ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

Facts:

Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals,

and trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to

public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition.

To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in

their decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public

policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under

the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.

A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on

Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.

AngLadlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion

by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the

establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions

contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and

equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’

international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete

and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was

validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT

sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and

that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national

existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.

Issue:

WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;

WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal

grounds.

Held:

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in AngBagongBayani stands for the

proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to

said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,

elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals)

may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in

AngBagongBayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the enumeration

of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element

is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular

organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made

respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At

bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in

religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is

inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of

the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to

justify the exclusion of AngLadlad. Be it noted that government action must have a

secular purpose.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why

special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended

to justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system would be so

harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.

We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil

laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a

nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else

which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality,” the remedies for which are

a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or

abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised

Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a

criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation

of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace

the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or

culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient

governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the

party-list system. The denial of AngLadlad’s registration on purely moral grounds

amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than

a tool to further any substantial public interest.

Duncan Assoc. of Detailman-PTGWO vs. Glaxo WellcomePhils., Inc. 

G.R. No. 162994, September 17, 2004

FACTS:

Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative on Oct. 24, 1995. Contract of

employment signed by Tecson stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and

abide by the existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing future

relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees with

competing drug companies and should management find that such relationship poses

a prossible conflict of interest, to resign from the company. Company's Code of

Employee Conduct provides the same with stipulation that management may transfer

the employee to another department in a non-counterchecking position or preparation

for employment outside of the company after 6 months. 

Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo's products in the Camarines Sur-

Camarines Norte area and entered into a romantic relationship with Betsy, an

employee of Astra, Glaxo's competition. Before getting married, Tecson's District

Manager reminded him several times of the conflict of interest but marriage took

place in Sept. 1998. In Jan. 1999, Tecson's superiors informed him of conflict of

intrest. Tecson asked for time to comply with the condition (that either he or Betsy

resign from their respective positions). Unable to comply with condition, Glaxo

transferred Tecson to the Butuan-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. After his

request against transfer was denied, Tecson brought the matter to Glaxo's Grievance

Committee and while pending, he continued to act as medical representative in the

Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. On Nov. 15, 2000, the National

Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that Glaxo's policy was valid...

ISSUE:

Whether or not the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees

from marrying employees of any competitor company is valid

RULING:

On Equal Protection

Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing

strategies, and other confidential programs and information from competitors. The

prohibition against pesonal or marital relationships with employees of competitor

companies upon Glaxo's employees is reasonable under the circumstances because

relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. That

Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interest cannot be denied.

It is the settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are

addressed only to the state or those acting under color of its authority. Corollarily, it

has been held in a long array of US Supreme Court decisions that the equal

protection clause erects to shield against merely privately conduct, however,

discriminatory or wrongful.

The company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to

comply with the policy. Indeed the application of the policy was made in an impartial

and even-handed manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee.

On Constructive Dismissal

Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to

when continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when

there is demotion in rank, or diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination,

insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. None

of these conditions are present in the instant case.

STAR PAPER CORPORATION VS. SIMBOL

G.R No. 164774 April 12, 2006

Facts: Simbol, one of the employees of Star Paper Corporation met Alma Dayrit, also

an employee of the company, whom he married. prior to their marriage, the manager

of the Personnel and Administration Department, Ongsito, advised the couple that

should they get married, one of them resigned because of a company policy. Simbol

then resigned before they got married. A similar occurrence happened to Comia and

she also resigned before her marriage to Howard Comia Estrella met Luisito Zuniga,

also a co-worker, a married man got her pregnant. The company allegedly could have

terminated her services due to immorality but she opted to resign. The three

respondents Simbol, Comia, and Estrella, on separate instances signed a Release

and Confirmation agreement.

Simbol and Comia allege that they did not resign voluntarily and that they were only

compelled to resign because of an illegal company policy. Estrella alleges that she

had a relationship with Zuniga who misrepresented himself a married but separated

man. After she got pregnant, she found out that he was not separated. She severed

her relationship with him to avoid dismissal due to company policy. Sometime, she

got into an accident which necessitated her to recuperate for 21 days and

necessitated to recuperate for 21 days. When she returned to work, she was denied

entry into the the office. She was directed to proceed to the personnel office where

shewas handed a memo which states that she was being dismissed for immoral

conduct.She refused to sign the memo because she was on leave for 21 days and

wasn’t given chance to explain. When she finally submitted her explanation, she

wasnonetheless dismissed by the company. Due to her urgent need for money, she

submitted a letter a of resignation in exchange for her 13Th month pay.

The respondents filed a complaint for unfair labor practices, constructive dismissal.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, The NLRC affirmed the

decision however, the CA reversed the NLRC’s ruling. Hence, the petition.

Issue: Whether or not the company’s policy is violative of the constitutional rights

towards marriage and the family of employees and of Article 136 of the Labor Code.

Ruling: Yes.It is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired

after they were found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they married a co-

employee. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting

Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of the Repacking Section, could

be detrimental to its business operations. Neither did petitioners explain how this

detriment will happen in the case of WilfredaComia, then a Production Helper in the

Selecting Department, who married Howard Comia, then a helper in the cutter-

machine. The policy is premised on the mere fear that employees married to each

other will be less efficient. If we uphold the questioned rule without valid justification,

the employer can create policies based on an unproven presumption of a perceived

danger at the expense of an employee’s right to security of tenure.

Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee marries a co-

employee, but they are free to marry persons other than co-employees. The

questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it creates

a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only way it could

pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory,

albeit disproportionate, effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business

concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the employee’s right to be

free from arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working

together in one company.

Lastly, the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our

jurisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners. The protection given to labor in our

jurisdiction is vast and extensive that we cannot prudently draw inferences from the

legislature’s silence that married persons are not protected under our Constitution

and declare valid a policy based on a prejudice or stereotype. Thus, for failure of

petitioners to present undisputed proof of a reasonable business necessity, we rule

that the questioned policy is an invalid exercise of management prerogative.

Corollarily, the issue as to whether respondents Simbol and Comia resigned

voluntarily has become moot and academic.

ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners, vs.PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.

G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008 (569 SCRA 467)

VERSION 1:

FACTS: THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.

The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual of PAL.

In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted PAL to send him to an extended vacation until November 1985. He was allowed to return to work once he lost all the excess weight. But the problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.

Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every two weeks for weight checks, which he failed to comply with.

On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of weight check dates, which he did not report to.

On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of company standards on weight requirements. Petitioner insists that he is being discriminated as those similarly situated were not treated the same.

On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal weight, “and considering the utmost leniency” extended to him “which spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5) years,” his services were considered terminated “effective immediately.”

LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the nature of the job of petitioner. However, the weight standards need not be complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight did not hamper the performance of his duties.

NLRC affirmed.

CA: the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed because he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. It is obvious that the issue of discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of escaping the result of his dismissal for being overweight.

ISSUE: WON he was validly dismissed.

HELD: YES

A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code.

In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner’s claims that obesity is a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the proper attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that “[t]he issue is could I bring my weight down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it now.”

Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the company physician, per the advice of PAL.

In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, “[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes

under Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).”

NOTES:

The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification defense. Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing the job. The qualification is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid “provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance.”

The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline upon its employees.

The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety.Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social justice or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral character.

VERSION 2:

Facts: Complainant was an international flight steward who was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the company.

Issue: Was the dismissal valid?

Held: SC upheld the legality of dismissal. Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social justice or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral character.

The obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. “[V]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).”

Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing the job.

Bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)

The Constitution, the Labor Code, and RA No. 7277 or the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons contain provisions similar to BFOQ.

Argument that BFOQ is a statutory defense must fail

Meiorin Test (US jurisprudence) in determining whether an employment policy is justified:

(1) the employer must show that it adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job;

2) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of that work-related purpose; and

(3) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary in order to accomplish the legitimate work-related purpose.

In Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol, this Court held that in order to justify a BFOQ, the employer must prove:

(1) the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and

(2) that there is factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.

In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid “provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance.”

The weight standards of PAL are reasonable. A common carrier, from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers it transports.

The primaryobjective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety. It cannot be gainsaid that cabin attendants must maintain agility at all times in order to inspire passenger confidence on their ability to care for the passengers when something goes wrong.

Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed employee as an act “social justice,” or based on “equity.” Provided the dismissal:

Entitled to separation pay, even if terminated for just cause

(1) was not for serious misconduct; and(2) does not reflect on the moral character of the employee.

Thus, he was granted separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) month’s pay for every year of service.

Obergefell vs Hodges

The landmark case of Obergefell vs Hodges upheld the rights of same-sex couples to marry. The US Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between two people of the same sex based on the following principles and premises:

(1) The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choicesdefining personal identity and beliefs.

(2) Four principles and traditions demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples.

(a) The first premise of this Court’s relevant precedents is that the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.

(b) A second principle in this Court’s jurisprudence is that the right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals. The intimate association protected by this right was central to Griswold v. Connecticut, which held the Constitution protects the right of married couples to use contraception.

(c) A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education.

(d) Finally, this Court’s cases and the Nation’s traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of the Nation’s social order. States have contributed to the fundamental character of marriage by placing it at the center of many facets of the legal and social order. There is no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with respect to this principle, yet same-sex couples are denied the constellation of benefits that the States have linked to marriage and are consigned to an instability many opposite-sex couples would find intolerable. It is demeaning to lock same-sex couples out of a central institution of the Nation’s society, for they too may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage.The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have seemed natural and

just, but its inconsistency with the central meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now manifest.

(3) The right of same-sex couples to marry is also derived from the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection. The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always coextensive, yet each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other.

(4) The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sexmay not be deprived of that right and that liberty.  Same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry.

(5) While the Constitution contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process for change, individuals who are harmed need not await legislative action before asserting a fundamentalright.

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