How Successful Transnational Non-governmental Organizations Set Themselves up for Failure on the...

World Development Vol. 54, pp. 273–287, 2014� 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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How Successful Transnational Non-governmental Organizations

Set Themselves up for Failure on the Ground

CRISTINA M. BALBOA *

Baruch College School of Public Affairs, City University of New York, USA

Summary. — This paper examines transnational non-governmental organization (TNGO) influence on global, national, or local policyarenas, as well as how a TNGO’s actions in one arena might aid or encumber its effectiveness in another. It expands Steinberg’s spheresof influence framework (2001, 2003) to create a new capacity typology. Through examining Conservation International’s work in MilneBay, Papua New Guinea, this paper demonstrates the “paradox of global capacity”: a phenomenon where a TNGO prioritizes certaincapacities that paradoxically grant it access to work at the local level while impeding its efforts to create lasting change there.� 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Key words — capacity, NGOs, transnational, Papua New Guinea, environment, Integrated Conservation and Development Project(ICDP)

* I am grateful for the open cooperation of the communities and organi-

zations, including Conservation International itself, both in Milne Bay

and Washington, D.C. This work was funded through generous grants

from the following organizations: Yale University; Yale Institute for Bi-

ospheric Studies; Yale Council on Southeast Asian Studies; Yale Center

for the Study of Globalization; Yale Tropical Resources Institute; Switzer

Foundation; Environmental Protection Agency Science To Achieve Res-

ults (EPA STAR) Program; The Robert & Patricia Switzer Foundation;

International Studies Association; PSC-CUNY; and Association for Re-

search on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Associations (ARNO-

VA). I am grateful for comments on drafts of this work from William

DeMars, Benjamin Cashore, Jonathan Koppell, John Casey, Nicole Ma-

rwell, Ava Berman, my cohort from the CUNY Faculty Fellowship Pu-

blication Program, and the anonymous reviewers from this journal. Finalrevision accepted: September 10, 2013.

1. INTRODUCTION

The current policy landscape is teeming with examples oftransnational non-governmental organizations (TNGOs)influencing policy on the global, national, and local scales.The International Rescue Committee works with the UnitedNations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) on a glo-bal basis to raise awareness and prioritize humanitarian crises.On the local level, the TNGO acts in over 40 countries as animplementing agency for UNHCR and to execute its own mis-sion of restoring safety, dignity, and hope to millions of refu-gees (International Rescue Committee, 2012; UNHCR, 2012).Save the Children International is known for its advocacywork on behalf of children. Its reports have influenced theway United Nations (UN) agencies operate (Bellamy, 2002),and have helped domestic authorities and governments createimplementation plans for children’s rights (Palestinian Na-tional Authority, 2010).

The increasing influence of TNGOs is not without contro-versy. The Gates Foundation, with 3 billion US dollars in an-nual contributions to its initiatives on global health,development, and US education (Kaufman, 2011), has weath-ered complaints that its sheer size has dominated the area ofmalaria research such that it “risks stifling a diversity of viewsamong scientists and wiping out the (World Health Organiza-tion’s) policy-making function (McNeil, 2008)” and that itsvoice on US Schools drowns out those with opposing views(Kaufman, 2011).

Both the scholarly and practitioner literatures on transna-tional non-governmental organizations map a growing debateon the function, focus, and operationalization of these agen-cies (Anheier, 2005; Florini, 2000; Herman, Lecy, et al.,2012; Krasner, 2002). Nevertheless, they tend to agree thatTNGOs are self-governing, non-state, not-for-profit organiza-tions whose missions focus beyond state boundaries to addressa wide range of issues in the service of the public benefit(Anheier, 2005; Risse-Kappen, 1995; Salamon, Anheier,et al., 1999). No TNGO operates in a vacuum. They con-stantly create and renegotiate relationships with governmentagencies, for-profit firms, other local and transnational NGOs,and communities, as part of a network 1 of actors working inan issue area. While many typologies of NGOs create a

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distinction between advocacy NGOs (which participate in lob-bying, agenda-setting, norms diffusion) and service delivery oroperational NGOs (which implement policy on the ground), agrowing number of definitions acknowledge that many NGOsperform both functions (Nalinakumari & MacLean, 2005; Ya-ziji & Doh, 2009). Like Oxfam, Medecins Sin Frontieres, andthe World Wildlife Fund (Yaziji & Doh, 2009) the aboveexamples demonstrate both the constant network interactionTNGOs engage in, as well as how these organizations can besuccessful at influencing policy at multiple scales. This papersheds new light on how the growing number of multifunctionand multi-sphere TNGOs operates.

The facility TNGOs enjoy over issue areas follows the fourpaths of non-domestic policy influence (in italics) offered byBernstein and Cashore (2000). TNGOs use the global marketto influence policy by mobilizing boycotts, creating letter-writing campaigns, and certifying and creating demand forcertain products (Auld, Balboa, et al., 2009). They influenceinternational rules and regulations through lobbying govern-ment representatives, direct participation in policy-makingfora, or by using their capacity to populate government del-egations, which negotiate international rules (Charnovitz,1997; Gunter, 2004). They change international normative dis-course through media campaigns and by generating researchon their issues (Myers, Mittermeier, et al., 2000; Porter &

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.09.001

274 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

Brown, 1996). In addition to success in these three areas,transnational NGOs are also able to acquire access to thefourth path of non-domestic policy influence: direct infiltra-tion of the domestic policy-making process, where TNGOsestablish both ends and means to attain policy output (Cash-ore & Howlett, 2007; Hall, 1993). Through their efforts onthe first three paths, TNGOs obtain access to local policyarenas and expand their impact beyond mere influence tocreate and implement policy (Balboa, 2009). However, astransnational NGOs move from the global to local policyarenas, we see intense criticism of their failure to create last-ing, meaningful, and appropriate change on the ground.TNGO practitioner literature struggles with creating linkagesand translations between the domestic or global macro policyarena and the local or micro spheres (Evaluation OfficeUNDP, 2002; Hunter, 2009; Salmen & Kane, 2006; Ubels,van Klinken, et al., 2010). It seems that these organizationsfunction well in global arenas—skillfully influencing domesticpolicy goals to align with their missions, but fall short whenthey become street-level bureaucrats, 2 designing the toolsand means to implement the policies they recommend. 3 Evenmore puzzling: despite the abundance of scholarly literature,best practices, and the TNGO staff’s own convictions thatinterventions on the local level must be context-specific tobe effective, TNGOs still have difficulty creating context-spe-cific interventions. Why?

In this paper, I suggest that this failure of TNGOs toimplement their missions on the ground stems from a “para-dox of global capacity” for TNGOs. That is, not only dothey lack specific kinds of capacity, but they set themselvesup for failure by prioritizing certain global capacities thatparadoxically grant them access to work at the local levelwhile impeding their efforts to create lasting change there.It is not the case that transnational NGOs lack capacitycompletely. These organizations have an abundance of cer-tain types of capacity, which is why they can become suchpowerful players on the global level, masterfully maneuveringthrough the first three paths of influence. Since the globalcapacities demonstrated in the first three paths help TNGOsgain access to the local sphere, they ultimately prioritize glo-bal capacities, taking focus away from the local and bridgingcapacities necessary to successfully maneuver at national andlocal policy levels. Their de-prioritization of local and bridg-ing capacities, reduces their ability to create context-specificinterventions and sets them up for failure. This paper demon-strates the paradox of global capacity for TNGOs, as well ashow bridging capacity can be an answer to this paradox.First, I offer a new typology for capacity of TNGOs, build-ing on and refining Steinberg’s spheres of influence frame-work–dividing TNGO capacity into global, national, andlocal spheres–to create an analytical tool to acknowledgeand overcome these capacity shortcomings, as well as articu-late each sphere’s unique contribution to the TNGO’s mis-sion (2001, 2003). I define “bridging capacity” andillustrate how the TNGO’s pursuit of global capacity limitsits ability to act as a bridge between local and global. Draw-ing on personal interviews, internal organizational documentsand project publications, this paper examines ConservationInternational’s (CI) engagement in Milne Bay (MB), PapuaNew Guinea (PNG) to illustrate how this prioritization ofglobal over local capacity simultaneously creates a policyniche for TNGOs on the ground while also impeding themfrom making lasting change. The last section of this paperwill raise questions toward building a research agenda forbridging capacity: how it might be built and prioritized bytransnational actors across fields of interest.

2. ASSESSING CAPACITY THROUGH A SPHERES OFINFLUENCE FRAMEWORK

The word “capacity” has a wide range of meaning, with dif-ferent implications depending upon an actor’s goals (e.g.,managing a store versus growing crops in a field versus com-pleting a degree); discipline (e.g., state sovereignty in interna-tional relations versus management’s more concrete skillsneeded for an organization to function versus public policy’smiddle ground of broad categories of capacities detailed withvarious skills); and also scale or sphere (i.e., global, national,local, organizational, individual) (Fukuda-Parr, Lopes, et al.,2002; Steinberg, 2001). Recent approaches to the concept haveworked to balance its complexity with practical learning onhow to address capacity. These approaches view capacity asa system- or network-wide phenomenon, with multiple actorsworking on multiple levels. Within this system, actors havevarying values, goals, and power dynamics (Baser & Morgan,2008; Fowler & Ubels, 2010; Parcell, 2010; Tandom, 2010;Ubels and Fowler, 2010; Visser, 2010; Woodhill, 2010). Thispaper offers a framework that encompasses the variation ofapproaches while being practically useful to a broad rangeof applications. By demonstrating how capacity differs in eachsphere of influence, and how these spheres interact with oneanother, this new framework illuminates how a TNGO’s suc-cess in the first three paths of non-domestic influence—pathsthat require global capacities—can impede its success in thefourth path: direct infiltration of the local policy process.

This paper asserts that there are three fundamental types ofcapacities: political, administrative, and technical. Thesecapacities are required for any organization or group of orga-nizations working on the same issue (i.e., a network) to func-tion and be successful. The more capacities an actor has (be itan individual or an organization), the more power it has to af-fect change within a network.� The political capacity category examines relations outsideof the organization and includes politics in the sense of thecontestation of ideas. Within any network, various actorsjockey for access, exposure and resources. Political capaci-ties reflect an actor’s ability to interact deliberately withothers and manage external relationships. It also reflectsan understanding of the processes of communication, deci-sion-making and collaboration on a network level. In thiscategory, actors strive to sell their ideas and norms to otheractors.� Technical capacity reflects the ability of an individual,organization or network to access information and to dothe work of its mission. It is the capacity to understandthe scientific, resource, legal and technological status thatinfluences an actor’s ability to fulfill its mission on multiplescales.� Administrative capacity addresses the internal manage-ment skills needed to function as an individual or organiza-tion (e.g., financial reporting, strategic planning). Suchskills are necessary for an actor to know and fulfill its stra-tegic niche in the network.

There is considerable overlap and interdependence betweenthese three categories. One capacity is often directly contingentupon the other two. Understanding the legal framework of anetwork (i.e., political capacity) also affects a TNGO’s capac-ity to manage it finances and contracts (i.e., administrativecapacity), which in turn, impacts its ability to raise more funds(i.e., political capacity). An organization’s reporting and eval-uation capacity can also impact the level of fundraising. With-out political and communication capacities, an organizationcannot fully understand local resource use, a required

TRANSNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS SET THEMSELVES UP FOR FAILURE ON THE GROUND 275

technical capacity for conservation. The dynamic nature ofthese types of capacities becomes even more evident in theempirical case of this paper.

Figure 1 gives examples of political, technical, and adminis-trative capacity for TNGOs coupled with Steinberg’s (2001,2003) spheres of influence framework to provide a more accu-rate depiction of transnational work. Steinberg’s work on theimpact of leadership on policy change and development inCosta Rica and Bolivia used a sphere of influence frameworkto argue that while there has been enormous foreign influenceon national policy in developing countries, this influence wasnot in itself sufficient to create change. On a national policy le-vel, actors needed to intimately understand and use the polit-ical resources (e.g., understanding of national power structure,personal contacts, long-term access to political processes) inorder to make change in that sphere (Steinberg, 2001, 2003).Steinberg highlighted that not only is it important for thereto be actors who can function and take advantage of the re-sources in each of these two spheres of influence, but it is alsonecessary for there to be actors who can bridge the twospheres.

This paper expands, alters, and refines Steinberg’s theory tobe more applicable to transnational non-governmental organi-zations. First, it expands this theory to include a third sphereof influence: the local sphere. Next, it alters the theory both toreflect the language of capacity and couples it with the threetypes of capacity (political, administrative, and technical) I of-fer above. Lastly, it delineates the traits necessary to exhibitwhat I call “bridging capacity” (a variation of Steinberg’sbilateral activists) between the global, national, and localspheres. The local sphere of influence is important for transna-

Figure 1. Sphere-specific capacities for trans

tional NGOs, since it includes not only policy creation butalso a means of implementation and enforcement at a local le-vel. The implementation of laws, priorities, and incentives thatare created on the global or national levels depends on localcapacity and context. The examples of capacity in Figure 1demonstrate clear differences in the global, national, and localspheres of influence.

At the local level—in households, villages and towns—theideas created at the global level and endorsed at the nationallevel show themselves to be successes or failures. The localsphere is where bottom-up approaches meet top-down poli-cies, the results of which offer incredible variety dependingupon their introduction and execution. Indeed, it is at this le-vel that powerful transnational NGOs have had the most dif-ficulty. Seasoned disaster relief organizations with full pursessent for medical assistance, humanitarian relief, and infra-structure rehabilitation all struggled in the aftermath of theSri Lankan tsunami to find local partners to help the organi-zations maneuver through local logistics, politics, and socialcontexts (Stirrat, 2006). Democracy promotion TNGOs mon-itor elections throughout the globe, and yet they agonize overboth the subjective nature of the definition of “democraticelections” and the clandestine and culturally specific opera-tionalization of election manipulation (Hyde, 2012). Environ-mental organizations like the World Wildlife Fund influenceglobal negotiations on biodiversity conservation, while mak-ing the difficult decision to leave the Democratic Republic ofCongo’s Garamba National Park when they determine that lo-cal political and cultural factors keep them from achievingtheir primary mission of conservation on the ground (Avant,2004). In other words, while these TNGOs are well-versed in

national non-governmental organizations.


the global capacities of the first three paths (i.e., use of globalmarkets, influence of international rules and regulations, andchange of international normative discourse), direct infiltra-tion of the policy-making process in local sphere remains con-founding.

As Figure 1 indicates, the differences between the global, na-tional, and local spheres are numerous. Individuals who canbridge these divides are few and far between. However, asSteinberg has indicated, this bridging leadership is essentialto the success of transnational actors. I suggest that such lead-ership requires: (1) in-depth inter-cultural and cross-cultural(ICCC) understanding; (2) commitment and discipline to actas intermediary; and (3) enough power in the organizationto influence or change how work is done. Cross-culturalunderstanding implies some comparing and understanding ofthe similarities and differences between cultures. Inter-culturalunderstanding signals knowing how to connect two or morecultures. Together, these traits combine knowledge of differentcultural practices and worldviews, awareness of one’s own cul-tural practices and assumptions, and skills to communicateand work across cultures.

While ICCC understanding is key to bridging capacity, anindividual who has cross-cultural and inter-cultural under-standing can do nothing to help an organization achieve itsmission without both the commitment and power to makechanges within the organization. A TNGO may have individ-uals who demonstrate ICCC understanding, but if they are lesspowerful than other actors in the organization, the changesthey seek do not take place. For example, anthropologists of-ten take on the responsibility of translating “the actions andbeliefs of one set of actors for another (West, 2005)”, but havelimited effect in changing operations within a conservationproject (West, 2006). Conversely, an actor can have both thedesire to act as an intermediary and the power to influencehis or her organization. However, without in-depth ICCC in-sight, his or her actions can be useless or even harmful to bothnetworks’ actors and the TNGO’s individual mission. As thispaper explores in the case of Milne Bay, Papua New Guinea,while local staff (or expatriates who had lived locally for dec-ades) demonstrated ICCC understanding, they did not havethe organizational sway of the Chief Technical Advisor(CTA), who may have had the desire to act as intermediarybut did not demonstrate ICCC understanding. Because allthree traits must be present in the individual, this bridgingcapacity is ultimately a form of leadership.

By no means does Figure 1 contain an exhaustive list of capac-ities for all TNGOs; it simply introduces the most salient capac-ity areas at this time. It is important to note that over time thenorms within each sphere change, altering the definitions of cer-tain capacities and reprioritizing them. For example, just withinthe last century, the environmental field changed from focusingsolely on preservation, promoting people-less tracts of land andsea, to including conservation which promotes land-use plan-ning and incorporating people into the landscape (Cunning-ham, 1997; Vandermeer, 1994). These changes in normsdemand different technical and political capacities. 4 Placingthe idea of “Western science” in the global sphere does not meanthis research is promoting it as a global norm or that it is a per-manent global technical capacity. Rather, current power struc-tures and epistemological hierarchies that rank it as a globalcapacity may change as norms change (Elgert, 2011). All threespheres are subject to a dynamic interaction of competingnorms, which over time will change the focus of capacity in eachsphere. As actors work to diffuse norms of accounting, conser-vation, fundraising, language, and other areas, the spheresinteract and reflect one another.

More details about the spheres begin to emerge upon theirempirical application. While funding sources are prevalent inthe global sphere, they are less available domestically. Con-cepts like partnership, obligation, accountability, leadership,legitimacy, nature, philanthropy, communication, work, ex-change, and business can be interpreted differently in eachsphere. While holding public meetings to hear complaintsand concerns about a project might be a useful exercise insome spheres, organizations must find other ways to hear com-munity concerns in areas of Palau where absence from suchmeetings can be a form of dissent (Interview 51). Workingwith the government to create protected areas may work inthe Philippines, but in Papua New Guinea where there is gov-ernment-protected indigenous resource ownership, this modusoperandi would not work (Beehler & Kula, 2005). Because ofthese differing interpretations, the same organization needs toadjust its operations in different contexts. The global sphere,where these TNGOs demonstrate the most capacity, reflectsthe norms from the nations and even localities that dominatethe policy arena. As one moves from the global to the local,the norms diversify to reflect the heterogeneity of multiplecountries and localities.

3. MILNE BAY, PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Papua New Guinea’s Milne Bay Province is part of what isglobally called the “coral triangle”—a biologically rich marinearea extending between Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, andthe Philippines (Government of Papua New Guinea, 2002).Within the coral triangle, Milne Bay contains the largest ex-panse of pristine coral reef, with over 13,000 km2 of coral reefs(Werner & Allen, 1998). Of the nineteen provinces in PapuaNew Guinea, Milne Bay is PNG’s largest maritime province(Conservation International, 2003) and contains 32% of thecountry’s total reef area (Government of Papua New Guinea,2002; Seeto, 2001). Overharvesting and destructive fishingpractices are the main threats to the province’s reefs (MilneBay Community Based Coastal and Marine Project, 2005;Conservation International, n.d.; Government of Papua NewGuinea, n.d.). 5

Milne Bay communities are concerned about the recent ef-forts to conserve their marine resources. As one of PNG’s leastpopulated provinces, Milne Bay’s small population seems tohave a lesser impact on the reef resources compared to neigh-boring provinces (Bailasi, 2005; Conservation International,n.d.; Government of Papua New Guinea, 2002; Seligman,2005; Werner & Allen, 1998). However these communities’dependence on the reefs is still high 6 and they are concernedabout maintaining traditional rights over marine resourceswhile continuing to benefit from them economically (Werner& Allen, 1998). Conservation efforts are often met with suspi-cion that foreigners intend to exploit resources for their ownwealth, rather than conserve them (Interviews 3, 23, 27 and34).

The Milne Bay Community Based Coastal and Marine Pro-ject’s (“the project”) initial plan took care to consult with awide range of network actors, including government, privatesector, and community members within PNG and in MB spe-cifically (Baines, Duguman, et al., 2006). Each actor had itsown priorities for the project, but CI’s ultimate objectivewas to create a system of Community Managed Marine Pro-tected Areas (MPAs) that would protect important ecosys-tems, preserve biodiversity, and protect marine resources inorder to achieve sustainable development and livelihoodbenefits for vulnerable small island communities (Milne Bay


Community Based Coastal Marine Project, 2001, 2005). Withelements of both conservation and development, 7 this projectcan be categorized as an Integrated Conservation and Devel-opment Project (ICDP) (Conservation International, 2003).

Phase One of the project was a pilot phase in which severalCommunity Managed Marine Protected Areas would be cre-ated within Zone One (of three zones). This phase involvedbuilding the capacity of local actors to take over the projectfrom CI in Phase Two, 8 when lessons learned in Phase Onewould be used to expand the project to other zones (Interviews1, 2, 3). Each phase was approximately five years long and keymilestones were required to be met in order for CI to securePhase Two funding for application to more zones (Govern-ment of Papua New Guinea, 2002).

The project seemed to achieve many markers of success. Itwas one the largest employers in the province and in PNGconservation (People Against Foreign NGO Neocolonialism,2003; Interview 3). Its staff had been recognized with an inter-national award (Interview 9). Many staff and communitymembers thought that work was progressing along an appro-priate timeline (Interview 14).

Regardless of these achievements, the project was broughtto a halt in October 2005, nearly two years before the end ofPhase One, when it was discovered to have spent all five yearsof funding in less than four years (Baines et al., 2006). Whatwas scheduled to be a late mid-term evaluation of the projectbecame the project’s final evaluation. Both the Milne BayGovernor and CI sought to continue the project with otherfunding, but neither actor could agree on who would havecontrol of the funds. Depending upon the source, CI waseither “chased” out of MB by the Governor because of projectmismanagement or chose to withdraw in the absence of appro-priate government capacity (Interviews 3, 14, and 41; AlotauEnvironment, 2006a, 2006b). Regardless, the missions of boththe project and CI were not accomplished in Milne Bay.

(a) Creating a niche: Conservation International in Milne Bay

With an annual budget of over 92 million dollars, more than800 global staff in over 40 countries and upward of 350 globalpartners (Conservation International, 2005), ConservationInternational is one of the world’s largest conservation NGOs(Chapin, 2004; Dowie, 2009). Its experience as an actor simul-taneously in the global conservation arena and the local spherein Milne Bay, Papua New Guinea is a telling example of howTNGOs’ global capacities create niches for themselves on thelocal level, where global capacities are an unhelpful and per-haps harmful substitute for local and bridging capacity.

CI’s mission is to empower “societies to responsibly and sus-tainably care for nature, our global biodiversity, for the well-being of humanity (Conservation International, 2010).” Likethe TNGOs mentioned above, CI experiences success operat-ing on the global level, but its global mission can only beachieved through concrete changes made on the ground. Thus,CI’s work illustrates each of Bernstein and Cashore’s (2000)four paths of domestic policy influence by (1) using globalmarkets, (2) influencing international rules and regulations,(3) changing international normative discourse, and (4) directinfiltration of the domestic policy process. The organizationhas worked to influence through markets by taking variouslevels of leadership in the efforts to certify 9 aquarium fish, bio-fuels, nuts, coffee, forest products, soy products, seafood, andtourism ventures, to name a few. CI has collaborated with cor-porations such as Wal-Mart and Starbucks to “green” theirproduct lines and processes, making them more sustainable(Gunther, 2006; Seattle Post-Intelligence, 2000). Moreover,

through both market influence and work with celebrities suchas Harrison Ford (a CI board member) and others to createadvertisements, events, and discussions on sustainability, CIworks to change the normative discourse on conservation,consumption, and the environment (Conservation Interna-tional, 2008, 2013).

CI’s focus on ‘biodiversity hotspots’ illustrates how theorganization influences both normative discourse and interna-tional rules and regulations. Conservation International hasused the concept of hotspots for prioritizing its work sincethe early 1990s (Gunter, 2004). Two publications helped theconcept gain traction in the global biodiversity conservationarena. In 1999, Russell Mittermeier, Norman Myers, CristinaMittermeier and Gil Robles published the book Hotspots:Earth’s biologically richest and most endangered terrestrialecoregions through Conservation International’s press (Mit-termeier, Myers, Mittermeier, & Robles Gil, 1999). The nextyear, Norman Myers was the lead author for the article “Bio-diversity hotspots for conservation priorities” (coauthoredwith several CI employees, including Russell Mittermeier,Cristina Mittermeier, and Gustavo de Fonseca) (Myerset al., 2000). The article was published in the highly-rankedjournal Nature. These publications define biodiversity hot-spots as “areas featuring exceptional concentrations of ende-mic species and experiencing exceptional loss of habitat(Myers et al., 2000).” The article then uses quantitative andqualitative methods to define 25 priority hotspots for biodi-versity conservation.

CI is not the only organization that has built its researchand conservation strategy around the concept, directing siz-able funding toward these hotspots. As an indicator of howthese works have influenced normative discourse, the 2000Nature article has been cited by scholarly articles an impres-sive 5,315 times in the past fourteen years (Web of Science,2013); 10 the book cited 1665 times by scholarly and othersources (Google Scholar, 2013). 11 Moreover, the concept ofhotspots has been referred to in publications and reports bymultiple national governments and global environment orga-nizations, including as a method for setting global conserva-tion priorities. National reports to the Convention onBiological Diversity and the Convention on InternationalTrade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora(CITES) use their hotspot designation as justification forbecoming a conservation priority (Ministry of Environmentand Forests, Government of India, 2009; Subregional SteeringCommittee: CITES/MIKE-South Asia, 2004; Towns, 2007).Documents from the World Bank, and especially the GlobalEnvironment Facility (GEF) use hotspots to prioritize biodi-versity evaluations and funding (Risby, Chatelain, et al.,2008; Risby, Schmidt-Soltau, et al., 2009; World Bank,2010). The World Conservation Union’s Red List of Threa-tened Species (which informs decision-making on CITES) alsouses the term (Cuttelod, Garcıa, Abdul Malak, Temple, &Katariya, 2008), as does the Liaison Group of the Biodiver-sity-related Conventions (a group that seeks to coordinatecooperation in the implementation of six biodiversity-relatedconventions) 12 to discuss its fund priority-setting (LiaisonGroup of the Biodiversity-related Conventions, 2009). Thuswe see that CI’s use and promotion of the hotspot concepthas not only changed normative discourse on conservation,but it has influenced the very institutions that create conserva-tion rules and regulations across the globe.

With its variety of approaches, it is no wonder CI has grownto be a powerful TNGO in the conservation field. CI’s abilityto effectively influence domestic policy through markets, nor-mative discourse, and international rules and regulations


(Bernstein & Cashore, 2000) has given it legitimacy on the glo-bal conservation stage, incredible amounts of funding for itswork, and exclusive access to resource areas. The relationshipbetween Bernstein & Cashore’s (2000) four paths in CI’s storyof involvement in Milne Bay Province is typical of how manyTNGOs gain access to and directly infiltrate the local policysphere. At the beginning of an issue’s policy life, a TNGOwho has already demonstrated skillful political capacity atthe global level gains access to a local community to gatherdata on its resources (Twose, 1987). This access to the localsphere increases the TNGOs legitimacy in the global sphereas a representative of the local communities and resources,piquing the interest of the funding community, and ultimatelyleading to increased financial support. The local–globaldynamics are mutually reinforcing: more funding means moreaccess, which means more legitimacy as the only global“experts” on the local sphere and, ultimately more fundingto return to the local sphere.

CI began its efforts in Melanesia in 1991 (ConservationInternational, n.d.). In 1996, it started working as a small teamin Milne Bay Province after identifying it as a top conservationpriority and consulting with the provincial government onhow best to build a partnership for marine conservation (Mil-ne Bay Community Based Coastal Marine Project, 2001). In1997, CI performed a rapid assessment of MB marine re-sources, assessing 53 sites in 22 days (Werner & Allen,1998). That same year, the United Nations Development Pro-gramme (UNDP) chose marine conservation as its priority forwork in PNG (Milne Bay Community Based Coastal MarineProject, 2001). CI worked with the UNDP and the local gov-ernment to create the Milne Bay Community Based Coastaland Marine Project in a way that responded to the needs ofthe communities in which it worked.

Since CI was the only transnational environmental NGOworking in Milne Bay, it uniquely held the power to moldthe global thinking about how conservation should be donethere. It was the only global “expert” on Milne Bay coastal re-sources and, its unique ability to access local informationabout a resource gave it an apparent legitimacy to speak onbehalf of a resource most global actors have never encoun-tered. 13 Those local actors who live with the resource do nothave access to the global decision-making or opinion-makingfora. CI’s unique role connecting the local and the global onthe issue also gave CI the opportunity to fund its work in Mil-ne Bay on a large-scale.

In 1998, based on the findings of the assessments, CI,UNDP, and MB Provincial Government drafted the proposalfor the Milne Bay Community Based Coastal and MarineProject. In 1999, the Governor of Milne Bay Province ex-pressed his support of the proposal along with CI and UNDP,and the final proposal was submitted to Global EnvironmentFacility, 14 the UNDP’s funding mechanism. GEF approvedthe proposal in 2000, and CI opened an office in Alotau, Mil-ne Bay in 1999–2000 (VanHelden, 2004). CI then performedanother biological survey of the marine resources (MilneBay Community Based Coastal Marine Project, 2001). Theproject itself began in November 2002 (Baines et al., 2006)after funds were released (Callister, 2006a, 2006b; VanHelden,2004).

The GEF funding process is a complicated one. It requires aUnited Nations agency to be the Implementing Agency (in thiscase, the United Nations Development Programme or UNDP)and a local government agency to execute the grant. Since theGEF/UNDP initial assessments indicated the governmentagencies in PNG lacked the capacity to execute the project,CI was named the executing agent of the project. No other

global actor had the local access or expertise. No local actorhad the capacity. CI was the only organization positioned toimplement the project. Thus, CI became the first NGO everto be the executing agency of a GEF grant, a clear exampleof the organization’s global political prowess. 15

(b) Assessing capacity in the Milne Bay Project

Figure 2 uses the spheres of influence framework as an ana-lytical tool to begin assessment of Conservation Interna-tional’s capacity for the Milne Bay Project. The previoussection of this paper highlighted CI’s global capacity. This sec-tion will give additional evidence of global capacity and exam-ine the project’s national and local capacity. The CI experienceclearly illustrates how a TNGO’s global capacity–marked byits ability to influence normative discourse, rules and regula-tions, and markets–not only gives it access to local communi-ties and resources, but also pushes the TNGO to prioritize theglobal over the local.

There were other markers of CI’s global capacity in the cre-ation of the Milne Bay Project. The negotiation of the detailsof the Milne Bay Project was quite drawn out and contentious(Interview 3). As a large bureaucracy, GEF imposed longwaits within the process (i.e., 18 months to complete an agree-ment, another 18 months to wait for the first payment). With abudget of nearly seven million dollars (Government of PapuaNew Guinea, n.d.), 16 the Milne Bay Project was perhaps oneof the largest marine conservation projects to date (Kinch,2003; Kula, 2002) and therefore had many bureaucraticrequirements. In addition, CI had its own administrative pro-cesses. Negotiations took place on multiple issues, includingCI’s overhead rates. CI staff state that they could only survivethe drawn out negotiation process because of CI’s ability toraise funds from other sources (Interview 3), an indication ofglobal political capacity. 17

The project also exhibited some local and bridging capacityin its initial stages. Acting deliberately to answer calls for envi-ronmental TNGOs to incorporate the communities who de-pend upon these resources for life and livelihood in the workof conservation (Grandia, 2004; Khare & Bray, 2004), CIworked both to address the resource threats (including localoverfishing and the introduction of encroaching foreign fishingfleets to the reefs) as well as to implement development activ-ities for the communities. As members of the communitieswho own the resources, local staffers in MB possessed localknowledge (or means of obtaining the knowledge) and theability to communicate about the resources.

However, political and administrative misunderstandings inthe national and local sphere also pepper this project’s shorthistory. 18 For 12–18 months, three international project staffdid not have valid PNG work permits and had to fly to Aus-tralia every 60 days to renew paperwork. As of June 2006, oneproject vehicle had never been licensed and may not have everbeen used. Another vehicle was also unlicensed (Baines et al.,2006). Additionally, while project leadership understood thatthe Napatana Lodge, a local restaurant and inn, was “whereperceptions get made (Interview 6),” they reacted to it by dis-couraging staff from frequenting this popular bar. However,the discussions at this bar, owned and operated by a promi-nent and opinionated expat businesswoman, formed publicopinion on the project. By not participating, CI project stafflost any input into these opinions.

These examples of the project’s capacity (or lack thereof)demonstrate how the spheres of influence framework can helpdetermine points of strength and weakness in TNGO capacity.While the project exhibited political, administrative, and

Figure 2. Sphere-specific capacities for Conservation International in Milne Bay.


technical capacity in multiple spheres, the lack of bridgingcapacity rendered the local capacity useless. The next sectionof this paper will demonstrate how these opportunities tobridge the local and global spheres were relegated by TNGOglobal capacity.

(c) Lost opportunities for bridging

The paradox of global capacity for TNGOs suggests thatthe same dynamic that gives a TNGO access to the localsphere also sets the organization up for failure on the ground.In order to obtain and maintain its command in the globalarena, a TNGO invests in both those global capacities andin the norms that value those capacities. This investment pri-oritizes the global over the local, so that when the TNGO triesto reconcile its values—which simultaneously embrace thecontext-specificity of its on-the-ground work and the univer-sality of its global approach—the global trumps the local, pre-cluding the TNGO from making decisions that favor thecontext. The more the TNGO gains access as the global experton a local community, the more its capacity and identity islinked to the global sphere, and the more constraints it facesin choosing local approaches.

Throughout the life of the project, there were many bridgingopportunities that were undermined by the paradox of globalcapacity. One area that showed bridging promise was that ofoversight. The project had two oversight committees madeup of locals and national actors with the intention of actingas bridges to connect the global and local conservation worldsby assuring that the project obtained its goals while respectinglocal tradition. Moreover, these committees were meant tobuild their own ICCC through exposure to any political con-flict, technical miscommunication, or administrative difficulty

they would be required to resolve (Government of PapuaNew Guinea, 2002; Milne Bay Community Based CoastalMarine Project, 2001). 19

The National Steering Committee represents one such over-sight body that was chaired by the Secretary of the Departmentof National Planning and Rural Development. It includedmembers from other local and national government offices,other TNGOs in PNG, academics and CI leadership. 20 Unfor-tunately, the CI staff and leadership in PNG did not demon-strate bridging capacity when interacting with this oversightbody. Reports and proposed changes to the project were givento the steering committee in long, poorly organized documents(one was 137 pages long), making it less likely that these busypeople would be able to fully grasp the content (Baines et al.,2006). Government officials felt uninformed because projectstaff sent them technical reports on the project “on disk andsmall print” that seemed officious, instead of briefing them inperson on the details of the project (Interview 17).

Without the ability of project staff and leadership to under-stand the cultural expectations of personal, individual, oralcommunication both to convey information and as a formof respect, not only was the committee rendered useless, butmembers were “made to feel uninvited” in the project (Inter-view 17). Had full bridging capacity been present, CI staffwould have known that local officials preferred to be briefedindividually and in person, and could have created time andprocess in the project to do so. This act could have created adomino effect, in turn empowering the steering committee toact as a bridge and building its members’ ICCC understand-ing. Instead, CI’s investment in their global communicationcapacity (manifested in written technical reports that are rev-ered in the global sphere) was prioritized over the local ap-proach.


Another lost opportunity to bridge was embodied in the Vil-lage Engagement Teams (VETs). These groups spent twoyears consulting with local communities on the aims of theproject and created action agendas based on communityneeds. This bridged technical capacity, helping the CI stafflearn about local resource use and ideas of conservation anddevelopment while training the community on CI’s ideas of re-source use, conservation, and development. The VET workalso built political capacity on both sides by exposing actorsto each other’s decision-making and communication pro-cesses.

Despite the VETs’ efforts to bridge capacity divides, a sub-sequent survey of marine resources seemed to directly contra-dict the locally-driven approach of the VETs. 21 To conductthe survey, global scientific experts were brought in for 2–3 months to perform a survey of local resources. These exter-nal experts did not stay within a community, but camped on asmall island nearby (Interview 10). It was a very expensiveundertaking and the sheer scale–with tents, generators andboats–starkly demonstrated the separateness of the spheres(Interview 10). This base camp was not well received by the lo-cals, who see sharing food and shelter as essential for creatingtrust and long-term relationships (Interview 46).

Nevertheless, some CI staff proposed an approach that em-braced the local knowledge of those who had fished in MilneBay for generations. One staff member who was not on thesurvey team went so far as to consult a local elder to helpdetermine which areas were overfished, which were more pris-tine and which fish were threatened by overfishing (Interview10). While the information provided by the elder largely con-firmed the survey data, it did not satisfy the need for an assess-ment compliant with global scientific norms. The story of thisassessment demonstrates how global ideas of technical andpolitical capacity trumped local ideas of the same capacities.Thus, CI’s vast expertise in Western science concurrentlyopened the door for the assessment, yet ultimately diminishedits credibility with the communities in which it worked.

CI had created agreements with many groups including re-source-dependent communities and local organizations. Theseagreements are best characterized not as contracts, but asMemoranda of Understanding (MOU) (Niesten, n.d.). CI staffengaged local actors in much discussion about what theMOUs entailed and great ceremony was associated with theireventual signing (Interview 50). But the administrative andpolitical ideas behind MOUs confused the communities andstaffers. One former CI partner stated: “(CI) stressed thatit’s not a legally binding document. If one partner is not happythey can pull out with 30 days’ notice. If it’s not legal, thenwhy do we need it? It just raises expectations. (The locals) havetheir ways of agreement. Why not just follow that? (Interview50).” Communities in Milne Bay operate more on trust thanon legalities (Interview 9). The MOU was seen as a personalpromise between the local groups and CI. This exit clause alsopuzzled the expatriate partners of CI, who saw CI’s breakingof the MOUs when it exited Milne Bay as undermining CI’sown espoused values of respect and integrity (Interview 9).Additionally, when CI pulled out of the MOUs, local organi-zations were not paid the funding they expected for servicesthey had prepared to deliver (Baines et al., 2006). TheseMOUs represent different cultural understandings of boththe political realm (e.g., communications, partnerships, ethics)and the technical realm (e.g., legal frameworks) of this project:another instance of global legal capacity overshadowing localconcepts of commitment.

When community members did not see an influx of cash intotheir villages, they had very specific ideas about where the

project money was being spent. As one local business ownerput it “From the local perspective, seeing an NGO with flashycars and knowing how much money (they raised), where werethese millions being spent (Interview 12)?” 22 Those who arenot intimate with the administrative and political details ofglobal fundraising might erroneously assume that funds spenton overhead should rather be spent on the project. As a CIstaff member in Washington, D.C. explained “(. . .) most peo-ple hate the idea of overhead. It’s just a simple factor of life–the lights, the building, (. . .) if your institution (infrastructure)doesn’t exist then you can’t get a grant, but the person whogets the grant usually doesn’t care about the institution (infra-structure) (Interview 3).”

Strict rules and analysis generated annually by the USAgency for International Development’s Negotiated IndirectCost Agreement dictate how much of CI (and any US-basedTNGO who does business with the US government) fundingcan go toward overhead and how much must go toward theproject. 23 The issue of high overhead costs brings to lightthe political and administrative needs of building bridges toeducate the local sphere on global funding norms, and a polit-ical paradox. First, these perceptions indicate that not enoughwas done to give locals an accurate description of the project’sfinancial obligations. Second, in order for CI to receive suchfunding for its conservation work, it must show global politi-cal prowess and spend funds on strategically-located offices inWashington, D.C. and on relatively expensive offices in MilneBay that have the global communication capacity (i.e., inter-net and phone technologies) expected of a successful TNGO.

Without this global political prowess, CI would not have hadaccess to evaluate the resources in Milne Bay or solicit fundingfor their conservation. While local staff and communities maycriticize CI for its global political capacity, without this capac-ity there would be no project. Overhead is a TNGO necessitythat needs to be clearly communicated across spheres.

(d) Individual leadership versus broader dynamics

Individuals who have the intercultural and cross-culturalunderstanding to bridge this divide are few. Even where theydo exist, they are often powerless against the institutionalforces that are blind to both the need for a conduit betweenspheres, and to the dominance of the global sphere in projectchoices. When asked, long before the demise of the project, ifthis was a typical initiative for the organization, CI senior staffin DC said “it is typical in that it is context sensitive. It’s notone-size fits all conservation (Interview 3).” How then, withstaff and leaders espousing the importance of context, did itfail? The answer lies in the spheres of influence frameworkfor capacity and the paradox it reveals. That is, in buildingthe global capacities needed to gain access to local resourcesand communities, CI subscribed to and reinforced a hierarchyof spheres, reducing its own power to bridge local and globalspheres.

The initial project planning team demonstrated great bridg-ing potential. It consisted of a Milne Bay government official,and two CI employees: one a PNG national, and the other anAustralian anthropologist married to a PNG woman who re-sides in Milne Bay. The anthropologist eventually became thetemporary head of the project or acting Chief Technical Advi-sor (CTA). This group had experience in both the globalsphere of conservation and the local sphere of Milne Bay,and created the project’s initial plan with bridging mechanismsof Village Engagement Teams, and National and ProvincialSteering Committees. Thus, they possessed cross-culturalunderstanding and were willing to serve as a bridge between


Milne Bay and Washington, D.C. Their effectiveness in usher-ing in the above mechanisms indicated that they initially hadpower within the project to make organizational decisions asa bridge. However, as the project was about to transition fromplanning to implementation, the acting CTA left the projectfor both personal and professional reasons and the PNG CIemployee left to conduct terrestrial conservation work else-where.

The search for a permanent CTA would ultimately result inthis constant primacy of the global over the local, as thechange in leadership marked the beginning of broad disem-powerment of bridges. The local government expert from theproposal leadership team was not qualified for the position be-cause, according to staff members, the position required con-servation experience in multiple locales and a PhD(Interviews 19 and 9). He was, however, hired as the secondin charge, with the unwritten expectation that once he ac-quired sufficient capacity, he might lead the project in its sec-ond phase (Interviews 2 and 3).

Since CI was now forced to look outside of the project for itsnew leader, the search was difficult 24 and it took eighteenmonths for CI to select a permanent CTA. While the project’snew leader had no experience working in PNG, he did have aPhD, recent experience with marine protected areas in Austra-lia, and management experience on a large-scale project in Ye-men. His experience in the developing world indicated that hewas able to act as a bridge in some contexts. Also, given thenumber of local staff working in Milne Bay (including the pro-ject’s second in command), and the bureaucratic requirementsof a large GEF/UNDP project, one can understand why CI’scentral office prioritized these global capacities over localcapacities for the project.

Despite the CTA’s formal training and bridging potential,his lack of ICCC understanding in Milne Bay coupled withglobal pressures on the project acted as an insurmountablebarrier for bridging. Although there was bridging potential be-tween the CTA and the second in command, community mem-bers and former employees were discouraged that the capacitybuilding seemed only to go one way; in their minds the CTAwas there to demonstrate to the local leaders the global orWashington, D.C. approaches to project management (assome informants called it the “top-down way” (Interviews14, 19, and 43)) without having to learn local approaches him-self. After CI pulled out of Milne Bay in 2006, local staff com-plained about not having any input into either the day-to-dayworkings or the overall approach of the project. While this re-search cannot speak to his desire to bridge, the above doesindicate that the CTA had little cultural understanding ofthe local and that the second in command had both limitedunderstanding of the global norms of the field and very limitedpower to make decisions.

There were other actors within the project who could haveacted as bridges between the spheres of influence CI inhabited.Other employees, former employees, and conservation expertsfrom Papua New Guinea were prevalent in the project’s na-tional and local steering committees. The Village EngagementTeams were created to act as bridges between the project andthe resource-dependent communities. Some CI staff andleadership in Washington, D.C. had extensive experienceand publication records indicating their cultural understand-ing of conservation in Papua New Guinea. Many of these localactors had authority to make organizational decisions ini-tially. As discussed above, the Washington, D.C.-based staffwere caught in a difficult situation. While many informantscomplained that CI-D.C. did not exercise appropriate over-sight of the project management team (Baines et al., 2006),

exerting more control over this team would have exhibitedthe very top-down management style the CTA himself was ac-cused of.

Other analyses of this project lay responsibility for its failuresquarely on the shoulders of CI’s leadership or project man-agement in general (Baines et al., 2006; Dowie, 2008). Whileit would be easy to demonize individuals, even former CI part-ners in Milne Bay say “Don’t blame everything on (the CTA).He had some wrong approaches but there were other thingsgoing on (Interview 41).” Indeed, leadership of this projectcould have made different decisions. However, knowing nowthat even the leadership team understood the importance ofcontext within the project, why still did they not create a con-text-specific intervention?

One major pressure to prioritize the global over the local,context-specific approach was the project timeline, which re-quired staff to produce results in a very short period of time.The eighteen months taken to find and hire the CTA took pro-ductive time out of the project. Because of funding agree-ments, the deadline for the first tranche of the projectremained the same, leaving only three years instead of fiveto complete Phase One (Baines et al., 2006). The CTA didnot have time to acquire the local and bridging capacities heneeded—or to empower them in others—to make the projecta success. The rigidity of the project’s timelines did not allowany actor to make decisions that would bridge spheres.

This discussion of the limiting factors of intercultural andcross-cultural understanding and bridging, points to broaderinstitutional dynamics that limit bridging power. The urgencyof TNGO missions is one limitation to bridging capacity.Building local and bridging capacity takes time, an elementmost TNGOs see as a luxury (West, 2006). If they do notact at once to save ecosystems, species will go extinct. IfTNGOs do not work immediately to protect and improve hu-man rights, socio-economic development, or public healthacross the globe, human beings will, with no hyperbole, die.If TNGOs do not act now, these undesirable results will beirreversible. Given the urgency of their missions, TNGOswould likely wonder how to possibly pause to create theseadditional capacities. However, this urgency also limits anorganization’s ability to become a true learning organization.If TNGOs could engage in double loop learning (Senge, 1990),they would create processes that incorporate cross-culturalperspectives and empower bridges to make decisions that re-flect those perspectives, making long-term, durable changemore likely.

Another pressure on TNGOs to prioritize global over localis the scale of the work. The problems TNGOs tackle crossstate boundaries by definition. With so many locales sufferingthe same threats and indignities, TNGOs rely on extrapolatingbest practices and trying to scale up local efforts. Project scale,coupled with the urgency of mission, disempowers the bridgesneeded to make interventions context-specific.

This is precisely how successful TNGOs set themselves upfor failure on the ground. Using their global capacities as ex-pert fundraisers, media facilitators, international negotiators,and scientists, they create policy niches for themselves in somelocal sphere. To gain local access, they must focus on demon-strating facility in Bernstein and Cashore’s (2000) first threepaths of non-domestic policy influence, emphasizing and pri-oritizing certain global capacities over the local and bridgingcapacities that will help them on the ground. While theymay not initially have the capacity at this local sphere to affectlasting change, if they do acquire it through hiring local staffor partnering, they still lack the bridging capacity to effectivelymaneuver between spheres. Even if they have access to local


capacity and potential bridges, their investment in creatingand promoting the norms of the global sphere—the same pri-oritizing of paths that bring them funding and access to re-mote resources—undercuts their power to make decisions astrue bridges. These norms favor global approaches to political,administrative, and technical ways of doing business, devalu-ing bridges’ inter-cultural and cross-cultural understanding,de-incentivizing actors’ desires to be bridges, and disempower-ing potential bridges’ abilities to make decisions based on theICCC understanding. The more TNGOs invest in creating glo-bal norms that do not allow for flexibility and context-specific-ity, the less effective any potential bridges will be, thusensuring TNGO failure on the ground. When in doubt ofhow to proceed under the circumstances of urgency andlarge-scale conservation, CI leadership repeatedly demon-strated this dynamic, reverting to global capacities of Westernscience, ICDPs, and Western communication styles.

4. CONCLUSION: BUILDING BRIDGES FORTRANSNATIONAL WORK

The difficulties bridging global, and multiple national andlocal capacities are not unique to CI’s work in Milne Bay. In-deed, transnational NGOs experience these difficulties regard-less of location or focus. More research must be done onbridging leadership to discern and recognize manifestationsof it in different contexts; to develop processes of buildingbridging capacity, which must simultaneously be global/uni-versal and local/context-specific; and to both identify andmeticulously dismantle the institutional norms that limitbridging leadership without completely eliminating TNGOs’access to local communities. The question this article raises re-quires multiple disciplines to answer.

The role of local actors and activists in this dynamic must bemore closely examined. A CI partner in Milne Bay said thatthe project’s second in command “was supposed to be the link-age between CI and MBPG (but) it didn’t work because he gottoo carried away. (. . .)I’d get carried away too, I suppose, if Iworked for a big NGO and wanted to have the American wayhere (Interview 43).” If the concept of a bridge demands acommitment to act as a bridge, what difference does it makeif no local actors want to bridge? While more research needsto be done on the traits of effective bridging leadership, onecould hypothesize that whether or not a local leader prefersto assimilate–to prioritize global capacities of the TNGO overlocal capacities–TNGOs need local capacity to achieve theirmission. Unless the entire community quickly starts exhibitingglobal capacity, TNGOs need to figure out how to operate inthe local sphere. To be clear, this marks the difference betweenSteinberg’s spheres of influence approach (2001, 2003) and mynew application of it to capacity: where Steinberg focuses ondomestic policy change, with domestically grounded bilateralactivists who bridge the spheres, this new framework focuseson TNGOs achieving their missions, and therefore places theresponsibility of bridging leadership on the transnationalorganizations and not the local actors.

Being the only global experts in a network, as CI was in Mil-ne Bay, is essential to creating the policy niche for theseTNGOs. However, it is alone insufficient to predict TNGOfailure. Do networks with multiple TNGOs prioritize spheresdifferently? I would hypothesize that the more unique theTNGO’s expertise (a uniqueness that might be directly relatedto the remoteness of the resource), the longer the TNGOwould enjoy its position as the only global expert on the localsphere. The less unique its expertise, the more the TNGO

enjoys the role of first mover in the network, but with othercompeting and collaborating TNGOs in the network. Moreglobal experts in a network could mean more opportunity tocreate bridging capacity in a network. Yet, it could also meanthat the norms that prioritize global capacity over local orbridging capacity are amplified, since these global experts mustalso subscribe to the capacity hierarchy in order to gain accessto the resource. More research must be done to determine theeffect of multiple global actors on bridging capacity.

While inter-cultural and cross-cultural understanding mayseem like an obvious and prevalent skill for professionalswhose work specializes in transnational contexts, scholarsand practitioners must determine both the extent of bridgingpotential and the limiting dynamics at play at the individual,organization, and network level. For example, ICCC under-standing grows with experience. However, since the more sea-soned transnational professionals are also more likely to havefamily and financial obligations that make moving to the re-mote locations of ICDPs less likely, does this mean that theresulting pool of potential project leaders will be limited tothose with less experience and, therefore, less interculturalunderstanding? When spheres, cultural norms, and ways ofpolitically, administratively and technically operating collide,how is the appropriate way forward chosen? How are thesechoices explained to parties in the multiple spheres such thatthe discussion builds intercultural understanding rather thanresentment and suspicion?

The desire to act as a bridge may also seem obvious and pre-valent in people who choose careers in transnational NGOs.However, given the difficulty in bridging as we have seen, theremust be disincentives that TNGO professionals face, whichquell or discourage this desire. What happens to individualswho contradict the global norms of TNGOs, even on behalfof the communities they serve? How can actors incentivizethe desire to act as bridges? How can TNGOs and their fundersempower potential bridges to make decisions that create truelearning organizations (Senge, 1990): decisions that questionnot only an organization’s strategies but also the assumptionsupon which those strategies are based? Can organizationalfields like conservation and development encourage cross-learning between projects without inappropriate extrapolationof lessons learned? Can we encourage an approach of “bestquestions” to assess the context and appropriateness of lessonslearned, in place of a “best practices” approach?

While this paper concentrated on conservation efforts in Pa-pua New Guinea, it offers a framework for a broader conver-sation about the growing number of non-governmentalorganizations who operate simultaneously at global and localspheres, and as both advocacy and service delivery organiza-tions. This paper’s analytical frameworks are meant to be use-ful tools for designing training for bridging leadership,assessing bridging potential for recruitment and retention pur-poses of an organization, and analyzing network-wide powerdynamics. My intent is to begin the discussion of how bestto balance the global capacity that successful transnationalNGOs offer to define problems, raise funds, and get local is-sues on a global agenda with the context-specific capacity theiron-the-ground work requires. This paper illustrates a frame-work by which TNGOs can explain their effectiveness or inef-fectiveness in various spheres, and begin to create globalnorms for administrative, political, and technical capacity thatwill foster and embrace true intercultural and cross-culturalcapacity to enable bridging leadership to flourish. UntilTNGOs transform the norms of the global sphere to allowthese bridges to thrive, they will continue to set themselvesup for failure on the ground.


NOTES

1. These groups of actors working on an issue (i.e. networks) demon-strate relationships ranging from being full partners working to achievethe same mission, mere acknowledgement or permission to operate in ageographic area, or even conflict. While the literature distinguishesbetween policy networks and advocacy networks, the nature of theseTNGOs who both advocate and provide services blurs the line. Thus thispaper simply calls these relationships “networks.” See Brinkerhoff (1999),Pal (1997), and Brown, Batliwala, et al. (2007).

2. See Lipsky (2010) for more on street level bureaucrats.

3. Other examples of TNGO failure or perceived failure in the localsphere abound. Development and relief TNGOs in Somalia and Rwandahave been accused of perpetuating the suffering they are charged toameliorate (Lipsky, 2010; Maren, 1997). Even with more NGOs per capitathan any other country in the world, most of them transnational, Haiti’sproblems in health and development still have not been solved (Doucet,2011).

4. Another example of changing norms demanding different capacity isthe changing government structure and responsibility brought on bydiffusion of New Public Management, which requires different politicaland administrative capacities for TNGOs than a traditional bureaucraticgovernment structure (Minogue, 2001).

5. Habitat destruction, overharvesting, port development, destructivefishing in the form of dynamite, gill netting, reef gleaming, trawling, andbycatch (Hunnum, Jenkins, et al., 2001; Kula, 2002) are also named withless frequency. Specifically, overharvesting of sedentary species like Bechede Mer, trochus and the giant clam are highlighted. Destructive fishingtechniques like the ones found in the live reef fish trade and targetingspawning aggregations are also threats. Run-off and sedimentation arealso potential threats to ecosystem health (Milne Bay Community BasedCoastal Marine Project, 2005).

6. Total protein consumption is low in Milne Bay, and up to 80% ofanimal protein comes from coral reef species (Milne Bay CommunityBased Coastal Marine Project, 2005). Over 62% of local people in MilneBay are dependent on the marine and coastal resources of the NetuliIsland Area (CI’s first project site in Milne Bay) (Milne Bay CommunityBased Coastal Marine Project, 2005) and an estimated 80% of the provincedepends on marine resources from the areas of highest conservation valuefor cash incomes and subsistence (VanHelden, 2004).

7. The staff of the project recognized capacity building and fostering thecreation of MPAs as the primary goals of this project (Interview 3). Theyacknowledged that since this project was a part of the UNDP, it wouldalways have development content to it. This development approach alsoresponded to the needs of the resource owners who wanted to improvetheir living situations and do so by using the reef resources.

8. Capacity would be built through formal training workshops, hiring orseconding individuals in the CI offices, and informally through basicinteractions that expose actors to concepts, processes and norms of theorganization. Local actors like the Provincial Government, Local LevelGovernment, village or ward leaders, local non-governmental organiza-tions (e.g. business associations, church development groups, and thenewly formed resource owner associations) as well as individuals withinthe community would acquire skills to perform the administrative (e.g.management skills, priority setting, budgeting, time management, staffmanagement), technical (land mediation, assessment and establishment ofmarine protected areas, household gardens), and political (e.g. planning,

policymaking and enforcement, intra-governmental communication andcollaboration, leadership, conflict management) tasks of implementing theproject in Milne Bay (Milne Bay Community Based Coastal MarineProject, 2005).

9. These certification schemes are non-state, market-driven efforts toensure that products meet certain environmental or social standards intheir collection, processing, transport, and sale (Auld et al., 2009).

10. Google Scholar lists 9880 citations of this article from both scholarlyand other sources (Google Scholar, 2013).

11. These were not the first publications to discuss biodiversity hotspots.Norman Myers and Russell Mittermeier had published on the topic overseveral previous years (see Mittermeier, Myers, Thomsen, Da Fonseca, &Olivieri, 1998; Myers, 1988). However, the use of the article in Nature hasbeen cited at least four times as often as any previous writing on theconcept (Web of Science, 2013).

12. These six conventions include the Convention on Biological Diver-sity, the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of WildAnimals, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species ofWild Fauna and Flora, the International Treaty on Plant GeneticResources for Food and Agriculture, the Ramsar Convention onWetlands, and the World Heritage Convention (Liaison Group of theBiodiversity-related Conventions, 2009).

13. CI’s own website confirms this (Conservation International, 2012b):“Every day, CI staff is on the ground in 28 countries building personalrelationships with local people empowered to enact change. As a result,we’re invited to the table when local, regional, and national leaders needguidance crafting environmentally friendly policies. We’re ready to helpthem make responsible choices articulated with the most recent globalguidance.”

14. The Global Environment Facility was founded in 1991 by the UnitedNations Development Programme, the United Nations EnvironmentProgramme, and the World Bank to fund efforts to protect the globalenvironment and promote sustainable development. It has since becomethe financial mechanisms to implement the Convention on BiologicalDiversity, The United Nations Framework Convention on ClimateChange, the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants,and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification. It is the largest publicfunder of environmentally-focused projects around the globe (The GlobalEnvironment Facility, 2005).

15. While the proposal was submitted by the Government of Papua NewGuinea and the agreement is a legal instrument between the Governmentof Papua New Guinea and UNDP, Conservation International was theexecuting agency who would perform the tasks and manage the funds(Government of Papua New Guinea, 2002).

16. This includes funding from the GEF, the Japanese Human Devel-opment Trust Fund, the UNDP, the Government of PNG (in kind), CI,Australian National University, and ACIAR (Government of Papua NewGuinea, 2002).

17. GEF was concerned about the administrative capacity of the CIoffice in Papua New Guinea to perform the grant and required a capacityassessment of the TNGO. This capacity assessment flagged key areas inthe PNG offices that needed improvement. CI headquarters in Washing-ton D.C. and its PNG national field offices in Port Moresby drew up plans


to address these shortcomings to satisfy GEF’s concerns—bridging thegap between the CI PNG staff’s national and GEF’s global administrativecapacity—and included them in the proposal. This demonstrated CI’sglobal administrative and political acumen: its ability to navigate thedemands of the GEF for the opportunity to execute the grant.

18. The project’s financial reporting is further evidence of the lack oflocal political and administrative capacity. Financial reports were notalways presented in the form requested because the project’s two mainoverseers—CI and UNDP—had different reporting processes and require-ments. Their accounting systems were not compatible with each other,often making reporting a double task (Callister, 2006b; Interviews 8 and14), causing conflict between the CI headquarters and the MB office(Interview 10), and requiring costly, out-of-country training for MB staff.The difficulty the MB office had in keeping up with changes in accountingsoftware were reflected in its high turnover of accounting staff in Alotau–four financial managers in less than 30 months (Baines, Duguman, et al.,2006; Interviews 14 and 19).

19. If there was clear and consistent evidence in the reports that thecurrent activities were failing to meet their objectives, the SteeringCommittee could not alter project objectives or outputs—only projectactivities and/or implementation arrangements. Changes to GEF fundedactivity required the consent of the GEF/UNDP executive coordinator orhis representative (Government of Papua New Guinea, 2002).

20. Other members include the Department of Environment andConservation Deputy Chair, the MBPG Administrator, the NationalFisheries Authority Manager of Sedentary Fisheries, the CI Director forthe Melanesia Program, the UNDP Assistant Resident Representative, aUniversity of PNG Senior Lecturer in Biology and the WWF CountryDirector (Government of Papua New Guinea, 2002).

21. The VET’s work in establishing relationships with communities anddiscussing the benefits of conservation in and of itself were alsoundermined by the global ICDP idea of the project’s sustainable livelihood“options.” Once the assessments of the communities were completed, CI

staff would present the communities with potential options for protectedareas and alternative incomes. These options came from a vast array ofproject learning from other sites—a best practice approach often reveredin conservation. These options did not come from the communities’ ideasof how they would develop themselves. It was an expert-driven processrather than a community-driven one—as if the community consultationsfrom just a few years before had never occurred (Callister, 2006b). Inaddition, the word “options” itself was problematic. It was a new word formany community members, and was eventually equated with the conceptof a promise, instead of potential programming. In the global sphere, theseoptions are seen as a technical approach to implementing ICDPs. As anindependent researcher in the field, sources would often ask me to have CIcome back and “do the options” like they said they would do, indicatingthat while the vocabulary of ICDPs had entered the communities, theconcept had not (Interview 41). This preference for the literal is notconfined to the idea of options. One volunteer told the story of a trip to avillage, where he turned to another volunteer and said something like “thisplace it great, we should come back here sometime” The villagers took thisas literal and recently mentioned to another volunteer that they were angryand disappointed he had yet to return (Interview 41).

22. Another community member stated “They talked about conservationand tourism, but ended up spending money on other things, fancy cars andoffices” (Interview 48).

23. One local stated “GEF allowed only 12–15% overhead (. . .) but thereare estimates that CI takes up to 25% overhead—not an honest bunch inmy estimate. . .” (Interview 10). However, according to CI employees inDC, the GEF would not allow for the overhead rate allowed by USAID,so CI actually had to fundraise for its overhead separately to subsidize theGEF agreement (Interview 3). This contradictory information clearlyindicates the absence of bridges.

24. Of course, the ideal candidate would have both experience working inthe region and experience managing a large integrated conservationproject. Finding a person who fit this description and was also willing tomove to a remote location was close to impossible.

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APPENDIX LIST. OF INTERVIEWS

onservation International, Washington, D.C.ion International, Washington, D.C.ion International, Washington, D.C.ion International, Washington, D.C.onservation International, telephone conversationonservation International, Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea

uinea Government, Port Moresby, Papua New Guineans Development Programme, Port Moresby, Papua New Guineaand Local Business Owner, Alotau, Papua New Guinea

onservation International, Alotau, Papua New Guineahurch Development Fund Association, Alotau, Papua New Guineaand Local Business Owner, Alotau, Papua New Guineaand Environmentalist, Alotau, Papua New Guineaion International, Alotau, Papua New GuineaAlotau, Papua New Guinea

e Bay Church Development Fund Association, Alotau, PNGrovincial Government, Alotau, Papua New GuineaAlotau, Papua New Guinea

onservation International, Alotau, Papua New Guineaonservation International, Alotau, Papua New Guinea

Netuli, Milne Bay, Papua New GuineaNetuli, Milne Bay, Papua New GuineaNetuli, Milne Bay, Papua New Guinea



















































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Interview # Interview date Source description

24 12/10/06 Community Member, Netuli, Milne Bay, Papua New Guinea25 12/10/06 Community Member, Netuli, Milne Bay, Papua New Guinea26 12/10/06 Community Member, Netuli, Milne Bay, Papua New Guinea27 12/11/06 Community Member, Nuakata, Milne Bay, Papua New Guinea28 12/11/06 Community Member, Nuakata, Milne Bay, Papua New Guinea29 12/11/06 Community Member, Nuakata, Milne Bay, Papua New Guinea30 12/11/06 Community Member, Nuakata, Milne Bay, Papua New Guinea31 12/11/06 Community Member, Nuakata, Milne Bay, Papua New Guinea32 12/12/06 Community Member, Nuakata, Milne Bay, Papua New Guinea33 12/12/06 Community Member, Nuakata, Milne Bay, Papua New Guinea34 12/12/06 Community Member, Nuakata, Milne Bay, Papua New Guinea35 12/12/06 Community Member, Nuakata, Milne Bay, Papua New Guinea36 12/12/06 Community Member, Nuakata, Milne Bay, Papua New Guinea37 12/12/06 Community Member, Nuakata, Milne Bay, Papua New Guinea38 12/12/06 Community Member, Nuakata, Milne Bay, Papua New Guinea39 12/12/06 Community Member, Nuakata, Milne Bay, Papua New Guinea40 12/13/06 Milne Bay Community Member and Local Business Owner, Alotau, Papua New Guinea41 12/13/06 Former Volunteer, AUSAID, Alotau, Papua New Guinea42 12/13/06 Employee, Conservation International, Alotau, Papua New Guinea43 12/13/06 Former Official and Community Member, Milne Bay Provincial Government, Alotau, PNG44 12/13/06 Milne Bay Community Member and Local Business Owner, Alotau, Papua New Guinea45 12/15/06 Employee, United Nations Development Programme, Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea46 12/15/06 Employee, The Nature Conservancy, Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea47 12/15/06 Employee, The Nature Conservancy, Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea48 12/13/06 Milne Bay Community Member and Environmentalist, Alotau, Papua New Guinea49 12/9/06 Board member, Milne Bay Church Development Fund Association, Alotau, PNG50 12/13/06 Former Volunteer, AUSAID, Alotau, Papua New Guinea51 07/12/06 Hatohobei Expert, Koror, Palau


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