How many nondualities are there?

DAVID LOY

HOW MANY N O N D U A L I T I E S ARE T H E R E ?

The nonduality of subject and object is the central claim of several important

Oriental philosophies for example, Taoism (Chuang Tzu: "When self and

other lose their contrariety, there we have the very essence of the Tao." 1 ), Mahfiyana Buddhism (A~vagho.sa: " . . . from the beginning corporeal form

and mind have been nondual". 2) and Advaita (Tat tram asi as the nondifference

of atman and Brahman). This common claim is so extraordinary, so much at

variance from commonsense and yet so fundamental to all these systems,

that it deserves more attention thatn it has received; in particular, comparative

and cross-cultural studies of this phenomenon have been lacking.

One cannot study the relevant literature without a suspicion arising. For all the systems that incorporate this claim, the nondual nature of reality is

revealed only in the experience of enlightenment or liberation, which is

experiencing nondually (or realizing that experience always has been nondual).

Enlightenment is the hinge upon which each metaphysic turns. Unlike Western philosophy, which tends to reflect on commonplace experience accessible to

all, these systems make far-reaching epistemological and metaphysical claims

on the basis of nonordinary experience accessible to very few - or to be more precise, accessible only to those who are willing to follow the rigorous path,

who are very few. (It is not that these claims are not empirical, but they are

grounded on evidence not readily available, which is of course the root of the difficulty in evaluating them.) Another significant similarity among these

different descriptions of enlightenment is that the experience cannot be attained or understood through conceptual means, because it transcends all

categories of thought, This means that the nondual experience transcends philosophy itself and all its ontological claims, to which one cannot help but respond: are these philosophies then based upon, and pointing to, the same nondual experience? During the experience itself there is no phil- osophizing, but if and when one "steps down" and tries to explain what has been experienced, perhaps a variety of descriptions are possible. Maybe

Journal o f Indian Philosophy 11 (1983)413-426. 0022-1791/83/0114-0413 $01.40. O 1983 by D. ReidelPublishing Company.

414 DAVID LOY

conflicting ontologies can be erected upon the same epistemological ground.

Consider the relationship between two systems which are both very close

and diametrically opposed: Advaita Vedanta and Mah~y~na Buddhism.

T R. V. Murti has characterized them as the Substance-view and the Modal-

view of Reality; the former asserts self (atman), substance (svabhava) and

permanence in contrast to the no-self, lack of substance and impermanence

of the lat ter) The fact that these two views are such mirror-images of each

other should awaken our suspicions. Is the question of deciding what is

Real - assigning ontological status - a value-decision made according to what

one chooses to emphasize? The well-known simile of water and waves is

useful here. Water represents the empty Absolute, and waves are its

phenomenal manifestation in time and space. The waves never lose their

intrinsic nature as water; they have no self-nature of their own, being simply

a form or manifestation of the water. Yet to emphasize only the unchanging

water is to miss the fact that water does not exist in an undifferentiated

state but constantly manifests itself only as waves, currents, eddies, etc.

So what really exists? The point here is that a variety of answers are possible,

and the difference between these answers is not a disagreement over what is

seen but over how one chooses to interpret it. One might say that there is

only one thing, the water, and that waves do not really exist, since they are

just the forms that water takes. Conversely, one might claim that there are

only waves, since there is no undifferentiated formless water. The answer

one gives will also determine whether there is permanence or impermanence.

If there is only the water, and the waves are dismissed as mere forms, then

there is no change: water remains the same, despite any oscillations that

may occur. But if there are only waves, and if the unchanging water is dismissed

as a thought-construction, then there is only change and no permanence.

Whore the analogy fails is that we can identify water and differentiate it

from other things (air, land), whereas the ~anyatd of Buddhism and the Nirgu.na-Brahman of Vedanta cannot be characterized in" any way. The simile would work better if water were all-pervasive so that we were in it and of it,

and so unable to distinguish it as an it. And this suggests another analogy

which may or may not be more than an analogy.

II

Comparing ganyatd to empty space is an analogy that naturally suggests

HOW MANY NONDUALITIES ARE THERE? 415

itself when we try to describe that which has no characteristics. In Buddhism,

for examples, space has been used as a simile for the Yog~c~ira parinllspanna, the dharmadhdtu, and the Pure Land. 4 In his paper on "Oriental Nothingness," s

Shin-ichi Hisamatsu lists the space-like "characteristics" o f ganyatd: as

empty space itself, Oriental Nothingness is all-pervasive, unobstructed

and unobstructing, pure, formless, unattainable, stable, empty, unattached,

impartial, voiding voidness (beyond the distinction between void and

non-void), and without any distinction between inner and outer - an

excellent analogy for nonduality. Where the analogy does not work is that

empty-space, as usually understood, has neither awareness nor life, whereas

emptiness for Mah~y~na, Brahman for Vedanta, and the Tao for Taoism are

the source of everything including consciousness.

But let us eliminate this difference by supposing that space is conscious -

that as a result of some experience I were to realize that "my" consciousness

is not mine at alk but is an aspect of space itself. This follows the analogy of

Vedanta which compares liberation to realizing that the space inside a sealed

pot is not and never has been separate from the infinite space around it.

However, this empty Mind-space (as I shall inelegantly refer to it) is not

completely void in one sense: co-existing with it are various things in space,

except that this "in" is now peculiar. This infinite Mind-space encompasses

all things, so rather than speaking of things as being "in" space, it seems more

appropriate to say that they are "of" space - that is, they are what Mind-

space is "doing" in that particular time-place. Consciousness is now, as

Safikara would say, not "of" something but "as" something: all phenomena

are the various ways in which this empty Mind-space manifests itself. Although

this Mind-space has no attributes in itself (the previous list of characteristics

is really a series of neti, neti), a multitude of phenomena arise within it and

of it in this fashion - yet, paradoxically, the Mind-space remains unchanging

and unchanged by these phenomena; their appearing and disappearing do not

disturb the peaceful empty Mind-ground from which they arise. These

phenomena, of course, are not material and do not persist in themselves, but

are rather processes in constant transformation.

Last but not least, this experience seems to be noetic: revelatory of The Way Things Really Are. But if "I" , having had this experience, were to be asked what

I had realized about the nature of Reality, how would I answer? It seems to me

that differing and contradictory ontological conclusions might be derived. We can imagine the following conversation among people who have had this experience

416 DAVID LOY

(A) "There are two real substances, both of which are omnipresent,

although they do not interfere with each other or interact. One is unchanging,

attributeless Mind-space, which is what I now realize my mind has always

been. The other is more difficult to characterize; I suppose we can call it

an "energy stuff", or perhaps a fine "matter stuff" except that it is dynamic

and constantly transforming, taking different forms although not really

changing its nature since these are just the forms that it takes. The difference

between these two substances is now clear to me: the problem before was that

these two were confused because my Mind-space tended to fixate on various

forms of the energy-stuff and so was not aware of its own true empty nature.

But now I realize that the unchanging Mind-space and the constantly-changing

energy-stuff are quite different from each other and always have been."

(B) "The previous speaker is mistaken. Only one thing exists: this

unchanging, qualityless Mind-space, which is what I and everything else really

are. The constantly-changing forms arise within and from this Mind-space

and are simply illusions which deceive us; they have no substance or reality

of their own, for they are only appearances which represent nothing but only

manifest the Mind-space. Before, " I" was clinging to these forms and reified

them into things that objectively self-exist - something the previous speaker

still seems to be doing - but I realize now that is an error. There is only one

Reality: this Mind-space, which in itself has no attributes and is a birthless,

deathless and unchanging whole."

(C) "What the others have called "Mind-space' cannot really be said to

exist because it has no characteristics at all: it is empty, literally nothing, and

how can nothing be "Real"? What ' T ' have realized is that there is no "I" at

all and never was; all that does exist are those constantly-transforming

appearances - or rather the "attribute-elements" of which they are composed

and which are now experienced clearly. I agree with the others that there

are no self-existing physical objects, for these attributes do not depend upon

or refer to any material substance; but these constantly-changing attributes are

themselves real. It is quite right to say that a cluster of red patches does not represent a flower, but those patches do exist - how could that be denied?

"I" am not aware of the red patch, for there is no ' T ' to be aware of it,

but the patches themselves do appear and disappear and seem to interact with

each other. However, it doesn't matter anymore what attributes arise or pass

away, now that the sense of " I" has evaporated." (D) "I agree with the previous speaker that the first two speakers, by


referring to Mind-space, have made something out of nothing - that is,

have hypostatized emptiness into a substance. Yet I must also agree with

the second speaker that phenomena are not real, for they too are empty.

He says they are empty because they are mere appearances of 'Mind-space',

but I say they are empty because they are mere appearances of nothing, without any self-nature of their own. The various attributes arise from

nowhere, interact with each other, and disappear - how can such transient,

interdependent phenomena be said to be real? Except for the first speaker,

we all ,,,ree that these appearances do not refer to any material substratum,

but the previous speaker tries to make these attributes into little substances.

Emptiness is their source and ground; but to say that emptiness is their

ground means that they have no ground. Because everything is groundless,

then nothing can be said to exist or be real.

"However, merely to say that everything is empty is one-sided. There is

not the voidness of empty-space, for myriad phenomena do arise. To denigrate

these phenomena as illusion is unfair - that is 'clinging to emptiness' (or,

in the terms of the second speaker, 'clinging to Mind-space'). Perhaps this is

an overreaction to the opposite problem of 'clinging to form', which occurred

earlier when we were ignorant. But one should cling to nothing. Phenomena

are illusory only if we are deceived by them; now that we have realized that

they are empty appearances, we should accept them for what they are and

play with them freely. That is life: the dance may be empty and have no

meaning, but there is still the empty dance."

(E) "I agree with the previous speaker, but he does not go far enough. We

have realized The Way Things Really Are, that the world is nondual, but

we should not be so infatuated with this new way of experiencing that we

become prejudiced against the ordinary, dualistic mode. That too is an over-

reaction against duality - and in another sense is still dualistic. I grant that

nonduality is revelatory of the truth in a way that duality is not, but that

does not imply that we should 'cling to nonduality. ' We should not dualistically

reject one mode in favor of another. Let us accept that there are these two

ways of experiencing, without prejudice against either. Our aim should be to

understand the relation between these two modes fully in order to be able

to experience either at will."

(F) "This experience we have had implies no ontological conclusion; from it we cannot deduce that anything exists or does not exist. We cannot

characterize the experience in any way, not even as nondual, for to label

418 DAVID LOY

experience is to re-present it, whereas the experience is what present when

we are not re-presenting. Yet re-presenting is what philosophy always does. So our experience transcends philosophy and cannot be grasped philosophically - why then try to describe it in the dualistic categories of language, which can only be misunderstood? If what is important is to gain this experience,

we should rather be concerned to demonstrate the inadequacy of philosophy,

both as a description of this experience and as a method for attaining it."

(G) "All the previous speakers assume that this experience is revelatory of

'The Way Things Really Are', but I do not see that it need be taken as noetic at all. What I experienced was a miracle: God manifested Himself to me and

then we merged together into the blissful voidness of the Godhead. But this was only a temporary irruption of God into the natural order, His material

creation, from which He later withdrew to end the experience, leaving the

physical world to operate as usual according to the scientific laws that He

has established to order it. To suppose that this brief union of my soul with Him reveals something about the nature of this world is blasphemy: God is

so perfect and I am so sinful and selfish by nature that there is an infinite,

insurmountable gap between us which only He in His grace can overcome -

and even that is only temporary."

All of these responses, A through G, are possible reactions to the experience of the empty Mind-space. The first view, A's, is that of S~irhkhya-Yoga,

whose dualistic metaphysics distinguishes puru.sa (Mind-space) from prakri (phenomena). However, my characterization of that position is not quite

satisfactory, for two reasons. First, the analogy had to be constructed in such a way as to falsify the claim that prakrti is an independent substance. In

order to include the S~rfikhya position, the relationship between Mind- space and phenomena should have been left undetermined and ambiguous,

but practically it is impossible for any description to avoid a bias towards either the independence or the dependence of these two; all description must also be interpretation. So a nondual prejudice has been built into the analogy: phenomena and Mind-space do not simply co-exist, but phenomena are a manifestation of Mind-space. This is to presuppose that the S~r/akhya- Yoga interpretation is erroneous, but that does pinpoint the problem of this system, which is the apparently-insurmountable difficulty of relating two completely independent substances. All the other speakers (except the last, G) perceive a relationship between the two, some to the point of denying that they are two, that is, distinguishable.


The second problem with my characterization is that it assumes there is

only one Mind-space, whereas S~rfikhya-Yoga postulates an apparently- infinite number of omnipresent yet distinct puru.sas. Again, this is a necessary deficiency of the analogy, which must be biased one way or the other. But

again too, this is a place where the S~rfikhya-yoga interpretation runs into

difficulties. For example, how can these various puru.sas interpenetrate

spatially and have no distinguishing characteristics (for each is exactly the

same as every other), yet be characterized as distinct and different?

The first speaker's interpretation did not perhaps bring out fully the

similarity between his view of phenomena and that of the third speaker, who referred not to forms but to "attribute-elements" (dharmas). Prakrti too is composite, a plurality of three gu.nas which interact to compose the tanmatras which interact to compose the mahdbhatas which interact to

compose "material objects" and mental phenomena. Both views agree that

objects as we normally understand them are mental constructions (according to Sarfikhya, under the catalytic influence ofpurusa) from a plurality of

distinguishable "bits" of experience. The path of liberation in Yoga seems

to involve reversing this evolutionary process in order to experience the

tanmatras and eventually the gunas as distinct from each other and as distinct

from purusa. This is similar to early Buddhism, whose vipasyana meditation teaches one to distinguish the various skandhas. It is significant that Advaita Vedanta accepts the gu.na theory of S~riakhya and that Mah~y~na Buddhism

accepts the dharma theory of early Buddhism, but in both cases these

elements are relegated to a subordinate position and denied any reality: for

Vedanta, the gu.nas are ultimately mdyd and for Mah~y~na the dharmas

are ~anya.

Why I have included the S~rfikhya-Yoga view, despite the difficulties

discussed above, is that it too seems to me to be an interpretation of the

experience given in the analogy: the duality-in-nonduality of Mind-space and

phenomena. Its response is to distinguish both as independent substances,

which is one natural reaction, however inadequate it finally proves to be.

The view of speaker B, that only Mind-space is Real, is that of Advaita Vedanta. Unlike the previous speaker, it emphasizes the dependence of phenomenal forms upon Mind-space (Brahman), to the extent that it denies them any reality at all. But from another perspective the similarity between these views is greater than their difference: They both reveal a strong pre- ference for the Mind-space and bias against the phenomenal. Vedanta shows

420 DAVID LOY

this by making phenomena into mere appearances but S]rfikhya may be said to go even further: Although pra~ti is granted the status of an independent substance, there is an insurmountable gap between it and puru.sa, which is what ' T ' really am. This reflects a more general Indian bias against

phenomena, which will be discussed later.

The third view, that of speaker C, turns the previous view upside-down:

Sthavfra Buddhism denies reality to the Mind-space but grants it to phenomena - not to objects, of course, but to the dharmas of which they

are composed. In terms of the analogy, such a denial of Mind-space may seem

perverse, but this is also due to the fact that the description given is an

interpretation. However, an attributeless consciousness which pervades

everywhere and encompasses everything, and which as nondual cannot

itself be known ("He is never known, but is the K n o w e r . . . -)6 can just

as well be described as "empty" (mnya). As Surendranath Dasgupta concluded

in his study of Safikara, "It is difficult indeed to distinguish between pure

being and pure non-being as a category." 7 This point is critical to my thesis,

but it cannot be elaborated here; I have defended it in an earlier paper. 8

In contrast to the first two views, this third one is not so prejudiced

against phenomena - although nirvdna is still characterized as a peaceful, unchanging condition distinct from the incessant interaction of the composite dharmas. This shift towards phenomena is more pronounced in Mahayana, despite the fact that it, like Vedanta, denies them any reality.

The M~idhyamika perspective has been distinguished into two viewpoints,

speakers D and F. F reflects the paramdrtha-satya, the highest truth that one

should not draw any ontological or other philosophical conclusions from the

experience. This expresses the "perspective" of the experience itself, which

really is no perspective at all. All philosophical issues are attempts to grasp the nature of this ultimate experience from the dualistic standpoint, and hence all answers must be inadequate. In response to the question what is Real, the Madhyamika, like the Buddha, ultimately remains silent.

The fourth speaker, D, expresses the M~dhyamika sa~nv.rti-satya, the relative truth. This view agrees with early Buddhism that Mind-space does not exist, and agrees with Vedanta that phenomena (dharmas for him) do not exist either, since they are interdependent and relative. However, because the category of non-existence is dependent upon the category of existence (and hence perishes with it) and because phenomena are


interdependent (interact and have causal effects) phenomena cannot be said not to exist either.

In Mah~y~na ~enerally we see more of a balance in perspective between empty Mind-space and phenomena; neither is negated in favor of the other,

for both are empty. As the Heart S~tra says, form is not only emptiness,

emptiness is also form. To say that emptiness manifests as form is not quite

right, however: As the Heart Sfltra continues, form is no other than emptiness,

and emptiness is no other than form - that is, one must be careful not to

reify emptiness into something that phenomena arise from, as S~flkara and the Mind-space analogy do; it is rather the case that empty phenomena appear

and disappear. Here we have the familiar Mah~y~na equation between nirvdna and sathsdra. This implies a different attitude towards change: the Ved~ntic

Brahman is static, the early Buddhist dharmas are impermanant, but the

Mah~yana view is more paradoxical: changing yet unchanging, since

phenomena change although their nature as empty does not. This is a more

dynamic conception than that of Ved~mta, which, prejudiced as it is against

phenomena, must conceive of the Absolute as static; because for Mah~y~na emptiness is not other than form, the Absolute is understood as more dynamic,

as active and creative. In the history of Zen Buddhism, for example, certain masters - e.g., Tokusan - have been criticized for being "too empty", that

is, leaning too much to the emptiness of form and not realizing sufficiently

the form of emptiness. Safikara would not have deemed this to be an error,

but the two most important Zen systems which codify the various stages of

enlightenment the Ten Oxherding Pictures of Kakuan and the Five Degrees

of Tozan - both depict this as incomplete enlightenment. The deep satori of the eighth Oxherding Picture - rendered as a simple circle representing

empty unity - is followed by "Returning to the Source", which depicts

a flowering branch representing particularity. Emptiness at this stage is found in the phenomena of the everyday world. According to Kakuan's

commentary, one "observes the waxing and waning of life in the world while abiding unassertively in a state of unshakable serenity. This [waxing and waning] is not a phantom or illusion [but a manifestation of the Source] ".9 In the Five Degrees, Tozan represents the stage of empty unity by the third degree, cheng chung lai, "the One alone" or "enlightenment emerging from

universality"; the fourth degree, p'ien chung chih, is "the Many alone" or "enlightenment arriving from particularity." lo The synthetic systems of T'ien-Tai and Hwa Yen make the same distinction.

422 DAVID LOY

This contrast between Brahman and ~anyatd also applies to Hindu and

Buddhist tdntra, and may account for the curious and significant reversal

of gender that occurs between them:

• . . Both the Hindu and the Buddhist Tfintras have another fundamental feature common to them [the first fundamental feature was emphasis on the human body as the means of liberation] - a theological principle of duality in nonduality. Both the schools hold that the ultimate non-dual reality possesses two aspects in its fundamental nature, - the negative (nivr. ttl~ and the positive (praw. tt~, the static and the dynamic,

- and these two aspects of the reality are represented in Hinduism by Siva and S~akti and in Buddhism by Praff~a- and Updya (or ganyatd and karuna-). It has again been held in the Hindu T~intras that the metaphysical principles of Siva-Sakti are manifested in this material world in the form of the male and the female; T~intric Buddhism also holds that the principles of Prajaa- and Updya are objectified in the female and the male. The ultimate goal of both the schools is the perfect state of union - union between the two aspects of the reality and the realisation of the non-dual nature of the self and the not-self.

(S. B. Dasgupta)

For Hindu tdntra, the masculine Siva is negative and static, whereas his

feminine consort Sakti is positive and active. This is reversed in Buddhist

tdntra where Praj~d/Sanyatd is feminine and Updya/Karu.nd is masculine.

The reason for this reversal is not clear, since it does not seem adequate

to explain such an important difference simply by attributing it to the natural

gender of the words used - why then were those particular words chosen,

and not others? However, the difference in emphasis between Vedanta

and Mah~yana may provide an explanation. The strong Hindu bias in favor

of the static Absolute could not allow it a feminine (hence subordinate)

gender, to the extreme that the active principle is, rather counter-intuitively,

made to be feminine - just as changing phenomena in Vedanta are total ly

subordinated to Brahman. In contrast, Mah~yana's greater emphasis on

phenomena - or more precisely, a more equal weight between the two -

allows the more plausible conclusion that passive emptiness is feminine and

active phenomena are mascul ine)2

Let us return to the Mind-space analogy. The view of speaker E is implied

by the first chapter o f the Tao Te Ching, which distinguishes the two ways

of experiencing without discriminating against either. Lines one, three, five

and seven describe the nameless Tao, the source o f heaven and earth, which

is reality apprehended nondually without intentions• Lines two, four, six and

eight refer to the usual pluralistic world of distinct, self-existing phenomena,


experienced dualistically due to naming and intending, which are not the

activities of a self but what create and sustain the sense of self. The apparently blissful peace of the experience of nonduality, and its apparent revelation of True Reality, should not lead to a complete negation of duality. A bias

in favor of non-duality is still dualistic; from the highest point of view, then, there are two modes of experience, neither of which should be permanently negated for the sake of the other. In Zen Buddhism, for example, there is a

conscious return to "delusion", if only to fulfill one's Bodhisattva Vow,

for in the nondual experience there are no sentient beings to be saved and nothing at all to be done. This implies an ultimate acceptance of the

phenomenal world which, it is safe to say, could not have occurred in India, even though one might expect this as a further development of the Mahayana viewpoint. This is why Mahayana took root in China, whereas Vedanta and Sthavfra Buddhism did not, and is part of a more general contrast between

India and China which has had deep philosophical implications. The Indian bias in favor of abstract, negative universals and atemporal otherworldliness is reversed by Chinese pragmatism which is biased in favor of particular

phenomena and the pattern of their transformation. The Chinese love of nature and their desire to unite with it (expressed in poetry and painting)

must be contrasted with Indian alienation from nature, which, given Indian geography and climate, was perhaps inevitable; consider too the contrast between the Indian renunciate ideal and the ragged, jovial, chubby, barefoot

and perhaps inebriate Han-Shan, for whom "ordinary mind is the Tao." 13 In terms of our analogy, the difference is between a general Hindu bias towards

the empty Hind-space and a general Chinese bias for nondual phenomena, which is probably Why Mahay~na Buddhism, which lies somewhere between these two extremes, was the bridge between these two cultures.

The last speaker, G, was included to suggest that the same experience

might provide an explanation of the theistic mystical experience - particularly in its "complete" form of union with God. Some theistic mystics - e.g.,

Eckhart - have understood the nondual experience as revelatory of The True Nature of Things, but others have not. Instead, they see it as a miraculous event in which God temporarily interferes with the natural order in order to manifest Himself through it. This would emphasize the significance of cultural conditioning and consequent expectations: If one had been raised in a culture which interpreted the nondual experience in this way, one would expect a temporary blissful union without any noetic implications, and might well

424 DAVID LOY

draw no ontological conclusions except to confirm one's belief in God who

is yet understood to exist (normally) apart from the phenomenal world, His

creation. The presupposition of one's own essential sinfulness - "original sin"

- and of God as infinitely perfect could keep one from making any inferences

about one's True Nature. We should not confuse this with the paramdrtha- satya of Mhdhyamika: for Mhdhyamika, the experience indeed reveals The

True Nature of Reality, but this is such that one cannot express it; no

philosophical categories can describe it. We must also be careful not to

conclude from this alone that the theist is wrong or misses something that

the nondualist does not, for both interpretations are cultt~rally-conditioned:

the nondualist too is conditioned to expect an ontologically-revelatory

experience.

III

Let us summarize these various responses to the "Mind-space" analogy by

charting the view of each on the ontological status of 'Mind-space' and

phenomena:

1. ~fiakhya-Yoga 2. Advaita Ved~nta 3. Sthavira Buddhism 4. bl~dhyamika Buddhism

(paramarthasatya) 5. Mhdhyamika Buddhism

(sarhvrtisatya)

Is 'Mind-space Real? Are Phenomena Real? yes yes yes no no yes

no ontological claims (silence)

no no 6. Taoism (Tao Te Ching, Ch. I) both duality and nonduality 'Real' 7. Theism not ontologically revelatory

It is surely significant that the first five views, which represent four of the most important Indian metaphysical systems, are the five possible noetic

responses to the question. All the four possible ontological conclusions are included as well as the "silence" which refuses to draw any philosophical

conclusions from the experience. What conclusions may be drawn from this?

The "Mind-space" analogy offers us an experience that seems to be susceptible to a variety of ontological interpretations - which interpretations,

as we have seen, are usually conditioned by a number of cultural factors. In this way I have tried to drive a wedge between the nondual experience and


its interpretation: the experience itself transcends philosophy, but when one,

perhaps inevitably, reflects on it and tries to describe it in language, then

divergent and even contradictory perspectives occur.

If the analogy in some sense represents The Way Things Are (which must

be the case if the analogy is to be meaningful, although from the "perspective"

of Speaker F this is ironic, to say the least), one might conclude that the

claim that it is ontologically-revelatory thereby becomes questionable. If

the nondual experience is subject to such a variety of interpretations, how

can it be said to "enlighten" one regarding The Way Things Really Are?

The experience is thereby devalued.

But such a conclusion does not necessarily follow. One might just as well

turn this around and maintain that the consequence is to devalue, not the

nondual experience, but the ontological question and indeed philosophy

generally. The experience is valid as revelatory, but this revelation cannot

be represented philosophically. This is of course consistent with the view of

the various nondual philosophers themselves, who generally acknowledge

that what is important is not the philosophical conclusions derived from the

experience but the experience itself, a4

National University o f Singapore

NOTES

1 From Chapter two, 'On the Equality of Things and Opinions', as translated in Wm. Theodore de Bary, Wing-tsit Chan, and Burton Watson (eds.), Sources of Chinese Tradition, Vol. 1, Columbia University Press, 1960, p. 69.

The Awakening of Faith attributed to A§vagho.sa, trans. Yoshito S. Hakeda, New York: Columbia University Press, 1967, p. 72. The translator's gloss on this passage emphasizes its importance: "The nonduality of mind and matter, spirit and body is the basic concept of the text and a common presupposition of Mahayana Buddhism." (Ibid.) 3 T. R. V. Murti, The CentralPhilosophy of Buddhism, London: Allen and Unwin, 1960, pp. 10-11. 4 See, forexample, Vasubandhu'sMadhyantavibhagabhasya, verse 21 andSukhavativ. yukopadesa, verse 2: "Ultimately, it [the Pure Land] is broad and limitless, just like space." s Shin-ichi Hisamatsu, "The Characteristics of Oriental Nothingness," in Philosophical Studies of Japan, trans. Richard De Martino, Tokyo: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, 1960, Vol. II. 6 Br.haddranyaka Upanisad, III. vii. 23. 7 Surendranath Dasgupta, A History oflndian Philosophy, Vol. 1, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975, p. 493.

426 DAVID LOY

8 'Enlightenment in Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta: Are Nirvana and Moksha the Same?' International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXII, No. 1, March 1982, pp. 65-74. 9 Philip Kapleau, (ed.), The Three Pillars of Zen, Tokyo: Weatherhill, 1966, p. 310; his brackets. lo See Chang Chung-yuan, Original Teachings of Ch'an Buddhism, New York: Vintage, 1969, p. 46 ff.; also Kapleau, pp. 300-1. The German mystic Jakob Boehme makes the same point:

• . . a good act thus begins with the evil particular, passes through the empty universal and ends in a life which endows the limited particular with a universal value.

• . . Like the negative mystics he [Boehme] asks us to flee the evil world and retreat to the Absolute, but unlike them he asks us to return to the same world with the Absolute in tow. The other-world ethics is discovered in an act which transcends nature but which is applied to nature• (from H. H. Brinton's study of Boehme, The Mystic Will. New York: Macmillan, 1930, pp. 213,221.)

11 S. B. Dasgupta, An Introduction to Tantric Buddhism, University of Calcutta, 1974, pp. 3-4 . 12 With apologies to all feminists who read this. 13 For a discussion of this difference, see Hajime Nakamura's Ways o f Thinking o f Eastern Peoples, ed. Philip P. Wiener, Honolulu: East-West Center Book, 1964. 14 This paper is part of a larger study on nonduality, which forms a doctoral dissertation to be submitted to the National University of Singapore•

How many nondualities are there?

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