How institutions work in a high corruption equilibrium. The legal assumptions. The Montesinos case....
-
date post
22-Dec-2015 -
Category
Documents
-
view
215 -
download
2
Transcript of How institutions work in a high corruption equilibrium. The legal assumptions. The Montesinos case....
How institutions work in a high corruption equilibrium.
The legal assumptions. The Montesinos case. National and international institutions vs.
power networks Experiences from the World Bank. New Ideas to go from high to low
corruption equilibrium.
Legal framework
All citizens have equal rights. Citizens vote to choose their government. REPRESENTATION.The government
represents the interest of all and has monopoly power to make public decisions.
SOVEREIGNTY.Each national government maintains formal relations with foreign governments and multilateral organizations.
‘Traffic Light’ World Maps Control of Corruption – 2000/01
Source for data: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2001.htm ; Map downloaded from : http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz/gov2001map.asp Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Red, 25% or less rank worse; Orange, between 25% and 50%; Yellow, between 50% and 75%; Light Green between 75% and 90% ; Dark Green above 90%
Criminal prosecution and political networks
1985/7. Criminal prosecutor of the military juntas ( three former presidents) , 22 generals, admirals and other officers.
1988/91. 2 military rebellion cases. 1988/92. More than 100 big corruption cases,
involving private bankers and businesspersons, public officials and cabinet members. Big mistake.
What was the difference? Power networks.
The former minister of labor case
•The former minister of labor was appointed President of a state-owned company.
•We collect evidences of fraud against him for one year.
•Finally, the judge indicted him, resulting in a political scandal.
•President Menem fired him. “A man under criminal suspicions can not be a public official”
•A woman who had two indictments was appointed as a new President of the company.
the individual behavior approach. (judges and prosecutors, journalists, people)
•Binnary ethic
Demons Saints
•Small number of criminals
90% Saints
10%Demons
Beyond binnary profiles
Demons good but sinful Saint
Ethical profile
25% Demons
50%
Honest but sinful
25% Saints25% demons 50% sinful 25%saints
25%
Institutions
from individual to organizational behavior.
Authorities abide by the law and are commited to enforce it
STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
OFFICIALS
CABINET
Ethical Profile of Authorities
Difficult situation
STATE
CABINET
OFFICIALS
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
Solutions
Institutional changes are not sufficient.
ENVIRONMENT
COMPANY Z
COMPANY Y
COMPANY X
MANAGERS
SUPERVISORS
EMPLOYEES
CABINET
OFFICIALS
PUBLICEMPLOYEES
MANAGERS
SUPERVISORS
EMPLOYEES
MANAGERS
SUPERVISORS
EMPLOYEES
government
The Montesinos case.
The clientelistic network
•Evidences from 110 vladivideos transcript in “El Comercio”
•The political and resource interchange of 230 people.
•Each number is a person
•Each blue line represent a political favor
•Each purple line represent a money interchange
1
State (Bureaucracy)
Vladimiro Montesinos
Media
Private Sector Municipal
Government
Military
Political Parties
Civil Society International
Legislative Branch
Judiciary
Alberto Fujimori
Political Support NetworkMoreno Ocampo
Media
Private Sector
Vladimiro Montesinos
Municipal Government
Military
State (Bureaucracy)
Political Parties
Civil Society International
Legislative Branch
Judiciary
Alberto Fujimori
1
Resource Dependency NetworkMoreno Ocampo
Lessons from Montesinos case
The judicial approach. Does the elimination of the central node ensure the disarticulation of the network or can the network be regenerated?
The institutional approach. Can we change institutions by constructing buildings, improving technology, training people or changing procedures?
The international approach. Can we use the relation with formal institutions to control informal networks in power?
A 170-person refuse collection company working for the city of Salta, the 700,000 inhabitant state capital of the Salta Province in northern Argentina.
In part because of Salta´s economic difficulties, payments for the refuse collection contracts in question had been delayed. These delays in the
payment of over 2.0 million dollars which the municipality of Salta owed to company began to pose problems. Total annual sales amounted to roughly
2.2 million dollars and the outstanding debt to the company began to threaten its viability. payroll had been delayed for over two months.
the treasurer informed the company’s CEO that by order of the Mayor, 33% of the contract ($660,000) would have to be paid in bribes in order for any
payment to be made.
the manager takes into considerations: the major is from the same party of the governor and a close friend of the state prosecutor. The governor is the owner of the state newspaper. He also appointed and control all the criminal
judges.
THE SALTA CASE
PAY OR NOT
FFINANTIAL BENEFITS 1.37 million Dollars MORAL BENEFITS Payment of salaries Profit for stockholders Inclusion in public
contracting networks (future contracts)
Financial viability of firm, including the provision of employment for workers
FINANTIAL BENEFITS No short-term financial
benefits for the company.
MORAL BENEFITS Personal moral satisfaction
Mayor
Treasurer
Prosecutor
Mayor
Treasurer
Newspaper
Governor
Supreme Court Chief Justice
Judge
Prosecutor
Mayor
Treasurer
Newspaper
Governor
Supreme Court Chief Justice
Judge
Prosecutor
Mayor
Treasurer
Newspaper
Governor
RESULTS The company refused to pay kickbacks and successfully
denounced the mayor.
The mayor was fired, jailed and replaced by a new mayor.
9 months later the company lost its contract.
5 years later the company had still not received the payment.
The Solution: destroy one node is not sufficient, you have to create
a preventive network
The Solution: destroy one node is not sufficient, you have to create
a preventive network
WB Data
WBI data about State CaptureCountry
Parliamentarylegislation(% of firms)
Presidentialdecrees(% of firms)
CentralBank(%offirms)
CriminalCourts(% offirms)
CommercialCourts(% offirms)
Partyfinance(% offirms)
Captureindex(% offirms)
CaptureClassification
Albania 12 7 8 22 20 25 16 MediumArmenia 10 7 14 5 6 1 7 MediumAzerbaijan 41 48 39 44 40 35 41 HighBelarus 9 5 25 0 5 4 8 MediumBulgaria 28 26 28 28 19 42 28 HighCroatia 18 24 30 29 29 30 27 HighCzech Rep 18 11 12 9 9 6 11 MediumEstonia 14 7 8 8 8 17 10 MediumGeorgia 29 24 32 18 20 21 24 HighHungary 12 7 8 5 5 4 7 MediumKazakhstan 13 10 19 14 14 6 12 MediumKyrgyzstan 18 16 59 26 30 27 29 HighLatvia 40 49 8 21 26 35 30 HighLithuania 15 7 9 11 14 13 11 MediumMoldova 43 30 40 33 34 42 37 HighPoland 13 10 6 12 18 10 12 MediumRomania 22 20 26 14 17 27 21 HighRussia 35 32 47 24 27 24 32 HighSlovakia 20 12 37 29 25 20 24 HighSlovenia 8 5 4 6 6 11 7 MediumUkraine 44 37 37 21 26 29 32 HighUzbekistan 5 4 8 5 9 4 6 Medium
Overall 24 21 25 18 18 20 20
Source: Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann, ‘Seize the State, Seize the Day’. State Capture Index = [1+….+6] / 6
An Index of State Capture
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Sta
te C
aptu
re I
ndex
Azerb
aijan
Bulgar
ia
Croat
ia
Czech
Rep
Estonia
Georgia
Hungar
y
Latvia
Lithuan
ia
Poland
Roman
ia
Russia
Slovak
ia
Slovenia
Ukrain
e
% Firms Affected by State Capture
Peru: “State Capture” by elite, shaping laws/regulations(as reported by firms, GAC diagnostic, 2001)
40 60 80 100
Central Bank decisions
Regulatory Agencies
High Officials (influencing presidentialdecrees/decisions)
Judiciary (influencing major courtdecisions)
Parliamentarians (to influence laws)
% firms reporting that bribes by others to institution have negatively affected their operations
Capture by Vested Interests of:
Fig.13: Peru: Sources of Undue Private Influence on the State
10
40
70
100
DrugConglomerates
EconomicGroups
FDI/TransnationalCorporations
OrganizedCrime
ProfessnlAssociations
Labor Unions
% r
ep
ort
ing
ag
en
t is
hig
hly
in
flu
en
tia
l
Firms Public officialsBased on governance diagnostic surveys of public officials and enterprises
Responses by:
WB data shows democratic representation is seriously distorted.Who represents the poor ?
This is not an occasional problem but a stable situation.
Formal institutions are crossed and controlled by a network of people who interchange favours and take the government for themselves.
In order to assure the possibility of controlling or distorting any public policy these networks maintain the public management at a very low level.
CHALLENGING ASSUMPTIONS
State Institutions represent citizens’ interest. Representation is not working.
The World Bank can develop economic programs and build institutions in developing countries without being involved in political issues. Commercial Sovereignty is gone.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
% o
f fi
rms
Note: For transition economies, average of 20 countries. Source: Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann, 2000 (www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance)
Companies responsibilityState capture
•WORLD BANK INCENTIVES20 billions dollar in loans.How much poverty alleviation?
Is the private sector the key actor for the social change?
THE TESTMADE TO 300 DIRECTORS OF U.S. AMERICAN COMPANIES IN
LATIN AMERICA
1. Who of you pays bribes to obtain business and to solve problems in the public sector?
2. Who believes that their competitors pay bribes to win business and to solve problems with the public sector?
3. Who has a strategy that would impede or make it difficult for other companies to obtain business because they paid bribes?
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES THE GOVERNMENT IS UNABLE TO ESTABLISH AN EFFICIENT PUBLIC MARKET. THE PRIVATE SECTOR IS UNABLE TO THINK ABOUT IT.
Beyond individual behavior and state institutions. Focus
in the outcome of the interaction.
IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF SERVICE DELIVERY
Creating Goods Social Networks
• Connecting green nodes • Changing the incentives of
yellow nodes• Controlling red nodes • Monitoring the interchange
between nodes
ENVIRONMENT
COMPANY Z
COMPANY Y
COMPANY X
MANAGERS
SUPERVISORS
EMPLOYEES
cabintet
OFFICIALS
PUBLICEMPLOYEES
MANAGERS
SUPERVISORS
EMPLOYEES
MANAGERS
SUPERVISORS
EMPLOYEES
government
Governance
The process and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised.