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HSR and Interurban Mobility: Who Are the Winners?

Pr. Yves CrozetLaboratoire d’Economie des Transports

(Institute of Transport Economics)University of Lyon - France

yves.crozet@let.ish-lyon.cnrs.fr

Berkeley – 02 & 03 05 2001 Realizing the Vision of a High Speed Rail System in California:

Connecting People While Fostering Prosperity, Smart Growth and Sustainability

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Contents

• 1) As Happy As HSR in France?

•2) HSR, land use and time management

- HSR: the French “model”- The Key role of Geography and Urban Hierarchy - CBA and the short list of HSR Winners

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HSR: the French “model” (1)

• 30 years ago the first HSR between Paris and Lyon (450 km, a 2 hours trip, 23 return trips per day, train capacity 500 or 1000, load factor close to 80%)

• Geography matters: Paris region population = 11 M, Lyon region population = 1,5M. And almost a desert between the two!

• The French “model” of TGV is therefore valid for an optimal mix between distance, speed and traffic in relation with a gravity rationale

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HSR: the French “model” (2)

• Between 1981 and 2011, extension of the Paris-Lyon “model”:

• North: Paris-London, Paris-Bruxelles (via Lille) 1993,

• West and South-West: Paris-Tours, Nantes, Rennes, Bordeaux (1994)

• South East: Paris-Marseille (2001)• East: Paris-Strasbourg (2007), Paris-Basel

(2011)

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Only 25 train stations on HS tracks

But 200 train stations receiving HS trains.

HS trains andHS tracks

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CBA and ex post evaluationExpected and observed economic profitability of

the first HS lines (20 years period)

Ex ante profitab.

Ex post profitab.

Paris-Lyon (S.E.) 16.5% 15.2%Paris–Tours (S.W.) 12.0% 7.0%

Paris-Lille (N.) 13.0% 3.0%

N-S Connection 10.8% 6.9%

Lyon Bypass 10.4% 6.1%

Mediterranean 8.0% 4.1%

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CBA, ex ante and ex post evaluationExpected and observed socio-economic

profitability of the first HS lines (20 years period)

Ex ante profitab.

Ex post profitab.

Paris-Lyon (S.E.) 28.0% ?Paris–Tours (S.W.) 23.6% 12.0%

Paris-Lille (N.) 20.3% 5.0%

N-S Connection 18.5% 15.0%

Lyon Bypass 15.4% 10.6%

Mediterranean 12.2% 8.1%

And the winners are….

• HSR winners are mainly the actors of HSR System• The surplus of users is the biggest gain: time gains

due to speed but also comfort gain (not estimated)• Railways operator (SNCF and RFF) are the second

winners: HSR is profitable for SNCF and for RFF• There are some losers: Motorways, airports and air

carriers• And don’t forget the cost for public funds

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2) HSR and local impacts

–Impacts are not as high as currently indicated

–But HSR is a big opportunity for local decision makers

– And a wonderful tool the manage the “scarcest resource”

National Economic Impacts ?• HSR is neither a « horn of plenty » nor a magic

wand• HSR strengthens the gravity rationale• HSR network does not change the hierarchy, the

relative attractiveness of cities (Paris > Lyon > Strasbourg)

• But a city not connected to HSR becomes a relative loser.

• The result is that all the local politicians want a HSR connection

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2500 km of new HS tracks

To be compared with the lenght of HS tracks in 2010 = 1875km

« Grenellede l’environnement »

Local Economic Impacts ?• No major and systematic impacts, neither on the

number of jobs nor on the number of inhabitants• The local economic dynamism is the same before

and after HSR, whatever the activity (industry, services and even services to firms)

• No major and systematic impact on land price• Higher price of land is concentrated around the train

station.• Very often the new jobs close to the station are the

result of a transfer from another part of the city

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The main lessons of HSR in France

• Please, don’t make the confusion between the consumer surplus and GDP growth

• The demand of speed is the consequence of economic growth, not the cause!

• But when you have economic growth, HSR is clearly a source of smart growth

• Especially for collective land use and individual time management

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HSR and land use patterns

• What happens around the HSR station (when they well located) ?

• A reorganisation of the local Public transit system (regional trains, metro, tramways, buses…)

• A new dynamism (inhabitants, jobs, shops…) and finally a leverage for the local decision maker to foster density and sustainable cities

• But it is not the case if the HSR station is “in the middle of nowhere”

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HSR and sustainable time management

• Time is the scarcest resource (because our life expectancy is growing slowly in comparison with our monetary resources)

• Car driving is therefore less and less attractive• And air transport is less and less comfortable

and more and more time consuming• HSR is the key to another way of life: cooler

and nevertheless more intensive !

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ConclusionGo fast and take your time!

(Prenez le temps d’aller vite)

Go fast and enjoy Public Transit! (Prenez le temps du transport collectif)

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Limits to the French “model”

• It is also necessary to explain that there is not only one HST model

• In Japan or in Germany the speed of HST can be “only” 200 or 250km/h

• The French HST model is not convenient for the urban region Marseille – Nice

• The French HST model is not convenient when the potential traffic is too low in comparison with the building cost

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Other limits

• It is clear that the more we extend the network, the more we reduce the profitability of the new links

• There is an optimal size of the HST network• Last but not the least, for some relations, air

transport is the cheapest mode, even when taking into account the external costs

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Modulation of rail access chargesHigh

SpeedMillions

trains-kmMainte-

nance ++ RenewalTotal

Cost M€MarginalCost M€

2005 RFFcharges M€

N1 53, 4 72,3 91 163 110 655N2 12, 5 26,1 24 51 27 61N3 3,4 12,4 8 20 8 12N2* 5,6 10,3 11 21 12 27N3* 3,4 9,5 7 16 8 12

Total HS 78, 3 130,6 141 271 166 767

OthersA 44,4 190 53 243 137 509B 59,8 231 71 303 172 264C 230,5 887 275 1 162 497 418C* 17,9 51 21 72 35 45D 78,2 499 219 718 281 123D* 2,6 8 7 15 8 7E 41,2 526 108 633 130 61

Total 474,6 2 392 754 3 145 1260 142740%

Total 552,9 2 522 895 3 416 1426 2194

Source : SESP

500/100

362/100

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Global mobility (data points : 1960-2000)

Per C

apita

Tra

ffic

Volu

me

, pkm

100 000

10 000

1 000

100

100 1 000 10 000100 000

GDP / cap, US$ (2000) Source : Schafer and Victor (2000) : economic growth rates based on IP CC IS9 2a/e scenario

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Time budget

Revenue

Distance

ValueofTime

Road speed

HighSpeed

CarWalking

HighSpeed

Source: Crozet 2009

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ORIGINE DU TRAFIC NOUVEAUProjets LGV (source: Bilans LOTI)

DUP Ex Post DUP Ex postLN2 (Atlantique) Gain de trafic / 22% 22% Report aérien 15% 30%

Trafic total Report route 85% 25%Induit pur 45%

LN3 (Nord Europe) Gain de trafic / 60% 60% Report aérien 13% 28%Trafic total Report route 22% 72%

Induit pur 65%

LN4 (Rhone Alpes) Gain de trafic / 14% 23% Report aérien 16% 23%Trafic total Report route 21% 77%

Induit pur 63%

LN5 (Med) Gain de trafic / 27% 22% Report aérien 48% 40%Trafic total Report route 18% 27%

Induit pur 34% 35%

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Tarifs LGV et surplus usagers

Nord Europe 58%

Thalys 56%

Eurostar 53%

Rhone Alpes Axe Savoie Dauphiné 52% Axe Midi 153%

Méditerranée 79%

surplus réel des usagers compte tenu des augmentations ou diminutions de tarifs