How To Prepare A Supreme Court Appeal Brief
-
Upload
joshua-j-israel -
Category
Documents
-
view
415 -
download
1
description
Transcript of How To Prepare A Supreme Court Appeal Brief
No. 08-9609
_____________________________________________________________________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 2008
__________________________________________________________________
JOSHUA J. ISRAEL,
Petitioner,
v.
SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS, and
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE,
Respondents.
__________________________________________________________________
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
___________________________________________________________________
JOSHUA J. ISRAEL
Petitioner / Pro Se
P. O. Box XXX
SXXXXX, MX 5XXX
(952) XXX-XXXX
__________________________________________________________________
2
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Is Petitioner deprived of complete judicial review of an incomplete
administrative review, when the Minnesota Supreme Court does affirm this incomplete
review, without applying their standard of review for a complete judicial review?
---------------------------------
Is Petitioner entitled to complete judicial review of an incomplete administrative
review, when the agency determined it had no authority to consider or determine the
constitutional issues on appeal?
-----------------------------------
Does an abuse of discretion by an administrative agency, which overrides the
procedure to be followed to protect a legislative entitlement, require a complete judicial
review by the Minnesota Supreme Court?
-----------------------------------
3
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
JOSHUA J. ISRAEL:
The petitioner, in a worker’s compensation proceeding for a
work-related injury.
SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS:
The employer, who refused to investigate the notice of injury;
who falsely claimed that Petitioner was receiving worker’s
compensation benefits; and who performed an employment lock-
out upon Petitioner and then terminated the employment of
Petitioner.
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY:
The insurer, who denied payment for medical treatment, and
healthcare provider participation, so as to prevent Petitioner from
obtaining medical evidence of a compensable injury.
JUDGE, PATRICIA J. MILUN:
The Compensation Judge, who proposed and then accepted the
Respondent’s amended answer that would prejudice the defense of
Petitioner; who did override the procedure specified by the
legislature, and who based her decision on a lack of adequate
medical evidence, and on the lack of health care provider
participation.
The WORKER’S COMPENSATION COURT OF APPEALS:
The Administrative Court of Appeals who declared it had no
authority to determine or consider the constitutional issues on
appeal.
The MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT:
The State Court of last resort who deprived Petitioner of
complete judicial review of an incomplete administrative review.
4
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page(s)
Table of Authorities - - - - - 7
Jurisdiction - - - - - - 8
State Statutes Involved - - - - 9
Constitutional Provisions Involved - - 10
Statement of the Case - - - - - 11
Reasons For Granting Writ - - - 18
Reason ―B‖ - - - - - - - 21
Reason ―C‖ - - - - - - - 25
Conclusion - - - - - - - 28
Appendix - - - - - - - 29
Opinion of Administrative Court of Appeals - - 29
Order of Indefinite delay - - - - - - 39
Order to deny a pre-deprivation hearing - - - 40
Findings and Order of Compensation Judge - - 41
Decision of Minnesota Supreme Court - - - 48
Order for preparation of Indigent Transcript - - 50
Order Granting Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis 51
5
INDEX TO APPENDIX
Appendix A –
The Opinion and Decision of the Minnesota, Worker’s Compensation Court of Appeals.
Appendix B –
The Order of Indefinite Duration to Extend IME Deadline.
Appendix C-
The Order of the Compensation Judge that did deprive the Petitioner of a pre-
deprivation process.
Appendix D –
The Findings and Order of the Compensation Judge in a worker’s compensation
proceeding.
Appendix E –
The Decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court.
Appendix F –
Order For Preparation of Indigent Transcript.
Appendix G –
Order Granting Leave to proceed in Forma Pauperis.
6
OPINIONS BELOW
The decision of the Worker’s Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) has been
designated for publication but has not yet been published.
The decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court has been designated for
publication but has not yet been published.
Notice to Attorney General, Lori Swanson, was made demonstrating the
constitutionality of a statute is drawn into question.
7
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
Brock v. Roadway Express Inc, (S. Ct. 1987) 481 U.S. 252, 261-262, 278.
Pages, 10, 15, 18, 19, 26, 27.
Hoff v. Kempton, (Minn. S. Ct. 1982) 317 N.W.2d 361. Page 17.
Kuenkamp v. Timesavers Inc., (Minn. S. Ct. 1988) 420 N.W.2d 891, 894.
Pages 19, 22.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, (S. Ct. 1985) 470 U.S. 532, 541, 548, 552. Pages 11,
15, 21, 23, 26.
Beok v. Wong Hing, (M. S. Ct. 1930) 231, N.W.2d 233, 233-234. Page 22.
Meinstma v. Loram Maintenance of Way, (Minn. App. 2003) 672 N.W.2d 224, 229-231.
Page 22.
Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, (Minn. S. Ct. 1984) 358 N. W. 2d 54, 59-61.
Pages 19, 25.
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1877, 1882. Page 26.
Davis v. Alaska, (S. Ct. 1974) 415 U. S. 308, 316-318. Page 15.
Delaware v. Fensterer, (S. Ct. 1985) 474 U. S. 15, 19. Page 15.
Olden v. Kentucky, (S. Ct. 1988) 488 U. S. 227, 230-233. Page 15.
Local 167 of Teamsters Union v. United States, (S. Ct. 1934), 291 U. S. 293, 298.
Page, 15.
8
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under Title 28 USC 1257(a), where the validity of a state
statute is drawn into question on the grounds of being constitutionally inadequate.
The date of the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court is October 3, 2008, and 90
days from this date to serve this Petition for Writ of Certiorari is January 2, 2009.
No petition for rehearing in the Minnesota Supreme Court was requested.
9
STATE STATUTES & RULES INVOLVED
Minn. Stat. 176.141(1)
*** If notice is given or knowledge is obtained within the time limitation, and if the
employee shows that failure was due to fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit of the Employer or
agent thereof, then compensation may be allowed. Page 16.
Minn. Stat. 176.221(1)
Within 14 days of notice or knowledge by the employer of an injury compensable
under this chapter, the payment of temporary total compensation shall commence.
Page 22.
Minn. Stat. 606.06
A writ of certiorari for review of an administrative decision pursuant to chapter 14 is as a
matter of right. Page 23.
Minn. Rule 5221.0420(1)
(1) *** a health care provider must participate cooperatively in the planning of an injured
employee’s return to work by communicating with the employee, the employer, the insurer,
the rehabilitation providers, and the commissioner in accordance with this part. Page 23.
Minn. Rule 5221.6050(7)(C)
(7)(C) If the insurer denies authorization or payment for treatment governed by parts
5221.6050 to 5221.6600, the health care provider or the employee may request a
determination from the commissioner or the compensation judge by filing a medical request
or petition under chapter 5220 and Minnesota Statutes, sections 176.305. Page 13.
10
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The U. S. Supreme Court has mandated that, the fundamental requirement of due
process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,
that there must be some kind of a hearing to ensure that an effective ―initial check‖
against a mistaken decision is provided before the deprivation occurs, and that a prompt
opportunity for complete administrative and judicial review must also be available
Brock v. Roadway Express Inc, (S. Ct. 1987) 481 U.S. 252, 261-263, 278 (Justice White
concurring).
The U. S. Supreme Court has mandated that due process guarantees provide
certain substantive rights that cannot be deprived of a citizen without constitutionally
adequate procedures; and that the root requirement of due process is that a citizen be
given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property
interest Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, (S. Ct. 1985) 470 U.S. 532, 541.
11
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Petitioner, JOSHUA J. ISRAEL, suffered an alleged work-related injury to
the T-12 to L-2 region of his vertebrae resulting from a reckless driving incident
committed by John Steigerwald, a training instructor, of the Employer, SCHNEIDER
NATIONAL CARRIERS (Closing Statement of Petitioner & Exhibits 3-14). Since
Petitioner believed that his back injury was an intentional act designed to deprive
Petitioner of employment opportunity, Petitioner did stay on the job, and continued to
perform his duties as a driver of a commercial motor vehicle. After a complaint was
sent to the Employer’s human resources department, the Employer did refuse to
investigate the notice of injury; an internal office-reorganization was initiated; the
Employer then changed the duties and expectations of the Petitioner; and required
Petitioner to do hard labor. When notice of injury was given, again, the Employer
refused to engage in the required [interactive process]; the Employer placed Petitioner
on medical leave; and then placed an employment lock-out upon Petitioner (Pre-Trial
Statement, p. 10-11). In response to Petitioner’s worker’s compensation claim, the
Insurer, LIBERTY MUTAL INSURANCE COMPANIES, denied primary liability for
the report of injury, based on the report being untimely.
The Petitioner then obtain the legal counsel of David H. Bailly, and Attorney
Bailly was required to demonstrate the denial of primary liability was frivolous, before
proceeding to make a claim for benefits. However, Attorney Bailly betrayed the
Petitioner, and sought to suppress the fraud and misrepresentation of the Employer and
Insurer (WCCA Decision, Appendix p. 38). Later, while Petitioner was locked-out and
collecting unemployment benefits, the employer terminated the employment of
12
Petitioner. Upon investigation by the Unemployment Division of Minnesota, the
Employer made misrepresentations to the Unemployment Investigator and claimed that
Petitioner was receiving worker’s compensation benefits (Pre-Trial Statement p. 11, p.
16), and this matter was introduced as evidence of misrepresentation and concealment
(WCCA Decision, Appendix p. 38). Thereafter, legal counsel, David H. Bailly, did
withdraw because Petitioner did not destroy his own credibility by making the false
statements that Attorney Bailly instructed Petitioner to say, and Attorney Bailly did
betray Petitioner when he allowed the Respondent’s legal counsel to exceed the scope of
discovery, and obtain information for personal use (WCCA Decision, Appendix p. 33,
par. 1). Thereafter, Petitioner was unable to obtain other legal counsel because the
Respondent’s legal counsel did prejudice the legal system against the Petitioner. As a
consequence, Petitioner was compelled to proceed as a pro-se litigant. Immediately
thereafter, the Insurer and the Employer secured an Order of indefinite delay from an
―unknown‖ Judge, and this case was delayed for 18 months (Order of Indefinite Delay,
Appendix p. 39; WCCA Decision, Appendix p. 35, par. 4a). As a result, Petitioner is
deprived of the Legislative entitlement to worker’s compensation benefits that pay for
healthcare provider participation in return to work planning, medical treatment, and
maximum medical improvement.
After this case was assigned to two other judges, the Petitioner was required to
attend pre-trial hearings before Compensation Judge, Patricia J. Milun, and to submit his
pre-trial statement, and his request for discovery. During pre-trial, and after Petitioner
demonstrated that failure of notice of injury was due to the fraud and the
misrepresentation of the Employer and the Insurer, the Compensation Judge proposed a
13
change to the Respondent’s previous Answer, and the Compensation Judge
recommended that Respondent’s should now admit to notice of injury. Since this
amended answer would prejudice Petitioner’s Legislative entitlement, and would
suppress Petitioner’s defense against misrepresentation and concealment of a
compensable injury, under Chapter 176, Petitioner did file an objection, did petition for
a hearing on the denial of primary liability, and did request relief from actions
prejudicial to the administration of justice; because, the Compensation Court was being
used as an instrument of injustice, and Petitioner is being deprived of the equal
protection of the Legislature, thereby (Petition For Summary Decision, p. 3, par. 11-
12); (WCCA Decision, Appendix p. 34).
However, the Compensation Judge refused to comply with any legislative
procedure specified for the protection of an entitlement to worker’s compensation
benefits (Appendix p. 40), and the compensation Judge did refuse to refer fraud and
misrepresentation matters to the Workers Compensation Fraud Unit. As a result,
Petitioner’s right to a hearing is established by the following Legislative procedure
specified to protect an entitlement conferred by the Minnesota Legislature:
Minn. Rule 5221.6050(7)(C)
(7)(C) If the insurer denies authorization or payment for treatment governed by
parts 5221.6050 to 5221.6600, *** the employee may request a determination from *** the
compensation judge by filing a *** petition under *** Minnesota Statutes, sections 176.305.
Thereafter, on 8/7/07, the Compensation Judge did proceeding to her evidentiary
hearing; did allow Respondent to admit to notice of injury (WCCA Decision, Appendix
p. 34, par. 3) did suppress Petitioner’s defense against concealment of a compensable
injury, under 176.141, (Judges Findings, Appendix p. 46, par. 22); and Petitioner was
14
deprived of discovery for effective cross-examination of John Steigerwald, and effective
examination of Dr. Florey (WCCA Decision, Appendix p. 34).
During the evidentiary hearing, the Petitioner did procure un-disputed evidence
that the Insurer’s denial of benefits was frivolous because the denial is based on an
inaccurate interpretation of the facts and the applicable law, and because the written
notice to deny benefits contains false and misleading statements (Closing Statement p. 2,
par. 2-3). Since this [suppressed] evidence remains undisputed, the worker’s
compensation benefits conferred to Petitioner are in default, in lieu of constitutionally
adequate procedure.
Furthermore, during the evidentiary hearing, Petitioner did refuse to enter into
evidence a written notice of injury that was faxed to the Employer (Transcript p. 201-
203) because the Employer admitted to notice of injury. However, the Compensation
Judge still used these matters [not entered into evidence] in her findings and conclusions
(Appendix p. 44-45, par. 7, par. 10). Thereafter, the Compensation Judge used the
Respondent’s admission to notice of injury to exclude Petitioner’s 176.141(1) defense
(WCCA Decision, Appendix p. 35, par. 3); and at the close of the record, the
Compensation Judge’s Findings and Order did deny benefits to Petitioner, and claimed
that Petitioner’s asserted defenses are grievance matters that are not within the scope of
her Chapter 176 jurisdiction. Since the Compensation Judge deprived Petitioner of the
right to overall case preparation, in the first instance (Appendix p. 40), which left many
issues un-defined and un-resolved, the Compensation Judge did surprise and prejudice
Petitioner with her final judgment, which made-out an [apparent] intentional tort
exception and which [apparently] concluded that this tort-exception made the Insurer’s
15
frivolous denial of liability a moot issue (Compensation Judges Findings, Appendix p.
46, par. 22). Since the Respondent failed to assert any intentional tort exception, the
Compensation Judge’s [apparent] intentional tort exception is another surprise, without
giving Petitioner an opportunity to respond. As a result of this ruling, the Compensation
Judge did define Petitioner’s entitlement to worker’s compensation benefits by her own
judicial lawmaking process designed to defeat Petitioner’s entitlement that is conferred
by the Legislature.
After raising constitutionally inadequate procedures [in the Notice of Appeal], to
the Worker’s Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA), the Petitioner brought forth that
the Minnesota Legislature conferred worker’s compensation benefits to Petitioner, and
that the Legislature did specify procedures to be followed to protect that entitlement
(WCCA Decision, Appendix p. 34). Petitioner also brought forth that his title to
compensation benefits are defeated by active concealment and misrepresentation, and
that Petitioner’s legal remedy is defeated by actions prejudicial to the administration of
justice (WCCA Decision, Appendix p. 35-36). However, the WCCA determined that it
had no authority to decide or determine the constitutional issues that this Court settled in
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, (S. Ct. 1985) 470 U.S. 532, 541, 548, 552; that this
Court settled in Brock v. Roadway Express Inc, (S. Ct. 1987) 481 U.S. 252, 261-262, 278;
that this Court settled in Davis v. Alaska, (S. Ct. 1974) 415 U. S. 308, 316-318; that this
Court settled in Delaware v. Fensterer, (S. Ct. 1985) 474 U. S. 15, 19; that this Court
settled in Olden v. Kentucky, (S. Ct. 1988) 488 U. S. 227, 230-233; and that this Court
settled in Local 167 of Teamsters Union v. United States, (S. Ct. 1934), 291 U. S. 293,
298. Thereafter, the WCCA dissected and re-arranged the evidence supporting these
16
constitutional issues, and their findings of fact and conclusions of law did create a
smoke-screen of confusion.
Furthermore, the WCCA refused to consider any of the evidence that was
excluded and suppressed by the Compensation Judge, and the WCCA limited its scope
of review to the pleadings, the transcript of evidence and exhibits, taken and admitted
into evidence by the Compensation Judge (WCCA Decision, p. 30). By doing so, the
WCCA deprived Petitioner of their standard of review, to view or to weigh, the entire
record of evidence, as a whole. In addition, the WCCA also determined that since the
Employer and the Insurer did admit to notice of injury; there is no dispute about the
notice of injury being timely, and that Petitioner is not prejudiced by this change in
tactics imposed during the evidentiary hearing. However, in contrary to the conclusions
of the lower courts, Minn. Stat. 176.141(1) clearly sets forth the following protections
for an entitlement to benefits that is conferred by the Minnesota Legislature:
Minn. Stat. 176.141(1)
*** If notice is given or knowledge is obtained within the time limitation, and if
the employee shows that failure was due to fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit of the Employer
or agent thereof, then compensation may be allowed.
Since the evidence of misrepresentation and concealment of a compensable injury
was suppressed, and this Legislative entitlement was overruled, the WCCA additionally
concluded that the Workers Compensation Act, does not have a provision for a contested
hearing when the Insurer denies benefits and/or primary liability for an alleged injury.
However, at the same time, the WCCA holds that Petitioner is still responsible for
making a claim for benefits (Appendix P. 35). As a result of this contradiction, the
constitutionality of the Minnesota Worker’s Compensation Act is now brought into
dispute, because this judicial lawmaking process has overruled Legislative procedure
17
that protects an entitlement to benefits, and has affirmed a judicial law making process
that deprives Petitioner of the equal protection of procedures specified by the
Legislature.
Upon Certiorari to the Minnesota Supreme Court (M.S.Ct.), the Petitioner
brought forth the M.S.Ct’s. own precedent that did disagree with the WCCA; that does
entitle Petitioner to a hearing on the issue of primary liability before a final decision on
an entitlement to benefits is made; and such hearing is for the primary purpose of
defining and resolving the issues in the case and for overall case preparation. In
addition, Petitioner also brought forth the Compensation Judges abuse of discretion that
did prejudice Petitioner’s right to a pre-deprivation process, for overall case preparation,
to foster an adequate opportunity to be heard and to defend; and that did refuse relief to
Petitioner on grounds of want of power to grant it, under the provisions of 176.141(1),
of the Worker’s Compensation Act.
When preparing his brief and argument for the Minnesota Supreme Court, and
since the standard of review in the M.S.Ct. is by a manifestly contrary to the evidence
scope of review, Petitioner brought forth the abuse of discretion and the evidence that
was excluded, by the lower courts, and the constitutionally inadequate procedure which
deprived Petitioner of the equal protection of the Legislature. However, the M.S.Ct.
deprived Petitioner of complete judicial review of an incomplete administrative WCCA
review; the M.S.Ct. did affirm the decision of the WCCA; and the M.S.Ct. decided that
the appeal of Petitioner has no precedential value, and does no more than to establish the
law of the case, citing Hoff v. Kempton, (Minn. S. Ct. 1982) 317 N.W.2d 361. However,
in Hoff, the M.S.Ct. still reversed and remanded the lower court ruling.
18
REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT
Reason A
IS PETITIONER DEPRIVED OF COMPLETE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AN
INCOMPLETE ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW, WHEN THE STATE COURT OF LAST
RESORT DOES AFFIRM THE ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW, WITHOUT APPLYING
THEIR STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR A COMPLETE JUDICIAL REVIEW?
This Court has held that the fundamental requirement of due process is the
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, that there must be
some kind of a hearing to ensure that an effective ―initial check‖ against a mistaken decision
is provided before any deprivation occurs, and that a prompt opportunity for complete
administrative and judicial review must also be available Brock v. Roadway Express Inc, (S.
Ct. 1987) 481 U.S. 252, 261-263, 278.
In the first instance, when an ―unknown judge‖ granted an Order of indefinite
duration, this Order was based on uncross-examined and untested evidence Brock v. Roadway
Express Inc, (S. Ct. 1987) 481 U.S. 252, 278 (Appendix p. 48), and this delay did destroy the
livelihood of Petitioner. Thereafter, when Petitioner tried to make a case for benefits and
requested a hearing to demonstrate the Insurer’s denial of primary liability was frivolous, the
Compensation Judge refused a hearing, at a meaning time and in a meaningful manner, so as
to ensure that an effective ―initial-check‖ against a mistaken denial of benefits is provided, to
Petitioner, before proceeding to deprive Petitioner of benefits. Thereafter, the Compensation
Judge refused to grant relief to Petitioner on the grounds of want of power to grant it. Then
on appeal, the WCCA did appear to agree that some sort of hearing is required; however, the
WCCA declared that the State’s Worker’s Compensation Chapter does not have a provision
for a contested hearing when the Employer denies primary liability. Since the WCCA also
determined that it had no authority to consider or determine any of the constitutionally
19
inadequate procedures brought forth on appeal, these constitutional issues were presented to
the Minnesota Supreme Court.
To sustain that Petitioner has a right to a hearing on the issue of primary liability
before decisions concerning an entitlement to benefits can be made, the Minnesota Supreme
Court made the following declaration, ―so long as a party has reasonable notice, we see
nothing constitutionally defective about considering the issue of primary liability, at a hearing
before a compensation judge, and that basic fairness requires the parties in a workers’
compensation proceeding be afforded reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard before
decisions concerning an entitlement to benefits can be made Kuenkamp v. Timesavers Inc.,
(Minn. S. Ct. 1988) 420 N.W.2d 891, 894.‖
Since Kuenkamp does entitle Petitioner to a pre-deprivation hearing to dispute a denial
of primary liability in a worker’s compensation proceeding, the M.S.Ct. had an obligation to
uphold its own precedent, and provide Petitioner with complete judicial review. To provide
complete judicial review of WCCA decisions, the M.S.Ct. decided that a manifestly contrary
to the evidence standard of review is the procedure in the Minnesota Supreme Court
Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, (Minn. S. Ct. 1984) 358 N. W. 2d 54, 60. Therefore, to
comply with the manifestly contrary to the evidence scope of review, Petitioner did prepare
his brief in compliance therewith; however, the M.S.Ct. deviated from its own standard of
review, for a complete judicial review, and did affirm the decision of the WCCA, without
opinion. As such, this case is completely void of the constitutional guarantee of an ―initial
check‖ against a mistaken decision; and this case is void of complete administrative and
judicial review of the constitutionally inadequate procedures that deprive Petitioner of the
equal protection of Legislative entitlements Brock v. Roadway Express Inc, (S. Ct. 1987) 481
20
U.S. 252, 261-262, without the procedure specified by the Legislature to protect that
entitlement.
21
Reason B
IS PETITIONER ENTITLED TO COMPLETE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AN
INCOMPLETE ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW, WHEN THE AGENCY DETERMINED
THAT IT HAD NO AUTHORITY TO CONSIDER OR DETERMINE THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES?
This Court has held that due process guarantees provide certain substantive rights
that cannot be deprived of a citizen without constitutionally adequate procedures; and
that the root requirement of due process is that a citizen be given an opportunity for a
hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
v. Loudermill, (S. Ct. 1985) 470 U.S. 532, 541.
At the trial court level, when the Petitioner requested a hearing, by authority of Minn.
Rule 5221.6050(7)(C), to prove that his title to property is defeated by fraud and concealment,
and that his legal remedy is defeated by actions prejudicial to the administration of justice, the
Compensation Judge deprived Petitioner of a decision on these issues, before proceeding to
the final evidentiary hearing, and this inadequate process left-open many legal and factual
issues that remain undefined and unresolved. Therefore, the constitutional guarantee of an
effective ―initial-check‖ against a mistaken denial of benefits is made a mockery, herewith,
and this judicial lawmaking by the Compensation Judge demonstrates a reckless disregard for
the constitutional guarantee of due process. To justify the finding that a frivolous denial of
benefits is a moot issue, the Compensation Judge did change tactics, without notice and
opportunity to respond, and apparently has made-out an intentional tort exception, so as to
conclude that Petitioner’s alleged injury is outside the course and scope of employment;
however, the evidence of record establishes a contrary finding. In the transcript of record,
John Steigerwald testified that no personal friendship or relationship does exist between
himself and Petitioner, and that no hatred or animosity is harbored against the Petitioner
22
(Transcript p. 253); therefore, any action of John Steigerwald that could have caused injury to
the Petitioner, would have been directed against the Petitioner, ―as an employee,‖ and not for
―reasons personal to the training engineer.‖ With evidence like this, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has consistently rejected the [apparent] intentional tort exception made-out by the
Compensation Judge, and the M.S.Ct. additionally holds that a corporate entity is by its nature
incapable of harboring the type of intent required for an intentional tort exception Beok v.
Wong Hing, (M. S. Ct. 1930) 231, N.W.2d 233, 233-234; Meinstma v. Loram Maintenance of
Way, (Minn. App. 2003) 672 N.W.2d 224, 229-231.
Upon appeal, the WCCA disregarded the precedent of the Minnesota Supreme Court
that grants Petitioner a pre-deprivation hearing, on the issue of primary liability, and declared
that the Worker’s Compensation Act does not have a provision for a contested hearing when
the Employer denies primary liability. As such, the WCCA also disregarded the following
Legislative entitlement:
Minn. Stat. 176.221(1)
Within 14 days of notice or knowledge by the employer of an injury compensable
under this chapter, the payment of temporary total compensation shall commence.
Therefore, in accordance with past practice, the procedure to be followed that protects
an entitlement to benefits are initiated when the employer receives notice of injury, at this
time the employer is to commence payment of benefits within 14 days; thereafter, once the
Employer investigates, the Employer can petition for a hearing to discontinue worker’s
compensation benefits Kuenkamp v. Timesavers Inc., (Minn. S. Ct. 1988) 420 N.W.2d 891,
893. At such hearing, the Employer presents its evidence for a discontinuance of benefits,
and the employee will have the necessary medical evidence to dispute a discontinuance.
Since both the Employer and Insurer are actively concealing a compensable injury, in
this case, and since the Compensation Judge abused her discretion to override Legislative
23
protections for an entitlement to medical treatment and health care provider participation, the
Judge’s actions are contrary to the following procedure specified by the Legislature:
Minn. Rule 5221.0420(1)
(1) *** a health care provider must participate cooperatively in the planning of an injured
employee’s return to work by communicating with the employee, the employer, the insurer, the
rehabilitation providers, and the commissioner in accordance with this part.
After the Compensation Judge deprived Petitioner of all healthcare provider
participation, the Judge’s abuse of discretion made sure that Petitioner would be incapable of
producing evidence of a compensable injury, and would be incapable of making a claim for
benefits, because Petitioner would be incapable of meeting his burden of proof. Since the
Findings and Order of the Compensation Judge is based on a lack of adequate healthcare
provider participation, Petitioner’s entitlement to worker’s compensation benefits is defeated
by judicial lawmaking that disregards the guarantee of constitutionally adequate procedure.
When constitutionally inadequate procedures were brought forth on appeal, the
WCCA refused to certify these constitutional issues for review by this Court or by the
Minnesota Supreme Court; the WCCA also claimed they could not consider or
determine any of these constitutional issues; and the WCCA directed Petitioner to go
―elsewhere.‖ In essence, the WCCA decided that Petitioner is not entitled to the procedure
specified by the Legislature for the protection of benefits that are conferred by the Legislature,
and the WCCA has authorized its deprivation by a judicial lawmaking process designed for its
deprivation Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, (S. Ct. 1985) 470 U.S. 532, 541. Since
the scope of judicial review includes a violation of constitutional provisions, and since
the appeal of Petitioner was as a matter of right, (afforded by Minn. Stat. 606.06), to the
M.S.Ct., Petitioner is in compliance to seek complete judicial review of this
constitutionally inadequate administrative adjudication. Now that a complete judicial
24
review is denied, to Petitioner, the mandate of this Court is to guarantee constitutionally
adequate procedures, to all citizens, before being deprived of any significant property
interest. Therefore, a Writ of Certiorari should be granted so that this Court may preside over
the constitutionality of the judicial lawmaking process that deprives Petitioner of the equal
protection of a Legislative entitlement.
25
Reason C
DOES AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, BY AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY,
WHICH OVERRIDES THE PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED TO PROTECT A
LEGISLATIVE ENTITLEMENT, AND WHICH SUPPRESSES SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE, REQUIRE A COMPLETE JUDICIAL REVIEW?
For complete administrative and judicial review in the Minnesota Appellate
System, first, the WCCA is to look at the evidence which does support and which does
oppose the Compensation Judge’s findings; and then, the WCCA is to determine its
substantiality; thus, viewing and weighing the entire record of evidence, as a whole.
Second, in the Minnesota Supreme Court, the limited scope of review of decisions made
by the WCCA is as follows: the facts are viewed in light most favorable to the findings
of the WCCA. These findings will not be disturbed unless they are manifestly contrary
to the evidence, or unless the evidence clearly requires reasonable minds to adopt a
contrary conclusion. In addition, when the Minnesota Supreme Court does apply their
manifestly contrary to the evidence scope of review, the Court is acting as the first, as
well as the final, reviewer of the findings Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, (Minn. S.
Ct. 1984) 358 N. W. 2d 54, 60.
As a result of Minnesota’s concept of complete administrative and judicial
review, when Petitioner brought forth evidence that was excluded and suppressed by the
Compensation Judge, and the WCCA, the Minnesota Supreme Court was to intrude
when it is apparent that the findings of the WCCA are manifestly contrary to the
evidence, or if it is clear that reasonable minds would adopt a contrary conclusion.
Therefore, upon the introduction of evidence that would require reasonable minds to
reach a contrary conclusion, a complete judicial review is not only necessary, but is the
26
constitutional mandate of this Court Brock v. Roadway Express Inc, (S. Ct. 1987) 481 U.S.
252, 261-262, 278.
To sustain the reversal of judgment, the Petitioner presented undisputed evidence
that the Insurer’s denial of primary liability is frivolous and is based on an inaccurate
interpretation of the facts and the applicable law. Petitioner also presented undisputed
evidence that the Employer refused to investigate the notice of injury; that the Employer
took retaliatory action against the Petitioner; that the failure of notice was due to the
fraud and misrepresentation of the Employer and Insurer; that the Compensation Judge
abused her discretion to propose and then allow an amendment that would prejudice the
defense of Petitioner, under Chapter 176; and that the Compensation Judge did override
the procedure to be followed that is specified by the Minnesota Legislature to protect an
entitlement conferred by the Legislature. In addition to this evidence, since the
Compensation Judge made no mention, in her Findings and Order, that Respondent did
admit to notice of injury; since the Compensation Judge used matters not entered into
evidence to sustain notice of injury; since the Compensation Judge disregarded the
procedure specified by the legislature to find that Respondent’s frivolous denial of
liability is a moot issue; and since there is undisputed evidence that the Respondent took
retaliatory action against Petitioner by terminating his employment Lingle v. Norge Div.
of Magic Chef Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1877, 1882 (Pre-Trial Statement); the presentation of this
evidence does warrant a reversal of judgment, and worker’s compensation benefits, that
are available to Petitioner, are in default, in lieu of constitutionally adequate procedure
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, (S. Ct. 1985) 470 U.S. 532, 541, and in lieu of
27
complete judicial review Brock v. Roadway Express Inc, (S. Ct. 1987) 481 U.S. 252, 261-
262, 278.
28
CONCLUSION
To confer a significant interest in property to citizens of the United States, and then
to deprive any citizen of that property interest without constitutionally adequate
procedures; and then on appeal, to deprive that citizen of complete administrative and
judicial review, does fly in the face of every constitutional mandate of the United States
Supreme Court. Therefore, this Court should preside over the disagreements, the
misinterpretations, and the judicial lawmaking that override the procedure specified by
the Legislature to protect an entitlement conferred by the Legislature, which does
establish unconstitutional procedure as a precedence for other courts to follow; because,
the Compensation Judges decision is in want of adequate medical evidence, and is in
want of adequate healthcare provider participation.
By: __________________________________
JOSHUA J. ISRAEL / Petitioner Pro-Se
P. O. Box XXX
SXXXXXXX, MX 5XXXX
Phone: 9XX-2XX-0XXX
29
APPENDIX
30
STATE OF MINNESOTA
WORKERS’S COMPENSATION COURT OF APPEALS
File No. WC07-271
[ Served & Filed ]
[ May 29, 2008 ] JOSHUA J. ISRAEL, Pro-Se
Appellant,
v.
Schneider National Carriers, and Aafedt, Forde, Gray,
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., Monson &Hager, P.A.
Respondents, 150 South 5th
Street
Suite #2600,
and, Minneapolis, MN 55402
St. Francis Hospital, Kris Wittwer
MN Department of Employment 2277 Hwy 36 West
And Economic Development, Roseville, MN 55113
Intervenors.
The employee’s appeal from Findings and Order of Compensation Judge, Patricia
J. Milun, served and filed November 6, 2007, was considered by Thomas L. Johnson,
Debra A. Wilson, and David A. Stofferahn, Judges of the Worker’s Compensation Court
of Appeals.
Based upon the pleadings in the case, the transcript of evidence taken before the
compensation judge, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and the briefs of the parties,
the court concludes the Findings and Order of the compensation judge are in accord with
the evidence and the law in the case, and are AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
______________________________
THOMAS L. JOHNSON, Judge
31
OPINION
THOMAS L. JOHNSON, Judge
The pro-se employee appeals from the compensation judge’s determination that
the employee failed to prove he sustained a compensable injury to his back arising out -
of and in-the-course-of employment. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Joshua J. Israel, the employee, applied for work as a truck driver with Schneider
National Carriers, the employer, in November 2004. He Completed three weeks of
required driver training in December 2004, at the Schneider Training Academy in Green
Bay, Wisconsin. On Monday, January 3, 2005, the employee began two weeks of over -
the-road instruction with training engineer, John Steigerwald, based in Minneapolis-St.
Paul. The employee drove or rode in a semi tractor-trailer with Mr. Steigerwald on eight
days, through Tuesday, January 11. During this time, the working relationship between
the employee and the training engineer deteriorated.
On January 12, 2005, the employee and Mr. Steigerwald were returning from Eau
Claire, Wisconsin, to Minnesota on Interstate 94. After crossing the border, they pulled
into the St. Croix weigh station. An inspection revealed defective brake lights and the
employee, who was driving, was given a out-of-service citation requiring repair of the
lights before proceeding. The employee believed Mr. Steigerwald intentionally replaced
a good fuse with a burned-out fuse while he was out of the truck, although he had no
proof. Mr. Steigerwald denied he had done so. The employee was upset about receiving
the citation and refused to drive the truck any further.
While waiting for a mechanic to arrive to repair the lights, Mr. Steigerwald
contacted the employer’s Green Bay operations center by phone and asked to be
replaced as the employee’s training engineer. The employer agreed, but required the
employee and Mr. Steigerwald to finish the day together. Mr. Steigerwald took over the
driving and the employee remained in the truck as a passenger.
Mr. Steigerwald drove the empty truck, by way of interstate highway, to St.
Cloud, Minnesota, where they picked up a loaded trailer. On the return trip to St. Paul,
Minnesota, they again traveled by freeway to Snelling Avenue going south. Mr.
Steigerwald testified it was rush hour, around 5 o’clock, and traffic on Snelling was
slow. From Snelling they drove to the St. Paul rail yard off Pierce Butler Route to drop
off the loaded trailer. After leaving the rail yard, they proceeded through St. Paul on
local streets and Interstate 35E to Eagan where the truck was normally parked.
The employee testified that at the St. Paul rail yard, while driving as a ―bobtail
unit‖- a tractor cab without a trailer – Mr. Steigerwald began to drive fast and
recklessly. The employee and Mr. Steigerwald agreed there were potholes and bumps in
the driving surface at the rail yard, and agreed there was an air-ride shock absorbent seat
32
on the driver’s side and a stationary seat on the passenger side. The employee describes
the events leading to his claimed injury, stating:
The tractor, as a tractor only, has a very stiff and rigid suspension…So,
when he’s not pulling a trailer, the ride is very rough in a semi bobtail unit. Now,
in the St. Paul rail yards, there’s potholes everywhere. And when he drove fast
on the rail yard that’s when he began to throw me around inside the truck. After
he left the rail yards as a bobtail unit…he drove around on the streets of St. Paul.
And when he ran over those potholes and bumps, he was throwing me around
inside the truck. I mean I was airborne…It was a traumatic situation for me,
because I knew he was doing this because he had given me previous instructions
not to drive this way (Transcript at 57-59).
The employee testified Mr. Steigerwald deliberately tried to hurt him or scare
him. Mr. Steigerwald denied he was speeding or drove recklessly, and testified he had
no reason to drive in a dangerous fashion, and was not trying to injure the employee.
Two days after this incident, the employee drove to the Green Bay operating
center where he took and passed the skills qualification test. The employee was
assigned a semi tractor by the employer and began driving his own loads. He reported
the incident to his service team leader, Eric Shack. ―I told him I had back pain.‖ (T. at
61). Eric Shack denied the employee had reported an injury to him and had no
recollection of the employee telling him anything about being injured in John
Steigerwald’s semi tractor.
On March 7, 2005, the employee faxed a written complaint to the employers
Human Resources department stating, in part, that he had previously raised safety
concerns with the regional loss prevention manager, on January 14, 2005, due to the
training engineer’s violation of policies and procedures, and had reported to Eric shack
that the incident gave him low back pain. The employee continued to work as an over-
the-road driver for the employer. In May 2005, the employer directed the employee to
file a first report of injury and obtain a physical examination. The employee had not
sought medical treatment for his back following the claimed January 12, 2005 incident.
The employee was seen by Dr. Daniel F. Florey, a family practice doctor, on May
25, 2005. Dr. Florey testified the employee complained of back pain, and told Dr.
Florey he made the appointment because he declined a job that would require heavy
lifting. The employee gave a history of a back injury that January with ongoing back
pain since that time. The doctor testified the employee told him his back began hurting
after riding in a truck with a very hard seat after a day when the truck ride had been
particularly rough. On examination, Dr. Florey found limited flexion on the le ft side
and somewhat limited backward extension that was possibly within normal limits for the
employee. The employee had full forward flexion and a normal neurological
examination, the doctor diagnosed low back pain and referred the employee to Dr.
Charlotte L. Roehr, a physical medicine and rehabilitation specialist. Dr. Florey
completed a report of workability, indicating the injury was work-related and providing
33
temporary work restrictions through June 25, including no lifting, carrying or
pushing/pulling over 20 pounds occasionally.
By letter dated May 31, 2005, the insurer, Liberty Mutual Insurance Companies,
denied liability for worker’s compensation benefits on the basis the employee failed to
give timely notice. The employee then obtained counsel and filed a claim petition on
June 10, 2005, alleging an injury to the low back on January 12, 2005, and seeking
temporary total benefits from and after May 25, 2005, permanent partial disability,
payment of medical bills and rehabilitation assistance. The employer and insurer denied
the employee sustained a work-related injury, denied an injury to the low back while
working for the employer, denied the employee was temporarily and tatally disabled.
The employee was seen by Dr. Roehr on June 24, 2005, and in follow-up on July
8. The history taken by the doctor indicated that the employee was training for a new
job as a semi driver. During the training, he was required to sit on a passenger seat with
no air suspension for several weeks. The first week he stated that his back just felt
unusual. During the second week, he had a particularly rough ride with lots of potholes.
The employee stated he experienced significant back pain and a feeling his back was
dislodged. He was able to drive home, but vomited and had some hot flashes and cold
chills for greater than 24 hours. Dr. Roehr’s clinical note states the employee described
non-radiating, aching and burning back pain in a band just above the belt line, pointing
to the L4-5 level, midline in the spine. The doctor noted no sign of radiculopathy or
mylopathy and diagnosed Myofascial pain and chronic muscle strain. Noting the
employee’s disability was primarily his difficulty returning to work with restrictions.
On July 22, 2005, Dr. Roehr noted legal proceedings were pending and work-hardening
was not approved. She had nothing further to offer at that point and the employee was
to return as needed.
The employee’s attorney subsequently withdrew and the employee proceeded
pro-se. The case was heard by a compensation judge at the Office of Administrative
Hearings, on August 7, 2007. At the employee’s request, the record remain open until
September 7, 2007, to allow submission of written interrogatories from Dr. Roehr and
the employee’s post-injury wage records. In a Finding and Order, served and filed on
November 6, 2007, the compensation judge found the employee failed to prove he
sustained a compensable injury, arising out of and in the course of employment, and
failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his back pain was casually
related to his work activities. The employee appeals.
DECISION:
1. Motion to Strike Respondents Statement of Facts
The appellant has moved to strike the respondent’s statement of facts on the basis
the statement includes scandalous information about the appellant not relevant to the
issues on appeal and intended to prejudice the court against appellant. The Minnesota
Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, cited by the employee, do not govern procedure in
this court, and we decline to strike the respondents statement of facts. We do not,
34
however, view the employee’s prior employment and litigation history necessary to a
determination of this appeal, and we have not considered the history objected to by the
appellant in reaching our decision.
2. Petition for Summary Decision
The employee objects to the compensation judge’s denial of his petition for
summary decision, under Minn. Stat. §176.305. With one exception, the Minnesota
Worker’s Compensation Act does not provide for ―summary judgment‖ without an
evidentiary hearing. Minn. Stat. 176.322 permits determination of a case without a
hearing only if the parties agree to a stipulated set of facts and only legal issues remain.
Zuehlke by Zuehlke v. Penrose Oil Co., slip op. (W.C.C.A. Jan. 24, 2001). The parties
did not agree to a stipulated set of facts, and the compensation judge properly denied the
petition on the basis that unresolved factual disputes remained. Compare, e.g.; Clay v.
American Residential Mortgage Corp. 56 W.C.D. 37 (W.C.C.A. 1996); Cannata v.
Borchert-Ingersoll, Inc., slip op. (W.C.C.A. Mar 8, 2004); Knapp v. Bud Meyer Truck
Lines, slip op. (Apr. 4, 1995).
3. Notice of Injury; Commencement of Benefits
The employee argues the legislature enacted a ―pre-deprivation process‖
requiring the employer, in worker’s compensation cases, to first commence payment of
compensation, within 14 days after notice of injury, and then initiate a petition to
discontinue benefits, after investigation and after medical evaluation is complete, citing
Minn. Stat. §176.021, 176.141, and 176.221. The employee contends the employer and
insurer fraudulently failed to investigate the claim, failed to timely pay compensation,
and failed to pay for medical care so medical information was complete, including
maximum medical improvement and return to work planning.
Under Minn. Stat. §176.141, no compensation is due until notice of injury is
given by the employee or actual knowledge is obtained by the employer. If no tice is not
given or obtained within 180 days of the claimed injury, the employee’s claim is barred
for lack of timely notice. The compensation judge found the employee provided written
notice to the employer in March, 2005, within 180 days of the claimed injury, and the
employer and the insurer admitted notice at the hearing. As there is no dispute that
notice was timely given, there is no prejudice to the employee. Nor is there any
evidence in the record of fraud on the part of the employer and insurer or the court
below in this respect.
Minn. Stat. §176.021 provides ―[e]very employer … is liable to pay
compensation in every case of personal injury… of an employee arising out -of and in-
the-course-of employment…. The burden of proof of these facts is upon the employee.‖
Under Minn. Stat. §176.221, ―[l]iability for compensation under this chapter may be by
the employer and insurer by giving the employee written notice of the denial of
liability.‖ If primary liability is denied, it is the employee’s responsibility to make a
claim for benefits, and the employee has the burden of proving a compensable injury
occurred. An employer and insurer are not required to commence payment of benefits
when there is a dispute as to whether the employee sustained an injury ―arising out-of
and in-the-course-of employment.‖
35
The employer and insurer in this case provided written notice to the employee in
May 2005 denying liability. The employee then obtained counsel, and a claim petition
was filed on June, 2005. In its answer, the employer and insurer denied primary
liability - - that is, denied the employee’s back pain arose out-of or resulted from his
work activities or employment with Schneider National. Having denied liability for the
claimed injury, the employer and insurer were not obligated to commence payment of
wage loss benefits or pay for medical treatment or rehabilitation assistance, including
maximum medical improvement or return to work planning.
4. Procedure of Evidentiary Issues
The employee contends the compensation judge’s decision was procured by
misconduct, fraud, and procedural errors, and is clearly erroneous.
a. Independent Medical Evaluation. The employee complains the respondents
cancelled an independent medical evaluation (IME) causing prejudice to the employee
by an indefinite delay of the examination. Upon the filing of a claim petition, an
employer and insurer may schedule a medical evaluation ―if an examination by the
employer’s physician or health care provider is necessary to evaluate benefits claimed.‖
Minn. §Stat. 176.155, sub 1. In this case, an employee’s attorney withdrew. The IME
was cancelled pending involvement of new counsel, and the employer and insurer
moved for an extension of time, as permitted by Minn. Stat. 176.155, sub. 1. The
motion was supported by sworn affidavit of counsel for the employer and insurer. The
compensation judge, on these facts, properly issued an order extending the time in which
to file an IME report. See, e.g., Bey v. Oxford Properties, Inc., 481 N.W.2d 40, 46;
W.C.D. 198 (Minn. 1992); Newberg v. Walgreens, No. WC05-195 (W.C.C.A. Oct. 5,
2005). There is no statutory mandate requiring an IME, and the employer and insurer’s
subsequent election to forego an IME was neither prejudicial nor improper.
b. Examination of witnesses. The employee argues the compensation judge and
the respondents prevented effective cross-examination of witnesses by evading the
production requested by the employee. Since the respondents withheld and concealed
evidence, the employee asserts, he could not prove his case by the preponderance of the
evidence.
In his pre-trial statement, the employee requested production of records including
Department of Transportation accident and safety violation records for John
Steigerwald. Mr. Steigerwald was a witness at the hearing and the employee has an
opportunity to cross-examine him under oath. The compensation judge permitted the
employee to ask Mr. Steigerwald about accidents or citations on his driving record over
the employer and insurer’s objection. On these facts, we see no error or prejudice to the
employee that would require reversal of the judge’s decision.¹
_________________________ ¹A compensation judge is not bound by common law or statutory rules of evidence. Minn. Stat .
176.141, sub., 1. To warrant reversal, a compensation judge’s evidentiary ruling must be prejudicial as
well as erroneous. See, Villella v. Ford Motor Co., No. WC07-236 (W.C.C.A. Mar. 25, 2008) cases cited
therein.
_________________________
The Employee also subpoenaed Dr. Florey to appear at the hearing, and to bring
the employee’s examination file. Although the doctor did not appear, the employee
agreed to take Dr. Florey’s evidence by phone, and the compensation judge waited until
36
5:00 p.m. to allow examination of the doctor via speaker phone. Dr. Florey saw the
employee only once, and the Report of Workability competed by Dr. Florey was
admitted into evidence. The doctor testified under oath, describing the history provided
to him by the employee, his examination, his diagnosis, and his recommendations. The
employee had an opportunity to question Dr. Florey about his causation opinion and the
actions taken, or not taken, by him. There is nothing in the record requiring a reversal
or remand on these facts.
c. Fraud and Medical Malpractice. The employee first argues he was harmed by
Dr. Roehr’s refusal to request a determination from the commissioner, pursuant to Minn.
R. 5221.6050, subp. 7.C. Under this rule, an employee or a provider may file a medical
request seeking a determination from he commissioner if authorization or payment for
medical treatment is denied. The rule does not require a doctor to file a medical request.
Moreover, in this case, the employee already had filed a claim petit ion when he was
seen by Dr. Roehr and before the insurer denied authorization for work-hardening.
The employee further argues the decision was procured by fraud and medical
malpractice that concealed the nature and extent of his injury. He asserts Dr. Roehr
stated his pain and back problems were located at L4-5 midline in the spine, but
maintains his pain is located at the thoracic T-12 to lumbar L-2. He also contends Dr.
Roehr diagnosed Myofascial pain and chronic muscle strain, but he, in fact experienced
radicular pain and muscle spasms in his abdomen ten months after the diagnosis. The
employee’s claim petition alleged an injury to the low back consistent with Dr. Roehr’s
diagnosis. The doctor’s medical records for employees were submitted at the hea ring.
We see no evidence establishing fraud on the part of the respondent’s with respect to the
medical evidence. To the extent the employee may be alleging Dr. Roehr committed
malpractice, this court has no jurisdiction to consider such a claim.
d. Judicial bias. The employee contends that judicial bias is shown by the
compensation judge’s coercing him to give u his right to temporary total compensation
and plead for temporary partial benefits. Eligibility for temporary total disability
benefits ceases when an employee returns to work – for any employer – and has an
income. If the employee is working and earning less than his wage at the time of the
injury, the employee may be eligible for temporary partial disability benefits. Minn.
Stat. 176.101. It became apparent at the hearing the employee was working and had
earnings during at least a portion of the time for which he claimed temporary total
disability benefits. The compensation Judge held the record open to permit the
employee to submit his earnings records post-hearing. There is nothing to suggest bias
on the part of the compensation judge under these circumstances.
5. Primary Liability- Substantial Evidence
The employee claims he sustained a work-related injury on January 12, 2005, as a
result of the intentional aggressive and reckless driving of training engineer, John
Steigerwald. On appeal the employee asserts the compensation judge’s finding that the
employee failed to establish he sustained an injury to his back arising out -of and in-the-
course-of his employment is not supported by the evidence and is clearly erroneous.
This court’s authority to review a compensation Judge’s decision on appeal is
established by statute and by the Minnesota Supreme Court. The role of this court,
when reviewing contested questions of fact, is to determine whether there is substantial
37
evidence in the record, as a whole to support the decision of the compensation judge.
Minn. Stat, 176.421, sub., 1. This court must give due weight to the compensation
judges opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses, and where there is conflicting
evidence or where more than one conclusion could reasonably be drawn from the
evidence, this court must uphold the findings of the compensation judge. Hengemuhle v.
Long Prairie Jaycees, 358 N.W.2d 54, 59; W.C.D. 235, 239 (Minn. 1984); Redgate v.
Sroga’s Standard Service, 421 N.W.2d 729; 40 W.C.D. 948 (Minn. 1988).
In this case, the determinative issue – causation- involves questions of fact. It is
the responsibility of the compensation judge to resolve factual disputes. Felton v. Anton
Chevrolet, 513 N.W.2d 457, 50 W.C.D. 181 (Minn. 1994). The employee had the
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, a casual relationship between his
employment and his claimed injury and disability. Fisher v. Saga Corp., 463 N.W.2d
501, 43 W.C.D. 819 (1990). The compensation judge having heard the testimony of the
witnesses and reviewing the documentary evidence submitted, concluded the employee
failed in his proof.
The employee maintains the compensation judge’s finding’s are not in
conformity with the medical evidence. He contends the judge improperly relied upon
the preliminary examination of Dr. Florey and disregarded the un-contradicted and
unopposed medical testimony of Dr. Roehr. The employee argues that because he was
referred to Dr. Roehr for further evaluation, and Dr. Florey made no functional capacity
assessment and no determination of maximum medical improvement, the judge
improperly relied on Dr. Florey’s incomplete examination to find that the employee has
not sustained an injury. The employee asserts he was denied medical treatment,
maximum medical improvement and functional capacity assessment and return to work
planning required by the worker’s compensation act, and the un-contradicted testimony
of dr. Roehr establishes the employee’s medical evaluation and treatment was interfered
with and remains incomplete.
As discussed previously, the employer and insurer properly denied liability for
the injury claimed by the employee and had no obligation to pay for medical treatment
or rehabilitation assistance in absence of a decision or award on stipulation ordering
them to pay benefits.
The compensation judge was required to make a decision on the record before
her. The evidence included the workability report and testimony of Dr. Florey along
with the medical records and responses to written interrogatories of Dr. Roehr. Both Dr.
Florey’s and Dr. Roehr’s records confirm the history of the incident conveyed by the
employee. In his workability report Dr. Florey checked a box indicating the employee’s
disability was work-related. At the hearing, however, Dr. Florey testified he had no way
of knowing whether there was a work injury in January, 2005 other than the employee’s
statement to him. The doctor agreed he did not reach any conclusion as to what caused
the employee’s back pain and the etiology of the condition was undetermined after his
examination of the employee. Dr. Florey additionally testified that a back injury as a
result of minor trauma would generally involve repeated exposure to the trauma over
long period of time. Dr. Roehr, in her responses to the employee’s written
interrogatories, stated it was ―unknown‖ as to whether minor trauma caused by a rigid
seat in a semi-tractor bobtail-unit could cause injury to the spine, when driven recklessly
over bumps and potholes.
38
The competency of a medical witness to provide expert testimony depends upon
both the degree of the witness’s medical/scientific knowledge and the extent of the
witnesses practical experience with the matter. No one disputed Dr. Florey’s or Dr.
Roehr’s qualifications as physicians. Both doctors took a history from the employee and
performed a physical examination. We have on many occasions stated this level of
experience provides sufficient foundation for expert testimony. Drews v. Kohl’s, 55
W.C.D. 33 (W.C.C.A. 1996). The decision concerning the weight to be given to
evidence submitted at the hearing, and whether to accept or reject a doctor’s opinion is
for the compensation judge, not this court. See Nord v. City of Cook, 360 N.W.2d 337;
37 W.C.D. 364 (Minn. 1985). We see no basis, on this record for reversal of the
compensation judges findings that the employee to prove he suffered a work-related
disability to his back.
Ultimately, the decision in this case rests on credibility. There was conflicting
testimony from the employee and the employer and insurer witnesses regarding the
events leading to the employee’s claimed injury, and medical evidence supporting the
employee’s claim of a work-related disability was equivocal, essentially resting on the
history provided by the employee. The court must give deference to the compensation
judge with respect to the assessment of witness credibility. Tolzman v. McCombs
Knutson Assocs., 447 N.W.2d 196, 42 W.C.D. 421 (Minn. 1989). Having carefully
reviewed the record, we cannot conclude that the compensation judge’s findings that the
employee failed to prove he sustained a compensable injury arising out of and in the
course of employment is supported by substantial evidence or clearly erroneous. We
must, therefore affirm.
6. Constitutional Claims and Other Issues
The employee additionally argues he was denied due process and equal
protection guarantees in violation of the United States Constitution. This court has no
authority to consider or determine constitutional issues. Weber v. Inner Grove Heights.,
461 N.W.2d 918, 43 W.C.D. 471 (Minn. 1990). Nor does this court have jurisdiction to
address the employee’s allegation the respondents made false statements to the
Unemployment Division of Minnesota or the claim his former counsel engaged in
actions prejudicial to the administration of justice. These issues must be addressed
elsewhere.
39
STATE OF MINNESOTA
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
SETTLEMENT DIVISION
100 WASHINGTON SQUARE, SUITE 1306
MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55401
File: 319-60-1713
DOI: 01/12/05
__________________________________________________________________
Joshua J. Israel,
Employee,
vs. ORDER EXTENDING IME DEADLINE
Schneider National Carriers, Inc., [ Served & Filed ]
Employer, [ Oct. 11, 2005 ]
and,
Liberty Mutual Insurance Group,
Insurer.
__________________________________________________________________
WHEREAS, it appears that in order to arrive at a just determination of the issues
in the above-captioned matter; and
WHEREAS, Schneider National Carriers, Inc., and Liberty Mutual Group have
moved for an Order extending the time within to file the report of an independent
medical examination;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Schneider National
Carriers, Inc., and Liberty Mutual Group may have an indefinite extension of time to
obtain and file an independent medical evaluation report.
Dated: 10/10/05 _________________________________
Compensation Judge
40
STATE OF MINNESOTA
OFFICE OF AMINIISTRATIVE HEARINGS 100 Washington Square, Suite 1700
100 Washington Ave South
Minneapolis, MN 55401-2138 _______
Telephone (612) 341-7600
TTY: (612) 341-7346
[ Served & Filed ]
March 8, 2007 [ Mar. 9, 2007 ]
Joshua Israel Janet Monson
P. O. Box 535 Aafedt, Forde, Gray
Shakopee, MN 55379 100 South 5th
Street
Minneapolis, MN 55402
Re: Joshua J. Israel v. Schneider National Carriers;
File No. 319-60-XXXX; DOI 1/12/05
Dear Mr. Israel and Ms. Monson:
The Petition for Summary Decision will be addressed at trial. Thank you for
your cooperation.
Yours Very Truly,
WORKER’S COMPENSATION SECTION
_________________________
PATRICIA J. MILUN
Workers Compensation Judge
Telephone: (612) 341-7633
PJM:mo
41
STATE OF MINNESOTA
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
WORKERS COMPENSATION DIVISION
(612) 341-7600
Mailing Address: Office Address:
443 Lafayette Road North P. O. Box 64620
St. Paul, MN 55155 St. Paul, MN 55164-0620
File No. 319-60-1713
DOI 1/12/05
Joshua J. Israel
Employee,
v. FINDINGS AND ORDER
Schneider National Carriers,
Employer,
and [ Served & Filed ]
Liberty Mutual Insurance Companies, [ Nov. 6 2007 ]
Insurer,
and,
St. Francis Hospital,
MN Dept. of Employment & Economic Development
Intervenors.
The above-entitled matter came on for a hearing, pursuant to notice, before
Patricia J. Milun, a Compensation Judge of the Office of Administrative Hearings, on
August 7, 2007, in Minneapolis Minnesota.
Employee, Joshua J. Irsael, P. O. Box 535, Shakopee, MN 55379 appeared pro
se. Janet Monson, Attorney at Law, 150 South Fifth Street, Suite 2600, Minneapolis,
MN 55402, appeared on behalf of the employer and insurer.
A Claim Petition filed on June 10, 2005, initiated this proceeding.
The record in this matter closed on September 7, 2007, at 4:30 pm.¹
__________________ ¹The employee requested additional time to obtain and file statements from Dr. Roehr as well as wage
records. The employer and insurer objected. The Motion to leave the record open for thirty days is
granted. The record closed on September 7, 2007, at 4:30 p.m.
__________________
Notice is hereby given that any party aggrieved by the decision herein may
appeal the decision, or any portion thereof, to the Worker’s Compensation Court of
Appeals. An appeal must be filed with the Chief Administrative Law Judge at P. O. Box
64620, St. Paul, Minnesota, 55164-0620, no later than 30 days following service of this
order; it must contain the information required by Minn. Stat. §176.421, sub. 4.
42
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. The Compensation Judge must determine whether the employee sustained a
personal injury on January 12, 2005, that arose out-of and was in-the-course and the
scope of his employment with Schneider National Carriers.
2. If so, what was the nature and extent of injury.
3. The compensation Judge must determine whether the employee is entitled to
temporary total disability benefits from May 25, 2005 through December 18, 2005, and
from December 21, 2006 through March 12, 2007.
4. The Compensation Judge must determine whether the employee is entitled to
temporary partial disability benefits from December 19, 2005 through December 20,
2006, and March 13, 2007 through May 7, 2007.
5. The Compensation Judge must determine whether the employee was an
apprentice on the claimed date of injury.
6. The Compensation Judge must determine whether the medical treatment at St.
Francis Hospital is reasonable, necessary and casually related to cure and/or relieve the
effects of the alleged January 12, 2005 injury.
7. The Compensation Judge must determine whether the insurer’s denial of
liability was a frivolous denial; and if so, what if any penalty is the employee entitled to
receive under Minn. Stat. §176.225.
The parties agreed to the following stipulations at the hearing:
STIPULATIONS
1. The payment information contained in the Motion to intervene filed by the
Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development on March 8, 2007,
is accurate. If liability is found, the insurer shall offset the unemployment benefit paid
to the employee for the same week and reimburse the Minnesota Department of
Employment and Economic Development.
2. The itemization of medical services contained in the Motion to intervene by St.
Francis Hospital on December 4, 2006 is accurate.
Based upon all the files, records, and proceedings herein, the Compensation
judge makes the following:
43
FINDINGS
1. The employee is an articulated and intelligent witness.
2. Any claims for any grievance filed by the employee in any form and made
part of the record by testimony or exhibit were not considered by this Court in making
its determination of liability.²
____________________ ²Neither the parties nor the Worker’s Compensation Act confer jurisdiction to a Worker’s Compensation
Judge beyond what is contained in Minn. Stat. Chapter 176. Accordingly, these Findings and Order are
limited to the provisions contained in Minn. Stat. Chapter 176.
____________________
3. The employee was hired by the employer on December 24, 2004. As a
condition of employment, Mr Israel was required to complete a training program at
Schneider Training Academy. The program was ―designed to meet the needs individuals
with various backgrounds and experience, ensuring each graduate has the skills
necessary to successfully enter a career as a professional truck driver‖ Petitioners
Exhibit C. The program included on-the-road driving instruction.³
___________________ ³On-the-road driving instruction required the employee to drive with a training engineer and perform the
job duties required of a truck driver. The employee was assigned John Steigerwald as his training
engineer.
____________________
4. The employee and the training engineer began a two week training course that
lasted eight days. During these eight days of training the working relationship between
the employee and the training engineer deteriorated. On the morning of January 12,
2005, the employee received a citation for inoperable brake lights while the company
semi tractor-trailer truck with the training engineer. The employee testified that the
training engineer has sabotaged the truck by changing the fuse when the employee was
not looking. The employee further testified that he had no proof for this accusation.
The training engineer denied the charge.
5. After a citation incident, the training engineer contacted the employer’s Green
Bay operating center and suggested the remaining on-the-road driving instruction be
completed by another training engineer. The employer agreed. The timing of the
request and the location of the parties required the employee and the training engineer to
finish out the day together. All of the parties agreed. The training engineer took over
the driving duties and the employee remained in the tractor-trailer truck as a passenger.
6. Based on the evidence presented at hearing, the facts do not establish that the
program entitled ―Career Training for the Professional Truck Driver‖ at Schneider
Training Academy was a apprenticeship program as that term is defined in Minnesota
Statutes and case law.
_____________________
44
4See Minn. Stat. 176.101(6) and Minn. Stat. 178.06. See also, Judd v. Sanatorium Comm’n of Hennepin
Co. 35 N.W.2d 430, 15 W.C.D. 385 (Minn. 1948); Rundberg v. Hirschbach Motor Lines, (W.C.C.A.)
April 7, 1994.
______________________
7. The employee testifies that on January 12, 2005, he sustained a work-related
injury as the result of intentional aggressive and reckless driving of the training engineer
after the employee had received a citation for an inoperable brake light.
__________________ The employee was upset at the training engineer for what he believed to be a deliberate set -up and scare
tactic. The employee stated in his deposition, ―Now I wanted to hit him. I wanted to hurt him; however,
my stomach began to hurt. I began to get this awful stomachache, and I was wondering why. And so at
this point—when something is wrong with me, I’m not frisky, I’m not ready to get into a fight with
anybody. And that was the only thing that kept a physical altercation from o ccurring between me and
him in that small cab.‖ (Respondent’s Exhibit 1): Deposition of Joshua Israel dated September 1, 2005,
pp. 110-111. ___________________
8. The employee asserts that the employer had knowledge and notice of a work
injury and the events which caused the work injury on three separate occasions. First,
the employee stated the training engineer warned him that ―he may suffer a back injury
if he returned for the second week of over-the-road training.‖6 That statement, if made,
does not establish that the training engineer was given or had knowledge that the
employee had sustained a work injury. Therefore, it does not constitute notice of injury,
under Minn. Stat. 176.141.
____________________ 6See Amended Claim Petition filed October 25, 2006.
______________________
9. The employee testified that the employer had knowledge and notice of a work
injury because the employee told his Service Team Leader (hereinafter) STL, Eric
Shack, on January 20, 2005, that he had sustained a work-related injury during the eight
day training course and as the direct result of intentional aggressive and reckless driving
of the training engineer. Eric Shack testified that he did not receive verbal notice from
the employee of the occurrence of injury. The testimony of the employee and the
testimony of Mr. Shack did not establish that notice was given in a manner that would
alert Mr. Shack that the employee was advising Mr. Shack that he had his back on the
job. Based on the evidence submitted, the Compensation Judge finds Mr. Shack did not
receive notice or have actual knowledge that the employee has sustained a work related
injury.
_______________________ Military
Training. There is no evidence to support a conclusion that this witness withheld information or
participated in selective memory loss to further the employer’s interest.
________________________
10. The employee contends that the employer had knowledge and due notice of a
work injury when he gave written notice by fax on March 7, 2005. On March 7, 2005
45
the employee faxed a written report to the Human Resources department of the
employer. The report is labeled Disparity and Discrimination in Reprisal for Reporting
Health and Safety Concerns. It States in part,
―On date 1/14/05, this driver did raise a safety issue with Debbie Knaus
because the training engineer assigned to this driver contradicted many policies,
practices, and procedures. In addition, on date 1/20/05 this driver did report to
STL, Eric Shack, that this incident did give lower back pain to this driver.
Furthermore, this lower back pain is still and issue (A. 2-3)‖
11. The Compensation Judge finds that the Human Resources Department of the
employer was placed on notice that the employee claimed to have suffered lower back
pain as a result of the lack of proper driving by the training engineer. Based on the
evidence submitted, the Compensation Judge finds the fax of March 7, 2005, constitutes
notice of the alleged injury on January 12, 2005.
12. Based on the evidence submitted, the employer was placed on notice of the
occurrence of a work injury on March 7, 2005.
13. From January 12, 2005 to March 7, 2005, the employee did not seek any
medical treatment for the pain in his lower back.
14. From March 7, 2005 to May 24, the employee did not seek any medical
treatment for the pain in his lower back.
15. On or about May 23, 2005, the employer directed the employee to file a
worker’s compensation claim and be seen by a medical examiner. The employee sought
treatment on May 25, 2005.
16. The employee was seen for a medical examination by Dr. Florey on May 25,
2005. Dr. Florey found the employee’s flexion and backward extension on examination
were limited. At the hearing, Dr. Florey testified that there were a variety of reasons
that cause a limitation in flexion, some of which are unrelated to an injury. Dr. Florey
further testified that his findings on backward extension were within normal limits.
17. On may 25, 2005, Dr Florey found the employee’s neurological examination
to be normal. Dr. Florey referred the employee to a specialist based on the employees
reported symptoms and not based on his findings on examination. Dr. Florey provided
work restrictions based on the employee’s reported symptoms and not based on his
findings on examination.
18. At the hearing, Doctor Florey testified that he did not have a complete
history of the origin of the complaints or the etiology of the complaints. Dr. Florey
further testified that the etiology was undetermined so he made no comclusion regarding
the cause of the employee’s back pain.
____________________
46
8On cross examination, Dr. Florey testified that most people with this type of injury seek medical care
closer to a time of the injury.
_____________________
19. Dr. Florey issued a report of workability on May 25, 2005, in which he
opined that the employee’s low back pain was work related. The Compensation Judge
finds that this opinion was based solely on the employees representation to the doctor
that the employee’s back pain was caused by work activities in January of 2005. The
doctor’s opinions contained in this report9 are not based on an independent evaluation of
the etiology of the employee’s back pain.
______________________ 9Petitioner’s Exhibit E.
______________________
20. The employee believes he sustained a work-related injury during the eight
day training course and as the direct result of the intentional aggressive and reckless
driving of the training engineer after the employee had received a citation for an
inoperable brake light. The evidence submitted does not establish that it is more likely
than not that the cause of the back pain was related to the work activities. The evidence
submitted does not establish that it was more likely than not that the employee suffered
a work-related disability. The evidence submitted does not establish that it is more
likely than not that any work-related injury limits the employee’s ability to work or
diminishes the employee’s earning capacity.
21. The employee has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence,
that he sustained a compensable injury that arose out of and in the course and the scope
of his employment with Schneider National Carriers. The employee has not met his
burden of proof by the evidence presented.
22. The entitlement to a payment for penalties under Minn. Stat. 176.225 is
based on a percentage of compensation awarded. Since the award of benefits is zero,
any award of penalties as a percentage of those benefits would also be zero. Therefore,
the question of whether the insurer engaged in a frivolous denial is moot.
23. Based on the foregoing Findings, the Compensation Judge makes the
following:
ORDER
1. NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the employee’s claim
for temporary total disability benefits from May 25, 2005 through December 18, 2005
and from December 21, 2006 through May 7, 2007 is denied.
2. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the employee claim for temporary partial
disability benefits from December 19, 2005 through December 20, 2006, and from
March 13, through May 7, 2007 is denied.
47
3. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the claim for medical expenses incurred at
St. Francis Medical Center is denied.
4. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the claim for reimbursement of benefits
from the Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development is denied.
5. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the employee’s claim for penalties is
denied.
6. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Claim Petition filed on June 10, 2005, is
dismissed.
_______________________
Dated at Minneapolis, MN PATRICIA J. MILUN This 5
th day of November, 2007 COMPENSATION JUDGE
PJM/mo (612) 341-7600
Digitally Recorded TDD: (612) 341-7346
MEMORANDUM
The Compensation Judge has carefully considered the entire record in this matter,
including the testimony at trial, documentary evidence submitted and also the arguments
presented by counsel for each of the parties. She has concluded that the evidence
supports her findings as to the issues in the present proceedings.
P.J.M.
48
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN THE SUPREME COURT
A08-1013
Joshua J. Israel,
Realtor,
[ Office of ]
vs. [ Appellate Courts ]
Oct. 3, 2008
Schneider National Carriers, and FILED
Liberty Mutual Insurance Companies,
Respondents,
and
St. Francis Hospital,
MN Department of Employment
and Economic Development,
Intervenors.
_____________________________________
Joshua J. Israel, Pro Se.
Janet Monson, Aafedt, Forde, Gray, Monson, & Hager, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota
for respondent.
______________________________________
Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.
ORDER
Based on all the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Worker’s Compensation
Court of Appeal’s filed May 29, 2008, be, and the same is, affirmed without opinion.
See Hoff v. Kempton, 317 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Minn. 1982) (explaining that ―[s]summary
49
affirmances have no precedential value because they do not commit the court to any
particular point of view,‖ doing no more that establishing the law of the case). We
further conclude the realtor’s constitutional claims lack merit.
Dated: October 3, 2008
BY THE COURT:
_________________________
Christopher J. Dietzen
Associate Justice
50
STATE OF MINNESOTA
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION DIVISION
(651) 361-7900
Mailing Address: Office Address:
443 Lafayette Road, North P. O. Box 64620
St. Paul, MN 55155 St. Paul, MN 55164-0620
Joshua J. Israel, [ Served & Filed ]
Employee, [ Nov. 21, 2007 ]
vs.
Schneider National Carriers, ORDER FOR PREPARATION
Employer, OF INDIGENT TRANSCRIPT
and,
Liberty Mutual Insurance Companies,
Insurer.
Pursuant to the provisions of Minn. Stat. § 176.421, sub. 4, Joshua Israel,
employee, has appealed the decision of Compensation Judge, Patricia J. Milun, and has
requested the Chief Administrative Law Judge to prepare a transcript of the hearing at
no cost to the appellant. Having reviewed the request and documentation in support
thereof:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a transcript of the hearing held on August 7,
2007, before the Compensation Judge in the above-referenced matter shall be prepared
at no cost to the appellant.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon completion of the preparation of the
transcript, appellant shall be provided with an invoice showing the cost of the transcript
and that in the event the appellant is successful in the appeal, the appellant shall request
the Court of Appeals to order that the cost of the transcript ahall be paid to the Office of
Administrative Hearings by the respondent.
____________________________________
WILLIAM R. JOHNSON
Assistant Chief Administrative Law Judge
Dated at Minneapolis, Minnesota (651) 361-7900
This 20th
day of November, 2007 TDD: (651) 361-7878
WRJ/lms
For: RAYMOND R. KRAUSE
Chief Administrative Law Judge
51
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN THE SUPREME COURT
A08-1013
Joshua J. Israel, [ OFFICE OF ]
Relator, [ APPELLATE COURTS ]
[ June 24, 2008 ]
vs. [ FILED ]
Schneider National Carriers, and
Liberty Mutual Insurance Companies,
Respondents
and,
St. Francis Hospital,
MN Department of Employment
and Economic Development,
Intervenors.
ORDER
Relator has moved under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 109.04 for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis in this appeal from the Minnesota Worker’s Compensation Court of
Appeals (WCCA). Realtor qualifies for in forma pauperis status under Minn. Stat. §
563.01, subd. 3 (2006). However, no affidavit of service of the motion on opposing
counsel, and no affidavit of service of the conformed copy of the writ of certiorari of the
WCCA have been filed. Review of decisions of the WCCA is governed by Minn. Stat. §
176.471 (2006), which requires service of the conformed copy of writ of certiorari
issued by the Clerk of Appellate Courts on the WCCA within 30 days of the WCCA’s
decision. Id, subd, 3 2006. *roof of Adequate Service on opposing counsel and the
WCCA must be filed before this matter will be considered.
Based upon all the files, records, and proceedings herein,
52
(1) the motion of realtor, Joshua J. Israel, for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
in the appeal be, and the same is, granted;
(2) the filing fee required by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 116.03, subd. 3, and the cost
bond required by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 107.01 are waived;
(3) to reduce the costs of briefing, relator’s brief and appendix (and reply brief, if
any) need not be bound, and realtor is authorized to file only one copy of each with the
Clerk of Appellate Courts;
(4) relator shall serve the conformed copy of the writ of certiorari issued by the
Clerk of Appellate Courts on the WCCA no later that June 30, 2008; and
(5) within 14 days of this order, relator shall file with the Clerk of Appellate
Courts an affidavit demonstrating service of the motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis on opposing counsel and an affidavit demonstrating timely service of the
conformed copy of the writ of certiorari on the WCCA, or the appeal will be dismissed.
Dated June 24, 2008
BY THE COURT:
_________________________________
Eric J. Magnuson
Chief Justice