How to minimize money's role in politics

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How to Minimize Money’s Role in PoliticsThis article is excerpted from the author’s mostrecent book, 10 Steps to Repair AmericanDemocracy (PoliPoint Press).

One of the most discussed political reforms overthe last thirty years has been campaign financereform. The reform effort blames much of what ailsour representative democracy on the perniciouseffect of private money in politics. In the 1990s,tales of the Keating Five, the Lincoln Bedroom, andBuddhist temples became the stuff of political leg-end. More recently, Thomas Edsall and Derek Willisreported that the 2004 presidential candidates brokea new record by spending $1.7 billion, nearly twicethe amount spent in 2000. Then, in 2005, HouseMajority Leader Tom DeLay was accused of cam-paign and money-laundering violations, and lobby-ist Jack Abramoff pled guilty to influence peddlingand bribery of various congressional members. Suchstories have created a widespread perception ofcronyism, corruption, and a “pay to play” politicalsystem swamped with money.

Beneath this perception is an irrefutable fact: itnow takes a lot of money to run for office. Besidesthe soaring costs of a presidential campaign, a sin-gle congressional district today has 650,000 resi-dents (a state senate district in California has850,000 residents). Without access to gobs ofmoney for TV and radio ads, direct mail, and otherways of broadcasting to the public, underfundedand nonmedia-sanctioned candidates have fewmeans to connect with voters. In many races,sometimes only one candidate per race has accessto such resources. The 2004 presidential electionwas a contest, in the words of Fox News commen-tator Bill O’Reilly, between “two silver spooners.”As a result, voters do not hear a range of view-points. Vigorous debate vanishes among the expen-

sive, poll-driven, sound-bite campaigns, and votersand democracy are the losers.

This loss of political debate and new ideas is one ofthe most insidious disadvantages of our privatelyfinanced campaigns. That’s why I was one of theorganizers (along with Common Cause andDemocracy Matters) of successful efforts to pass leg-islation in both San Francisco and Oakland for pub-lic financing of local races. I believe strongly inpublic financing of campaigns as one of the essentialreforms needed to repair our broken democracy.This is particularly true since the U.S. SupremeCourt, in the mid-1970s, Buckley v. Valeo case,equated money with free speech by ruling that can-didate spending caps and most restrictions of cam-paign funding (other than limits on the amount ofindividual donations to candidates) are unconstitu-tional. It was one of the worst decisions the HighCourt ever rendered, and it has greatly limitedreform possibilities. Given the legal constraints,public financing is the most promising campaignfinance reform because it helps level the playing fieldby giving all candidates sufficient resources to com-municate with voters, and it establishes incentivesfor candidates to voluntarily accept spending limits.

Yet it often bothers me that some of my reformcolleagues have oversold the significance of cam-paign finance reform. We frequently hear thatcampaign finance reform—whether public financ-ing, donation limits, free air time, or spendingcaps—will lead to greater competition in our elec-tions, wash candidates clean from the effects ofmoney, and change election outcomes as well aslegislative policy. Indeed, Ellen Miller and MicahSifrey note that some veteran voting rightsactivists believe that “getting private money out ofpublic elections is the unfinished business of the

B Y S T E V E N H I L L

© 2006 Wi ley Per iodicals , Inc .Publ ished onl ine in Wi ley InterScience (www.interscience.wi ley.com)

Nat ional Civ ic Review • DOI : 10.1002/ncr.135 • Summer 2006

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voting rights movement,” implying that doing sowill elect significantly more minority representa-tives—a claim that is demonstrably false.

After more than thirty years of campaign financereform, including the use of public financing ofcampaigns in several states, the presidential elec-tion, and a host of municipal elections, I see littleevidence that these claims are accurate. I wish thatcampaign finance reform was the magic bullet somesay it is, “the reform that makes all other reformspossible,” as some have called it. But the truth is,it’s not. Where reforms have been passed, particu-larly public financing of campaigns, there is solidevidence of more contested races and candidatesrepresenting more points of view. This in turn hasincreased political debate and engagement of vot-ers, a great accomplishment. But there is little evi-dence that having more contested races has led tomore competitive races—an important distinction.

What’s needed now, I believe, is a new and moreeffective approach to campaign finance reform. Inparticular, we need to see why campaign financereform, particularly public financing of electionsand free media access, is a necessary but insufficientstep toward repairing our broken democracy.

The Hype of Reformers

In every election cycle—you can set your calendarby it—leading campaign finance reform organiza-tions issue a postelection press release announcingsomething to the effect that “Money Largely

Determines Election Outcomes” (or, from theCenter for Responsive Politics, “Money Wins Big in2000 Elections”). These announcements declare thatgetting private money out of campaigns, or at leastreducing spending inequity between candidates, willsignificantly affect American politics.

But as has been demonstrated by numerous studies,such as FairVote’s biannual “Dubious Democracy”reports, campaign spending inequity did not giverise to the many lopsided one-party districts in theUnited States today. They are produced by partisanresidential patterns in red and blue America com-bined with district-based, winner-take-all elections,which in some states are exaggerated by incumbentprotection plans drawn during the redistrictingprocess. Sure, the winners have more money thanthe challengers, but what’s the cause and what’s theeffect? The money goes to candidates who donorsknow will win because the partisan demographics ofthe district guarantee this result. By betting on thesure horse in each race, donors hope they’re buyingaccess and influence—not elections. In other words,for most elections money follows electoral success,not vice versa. But by reversing cause and effect,these headlines confuse our understanding of howour democracy works and how to repair it. Thisconfusion exaggerates our expectations of howmuch campaign finance reform really can accom-plish, leading to disappointment among reformers,the public, and funders of reform.

This realization was never clearer than in May2005, when I addressed the annual convention ofthe Arizona League of Women Voters. Spearheadedby the league in 1998 and 2000, Arizona enactedtwo of the most talked-about reforms: full publicfinancing of campaigns (“clean money”) for stateelections, and a nonpartisan independent redistrict-ing commission. Arizona’s reform success generatedexcitement and hope across the nation. Yet I foundmembers of the League of Women Voters, as well asother Arizona reformers, downright glum abouttheir efforts. Apparently the recent electoral results

National Civ ic Review DOI : 10.1002/ncr Summer 2006

There is little evidence that having more contest-ed races has led to more competitive races—animportant distinction. We need to see why cam-paign finance reform, particularly public financ-ing of elections and free media access, is anecessary but insufficient step toward repairingour broken democracy.

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hadn’t matched their expectations or their campaignrhetoric. In fact, the Grand Canyon State saw someof the least competitive races in the nation in 2004.None of the thirty state senate seats was competi-tive, and more than half of the seats were uncon-tested by one of the two major parties. In the statehouse, which uses two-seat districts, half the raceswere uncontested by a major party and only five outof sixty races were competitive. In the end, 97 per-cent of incumbents won reelection, whether theircampaign was publicly financed or privatelyfinanced (and despite having an independent redis-tricting commission removing the worst excesses ofincumbent gerrymandering).

These are not the results one would hope for in astate that has been at the forefront of politicalreform. To be sure, some positives have occurred inArizona as well—for example, a decent increase inthe number of candidates running in the primariesand for statewide executive offices, which fosteredmore political debate. And ten of the eleven win-ners for statewide office were publicly financedcandidates, including the current governor, JanetNapolitano. On the other hand, a report from theClean Elections Institute and another by HectorPreciado from the Greenlining Institute show thatthe number of women candidates in the primariesdeclined steadily from seventy-one in 2000 tosixty-six in 2002 to fifty-nine in 2004, only 29 per-cent of primary candidates; and the number ofminority candidates, after increasing significantlyfrom thirteen in 2000 to thirty-seven in 2002,decreased to thirty-four in 2004, only 17 percent ofall primary candidates (in a state that is 36 percentminority). There has been no noticeable impact onlegislative policy.

In Maine, another state with full public financing ofcampaigns, results have been somewhat better butstill not earth-shattering. On the positive side, thenumber of contested primaries rose to 39 in 2004,up from 25 in 2000, fostering more political debate(though that’s out of 186 races—still a small fractionoverall). In the November election, only two raceswere uncontested by a major party in the state sen-ate, and seven in the house. At least three indepen-dent legislators’ victories can be attributed partly topublic financing allowing them to knock off candi-dates of both major parties. But Maine also remainsdogged by mostly noncompetitive elections: in 2004the average victory margin for 35 state senate racesand 151 state house races was a landslide of twentypoints. Only 4 races in the senate were highly com-petitive (won by less than five points), while 31 inthe house were, the latter a decent showing. Buttwice as many house races, 62 overall, were won byhuge landslide margins. The number of women inthe Maine legislature has dropped to its lowest levelin twenty years. In a report examining public financ-ing in Maine, Arizona, and elsewhere, TimothyWerner and Kenneth Mayer concluded, “There is lit-tle evidence that public funding has increased repre-sentation of women . . . or the number of womenwho run for office.”

So after all their hard work, it was not surprisingthat Arizona reformers expressed disappointment.Ever an optimist, I told the reformers to take heart:it’s not that public financing and independent redis-tricting commissions aren’t good reforms, it’s justthat they are more limited in their impact than mostpeople realize. In Arizona, as in many states, publicfinancing (and redistricting commissions) are ren-dered less than potent by the red and blue partisanresidential patterns combined with the winner-take-all electoral system. Over the past fifteen years, lib-erals and Democrats have become more numerousin the southern part of the state (around Tucson),while conservatives and Republicans dominate therest of the state. The only way to make winner-take-all districts more competitive in Arizona is to draw


For most elections, money follows electoral suc-cess, not vice versa. But by reversing cause andeffect, headlines confuse our understanding ofhow our democracy works and how to repair it.

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narrow bands that extend vertically from south tonorth, like the teeth of a fork. But such districts notonly would look ridiculous but also would break upcommunities of interest, such as geographic regionsand racial minorities, showing the trade-off ofwinner-take-all districts: you can have competitiveelections or representative results, but it’s pretty dif-ficult to have both. Unfortunately, there’s little thatpublicly financed elections, or even redistrictingcommissions, can do to counter these realities.Demography in Arizona, as in so many other states,has become destiny.

Public financing’s greatest successes have been real-ized in city elections, as with New York City andLos Angeles, which use public financing for mayor,city council, and other races. There, we see strongevidence that the availability of public funds hashelped level the playing field and produced moreminority and women candidates, especially for lead-ing offices such as mayor and city council. LosAngeles’s current Latino mayor was a publicly fund-ed candidate, and as of 2002 approximately half themembers of the New York City Council wereminorities and one-quarter women, most of whomreceived public financing (on the other hand, mostof these cities’ council races were completely non-competitive). But these cities are heavilyDemocratic, so elections are fought along differentbattle lines from the red and blue fiefdoms of stateand federal politics.

In short, Arizona and other states find themselves ina situation where the problem is not simply whetherone candidate greatly outspends the other. Theproblem also is balkanized partisan residential pat-terns combined with electing legislators by means of

a checkerboard electoral map of individual districts.Campaign finance reform is valuable but insuffi-cient. I told the Arizona reformers that it was timeto take the next step: scrap their winner-take-all sys-tem and start using proportional representationalong with public financing of campaigns—a pow-erful combination that would greatly increase com-petition and substantially improve representativegovernment in Arizona.

The Puzzle of Quid Pro Quo

Rather than focusing on the level of political com-petition, some campaign finance reformers focus onthe quid pro quo between politicians and donors—granting legislative favors in return for big dona-tions from lobbyists and influence peddlers likeAbramoff and his ilk. There is a belief that publicfinancing of campaigns, even in the face of an ava-lanche of noncompetitive safe seats, will make thepoliticians act differently because they won’t need torely on special interests to raise money and so thischange in association will also affect their votes. Ibelieve there is much truth to this view, but a keyquestion is, how much? To what degree does whopoliticians raise money from affect overall policy,especially in major policy areas?

Look at the amount of political donations from cor-porations and various industries. Obviously it is alot of money by the standard of the average voter,but it is really a small amount for these corpora-tions. For instance, in May 2000 a leading campaignfinance reform newsletter, Ouch!, reported that thesenators who voted against an amendment to bank-ruptcy legislation received $34,520 more on averagefrom the banking and credit industry than the sena-tors who voted in favor of the amendment, theimplication being that the donations affected theirvotes. But that was over a six-year period, whichworks out to less than $6,000 per senator per year.Apparently a senator can be bought pretty cheaply.It also implies that for a mere $6,000 per year thesupporters of the amendment could buy back thosesenators’ votes, which is clearly incorrect.


You can have competitive elections or representa-tive results, but it’s pretty difficult to have both.Demography in Arizona, as in so many otherstates, has become destiny.

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In March 2000, the same newsletter provocativelyjuxtaposed the fact that Congress had barred theTransportation Department from requiring higherfuel efficiency for SUVs and light trucks with thefact that the auto industry’s contributions to feder-al campaigns were $4.6 million over a four-yearperiod. This works out to little more than $1 mil-lion per year, a pittance for the auto industry. Ifthese corporations and industries really wanted toinfluence the legislative process or try to buy elec-tions, they have the deep pockets to spend a lotmore money. Billions more.

Rather than the corruptive influence of quid proquo, a better explanation of the relationshipbetween politicians and their donors is often a bitmore mundane: they are on the same team. A certainnumber of these politicians take donations from cer-tain special interests and introduce their billsbecause they believe in the bills and the issue. Thedonors are not necessarily trying to buy a legislatorso much as give money to the side that best protectstheir interests.

An excellent example of this a few years back wasthe heated battle over gun control. Recall that thislegislative episode came after a rash of high schoolshootings, including the tragedy at Columbine. Thelegislators who led the fight against gun control,notably Republican Tom DeLay and DemocratJohn Dingell, did not do so because they had beenbought by the National Rifle Association. No, itwas because they believed in the correctness of theirposition. They were, in effect, on the antigun-control team, just as the NRA is on the team. Oneis the representative in the legislature who intro-duces the bill, and the other is the pressure group

that provides the financial backing, lobbyists, andactivists to push or kill a certain bill. There is notnecessarily a quid pro quo there. After all, reform-ers in favor of gun control, such as the nationalorganization Handgun Control, do the same thing:they find supportive and collegial legislators tointroduce their bills, and in return they supportthem with their money, endorsements, and activists.But supporters of gun control would hardly callthese legislators “bought,” would they?

Nevertheless, during the gun control debate cam-paign finance reformers noted that the members ofCongress who voted the NRA’s way received thirty-one times more money from gun rights groups thanthose who voted in favor of background checks.This worked out to about $11,195 per member,which is not a lot of money for a house race today.It turned out there was a simpler and better expla-nation for explaining the patterns of NRA dona-tions: they give, first of all, to house members whoare on the antigun-control team, to support theirteam members’ reelection. The house members areon the team because they believe in the issue.Second, the NRA donates to candidates representingswing districts, who perhaps have been intimidatedinto supporting the NRA position because if you arethe legislator in a swing rural district the gun controlissue can cost you a crucial number of votes.Examination of the Democrats who voted againstgun control shows that nearly all of them were fromrural swing districts where being on the wrong sideof the gun-control issue can cost you your seat. It’sthe votes against them that swayed their support,not campaign contributions.

Following the vote in May 2000 to permanentlyopen commercial ties with China, the public watch-dog Center for Responsive Politics issued a newsadvisory that read, in part: “But did the moneyhave an impact on today’s vote? An analysis ofcampaign contributions made by members of theBusiness Roundtable shows that House membersvoting to approve the China bill have received an


Rather than the corruptive influence of quid proquo, a better explanation of the relationshipbetween politicians and their donors is often a bitmore mundane: they are on the same team.

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average of $44,000 in PAC and individual dona-tions this cycle. Lawmakers voting ‘no’ took in anaverage of $25,000.”

Note that lawmakers voting both yes and noreceived sizable donations from the BusinessRoundtable members. The watchdog group wouldhave us believe that a mere $19,000 difference indonations between house members who voted yesand those who voted no allegedly was the smokinggun that pointed to the yes votes as having beeninfluenced by donations from the BusinessRoundtable. This hardly seems plausible.

One can point to numerous examples like these inwhich reformers found a smoking gun where theevidence did not support the conclusion, usingalarmist statistics that generate more heat than light.In short, the fact that a lot of candidates receivechunks of money from the same corporations,PACs, lobbyists, and special interests, though defi-nitely a relationship that needs to be tracked andmonitored, is not by itself proof that they have beenbought. Nor can one assume that a political partyhas been bought because it receives large soft-moneydonations from certain corporations, industries, orPACs, or the endorsement of voters and activiststhat keep supporting and voting for them.Sometimes they are just on the same team, and theywould be on the same team even if there were notlarge chunks of money involved. That’s because theyhave the same beliefs and legislative priorities thatflow from these beliefs.

Certainly there are notorious examples of ridersattached to bills specifically because some quid pro

quo occurred between a donor and a powerful rep-resentative, committee chair, or party leader whowas influential enough to add the rider to the bill.But such riders are a small percentage of overall pol-icy and legislation. Usually such a blatant quid proquo is an exchange between the legislator and anindividual donor (who is often a constituent fromthe legislator’s home district or state) that affects thedonor’s personal business situation, not major areasof policy. Though reprehensible and unethical, suchbehavior is hardly the smoking gun we are lookingfor here.

The Pyramid of Money

To understand the role that private money plays inour elections, it’s important to understand what Icall the “pyramid of money.” Party leaders such asRepublican Tom DeLay and Democrat NancyPelosi, as well as most incumbents from both par-ties, don’t need to spend a dime on their reelectionsbecause they represent one-party fiefdoms that aredue to the red and blue partisan residential patternsand winner-take-all elections. Nevertheless, the BigMoney Kings and Queens raise huge amounts ofmoney for their own reelections. Why? Becausethey use the money for party-building activities andto finance colleagues in the handful of hotly con-tested races, buying themselves influence amongtheir peers and important party leadership posi-tions. Think of it as a pyramid structure with eachparty’s kings and queens sitting at the top, the fatcats directing the flow of money to the predictablytight races, hoping to win a majority of seats fortheir team. The rest of the safe-seat incumbents,along with the lobbyists, lawyers, allied PACs, anddonors, fill out the lower levels of the pyramid, fun-neling money into the labyrinth where it is directedby party leaders who are skilled in the art of decep-tion. It’s a well-oiled team operation, with lots ofgive and take among the levels of the team.

The pyramid symbolizes the shape and flow of pri-vate money in our political system, and it is fueledby winner-take-all’s one-party fiefdoms, which


Campaign finance reform is valuable but insuffi-cient. It is time to take the next step: scrap thewinner-take-all system and start using propor-tional representation along with public financingof campaigns.

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allow so many safe-seat incumbents to raise hugeamounts of money that’s not needed for their ownreelection just so it can be funneled to other partisanactivities. If you want to understand the crucialdynamic of money in our politics, don’t think ofcandidates receiving briefcases of money from shad-owy lobbyists; think of the pyramid.

Political scientists Jacob Hacker and Paul Piersondescribe the modern-day dance between lobbyistsand partisan leaders as one where “the stereotypedrelationship between the lobbyists and the lobbied”has been turned on its head (p. 142). Indeed, com-ments by DeLay reveal the extent to which the lob-byists and special interests today follow the lead ofpolitical leaders, not vice versa. In her bookShowdown, Elizabeth Drew quoted DeLay: “Noone came to me and said, ‘Please repeal the CleanAir Act.’ We say to the lobbyists, ‘Help us.’ Weknow what we want to do and we find the people tohelp us do that” (p. 116).

So the pyramid is the problem, much more than thequid pro quo; the quid pro quo is repugnant butonly a symptom of the bigger picture. Abramoff andothers like him are hardly the reason DeLay and theGOP pursue ultraconservative policies. Abramoff’sillegal activities did not affect major policy areas.Instead, reported Mark Sherman, they involvedreceiving favors from legislators—including fromDeLay—for himself and his business clients inexchange for large donations and perks for legisla-tors. DeLay got what he wanted—large donations togrease his political machine—and Abramoff gotwhat he wanted—personal favors for his businessesand clients, each playing a respective role in thepyramid of money. In this fashion, major policydirections are driven not by quid pro quo but by thedynamics of the pyramid, with its one-party fief-doms and kings and queens sitting atop the pile,directing the show.

Certainly it is true that when quid pro quobecomes pervasive, its cumulative effects are corro-

sive to our democracy because of the public per-ception of corruption as well as actual corruptionof certain policies and appropriations. But it is alsotrue that, even with strong campaign financereform, breaking up the pyramid will be very diffi-cult so long as we are using a winner-take-all sys-tem where most legislative seats are lopsidedone-party districts, and invincible incumbents withno worries about reelection can funnel their cam-paign funds to party leaders sitting atop the pyra-mid’s labyrinth.

The Promise of Public Financing

Despite the noxious influences of the pyramid, pub-lic financing of campaigns still can accomplish alot—though again, not necessarily for the reasonthat many advocates say. Much of the rhetoric fromits advocates is aimed at cleaning up politics, withthe implication being that politicians who take pri-vate money are dirty. This ignores the fact that ittakes a fair amount of money to communicate withmillions of voters; presidential elections obviouslyare hugely expensive, but so are statewide and con-gressional races and even many state legislativeraces. If candidates can’t raise enough money tocommunicate with voters, well-financed, shadowyindependent expenditure committees (which are notsimilarly restricted) will end up becoming the domi-nant source of information for voters. That’s a dis-turbing thought.

Also the cleaning-up-politics rhetoric underminesour reformer efforts because by reinforcing thenotion that politicians and money are dirty,crooked, and sleazy, reformers make large seg-ments of the public repulsed at the idea of fundingpoliticians with their taxes and providing “wel-fare” for the sleazy politicians. It also contributesto a generally negative feeling of the public towardgovernment itself, which feeds into a conservativeagenda that for three decades has been bashinggovernment and making the public feel as if “gov-ernment is the problem.” If Americans don’t valuegovernment, then it’s not likely they will value democ-


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racy; nor will they value reform of that democracy.So the notion of cleaning up our politics not onlyis overhyped; ultimately it is counterproductiveand lashes back against our own campaign financereform efforts.

Here’s a more useful—and more accurate—ratio-nale. Public financing allows candidates to chipaway at the monolith of the pyramid by allowinglesser-funded candidates to challenge better-fundedcandidates and party machines, and to raise issuesthat foment real campaign debate. It will not unseatthe many one-party fiefdoms or destroy the pyra-mid, but public financing can rattle it. Only rarelywill it help produce upsets and elect a few moreJesse Venturas (Minnesota’s partial public financingand Ventura’s inclusion in televised debates certain-ly were factors in his gubernatorial victory). Butgiven the dynamics of winner-take-all elections com-bined with partisan residential patterns that createso many safe seats, there’s not a lot of wiggle roomfor upsets to occur. The most effective and accuraterationale in favor of public financing, then, is notsimply one of cleaning up elections but also one of“opening up the system,” offering a broader andlivelier debate and getting useful political informa-tion into the hands of voters.

When presented with the argument this way, a fairnumber of incumbents should embrace publicfinancing of campaigns. It rarely threatens their ownreelection, and it frees them from the unpleasanttask of “dialing for dollars” in order to fund theircampaign. Most incumbents would enjoy beingunshackled from the demands of fundraising, spend-ing more time with their constituents, and actually

governing. In fact, more legislative incumbents inArizona and Maine have begun accepting publicfinancing and opting out of the privately financedsystem, and why not? It doesn’t threaten them polit-ically, and it relieves them of the loathsome pressureof begging for money from well-heeled donors.

Given the proper role of public financing in awinner-take-all system—to rattle the pyramid, en-courage political debate, get information into thehands of voters, and occasionally contribute to anupset or two—the rules should not be tailored to ex-clude independents and third-party candidates. Al-ternatives to the major party candidates often arethe only hope for shaking things up and reversingthe stale formula of the duopoly we now witness aselectoral politics. Third parties and independentcandidates have often played a role as the “labora-tories for new ideas,” says Sam Smith—leading thecharge for advancements such as abolition of slav-ery, income tax, balanced budgets, women’s suf-frage, the forty-hour workweek, Social Security, di-rect election of U.S. senators, and more. Politicalalternatives should be strongly encouraged, fullyfunded, and included in televised debates, yet somereformers write their legislation in such a way thatonly Democratic and Republican candidates have achance to qualify for public financing. This is ex-actly what happened when the Connecticut statelegislature, with the support of leading campaign fi-nance reform groups, passed public financing legis-lation in December 2005 that discriminated againstindependent and third-party candidates. LowellWeicker, who was elected governor as a third-partycandidate of the Connecticut Party in 1990, wouldhave needed two hundred thousand signatures tobecome eligible to raise qualifying donations, whilethe major party candidates he defeated would nothave had to gather a single signature. This kind ofdiscriminatory approach undermines the good thatcomes from public financing of campaigns.

Public financing measures have succeeded at the bal-lot box in Maine, Arizona, Massachusetts, Albu-


Public financing allows candidates to chip awayat the monolith of the pyramid by allowing lesser-funded candidates to challenge better-fundedcandidates and party machines, and to raiseissues that foment real campaign debate.

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querque, and San Francisco, and been enacted leg-islatively in Vermont, North Carolina, Connecticut,Portland (Oregon), San Francisco, Oakland, andelsewhere; but statewide losses in Missouri and Ore-gon have demonstrated that its viability is not a slamdunk. In places where it has been passed, it hasn’tproduced many electoral upsets or helped to throwthe bums out, as some unrealistically hoped, but itdoes minimize money’s role and produce more po-litical debate. In Maine, it probably contributed tohealth care reform—not a small achievement. Butmostly public financing’s success can be measuredby the new faces and new voices it introduces intoour politics, in itself a significant accomplishment.

Free Media for Candidates

In addition to giving public money to candidates,another promising approach is mandating free radioand television airtime for candidates. Since broad-cast media is the greatest expense of any candidate’scampaign, especially in the biggest races, this wouldbe a valuable contribution to the quest for healthypolitical debate and to challenging the pyramid. Bylaw, “we the people” own the airwaves, but they arehanded over for free to the broadcasting corpora-tions, a nearly $400 billion giveaway. Then thosecorporations turn around and sell back the airwavesto the candidates, even brazenly jacking up the priceof political ads as the election nears. It is such acrooked deal. The government should requirebroadcasters to furnish free airtime to candidates asa condition of receiving their broadcasting license.Mandating free airtime would cost the taxpayersnothing, but it would significantly reduce the pres-sure to raise gobs of money in competitive races, aswell as enhance political debate.

Free media time for candidates is a practice alreadyused by most established democracies around theworld, and it works extremely well. Conservativesand liberals alike support free media time; witnessNorman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Insti-tute joining with Paul Taylor, formerly of the Al-liance for Better Campaigns, to call for distribution

of vouchers for a reasonable amount of free adver-tising time to candidates and to political parties.They also have called for broadcasters to be re-quired to air a minimum of two hours a week ofcandidate discussion of issues during prime time inthe four to six weeks preceding every election. Sena-tors John McCain (R-Arizona), Russell Feingold (D-Wisconsin), and Richard Durbin (D-Illinois) haveintroduced the Our Democracy, Our Airwaves Act,which would amend the Communications Act of1934 to establish minimum airtime requirements ontelevision and radio stations for candidate- andissue-focused programming prior to primary andgeneral elections. The act would also establish avoucher system for the candidates’ purchase of com-mercial broadcast air time for political advertise-ments, financed by an annual fee on all broadcast li-cense holders.

Although free airtime and public financing willopen the political system and foster more debate, itis instructive to note that getting rid of the single-seat-district, winner-take-all electoral system andreplacing it with a form of proportional represen-tation would more easily accomplish the samegoal. Use of proportional voting in Illinois (until1980) and various cities today shows that not onlyhas it fostered more debate but it actually electedmore independent-minded candidates who didn’tneed as much money to win, even when runningagainst the political machine. This is because pro-portional voting produces more contested andmore competitive races. It challenges the pyramidin a way no other reform can. Combined with pub-lic financing and free airtime, it would vastlyimprove American politics.

Americans should seek to pass public financing andfree media time for campaigns at all levels of gov-ernment—local, state, and federal. Some concernedtaxpayers will argue that we can’t afford them; Iargue we can’t afford not to have them. We are los-ing political ideas and losing stimulating debate at arapid rate. Publicly financed campaigns and free


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airtime will help minimize money’s role and openup American democracy to new voices and newideas. Some may see this as only modest improve-ment compared to the unrealistic goal of cleaningup politics, but this is the best we can hope forgiven the realities of the winner-take-all landscapeand the limits imposed by a dreadful SupremeCourt decision that equates speech with money.Public financing of campaigns and free media timehold considerable promise for improving ourdemocracy, and we should work vigorously fortheir enactment.

Here is a summary of reforms along these lines:

• Support public financing of all campaigns at thelocal, state, and federal levels.

• Demand free media time for candidates on radioand TV; support McCain, Feingold, and Durbin’sOur Democracy, Our Airwaves Act.

• Include third-party and independent candidatesin public financing and televised debates.

• Set appropriate donation limits.• Set appropriate spending caps on candidates (if

we can sneak it by the Supreme Court).

And here are organizations to contact:

• Public Campaign, www.publicampaign.org,(202) 293–0222

• Common Cause, www.commoncause.org, (202)833–1200

• Campaign Legal Center, www.campaignlegalcen-ter.org, (202) 736–2200

• League of Women Voters, www.lwv.org, (202)429–1965

• Free Air Time Campaign, www.freeairtime.org,(888) 6FreeTV

• U.S. PIRG, www.uspirg.org, (202) 546–9707• TheRestofUs.org, (916) 446–4741

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Steven Hill is director of the New America Foundation’spolitical reform program. His previous book was FixingElections: The Failure of America’s Winner Take All Politics(Routledge Press); www.FixingElections.com.

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