HR Case Digest

8/10/2019 HR Case Digest

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Simon vs. CHR (G.R. No. 100150 Jan 5, 1994)

CHRs power to cite for contempt should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted

operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers.

Facts: A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the

pe ti t io ner s) in h is ca pac i t y a s an Executive Off icer of the Quezon City

Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to,

and received by, the private respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA

Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a grac e- pe ri od

of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned

premises of North EDSA . Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private

respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give

way to the "People's Park". On 12 July 1990 , t he group , l ed by thei r P resid ent Roque

Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Sala ys ay) wi th the CH R agai nst

the pe ti ti oners, as king the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be

addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of QuezonCity to stop the demolition of

the private respondents' stalls, sa ri -s ar i st or es , an d c ar in de ri a a lo ng No rt h

E D S A . T h e complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580. On 23 July1990, the CHR issued

an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North

EDSA pending resolution o f the vendors/ squatters' complaint before the

Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. In an Order,

dat ed 25 Se ptem ber1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying o u t t h e

demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores andcarinderia despite the "order to

desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them.

Issue: Whether or not the CHR has jurisdiction:

a)

to inves tigat e t he a lleg ed violat ions of t he " busine ss rights" of the private

respondents whose stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and

authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;

b)

to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners for contempt;

Held: a) Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is

readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights

that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate

Garcia, for instance, mentioned s uc h ar e as as t he "( 1) pr ot ec t io n o f r ig ht s of

po l it i c a l detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of t o r t u r e s , ( 3 )

f a i r a n d p u b l i c t r i a l s , ( 4 ) c a s e s o f disappearances, (5) salvagings and

hamletting, and (6) other c r i m e s c o m m i t t e d a g a i n s t t h e r e l i g i o u s . " W h i l e

t h e en ume ra t io n ha s no t l ike ly b ee n me ant to hav e a ny preclusive effect,

more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it


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has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a

conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit

to resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights

that should fall within the au th or it y of th e Co mm is si on , ta ki ng in to ac co un t it s

recommendation." In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be

demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected

by private respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More

than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take ju dicia l

notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus

to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been

violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it

may, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in

this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the st a l l s ,

s ar i - s a r i s tor e s an d car i n d e r i a o f th e p r i v ate res pond en ts can fal l w ithi n the

compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the

Constitution.

b) No , o n it s co ntem pt power s, t he C HR is cons titut ionall y authorized to "adopt its

operational guidelines and rules of proce dure, and cit e for con te mpt for vio lat ion s

thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its

authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in

d i r e c t o r i n d i r e c t c o n t e m p t , a n d t o i m p o s e t h e a p p r o p r i a t e p e n a l t i e s i n

accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in t h e R u l e s o f C o u r t . " T h a t

p o w e r t o c i t e f o r c o n t e m p t , however, should be understood to apply only to violations

of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure es se nt ia l to ca rr y

o ut i t s in ve s t ig a t or ia l po w e r s . T o exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could beexercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold

relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its

investigative wo rk . Th e "o rde r to des ist " (a s em ant ic i nte rp lay for a

restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is not i n v e s t i g a t o r i a l i n

c h a r a c t e r b u t p r e s c i n d s f r o m a n adjudicative power that it does not possess.


3/17

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS v. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA

Facts: The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 for being violative of

the due process clause, contending that said ordinance is not only arbitrary, unreasonable or

oppressive but also vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise allege the invasion

of the right to pri vac y and the guaranty against self-incrimination. Ord inance No. 4760proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these

establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared

for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all t imes, and by intr oducing

several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the

registration of transients and guests."Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended

to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than

l e g a l " a n d a t t h e s a m e t i m e , t o i n c r e a s e " t h e i n c o m e o f t h e c i t y

government."The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioners. Hence, the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 4760 is unconstitutional

Held: No. The mantle of prote ctio n assoc iated with the due proc ess guarant y does not

cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being

specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of

nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To

hold otherwise wo uld be to unduly res trict and nar row the sco pe of police power

which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable

of powers, extending as it does "to all the great public needs."It would be, to paraphrase

another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it cou ld be de pr iv ed or

allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public

morals, public safety and the general welfare. Negatively put, police power is that inherent and

plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibi t all t hat is hurt full to t he

comfort, safe ty , and we lfa re of society. On the legislative organs of the government,

whether national or local, primarily rest the exercise of the police power, which, it cannot

be too often e mphasized, is the pow er to presc ribe reg ulations to promote the

health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the

requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties

however, the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of

any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered

as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of

any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts. The Court

reversed the judgment of the lower court and lifted the injuction on the Ordinance in question.


4/17

Rubi vs. Provincial Board Of Mindoro

Facts: This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of

Mindoro.

The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which states that provincial

governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) are found is

authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct

such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected

by him and approved by the provincial board. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the

Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be

selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans

may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead applications are

previously recommended by the provincial governor.

Thereafter, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2, which says that the

provincial governor has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent

settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised

Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans

east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan,

were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any

Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not

exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code.

Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the

protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they

roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.

It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the

reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.

It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial

officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation

established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the

custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the

reservation.

Issue: Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty withoutdue process of law.

Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.


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Held: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his

liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws,

and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery

and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the

Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the

Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is

constitutional.

The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao

reservation, it will be read, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The failure of

former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the

only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a

permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the

Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of

introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.

Considered purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the

Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. It is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power.

But a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy. One cannot hold that the liberty of the

citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is

considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor

can one say that due process of law has not been followed.

None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. To constitute

"due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In

some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is especially true where

much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular

cases.

The idea of the provision in question is to unify the people of the Philippines so that they may

approach the highest conception of nationality. The public policy of the Government of the

Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The

Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have

said, for their own good and the good of the country.

Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas

corpus can, therefore, not issue.


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Orquiola v. Sandiganbayan

No digest found


7/17

Galman vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that

had just landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired

point-blank into the back of his head by an assassin. The military investigators reported within a

span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to beunknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman,

and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn.

President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of

people who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and

freedom.

The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version

stating that "the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive

affiliations. Only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's

assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only difference

between the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents

above-named in the title of the case involved in the military conspiracy; " while the chairman's

minority report would exclude nineteen of them.

Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer.

Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in

the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the

restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply

to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit acopy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution.

But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss

the petition and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from

rendering its decision. The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day

period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution

(which apparently was not served on them).

Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate

the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits

that the people are entitled to due process.

However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime

charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents

submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot

and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration

for lack of merit.


8/17

Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging

that respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in

miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the

sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause.

Held: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the said

cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the

requirements of due process.

Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former Pres. was

no longer around) affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he

revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos

to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. Malacaang wanted dismissal to the extent thata prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel. Malacaang Conference planned a

scenario of trial where the former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by

categorizing the participation of each respondent; decided that the presiding justice, Justice

Pamaran, (First Division) would personally handle the trial. A conference was held in an inner

room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with

the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room where the

meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to

see the President. During the conference, and after an agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos

told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres.

Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.

The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and

from Malacaang Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of

the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the

Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which

proved to be beyond their capacity to resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the case"

of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres.

Marcos came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed

not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of

wonder that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with hisannounced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his administration

of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a procedure would be a better

arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may

claim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if

some other witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office.


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More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The

disappearance of witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. According to J. Herrera,

"nobody was looking for these persons because they said Marcos was in power. The assignment

of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by

virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The

custody of the accused and their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The

monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacaang and by Malacaang personnel.

The partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President Marcos had wanted all

of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. In rendering its decision, the

Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor

of the accused was clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was totally

ignored and disregarded.

The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the

government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process

in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." OurPenal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any

judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of

the courts of justice."

Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to the

handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacaang conference

(and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified

respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The courts would have no reason to

exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to

subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world areentitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake.

There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having

been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in

legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All

acts and all claims flowing out of it are void.

Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case, petitioners' motion

for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the

Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which

had required the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no

restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately

issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. All

of the acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to

lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner.


10/17

With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an

impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial for the

crimes charged against them before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due

process.

The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system ofgovernment, is to fill the public posts. Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no

constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in

accordance with their oath of office, guided only the Constitution and their own conscience and

honor.


11/17

Stonehill v. Diokno

Facts: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners personally,

and/or corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to search the persons of

petitioners and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to search for personal

properties books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all business

transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and

Bobbins(cigarettes) as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and

Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.

Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and on the

respective residences of the petitioners, there seized documents, papers, money and other

records. Petitioners then were subjected to deportation proceedings and were constrained to

question the legality of the searches and seizures as well as the admissibility of those seized as

evidence against them.

On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially lifted the same

on June 29, 1962 with respect to some documents and papers.

Held: Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus, illegal or being

general warrants. There is no probable cause and warrant did not particularly specify the things

to be seized. The purpose of the requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of the domicile and

the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or

passion of peace officers.

Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as afruit of apoisonous tee. However, they could not be returned, except if warranted by the circumstances.

Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of those taken from

the corporations for which they acted as officers as they are treated as personality different

from that of the corporation.


12/17

US VS. BUSTOS [37 PHIL. 731; G.R. L-12592; 8 MAR 1918]

Facts: In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, and

prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary(privileged communication) through

the law office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman

Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance inoffice and asking for his removal. The specific charges against the justice of the peace include

the solicitation of money from persons who have pending cases before the judge. Now,

Punsalan alleged that accused published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious,

defamatory, and libelous against him.

Issue: Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of his right to free

speech and free press.

Held: Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial

conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is

wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot

criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will

be effectively suppressed. It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in

the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official

dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts

to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them.

The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and

the complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to

meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or

group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of thegovernment for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of

course, assume responsibility for the charges made. All persons have an interest in the pure and

efficient administration of justice and of public affairs.

Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have

demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the

development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. All persons have an interest in the pure

and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is

privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he

is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. Although the charges are probablynot true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good

faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance

in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizensto secure the removal

from office of a person thought to be venal were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the

privilege.


13/17

In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that

presumption. A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination

to discover grounds of malice or falsity.


14/17

Narciso v. Romana

No case digest


15/17

SSS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS CA

FACTS: SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands. SSS filed with the

Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint against petitioners for staging an illegal strike

and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from

reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS.

ISSUE: WON employees of the Social Security System(SSS) have the right to strike.

HELD: Yes. While there is no question that the Constitution recognizes the right of government

employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to

strike. The commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations

only, without including the right to strike. It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (R.A.

No. 875), which was repealed by the Labor Code, expressly banned strikes by employees in the

Government, including instrumentalities exercising governmental functions, but excluding

entities entrusted with proprietary functions No similar provision is found in the Labor Code. To

implement the constitutional guarantee of the right of government employees to organize, the

President issued E.O. No. 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize

of government employees. In the absence of any legislation allowing government employees to

strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, they are prohibited

from striking. The SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter,

its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's

memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the

SSS was illegal


16/17

Aberca vs. Ver

FACTS: This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and

liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known

as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes

against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports aboutCT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila," Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying

with said order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively

issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party

confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were

arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest,

they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of

their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed threats,

tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or

confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights

were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatorystatements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously

known to and sanctioned by defendants.

Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the respondents postulate the view that

as public officers they are covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done in the

performance of official duties or function

ISSUE: Whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for

damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and

liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. If such action for damages may be maintained, who

can be held liable for such violations: only the military personnel directly involved and/or their

superiors as well.

HELD: SC: We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally

misplaced. The cases invoked by respondents actually involved acts done by officers in the

performance of official duties written the ambit of their powers.

It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were

merely responding to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence,

insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President

Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of suchobjective, to launch pre- emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist underground

houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by

any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the

individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the

supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience

and allegiance at all times.


17/17

Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private

individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as

enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are

excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute

a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of the privilege of

the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for

illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension

does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the

right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a

speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5 Section 1, Article 19. to 'acts of

alleged physical violence" which constituted delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as

actionable the act of violating or in any manner impeding or impairing any of the constitutional

rights and liberties enumerated therein, among others

The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and details, how

plaintiffs' constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were

violated and impaired by defendants. The complaint speaks of, among others, searches made

without search warrants or based on irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants;

seizures and confiscation, without proper receipts, of cash and personal effects belonging to

plaintiffs and other items of property which were not subversive and illegal nor covered by the

search warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under irregular, improper

and illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of 'safehouses"

where they were kept incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological torture and

other inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory

statements. The complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs

violative of their constitutional rights.

Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be

held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those

directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violation.

The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the

complaint. It is well established in our law and jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on theground that the complaint states no cause of action must be based on what appears on the face

of the complaint. 6To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in

the complaint, and no others, should be considered. 7For this purpose, the motion to dismiss

must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.

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