Hukkinen Roe Et Al 1990 a Salt on the Land

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A Salt on the Land: A Narrative Analysis of the Controversy over Irrigation-Related Salinityand Toxicity in California's San Joaquin ValleyAuthor(s): Janne Hukkinen, Emery Roe, Gene I. RochlinReviewed work(s):Source: Policy Sciences, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Nov., 1990), pp. 307-329Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4532205 .

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308

ley's agriculturaldrainage,local, state and federal irrigation agencies are

caught n a systemwidedilemma ittlerecognizedor articulatedby irrigationofficials.On the one

hand,despiteconsiderablesocial and

politicalpressureto solve or mitigate he problemsof toxicityandsalinity n agricultural rain-

water, persistent uncertaintyabout the risks and efficacy of competingmethods has preventedprogress n rectifying hese problems.On the other

hand, solutions that allow irrigation o continue unabated n the Valleywillexacerbateanongoing controversy verthe provisionof subsidizedwaterforthesubsidizedcropsof a few highlysubsidizedagribusinessirms.

In short, irrigationagencies face the need to reduce uncertaintyabouttreatmentmethods,while reduction n thisuncertaintyncreases he potential

for furtherpolarizingthe irrigation controversy. dentifyingthis dilemmahelps us understandwhy policy-makersare very reluctantto move in anyaction-forcingdirection that increases theirpoliticalcosts and have insteadcontinued to request ittle but additionalstudyin the face of a manifestand

growingproblem.In thisarticle,we demonstratehow a narrative pproachcanidentifysuch

implicitblocks to effectivepolicy-makingand sketchout those areas of con-tention that mustbe addressedbefore conventionalpolicy-analyticools canbe

effectivelyused. We also describeour

experiencen

presentinguch results

to the irrigationofficials concerned and their responseto the dilemma dis-closedbythe narrative pproach.

Background n irrigation oxics and salts in the SanJoaquinValley

Thesetting

According to estimates publishedin the early 1980s, approximately ightmillion of the eleven million crop-producingacres in Californiaare under

irrigation.1 he SanJoaquinValleyhasaccounted or overhalf of theirrigatedacreage n the recentpast2and wellover half of the state's$15 billionannual

gross agriculturalproduction.3Moreover, ive of the ten highest producingcounties of agriculturalommodities n theU.S. are located in theValley.4TheStateWaterProjectandthe federal CentralValleyProject,whicharethe Val-

ley'smainsuppliersof irrigationwater,accountforover a quarterof thewaterused

annuallyn California.

In additionto the problemof salinization,potentially oxic trace elementshavebeen foundin the drainagewater.Soils in some partsof the SanJoaquinValley(and in particularalongthe westernslopes) haverelativelyhigh con-centrationsof selenium(a naturallyoccurring raceelement thatwashes outof farmsoils)aswell as otherpotentially oxicelements.TheValley's aliniza-tion problemis due to an underlying ayerof clay,whichrestricts he properdrainageof irrigationwater.As a consequence,widespreadand continuous

irrigationhas led to high water tables and heavy salt accumulation.These



309

problems currentlyafflict some 500,000 acres of irrigated and, and it hasbeen estimatedthat between 1 millionand 3.6 million acres of Valleyfarm-landcould

eventuallybe affected

bysalt

build-upand

inadequatedrainage.5In an attemptto resolve the salinizationproblem,subsurfacedrains havebeen constructed o remove the drainagewaterfrombeneaththe fields.Formore thanthirtyyears,a masterdrain,eitherto the SanFranciscoBay-Deltaor directlyvia pipelineto the PacificOcean, was consideredto be the best

way to dispose of the drainageout of the Valley.As neitherhas been con-

structed,drainagehas been dischargedprimarilynto the SanJoaquinRiveror into evaporationpondslocatedin theValley.Thisdisposal, n turn,hasledto the toxicityproblemassociatedwithValleyagricultural rainage.

For reasonsdiscussedbelow,the canaloriginally ntended to carrydrain-age from the CentralValleyProjectout of the Valleyended up being con-structedonly as far as KestersonReservoir n the northernpartof the Valley.Unexpectedly,an alarmingnumberof birddeaths anddeformities,mostlike-

ly causedby abnormallyhighlevels of selenium n the pond water andfoodchain,werefound at Kesterson n the early 1980s.6Unusuallyhighlevels ofseleniumand otherpotentially oxic traceelementsalso havebeen observedelsewhere n the Valley,most notablyin the evaporationponds that serve as

drainagedisposalsites in the southern

partof the

Valley,an area serviced

bythe State WaterProject.7The clean-upcost of Kestersonalonehas been esti-matedto be anywherebetween$12 and$145 million.8

Public awarenessof the risks of seleniumand other toxics found in the

Valleyconsiderably ncreasedconflict and uncertaintyover the disposal of

agricultural rainage.Out-of-Valley ptions such as a masterdrainor pipe-line, contentious even when only saline flow was envisioned,became polit-icallyunacceptable o virtuallyall interestedparties,including agribusiness.Moreover, n-Valleydisposaloptionsnow includethe managementof miner-

als and other potentialtoxics whose propertiesand healthimpactsare littleunderstood.Attentionhas thereforeshifted to analyzingandassessingshort-termand often techno-economically ncertainalternatives, uch as improvedon-farmmanagementpractices, and retirement,and variousbiologicaland

physical-chemicalreatmentprocessesandfacilities.

Policyanalysiseffortso date

Over the last forty years,considerablepolicy analysis,researchand designefforts have been devoted to findingbetter ways to dispose of agriculturaldrainageandmanagingts associatedproblems.Roughly hreeperiodscanbeobserved in this history.Between 1950 and 1975, state and federalinterestfocusedon establishinghe techno-economic easibilityof a masterdraindis-charging nto the San FranciscoBay-Deltaand servingthe entireValley.9 nthe end, local, state and federal officials could neither resolve their differ-ences over how to finance and implementthe master drainthat had been



311

More important,even when a number of intervieweesdid state the same

problem,their perceptionsof causalityoften differedwidely:What was a

causeor aninitialproblem rom one expert'sviewpointprovedto be aneffector a terminalproblemfromthe perspectiveof some other expert.Onlynine

problemswere classifiedas justone typeof problem(e.g.,as an initialor ter-minal problem)by all who mentioned it and none of them were included

amongtheeightmostfrequentlymentioned.

Nothing could more clearly illustratethe failureof four decades of at-

tempted policy-making han this inabilityof major actors in the drainagecontroversy o convergeevenon causalrelationships.By andlarge,the prob-lem is not clearlydefined, the objectivesto be achievedin terms of water

qualityare not agreedupon,the technicalsolutions n lieu of the masterdrainor ocean pipelineareuncertain,and littleagreementexists on the criteria oassess the effectivenessof the technicalsolutions.The inability o agreeuponcausalrelationships,particularlyn problemdefinition, s made all the moresalientanddifficultby the one common theme that didemerge rom the inter-views:Althoughno Valley-widemasterdrainor pipeline s feasible,nowor inthe foreseeablefuture, t is absolutely mperative hat the Valley'sagriculturaldrainagebe managed effectively,somehow.Twenty-oneof the twenty-threeintervieweesmade this

pointin one fashionor another.14

The SanJoaquinValleyDrainagePrograms expectedto end in 1990 andits managerhas alreadypredictedthat a fourthphase of researchand plan-ning will be needed.15The following analyticexercisewas developedin re-

sponse to our initialattemptto use conventionalpolicy analysis n analyzingthe drainageproblemfor the SJVDP.This approach akes as its centraltaskthe analysisof the controversy'sundamentalack of convergenceover how

problemsand their causal relationshipsare defined.By understanding he

underlying actorsgivingrise to this lack of convergence,the new phase of

research,we argue,willbe in a betterpositionto analyze he drainagessue inways making it more amenable to conventionalpolicy analysis than hashithertobeen the case.

The analyticexercise

Our startingpoint was the assumptionthat the thirdphase of intergovern-mental researchand

analysiswouldin all likelihoodachieveas little as did its

predecessors n resolvingthe drainagecontroversy.We also assumed that alimitedbudgetwould existto implementanyproposedsolution to the drain-

ageproblem,butthat therewould be no restrictionson the kinds of solutionsto be reviewed and analyzed.We were not, for example,limitedto recom-

mendingbuildinga new programon what the SJVDPmayin the end recom-mend as 'promisingareasof future research'nor the expectationthat such a

programwouldbe funded at anywherenear the levelof pastefforts.Not sur-

prisinglygiven the intergovernmental atureof the controversy, he single



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mostimportant onstraintwe imposedon ouranalysiswastheneed to ensurethatthe often differingperspectivesof the major ocal, stateand federalirri-

gationofficials n the

drainage ontroversywere taken ntoaccount.

Faced with an inabilityto applymore traditionalpolicy-analytic ools to

compare drainagealternatives ndoptions,we decidedto analyzethe storiesand scenarios of the intervieweesas a way of identifying he controversy'sunderlyingset of actor beliefs and premisesabout drainage problemsandtheir causalrelationships.Ratherthantreatingeach actorinterviewas a testof some externallyconstructedmodel of causalitysaid to be operating n a

controversy hatis takenas a given,each storyand scenariois treatedas an

equallyvalidelementof a largernarrativeromwhich reality'inthiscase,the

systemwidedrainage controversy) s constructed. While such attention tostories and narrativess not new to policy-makingand policy analysis,'6an

integrativeanalysisof causalitybased on the inter-relationships mongactornarratives asto ourknowledgerarelybeen made the central ocus of a speci-fic policy analysissuch as thatreported nthispaper.

Networkanalysis

Given the difficultyof identifyingany set of expressedcausalrelationshipsheldin commonby anyimportant ubsetof policyactorsandaffectedparties,the questionwe then askedwas whatwere the 'problemsandcausal relation-

ships'specificallyrecounted n each interview.Since the intervieweewas alsoa memberof aninterestgroupand since thecontroversy evolvesaroundsuchinterestgroups,we also set out to determinewhat'problemsand causalrela-

tionships'could be discerned within and among the interestgroups con-cerned. Networkanalysishelpsus to makerudimentary istinctionsbetween

these three levels and has severaldistinctadvantages or the purposeof ouranalyticexercise.

In its simplestform,networkanalysisproceededas follows. If individualX

arguedthatproblemstatement 1 led to problemstatement2 (1 - 2), whileindividualY felt that problem statement 2 led to problem statement 3(2 - 3), then the aggregated network' in this case a simple chain)wouldbecome 1 - 2 - 3 (assuming the only interviewees were individuals X and

Y). Moregenerally, tatement2, which s the terminalproblemfor individualX is the initial

problemfor individualY and becomes the

transferproblemafter aggregation.When the problemnetworks of several interviewees are

aggregated n this fashion,each reportedcausalrelationship -) is explicit,i.e., has been statedby at least one of the interviewees.The resultingaggre-gatednetworksare implicit, n the sense thatno one personneed actually ohavedescribedor perceived hecompletechainof problems.

The advantagesof thisprocedureareseveral.First, t allowsus to examinebetter to what extent, if at all, the lack of convergenceover problemsand

causality n the controversys due to contradictory r circularargumentation



313

at the individual or intra-group evel, ratherthan due to well-argued,but

conflicting,values andperceptionsbetweeninterestgroups.Second,aggrega-tion to the

inter-groupevel

might identify'causal

relationships'which

onlybecome clear when the views of thecontroversy's articipants reconsidered

togetherand which are robustenoughto affordpossible points of departurefor future ollow-up.Third,potentialsourcesof futureconflictbetweeninter-est groupsmightwell become clearer,since the aggregation xercise is ourbest approximationof the lines of reasoningand debate that could be dis-

playedwere all the controversy'smajorparticipants o come arounda tableand arguethe points they raisedindividually n the interviews. Obviously,'potential'has to be underscored, ince a simple aggregation xercise cannot

capturethe interactioneffect of people modifyingin public positions theyhold in private.)Fourth,andin waysthat will become clearerbelow,aggrega-tion to the inter-groupevelallowsus to represent hedrainage ontroversy sa combinationof individualandgroup perceptions hatimposes systemwideproblems and dilemmas across these individuals and groups: By treatingindividualproblem statementsas elements of a complex, multi-actorand

multi-group network'the resulting assemblageof connected (or isolated)problemnetworks comes to representa systemic,if implicit,expressionofcausal beliefs from which the

drainage controversyhas in

large partbeen

constitutedandthroughwhich t has been perceivedby actors and thegroupsto whichtheybelong.17

The resultsof the networkanalysisshow that linear causalpathwaysarerareat the inter-groupevel.Indeed,the emergenceof multiplecircularnet-works in whichthereis no uniqueinitial or terminalproblemdominatesthe

aggregation xercise.In the simplestcircularnetwork,statement1 is said tolead to statement2, but statement2 is also said to lead back to statement1

(1 2). A more complex circular network could have the structure

1 - 2 - 4- 4 - 1. Only two interviewees were found to have made suchcircularargumentationn theirinterviews.The relativedearthof circularnet-works also holds at the grouplevel (whenexcludingthese two individuals):None canbe constructed orthe agriculturalommunity, lanners,regulators,or environmental ommunity,whentheproblemnetworksof intervieweesare

aggregatedwithin each interest group. This lack of within-groupcircular

argumentationhus increases our confidence thatthe four groupsidentifiedarein factfairlydistinctandhomogeneous.

However,at theinter-group

evel, where theproblem

statementsof morethan one groupareconsideredtogether, he numberand complexityof con-structedcircularnetworks ncreasesdramatically.The five, relatively impleintra-groupnetworksgive way to 34 more elaborately inked circularnet-works in a pairwisecomparisonof the groups,while aggregationacross allfourinterestgroupsyields 244 circularnetworks.18ndeed,the most striking,unheraldedfeature of the San Joaquin Valley drainagecontroversy s the

multiplecircularity mplied n the storiesthat its keyparticipantsell as a wayof articulatinghedrainagessue.



314

At firstglancethe emergenceof so manycircularnetworkswouldseem todo nothingmore than confirmour earlier inding hat thedrainage ontrover-

syis not localized to a set of

commonly perceived problemsand solutions.

The discoveryof circularnetworks,however,was useful to us on two counts.First and as will be seen shortly, hese networksprovedto be potentiallyde-

stabilizing:They are what the literature alls 'positive' eedback oops, where

problemsget worse and worse,in contrastto 'negative,' quilibrating nes.'9Not only do the networksrepresentpotentialsources of futureconflict,but

they single out a complex of problemswhose mutually reinforcingnaturecouldmake themeven moreproblematico thepolicy-maker.

Second, the discoveryof circular networks served both to support our

earlierdecisionto analyzethe drainagecontroversyn narrativeerms and toindicate he direction nwhichthenarrative nalysis houldproceed.A recent

development n the applicationof narrative pproaches o policyanalysishasbeen to focus on a comparisonof twoverydifferent ypesof narrativesoundin publicissues of highuncertaintyandcomplexity,where the only 'facts' eftfor the analyst o examinearethe storiespeople tell to articulatessueuncer-

tainty.Theanalyststartswith theconventionaldefinitionof storiesandidenti-fies those narratives hatdominatethe issue and conformto this definition:f

they are stories,they havebeginnings,middles and ends;if arguments, heyhavepremisesand conclusions.Thenextstepis to identify hosemajornarra-tivesin the issue thatdo not conformto this definition,e.g.,the circularnet-worksjust discussed. The analyst hen comparesthese two sets of narrativesto see if the comparisontells anotherstory,the assumptionhere being the

elementaryone fromsemiotics and gestaltpsychologythat the meaningof a

narrative,ikeany thing, s best definedby contrastingt with whatit is not.Inour present analyticexercise, this means a comparisonof the circularnet-works with the largernetworksof initialand terminalproblems n whichthey

are embedded. Once the narrativeshave been compared,the policy analystthen determines f or how thatcomparisonre-definesthe problem n such a

wayas to make it more amenableto the conventionalpolicy analytical ools,which in our exercise was organizationtheory.This narrativeprocedure,whichhas been appliedto other public policy issues,providesthe focus forthefollowinganalysisof majorproblemnetworks n theirrigation gencies.20

Majorcircularnetworks Uncertaintys a sourceofpolarization

Since the views of local, state and federal irrigationofficials are of majorconcern in the analyticexercise,the following analysisof circularnetworkscenterson the eighteeninterviews nvolving he agriculturalommunityandthe planners:The two groupstogetherare what can be termed California's

'irrigationbureaucracy,'.e., the intervieweesrepresentthe operationalandresearch staff associated with the local district,state and federal irrigationagenciesoperating n theSanJoaquinValley.Thisfocus reducesconsiderably



315

thenumberof circularnetworks o be examined.When theproblemnetworksidentified by the agricultural ommunityand plannersare considered to-

gether,we find threeinterconnectedcircularnetworks- an 'initial

oop'that

leads to a 'terminal oop' both directlyand via a 'transfer oop.'The initial

loop revolvesaroundthe perceivedbreachingof state and federalwatercon-tracts that were said to haveguaranteeddrainagedisposalfor farmers n the

Valley,whichin turn leads to a transfer oop centeringaroundproblemsofwaterquality tandardsand costs said to arise as a resultof the now-uncertain

drainagedisposal.The threecircularnetworks and the terminalproblemtowhichtheylead are shown n Figure1.

The terminalloop best illustratesthe specifics of the circularityand its

important implicationsfor exacerbatingpolitical polarization.The inter-viewees from the agriculturalommunity aidthat the necessityof taking rri-

gatedlandout of production(becauseof severedrainageproblems)raisesintheir view the need to compensatethe affected rrigators.This,in turn,raisesotherquestions n theirminds abouttheequityof compensatinghesefarmersfor such losses andnot otherswho remain n irrigatedproductionandwhose

productioncosts also arerisingdueto drainage-relatedroblems.According to planners, the agriculturalcommunity's recognition that

drainage-relatedosts are

risingorall

farmers,but that

government ompen-sation is not being distributedto all who deserve it, only induces further

competitionamongthe farmers or whatremainingprofitsare to had in irri-

gation. Increasedcompetitionin the view of planners pits large corporatefarmsagainstsmallerfarms,inevitably eadingto some farmsgoing out of

production.The first rrigatedand to go out of productionwillbe that suffer-

ing from the severestdrainageproblems.And thus the circle is completed:Land is said to be driven out of production, f not because of competitionbetween farms in the presence of compensation,then because of severe

drainageproblemsand associated osses thatwouldpersistin the absence ofcompensation.

If each of the statedcausalconnectionsactuallyheld, then the impactof

takingout of production hosefarmswithseveredrainageproblemswouldbeconsiderable;anywhere rom 20 to 70 percentof the land currentlyunder

irrigationproduction n the Valleycouldbe affected.Market orcesmight,ofcourse,forestallthe worst-casescenarioto the extentthat the decliningsup-ply of irrigable and and the growingdemand for its production ed to risingland and agricultural rices, thereby

encouraginghe

developmentof better

waysto handletheproblemsafflicting heremaining,poorlydrained rrigatedland.But thatsolution couldcome much too late andat too greata cost fromthe perspectiveof those decision-makerswho are chargedwith having to

worryabout the considerabledislocationlikely to result from the loss of amillionor more acresfrom rrigatedproduction.

This potentialcost to decision-makers s evidentfromthe majorproblemproducedby the three circularnetworks.The terminal oop just describedwas found to lead to only one terminalproblem statement: Agricultural



316

INITIAL / TRANSFERLOOP 1 LOOP

Landmustgo out Large armsvs.inesscompetition

of production. smallfarms. in agricultural

community.

i]Z. 1111

TERMINALLOOPEquity problems

Need for createdby cost-compensation for sharing arrangementsfarmersgoingout ragemeof businessdue to of drainagemanage-drainageproblems. ment solutions:who

benefits,who pays?

Agricultural rainageproblemsmaytake

farmersout ofproduction,which

meansno payersforthe FederalandState

waterprojects.

Fig. 1. Circular networks of the irrigation bureaucracy.



317

drainageproblems may take farmersout of production,which means no

payersfor the federal and state waterprojects.'The irrigationbureaucracy

dependson the politicaland financialresourcesof irrigators;ndeed,theverylegitimacyof the bureaucracyderives from the need to irrigateCaliforniafarmland.Takingland out of productionstrikes directly,at the irrigationbureaucracy'sautonomy,authority,and influence. Heated comments ex-

pressed n the interviews ndicatethat land retirement s anincomprehensibleproposalfor many irrigatorsand irrigationbureaucrats:Land will NOT goout of production'and 'Taking and out of production s an infeasiblepro-posal,'as someof themputit.

On the otherhand,land retirements no problemat allfor segmentsof the

environmentalcommunity.In fact, it is the preferredsolution for many,especiallythose who havefoughtfor decades againstwhat is perceivedas afederal water subsidyfor agribusiness. Concretely[the drainage problem]meansthatsome land will have to come out of production,' s one environ-mentalistargued. notherwords,evento raise thequestionof land retirementis correctlyperceivedby the irrigationbureaucracy s furtherpolarizing he

drainage ontroversy.

SummaryThe circularargumentationmplicit n the beliefs held by those in the irriga-tion bureaucracyhelps identifyseveraluncertaintiesover the drainage ssuewhich increase the potential for even greaterpolitical conflict in the con-

troversy.One uncertaintyarisesbecause the empiricalmerits of the bureauc-

racy'sexpertopinionsaboutproblemsandtheirrelationshipshaveyet to beconfirmedand are sufficientlynconsistentas to giverise to some circularityat the aggregate evel. If, however, he problemstatementsand causal rela-

tionshipsareprovento be as specifiedin the circularnetworks, henthe cer-

taintiesanduncertaintiesprofessedby expertsbecome locked into a positivefeedback oop that is mutually einforcing nd all the morepersisting:For the

irrigationbureaucracy,his means thatthe problemsof land retirementand

decliningsupportwilljustget worseandworse,unlesssomethingunexpected(the market?government?)ntervenes.Moreover, o undertake he verifica-tion exercisenecessaryto ascertainreal cause and effect empiricallywould

requirenot onlyconsiderableadditionalresources,but alsocorroborationbythose very'experts'whose statementsgaverise to the circularargumentationinthe first

place.In the absence of verification, he irrigationbureaucracy s left with the

veryrealfears about whateffect polarizationover the land retirement ssuecan have on the bureaucracy's perationsand legitimacy.A scenarioabouthow 'uncertainty an lead to polarization,'of course, does not necessarilydenote a potentially ntractableproblem,butit does suggest hatthedrainagecontroversywill have to be reconceived n termsthat deal directlywith thepoliticalpolarizationbeforeuncertainties an be reduced.However,a secondpartof our analysis ed us to the complementary onclusionthatattempts o



318

resolve the present polarizationare most likely to increase, rather than

reduce,presentuncertainties.

Polarization s a sourceof uncertainty:he implicationsof themasterdrainassumption

Having exploredthe majordrainagemanagementproblemsin the last sec-tion, we now turnin more detail to the organizational nd political implica-tions for the irrigationbureaucracy f the widely-heldno-drainassumption.As noted earlier, he majorpartiesto the drainagecontroversyagreeon two

basic points:It is absolutely mperative hat the Valley'sdrainagebe bettermanagedand that this not be done throughconstructionof a master drain.What then does this assumptionreally mean to the controversy'smajorparticipants?

Ourstartingpointwasto see if narrativeanalysiscould help us in answer-

ing this questionas well.Fortunatelyor our purposes,the field of semioticscontains an analogueto the reciprocalcausallink, *, found in the circularnetworks.Moreover, he analogue's ink, which is one of mutualdefinition,not mutualcausation,is especially pertinentsince the questionof concern

revolves around definingjust what the no-drainassumptionmeans to theparties concerned. The basic notion underlyingthe semioticsquareis theearlier one that a term is best definedby what it is not.21Withinthe frame-workof the semioticsquare, heno-drainassumptiondraws ts meaning romthreepossiblecounter-positions oncerning hedrainor drainage.At its mostobviouslevel, the no-drainassumption s simplythe rejectionof the positionthat there should be a Valley-widedrain.At a more generallevel, each ofthesetwopositionscouldopposedbythosewho differnot over thedrain,but

over whetherdrainagewill takeplace at all in the Valley.For everyonewhomaintainsa no-drainposition as their startingpoint, there are those whocould assert thatdrainagewill be maintained hroughout he Valley,even ifthisrequires he (unmentionable)masterdrain.In contrast, or everyonewho

arguesthat there will be a drain,there are those who could claim that the

startingpositionis not merelyno drain,but no drainage acilitieswhatsoeverin the Valley.These fourpositionsdefine each otherreciprocally, nd we callthis networkof mutuallydefiningpositions theimpliednetwork.'

If all fourpositionsweremanifest, he debateover the SanJoaquinValley'sagricultural rainagecould be demonstratedo be polarizedoverfairlyclear-cut divisions on which the policy analystcould then focus attentionand

analysis.But full-blownpolarizationis precisely what has not happened.Opposing operating assumptionshave yet to be fully realized or acted.Indeed, the lack of widespreadpolarizationand open controversyover themasterdraingreatly urprisedus. Whatfactorsaccountfor thisattenuation?

Some of the polarizationhas been internalized o the bureaucracy.nsteadof being espoused by opposinggroups,two of the opposingpositionshave



319

Particular rainage roposals

No valley-wide 4 lt; Valley-widedradrain drain

No valley-wide 4_ Valley-widedrainage drainage

Drainage r no drainage t all

Fig. 2. The implied network.

simultaneouslybecome an integralpart of the irrigationbureaucracy's wnscenario.Manyofficials n the relevant ederal,state,regionalandlocal agen-cies

saythat therewillbe no

drain,yet ferventlyarguethat

drainagewill con-

tinuein theValley.Theydo so by formallyrejectinga masterdrain,while still

believingin it when arguingthat Valley-widedrainage s imperative.22 he

potential orcognitivedissonance s manifest.

Balancingthese internalcosts, however, s the fact that the bureaucracy'sdualpositionhasbeen 'functional'npreventingamorepolarizeddebateoverthe drainage ssue.Whator whomcould the environmentalists rgueagainst,whenboth theirrigators ndtheirrigationbureaucrats penlysaythatneithera drain to the Delta nor a pipeline to the Ocean will be constructed?By

holdingwhat seem on appearances o be two mutuallyopposing positions,i.e., 'therewillbe no drain'and 'drainages required,'he irrigationbureauc-

racy has reducedthe potentialfor the two other opposing positions to be

realized, hemostthreatening f which s the assumption hattherewillbe no

Valley-widedrainagewhatsoever.Instead of four mutuallyopposing posi-tions,the currentrealitypresentsa truncatedversionof the 'impliednetwork'in which real debate is frustratedby an irrigationbureaucracywhich pre-servesthenotion of Valley-widedrainageatthecost of conceding,rather han

accepting,hattherewill be no masterdrain.

Irrigators nd irrigationbureacratshavegood reasonfor wanting o avoidfurtherpolarization.The Kesterson selenium finds transformeda primarilyagricultural rainageproblem ntourgentenvironmentaloxicsone. Toquotea planner, Toxics n agricultural rainagewaterhaveshiftedthe natureof the

problem rom a "harmless"alinityproblem o one requiringpolicingpowers.'Kesterson, he 'local solutionto the salinityproblem,'becameKesterson, he'local toxics problem'threateningValley-widedrainageand irrigationas awhole.



320

Quick to learn by example, the irrigationbureaucracyhas become veryreluctant o implementfurther remedies'when Californians ake the major

lesson of Kesterson Reservoirto be the need for constant vigilance:Whoknowswhatnew drainage solution'will lead to even more terribledrainageproblems?Moreover,evenif the 'solution'actuallyworked,oppositionwould,stillarise from environmentalists nd others to the extent that the drainagesolution increased the long-termviabilityof irrigatedagriculture s it is cur-

rentlypracticedby agribusinessn theValley.As a result, hebureaucracy asaccommodated tself to uncertainty:Better to try coping with the manifolduncertaintiescausedby not discussingobviousproblemsassociated within-

Valley'solutions' han to runthe risk of havingthese problemspubliclydis-

cussed in a waythat makes the issuesjustas contentiousas the out-of-Valleysolutions of the masterdrainand oceanpipeline.Uncertaintyover landgoingout of production n the absenceof a remedyto the drainageproblemhas tobe weighed against he potentialfor furtherpolarizingenvironmentalists ndothers whenputting orwarda 'solution' o forestall andretirement.Thus,the

seeming certaintyof the no-drain assumptionengenders in the end the

persistenceof uncertaintyortheirrigation ureaucracy.23

SummaryComparisonof the implied and truncatednetworkstells its own scenarioabouthow 'polarization an lead to uncertainty'n the drainagecontroversy.Inparticular,hepotential orthecontroversy's olarizationhas led to a situa-tion of increased uncertainty or the irrigationbureaucracy. n functionalterms, the bureaucracy eems to hold conflictualpositions as a way of re-

ducing the potential for polarization,at least in the short run. Efforts torationalize he conflictingbeliefs, or to rankorderpossible solutionsto the

drainageproblemwithoutaddressing he underlying onflict,arelikelyto be

activelyopposed ratherthanaccepted.Takentogetherwiththe earlier anal-ysis of the circularnetworks,narrativepolicyanalysiscan in thiscase identifywhyit was that effortsto clarifycausalityandoptionsprovedso difficult.As

long as the issue of drainversusno draincannotbe openly debated at thepolicy level, uncertaintywill persist. Yet, this uncertaintyas to drainageoptions cannot be directlyaddressedfor fear that furtherpolarizationwilloccuroverthe matterof taking and outof production.

In contrast o the all-powerfulbureaucracy aintedby some authors,24urnarrative

nalysisuncovers

a fundamentally isablingpolicydilemma,whosedimensions and structurearenot articulated andperhapsnot perceived)byparticipants o the policy process;indeed, their suppression s part of the

policyproblem.

The drainagedilemmaas a policy problem

Irrigationagencieshavelittle choice but to maintain he appearanceof seek-



321

ing resolution of the prevailingand potentialuncertainties n the drainagecontroversy,irst becauseagricultural rainage s perceivedto be an environ-mental toxics

problemrequiringmmediate

remedies,and second because

within the next several decades the physicalwater-logging nd salinityprob-lems could well lead to the forced retirement f a greatdeal of irrigatedand.If the irrigationbureaucracydoes not better manage these problems, its

organizational aisond'tre is threatened.On the otherhand,currentlyproposedefforts to reducethe unknowns n

the drainagecontroversyrun the risk of elicitingoppositionnot just to the

proposedsolution,but to Valleyagribusinesstself.Politicaloppositionto themasterdrain andthe ocean pipeline,voterrejectionof new large-scalewater

projects,such as thePeripheralCanal,recent efforts to restrictanynewdiver-sionsfrom the SanFranciscoBay-Deltasystem,and now thecontroversy verthe proposed Kestersonclean-upplans are all remindersof how irrigation-related solutions'quicklycome under attack n California.A fully polarizeddebate on irrigation n generaland on toxics in particulars an unpalatableprospect for the irrigationbureaucracy, ince it might ultimatelylead to

posingthe issue directlyas landwithdrawals ersusthe masterdrain; he firstis incompatiblewith its goals and purposes, the second with its politicalenvironment.

Thus,reducinguncertaintywillpotentially ncreasepolarizationandpoliti-cal interference;reducingpolarizationby letting uncertaintypersist or in-crease could ultimately orce unwantedchangeof organizationalgoals andcharter.Threatened rom both sides, irrigationagenciesarepressedto man-

ageconflictby walkinga fine line betweenuncertaintyandpolarization.Thisdilemma s foundto persistfor each of thecurrentlyproposedtechnicalsolu-tionsof thedrainageproblem n theValley.25

Irrigationagencies are attempting o resolve their dilemmain two ways.

Agencieshavebegunto distancethemselves romeachother,arguing hat thedilemmais more of a problemfor some than for others. For example,thereare those who saythat the CaliforniaDepartmentof WaterResourcesreallydoes not haveto walk such a fine line betweenuncertaintyand polarization,since agricultural rainage s more of a problemfor U.S.Bureauof Reclama-

tion, which is responsiblefor the Kestersonclean-up.A second tactic hasbeen to try to create more uncertaintythan polarizationby not fundingresearch on out-of-Valleysolutions while at the same time conductingresearchon

in-Valleyolutions. For

example,the San

JoaquinValleyDrain-

age Program's voidanceof controversial esearchon out-of-Valley olutionshas kept alive the uncertaintyover the techno-economicfeasibilityof suchsolutions,shouldtheybecomepoliticallyandlegallyfeasibleat a laterdate.26

Similarly,the Program'sresearch efforts on in-Valleysolutions have de-bunkedconventionalwisdom aboutthe drainageproblemandproducednew

findingsin areas unfamiliar o the watermanagersand users.27 n so doing,irrigationagencies,such as the Program,put themselves n a positionwhere

theyalwayshavemorequestions o askthan canbe answered.



322

On closer inspection,these two tacticsreproducethe componentsof the

originaldilemmain a new guise.The advantage rrigationagenciesgain by

arguinghat the

drainageproblemis not their problemis only a short-run

expedient,since the agenciesend up confrontinga differentset of uncertain-ties.Forexample, he State WaterProject s in a betterlegal positionthantheCentralValleyProjectto reallocatewater'givenup' by agricultural ontrac-tors to meet the growingneeds of urban contractors.But the unknownsofsuch a shiftin allocationare considerable,and it is highly probablethatthe

Departmentof WaterResources would exercise as much cautionin makingthis reallocationas it is now exercising n the agricultural rainagecontrover-

sy. The second approach to 'resolving'the dilemma - calling for more

researchwhile avoiding unding topics that should be researched is also ashort-runexpedient. Using researchuncertaintiesto reduce the threat offurtherpolarizationwill not forestall hehighlypolarizedpoliticaldebatethatwillultimately urfacewhensalinityproblemshave reacheda scaleendanger-ingwide tractsof irrigatedagriculture.n short,tacticallyunderstandable ut

strategicallyunhelpful, inter-agencypolarizationand progressiveresearchuncertaintiesdo not in the endavoidthebureaucracy'sasic dilemma.

Recommendations: ncouplingdrainageandirrigation

The findingsof our narrative nalysis lluminatehow the bureaucracy'song-term goal of better Valley-widedrainageand its more immediategoal of

ensuring irrigated production in the Valley are irreconcilablewhen the

bureaucracy cts as if its own self-interestprecludes acingup to the politicalchallengeof open, polarizedconflict over irrigationor of persisting,unre-solved uncertaintiesover drainage.The findingsexpose the degreeto which

the internalizedbureaucratic onflictderivesfrom andis reinforcednot onlyby the inabilityof agenciesto decide whether rrigation theirtraditional, nd

legitimating ole)or drainagemanagementa relativelynewgoal)should have

higherpriority,but also by theirconsequent(andoften implicit)rejectionofthe notion thatthe choice must be made at all. Indeed,the rejectioncan be

explicit at times, as discussed in the following section on the agencies'responseto our research indings.

In writingup the findingsof our researchfor the sponsoringagency,wefocused on the conflict overbureaucratic oals as the ultimatesourceof the

agencies'dilemma,and its resolution as a prior condition for developingimplementabledrainage programs and policies. In particular,we askedwhetherdrainageandirrigation ouldbe administrativelyncoupledas a wayof resolvingthis goal conflict. Our narrativeanalysisprovedhelpful again.Going back over the results of the networkanalysis,we noted that whilemention is made both of irrigation-relatedactors and of drainage-specificproblems n the circularnetworks, he sole terminalproblemstatementcon-cerns the threatthat drainageproblemsin particularpose to the long-term



323

survivalof the state and federal waterprojectsin California.Moreover, he

impliednetworkanalysispertainsonly to relationsbetweendrainageandthemasterdrain.Nothing s impliedwithrespectto irrigationperse. Yetdrainageis commonlytakento threaten rrigationon the assumption hatthe former saninseparablephysicalandorganizational omponentof thelatter.Whilethis

physicalrelationships inherent, heorganizational ne, however,s not.Even

though irrigationoften does lead to problemsof salinityand toxic buildup,irrigationagencies not only can, but traditionallyhave, functionedwithout

consideringdrainage.The questionthen becomes; Would the problemsof

drainagebecome more tractable f assignedto a specificagencynot chargedwithconcern about the futureof irrigation?

Withdrainageresponsibilities eparatedout, irrigationagencieswould berelatively ree to continue to promoteandargue or solutions most appropri-ate to theirconstituenciesand historicalorganizational oals; t wouldbe thetaskof the drainageagency(or agencies)to seek solutions for safe drainage.While the goal conflict would stillexist, it wouldbe externalized. nner con-flict andcognitivedissonanceovergoalswouldbecome externalconflict with

open politicaldebate aboutgoalpriorities.Thiswouldclarify he termsof the

debate, and allow the tradeoffs to be openly arguedby 'advocate'agenciesinstead of submerged or disguised by agencies trying to avoid difficult

internalchoices.In suggesting his solution,we had two objectivesin mind.First,we did

(and still do) believe thatdespite the knownpoliticaland institutionalprob-lems of creatingnew agencies,the importanceof both irrigatedagricultureandsafemanagementof drainagewaterto California s such as to justifythissolution if we can demonstrate that it is the best alternative.Second, we

hopedby this meansto bringhome to thepolicy-makers ndagenciesfollow-

ing our study the importancewe attached to our findings concerningthe

policy dilemma they faced (and will continue to face) under the currentinstitutional tructure.We madeit clear to irrigationofficialsthatany proposalto separatedrain-

ageandirrigation rganizationallyndto createanindependent,autonomous

agencyhavingthe sole institutionalmandateof managingagricultural rain-

age wouldclearly nvolveissuesof authority, esponsibility, ost, and staffingwhich cannotbe easilyresolvedandwhich, therefore,would haveto be fullyconsideredat the outset.The mostimportant ingle ssue willbe assuring hatthose inter-agencydifferenceswhichcannot be negotiatedbetweenthem ontheirown willhave to be settledformally,f not in the courts,thenby a statu-tory regulatoryboard havingthis authority e.g., the StateWaterResourcesControlBoard n California).

Despite these possible drawbacks, he potentialbenefitswere clear.First,organizational ecouplingwouldgreatlyreducethe stressplacedon anirriga-tionbureaucracyhatdoes not havethe staffing, he politicalmandate,or the

propensityto pay full attentionto the drainageproblem.The tensions in-herent in the internalgoal conflict would therebybe reduced.Second, the



325

bution of water were unlikely agents for promotion of environmental

objectives,particularly f those meant reducingirrigationwater and/or

takingandout

production.Thatalthoughwe recognized hehigh politicaland other costs of creatinganew agency, separatingdrainageand irrigationfunctions was the onlycourse of action likely to providean escape from the dilemma and allow

policy-makingo proceedtowardssome resolution.

When this was sent to agenciesfor review,the commentswe receivedwere

generallysupportive,andtendedto containsuggestionsor critiquesonlywith

regard o specificpointsor sensitiveareasrequiring most delicate choice of

language.There were some amusingpoints, such as an expressedconcern

over our languageabout bureaucratic survival' hat disappearedwhen themanifestationsof survivalwereused in lieu of the terminology,and a denialthatagenciesweredistancing hemselves rom one anotherbytheverypeoplewhose interviewssuppliedthe data. Once we revised the draftto alter the

'provocative'anguage, he writtenreviewswerebyandlargequitepositive.However,whenwe soughtto move to the schedulednext stage(a meeting

between our group, our sponsor,and selected agency representatives),wereceivedno supportwhatsoever.And,whenweappliedfortheexpected(and,

we had thought,pre-agreed o) renewal or a secondfullyearof research ayear to be focused on more intensiveand specific data collection - it wasdenied. We were told thatprioritieshad shifted,thatthe agencywas not pri-marily interestedin setting an agendafor action, that furtherinstitutionalwork was to focus on legal aspects,and, politely,that there was simplyno

fundingto be had for work suchas ours. Albeit a smallconsolation,ournar-rativeanalysis ed us to understandbetterwhy our attempts o continue ex-

plicating he underlyingandimmediatedilemmaconfronting rrigationagen-cies were met by irrigationofficialswith the

counter-argumenthat we had

chosen the 'wrong'partof the problemto analyze,where the primary prob-lem'remained nthefield,not in thebureaucracy.

Conclusion

Many policy analystsalreadyknow that carefulattentionto the argumentsdominatingan issue of high uncertaintyand dissensuscan tell them some-

thinguseful about how the controversywill unfold. This case studydemon-stratesthat 'non-traditional' rocedures,such as networkanalysis,can be of

greatuse to the practicinganalystnot onlyfor augmenting uchconventional

policy analyticaltechniquesas organizationtheory and considerationsof

politicalfeasibility,but also for understandinghose cases where there is aseemingresistance o theirapplication.

In particular,or complexlycausaland goal-conflictedsituationssuch asthis one, our study exposes the degree to which the inabilityto reconcile



326

objectivesand resolveoutstandingproblemsand indeterminacies nheresinthe structureof the issue- that s, in therelationships etween andamongthe

manyproblemsidentified

bythe

actors,giventhe actors'bureaucratic

posi-tions and self-definitions. n this case the analysiswas based on networksof

problemsand assumptionswhose dimensionsand linkageelude the actorsthemselves.The networksprovide a way of disclosingthe structureof the

issue, and our narrativearticulatesthe connectivityand assumptionsthatstructurepresents o policy-makers.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thankWilliamAscher, Sally Fairfax,Steve Ford, LouiseFortmann,Ed Imhoff,David Jenkins,and severalanonymousreviewers ortheir commentson earlier versionsof this paper.Hukkinenundertookthedata collection, most of the networkanalysis,and contributedequallywithRoe to the applicationof narrativepolicy analysis o the case study.Roe alsowas primarilyresponsiblefor the conceptualframeworkand Rochlin pro-vided most of the organizationalmplicationsof the case study.This articledrawsmaterial romHukkinen'sdissertation

inpreparation)nd from Janne

Hukkinen,Emery Roe, and Gene I. Rochlin (1988). WhenWaterDoesn'tMean Power:How GovernmentCanBetterHandleUncertaintyndPolariza-tion Relatedto AgriculturalDrainage n the SanJoaquinValley, reportpre-paredforthe CaliforniaDepartmentof WaterResources,Sacramento.

Notes

1. B. DelworthGardner,RaymondH. Coppock,CurtisD. Lynn,D. WilliamRains,RobertS.Loomis,andJ.HerbertSnyder 1982). Agriculture,'Chapter Iin Competitionor Califor-nia Water: lternativeResolutions Eds.,ErnestA. EngelbertwithAnn Foley Scheuring),University f CaliforniaPress,Berkeley,p. 12.

2. CaliforniaDepartmentof Water Resources (1987). CaliforniaWater:Looking to the

Future,DWRBulletin160-87, Sacramento, p.9, 11.3. CaliforniaDepartmentof WaterResources(1983). TheCaliforniaWaterPlan:Projected

Use and Available WaterSuppliesto 2010,Bulletin 160-83, Sacramento,pp. 117, 123.CaliforniaDepartment f Finance(1987), California tatisticalAbstract987,Sacramento,p. 110.It hasbeenestimated hat agricultureontributed 62 billionof the stategross pro-

duct of $593 billion n 1987,'whentaking ntoaccounttheemployment,processing, rans-portationandotheractivitygeneratedbyagriculturenCaliforniaWilliamDuBois[1989].Letter o theEditor of Issues nScienceand Technology,ol.V,No. 3, Spring,p.7).

4. SanJoaquinValleyDrainageProgram 1987). DevelopingOptions:An Overview f Effortsto SolveAgriculturalDrainageand Drainage-Relatedroblems n the SanJoaquinValley,Sacramento, . 8.

5. SanJoaquinValleyDrainageProgram1987), p. 8. SanJoaquinValleyInteragencyDrain-

age Program 1979). Agricultural rainage nd SaltManagementn theSanJoaquinValley,Final Report, Fresno, p. 6-4. Assembly Office of Research(1987). California2000:Paradise n Peril Making ssues n NaturalResources, acramento, . 14.



327

6. HarryM. Ohlendorf(1986). 'AquaticBirds and Selenium n the San JoaquinValley,'nSeleniumandAgriculturalDrainage:mplicationsor SanFranciscoBayandtheCaliforniaEnvironmentProceedingsof the SecondSeleniumSymposium,March23, 1985, Berke-

ley, CA), Tiburon, p. 18. Kenneth Tanji,Andre Lauchli, and Jewell Meyer (1986).'Selenium n the San Joaquin Valley,'reprintfrom Environment,Vol. 28, No. 6, July/August,pp.6-7.

7. Roger Fujii (1988). Water-Qualitynd Sediment-Chemistry ata of Drain Waterand

EvaporationPondsfrom TulareLake DrainageDistrict,KingsCounty,California,March1985 to March 1986, U.S. Geological Survey,Open-File Report 87-700, Sacramento.

RoyA. Schroeder,Donald U. Palawski,and Joseph P. Skorupa(1988). Reconnaissance

Investigationf WaterQuality,BottomSediment,and BiotaAssociatedwithIrrigationDrai-

nagein the TulareLake BedArea,SouthernSanJoaquinValley,California, 986-87,U.S.

Geological Survey,Water-Resources nvestigationsReport 88-4001, Sacramento.San

FranciscoChronicle May11, 1988).'HighLevelsof Selenium n NatureAreas,'SanFran-cisco.8. ThePress-EnterpriseNovember7, 1988). 'UCR ToxicCleanupMethod"Superior".'an

FranciscoChronicle August18, 1987). '$24.6 Million Plan:WaterBoardOKs Kesterson

Cleanup,'SanFrancisco.SanFranciscoChronicleMay17,1988).'U.S.KestersonCleanupPlan- MoreChemicals,' an Francisco.

9. Among the severalreportson the masterdrain are U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 1949).CentralValleyBasin:A ComprehensiveDepartmentalReporton the Developmentof theWater nd RelatedResourcesof the CentralValleyBasin,and Commentsrom theStateofCalifornia ndFederalAgencies,U.S.SenateDocument113,81st Congress,First Session.

CaliforniaLegislature 1957). DrainageProblemsof the SanJoaquinValley f California:TenthPartialReportbytheJoint Committee n Water roblems,CaliforniaStatePrintingOffice,Sacramento,CA. CaliforniaState WaterResourcesBoard(1957). TheCaliforniaWaterPlan, Bulletin No. 3, Sacramento,CA. San Joaquin Valley Drainage AdvisoryGroup(1969). FinalReport,Fresno,CA.

10. SanJoaquinValleyInteragencyDrainageProgram1979).11. SanJoaquinValleyDrainageProgram1987).12. StevenHall(1989). 'MyTurn'WestValleyournal,April,p. 3.13. Duringthe summer of 1987, interviews were conducted with twenty-threendividuals

representing he main interestgroups in the San JoaquinValley agriculturaldrainagecontroversy.The intervieweeswere classified into four

groups:Twelvewere associated

with the agriculturalommunity local water, rrigation,and drainagedistrictmanagers);six were groupedas planners(stafffromthe San JoaquinValleyDrainageProgram, heCaliforniaDepartmentof WaterResources,andtheDepartmentof FishandGame); hreewere stateand federalregulatorsstaff rom the StateWaterResourcesControlBoard,theCentralValleyRegionalWaterQualityControlBoard,and theU.S.Environmental rotec-tion Agency);and two were fromthe environmentalommunity the NaturalResourcesDefense Council and the San FranciscoBay Institute).The state's views on the Valleydrainageproblemweresampled hroughnterviewswith staff n theCaliforniaDepartmentof WaterResources,while interviews with the San JoaquinValley DrainageProgramhelpedto capturesome of the Federalperspectiveson thisproblem, .e., its staff includes

representativesrom,amongothers,the U.S. Bureauof Reclamation.Lawyersas a groupwere notspecificallynterviewed, uttheirviewson thedrainageproblemwere reflected nthe interviewswith the variousagencyrepresentatives, articularlyhe state and federalofficialswhoseofficesrelyon large egalstaff.

Overall, he 23 interviewsmost probably dentifiedwhat areperceived o be the majorproblemsassociated with the Valley'sagricultural rainage romthe perspectivesof the

partiesmost involved n the controversy.The cumulative requencydistribution urveof

problemsmentioned n the interviews howsthat the numberof new problemsaddedbyindividualnterviews apersoff considerablyafterthe 18thinterview.Formore detailsonthemethodology,ee Hukkinen,Roe andRochlin 1988).



328

14. Some of those interviewed xpressed his viewforcefully:Adrainagewaterbypassto theDelta is out of the question.This means not only thatthe [masterdrain] s unacceptable,butalso that a bypass ordrainagento the SanJoaquinRiver s out.'Othersmentioned he

'no drain'assumptionwith something approachingregret: On cestain farm areas thegroundwaterevel must be lowereddown,out of the root zone. This watermustbe taken

out, and the question s where to putit ... Personally still feel that the drain s the waytodo it in the longrun.However, t willprobablynot be builtwithin he next20 or 30 years.'The consensushoweverwas clear andcommonfor the vast majorityof the interviewees:Therewillbe no drain,butproperdrainages needed.

15. WestValleyournal 1989). 'ImhoffCites PossibleDrainageSolutions,'April, p. 3. See also

StephenHall(1989). 'MyTurn,'WestValleyournal,April,p. 3.16. For a samplingof this literature, ee MartinRein(1976). Social Scienceand PublicPolicy,

PenguinEducation,England;ThomasKaplan(1986). 'The NarrativeStructure f Policy

Analysis,'n Journalof PolicyAnalysisandManagement,Vol.5, No. 2;and MartinKrieger(1981). Advice and Planning,TempleUniversityPress,Philadelphia.For a recentdiscus-sion on the importanceof argumentationn policy analysis,see GiandomenicoMajone(1989). Evidence,Argumentand Persuasion n the PolicyProcess,YaleUniversityPress,NewHaven.

17. As noted earlier,the twenty-threenterviewsmost likely capturedthe prevailingmajorproblemsassociatedwithagriculturalrainagen theValley.

18. The computerprogramdevelopedfor this research dentifieda feedback oop as the re-sidualproblemnetwork eft after initialand terminalproblemswere truncated romthe

largernetwork.As such,a circularargument an be seen as a problemnetworkconsisting

onlyof transferproblems.19. For a discussion of the distinctionbetween positive and negativefeedback,see ErichJantsch 1985). TheSelf-Organizing niverse, ergamonPress,Oxford,pp.5-6.

20. Narrativeanalyseshavebeen undertaken or the 1980/82 Medflycontroversyn Califor-nia, the CubanMissileCrisis,the animalrightscontroversy, nd the debate overnuclearreactorsnot built according o designspecifications.See EmeryRoe (1989). 'Narrative

Analysisfor the Policy Analyst:A Case Studyof the 1980-82 CaliforniaMedflyCon-

troversy,'n Journalof PolicyAnalysisandManagement, ol.8, No. 2. See alsoEmeryRoe

(forthcoming). AppliedNarrativeAnalysis:The Tangencyof LiteraryCriticism,SocialScienceandPolicyAnalysis,'n NewLiteraryHistory.The Medfly controversyprovidesashort illustrationof how the narrative

procedureworks.The

storycritiquedn thatcon-

troversy, articularly y environmentalists, as the scenarioproposedby state andfederalbureaucrats bout how aerialsprayingof malathionwould lead to the eradicationof the

Medfly infestation.The critiquecalled into doubt the aerial sprayingscenariowithout

havinga storyof its own thatoffered an alternative r counter-proposalo thatspraying.Eventually, he public'scomparisonof the critiqueand the scenariogenerateda wide-

spreadmeta-storyabout howthe critiqueheightened he public'ssense of risk anduncer-

taintyassociatedwiththe infestation.The search or meta-storiesgeneratedby comparingthe storiesand non-stories hatdominatediscussionsof broadsocial,economic,andpoliti-cal issues has been a majorpreoccupationof recent structuralist nd post-structuralistcriticism.See MichaelRiffaterre1988). 'TheRelevanceof Theory/Theoryof Relevance,'in The YaleJournalof Criticism,Vol. 1, No. 2, Spring,p. 165. Jean-Franqois yotard nparticular iscussesthe roleof'metanarratives'n his ThePostmodernCondition:A Reporton Knowledge1984).

21. For an introductiono the semioticsquare, ee A. J.Greimas 1987). OnMeaning: elected

Writingn SemioticTheory,Volume38 of TheoryandHistoryof Literature,UniversityofMinnesotaPress, Minneapolis.Our applicationof the semiotic squarefollows RonaldSchleifer 1987). A. J. Greimasand theNatureof Meaning,Universityof NebraskaPress,Lincoln,pp.25-28.

22. Some in the irrigationbureaucracy perateunder the assumption hat there will be no



329

Valley-widedrain in the foreseeablefuture,but at the same time think that the drainshould be constructedduringthat time period.'The main drainis politicallyout at the

moment,but it would be the best solution,'as one irrigatorput it. Others,however, ind

nothingcontradictory n holding these two positions, since in-Valleysolutions and/ormasterdrainmightbe found feasiblebeyondthe foreseeable uture.Unfortunately, eliefin eitheroptiononlyexacerbates hedrainage ontroversy.

23. As such,the startingassumption,therewill be no drain,' urnsout to be the realproblemin the finalanalysis,a pointthatis underscoredby anotherexample.A similarpatternofinterconnectedoops as was found in the irrigationbureaucracys producedwhen the

problemnetworksof the agricultural ommunityand regulatorsare aggregatedogether,only this time the singleterminalproblemproduceddoes not relate to the loss of payersfor the waterprojects,butto the lack of the masterdrainspecifically:Need foragriculturaldrainageoutlet and dischargepoint, which do not exist (such as master drain to Bay-

Delta).'24. See MarcReisner(1987). CadillacDesert:TheAmericanWest ndItsDisappearingWater,

PenguinBooks,NewYork,p. 486.25. For moredetailson how the dilemma s replicated n each of the specifictechnicalsolu-

tions proposedfor the drainageproblem,see Chapter4 of JanneHukkinen,EmeryRoe,and Gene I. Rochlin 1988).

26. A recent letter from the National Research Council'sCommitteeon Irrigation-InducedWater Problems to the San JoaquinValley Drainage Programcriticizes the Program'smanagementor restrictingts scientists o those optionsconsidered politicallyeasible.' twillbe interestingo see whether heiradvice,muchof which s so congruento ourown,is

heeded,or

whether,as seems

probable,he California

rrigation ureaucracywillcontinue

to walk the line betweenuncertaintyand polarization n neithermentioning he unmen-

tionable,noradmittingo theirowninability o set andholdpriorities.27. Personalcommunication rom Ed Imhoff,Manager, anJoaquinValleyDrainageProgram

(1988).28. The focus on organizational nd management pproaches o handlingwhatin California

seem to be technicalandpoliticalproblems,such as salinizationof irrigatedand,is con-sistentwiththe literature n irrigationystemsandassociatedproblems n other countries.See NormanUphoffwith PrithiRamamurthyndRoySteiner 1988). Improving erform-anceof IrrigationBureaucracies:uggestionsor Systematic nalysisandAgencyReorienta-

tion, IrrigationStudiesGroup,CornellUniversity, thaca, NY, particularly ohn Mont-

gomery,'Chapter9: BureaucraticCulture in IrrigationManagement.'See also RobertChambers (1988). Managing Canal Irrigation:PracticalAnalysis from South Asia,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge.

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