inhabitants o Gal/iRegion since the early 1990s. I Russia exercises itsmoral and legal responsibilities, the subjugation o the population to ill-disciplined Abkhaz, Ossetian,and Mingrelian militias, rampant banditry, andcorruption inside the two aspiring republics willcome to an end.

2. Although it now seems inconceivable that Abkhaziaand Russia will someday opt to see Abkhazia backwithin Georgia, it is more conceivable that theGal/i Region, with its overwhelmingly Georgian/Mingrelian population, is eventually ceded toGeorgia. Russia’s installation o a new naval acil-ity at Ochamchire (slightly northwest o Gal/i)lends credence to this possibility. However, thedisposition o Gal/i Region is likely to remain inlimbo at least until a ter the Sochi Olympics and achange o regime in Tbilisi. Accordingly, it alls to

Russia and Sukhum/i to stabilize Gal/i and make ita more livable place or its current inhabitants andreturnees rom across the Inguri River.

3. Now that Georgia has de nitively lost the warsover Abkhazia and South Ossetia both militarilyand politically, the current Georgian governmentmay be tempted to mimic previous Georgianregimes in tolerating, i not encouraging and

acilitating, the re-emergence o militia and partisanactivity as a means o oiling Russian e orts by

omenting continued instability in and around thetwo regions. This possibility will be more likely i EU and US in uence is insu cient to rein inGeorgian behavior, perhaps ollowing a regimechange in Tbilisi, or i the current regime becomesdisa ected with the EU as a result o the EU’sreport on culpability or the 2008 war. In the past,militia and partisan activity and the predictableRussian responses to it have perpetuated seriousthreats to the sa ety and wel are o people in andaround the contested areas. I there are more instiga-tions o violence, more displacement is inevitable:needs will persist or humanitarian assistance andprotection.

4. The EU has institutionalized its pro-Georgianstance and is increasingly seen by Russia, Abkhazia,and South Ossetia as adversarial. Present only onthe Georgian side o the con ict lines and with slimhopes that it will be allowed to enter either Abkhaziaor South Ossetia, the EUMM is a dangerousexpression o this: EU monitors now gaze at Russianmilitary positions in Abkhazia and South Ossetiathrough binoculars, shing or in ormation rompeople who cross into Georgia rom the tworegions and reporting in secret to European capitals.The rst e orts to get an incident prevention



33

mechanism in operation or Abkhazia only tookplace between the EUMM, Russians, Georgians,and Abkhaz in July 2009, nearly an entire year a ter the South Ossetia war. The EUMM is ailing badlyat its mission to mitigate con ict and risks becominga counterproductive presence. This will have growingimplications or humanitarian action, especially thatpursued by operational agencies a liated with the

EU.

5. Whatever the merits o their claims to indepen-dence, humanitarian e orts that are visibly a liatedwith the EU are likely to experience a contractiono operational space in Abkhazia and South Ossetia

or as long as the EU is seen as adversarial in thesecessionist areas. This may extend to securitydi culties i Abkhaz or Ossetian militias are notreined in.

6. Conversely, humanitarian e orts by Europeanorganizations in Georgia proper may experience asimilar backlash in response to the publication o

ndings rom the EU’s assessment o culpability or the August 2008 war.

7. Political and military developments in Abkhaziaand South Ossetia have e ectively ruled out thepossibility o return or many Georgians who edthese areas in the 1990s. The “new reality” hasalready given impetus to e orts to more ully integrate

Georgia’s uprooted population into communities inGeorgia proper. This will remain a major thrust o recovery e orts or the next several years, alongsidee orts to acilitate return o people who have ed

rom areas adjacent to South Ossetia and rom Gal/iRegion.

Recommendations

Core principles o humanitarian action were violatedwith aplomb by a range o actors in Georgia. The strategiesput into place were ormulated largely withoutre erence to prior experience by actors in the regionand beyond. The result was a humanitarian crisissuperimposed atop an earlier humanitarian crisis, butwith the underlying issues in neither situation e ectivelyaddressed. Moreover, the scaling-down o the aidpresence and donor support or a number o years, onlyto be reactivated a ter the latest upsurge o violence,con rms the need or continued struggling with rootcauses and longer-term questions during a crisis and inthe apparent lull therea ter.

Given the documented abdication o their under-takings by donor governments, governments in theregion, and humanitarian agencies to the core principleso humanitarian action and International HumanitarianLaw, it seems highly anticlimactic or recommendationsto ocus on bureaucratic and organizational improve-ments in the UN and other systems. While there isclearly room or improvement in the implementation o humanitarian activities in this crisis, the response to therecent violence in the Caucasus underscores rst and

oremost the need or a renewed commitment o politicaland humanitarian actors o all stripes to humanitarianprinciples, IHL, and undertakings to Good HumanitarianDonorship and UN Guidelines on the use o military

orces in humanitarian response.

The absence o lessons learned and applied suggeststhat in this instance at least, there may be an inversecorrelation between the integrity o humanitarian actionand the willingness to identi y relevant lessons, on theone hand, and the political pro le o the con ict on theother.

The ollowing recommendations to speci c actorsemerge rom the eld research conducted or this

report. They are urther in ormed by a retrospective onhumanitarian responses to earlier con icts in the region.They seek to in orm policy and operational choiceslikely to re-emerge in the uture:

1. The UN’s Emergency Relie Coordinator (ERC)should appoint UN Humanitarian Coordinatorswithout delay at the onset o a humanitarian emer-gency or when a political crisis threatens to escalateinto serious violence.



4

2. When appointing Humanitarian Coordinators, theERC should take into account that ResidentCoordinators might not be suitable choices or theHC role in states a ected by internal con icts,where the HC’s real and perceived neutrality andhis or her perspectives and access might becompromised by the Resident Representative’spre-existing relationship with the host government.

3. The ERC should work more closely with UNResident Representatives, donors, and the Secretariatto prevent the premature closure o OCHA o cesbe ore humanitarian work is completed or coordi-nation responsibilities are handed over to other capable actors. OCHA presence is essential in ragilecontexts such as situations o pre-con ict, post-con ict, and rozen con ict to ensure adequate levelso humanitarian advocacy, con ict early-warning,and preparedness. OCHA presence can also ensure

that operational UN agencies give due regard tohumanitarian needs in recovery or developmentcontexts.

4. Using the 23 Principles o Good HumanitarianDonorship as benchmarks, Humanitarian Coordinatorsand the ERC should be empowered and encouragedby the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)to more orce ully advocate and act against harm uldonor practices such as blatantly politicized donor decisions.

5. The Executive Committee on Humanitarian A airsshould ensure that steps are taken to more ullyacquaint UN Country Teams and HumanitarianCoordinators with procedures and methods or asserting humanitarian access in con ict environ-ments, including experience-based learning abouthow to negotiate access with di erent orms o combatants. There is an evident need to reviewthe basics. In addition to a lack o basic skills,another impediment appears to be an institutionalreluctance in the UN system to expend politicalcapital or asserting access. However, no other entity has the political clout and reach o the UNsystem or doing so. (See also Item 10 below).

6. In cooperation with the ERC, OCHA headquarters,and the UN Department o Political A airs (DPA),Humanitarian Coordinators should more closelymonitor, report on, and, i necessary, advocateagainst the injudicious use o military orces in hu-manitarian responses, in accordance with the UNGuidelines on the Use o Military and Civil De enseAssets in Complex Emergencies.

7. The ERC should ensure that it is standard procedureor UN OCHA to deploy a UN Civil Military

Coordination O cer whenever military orces areinvolved in assistance operations. A situation likethat in Georgia, which directly involved the armed

orces o two permanent members o the SecurityCouncil and several others, merits the appointmento at least one senior CMCoord O cer to assert

humanitarian interests with military orces, in supporto the Humanitarian Coordinator.

8. The Humanitarian Coordinator or Georgia shouldtake the lead in getting the Georgian Law onOccupied Territories clari ed without delay.Speci cally, the HC should press the Georgiangovernment to institute streamlined and transparentprocedures or obtaining humanitarian exemptions

rom the law. The HC should similarly assert theneed with de acto authorities in Tskhinval/i to allow

un ettered humanitarian access rom within Georgia.

9. OCHA should reopen its Tbilisi o ce and, in lighto current protection problems and gaps in assistanceactivity, should establish sub-o ces in Abkhaziaand South Ossetia under whatever institutionalarrangements are practical, given the prevailingpolitical sensitivities.

Priority tasks in Tbilisi should include ongoingadvocacy with state and non-state actors, monitoring

o ongoing assistance and protection needs especiallyin con ict-a ected areas, con ict early-warning,and humanitarian preparedness.

Priority tasks in Abkhazia should include provisiono coordination services to the operational human-itarian community, active monitoring o protectionand assistance needs in Gal/i Region, creation andmaintenance o an assistance database detailingactivities since 1993, con ict early warning, andhumanitarian advocacy with de acto authorities inSukhum/i and Gal/i (e.g., encouraging moreconstructive engagement o Abkhaz authorities andRussian orces on the protection needs o returneesin Gal/i Region).

Priority tasks in South Ossetia should similarly ocuson active monitoring o protection and assistanceneeds, con ict early warning, and advocacy withde acto authorities and Russian orces with the aimo encouraging greater restraint among Ossetianirregulars and ensuring that humanitarian gaps areadequately lled by local or international actors.



35

10. UN Agencies, INGOs, and other humanitarianactors should collectively revisit the question o humanitarian access at the Inter-Agency StandingCommittee level. For those who have de erred topolitical actors involved in the Geneva Talks tomake access decisions or them, the risks o thisapproach need to be taken on board. There is aneed or most humanitarian actors in the context to

assert humanitarian access more independently,creatively, and pro essionally.

11. The US Department o State should undertake areview o what went wrong in the US “humanitarian”response in Georgia with a view to brie ng theObama administration on the need or rewallsbetween humanitarian action, on one hand, andmilitary or political action, on the other. Thereview should incorporate the views o InterActionand its members, expressed by InterAction in the

a termath o the con ict.

12. The ICRC should step up its InternationalHumanitarian Law dissemination e orts amongGeorgian, Russian, Abkhaz, and Ossetian arms bear-ers, and among NATO training o cers deployed tothe Caucasus.

13. As an essentially political mission already viewed inthe region as partial, the EUMM should not engagein civil a airs or quick-impact projects. Humani-

tarian action should be per ormed by humanitarianorganizations. EUMM reporting o cers at the localand headquarters level should continue to sharein ormation relevant to humanitarian agencies withaid actors, and should be actively encouraged to doso by EUMM management.

14. The US Department o De ense should incorporatemandatory IHL-based training on distinction andthe proportionate use o orce into all o its militaryassistance programs.



6

Annex APrecursors to the Confict between Georgia and South Ossetia 52

Ossetians are a distinct ethnic and linguistic groupon either side o the north Caucasus mountains,straddling a strategic pass through the mountains that ormthe present internationally recognized border betweenGeorgia and Russia. Their location con erred specialimportance, and at times avorable status, under Russiancolonial interests. Ossetians generally sided with Czarist

orces, deepening a historical cle t between ethnicOssetians and Georgians. Under the Soviet system,South Ossetia had the status o an autonomous regionwithin Georgia. Urban centers had mixed Ossetian,Georgian, and Russian populations, while rural villageswere either mixed or monoethnic. Nationalist sentimentsemerged simultaneously among Ossetians and Georgianswith perestroika in the late 1980s. Demonstrations inthe South Ossetian administrative center o Tskhinval/i,sparked by a typhoid outbreak and discontent over thedecrepit state o the city’s water system, led in early1988 to a Georgian assertion o political control. Protestsand strikes turned into violent ethnic clashes whichbecame worse with the involvement o loose-knitGeorgian gangs in 1989.

A decree issued by the Georgian Supreme Sovietstipulating Georgian and Russian as the o cial languageso the region helped crystallize secessionist rumblings inSouth Ossetia, ultimately leading to a proclamation o independence – rom Georgia but still within theSoviet Union – in September o 1990. Georgia dispatchedinterior ministry troops to Tskhinval/i and surroundingareas, counter to Moscow’s wishes. Clashes escalated as

the ragtag Georgian National Guard and paramilitariesimposed a sporadic economic blockade on Ossetians,which included preventing the passage o essential goods

rom North Ossetia through the Roki Tunnel at theRussian-Georgian border. With the collapse o the SovietUnion and Georgia’s 1991 declaration o independence,the internationalization o the Russian-Georgian border e ectively bisected the Ossetian population into Northand South Ossetia.

Coincident with a series o earthquakes that in ictedserious damage on housing and in rastructure in andaround Tskhinval/i and Djava, violence and hostage-taking continued sporadically or much o 1991, peakingwith the prolonged shelling o Tskhinval/i by Georgian

orces. An estimated 500 people were killed. Approximately100,000 ethnic Ossetians ed rom South Ossetia andother parts o Georgia, mainly to North Ossetia in theRussian Federation, while an estimated 11,000 ethnicGeorgians ed as IDPs to other parts o Georgia. Armedhostilities waned as Georgian ghters gravitated towardscon ict in Tbilisi and eventually Western Georgia andAbkhazia, but South Ossetia proclaimed sovereignty inMay o 1992. A Georgian-Russian-Ossetian peace-keeping orce was established under the Joint ControlCommission (JCC) in June o 1992. The OSCEbecame involved in promoting political negotiations inDecember 1992 and later responded with an expandedunarmed observer mission to monitor the peacekeeping

orce. Low-level, back-and- orth violence, much o itwith criminal overtones, continued or several years.

As in Abkhazia, most pressing humanitarian needs inSouth Ossetia were met by the ICRC and a small number o international NGOs, but the region did not receiveanywhere near the same level o assistance rom westernand multilateral donors provided in Georgia proper andwas more severely a ected by economic collapse whenthe Soviet system disintegrated. For several years, major donors and UN agencies tended to steer clear o assistanceto South Ossetia, earing that their relations with the

Georgian government would be jeopardized and theregion’s claims to independence legitimized. This ledto perceptions among many Ossetians, clearly andrepeatedly voiced by their leadership in Tskhinval/i,that aid was being withheld as punishment. Donor attitudes shi ted in 1997 and limited unds were madeavailable or reconstruction and rehabilitation o damagedin rastructure.

The depth o intercommunal tensions resulting romthis earlier war in South Ossetia was di cult to gauge.

Although there was no doubt that some o those whowere directly a ected by the war continued to harbor animosities, the bigger picture was more encouraging.



37

As early as 1994, Georgian and Ossetian villagers tradedreely together at a market north o Tskhinval/i, under

the watch ul eye o Russian troops who extorted pro-tection money rom market vendors, customers, andsuppliers. The market at Ergneti, just outside Tskhinval/i,emerged in 1996 and similarly provided an importantand rare, albeit illicit, venue or interaction between theethnic groups.

By early 1998, Georgian president Shevardnadzehad visited Tskhinval/i. Private Georgian and Ossetiancars could traverse the ront lines with little di culty. Asubstantial warming o political relations between SouthOssetian and Georgian authorities in 1997 increased thespace or both aid and peacebuilding and enabled thelong-awaited repatriation o Ossetian re ugees andGeorgian IDPs to begin. Donor support or recon-struction and economic recovery programs in andaround South Ossetia re ected a growing optimism that

the OSCE-brokered peace process was making goodheadway, although ma a activity connected to the rawalcohol trade, as well as banditry, continued to threatenthe consolidation o peace.



8

Annex BPrecursors to the Confict between Georgia and Abkhazia 53

Abkhazia is a ertile area sandwiched between theBlack Sea and the Caucasus mountainrange. The areahas signi cant economic potential rom agriculture andtourism and in Soviet times was a major rail andcommunications link between Russia and the southernCaucasus. War and ethnic cleansing in Abkhaziabetween mid-1992 and late 1993 resulted in an estimated10,000 deaths, the displacement o some 250,000(predominantly Mingrelian) Georgians and an unknownnumber o Abkhaz and smaller minorities. Widespreaddestruction was in icted on residential areas throughoutAbkhazia south o Sukhum/i. Although a ormal cease-

re came into e ect in May 1994, lawlessness, low-levelviolence, and insecurity has prevailed ever since,particularly in Gal/i Region, precluding an organizedreturn o those who had ed their homes and allowinganimosities to ester and are.

The con ict over the autonomy o Abkhazia isatypical in the region because, in the evento the massreturn o the ethnic Georgian (or Mingrelian) population,ethnic Abkhaz will again comprise a small minorityrelative to other ethnic groups. Be ore the war, Abkhaz-Georgian tensions evolved in ways that tended to belocalized and variable, but were rooted in historical

ears, ethnic demographics, real and perceived injustices,and Soviet social engineering.

Language, a highly personalized and central eatureo national identities, has played a key and requent roleas a ashpoint. Amid a growing ethnic Georgian

majority, the Abkhaz had long been a minority along withRussians, Armenians, Greeks, and others. An Abkhazalphabet based on Cyrillic was created in 1862. SomeAbkhaz had adopted Islam under Ottoman in uenceduring Czarist times, in the seventeenth and eighteenthcenturies, leading to Russian-imposed deportations o many Abkhaz to Turkey and elsewhere in the OttomanEmpire. Abkhazia was restive under Russian rule, butprimarily sided with Bolshevik orces against independentGeorgia early this century. Latin script was adopted bythe Abkhaz in 1918. A ter Bolshevik orces consolidated

control over the Caucasus, Georgia was absorbed intothe Soviet Union. Following a brie period as a Union

Republic, Abkhazia was placed in late 1921 as a titular Abkhaz region within Georgian borders. By 1926, ethnicAbkhaz constituted less than one-third o the populationo Abkhazia, and steadily diminished in relative numbersas the “Georgianization” policies o Stalin’s intelligencechie Lavrenty Beria, himsel a Georgian, encouragedsettlement o ethnic Georgians and others in Abkhazia.An edict in 1938 replaced Latin script with Georgiancharacters as the basis o the Abkhaz language. Abkhazgenerally resented subjugation o their culture and identityto growing Georgian in uences.

The death o Stalin led to attempts to right some o the wrongs o his rule. Abkhaz were allowed to makegreater use o their own language in education andpublications. Cyrillic script was once again o ciallyadopted. Demographic changes were accelerated by thedevelopment o resort areas on the Black Sea coast,however, and by 1959 the Abkhaz made up only 15.1percent o Abkhazia’s population. Sporadic ethnic riotssur aced in the 1950s through the 1970s. A growingsense among the Abkhaz that their identity was beingthreatened was ueled by increasing settlement o Armenians in Abkhazia and subtle Georgian CommunistParty policies o assimilation. Moscow responded toAbkhaz ears in the 1970s by granting increased culturalautonomy and economic bene ts to the Abkhaz, whoalso had autonomous political institutions. These actorsin turn led to resentments among the ethnic Georgianmajority that the Abkhaz were un airly advantaged.

The advent o perestroika loosed repressed ethnictensions in Abkhazia and Georgia proper. Encroachingsystemic collapse paved the way or extremist ethnicchauvinism to take hold amongst the populace. ZviadGamsakhurdia, an intellectual later to become indepen-dent Georgia’s rst president, took an openly chauvinisticapproach to ethnic questions, which e ectivelymobilized minority ears and eventually led in Abkhaz-ia, Adjara, and South Ossetia to closer identi cationwith Russia and nascent secessionist movements. Inmid-1989, as the Soviet system ell deeper into disarray,

serious intercommunal violence ensued, ollowing thelanguage-centered decision taken in Tbilisi to bolster educational opportunities or Georgians at the AbkhazState University in Sukhum/i. Meanwhile, Tbilisi took



39

increasingly strident measures to marginalize minority-led political structures in Georgia’s autonomous regions,leading rst to civil war with South Ossetia. Abkhazia’sSupreme Soviet issued a declaration o Abkhaz sover-eignty in August 1990, within the altering USSR.

At the end o 1991, another civil war broke outin Georgia, between ollowers and opponents o

Gamsakhurdia and quickly moved rom Tbilisi to theSamegrelo district in Western Georgia. As ghtingabated in South Ossetia, sel -styled warlords threw their weight behind Eduard Shevarnadze, ormer Soviet

oreign minister and the new de acto head o the Georgiangovernment. Shevardnadze, keen to distance himsel

rom his Soviet past, ceded to Georgian nationalistpressures by abolishing Abkhaz autonomy and annullingan ethnic compromise between the Abkhaz and Georgianparliaments. As ghting continued in West Georgia,“Zviadists” were orced closer to and eventually into

the southern reaches o Abkhazia. A hostage-taking o Georgian government o cials served as a pretext or

ghters aligned with Tbilisi to enter Abkhazia in August1992. Encountering little resistance, they continued toSukhum/i, seizing the Abkhaz capital and orcing theleadership to ee. Full-scale civil war ensued, withatrocities on both sides well-documented by humanrights organizations.

Aided by Russian orces based in Abkhazia andvolunteers rom the nearby northern Caucasus, the Abkhaz

eventually recaptured Sukhum/i and the remainder o Abkhazia in September 1993, expelling Georgian ghtersin a humiliating de eat. During the war, the brutalnature o the violence was characterized on both sidesby ethnic sweep operations, terror, expulsions, extensivelooting, and rape in icted on civilians o the “other”ethnic group. Taking on an increasingly ethnic imprint,violence extended into villages and even amilies whereAbkhaz and Georgians had previously ound a modusvivendi. Deeply personal experiences o ethnically-based violence led to cycles o retribution and vengeanceattacks, many o which were interrupted – but by nomeans nished – when an o cial cease- re wasinstituted in May 1994. The outcome o the war wasan almost complete separation o Abkhaz and Georgians,many o whom now harbored deep mutual hostility. ASeparation o Forces Agreement established a securityzone in Gal/i and Samegrelo (Zugdidi) Regions,patrolled by a nominally Commonwealth o IndependentStates (CIS) peacekeeping orce o Russian troops andmonitored by the small, unarmed UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). The QuadripartiteAgreement (QPA) was also signed by representatives o Russia, Georgia, Abkhazia, and UNHCR, stipulatingmechanisms or political negotiations and the repatriationo IDPs.

A large-scale repatriation e ort to the Gal/i Regionunder UNHCR auspices, regarded by many in thehumanitarian community as dangerously premature,

ailed in September 1994, due to the absence o securityor returnees and Abkhaz attempts to screen returneesor alleged participation in the war. Most Georgian

IDPs were maintained in displacement status byinternational and government assistance, and the IDP

community became highly politicized. Since 1995, tenso thousands o predominantly Mingrelian IDPs havespontaneously returned to their homes in Gal/i Regionand, more recently, to areas slightly north o Gal/i thatare outside o the security zone. Spontaneous returneesreceived UNHCR and other assistance to rebuildhomes and community in rastructure, but seriousde cits in protection – a result o the reluctance o theCommonwealth o Independent States PeacekeepingForce (CISPKF) to adopt a policing role – contributedto recurring abuses o returnees by Abkhaz police,

paramilitaries, and Georgian partisan groups. Althoughmost pressing humanitarian needs were being metelsewhere in Abkhazia by the ICRC and a hand ul o international NGOs, UN and U.S. donor policiesproscribed signi cant assistance to insurgent-held areasuntil relatively recently. The rationale or this was thatwithholding aid would help to a rm Georgia’s territorialintegrity and exert pressure on the Abkhaz leadership toadopt a more moderate stance in political negotiations.As in South Ossetia, Abkhaz elt they were beingpunished through the withholding o essential aid.

In 1997, there was signi cant movement in theo cial peace process, including the establishment o aCoordinating Council with working groups or re ugeesand IDPs, andsocioeconomic problems. These develop-ments, along with renewed donor interest in undinghumanitarian and post-war recovery programs inAbkhazia, led to growing recognition among aidagencies o the need to think ahead to the programmingimplications o an eventual return or at least some o Georgia’s remaining 250,000 displaced people. However,growing militancy among some elements o the IDPpopulation (the so-called “White Legion” and “ForestBrothers” partisan groups), a deterioration in the situation

or spontaneous returnees within the security zone, andmore requent targeted and random attacks againstcivilians in Abkhazia and Western Georgia posedmounting threats to this progress. Security o aidoperations and personnel in these areas deterioratedsteadily since 1995. These conditions ormed the back-drop or renewed violence in and around the securityzone in May o 1998, resulting in more than 100 deathsand the extensive burning o returnee homes. Anestimated 35,000 people ed to Zugdidi rom Gal/iRegion, many or the second or third time.



0

Annex CConfict, Geopolitics, and Humanitarian Action in Georgia,

South Ossetia, and Abkhazia

Chronology o Events 54

1801 Georgia annexed by Russia.

1918 Georgia declares independence rom Russia.

1922 Bolsheviks consolidate control over Caucasus.

1985 Gorbachev comes to power in USSR.

1987 Perestroika introduced.

1988 Rising interethnic tensions, Georgian nationalism, and secessionist rumblings in Abkhazia andSouth Ossetia.

1989 April: demonstrators killed in clash with Soviet troops in Tbilisi. July: ethnic riots in Abkhaziakill 17, martial law declared. November: violent clashes between Georgian nationalist ghtersand Ossetians in Tskhinval/i, continuing until January 1990.

1990 Growing lawlessness throughout Caucasus. January: Soviet troops deploy in South Ossetia.March: Georgia declares sovereignty. August: Abkhaz Supreme Soviet adopts declaration o

sovereignty o Abkhaz Soviet Socialist Republic. September: South Ossetia declaresindependence rom Georgia but within USSR. Georgia dispatches interior ministry troops toTskhinval/i and surrounding areas, counter to Moscow’s wishes. Clashes escalate, and Georgiaimposes sporadic economic embargo on Tskhinval/i which periodically cuts the city o romessential goods passing through Roki tunnel rom Russia.

1991 April: Georgia declares independence rom USSR. December 8: USSR ceases to exist.Internationalization o Georgia/Russia border e ectively bisects Ossetian population betweensouth and north. An earthquake strikes Tskhinval/i and Djava in South Ossetia, resulting inwidespread damage to housing and in rastructure. Violence and hostage-taking continuesbetween Georgians and Ossetians, culminating in the prolonged shelling o Tskhinval/i by

Georgian ghters, killing an estimated 500 persons. Some 100,000 Ossetians ee rom SouthOssetia and other parts o Georgia to North Ossetia, while approximately 11,000 ethnicGeorgians ee as IDPs to other parts o Georgia. Earthquake and war damage and the e ectso collapsed in rastructure will go largely unaddressed by international aid agencies or several

years, with donors only beginning to engage there in 1995. Few international humanitarianorganizations apart rom the ICRC and a ew INGOs seek to be present until several years later.

1992 Georgian President Gamsakhurdia toppled a ter battle in downtown Tbilisi: ghting wanes inSouth Ossetia as open war are escalates in Western Georgia between Zviadists and loose-knitparamilitaries comprising “Georgian National Guard,” continuing into March. May: SouthOssetia proclaims sovereignty. June: Joint Control Commission and Georgian/Russian/Ossetian

Peacekeeping Force established in South Ossetia. August: loose-knit Georgian ghters invadeAbkhazia and open war are ensues, with Georgian ghters taking Sukhum/i. December: OSCEmission opens in Georgia, beginning diplomatic e orts to stabilize the situation and later dispatching unarmed international monitors in and around South Ossetia.



41

1993 September: Georgian ghters expelled rom Abkhazia; renewed ghting ensues in WesternGeorgia, continues to November.

1994 Georgians and Ossetians trading reely together at a joint market near Tskhinval/i. May: Georgiaand Abkhazia sign Separation o Forces Agreement, Quadripartite Accord instituted.CIS Peacekeeping Force deployed. July: UNOMIG mandate and mission expanded by UNSC.September: large-scale spontaneous return o some 35,000 IDPs to Gal/i Region o Abkhazia.Georgia engages with NATO Partnership or Peace Programme or the rst time.

1995 November: Georgian President Shevardnadze survives assassination attempt in Tbilisi.

1996 Continued low-level back-and- orth violence between Georgian irregulars and Abkhaz,particularly in Gal/i Region. This will persist or many years.

1997 Increased intercommunal contact begins between Georgians and South Ossetians in and aroundSouth Ossetia, amid increasing normalization and cooperation over uel and alcohol smuggling,but also against a backdrop o low-level back-and- orth violence. August: Abkhaz leader Arzinbatravels to Tbilisi or direct talks with Shevardnadze. Aid rom agencies based in Tbilisi increases,along with UNDP-, EU-, and OSCE- administered peacebuilding unding. Donor support or

reconstruction and economic recovery programs in and around South Ossetia re ect growingoptimism that OSCE-brokered peace process is progressing.

1998 Shevardnadze visits Tskhinval/i or direct talks with Ossetian leadership. Continued militancyamong elements o Georgian IDP population rom Abkhazia. February: UNOMIG observerstaken hostage by Zviadists near Zugdidi. May: outbreak o violence in Gal/i Region o Abkhazia, many rebuilt homes burned or the second time. Abkhaz militia undertake ethnicsweep operation, resulting in new displacement o some 35,000 to Zugdidi area, most or thesecond time. Organized crime in and around South Ossetia involving Georgian and Ossetiansmuggling and banditry poses continuing threats to stability, o ten resulting in armed clasheswith ethnic overtones.

2002 March: US expands Global War on Terror to southern Caucasus on Russia’s border, dispatching180 US military advisers to provide training to our Georgian army battalions with the intent o asserting Georgian control over Chechens in Pankisi Gorge. The US believed at the time thatal-Qaeda remnants had ed to the Pankisi among some 2000 Chechen ghters.

Nov 2003 Mikhail Saakashvili spearheads “Rose Revolution” in Tbilisi, ousting Georgian PresidentEdouard Shevardnadze.

2004 Saakashvili becomes Georgian President through “Rose Revolution” on a plat orm o anti-corruption, restoring Georgia’s territorial integrity, and building relations with the West,including the EU and NATO. Concerted e orts begin to quali y Georgia or membership inboth organizations, to the consternation o Russia. Saakashvili’s anti-Russian rhetoric, o tenincluding personal insults directed at Russian leadership, becomes increasingly strident. Inmid-June, the Georgian government begins clamping down on the Ergneti market outsideo Tskhinval/i, e ectively depriving thousands o Ossetians and nearby Georgians o their livelihoods and severing perhaps the only remaining ties o interdependence between Ossetiansand Georgians. South Ossetians gravitate increasingly toward ties with Russia, which increasesaid to Tskhinval/i. Tensions increase sharply between Tskhinval/i and Tbilisi.

2005 UN OCHA o ce in Tbilisi dissolved. Two national sta absorbed into UNDP, thensubsequently laid o .

2006 Russian imposes trade and transport restrictions on Georgia in a climate o worsening relationsbetween Tbilisi and Moscow.



2

2007 May: South Ossetian Provisional Administration ormed as a shadow government bySaakashvili. October: clash between Georgian police and Russian PKF in Ganmukhuri adjacentto Abkhazia, resulting in the arrest o our Georgian policemen and the arrival on the scene o Saakashvili, his de ense and interior ministers. Surrounded by television crews, Saakashviliupbraids commander o PKF and accuses PKF and UNOMIG o abrogating their mandates toprotect civilian population.

17 Feb 08 Kosovo declares independence rom Serbia.

15 May 08 Russia, China, and India reject Kosovo independence.

Jun/Jul 08 Skirmishes between Georgian and South Ossetian ghters. Tensions increase. Russian militaryover ight o Georgian territory coincides with visit to Tbilisi o US Secretary o State Rice, whopledges US support or Georgia’s bid or NATO membership. Georgian military trains with USand other western orces in joint NATO exercise within Georgia that coincides with a major Russian military exercise in the North Caucasus.

07 Aug 08 A ter a week o increasingly intense skirmishes which caused thousands o South Ossetians toleave Tskhinval/i and Djava, Georgian President Saakashvili declares unilateral cease- re with

South Ossetia. Georgian military begins bombardment o Tskhinval/i with heavy weapons atapproximately 11:30 pm “to restore constitutional order.” Members o Russian PKF killed inthe attack. An OSCE monitor describes the Georgian attack as “absolutely disproportionate.”

Jubilant demonstrations on the streets o Tbilisi when news o attack is announced.

08 Aug 08 Russian Forces enter Georgia through Roki tunnel.

09 Aug 08 Russian orces take control o Tskhinval/i.

09 Aug 08 Abkhaz orces clash with Georgian orces in Kodori Valley. Russian orces in Abkhaziaare bolstered.

10 Aug 08 Russian orces enter Zugdidi and Senaki.

11 Aug 08 ICRC issues preliminary emergency appeal or $7.4 million or the needs o around 50,000war-a ected persons.

12 Aug 08 Russian orces take e ective control o Georgian port o Poti. Cease- re agreement advanced byFrench President Sarkozy.

13 Aug 08 Russian armor and troops enter Gori, taking control o military bases, and proceed towardTbilisi along the major east-west highway, e ectively bisecting Georgia. Sarkozy pushes peaceplan with Saakashvili in Tbilisi. US President Bush announces a military-led humanitarianmission to Georgia. USAID transitioned rom regional to Washington DC-led operation.Saakashvili lauds the US decision as a “turning point,” wrongly assuming that the US meantto secure Georgian air and seaports.

14 Aug 08 US and Poland sign agreement on missile de ense system. First shipments o US aid arrive inGeorgia by military airli t.

15 Aug 08 Russian orces halt advance at Igoeti, 35 km rom Tbilisi. Saakashvili signs EU-sponsored peaceplan. US Secretary o State Rice visits Tbilisi. USAID DART team deploys to Georgia.

16 Aug 08 Russian President Medvedev signs EU-sponsored peace plan.

18 Aug 08 UN issues Flash Appeal or $59.6 million or Georgia, not including South Ossetia or Abkhazia.Aid activities in the two contested regions are not re ected in the appeal.



43

20 Aug 08 ICRC re-establishes presence in Tskhinval/i with seven expats and ten national sta .

21 Aug 08 OSCE deploys additional 20 monitors, bolstering a skeleton sta . ICRC teams enter bu er zonearound South Ossetia and other a ected villages near Gori. Family reuni cations begin shortlya ter. ICRC o ce opens in Gori. Two US Navy ships and one US Coast Guard cutter enroute to Georgia through Black Sea. Human Rights Watch reports that cluster munitions hadbeen used in the South Ossetia con ict.

22 Aug 08 Russian orces begin withdrawal, exiting Gori. UNHCR head Guterres visits Tskhinval/irom north, entering through Russia.

24 Aug 08 Georgian government organizes 400 buses to take IDPs to Gori rom Tbilisi.

26 Aug 08 Medvedev recognizes independence o South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

29 Aug 08 US military concludes airli t o Humanitarian Daily Rations and other commodities to Georgia.

01 Sep 08 EU emergency summit agrees on dispatch o unarmed EU monitoring mission to Georgia.Tensions remain high in areas adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, with numerous low-level

attacks and skirmishes throughout September and October.

02 Sep 08 Russian Prime Minister Putin queries why US humanitarian aid is being delivered to Georgia“with warships armed with modern missile systems.”

03 Sep 08 US announces $1 billion in aid to support Georgia’s humanitarian needs and economicrecovery. InterAction issues press release entitled “Humanitarian Principles at Stake in Georgia,”condemning military leadership o the US aid response. Georgia severs diplomatic relationswith Russia.

04 Sep 08 US Vice President Dick Cheney visits Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine, again pledging US

support or Saakashvili and Georgia’s accession to NATO.

08 Sep 08 “Joint Needs Assessment” begins in Georgia by World Bank, EC, and UN. The report romthe JNA was not made public. Accord reached on implementing terms o cease- re agreement.

09 Sep 08 UNSG Ban Ki Moon’s spokesperson Michele Montas claims in UN daily brie ng that aUN humanitarian assessment mission had been barred access into “bu er zone” on 09 September by Russian troops.

10 Sep 08 Russian ambassador to UN issues sharp rebuttal to UN claim o denied access, saying that theUN had not contacted Russian Foreign Ministry or other Russian authorities.

11 Sep 08 First UN humanitarian convoy “allowed to enter Russian-controlled areas north o Gori,”crossing Karaleti checkpoint.

13 Sep 08 Russian orces withdraw rom Poti, Senaki, and Khobi.

15 Sep 08 EU decides to deploy EUMM with a mandate covering all o Georgia.

17-20 Sep 08 OCHA leads humanitarian assessment mission to South Ossetia and adjacent areas with the intento eeding results into revised Flash Appeal.

1 Oct 08 EUMM deploys 200 monitors rom 22 countries to Georgian areas adjacent to South Ossetia andAbkhazia, based in Tbilisi with regional eld o ces in Tbilisi/Mtskheta, Khashuri, Gori, andZugdidi. The mission is not granted access to the secessionist areas as stipulated in its mandate.



45

15 Jul 09 UNOMIG completes withdrawal o observers rom Abkhazia/Western Georgia.

11 Aug 09 Third incident prevention and response mechanism meeting held in Gal/i with Georgian,Russian, and Abkhaz participation, acilitated by EUMM and UN.

12 Aug 09 Putin announces $500 million in military spending in Abkhazia, including a Russian navyacility at Ochamchire and additional unding or Russian border guards. Russia reiterates

that its recognition o Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence will not be rescinded.



6

Footnotes

1 Greg Hansen is a Canadian aid worker and independent researcher. Hansen is the author o the HA2015 country study on Iraq. He has workedin con icts throughout the Caucasus and in 1998 authored Humanitarian Action in the Caucasus: A Guide or Practitioners or the Humanitarianismand War Project and Local Capacities or Peace Project o the Collaborative or Development Action.

2 See S. Neil MacFarlane, Larry Minear, and Stephen D. Shenfeld, Armed Con ict in Georgia: A Case Study in Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping ,Humanitarianism and War Project Occasional Paper No. 21, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute or International Studies, Brown University, 1996; andGreg Hansen, Humanitarian Action in the Caucasus: A Guide or Practitioners , Humanitarianism and War Project and Local Capacities or PeaceProject (LCPP), Occasional Paper No. 32, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute or International Studies, Brown University, 1998,http://www.watsoninstitute.org/pub/OP32.pd ; and Greg Hansen and Larry Minear, “Waiting or Peace: Perspectives rom Action-OrientedResearch on the Humanitarian Impasse in the Caucasus,” in Disasters , Vol. 23 Issue 3, pp. 257-270, September 1999.

3 UNHCR, Georgia Global Needs Assessment, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e48d2e6, last accessed November 2009.

4 https://wikis.uit.tu ts.edu/con uence/display/FIC/Humanitarian+Agenda+2015--The+State+o +the+Humanitarian+Enterprise.

5 See ootnote 2 above

6 See Annexes A & B or more extensive background on the evolution o the Georgia/ South Ossetia and Georgia/Abkhazia con icts, and Annex Cor a timeline. The European Union commissioned an exhaustive international investigation into the circumstances leading up to the August 2008

war, led by Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini. “The aim o the act-fnding mission shall be to investigate the origins and the course o the con ict inGeorgia, including with regard to international law (1), humanitarian law and human rights, and the accusations made in that context (2). Thegeographical scope and time span o the investigation will be su fciently broad to determine all the possible causes o the con ict. The results othe investigation will be presented to the parties to the con ict, and to the Council, the Organisation or Security and Cooperation in Europe(OSCE) and the United Nations (UN), in the orm o a report.” European Union, Council Decision 2008/901/CFSP o 2 December 2008 concerning

an independent international act-fnding mission on the con ict in Georgia , December 2008. The report was released in late September 2009 asthis study was concluding.

7 The US airli ted the Georgian troops home rom Iraq as soon as Russian orces crossed into Georgia, although these particular troops did notengage in any fghting at the time. The Georgian government recently announced that it would bolster its troop contribution to the NATO-ledwar in A ghanistan, and that its orces there would be deployed alongside the American contingent.

8 Georgian troops were involved in a military exercise with NATO troops in Georgia days be ore the attack on Tskhinval/i.

9 See Theresa Freese, Smuggling to Survive , Eurasianet, date unknown, http://www.eurasianet.org/georgia/shida/story.html. Market activity whereSouth Ossetians traded with Georgians was evident as early as the mid-1990s, during a visit by the author, and occurred under the eye o Russianpeacekeeping troops who themselves benefted rom the trade by extorting payments rom buyers and sellers.

10 Interviews with aid agency sta , September 2008, July 2009.

11 Tony Karon, Has Georgia overreached in Ossetia? Time, 9 August, 2008.

12 EMERCOM o Russia,South Ossetia, How it Was , 2008, http://www.mchs.gov.ru/new/news/detail.php?ID=22843&lang=eng.EMERCOM is the Emergency Situations Ministry o the Russian Federation.

13 Estimates o IDPs and returnees are taken rom IDMC, Georgia: IDPs in Georgia still need attention , 9 July 2009.

14 UNHCR distributes frst aid in Georgia-South Ossetia “bu er zone,” UNHCR, 18 September 2008,. http://www.unhcr.org/48d276bc2.html.

15 Interview with UNHCR o fcial in Tbilisi, July 2009, corroborated by other aid agencies.

16 See Box 2 entitled “The Nature o War are in the Caucasus” in Hansen, Humanitarian Action in the Caucasus …, op. cit., p. 11.

17 Human Rights Watch, A dying practice: Use o Cluster Munitions by Russian and Georgia in August 2008 , 2009.http://www.hrw.org/sites/de ault/fles/reports/georgia0409webwcover_0.pd .



47

18 Both Russia and Georgia have had western public relations frms and media consultants on the payroll since be ore the August 2008 war to helpmanage perceptions in western capitols and media. Russia, or example, used a PR frm to promote its image during its presidency o the G8.Georgia engaged PR frms to promote its case or NATO and EU membership. See Andy Rowell, Who is on the Side o the Angels? , Spinwatch,26 August 2008, http://www.spinwatch.org/-articles-by-category-mainmenu-8/62-international-politics/5153-who-is-on-the-side-o -the-angels.

19 Peter Wilby, Georgia has won the PR war, The Guardian, 18 August 2008 ,http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2008/aug/18/pressandpublishing.georgia.

20 C.J. Chivers and Ellen Barry, Georgia Claims on Russia War Called Into Question, New York Times, 7 November 2008,www.nytimes.com/2008/11/07/world/europe/07georgia.html.

21 The EU and the Georgian government signed an agreement in early 2009 in which Georgia pledged not to use EU unding or military purposes.In interviews in Tbilisi in September 2008 and July 2009, donor representatives and the UN Humanitarian Coordinator indicated that there hadbeen no attempts to raise or discuss the substitution e ect in the donor community, by which donor support to the Georgian government could

ree up government resources to be applied to military purposes. For urther explanation o the substitution e ect, see Mary B. Anderson, Do NoHarm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War , Lynne Rienner Publishers, USA, 1999.

22 In a 1996 study by the Humanitarianism and War Project on humanitarian action in Chechnya, the authors noted this about Russian orces andtheir problematic interactions with humanitarian actors: “In a climate o suspicion, the absence o even a minimal understanding o humanitarianand NGO activity made negotiations or humanitarian access or appeals on behal o civilians an extremely laborious process, with outcomes neverassured. Blurred chains o command among combatants and a lack o accountability among military and civilian authorities complicated suche orts urther. Authorities at all levels repeatedly demonstrated a propensity or entering into agreements and understandings with humanitarianagencies or to establish procedures that were then ignored or used to impede humanitarian activity urther. The ‘Catch-22’ scenario was amiliar.

An o fcer at the command headquarters o Russian orces in Chechnya, or example, had liaison duties with humanitarian organizations.However, to see the o fcer, agencies required a letter rom the commanding general. To see the commanding general, however, arrangementscould only be made by the liaison o fcer.” Greg Hansen and Robert Seeley, War and Humanitarian Action in Chechnya , Occasional Paper No. 26,Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute or International Studies, Brown University, 1996, p. 66.

23 See Annexes A and B or urther background.

24 Interview in Tbilisi, September 2008.

25 Mingrelians are an ethnic sub-group o Georgians in Western Georgia. They comprise the majority o the returnee population in southernAbkhazia. Their language is a Georgian dialect.

26 Based on a telephone interview with Einar Bjorgo, Head, Rapid Mapping, Applications and User Relations, UNOSAT - Operational SatelliteApplications Programme, UNITAR, Geneva. See also UNOSAT’s website at http://www.unitar.org/unosat/org.

27 IDMC and NRC, Georgia: IDPs in Georgia still need attention, 9 July 2009, www.internal-displacement.org.

28 Interviews in Tbilisi and Gori, July 2009.

29 See Principles and Good Practice o Humanitarian Donorship , www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/.

30 See Principles o Conduct or The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Response Programmes ,www.i rc.org/publicat/conduct/index.asp.

31 The Law on Occupied Territories was adopted by the Georgian parliament on October 23 2008.http://www.parliament.ge/fles/69_18768_820796_Law-Occupation.doc.

32 See Guidelines On The Use o Military and Civil De ence Assets In Disaster Relie – “Oslo Guidelines,” updated November 2006,http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docId=1111316, and Guidelines On The Use o Military and Civil De ence Assets ToSupport United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies , March 2003 (revised January 2006, http://ocha.unog.ch/drptoolkit/ PreparednessTools/Normative%20and%20legal%20instruments/Normative%20Guidance%20on%20specifc%20issues/MCDAGuidelines%202003%20RevJan06.doc.

33 Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene.

34 Interview in Tbilisi, August 2009.

35 Interview with major donor in Tbilisi, September 2008.

36 Interview with de acto Abkhaz Foreign Ministry sta , Sukhum/i, July 2009.

37 Hammarberg, Report on Human Rights Issues Following the August 2008 Armed Con ict, Council o Europe Commissioner on Human Rights,15 May 2009, p. 16.



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38 European Commission or Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on the Law on Occupied Territories o Georgia ,Opinion No. 516/2009, CDL-AD (2009) 015, March 2009.

39 Reuters, UN aid o fcials in Georgia lacked paperwork-Russia; Reuters Foundation, 10 September 2008.

40 Hammarberg, op. cit., p. 12.

41 See S. Neil Mac arlane, Larry Minear, and Stephen D. Shenfeld, Armed Con ict in Georgia: A Case Study in Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping ,Occasional Paper No. 21, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute or International Studies, Brown University, 1996: “The act that [the UN’s] leadhumanitarian agency, UNHCR, was also a participant in the political process (it was represented at the political talks and chaired the QuadripartiteCommission on Repatriation) gave it an interest in promoting resettlement and in rapid movement toward political settlement. Had UNHCR notbeen involved in the negotiations, it might have been reer, as noted by one UN sta person, to voice humanitarian assistance and protectionconcerns” (p.44). Ultimately, the authors conclude, “The UN, centerpiece o the international response to the crisis, proceeded in a manner[that] situated humanitarian activities frmly within a political rubric. Re ecting a now- amiliar structural bias toward UN member governments inits political support o the Georgian authorities, the UN displayed questionable judgment in promoting the rapid return o re ugees. Facilitatingtheir return re ected the imperatives o the political process, to which the UNHCR through its role on the Quadripartite Commission lent itsinstitutional weight, to the detriment o their sa ety and protection” (p.90).

42 Interview in Sukhum/i, July 2009.

43 Private communication with ormer EUMM observer and veteran o other observer missions, August 2009.




47 InterAction, Humanitarian Principles at Stake in Georgia , Press Release, 3 September 2009.

48 Cited in Civil Georgia Daily News, Putin on Georgia’s Humanitarian Aid, NATO Ships in Black Sea, 2 September 2008.http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=19377.

49 See Elana Schor, Bush says US military will deliver humanitarian aid to Georgia . Guardian.co.uk, 13 August 2008.www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/13/georgebush.georgia. See also Strat or, Georgia and the US Tripwire , 13 August 2008.www.strat or.com/analysis/georgia_saakashvili_and_u_s_tripwire, and American Forces Press Service, S hips to deploy to support Georgiahumanitarian assistance mission , 21 August 2008. http://www.relie web.int/rw/rwb.ns /db900sid/EDIS-7HQQ7X?OpenDocument.

50 Reuters, “US to take control o Georgian ports: Saakashvili,” 13 August 2008.http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSLD49893320080813.

51 Center-periphery relations remain a highly-charged issue in Georgia, where allocation o resources to the regions con ounds pre-existingsentiments o alienation rom the central government. Within Georgia proper there are persistent cleavages between Tbilisi and WesternGeorgia, Samstkhe-Javakheti and Adjara. The insistence by Georgian opposition parties that President Saakashvili resign and government use o

orce to quell demonstrators serve as reminders o the ragile state o domestic Georgian politics. The armed hostilities between Tbilisi andGamsakurdist fghters in Western Georgia in 1994 and the lawlessness that prevailed or several years compel urther caution about the abilityo Georgia to weather political storms in ways that avoid bloodshed.

52 Excerpted rom Hansen, Humanitarian Action in the Caucasus , op. cit.

53 Excerpted rom Hansen, Humanitarian Action in the Caucasus , op. cit.

54 Drawn rom a number o sources, including news reports, context analysis reports rom humanitarian organizations, feld interviews, andGreg Hansen, Humanitarian Action in the Caucasus: A Guide or Practitioners , Humanitarianism and War Project and Local Capacities or PeaceProject, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute or International Studies, Occasional Paper No. 32, Brown University, 1998.



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