How to Succeed in Afghanistan

8/4/2019 How to Succeed in Afghanistan

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How to succeed in Afghanistan

With rampant institutional corruption in Kabul, the US is better served by pursing the

decentralisation of authority.Robert GrenierLast Modified: 20 Dec 2010 13:37 GMT

Barack Obama's current policy ventures are restrictingprogressive initiatives towards stability in Afghanistan [AFP]

This past week, President Obama announced the results of his promised annual review of US actions inAfghanistan and Pakistan. As expected, the review contained few, if any surprises.

In describing his administrations study - which was not so much a policy review as a diagnostic exercisedesigned to measure progress against the goals he had carefully set out a year ago at West Point - the

President struck a tone of cautious optimism, citing modest, though admittedly reversible, progress acrossthe board in addressing the many challenges in the region.

This steady progress, he concluded, will permit the start of a gradual, responsible draw-down of USforces, beginning a mere six months from now.

Indeed, if there were any surprise in this exercise, it was in the Presidents apparent obliviousness to thevast disconnect between his sensibly modest goals, and the sweepingly ambitious, grandiose and costlystrategy being employed at his direction to achieve them.

".from the start," he said, "Ive been very clear about our core goal. Its not to defeat every last threat tothe security of Afghanistan, because, ultimately, it is Afghans who must secure their country. And its notnation-building, because it is Afghans who must build their nation. Rather, we are focused on disrupting,

dismantling and defeating al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and preventing its capacity to threatenAmerica and our allies in the future."

The disconnect between rhetoric and reality

This is a President who, perhaps more than any politician I have ever seen, is preternaturally heedless ofthe vast gulf between his rhetoric and the actual direction of his policies. We have seen this in Obamasrhetoric concerning his desire to change perceptions of the US in the Muslim world; we have seen it in hisclaimed commitment to Mideast peace and the need to provide both justice to Palestinians and security


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for Israelis; and now, disastrously, we are seeing it in his stated policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Consider this: An American administration which claims to be highly discriminating in the threats it willconfront in Afghanistan has embraced an apparently open-ended and disproportionate commitment tomaintain a force of 100,000 troops to say nothing of an additional 50,000 in NATO forces and an army

of diplomats and development experts at a cost of nearly $100 billion per year, in a country whoseentire gross domestic product is only $14 billion.

Yes, President Obama insists that he will begin a drawdown of forces next year as Afghans demonstrategreater capacity to maintain their own security. Brave words notwithstanding, however, haltingly slowprogress in constructing a 'capable" Afghan army means that the US will continue to pay a huge price inboth blood and treasure for years to come absent a change in policy which the President shows no signof considering. How long will a US public already disenchanted with what it sees as a losing andthankless proposition willingly pay such costs?

This same administration, which nominally eschews nation-building, is nonetheless trying to construct amodern, highly centralized state apparatus for which Afghanistan lacks any historical precedent, sufficienteducated human capital, or popular support.

Institutional corruption

By concentrating power in a central authority which exerts control over government appointments all theway down to the local level, a US nominally committed to ethical and transparent governance hasfacilitated construction of a mafia-like structure in which corruption is not only rampant, but vertically-integrated, with local officials sharing their ill-gotten gains with those up the chain who appointed them.

Moreover, by channeling huge amounts of cash for infrastructure and development projects through apolitical structure dominated by cronies of the Kabul elite, the US has facilitated the growth of corrupt,locally-unaccountable officials who support their personally - and tribally - connected friends and preyupon the less-favoured, driving them into the arms of the Taliban.

Finally, the centrepiece of the current US strategy, the key element in the strong centralised stateenvisioned by the US and NATO, which will relieve the well-intentioned westerners of their currentburdens - the Afghan National Army - is to be expanded to 134,000 troops by the end of 2011, andperhaps to as many as 170,000 thereafter.

Leaving aside its inadequate training, its high attrition rates, and the fact that its dominance byAfghanistans ethnic minorities undermines its effectiveness in the contested Pashtun areas of thecountry, maintenance of such a huge force in the field would require budgets measured in multiples ofAfghanistans GDP: In short, even if built, it simply cannot be sustained. Those who suggest that westerngovernments will support such a force to the tune of many billions per year, even after their own troopsare no longer on the front lines, are simply ignoring history.

The inevitable path to failure

In short, Obama has allowed himself, against his better judgment, to be forced into a comprehensivecounter-insurgency strategy grossly inappropriate to his modest stated objectives in Afghanistan andPakistan.

Confronted by the refusal of the military bureaucracy to provide him with a strategy calibrated to his goals,Obama has given General Petraeus his head, compensating for this apparent dereliction by insistingrhetorically on policy objectives and a withdrawal timeline thoroughly belied by the actions of his


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government. This is a policy doomed to sink under the weight of its own contradictions.

If the US and its allies are to avoid a disastrous failure in Afghanistan, they should embrace the modestgoal at which their efforts are nominally aimed: To deny safe haven to al-Qaida on either side of theDurand Line. Further, they must understand that such an objective can only be achieved, over the long

term, by Afghans and Pakistanis operating on their own account, and reorient their methods to suit.

Paving the path to success and stability

If the end-state to be avoided in the ungoverned areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan is an uncontestedterrorist safe haven, then an achievable western goal would be to ensure that any terrorist safe havenswhich may appear are, in fact, contested, pending the two countries much longer-term goal of fullycontrolling their own territory. In the case of Afghanistan, this would mean that the price of continued USand NATO support to the government would be a continuing platform for counter-terror operations whichhave arguably been the most successful aspect of the US engagement to date.

More broadly-based US efforts to support the Afghan government and to extend responsible control overmore of the country, however, must focus on true sustainability, and must conform to traditional Afghan

norms of governance to succeed.

This would mean, first of all, a sharp devolution of power from the centre to the periphery. Rather thanprovincial and district officials being appointed by Kabul, such officials should be locally selected, andsubject to traditional forms of democratic accountability, whether through elections or broadlyrepresentative shuras. This would help to break the systemic, vertically-integrated corruption bedevilingthe country, and reduce popular resistance to the Kabul regime.

Economic assistance should remain a key part of western efforts to build support for the Kabulgovernment, but to do so it should be pursued on a much more modest scale, and tied to efforts toencourage and empower responsible local governance.

Rather than pouring billions into large-scale projects which generally serve to empower unaccountableelites and their provincial cronies and which generate scant political support in the bargain - westernassistance should be provided via initiatives such as the highly successful National Solidarity Program,through which funding is provided for village shuras to select and administer their own projects and takefull ownership of them.

Decentralising the security effort

The shift from building unaccountable and unsustainable centralised institutions should extend, perhapsmost importantly, to the security realm. Rather than focusing their efforts exclusively on building up anethnically unrepresentative and unsustainably large national army, the US and NATO should complementefforts to train a small but capable national force with initiatives aimed as supporting local tribal leadersand others particularly in the Pashtun South and East - who have genuine weight in their communities

and who are willing and capable of leading local militias to resist Taliban intimidation and brutality.

Though disparaged by some as an effort to build up warlords, support to traditional Afghan leadersprovided by knowledgeable and engaged military and intelligence officers can be conditioned on thoseleaders willingness to accept the guidance of broadly-based and representative local shuras.

Promotion of "warlords," in short, would place US and NATO forces in service to authentic Afghanleaders, rather than the other way around; would conform to Afghan social and cultural norms; and could


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serve to encourage warlords best behavior, both in local and national contexts.

Building Afghan security in this manner would be a task for relatively small US and coalition special-forcesunits, and thus would require many fewer troops perhaps something on the total order of 35,000 to45,000, rather than the current total of 150,000.

Rather than relying on conventional forces to engage in large, highly disruptive sweep operations whichgenerate significant civilian casualties to clear and hold territory, in the often vain hope that Afghansecurity and governance will follow behind, western forces instead would seek out genuine leaders incontested areas whom they could then support.

In areas lacking capable and courageous leaders willing and able to counter Taliban incursions, theTaliban could well consolidate control. So long as they did not play host to foreign militants posing athreat to the region and the wider world, however, this is something the US should be willing to live with.

A productive platform for counter-terrorism

When and where a genuine terrorist safe haven were to arise, moreover, foreign counter-terrorism forceswould have an Afghan platform from which to exercise their right of sovereign defense with fullacquiescence of the national government.

In areas where Taliban-affiliated leaders were to take advantage of decentralized governance to exerttraditional forms of local rule and had the support of the local population, this should be a matter ofindifference to western forces: Where core western counter-terror objectives are not engaged, theyshould not be reflexively attacking the Taliban.

It would be far more likely, of course, that Taliban gains would be made through intimidation, and thuslikely over time to generate popular resistance. As we saw after 9/11, local opponents of the Taliban willbe far more likely to rise up against them if they have recourse to western military support.

Viewed another way, in areas where Taliban dominance generates incipient local opposition, and wherethere is a danger that the Taliban will provide support to regional and international militants, westernforces should be in the position of fomenting insurgency, rather than allowing themselves to fall into thetrap of conducting an indiscriminate, nation-wide counterinsurgency.

If the desired end-state in both Afghanistan and Pakistan is responsible government control over allnational territory, the approach advocated here for Afghanistan will take many years. Its advantage overcurrent policy, however, is that it would be sustainable by the West, put Afghans appropriately in the lead,and be actually capable of achieving its long-term goals, while providing means of defense againstinternational terrorists in the meantime.

A transparently sustainable US-NATO policy in Afghanistan could also have salutary effects in Pakistan,where US policy to date has been similarly deficient. The shape of a viable US policy toward Pakistan will

be considered next week.

Robert Grenier is a retired, 27-year veteran of the CIA's Clandestine Service. He was the CIA'schief of station in Islamabad, Pakistan, from 1999 to 2002 as well as the director of the CIA'sCounter-Terrorism Centre from 2004 to 2006.

o Reko Diq project to be completed in next 4 years

o * Project to generate annual income worth Rs 15.875 billion
http://maps.google.com/maps?ll=29.1008388889,62.1055833333&spn=0.1,0.1&q=29.1008388889,62.1055833333%20(Reko%20Diq)&t=hhttp://maps.google.com/maps?ll=29.1008388889,62.1055833333&spn=0.1,0.1&q=29.1008388889,62.1055833333%20(Reko%20Diq)&t=h


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o To create 917 job opportunities

ISLAMABAD: Reko Diq Gold and Copper project worth Rs 8.812 billion is expected to be completed

in the next four years and generate income to the tune of Rs 15.875 billion per annum ($185.25

million) with estimated production of 38,305tonnes ofcopper, 42,618 ounces gold and other valuable

metals.

Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC) in its last meeting has approved

this vital project to be executed by the Department of Mines and Minerals,Balochistan(Strategic

Organisation). Reko Dik project having local component of Rs 5.209 billion and foreign exchange

component of Rs 3.603 billion would create 917 job opportunities in the province.

Reko Diq is the fifth largest copper ore reserve in the world having 0.8 percent of copper content.

Department of Mines and Minerals, Balochistan envisages creating a facility for processing of 15,000

tonnes cooper ore per day to produce copper metal, and other valuables such as gold, silver,

molybdenum andsulphuric acid at Reko Diq. This facility will be for the production of copper and

gold ingots only. A separate facility will be for the production of copper and gold ingots in value-

added products such as sheets, pipes, and rods as per requirement.

It has been estimated that annual income from the project will be Rs 15.875 billion or equivalent to$185.25 million per year, the recurring cost of the project would be Rs 4.770 billion after completion

in next four years.

The project would provide necessary infrastructure and give boost to the mineral sector by exploiting

the mineral resources of the country. It will also help in achieving self-reliance in the production of

copper, gold ingots and some other materials such as silver, molybdenum and sulphuric acid. The

project would help improve livelihood of the people of Balochistan by providing direct employment to

917 persons and generating economic activity in the area. The plant and equipment required for the

project would be designed and manufactured locally using expertise and engineering industrial base

available in the country.

The sponsor of the project has confirmed the government about the management structure of the

project and informed that provincial government is in a process of hiring services of a lawyer to deal

with matters leading to the formation of a company as advised by the Central Development Working

Party and they had also notified the board of governors recently, which shall exercise full financial

and administrative powers to implement the project on fast track basis by maintaining transparency

and efficiency.

According to the project document, keeping in view the local consumption of copper, which is

estimated at around 100,000 tonnes per year, the sponsors had assured that they had not foreseen

any marketing problem, however, they would hire professionals in due course of time in this regard.

Secretary Mines and Minerals, Balochistan has asked the federal government to provide fundingfrom federal Public SectorDevelopment Programme or from the Balochistan package. It has been

decided that the funding requirements for the project during 2010-11 and onwards be done by the

ECNEC. DDT. By Sajid Chaudhry

Nato Expansion
http://maps.google.com/maps?ll=33.7166666667,73.0666666667&spn=0.1,0.1&q=33.7166666667,73.0666666667%20(Islamabad)&t=hhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tonnehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copperhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copperhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goldhttp://maps.google.com/maps?ll=30.12,67.01&spn=1.0,1.0&q=30.12,67.01%20(Balochistan%2C%20Pakistan)&t=hhttp://maps.google.com/maps?ll=30.12,67.01&spn=1.0,1.0&q=30.12,67.01%20(Balochistan%2C%20Pakistan)&t=hhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sulfuric_acidhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sulfuric_acidhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ingothttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economicshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_sectorhttp://maps.google.com/maps?ll=33.7166666667,73.0666666667&spn=0.1,0.1&q=33.7166666667,73.0666666667%20(Islamabad)&t=hhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tonnehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copperhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goldhttp://maps.google.com/maps?ll=30.12,67.01&spn=1.0,1.0&q=30.12,67.01%20(Balochistan%2C%20Pakistan)&t=hhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sulfuric_acidhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ingothttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economicshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_sector


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By James Petras

The admission of three former members of the Eastern bloc into NATO was described by

President Clinton as "a very great day not only for Europe and the United States, not simply

for NATO but indeed for the cause of freedom in the aftermath of the Cold War." Behind the

euphoric rhetoric of the NATO leaders and their supporters in the mass media (El Pais in

Spain, The New York Times in the U.S.) there is power politics, economic profits, and

hegemonic domination.

Washingtons rejection of Frances attempt to increase European influence in the command

structure of NATO was a prelude to Clinton dictating the terms for new members of NATO:

the three new members (Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic) are U.S. clients; therejected candidates (Romania and Slovenia) are French and German clients. The real

meaning of the "expansion of NATO" is the extension of U.S. hegemony to Central-Eastern

Europe. With the U.S. in command that means military bases and deep penetration of the

military and security systems of those countries.

Secondly, through U.S. domination of NATO, the new members will be pushed to accelerate

the "free market reforms" and increase the opportunities for Western multinational

corporations. NATO military forces will back the regimes administrating these "unpopular

measures"strengthening the repressive arm of the state.

The U.S. Congressional Budget Office predicts total cost of NATO enlargement at about

$125 billion over 13 years with Washington paying only $19 billion. That means Eastern and

Western Europe will have to pay 85 percent of the cost, or $106 billion. At a time of large-

scale unemployment and cuts in social budgets in East and West Europe this is likely to

lower living standards and provoke greater social unrest. The new members of NATO in East

Europe will have to increase their military spending to be on the same footing with their

Western partners. U.S. arms manufacturers are the biggest supporters of NATO expansion

and will be the principle economic beneficiaries. The president of the U.S. Committee to

Expand NATO, Bruce Jackson, is also the director of Lockheed Martin Corporation, the

worlds best weapons maker. Entering NATO means buying U.S. weapons. The potential

market for fighter jets alone is $10 billion. Hungary will increase its military spending by 35

percent, Poland 20 percent, and the Czech Republic by similar percentages.

By shifting from one power bloc (Warsaw Pact) to another (NATO), the Eastern European

countries will deepen their clientele relationsa process of re-satellization. Vaclav Havel,

Gyula Horn, and Aleksander Kwasniewski, the rulers of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and

Poland, have undermined the independence of their countries with the hypocrisy and cant


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reminiscent of the previous Soviet clients.

The expansion of NATO almost to the border of Russia means that U.S. missiles will be only

seconds from their major cities. The military forces are a major security threat to Russian

internal and external policy. NATO encirclement means that Russian policy will be pressured

to conform to Washingtons dictates. The enlargement of U.S. hegemony opens the door to

the de facto extension of U.S. influence in the Ukraine and Baltic Republics, through the

existing client regimes. It is likely that the increased NATO threat will sooner or later lead to

the further subordination of Russia to the West (under Yeltsin) or his replacement (and the

elaboration of a new Russian defense policy capable of countering NATOs advance).

Washington can now count on the votes of its new Eastern client members in deepening

Western Europes subordination to its dictates. The inclusion of the three new members is

as much directed at neutralizing West Europe within NATO as it is in increasing U.S.

encirclement of Russia.

The growth of U.S. power has been significantly aided by Spanish politicians. Javier Solanohas played an active role in implementing Washingtons policy in Bosnia. U.S. policy makers

hailed Aznars decision to do what France would not and join the NATO military structure.

Thus U.S. hegemony within NATO has been strengthened at the expense of Europe thanks

to Spanish and Eastern European servility. That is the real meaning of the "enlargement of

NATO." And lets not forget the billion dollar military contracts going to U.S. arms

merchants.

In the future, given the increase in military expenditures and decline in social programs, the

NATO armed forces may be very busy, not fighting external enemies, but the rebellious

domestic population defending their living standards, resisting foreign militaryencroachments on their democratic freedom and political independence.

How to Succeed in Afghanistan

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