How Logistics Contributed to the Victory of the British in the New Zealand Wars of the 1860s

8/2/2019 How Logistics Contributed to the Victory of the British in the New Zealand Wars of the 1860s

1/7

P a g e | 1

How tactics and logisticscontributed to the victory

of the British in the New

Zealand Wars of the 1860s

Paul Watkins

New Zealand 2010

Paper submitted as a partial

requirement for a degree in

Defence Studies


2/7

P a g e | 2

I. IntroductionThis paper will discuss how British tactics and logistics contributed to their success in the

Waikato campaign of the New Zealand Wars in 1863-64. Geoffrey Parker, in his book The

Cambridge History of Warfare explains his five fundamental principles of western warfare.These are: a reliance on technology, discipline, the aggressive pursuit of total victory,

economic power and the ability to implement change. He also asserts that the outcome of

wars has been determined less by technology than by better war plans, the achievement of

surprise, greater economic strength and superior discipline.1

Better war plans (tactics) and

greater economic strength (logistics) will be shown to be the main contributors to the British

success in the Waikato Campaign of the New Zealand War of 1863-64.

II. Applying The Lessons Of The Crimean WarWhile the campaign was initiated by the governor to end the threat posed by the rebel

Maori King Movement, this objective was not achieved. But militarily the campaign was a

success and allowed for European expansion into the region. The war was lead by

Lieutenant General Duncan Cameron, who with most of his staff had served in the Crimean

War. For this reason he was determined not to the repeat the logistical fiasco of that

campaign.2

The New Zealand wars of the 1840s had also taught the British that sound

logistics were a basis for defeating the Maori as this was the Maoris weakness.3

Unlike previous wars between the British and Maori, Cameron developed a deliberate

invasion plan before he started. This plan was designed to destroy the economic bases of

the King Movement in the Waikato province.4 Camerons planning began in April 1861, the

war itself not beginning for a further two years in July 1863. His reconnoitre of the Waikato

lead to four alternate invasion routes being identified.5

During this time, total available

troop numbers in New Zealand increased substantially, from 4,000 men to 6,000 by August

of 1863 to a peak of 14,000 infantry in March 1864.6

In May 1864, an artillery regiment, a

battalion of the Military Train and the Naval Brigade were added to this force.7

III. Why Logistics Became An Integral Part Of The Strategy

1Parker, G, editor, The Cambridge History of Warfare, p2

2Belich, James, The New Zealand Wars, p127

3Taylor, R, The Strategy of War, p66

4Johanson, Maj T, Ka Pu Te Ruha, Ka Hao Te Rangatahi, p75

5Taylor, Maj R, Logistical Operations in the Waikato War 1863-64 p16

6 Belich, James, The New Zealand Wars, p1257Johanson, Maj T, Ka Pu Te Ruha, Ka Hao Te Rangatahi, p75


3/7

P a g e | 3

To maintain such a force, considerable attention had to be paid a sustainable supply of

materials and robust communication lines. Attending to the logistics support allowed

Cameron to maintain his force in the field and conduct a continuous offensive campaign.

This caused the Maori to be reactionary rather than be able to set the tone and timing of

the battles within the war. Each British initiative was designed to bring the Maori to battleand achieve a decisive victory.

8

The Maori did not have a dedicated professional soldier class. Maori warriors had to be

available for economic duties, notably the planting and harvesting of crops at the

appropriate times of the year. In the First Taranaki War, the Maori used a shift system,

which allowed warriors to return to their homes for cropping duties and then back to their

fighting duties.9

However this was very much stretched in the Waikato War due to the scale

of the conflict, so great pressure was placed on the tribal economies and manpower.10

IV. Phase One And Two Of The WarThe war was fought in four distinct military phases. The first was between July and October

1863, when Maori conducted successful guerrilla raids against civilian targets and the armys

preparation of a distribution network.11

This resulted in tying up most of Camerons

manpower in defending the supply preparations. So many of his forces were engaged in

protection duties that he had to wait for reinforcements before proceeding with the

invasion.12

The second phase was the capturing of the Pas (A Pa is a fortified Maori village) at

Meremere and Rangiriri and the occupation of Ngaruawahia from October to December

1863.13

In September the Maori abandoned the guerrilla warfare tactics and decided on a

defensive pa strategy instead.14

This change of strategy removed the threat to the British

supply lines, which allowed the British to regain the initiative. The Meremere pa was the

first one encountered and obstructed progress south by foot.

Cameron knew that frontal attacks on pa had proved costly and indecisive in the past. So his

tactic was to land 1,200 men about nine kilometres to the rear of the pa, by river. This way

he could attack from both the front and back at the same time. Rather than fight however,

8Ibid, p76

9Taylor, R, The Strategy of War, p59


11Taylor, Maj R, Logistical Operations in the Waikato War 1863 -64, p12



Ibid, p14


4/7

P a g e | 4

the Maori abandoned the pa, as they had done in the past when pa are attacked, so no

decisive victory could be obtained.

By early January the British had 7,000 men in the field, so keeping them supplied was a huge

undertaking. For this reason Cameron delayed further aggressive action until he wasadequately supplied. Unlike the British who spent considerable time creating and

maintaining a logistics network, the Maori had exhausted their resources in the building and

manning of Meremere. They had maintained a large force on the front line for three months

and thus neglected their traditional tribal food preparation and economic activities.15

Camerons logistics plan included establishing depots at close intervals along his line of

advance. Adding to this he also set up precautionary alternate supply routes through the

Firth of Thames and through Raglan.16

In December and January, the summer months

meant a very low river level, hampering the travel of supply steamers. The steamer Avonwas also sunk from hitting a river obstruction in February.

17The Raglan supply route then

became important as a result of these issues and helped save the British position in the

Upper Waikato18

This considerable logistics system allowed Cameron to be able to press on with his

aggressive pursuit of total victory, while the economic reality of the Maori at that time

meant that they could only muster 500 warriors to defend the pa at Rangiriri.19

The

Rangariri pa was lost when Cameron attacked, with high loss of life on both sides.

V. Phase three attacking the Maori logistics chainThe third phase of the war was the calculated and deliberate destruction of the Maori food-

basket at Rangiaowhia and the subsequent battle at Hairini in February 1864.20

When

progressing beyond Rangiriri, Cameron discovered a Maori line of defence consisting of at

least three substantial Pa. These included Paterangi, Pikipiko and Rangiatea, generally

referred to as the Paterangi Line.21

Camerons aim was to destroy the agriculturally rich Rangiaowhia area, which lay beyond

the line of pa. So his tactic was to circle around the Pas and move directly to Rangiaowhia.






20 Taylor, Maj R, Logistical Operations in the Waikato War 1863-64, p1221

Belich, James, The New Zealand Wars, p160


5/7

P a g e | 5

Knowing the importance economically of that area to Maori, he hoped to draw the Maori

from the pas towards him for a decisive battle.

In typical style, Cameron spent a month preparing for that manoeuvre, the timing of the

operation being determined in Camerons words, to gather sufficient means of transport...to sustain both the move against Rangiaowhia and any subsequent defensive operation.

22

They successfully attacked the settlement at Rangiaowhia on 21st

February, killing about a

dozen of the poorly armed and relatively defenceless inhabitants.23

While the Maori did leave the pa of the Paterangi Line, they did not engage Cameron as he

had hoped. They did put up an unsuccessful fight nearby at Hairini however. In his

preparations for this phase of the war, Cameron had moved a large baggage train with

artillery to Te Awamutu. It was this baggage train that helped ensure the success of the

British at Hairini.24

Historians differ on the importance of the Hairini engagement. James Belich sees it as a

rearguard action to buy time for the rest of Maori move into Ngati Maniopoto territory.25

Richard Taylor interprets it as the action which finally broke the Kingite resistance and

tipped the balance irreversibly in the favour of the British. Taylor asserts that this is

because it forced the Maori to abandon their Paterangi Line pas and allowed the British to

occupy 3,000 acres of cultivated land, which grew wheat, vegetables, apples, kumara and

potatoes among other essential foodstuffs.26

Logistics helped win the action for the British,

and at the same time severely denied Maori of their own logistics support.

VI. Phase four the final battle at OrakauThe fourth and final phase of the Waikato war was at Orakau late March and early April

1864. The site was poorly chosen by Maori and open to attack from too many sides. But

the simple truth is that from a logistics standpoint the Maori were defeated at Orakau

before the first shot was even fired27

The Maori defence showed a lack of planning and the

loss of the surrounding food supply region ensured defeat.

VII. ConclusionsIn conclusion, referring back to Geoffrey Parkers five fundamental principles of western

warfare, Parker asserts that the outcome of wars is determined very much by better war


23Simpson, T, What happened at Rangiaowhai?, p3

24Taylor, Maj R, Logistical Operations in the Waikato War 1863-64, p22



Taylor, Maj R, Logistical Operations in the Waikato War 1863 -64, p23


6/7

P a g e | 6

plans and greater economic strength28

The British systematically drove the Maori to the

final stand at Orakau where they had no sustainable military, food or water supplies. By

contrast, the British had a logistical chain that stretched over land, river and sea back to

England.29

The British had planned and could sustain a lengthy aggressive campaign, while

the Maori could not.

Camerons tactics were to put considerable emphasis on his own logistics while targeting the

logistical vulnerabilities of the Maori. Therefore better war plans (tactics) and greater

economic strength (logistics) were the main contributors to the British success in the

Waikato.

28 Parker, G, editor, The Cambridge History of Warfare, p229

Taylor, Maj R, Logistical Operations in the Waikato War 1863 -64, p23


7/7

P a g e | 7

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Belich, James, The New Zealand Wars, Auckland, Penguin Books, 1986

Cowan, J, The New Zealand Wars: A History of the Maori Campaigns and the PioneeringPeriod: Volume I: 18451864, Wellington, R. E. Owen, 1955, (accessed via

http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/tei-Cow01NewZ.html 26/08/2010)

Findlay, N, Sacred Soil, Auckland, Random House, 1998

Johanson, Maj T, Ka Pu Te Ruha, Ka Hao Te Rangatahi: Changes In Maori Warfare Between

The Period Prior To First European Contact And The End Of The New Zealand Wars A thesis

presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Master of Military Art and

Science, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2009. (accessed via http://www.dtic.mil on 18/08/2010)

Parker, G, editor, The Cambridge History of Warfare, Cambridge University Press, 2005

Ryan, T and Parham, B, The Colonial New Zealand Wars, Wellington, Grantham House, 2002

revised edition

Ryan, T, The Maori Warrior and British Soldier, published in Contested Ground Te Whenua

I Tohea, edited by Kevin Day, Wellington, Huia Publishing, 2010

Simpson, T, What happened at Rangiaowhai?, Wellington, The National Council of

Churches, 1983

Taylor, Maj R, Logistical Operations in the Waikato War 1863-64 published as No9 in the

Occasional Paper Series, Major L. Amner editor, Trentham Military Camp, Upper Hutt, NZ

Army Military Studies Institute, 2005

Taylor, R, The Strategy of War: The Taranaki Wars and the Development of Maori and

British Strategy, published in Contested Ground Te Whenua I Tohea, edited by Kevin Day,

Wellington, Huia Publishing, 2010

How Logistics Contributed to the Victory of the British in the New Zealand Wars of the 1860s

Documents

Transcript of How Logistics Contributed to the Victory of the British in the New Zealand Wars of the 1860s