Wolfgang Obergassel, Lauri Peterson, Florian Mersmann, Jeanette Schade, Jane Alice Hofbauer, Monika Mayrhofer

Human rights and the Clean Development Mechanism

Lessons learned from three case studies

© Wolfgang Obergassel, Lauri Peterson, Florian Mersmann, Jeanette Schade, Jane Alice Hofbauer, Monika Mayrhofer, 2017. The definitive, peer reviewed and edited version of this article is published in: Journal of Human Rights and the Environment, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 51-71, 2017. DOI: 10.4337/jhre.2017.01.03

Wolfgang Obergassel a* Lauri Peterson b Florian Mersmann a Jeanette Schade c Jane Alixe Neubauer d Monika Mayrhofer d

Human rights and the Clean Development Mechanism: lessons learned from three case studies

a Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and

Energy, Germany b Department of Government, Uppsala University c Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development

(COMCAD), Bielefeld University d Section for International Law and International Relations,

University of Vienna * Corresponding author:

Wolfgang Obergassel Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy Döppersberg 19 41103 Wuppertal Germany

E-mail: wolfgang.obergassel@wupperinst.org Phone: +49 202 2492 149 Fax: +49 202 2492 250

This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as editing, corrections and structural formatting, may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was sub-sequently published in the Journal cited above.

HumanRightsandtheCleanDevelopmentMechanism:LessonsLearnedfromThreeCaseStudiesWolfgang Obergassel, Lauri Peterson, Florian Mersmann, Jeanette Schade, Jane AliceHofbauer,MonikaMayrhofer

ThisarticleanalyseshumanrightsimplicationsofprojectsundertheCleanDevelopment

Mechanism(CDM)oftheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange

(UNFCCC).WhiletheCDMislikelytoexpireinthenearfuture,theexperiencegainedshould

beusedtoinformtherulesofthenewmechanismtobeestablishedunderthe2015Paris

Agreement.WearguethattheCDMandthenewmechanism,asinternationalorganisations

undertheguidanceofUNFCCCmemberstates,shouldapplytheUNGuidingPrincipleson

BusinessandHumanRights.Basedontheexperiencedrawnfromthreecasestudies(two

hydropowerprojectsinBarroBlanco,Panama,andBujagali,Uganda,andonegeothermal

energyprojectinOlkaria,Kenya),weshowthatCDMprojects,whileinformalcompliance

withCDMrules,canleadtoanumberofhumanrightsinfringements.Weconcludewitha

numberofrecommendationsonhowtoachieveagreaterrecognitionofhumanrightsinthe

newmechanismundertheParisAgreement.

Keywords:Climatepolicy,humanrights,CleanDevelopmentMechanism,involuntary

resettlement

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1INTRODUCTIONMitigationofclimatechangerequireslarge-scaleinvestmentsinarangeofprojectsinthenearfuture,which—asisthecasewithalllarge-scaleprojects—haveahighpotentialtoinfringehumanrights.1Thepreambleofthe2015ParisAgreementacknowledgesthat‘Partiesshould,whentakingactiontoaddressclimatechange,respect,promoteandconsidertheirrespectiveobligationsonhumanrights,therighttohealth,therightsofindigenouspeoples,localcommunities,migrants,children,personswithdisabilitiesandpeopleinvulnerablesituationsandtherighttodevelopment,aswellasgenderequality,empowermentofwomenandintergenerationalequity’.2 Humanrightsimplicationsofinternationalclimatepolicyarenot,though,onlyamatterforthosestatesactingashoststoconcreteactions.Inparticular,climate-relatedactionsindevelopingcountriesusuallyinvolveinter-andtransnational(non-state)actorssuchasbilateralandmultilateraldevelopmentagenciesandbanksaswellasprivateprojectimplementers—aconvergenceofactorsraisingthequestionofextraterritorialhumanrightsresponsibilities.3 Thispaperanalysesoneinternationalclimatemechanism,theKyotoProtocol’sCleanDevelopmentMechanism(CDM),fromahumanrightsperspective.TheCDMwaschosenbecauseitissofarthelargestinternationalmitigationpolicyinstrumentfordevelopingcountries,andhasabout7,700registeredprojects.4Moreover,accusationsofhumanrightsviolationssuchasforcibleevictionshaveaccompaniedthemechanismfromthebeginning,5makingitaparticularlysalientfocusforahumanrightsanalysis. TheCDMislikelytoexpiretogetherwiththeKyotoProtocol’ssecondcommitmentperiod,whichendsin2020.However,the2015ParisAgreementestablishesanew‘mechanismtocontributetothemitigationofgreenhousegasemissionsandsupportsustainabledevelopment’.6ThedecisionbythePartiestotheUNFCCCtoadopttheParisAgreementspecifiesthattherulesforthismechanismaretobedevelopedonthebasisof,interalia,‘[e]xperiencegainedwithandlessonslearnedfromexistingmechanisms’.7Therefore,despitethefactthattheCDMhasonlyalimitedlifetimeleft,ananalysisofthemechanismcanprovideworthwhileinputtothedevelopmentofnewmechanisms. Thepresentarticlefirstoutlinesrelevanthumanrightsnormsanddiscussesobligationsofstateandnon-stateactorsinextraterritorialactivities.Next,thearticleanalysestheextenttowhichextenthumanrightsnormsareconsideredbytheCDM’srules.

1UNHRC,‘ReportoftheOfficeoftheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforHumanRightsontheRelationshipbetweenClimateChangeandHumanRights’(2009)A/HRC/10/61,22ff.<http://www.refworld.org/docid/498811532.html>accessed15May2015.2UnitedNations,ParisAgreement,Preamble‘,(UnitedNations2015)3Extraterritorialresponsibilitiesherearemeantasthoseresponsibilitiesof(non-state)actorsthatarisefromactivitiesoutsidethedirectjurisdictionoftheirparentstate(seealsosection2.2ofthispaper).4UNFCCC,'CDM:CDM-Home'(cdm.unfccc.int,2016)<http://cdm.unfccc.int>accessed7November2016.5Seee.g.HeidiBachram,'ClimateFraudandCarbonColonialism:TheNewTradeinGreenhouseGases’(2004)15CapitalismNatureSocialism;LarryLohmann,CarbonTrading:ACriticalConversationonClimateChange,PrivatizationandPower(DagHammarskjöldFoundation,Uppsala2006).6UnitedNations2015(n.2),Art.6.4.7UNFCCC,‘Decision1/CP.21,AdoptionoftheParisAgreement.FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1,29January2016,para38‘,(UNFCCC2015)

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ThearticlethenexaminesthreeCDMprojects,theBarroBlancohydropowerprojectinPanama,theBujagalihydropowerprojectinUgandaandtheOlkariageothermalprojectinKenya.Thesethreecaseswereselectedbecausetheyinvolveinternationalactorsandhaverecurrentlybeenthesubjectofmediareportsconcerninghumanrightsallegationsinthecontextofassociatedresettlementmeasures.Assuch,theyprovideusefulsitesforadetaileddiscussionofextraterritorialobligations. Theresearchapproachappliedineachcasewasahumanrightsimpactassessmentconsistingofdeskandfieldresearch,includinginterviewswithkeystakeholdersandfocusgroupdiscussions.Thethreecaseswerefirstextensivelyresearchedforwrittenevidenceinadesk-topresearchexercise.Thefindingsfromthisstagethenfedintoapreliminaryreportthathypothesizedpossibleinfringementsofhumanrights.Theteamthenconductedfieldmissionstoeachcasestudysite,andconductedinterviewsandfocusgroupdiscussionswithalargenumberofdifferentstakeholders.Theintervieweesincludedindividualsdirectlyaffectedbytheprojects,projectdevelopers,governmentofficialsinvolvedinprojectapprovalanddevelopment,non-governmentalorganisations,andrepresentativesofthebi-andmultilateraldonororganisationsandbanksinvolvedinprojectfinance.Finally,thearticlediscussesproceduralstepsandinstitutionalsettingsusefulforthepreventionoffuturehumanrightsproblemsinfutureprojects.

2.HUMANRIGHTSANDEXTRATERRITORIALOBLIGATIONS:LARGE-SCALEINVESTMENT,HUMANRIGHTSNORMSANDSTATEOBLIGATIONSLarge-scaledevelopmentinvestmentsveryofteninvolvedisplacementandresettlementoflocalpopulations,withconsequentimpactsontheirlivelihoods.Accordingtoestimates,about15millionpeopleareevictedworldwideeachyearasaresultofinfrastructureprogrammes(dams,urbanization,roads,etc.).8Displacementandplannedrelocationfrequentlyleadto‘interlockingdisadvantages’9thatlimitpeople’sopportunitiestomaintainandimprovetheirlivelihoods,underminetheirassetsandcapabilitiesandincreasetheriskstheyface.Asaconsequence,relocationfrequentlyimpairstheenjoymentofsubstantivehumanrights,suchastherighttohousing,food,water,healthandproperty,aswellascivilandpoliticalrights,suchastherighttoself-determinationandtoparticipationindecision-making.10Inordertopreparethegroundforthefollowinganalysis,thefollowingbrieflyoutlinesthemostpertinenthumanrightsaffectedinthecasestudies.Animportanthumanrightthatprotectslocalpeoplefromarbitraryevictionsistherighttoproperty,whichmakesexpropriationsconditionalupondemonstrablepublicinterestand8AnthonyOliver-Smith(ed.),Development&Dispossession:TheCrisisofForcedDisplacementandResettlement(SchoolforAdvancedResearchPress2009).9Interlockingdisadvantages"includeavarietyofformsofexclusion,discriminationanddisempowerment,whichinturndeterminepeople’sabilitytoaccessnaturalresources,socialnetworks,education,healthcare,aswellaslabour,commodityandfinancialmarkets."quotedfromJeanetteSchadeandothers,'ClimateChangeAndClimatePolicyInducedRelocations:AChallengeForSocialJustice'(InternationalOrganizationforMigration(IOM)2015),3,<https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/policy_brief_series_issue10_0.pdf>accessed17May201610ibid;JeanetteSchadeandWolfgangObergassel,'HumanRightsAndTheCleanDevelopmentMechanism'(2014)27CambridgeReviewofInternationalAffairs717.

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adequatecompensationtothoseaffected.TherighttopropertyisrecognizedbyArticle17oftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsandbyallregionalhumanrightstreaties.Moreover,thisrightrelatestothequestionofsecurelandownershipduringcontroversialdevelopmentprojects,arelationshipacknowledgedbyCESCRGeneralCommentNo.7,whichnotesthat‘forcedevictionsoccur[also]inthenameofdevelopment’.11Therighttohousingaddressesthisproblembydefining‘legalsecurityoftenure’tobepartoftheright.12 AssetoutintheUNGuidingPrinciplesonInternalDisplacement,Principle6,displacement/evictionsareallowedincertaincircumstances,butthismustbeinterpretedstrictly.Relocationsarepermissibleifthemeasurethatnecessitatesitisjustifiedbyacompellingandoverridingpublicinterest.Principle7oftheGuidingPrinciplesstipulatesthat,wheredisplacementisfoundtobeunavoidable,measuresmustbetakentominimizeitanditsnegativeconsequences.Thisobligationhasinteralialedtothedevelopmentofdetailedguidelinesbyinternationalorganisationsforcarryingoutrelocationsinthecourseoflarge-scaledevelopmentprojects,includingpriorenvironmentalimpactassessments.13 Tosafeguardagainstinfringementofthesesubstantiverightsproceduralnormsareofhighrelevance.Forexample,theInter-AmericanCommissiononHumanRights(IACHR)regardsaccesstoinformation,participationindecision-makingprocesses,andaccesstolegalremediesascrucialmeasures‘tosupportandenhancetheabilityofindividualstosafeguardandvindicate[their]rights’.14Othertreatybodieshavereachedsimilarjudgements.15Indigenouspeoples'righttoparticipationisprotectedbythenon-bindingUNDeclarationontheRightsofIndigenousPeoples(UNDRIP)thatdeclaresthat‘norelocationsshalltakeplacewithoutthefree,priorandinformedconsent[FPIC]oftheindigenouspeoplesinvolved’.16FPIChasinteraliabeenendorsedbythetreatysupervisingbodiesoftheICESCRandtheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofallFormsofRacialDiscrimination(CERD).17Proceduralnormsareparticularlyimportantinthecontextofthisarticle.Aswillbearguedbelow,thelimitedimplementationofthesenormsisacoredriverforthehumanrightsinfringementswithinthethreecasestudies.

3.2 ExtraterritorialobligationsandobligationsofforeignbusinessactorsImplementingprojectsundertheCDMandotherinternationalclimatepolicyinstrumentsinaspecificcountryinvolvestheengagementofforeignactorssuchasotherstates,11CESCR,‘GeneralCommentNo.7:TheRighttoAdequateHousing(Art.11.1):ForcedEvictions’(UNCommitteeonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights1997)para7<http://www.refworld.org/docid/47a70799d.html>accessed27May2015.12CESCR,‘GeneralCommentNo.4:TheRighttoAdequateHousing(Art.11(1)oftheCovenant)’(UNCommitteeonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights1991)SixthSessionE/1992/23para8<http://www.refworld.org/docid/47a7079a1.html>accessed28May2015.13WalterKälin,GuidingPrinciplesOnInternalDisplacement(TheAmericanSocietyofInternationalLaw2008),26;32;36-41.14IACHR,‘ReportontheSituationofHumanRightsinEcuador’(1997)FN34.15JohnHKnox,‘ClimateChangeandHumanRightsLaw’(2009)50(1)VirginiaJournalofInternationalLaw198ff<http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1480120>accessed28August2015.16UN,‘UnitedNationsDeclarationontheRightsofIndigenousPeoples’(UNGeneralAssembly2007)A/RES/61/295<http://www.refworld.org/docid/471355a82.html>accessed12May2015.17TaraWard,‘TheRighttoFree,Prior,andInformedConsent:IndigenousPeoples’ParticipationRightswithinInternationalLaw’(2011)10NorthwesternJournalofInternationalHumanRights54,65.

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internationalorganisations,andforeigncompanies.Whileatleastpartlycontested,18thebasicstandpointofthepresentarticleisthatforeignstates,andbyextensiontheinstitutionsandorganisationstheyaremembersof,havetheobligationtorespect,protectandfulfilhumanrightsinbusinessdealingsoutsidetheirdirectterritorial(orintheEU'scasedirectregulatory)boundaries.19FollowingtheUNGuidingPrinciplesonBusinessandHumanRights(the‘RuggiePrinciples’),endorsedbytheHumanRightsCouncilinJune2011,businessesbasedinstatesthatarePartiestohumanrightstreatiesshouldinalltheirbusinessdealingsfollowtherulessetoutbythosetreatiesaswell.20 TheRuggiePrinciplesstatethat‘Atpresentstatesaregenerallynotrequiredunderinternationalhumanrightslawtoregulatetheextraterritorialactivitiesofbusinessesdomiciledintheirterritoryand/orjurisdiction.Noraretheygenerallyprohibitedfromdoingso,providedthereisarecognizedjurisdictionalbasis’.21TheRuggiePrinciplesfurtherstipulatethatstatesshouldclearlysetouttheexpectationthatallbusinessenterprisesdomiciledintheirjurisdictionorterritorymustrespecthumanrights;andputforward‘strongpolicyreasons’toregulatebusinessactivitiesabroad,particularlyifthestateisinvolvedwithorsupportscorporationsoperatingabroad,e.g.throughlendingpolicies.22 TheRuggiePrinciplesalsoconfirmthatstates‘retaintheirinternationalhumanrightslawobligationswhentheyparticipatein[multilateral]institutions’:statesshouldseektoensurethatmultilateralorganisationsdonotrestraintheirmembersfromrespectinghumanrights;andshouldhelpotherstatestomeettheirdutytorespecthumanrights.23 Inrelationtobusinesses,aparticularlyimportantaspectforthepresentarticleisenshrinedinprinciple17:‘Inordertoidentify,preventandmitigateadversehumanrightsimpacts,andtoaccountfortheirperformance,businessenterprisesshouldcarryouthumanrightsduediligence.Theprocessshouldincludeassessingactualandpotentialhumanrightsimpacts,integratingandactinguponthefindings,andtrackingaswellascommunicatingtheirperformance’.24Principle17thuscallsonbusinessestogenerallyconductHumanRightsImpactAssessmentsaspartoftheirduediligenceprocesses. Insummary,followingtheRuggiePrinciples,sincebusinessesaresubjecttonationalregulationsinthecountriestheyarebasedin,thesecountriesneedtoensurethathumanrightsobligationsareupheldinthedealingsofthosebusinessesbothnationallyandabroad.

18ICCPR§(2)(1)setsoutthatthedutyofastatetorespectandensuretherightsrecognizedbythecovenantisconfinedto"allindividualswithinitsterritoryandsubjecttoitsjurisdiction".TheICESCRcontainsnosuchparagraphlimitingitsjurisdiction.Instead,ICESCRArt.2(1)statesthateachpartytotheCovenantundertakessteps‘individuallyandthroughinternationalassistanceandco-operation[…]withtheviewtoachievingprogressivelythefullrealizationoftherightsrecognizedbythecovenant[…]includingparticularlytheadoptionoflegislativemeasures’.19OHCHR,‘ReportoftheSpecialRepresentativeoftheSecretary-GeneralontheIssueofHumanRightsandTransnationalCorporationsandOtherBusinessEnterprises’(OfficeoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRights2011)A/HRC/17/317.GeneralPrinciples.20ibid.21ibid,CommentarytoPrinciple2.22ibid7,"Thereasonsincludeensuringpredictabilityforbusinessenterprisesbyprovidingcoherentandconsistentmessages,andpreservingtheState’sownreputation.".23ibid,CommentarytoPrinciple10.24ibid,Principle17.

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Also,asstatesaretheprincipalsandconstituentsofinternationalorganisations,itiswithintheirresponsibilitytoensurethatinternationalorganisationsrespectupholdhumanrightsintheirwork.

3THECLEANDEVELOPMENTMECHANISMANDHUMANRIGHTS

3.1StandardsoftheCleanDevelopmentMechanismTheaimoftheCDMisdefinedinArticle12oftheKyotoProtocol:toassistdevelopingcountriesinachievingsustainabledevelopmentandtoassistindustrializedcountriesinachievingcompliancewiththeemissionreductioncommitmentstheyadoptedintheProtocol.TheCDMissuesCertifiedEmissionReductions(CERs)onceaprojecthascompletedapre-determinedprojectcycle.IndustrializedcountriescancounttheseCERstowardstheirKyotocommitments.Thesecountriesmayeitherbedirectlyinvolvedintheprojectsor,theusualmodel,simplypurchasetheCERsfromprivateprojectoperators.25 TheMarrakeshAccords(MA)26establishthedetailed‘modalitiesandprocedures’fortheimplementationofaCDMproject.27TheCDMissupervisedbyanExecutiveBoard(the‘Board’)andservicedbytheUNFCCCSecretariat.IfprojectparticipantswishtoproposeaprojectfortheCDM,theyneedtoprepareaProjectDesignDocument(PDD)accordingtoatemplateandregulationsestablishedbytheBoard.ThePDDmustbeexaminedbyaDesignatedOperationalEntity(DOE)—aCDM-accreditedindependentcertificationcompany.Theprojectalsoneedstobeapprovedbythehostcountry(wheretheprojecttakesplace)throughitsDesignatedNationalAuthority(DNA)and—onceCERsaretobesold—thecountriesimportingtheCERs.TobeissuedCERs,achievedreductionsneedtobemonitoredbytheprojectparticipantsandverifiedbyanotherDOE. WhiletheCDM'smodalitiesandproceduresdonotmentionhumanrights,theyrequireprojectparticipantstoreportonandtoaccountforstakeholdercommentsandtoreportontheproject’scontributiontosustainabledevelopment.However,therearenointernationallyagreedCDMcriteriaforsustainabledevelopment,norrulesforhowtoconductlocalstakeholderconsultations.Developingcountriesrejectedproposalsforsuchstandardsandproceduresasincompatiblewiththeirnationalsovereignty.28 Itisthereforeuptohostcountriestodefinesustainabledevelopmentcriteriaandproceduresforlocalstakeholderconsultations.Researchhasconcludedthatmosthostcountrieshaverathergenerallistsofnon-bindingguidelinesinsteadofclearcriteriaanddonotthoroughlyinvestigateprojects.Stakeholderconsultationsareoftendeficient.29Many

25WolfgangSterkandChristofArens,'InvestingInClimateProtection.Project-BasedMechanismsCDMAndJI'(FederalMinistryoftheEnvironment,NatureConservationandNuclearSafety(BMU)2010).26TheMarrakeshAccordscontaindetailedimplementationrulesfortheKyotoProtocol,particularlyregardingemissionsaccountingandthefunctioningoftheKyotoProtocol’sflexiblemechanisms.27Decision3/CMP.1,FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1of30March2006.28FarhanaYaminandJoannaDepledge,TheInternationalClimateChangeRegime:AGuidetoRules,InstitutionsandProcedures(CambridgeUniversityPress2004).29EmilyBoydandothers,‘ReformingtheCDMforsustainabledevelopment:lessonslearnedandpolicyfutures’(2009)12EnvironmentalScience&Policy820;KarenHolmOlsen,‘TheCleanDevelopmentMechanism’s

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countriesarethusseenaspracticingmarket-enablinggovernance,ratherthangovernanceofthecarbonmarket,withnationalauthoritiesactingmorelikebusinessdevelopersthanwatchdogs.30 Furthermore,alltheseprocessestakeplacebeforeprojectimplementation.TheCDMrulescontainnomechanismsforaddressingproblemsthatmaynothavebeenvisibleintheprojectdesignandapprovalphase.TherealsoisnopossibilitytoappealBoarddecisions.TheUNFCCChasbeendiscussingtheestablishmentofanappealsprocedure,butthemostrecentdraftdecisiontextdatesfromDecember2012andhasbeenpushedforwardwithoutfurtherchangesfrommeetingtomeetingeversince.ControversialissuesincludethequestionofwhowouldbeallowedtoappealBoarddecisionsandwhethertherightofappealwouldcoverprojectrejectionsonly,oralsocoverapprovals,andifso,onwhatgrounds.31 CriticismofthelackofsafeguardsintheCDMhasfrequentlybeenontheBoard’sagenda.Moreover,in2011,theBoardconvenedaHigh-LevelPaneltoconductaCDMPolicyDialoguetoidentifyavenuesforimprovingthemechanism.TheHigh-LevelPanelrecommendedalistofactionstohelpensurethatCDMprojectshelpachievesustainabledevelopment.Theseactionsincludebetterassessmentofprojects;reporting,monitoringandverificationofimpactsthroughoutthelifetimeofaproject;enablingde-registrationofprojectswithnegativeimpacts;andestablishingguidelinesforlocalstakeholderconsultations.32Nonetheless,membersfromdevelopingcountriesinparticularrepeatedlyrejectedsuchsuggestionstostrengthenrulesasbeingincompatiblewithhostcountries'nationalsovereignty.33 In2015,theUNFCCCSecretariatproducedaconceptnoteonhowtoimprovestakeholderconsultations.Theconceptnoterecommendeddefining

• thescopeoflocalstakeholderconsultationsascomprisingbothpositiveandnegativeimpacts,

• theminimumgroupofstakeholderstobeinvolved,

ContributiontoSustainableDevelopment:AReviewoftheLiterature’(2007)84ClimaticChange59;LambertSchneider,‘IstheCDMFulfillingItsEnvironmentalandSustainableDevelopmentObjective?AnEvaluationoftheCDMandOptionsforImprovement’(Öko-Institut2007)<http://www.oeko.de/oekodoc/622/2007-162-en.pdf>accessed14April2016;WolfgangSterkandothers,‘FurtherDevelopmentoftheProject-BasedMechanismsinaPost-2012Regime’(WuppertalInstituteforClimate,EnvironmentandEnergy2009)<http://www.carbon-mechanisms.de/fileadmin/media/dokumente/publikationen/cdm_post_2012_study_wi.pdf>accessed14April2016.30Böhmandothers,‘GreeningCapitalism?AMarxistCritiqueofCarbonMarkets’(2012)33OrganizationStudies1617;JonPhilipsandPeterNewell,‘ThegovernanceofcleanenergyinIndia:Thecleandevelopmentmechanism(CDM)anddomesticenergypolitics’(2013)59EnergyPolicy654.31UNFCCC,‘Appealsmechanism,in:UNFCCC,ReportoftheSubsidiaryBodyforImplementationonitsthirty-seventhsession,heldinDohafrom26Novemberto2December2012.Addendum,FCCC/SBI/2012/33/Add.1,7March2013,pp.4-10(UNFCCC2013).32UNFCCC,ClimateChange,CarbonMarketsandtheCDM:ACalltoAction,ReportoftheHigh-LevelPanelontheCDMPolicyDialogue(UNFCCC,Bonn2012).33SchadeandObergassel(n.10).

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• meansforinvitingstakeholders’participation,

• informationtobemadeavailabletostakeholdersanditsformat,

• howconsultationsshallbeconducted,

• howprojectparticipantsaretotakecommentsintoaccount,

• whetherandhowasecondroundofconsultationsshouldbecarriedout.34

Basedonthisconceptnote,ninety-eightnon-governmentalnetworks,organizationsandconcernedcitizenssentanopenlettertotheExecutiveBoard,urgingtheBoardtoadopttherecommendationselaboratedbytheSecretariat.Furthermore,theyurgedtheBoardtodevelopaworkprogrammetoestablishanindependentaccountabilitymechanismandinternationalsustainabledevelopmentcriteria.TheyalsourgedthattheUNFCCCSecretariatshouldbegivenamandatetoengagewiththeUNOfficeoftheHighCommissioneronHumanRightsorspecialrapporteurstoensurethatconcernsregardinghumanrightsimpactsofCDMprojectsareconsideredandaddressed.35JohnKnox,UNSpecialRapporteuronHumanRightsandtheEnvironment,similarlywrotealettertotheExecutiveBoard,fullysupportingtherecommendationsmadebytheUNFCCCSecretariatandtheNGOletter.36InNovember2015,theeighty-seventhmeetingoftheBoarddecidedthatifstakeholderssubmitcommentsonhumanrightsconcernsinprojects,suchinformationshouldbeforwardedtotherespectivenationalauthoritiesandto‘relevantbodieswithintheUnitedNationssystem’,i.e.UNhumanrightsbodies.37Inaddition,theBoardapprovedaconceptnoteonimprovinglocalstakeholderconsultationprocesses.TheBoardmandatedtheUNFCCCSecretariattodraftamendmentsoftheCDM’srelevantregulatorydocumentsfortheconsiderationoftheBoardatafuturemeeting.38TheBoardconsidereddraftrevisionsoftheCDMstandardsatitsninety-secondmeetinginNovember2016,includingstandardsforstakeholderconsultations.OnthisoccasiontheBoarddecidedthatthetimingoflocalstakeholderconsultationsmustbeasrequiredbyhostcountryrules,orbeforethestartoftheprojectifsuchrulesdonotexist.TheBoardalsodecidednottoestablishaderegistrationprocessatthistime.TheSecretariatistoprepareafurtherdraftrevisionoftheCDMstandardsreflectingthesedecisions.39AccordingtothedecisionadoptedinNovember2015,thescopeoflocalstakeholder

34UNFCCC,‘Conceptnote,Improvingstakeholderconsultationprocesses,Version01.0(No.CDM-EB86-AA-A15)‘(UNFCCC2015).35OpenlettertoimplementUNobligationstorespecthumanrights,9October2015<http://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Open-letter-to-implement-UN-obligations-to-respect-human-rights_final_09102015.pdf>accessed1September2016.36Knox,John,LettertotheCDMExecutiveBoard<http://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/J.-Knox-Letter-to-CDM-Board-12-Oct-2015.pdf>accessed1September2016.37UNFCCC,‘Meetingreport,CDMExecutiveBoardeighty-seventhmeeting,Version01.1(No.CDM-EB87)‘(UNFCCC2015),para52.38ibid.,para51.39UNFCCC,‘Meetingreport,CDMExecutiveBoardninety-secondmeeting,Version01.0(No.CDM-EB92)‘(UNFCCC2016),para32..

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consultationsshallinfuturecoverpotentialdirectpositiveandnegativeimpactsofprojectsonlocalstakeholders.Asaminimum,representativesoflocalstakeholdersdirectlyaffectedbytheprojectandrepresentativesoflocalauthoritiesrelevanttotheprojectshallbeinvitedtoparticipateintheprojectplanningphase,andtheprojectparticipantsneedtoprovideevidencethattherespectiveinvitationsweresent.Informationshouldbedisseminated‘inwaysthatareappropriateforthecommunitythatisdirectlyaffected’andincludeanon-technicalsummaryoftheprojectanditsallegedpositiveandnegativeimpacts,andthemeanstoprovidecomments.40Theconceptnotealsoenvisagesthattheproject'sDOE(i.e.theorganisationauditingtheproject)shouldopena14-daycommentingperiodafterpublicationofthefirstmonitoringreporttoallowforcommentsonimpactstriggeredbyprojectimplementation,i.e.afterprojectimplementationhasbegun.IfcommentsrelatetoCDMrequirements—whichasalreadynoteddonotcoverhumanrightsissues—theseneedtoberesolvedbeforecreditscanbeissued.Otherwise,theBoardwillforwardthecommentstothehostcountryauthorities.41ItbearsnoticingthatthenewrulesapprovedbytheBoardaremuchlessdetailedthantheproposalmadebytheSecretariat.SuggestionsmadebytheSecretariatthatarenotincludedinthedocumentadoptedbytheBoardincluderequirementsforprojectparticipantsto:

• substantiatehowtheyidentifiedthelocalpeopleaffectedbytheproject,

• invitelocalnon-governmentalorganisationsworkingontopicsrelevanttotheproject,

• usebestpracticestoinvitestakeholders,

• provideanon-technicalsummaryoftheprojectinappropriatelocallanguage(s);theversionadoptedbytheBoarddoesnotspecifythelanguage(s)tobeused,

• providemanagementplanstocontainpotentialadverseimpacts,

• conductanin-personstakeholdermeeting,

• providedocumentedfeedbacktothestakeholdersandconductafurtherfeedbackroundifresidualconcernsarecommunicatedwithin14days.

3.3 ObservationsBasedontheRuggiePrinciples,notonlythehoststates,butalsointernationaldonors,financialinstitutions,creditbuyersandprivateinvestorsinvolvedintheCDMorindividualprojectshavearesponsibilitytoensurethehumanrightscompatibilityofprojects.Nonetheless,humanrightsaresofarnotmentionedanywhereintheCDM’srulesandprocedures.Theonlypotentialhooksforhumanrightsconcernsaretherequirementthatprojectsshouldcontributetosustainabledevelopmentandshouldinviteanddulytake

40UNFCCC,‘Improvingstakeholderconsultationprocesses,Version01.0(No.CDM-EB87-A12)‘(UNFCCC2015)41ibid.

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accountofstakeholdercomments.However,therearenointernationallyagreedcriteriaorproceduresforassessingCDMprojects’contributionstosustainabledevelopment,norarethereinternationallyagreedproceduresforconductinglocalstakeholderconsultations.Mosthostcountriesdonotthoroughlyinvestigateprojectsfromahumanrightsperspective.Furthermore,therearenocomplaintoraccountabilitymechanisms.Attemptstoremedythesedeficitshavebeenmetwithresistanceonthegroundsthatitwouldimpingeonthenationalsovereigntyofhostcountries. In2015,theBoardtookastepforwardbydecidingtoforwardhumanrightsconcernstoUNhumanrightsbodies.However,theBoardstillhasnomechanismsofitsowntobecomeinformedofsuchconcerns.Itonlybecomesawareofhumanrightsissueswhentheyareraisedbynon-governmentalorganisations—whichusuallyalsoinformtheUNhumanrightsbodies.Theaddedvalueofthisnewapproachmaythereforeberatherlimited. TheBoardalsodecidedtostrengthenstakeholderconsultations.However,thenewrulesapprovedbytheBoardareyettobeimplemented,andtheyaremuchlessdetailedthantheproposalmadebytheSecretariat.ContrarytowhattheSecretariathadsuggested,supportedbyNGOsandbySpecialRapporteurJohnKnox,thenewrulesstillcontainnoguidanceonhowtoidentifytherelevantpeopleaffected,norequirementtoprovideprojectinformationintheappropriatelocallanguage(s),norequirementtoprovidemanagementplanstoaddressadverseimpacts,norequirementtoconductin-personstakeholdermeetingsandnorequirementtoprovidefeedbacktostakeholders. Whileundoubtedlyastepforward,thenewrulesthereforestilldonotsolvetheCDM's‘blindness’asregardssustainabledevelopmentandhumanrightsinfringementsthroughCDMprojects.Thatthiscanbearealissueisexemplifiedwiththreecaseexampleswehaveassessedinthecourseofourstudies.

4CASESTUDIES

4.1TheBarroBlancohydropowerprojectinPanama42

4.1.1.DescriptionoftheCDMprojectThehydroelectricpowerplantprojectBarroBlancowasconstructed,andwillbeoperatedby,PanamanianGENISA,specificallyfoundedforthisproject.43TheBarroBlancodamislocatedintheprovinceofChiriquí(districtofTolé)intheimmediateproximitytoanAnnexareaofthecomarcaNgäbe-Buglé.44Oncefinished,itwillhaveaninstalledcapacityof28.84MW.45 TheestimatedprojectcostsofBarroBlanco,amountingto78,316,800USD,arefinancedbytheDeutscheInvestitions-undEntwicklungsgesellschaftGmbH(DEG),theNetherlandsDevelopmentFinanceCompany(FMO)46,andtheCentralAmericanBankfor42TheBarroBlancocasewasinvestigatedbyJaneAliceHofbauerandMonikaMayrhofer.43GENISA,‘GENISAProjectManagementReport,EnvironmentalandSocialSummaryReport’9.44Comarcasaredemarcatedindigenousregions,whichhaveevolvedintobodieswithanautonomousadministration.45BarroBlancoPDD,‘CDMPDDBarroBlancoVersion03’.46FMO/DEGBarroBlancoComplaint,‘BarroBlancoComplaint-Annex1:AnalysisofPoliciesandProcedures’.

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EconomicIntegration(CABEI)(eachinvestingapproximately25millionUSD).47 TheBarroBlancoprojectobtainedtheletterofapprovalrequiredtoberegisteredasaCDMprojectbyAutoridadNacionaldelAmbiente(ANAM),Panama'sthenCDMDesignatedNationalAuthority(DNA),on17November2009.48InJune2011,BarroBlancowasregisteredbytheCDMExecutiveBoard.49AccordingtothevalidationreportoftheDesignatedOperationalEntity,AENOR,itwasverifiedduringtheirvisitthatthe‘localcommunities(Veladero,CerroViejo,PalaciosandBellavista)hadbeenconsultedandhaddemonstratedtheirsupportforthedevelopmentoftheBarroBlancoHydroelectricpowerplantprojectbysigningthecorrespondingminutesofthemeetings’.50Inconsequence,AENORstatedthatafterspeakingtoANAMandthe‘maincommunitiesinvolvedinthearea’,thecommunitieshad‘agreedthattheprojectwillbringworkanddevelopmenttothearea,andallofthemsupportedthedevelopmentoftheproject’,andthat‘nonegativefeedbackwasreceived’.51Thus,AENORconcludedthatitcouldrecommendtheBarroBlancoprojectforregistration. AnumberofNGOreportsindicatethatcommentshadbeensentbyglobalstakeholders,andtheirreceipthadbeenconfirmed.However,AENORhasnotreflectedonthesecommentsandtheyhavenotappearedonthewebsiteoftheUNFCCC.52 Withpossiblytheaboveexception,itispossible,therefore,toreachetheconclusionthat,fromaCDMperspective,theruleshavebeenobserved,andthatnomajorconflictsarisefromtheBarroBlancoproject.AcloserinspectionofinformationonthecasefromoutsidetheCDMrealm,however,revealsadifferentpicture.

4.1.2ThecaseOncecompleted,theBarroBlancohydroelectricdamwillimpactindigenousterritory,whichisprotectedbyPanama’sConstitutionaswellasbyLaw10of1997thatestablishesthecomarcaNgäbe-Buglé.Thus,priortograntingGENISAaconcession,thegovernmentofPanamawasobligatedbylawtoenternegotiationsingoodfaithwiththeaffectedcommunitiesinordertoobtaintheirfree,priorandinformedconsent(FPIC). AccordingtothePanamanianExecutiveDecreeNo.123,53apublicforumisrequiredaspartoftheimpactassessmentprocess.TheDecreestatesthatthepublicforumshouldbe

47CABEIreplacedthefundingthatwasoriginallysoughtthroughtheEIB.TheEIBloanapplicationwaswithdrawnbyGENISAin2010,afteritlearnedthattheEIBplannedtovisittheaffectedareaduetoacomplaintregisteredwiththeEIBCM(ComplaintMechanism).EIBBarton,‘WrittenQuestionstoEIBDirectorTamsynBarton-Hearingon21January2013’;EIBCM,‘BarroBlancoHydroelectric,Panama’<http://www.eib.org/about/accountability/complaints/cases/barro-blanco-hydroelectric-panama.htm>accessed19May2015.48AENOR,‘CDMValidationReport’9.49UNFCCC,‘ExecutiveBoardoftheCleanDevelopmentMechanism.Sixty-firstmeeting.Report(No.CDM-EB61)‘(UNFCCC2011)50AENOR(n44)24.51ibid43.52OsvaldoJordan,OscarSogandaresandMiguelArjona,‘BarroBlancoHydropowerProjectinPanamaViolatesCDMRules(Newsletter#12)-CarbonMarketWatch’(15February2011)<http://carbonmarketwatch.org/barro-blanco-hydropower-project-in-panama-violates-cdm-rules-newsletter-12/>accessed1July2015.53MinisteriodeEconomíayFinanzasdePanama,'DecretoEjecutivoNo.123-ReglamentaLaLeyNo.41GeneralDeAmbiente,August14,2009'(Panama2009).

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organisedbytheprojectpromoterduringtheevaluationandanalysisoftheEnvironmentalImpactAnalysis(EIA),inordertoprovideinformationontheprojectandtheopportunityforstakeholderstocommentonthestudy. GENISAconductedapublicforuminearly2008,aspartoftheEIA.54Theforumwasheldatalocationoutsideoftheindigenousterritorythatwasdifficulttoreachfortheaffectedcommunities(requiringaseveralhourfoot-march),andwaspoorlyadvertised.Aswasreportedinon-siteinterviewsconductedbytheauthors,onlyafewmembersofthecommunitiestookpart,andthosewhodidwereinitiallyrestrictedfromparticipatingandonlylaterallowedin.Atthisstage,nofurtherconsultationsinthecourseoftheEIAproceedingstookplacewiththeaffectedcommunities. Importantly,theprojectdoesnotincludearesettlementplanalthoughaverificationmissionoftheUNDPin201355foundthattheprojectwouldleadtothedisplacementofseveralfamilies.56Theprojectcompanyhasnotreachedanagreementwiththeaffectedcommunitiestopurchaseorleasetheirland.Thelackofaresettlementplanalsomeansthatnoprecisedataexistsontheactualnumberofpeopleaffectedbytheprojectandthatthereforenostructuredplanningofcompensationmeasureshastakenplace.InApril2014,acomplaintwasfiledwiththeindependentcomplaintmechanismoftheFMOandDEG,whichreleasedareportonthecaseinMay2015.ThereportoftheFMO/DEGcomplaintmechanismpointsoutthatthelenderswerenotfullyappraisedofseveralissuesincludingenvironmentalandsocialimpacts,indigenouspeoples,culturalheritage,biodiversityandecosystemimpactsatthetimeofprojectapproval.57 Previously,ANAMhadtemporarilysuspendedtheprojecton9February2015,interaliabecauseanagreementwasnotreachedwiththecommunities,thenegotiationprocesswasstillongoingandtheNationalInstituteofCulture(INAC)hadnotyetapprovedanarchaeologicalmanagementplantoprotectlocalarchaeologicalfindings.58Asofearly2016,constructionofthedamhadresumedeventhoughtherestillisnoagreementwiththelocalcommunities.59Protestsundertakenbythelocalpopulationwerestillongoing.60InMay

54TheEIAclassifiedBarroBlancoasacategoryIIIproject,whichcanresultinsignificantadverseenvironmentalimpactsandcallsforamoredetailedanalysis.55TheverificationmissionwascarriedoutasaresultofapoliticaldialogueandmediationprocessthatfollowedtheprotestsandtheblockageofthePan-AmericanHighwayin2012.Thedialoguetookplacebetweentheaffectedindigenouscommunities,thegovernmentandtheprojectoperatorandwassupportedbytheCatholicChurchandUNDP.56LópezGarcía,L.(2013)PeritajeindependientedelapresadeBarroBlanco,Panamá:informefinaldelacomponentdeingenieríahidráulica,5September2013,http://media.gestorsutil.com/PNUD_web/651/centro_informacion_documentos/docs/0910718001378499234.pdfaccessedNovember8,2016.

57FMO/DEGIEP,‘BarroBlancoHydroelectricProjectPanama-PanelReportNo.1’,paras.50-55.58ANAM,‘ANAMOrdenaParalizacióndeObrasDelProyectoHidroeléctricoBarroBlancoPorIncumplimientosdeEIA’(MiAmbiente,9February2015)<http://miambiente.gob.pa/index.php/homepage/ultimas-noticias/otras-noticias/959-anam-ordena-paralizacion-de-obras-del-proyecto-hidroelectrico-barro-blanco-por-incumplimientos-de-eia>accessed23June2015.59Meanwhilethegovernmenthastakenovernegotiationswiththeaffectedcommunitiesandanewroundofnegotiationsstartedon1March2016.

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2016,itwasreportedthatthefloodgatesofthedamwereopened.On9June2016,thefloodingofthereservoirwasstoppedbythegovernmentafterindigenousgroupsfiledacriminalsuitagainstthenationalPublicServiceAuthorityASEP.61

4.13ObservationsTheBarroBlancoCaseshowedmultipleviolationsofhumanrights,evenbeforetheactualconstructionofthedamitselfhadstarted.Therighttopropertyandtherighttohousinginparticular,butalsotherighttohealthofthelocalpopulationareaffected.Theprocessofconductingthemandatoryeconomicandsocialimpactreportwasflawedandincomplete.However,thesemajordeficiencies,aswellastheconflictswiththelocalpopulation,seemtohaveplayednoroleintheissuanceoftheletterofapprovalbyPanama'sDNA,andalsoseemtohavebeensignificantlydownplayedbythevalidationreportoftheDOE. Onthebasisofthevalidationreport,theCDMExecutiveBoardcouldseenoreasonnottoregistertheproject.However,thereisnomechanismtocross-checkDOEvalidationsfortheCDMExecutiveBoard.Also,thereisnomechanism(yet)withintheCDMtoaddresscomplaintsoflocalstakeholdersafterprojectregistration. Thus,duetothelackofproceduralnormswithintheCDM,theprojectwasregisteredundertheCDMeventhoughitfailedtorespect,protectandfulfilhumanrights.

4.2TheBujagalihydropowerprojectinUganda

4.2.1DescriptionoftheCDMproject62TheBujagaliHydropowerProject(BHP)isaregisteredCDMprojectinUganda.ItislocatedontheVictoriaNileriverintheBuikweDistrictintheCentralRegionofUgandaandwasregisteredwiththeCDMinOctober2011.63Acapacityof250MWwasinstalledbytheendof2012,abouthalfofUganda’sgenerationcapacity.Withtotalinvestmentsofnearly800millionUSD,theBHPisoneofthebiggestinvestmentprojectsinUganda.64 TheBujagalidamprojectinvolvedtwomajorphases.AfirstattemptundertheleadofUS-basedAESNilePower(AESNP)inthelate1990sfailedinteraliaduetoallegationsofcorruptionthatledtothewithdrawaloftheoriginallenders,andtoanunfavourablereport

60LaEstrella,'IndígenasvuelvenalacalleporBarroBlanco'(LaEstrelladePanamá,21January2016)<http://laestrella.com.pa/panama/nacional/indigenas-vuelven-calle-barro-blanco/23917307>accessedApril152016.61Brasier,P-J,‘BarroBlanco:floodingsuspended,internationallenderspressuredtoact’,14July2016,<http://carbonmarketwatch.org/barro-blanco-flooding-suspended-international-lenders-pressured-to-act/>accessedSeptember9,2016.62TheBujagalicasewasinvestigatedbyFlorianMersmannandMonikaMayrhofer63CDM,‘Project4217:BujagaliHydropowerProject’(UNFCCC)<https://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/ERM-CVS1291830806.57/view>accessed17May2016.64EJAtlas,‘BujagaliHydropowerProject,Uganda’(EnvironmentalJusticeAtlas,13November2014)<http://ejatlas.org/conflict/bujagali-hydropower-project-uganda>accessed13November2014;JohnOyuke,‘Uganda’sBujagaliPowerPlantSwitchedon’(StandardDigitalNews,11October2012)<http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000068143/uganda-s-bujagali-power-plant-switched-on>accessed27August2015;UNEPDTU,‘UNEPDTUCDM/JIPipelineAnalysisandDatabase,September1st2014’(2014)<http://www.cdmpipeline.org/publications/CDMPipeline.xlsm>accessed9December2014.

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bytheWorldBank'sInspectionPanelin2001.65AESNPwithdrewfromtheprojectin2003,beforeconstructionstarted,eventhoughithadalreadycompletedeconomic,socialandenvironmentalassessmentsandbegunresettlement.66Approximately8,700peoplewereresettledorlostassetswithoutpropercompensationuponprojectcancellation.67 Aftertheterminationofthefirstprojectattempt,theGovernmentofUgandainstatedtheBujagaliImplementationUnit(BIU)tomanagecommunityrelationswiththeresettledpeople.However,BIUdidnotfollowuponresettlementcompensationactivities.68 Finallyin2005,theprojectwastakenupagainunderanewcompany,BujagaliEnergyLimited(BEL).In2006,RJBurnsideInternationalLimitedcarriedoutaSocialandEnvironmentalAssessment(SEA)andacomprehensivePublicConsultationandDisclosureProgram(PCDP)forBEL,whichentailed,interalia,meetingswithgovernmentagencies,discussionswithNGOs,consultationswithlocalcommunities,publicmeetingsandsurveywithaffectedcommunities.69 AccordingtotheCDMPDDtheprojectofficiallystartedon21December2007.70TheCDMPDDitselfwasdevelopedin2011.WithinthePDD,BELgaveassurancesthatthecompanywouldtakeupresponsibilitiesforthosepeopleaffectedbytheprojectwhohadbeendisplacedinthecourseofthepreviousprojectattempt.71 TheCDMvalidationreportwasissuedin2011byERMCertificationandVerificationServices,whichactedasDOEfortheproject.Itreportsinteraliathattheprojectsitehadbeenassessedandthatfollow-upinterviewswithstakeholdershadbeenconducted.ThereportconcludesthattheBujagalidam‘meetsallnecessarycriteriaandrequirementsoftheCDM[...].TheDNAofthehostPartyhasconfirmedthattheprojectassistsinmeetingsustainabledevelopmentcriteria’.7265WorldBank,‘Uganda-BujagaliProject :InspectionPanelInvestigationReport’(WorldBank2002)InspectionPanelReportandRecommendations23998<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/05/3054709/uganda-bujagali-project-inspection-panel-investigation-report>.66WorldBank,‘Uganda-BujagaliHydropowerProject’(WorldBank2005)<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/10/6343110/uganda-bujagali-hydropower-project>;PatrickMcCully,‘InternationalRiversCommentsonCDMProjectDesignDocumentforBujagaliHydropowerProject(Uganda)’(InternationalRivers2010).67AfDB,‘IndependentReviewPanel.ComplianceReviewReportontheBujagaliHydropowerandInterconnectionProjects’(AfricanDevelopmentBankGroup2008)<http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Compliance-Review/30740990-EN-BUJAGALI-FINAL-REPORT-17-06-08.PDF>.68ibid.69R.J.Burnside,‘BujagaliEnergyLimited:BujagaliHydropowerProject’(RJBurnsideInternationalLimited2006)SocialandEnvironmentalAssessment–MainReportI-A10045.70CDM,‘ProjectDesignDocument:BujagaliHydropowerProject’(UNFCCC).<https://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/8/F/Z/8FZCNYUT9JB5AO6SM0KXR73QGEHIPV/PDD_form05-Bujagali%20V2.1%205March2014_clean.pdf?t=NVJ8bzVvYnpqfDB9_CD5Xoq7GeqVwYmmnBQf>accessed15April2016.71ThePDDwasrevisedin2014inordertoaccountforslightlyhighergenerationvaluesthanoriginallyexpected.Otherwise,itremainsunchanged.72ERMCertificationandVerificationServices,‘CDMValidationReport‘(ERMCVS2011).<https://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/H/A/0/HA0MN2GWX18YJE4IC93R56UFPZ7QDT/1883%20v1%20Bujagali%20FVR%2006Oct2011signed.pdf?t=eTN8bzVvYnA3fDDPNOfr9Q5mIaCRkUnQ1jk7>accessed15April2016.

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Again,judgingfromofficialCDMdocumentation,theprojectseemstomeethighstandards,andnomajorinfringementsuponhumanrightsshouldbeexpected.Inpractice,theprojectcausedasignificantnumberofhumanrightsviolations.

4.2.2ThecaseRightfromthepreparatoryphaseoftheproject,theBHPfacedoppositionfromlocalgroupsandenvironmentaljusticeorganisations.Complaintscentredontheallegedinadequacyoftheconsultationandresettlementprocessandthelackofadequatecompensationfortheaffectedpeoplewhoclaimedtohavelosttheirlivelihoods.Amongothercomplaints,theresettlementsitewasdeemedinadequateinitslocationandinferiortotheoriginalsettlement;housesandservices(water,electricity,education)wereunfinished.Theresettledpeopledidnothaveanadequatevoiceinthechoiceoftheresettlementsite.Becauseofthelocationfarfromtheriver,thepeople'smainoccupationoffishingcouldnotbeupheld,andmanyoccupantsfellintounemployment,leadingtotheirinabilitytopayforschoolfees.73 AccordingtotheCDMPDD,theconsultationprocesswiththelocalcommunitiescontinuedduringtheconstructionandoperationofthedam.BELworkedwithawitnessNGO,InterAidAfrica,inordertoaddressgrievancesfromaffectedpersons.74Frominterviewsthattheauthorsofthispresentarticleconductedwiththelocalpopulationitbecameclearthat,insteadofrelyingonthegrievancemechanismoftheprojectimplementer,affectedpeopleturnedtootherNGOstorepresentthem.TheseNGOsthenturnedtothegrievancemechanismsofthemultilateralbanksthatactedaslendersfortheproject. In2006,afterafact-findingmission,theAfDB’sComplianceReviewandMediationUnit(CRMU)recommendedtheAfDBGroup’sBoardsofDirectorstoconductacompliancereview.ThereviewconcludedthattheBIPhadnotcompliedwith,interalia,therequirementsoftheBankPoliciesonInvoluntaryResettlement,GenderandPovertyReduction,norwithenvironmentalpoliciesandguidelines.75 In2007,complaintswerealsofiledwiththeWorldBank'sInspectionPanel.TheInspectionPanelfoundthattheprojectviolatedWorldBankpoliciesonenvironmental,hydrological,social,cultural,economic,andfinancialissues.ThePanelfurthercriticizedtheproject,statingthat‘theProjectdidnotcomplywiththemandateof[World]Bankpolicytoimproveoratleastrestore,inrealterms,thelivelihoodsandstandardsoflivingofthepeopledisplacedbytheProject’.76 InresponsetotheInspectionPanel'scritique,theprojectmanagementdevelopedanactionplan(MAP,latestprogressreportin2013)toalleviatetheshortcomingsoftheproject.Theactionplanincludedimprovementsininstitutionalcapacity,increasedguidanceonsocialsafeguardissues,socialimpactassessments,andsharingofprojectbenefitswithaffected

73EJAtlas(n58);AfDB(n61).74BujagaliPDD(n64).75ibid;AfDB(n61).76WorldBank,‘ManagementReportandRecommendationinResponsetotheInspectionPanelInvestigationReportNo.44977-UgoftheUganda:PrivatePowerGeneration(Bujagali)Project’(2008)IDA/R2008-0296.

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people.77 Theintervieweesregardedtheredressmechanismsaseffectiveandresponsivetotheircomplaints.ThemanagementplanssetupbyADBandWorldBank/IFCinresponsetothereportsbytheredressmechanismswereregardedbymostintervieweesaspivotalinrightingthesituationfortheaffectedpeople.Infact,intervieweesoverwhelminglypointedtotheMDBs,especiallytotheWorldBankInspectionPanel,asthemostreliablereferenceforhearingcomplaintsandrightingfailures.

4.2.3ObservationsBujagaliisacomplicatedcasebecauseofitstwoconsecutiveimplementationphases,whichmuddledreponsibilitiesandleftaffectedpeopleinlimbo.WithintheCDMrealm,theprojectcompliedwithallrequirements,but,again,intheabsenceofclearrulesofconduct,itwasuptothehostcountrytoenforceanyrulesandlawsaprojectneedstocomplywith.SuchenforcementbythehostcountrydoesnotseemtohavetakenplaceinBujagali.Thecase,however,showshowimportantclearproceduralnorms,andespeciallygrievancemechanisms,canbeinordertoaddresshumanrightsinfringementscausedbyaprojectsuchasBujagali. Thepresenceofinternationallendersseemstohavebeenhighlyimportantinordertosettlethemultipleclaimsofinfringementsofhumanrights,whichamongothersincludedrighttohousing,righttofood,righttohealthandrighttoproperty.Whiletherecommendationsbythenon-judicialgrievancemechanismsofthemultilateralbanksarenon-obligatory,theycreatepressureontheimplementerstoalleviateidentifiedgrievancesofproject-affectedpeople.

4.3TheOlkariageothermalprojectinKenya

4.3.1DescriptionoftheCDMproject78TheOlkariaIVgeothermalpowerplantislocatedinKenya’sshareoftheAfricanRiftclosetoLakeNaivashaandadjacenttotheHell’sGateNationalPark.OlkariaIVisoperatedbytheparastatalKenyaElectricityGeneratingCompany(KenGen).TheprojectwasapprovedbytheKenyanDNAinJuly2012;thefinalPDDwascompletedinNovember2012andthevalidationreportbytheDOEfollowedshortlyafter.InDecember2012,theDOEsubmitteditsCDMregistrationrequestform;registrationwasthenenactedinJune2013andantedatedtoDecember28,2012.79 TheprojectispartofthelargerKenyaElectricityExpansionProject(KEEP)oftheWorldBank.Itisfundedbyfivemainlendinginstitutions(theWorldBank'sInternational

77WorldBank,‘Uganda-PrivatePowerGeneration(Bujagali)Project :FourthProgressReportonImplementationofManagement’(TheWorldBank2013)82625<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/02/18510512/uganda-private-power-generation-bujagali-project-fourth-progress-report-implementation-managements-action-plan-response-inspection-panel-investigation-report-uganda-private-power-generation-bujagali-project-fourth-progress-report-implementation-management>accessed4February2016.78TheOlkariacasewasinvestigatedbyJeanetteSchadeandJaneAliceHofbauer.79CDM,‘Project8646:OlkariaGeothermalProject’(UNFCCC)<http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/JCI1355128868.24/view>accessed17May2016.

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DevelopmentAgencyIDA,theEuropeanInvestmentBankEIB,theFrenchDevelopmentAgencyAFD,theGermanDevelopmentBankKfW,andtheJapaneseInternationalCooperationAgencyJICA)—byinvestmentsamountingtoroughly1.4billionUSDintotal.80 LendersagreedthattheinvoluntaryresettlementnecessaryfortheprojectwouldbecarriedoutaccordingtoOperationalPolicy4.12oftheWorldBank.ThreeMaasaivillageshadtoberesettledtovacatethelandforOlkariaIV.81Afourthonehadtoberesettledbecauseoftheprojectedairpollution.82KenGencontractedaconsultantfirm,GIBBAfrica,toelaborateaResettlementActionPlan(RAP). TheCDMPDDforOlkariaIVmentionstheexistenceofalanddisputebetweentheMaasaiandKedongRanchLtd.concerningthelandrequiredfortheproject,theclaimtobeconsideredinjobofferings,andclaimsforcompensation.83KenGen’sresponseinthePDDisthatrelocationswillbeorganisedaccordingtoapprovedstandards,thatfundsareprovidedforcommunityprojects,andthatMaasaiapplicationsforjobswillbeconsideredincaseofappropriateskills.However,appropriatejobtrainingforthemainlyunskilled,semi-nomadicpastoralistMaasaiarenotmentioned.84 ThelocalstakeholderconsultationfortheCDMproject'svalidationwascarriedoutinMarch2012bytheDOEJapanConsultingInstitute(JCI).TheDOEconcludesinitssummaryofthepublicconsultationprocessthat‘[a]goodnumber(99%)oftherespondentsadmittedthattheywereawareoftheproject[…]’85whichisnotsurprisingbecauseresettlementplanninghastakenplacesince2009. AstheDOEreceived,initsview,nomajorobjectionsagainsttheproject,theconsultationprocessraisednoobstacletotheCDMprojectregistration.ThereforetheDOEissuedapositivevalidationreport.86WithinthelimitsoftheCDMregistrationprocess,allformalobligationshavebeenobserved.

4.3.2ThecaseThecommunitymembersofthefourvillages,allMaasai,havebeenresettledasonegroup.Thenewsettlementsitewasagreedtoprovideformodernhouses,moderninfrastructure

80WorldBank,‘Kenya-ElectricityExpansionProject(English)-IntegratedSafeguardsDataSheet’(2010)AC4957<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2010/03/11987133/kenya-electricity-expansion-kenya-electricity-expansion-project>accessed29April201681GIBBAfrica,‘OlkariaIV(Domes)GeothermalProjectinNaivashaDistrict:ResettlementActionPlanforOlkariaIVPowerStation’(2011)<http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/07/27/000333037_20120727015202/Rendered/PDF/RP8830v110P1030IA0IV0RAP0JULY002012.pdf>accessed29April201682Mwangi-GachauE,‘ResettlementofProjectAffectedPersons:ACaseofOlkariaIV(Domes)GeothermalProjectinNaivashaDistrict,Kenya’(2011)8<http://www.gak.co.ke/nibs/web_resources/RESETTLEMENT%20OF%20PROJECT%20AFFECTED%20PERSONS-%20A%20CASE%20OF%20OLKARIA%20IV%20%28DOMES%29%20GEOTHERMAL%20PROJECT%20IN%20NAIVA.pdf>accessed29April2016.83OlkariaPDD(n69),32.84Ibid.85ibid.86JapanConsultingInstitute,‘ValidationReportOlkariaIVGeothermalProject‘(JCI2012)<http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/f/h/TKAX31U9OWMNS5LCZPIYJ2B0VG48RD.pdf/Validation%20Report%20Olkaria%20IV%20ver0.pdf?t=RVp8bzgzN3JsfDAt4a2W9pVvuUzmA2043iBT>accessed31May2016.

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(roads,electricityandwaterpipes),socialservices(schoolandhealthcentre),andadditionallandforpasturingofthecattleatthesite.Thetotalareaforcompensationoflandwasagreeduponas1,700acresoverwhichtheprojectaffectedpersons(PAPs)aresupposedtogettheirowntitledeeds.ResettlementplanningwascarriedoutbytheResettlementActionPlanImplementingCommittee(RAPIC),whichincludedrepresentativesfromallaffectedcommunities,localadministration,atheoperator—andin2012anoperational-levelgrievancemechanismwasestablished.87 However,whenresettlementwaseffectedinAugust2014,complaintsweresubmittedimmediatelytotheWorldBankInspectionPanelandtheEIBComplaintMechanism(EIB-CM),whichinlate2014startedtoinvestigatetheproject. Mainpointsraisedbythecomplainingcommunitymembershavebeen:flawsofthecensusandlackofhouses,thequalityofland,lackoftitledeeds,largedistancesfromprevioussourcesoflivelihoods,useofcompensationfundstopayforaccesstotheelectricitygrid,shortcomingsinlivelihoodrestoration—inparticularwithrespecttotheCulturalCentre(oneofthevillages)—bynottakingintoaccountthattourismisitsuniquesourceoflivelihood(notpastoralism),88incidentsofintimidationandexclusionof(outspoken)communityrepresentativesinRAPIC,andlackoftrustinRAPICanditsgrievancemechanism.Themajorityofthesecomplaintshadalreadybeenanissuebeforethephysicalmove.89 Theinvestigatingbodiesofthebankslargelyconfirmedtheallegationsofthecomplainants,andinadditionfoundthatdonorsdidnotapplytheWorldBank’sOperationalPolicy4.10onindigenouspeoples,thattheWorldBankinsufficientlymonitoredtheresettlement,andthattheMutualRelianceInitiative(MRI),ajointco-financingmechanismoftheEuropeanlenders,tosomeextentpreventedEIBfromcomplyingwithitsduediligence.90

4.3.3ObservationsThedocumentationofthelocalstakeholderconsultationprocessisnotincludedinthePDD,butininterviewsconductedwithinthecasestudyaffectedpeopleconfirmedthattheyhadattendedthemeeting.Itseems,however,thattheyarenotawarewhattheCDMisabout,norofthepoliticalmeaningoftheirparticipationintheconsultation. WhiletheinvestigationsconductedbytheWorldBankInspectionPanelandtheEIB-CMfoundanumberofsignificantflaws,notleastconcerningtheconsultationandparticipationofproject-affectedpersons,theCDMExecutiveBoardremaineduninformedofthecontroversies.Sinceatthetimeofregistrationnopossibilityofacomplaintsreviewpost-registrationexistedwithintheCDM,anyrightingofgrievanceshashadtofallbackonotherstructures,asprovidedbythemultilateraldevelopmentbanks.87GIBB,ResettlementActionPlan(n70)88ItshouldbenotedthatdifferentPAPsprofitorsuffertodifferentdegreesfromtherelocationandthatinter-communitydivisionsandpowerimbalancesexist.89ForfurtherdetailsseeJeanetteSchade‘EUaccountabilityfortheduediligencefailuresoftheEuropeanInvestmentBank:ClimatefinanceandinvoluntaryresettlementinOlkaria,Kenya’inthisSpecialIssue.90WorldBankInspectionPanel,'KENYAElectricityExpansionProject(P103037)-InvestigationReportJuly2,2015'(WorldBank2015)<http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/PanelCases/97-Inspection%20Panel%20Investigation%20Report.pdf>accessed17May2016;EIBComplaintsMechanism,'ConclusionsReport.OlkariaIandIV,Kenya,ComplaintSG/E/2014/07andSG/E/2014/08'(2015).

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5CONCLUDINGREFLECTIONS

5.1HumanrightsinfringementsandCDMdeficienciesBasedontheRuggiePrinciples,notonlyhoststates,butalsointernationaldonors,financialinstitutions,creditbuyersandprivateinvestorsinvolvedintheCDMorindividualprojectshavearesponsibilitytoensurehumanrightscompatibilityofprojects.Nonetheless,humanrightsarethusfarnotmentionedanywhereintheCDM’srulesandprocedures—ensuringprojects’contributiontosustainabledevelopmentandadequatestakeholderconsultationsislefttoeachhostcountryindividually.Previousresearchhasconcludedthatmanyhostcountriesdonotthoroughlyinvestigateprojectsandthatstakeholderconsultationsareoftendeficient.Furthermore,therearenocomplaintoraccountabilitymechanisms. Thesepointsareborneoutbythecasesdiscussedinthisarticle.Allthreecasesinvolveconflictsaroundresettlementandtheconsequentimpairmentoflivelihoodsaswellasdeficienciesinstakeholderconsultationsandimpactassessments.BasedontherightstopropertyandsecurityoftenureasspelledoutbyArticle17oftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,andelaborateduponintheGuidingPrinciplesonInternalDisplacement,involuntarydisplacementandresettlementcanonlybejustifiedbyacompellingandoverridingpublicinterest.Thedecisionconcerningwhetherthereisacompellingpublicinterestislinkedinteraliatotheobligationofconductingapriorenvironmentalimpactassessment.Thoseassessmentsweredeficientinallthreecases,whichledtodeficientimplementationandalsoleavesaquestionmarkoverwhethertheresettlementswereactuallyjustified. IntheBarroBlancocase,theviolationofstateresponsibilityrelatesinparticulartothefailuretoobtainthefree,priorandinformedconsentoftheaffectedindigenouscommunities.Closelyconnectedtothisissueistheproblemofafaultyenvironmentalandsocialimpactassessment,whicherroneouslyconcludedthattheprojectwouldnotinvolvedisplacements.Inaddition,eventhoughthisinitialassumptionwasdisproved,thereisstillnoresettlementplanyet,noprecisedataonthefullrangeofpeopleaffectedbytheprojectandtodate,nostructuredplanningofcompensationmeasures. IntheBujagalicase,thegrievancemechanismsofthethreeMDBsinvolvedconcludedthattheinitialsocio-economicsurveyhadbeenfaulty.Moreover,theprojectfailedtoatleastrestorethelivelihoodsandstandardsoflivingofthepeopledisplacedbytheproject,inparticularduringthehiatusperiod,whenresponsibilityfortheprojectlaysolelywiththegovernmentofUganda.Whiledeficiencieshavebeenremediedsince,intheinterimthePAPsexperiencedaseverelydiminishedstandardofliving.Onthepositiveside,theMDBgrievancemechanismsprovedeffective.Thecasethusdemonstratesthatsocialsafeguardpolicies,expressedthroughproceduralnorms(inthiscaseoftheMDBs)canproveeffectivetosafeguardagainst,oratleastremedy,infringementsonhumanrights. TheOlkariacaseshowsasimilarpicturewithweaknessesintheimpactassessmentandstakeholderconsultations.Thecensus,providingthebasisforanycompensationentitlements,wasmethodologicallyflawed,whichresultedincontinuouscomplaints.Furthermore,theconsultationprocesswasaccompaniedbystrugglesoverlandrightsanddistrustintheproject’smechanismsforparticipation.

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Finally,allthreecaseshighlighttheCDM’slimitationsintermsofensuringaccuracyandaccountability:

• ThedocumentationoftheBarroBlancoprojectclaimsthatlocalcommunitieshavebeenconsultedandhavedemonstratedtheirsupportfortheprojecteventhoughevidencepointstothecontrary;

• ThedocumentationoftheBujagaliprojectmentionsthattherewasresettlementinthefirstprojectphasebutmakesnomentionoftheassociatedproblems;

• ThedocumentationoftheOlkariaprojectmentionsthelanddisputeandassertsthatallproblemswillberesolved.However,thishasnotbeenthecase.Moreover,manyproblemsaroseonlyduringprojectimplementation,buttheCDMhasnoproceduresforre-openingcases.

5.2WaysforwardTheParisAgreementopensanewpageforinternationalclimatepolicy.TheacknowledgementofhumanrightsasanintegralpartofdecisionsonclimateactioninthepreambleoftheagreementprovidesanopportunitytobetterintegratesafeguardsintotheAgreement’smechanisms. WhiletheCDMislikelytoexpirewiththeendingoftheKyotoProtocol’ssecondcommitmentperiodin2020,theParisAgreementestablishesanewmechanism—therulesforwhicharetobedevelopedonthebasisofexperiencegainedfromexistingmechanism.ThisshouldincludetheexperiencegainedwiththehumanrightsissuescausedbytheCDM’slackofstandards. Thisarticlehasdeliberatelyfocusedonprojectswithnegativemediacoverageinordertoanalysehumanrightsconcernsandextraterritorialobligationsasdeeplyaspossible.SomeauthorsseethefundamentalorientationofcarbonmarketssuchastheCDMasbeinginherentlygearedtowardsexacerbatingpre-existinginequalities.TheCDMallowsemittersinthe‘GlobalNorth’toshiftthecostofemissionreductionstothe‘GlobalSouth’.Thisshiftnecessarilyappropriateslocalproductiveresources,impairinglocallivelihoods.91Evenifprojectsarerunbywell-intentioneddevelopers—inthemain‘carboncomesfirst’ratherthanlocaldevelopmentneedssincewithoutemissionreductionstherewillbenocarbonfinance.92Bryantetal.evensuggestthatthegenerationofinexpensiveemissioncredits,thecorerationaleoftheCDM,cruciallyhingesonweaksocialandenvironmentalregulationattheprojectlevel.93However,otherresearchhasidentifiedCDMprojectswithpositiveimpactsonlocallivelihoods.94Sohowtoexplainsuchdifferencesinoutcome? Thecontributiontosustainabledevelopment(orlackthereof)dependsineachcaseuponnationalandinstitutionalpriorities,marketdemandsandtheinvolvementof

91Bachram(n.5);Böhmandothers(n.30).92AdamBumpus,RealizingLocalDevelopmentintheCarbonCommodityChainPoliticalEconomy,ValueandConnectingCarbonCommoditiesatMultipleScales(UnitedNationsResearchInstituteforSocialDevelopment,Geneva2011).93GarethBryantandothers,‘‘Fixing’theclimatecrisis:capital,states,andcarbonoffsettinginIndia’(2015)47EnvironmentandPlanningA.94Boydandothers(n.29);Bumpus(n.92);Sterkandothers(n.29).

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stakeholdersatmultiplelevels.95GiventheabsenceofinternationalgovernanceforsustainabledevelopmentintheCDM,nationalgovernanceiskey.Responsibilityforthedeficienciesinthethreeprojectsanalysedheretoalargeextentlieswiththehostcountries:failingtoobtainFPICintheBarroBlancocase,failingtoprovideforresettledcommunitiesintheBujagalicase,andfailingtoorganiseorderlyresettlementintheOlkariacase. Intheliterature,Peruisfrequentlyheldupasapositivecounter-example.Insteadofrelyingondeskreviewsasdomanyothercountries’DNAs,thePeruvianDNAconductssitevisitsandconsultswiththelocalpopulationontheirneedsandpossiblecontributionstotheproject.Moreover,Perurequiressustainabledevelopmentbenefitstobeincludedintheprojects’monitoringplans.Asconsequence,Peruvianprojectsarefoundtohaveahighincidenceofsustainabledevelopmentbenefits.96 However,sinceregulationinothercountrieshasbeenlacking,internationalregulationseemscalledfor.BasedontheexperiencegainedintheCDM,onecanconcludethatallstatesthatarepartiestorelevanthumanrightstreatieshavearesponsibilitytosupportproposalswithintheUNFCCCtoimprovethehumanrightscompatibilityofclimatemechanisms.InreferencetotheRuggiePrinciples,PartiestotheUNFCCCshouldthusensurethatthemechanismswithintheUNFCCCrequireallprojectstoundergoahumanrightsimpactassessment(HRIA)withclearproceduralrequirementsforstakeholderconsultations.Applicationofstandardsshouldnotbelefttothefortuitousinvolvementofdonorssuchasthemultilateralbanks.Projectsthatdonotcomplywiththerequirementsshouldbedeemedineligibleforregistration.Moreover,projectsshouldberequiredtomonitorsocio-economicimpactsthroughouttheirlifetime.Tooperationalizetheserequirements,DOEsshouldbegivenamandatetoassesscompliancebeforeandthroughoutprojectimplementation. Mandatoryhumanrightsstandardswouldhelpempowerlocalcommunitiestoinfluenceprojectdesignsaccordingtotheirneeds.Ataminimum,mandatorystandardswouldpreventthenewmechanismfromprovidingresourcestoprojectsthatinvolvehumanrightsviolations. TheUNFCCCshouldfollowbestpracticeofinternationalorganisations,notablythedevelopmentbanks,andestablishaninstitutionalgrievancemechanismattheinternationalleveltoaddressfailuresofthemechanism’sgoverningbodytoadheretostandards.Inaddition,theUNFCCCshouldrequiretheestablishmentofaproject-levelgrievancemechanismifaprojectisdeemedtohaveasignificantadverseimpactoncommunitiesand/ortheenvironment.GrievancemechanismsattheoperationallevelshouldataminimumcomplywiththeRuggiePrinciplesandappliedproceduralrequirementsshouldincludetherighttoaccesstoredress(complaintsmechanisms).Finally,thereshouldbeprocedurestoallowthede-registeringofprojectsifhumanrightsviolationsarerevealedafterregistrationandarenotsatisfactorilyaddressed. Theintroductionofmandatoryhumanrightssafeguardswouldsignificantlyincreasetransactioncosts.AsthecoreobjectiveoftheCDMistogenerateinexpensiveemissionreductions,Bryantetal.suggestthattheremaybesignificantpolitical–economiclimitations

95AdamBumpusandJohnCole,‘HowcanthecurrentCDMdeliversustainabledevelopment?’(2010)1WIREsClimateChange541.96Boydandothers(n.29);BumpusandCole(n.95).

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tothepotentialforreformingtheCDMwithoutunderminingtheveryrationaleoftheinstrument.97However,anempiricalstudyofCDMGoldStandardprojects—projectswithavoluntarylabelthatincludessocialandenvironmentalcriteriaaswellasmandatoryproceduresforhowtoconductlocalstakeholderconsultations—revealsthatprojectdevelopersgenerallydeemtherequirementstobemanageablewithareasonableamountofadditionalwork.98Fromahumanrightsviewpoint,thereisinanycasenoexcuseformakingthemostvulnerablegroupsbearthesocialcostsofmitigation.99

Acknowledgement

Thisarticleisbasedonresearchconductedinthecontextoftheproject‘ClimAccount–HumanRightsAccountabilityoftheEUandAustriaforClimatePoliciesinThirdCountriesandtheirpossibleEffectsonMigration(KR13AC6K11043)’fundedbytheAustrianClimateandEnergyFund,ACRP6thCall,thatwasimplementedbytheLudwigBoltzmannInstituteofHumanRights(Vienna/Austria),theUniversityofBielefeld(Germany)andtheWuppertalInstituteforClimate,EnvironmentandEnergy(Germany).

97Bryantandothers(n.93).98Sterkandothers(n31).99JeanetteSchade,'LesMigrantsDesPolitiquesClimatiques:NouveauxDéfisFaceAuxDéplacementsGénérésParLeChangementClimatique'(2012)88Cultures&conflits85.