How far is to far

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How far is too far?Lessons forbusiness from

ultra-high-performingmilitary teams

James D. Eggensperger

The author

James D. Eggensperger is Director of Graduate Programs inJournalism and Mass Communication and Assistant Professor atIona College, New Rochelle, New York, USA.

Keywords

Team working, Armed forces, Team learning, Team performance,Organization and methods

Abstract

Management in organizations has a common focus on achievinggoals in the most productive, efficient way. Many managers use

teams as powerful tools in focusing on and achieving goals. Ithas been claimed that everyone in an organization belongs toone or more teams. In parallel to the development of business

teams, the US military has developed high-performance teams toachieve discreet goals in ultra-stressful, dangerouscircumstances. Teams in business and the military are focused ongoals that require in-depth training, high personal investment by

team members, deep commitment to the team, complementaryskills, and high performance under pressure. Can businessleaders learn from military teams who have lives depending on

their performance? The research and analysis points to theconclusion that some lessons from military teams can bevaluable for managers in business organizations, but also

suggests that high performance may not be as desirable as itseems.

Electronic access

The Emerald Research Register for this journal isavailable atwww.emeraldinsight.com/researchregister

The current issue and full text archive of this journal isavailable atwww.emeraldinsight.com/1352-7592.htm

Introduction

Large, modern organizations are managed through

hierarchical structures that originated centuries

ago with military organizations, and which are still

used to show the full complement of equipment,skills, and job levels that are assigned to an

organization. Kolenda et al. (2001) describe how

Xenophon, the Greek historian and military

leader, talked about leadership and control of

troops in 400 BC. Xenophons goal for a military

organization was for it to be a rational, orderly,

and effective community while respecting the

freedom and dignity of the individuals within it

(p. 7). This definition could be lifted in toto and

placed into the operations manual of many

businesses. Borrowing between the military and

business continues. Truskie (1999) refers often to

military and law enforcement organizations as onemodel of a high-performing organization. Military

management books such as Leadership: The

Warriors Art(Kolenda et al., 2001) are replete with

references to common business strategy terms.

Both military and business organizations

typically:. have specific measurements and goals;. have motivated leaders;. have established structures and

communications processes; and. are under pressure to produce results.

Both often use teams as key organizational andoperational strategy elements for achieving their

goals.

However, the author observed an important

difference during service as an officer in the US

Army and as an executive with IBM from the mid-

1970s to the mid-1990s. The military, by its very

nature, practises a high degree of urgency, and

penalties for non-performance or failure can be

much more Draconian and result in casualties or

death. In most business organizations, failure to

perform results in dismissal at worst.

This paper explores those dimensions: the

similarities between high performance teams inmilitary organizations and in business and what

lessons business leaders can learn from military

teams, arguably the highest of high-performing

teams. This paper also will examine:. the military teams that may be the highest of

high-performing teams;. case histories from new battlefronts;. lessons that may be learned from the new ways

that these teams operate; and. potential problems of institutionalizing very

high performance teams.

Team Performance Management

Volume 10 Number 3/4 2004 pp. 53-59

q Emerald Group Publishing Limited ISSN 1352-7592

DOI 10.1108/13527590410545045

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Command and control andcommunications

Military leaders, from the time of the Roman

legions, have organized their fighting men into

subgroups according to skills and combat

capabilities, such as cavalry, artillery or infantry.

Fundamental to the efficient functioning of any

organization is a method of transmitting the

functional information of the organization to lower

levels and ultimately to the people who are

responsible for carrying out the functions of the

organization.

Military operations, as observed by the author

during military training leading to service in

Vietnam, rely heavily on disciplined, highly

defined command and control processes to ensure

that the immediate goals of the organization are

transmitted to those who must act and that there is

no question as to what is expected. Command and

control defines a system developed over time and

under high-stress conditions. Command defines

the issuing of orders based on strategic and tactical

objectives, and control defines the ability to ensure

that subordinates follow those orders in a specific

manner based on rigid training and highly detailed

methods of operation.

There are distinct and important differences

between military command and control processes

and the management processes of business

organizations. Military management has

developed communications processes using terms

and signals that are designed to eliminate almost

all chance of misunderstanding. For example,military troops are taught to spell out the most

elementary commands and data transmission in a

phonetic alphabet a distinct word standing for

each letter of the alphabet so that there is little

chance for ambiguity. Hand signals are taught to

eliminate the need for verbal communication in

the heat and noise of battle.

Clancy (2002) explains that each member of an

Army Special Forces team can send and receive

Morse code and can speak the language of the

country where he is operating. Special Forces

soldiers also are trained in the culture of the

societies where they are working.The very nature of conflict and high intensity

situations dictates that each member of the team

responds the same way every time to commands.

Clancy quotes General Carl Stiner, a retired army

general who was the commander of the US Special

Operations Command, on training, Every soldier

should be required to fully [italics in original]

perform every task to the standard expected of him

for success in combat (p. 125).

Further, the observation of the author based on

basic army combat training is that procedures and

specific commands are highly detailed and are

repeated during training drills with the specific

goal of establishing habits and automated

responses among soldiers so that orders are

followed exactly and immediately. Such an almost

unthinking response results in predictable

behaviors and actions across the military

organization, from top to bottom.

In contrast to the militarys detailed training and

practice in applying communications and culture-

based information transfer, business organizations

often merely publish policies and procedures in an

effort to establish consistency of response and

predictable results. Company manuals, today

often published on intranets, contain detailed

policies on topics ranging from travel and expense

accounting to contacts with suppliers to relations

with the press. Training and company orientations

are designed to establish company cultures which

define the behavior of employees across an

organization.Katzenbach and Smith (1993) detail the

barriers to successful team implementation as:

. . . lack of conviction that a team or teams can work

better than other alternatives; personal styles,

capabilities, and preferences that make teams risky

or uncomfortable; and weak organizational

performance ethics that discourage the conditions

in which teams flourish (p. 21).

The lack of personal conviction may be a critical

factor in the inability of business to establish high-

performing teams.

Attitudes of team members

Both military and business organizations have

defined special, smaller groups of specially chosen

employees for highly defined, specialized activities

that carry out highly defined operations in support

of the larger strategy of the organization.

In the military, ultra high-performing teams,

known as Special Operations Forces, have been

defined for tactical projects that require special

skills and attitudes. Potten and Sepp (2001)

suggest that todays new special forces teams

comprise dedicated high achievers, many of whom

share the following attributes:

. . . a combat veteran, about 31 years old, conversant

in a foreign language, with 12 to 14 years of Army

service. He also has 13 to 14 years of formal

education (about 40 percent have either an

associates or bachelors degree), and a standard

Army intelligence test score of around 127 (100

points is theArmy mean; 110 is needed to enter West

Point) (cited in Kolenda et al., 2001, pp. 333-4).

Special operations forces (the US Armys Green

Berets and the US Navys SEALs are the best

How far is too far? Lessons for business from military teams



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known) work in small team environments which

demand the highest performance and where

anything less than high performance may result in

injury or death. In contrast to most military

situations, where opportunities for individual

initiative have consciously been limited and even

frowned on because individualism can be likened

to unpredictability, special operations team

members are taught to work independently and

respond to fluid situations quickly and decisively.

Members of the special forces are carefully

chosen and have been called the Renaissance

Men of the military (Clancy et al., 2001). Because

the physiological and psychological toll of

becoming such a high performer will be intense,

the washout rates and qualifications for military

special forces are very high. Clancy et al. (2001)

estimate that the training of one special forces

soldier will take a full year and cost at least

$100,000. They further estimate that as few as

3 percent of candidates make it through therecruitment, selection and qualification processes.

Labich (1996) analyzed what he identified as

high-performing teams in non-business situations

with an eye toward extracting any lessons that

business people might take away. He visited

championship sports teams, oil-field firefighters,

emergency-room doctors and the Tokyo String

Quartet in search of the elements that made those

teams high-performing and successful. He was not

sanguine about the ability of business people to

reach the levels of performance demonstrated by

his examples and by the special forces mentioned

above:You cant watch such elite, high-performance

teams operate without wondering what these

people know that so many of their corporate

counterparts have yet to learn (p. 90).

An insight can be gained about the cohesiveness of

a high-performance military team from the story of

lieutenant junior grade Jeff Eggers, a 24-year-old

Rhodes scholar who became a Navy SEAL. Eggers

told Labich that one sure-fire way to wash out is to

try to get by without the help of fellow recruits. He

was quoted as saying: If you are the sort of person

who sucks all the energy out of the group without

giving anything back, then you are going to goaway (p. 90). That sense of all-out teamwork is

carried through in the field. SEALs never operate

on their own, and their sense of identification with

the group is all but total. One great source of unit

pride is that no dead SEAL has ever been left

behind on a battlefield.

Katzenbach and Smith (1993) refer to the

personal commitment orientation of high-

performance business teams, writing:

What sets apart high-performance teams . . . is the

degree of commitment, particularly how deeply

committed the members are to one another. Such

commitments go well beyond civility and

teamwork. Each genuinely helps the other to

achieve both personal and professional goals.

Katzenbach and Smith (1993) allude to the fact

that high-performing business teams outperform

other business organizations:

Any group seeking team performance for itself, like

any leader seeking to build strong performance

standards across his organization, must focussharply on performance. For organizational

leaders, this entails making clear and consistent

demands that reflect the needs of customers,

shareholders, and employees, and then holding

themselves and the organization relentlessly

accountable (p. 14).

The difference between the two philosophies may

be more than the degree of personal commitment

and personal risk. Military teams go into their

professions with the understanding that they and

their colleagues are at risk, an environment that is

true of few other professional situations. In

business, few if any environments contain risk of

personal harm.

Leading high-performance teams

The governing philosophy of military

organizations has long been that tacticians and

experienced soldiers knew best how to operate in

stressful, high-intensity situations. Military

management had long ago concluded that any

deviations from standardized procedures could putboth individuals and missions at risk.

Labich (1996) concluded that business people

may not be ready to make the sacrifices required

for inclusion on high-performing teams. We are

talking here about teamwork at a rarefied level, a

swarm of people acting as one, he wrote. Its a

state in which team members be they musicians,

commandos, or athletes create a collective ego,

one that gets results unattainable by people merely

working side by side. Its all about humility, of

course. Is that why its such a scarce thing in the

business world? (p. 90).

The highest of high-performing teams

Small teams of highly motivated and focused

combatants have been employed over the history

of warfare. The American colonists in the

American Revolution initially acted as bands of

guerillas, striking quickly at enemy installations

and attacking in unconventional patterns. Since

then, and in other contexts, small combat teams

with highly focused missions and specialized skills

have been employed to support geopolitical

strategy at the local level. Clancy (2002) estimates




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that the USA has 3,500 special forces troops

employed in more than 60 countries in an average

week.

A new model

Special operations forces from the USA and other

countries were inserted into Afghanistan shortlyafter the September 11, 2001 attacks. The value

and effectiveness of these highest of high-

performance teams has been shown multiple

times, and figured prominently in the fall of the

Taliban months sooner than anticipated. The

military teams achieved their goals by being highly

responsive, highly focused and being creative in

fluid, dangerous situations.

Priest (2002) interviewed 30 members of

special operations teams who had been operating

in Afghanistan and focused on one team that was

chosen as the best of the best:

Team 555 had been chosen to be the first A-teaminfiltrated into Afghanistan during the war, the

vanguard of a small, nearly invisible US ground

presence that helped topple the Taliban with

stunning speed and tested a new template for

warfare (p. A01).

Further, Priest (2002) reported, most of the A-

teams split into four detachments of three men

each so they could cover more territory. Some sub-

teams went for weeks without seeing other

Americans. They maintained contact with other

teams and senior officers via satellite radio, and

created virtual teams with allies and other

government forces. The success of those teams was

measured in stark terms: their very survival as well

as their ability to vanquish against enemy forces.

US military operations in Afghanistan may have

begun to refashion decades-old processes and

mindsets. New ways of operating are being

developed because few if any non-US fighting

forces are willing to go head-to-head with the US

military, globally acknowledged to be the best-

equipped and trained force in the world.

Barry and Hirsh (2001) took note of this

transition shortly after the attacks in September

2001:

Americas increasing need for Special Forces the

Green Berets in Vietnam are the prototype is,strategists say, a countermove to the shifting tactics

of potential enemies. A lot of this stems from the

fact that the United States has the worlds best

military, and after the gulf war nobody in their right

mind planned to take us on tank for tank, plane for

plane, says Andrew Krepinevich, who runs the

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, aWashington think tank. As seen in terrorist

insurgencies, enemies are adopting strategies ofthe weak, the asymmetric approach (p. 37).

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, a

businessman steeped in military doctrine,

described the new format of the military response

to asymmetric attacks by high performance teams

when he addressed an audience at the National

Defense University in January 2002:

From the moment they landed in Afghanistan, they

began adapting to the circumstances on the

ground. They sported beards and traditional

scarves. They rode horses horses that had beentrained to run into machine-gun fire, atop saddles

that had been fashioned from wood and saddlebagsthat had been crafted from Afghan carpets

(Rumsfeld, 2002).

The sight of empowered, creative US Army

soldiers thundering across the plains in

Afghanistan, with modern weapons and modern

communications devices, is one of the memorable

images of the incursion into Afghanistan.

The US Defense Department is adapting

business research and practices for ways to break

its hide-bound processes and enabling people who

are used to doing things in specific, highlystructured ways to be creative and find solutions

depending on personal observations and readings

of the situation. Ironically, they may have the most

creative teams and the teams that have evolved the

furthest on the continuum of high performance

and innovation.

Lessons for business

Special operations forces have emerged at the

cutting edge of high-performance teams. They

embody and demonstrate virtually all theattributes of teams defined by leading thinkers.

They demonstrate:. clear understanding of their tasks;. deep commitment to each other;. a deep sense of linkage with a larger strategy;

and. specialized skills.

As pioneers, the teams may have learned lessons

about personal commitment, responsiveness,

accepting responsibility, creativity and

organizational fit that can be applied to other

organizations. A multitude of definitions and

descriptions of high-performance teams have beencreated in the team literature, providing a wide

variety of parameters that management can use for

creating teams tied to organizational goals, for

identifying both team leaders and members, for

measuring the outcomes of teams, for refining the

role of teams within an overall structure, and for

separating teams from the ordinary functioning of

the organization.

Gustafson and Kleiner (1994) suggested that

high-performance teams have the following

attributes:




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. participative leadership;

. shared responsibilities;

. definition of purpose;

. high communication;

. a focused future;

. focused tasks;

. creative talents; and

. rapid responses.

With the possible exception of the focused future

attribute, high-performing military teams fit all of

these criteria and add a high quotient of personal

commitment to other team members.

That said, the list provides little value when

measured against the requirements of

organizations. Except for the attributes of high

communication and rapid response, the list could

apply to virtually any organizational entity of a

modern business enterprise at any level of

performance. The term high performance has

come to describe an orientation towards businessoutcomes or measurements such as customer

satisfaction.

High-performance teams should be defined as

small groups that have specific, difficult-to-achieve

outcomes as their goals. These outcomes should

also have direct links to overall strategic direction

and measurements of the meta-organization. Most

definitions are general and not highly demanding,

either of the organizations or individuals.

Collins (1995) addresses the issue of lack of

definition for high-performance teams, saying:

There is hardly any research available. When we

talk about teams, self-managing or self-directing,

or quality circles, many references are available.

High performance teams are a different story.

There are only 23 references on high performance

teams. And most of them were either case studies

using a variety of frameworks or simply accounts of

a snapshot of the teams history.

Collins (1995) surveyed four teams using 48

attributes established by Peter Vaill. She based her

qualitative study of teams, all of which were

regional winners of excellence awards from the

Association for Quality and Participation, on

interviews with team members. High performance

in this case was winning an award. Based on her

analysis of interviews with team members, Collinsdeveloped the following list of characteristics

shared by high-performance teams:. they exhibit behaviors similar to those of a

newly converted member of a religion or an

elite club;. they have significant organizational support

and in turn strongly support the organization;. they are the in-house change agents and are

continually shifting the way business is done;. they have tremendous influence both inside

and outside the organization; and

. they are a primary vehicle for involvement and

leadership for those populations who may be

under-represented in many organizations.

The five attributes begin to define a structure for

defining high-performance teams in an

organization. High performance teams are defined

as special and unusual and focused onextraordinary undertakings. The list would apply

as well to business organizations as to military

organizations, though the intensity of activity

would probably be less in a business organization.

Once again, personal commitment to fellow team

members, to the team and to the overall

organization is conspicuous by its absence.

Ultra high-performing teams are proving

effective in asymmetrical, uncertain warfare

situations. They exemplify the ultimate in open

systems, taking clues and information from the

environment, processing it quickly, and

responding and learning and reacting according tothe feedback received (which can be deadly).

The question naturally generated from this

review of the highest of high-performing teams is

how ultra high performance teams would operate

when conditions become less harsh and

demanding.

Problems of teams

Teams have grown in stature and promise based on

highly publicized successes and the promise that

teams hold for achievement. However, they are not

a panacea which will solve organizational defects,

strategic shortcomings, lack of skills or missing

ethics. There are examples of high-performance

teams which have produced positive results.

Katzenbach and Smith (1993) cite Motorola, GE,

3M and Ford as well as the US military during the

1991 Gulf War.

There are, however, other examples of how

teams did not produce desired outcomes. Gladwell

(2002) assertsthat one of the lessons of the debacle

of Enron is that even if the best and the brightest

people are formed into teams and given virtually

unlimited authority, they may not automaticallyproduce positive results for the organization.

Enron hired the highest-achieving students from

top business schools, and provided them with

plentiful financing and other tools and resources.

But in the end the firm declared bankruptcy and

executives were charged with fraud. Teams

accelerated the decline of the firm because they did

not have a commitment to the organization: they

were focused on personal gain and not on long-

term results, and they did not have a focused future

or regard for potential consequences.




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Some observers have suggested that high-

performance teams can have undesirable effects

within a larger organization and on individual team

members because of the special nature of the team,

the intensity of the activity and suspicions of

special treatment among the larger population of

the organization.

Baloff and Doherty (1989) describe negative

consequences which teams may face within the

overall organization:

These negative consequences fall into three

categories. First, participators may be subjected to

peer-group pressure against what is perceived as

collaboration with management in ways that

endanger employee interests. Second, the

participators managers may attempt to coerce

them during participation, or they may retaliate

against the participators if the results of the

participation displease them. Third, participators

may have difficulty adapting psychologically at the

end of a highly motivating participation effort if

they are thrust back into a narrow, rigidlytraditional tasks. (pp. 51-2).

Within some teams a protective screen develops

which separates the team members from others in

the organization. According to Collins (1995),

team members create and adopt a belief that:

. . . if you are a part of the team, you are considered

family and special. If you are not part of the team,

you are an outsider and as in families, it may be

okay for you to talk about your family, but it is not

okay for anybody else to talk about them (p. 24).

Military personnel exhibit similar tendencies but

maintain the pattern of high intensity and

exaggerated responses not found in less intenseorganizations. Clancy et al. (2001) make the point:

Because those in a soldiers parent branch (armor,

infantry, aviation, etc.) tend to view a special forces

candidate as a traitor or malcontent, failure to

qualify frequently results in his leaving the service

entirely (p. 24).

Team-focused organizations may also be difficult

for an overall organization to accommodate. When

the war in Vietnam ended, history repeated itself in

a pattern which is instructive for scholars of

modern organizations. The point is made that

special operations teams have long been out of the

mainstream of the US military and moreconventional military organizations and officers

have repeatedly sought to bring unconventional

forces inside the tent, eliminating the special

privileges and the unique training and uniforms of

the special forces.

For example, after Vietnam, there was a

concerted movement by the mainstream military

to bring special operations forces back into a more

structured and controlled situation (Marquis,

1997). Congress countered the military

establishment and passed legislation establishing

the Special Operations Command. The legislation

elevated the special operations forces from the

Navy, Air Force, Army and Marines and gave them

organizational status equal to more traditional

branches. Barry and Hirsh (2001) observed in

Newsweek:

In the Pentagon, the shift to this new field of

conflict portends jealous bureaucratic battlesbetween the conventional services and Special

Forces. Since the cold war, the budget for most

conventional units has declined or remained

stagnant; funding for Special Forces has grown

(p. 38).

Insights into the future from militaryteams and leadership

Business has learned from military organizationsfor centuries, as have other organizations in

society. The military is often on the leading edge

because of its high profile, critical requirements

and because it has funding when other

organizations do not. Can any or all of the

innovative operations and practices of the new,

ultra high-performance military teams be

extrapolated into teams from other organizations

that operate in less stressful and less threatening

environments?

Creativity under stress in an organization that

demands precise responses may be a highly desired

model for modern business, as it is for the military.

But its desirability in the long run is not clear,

either from a business or from a military point of

view. Within the first six months of 2002, two

special forces soldiers shot and killed their wives

and two others committed suicide. Three of the

men had been deployed to Afghanistan and had

returned. The Army has not made a specific causal

connection with either the roles the men played in

Afghanistan or their training and experiences in

special forces. The implications of high-stress,

continuous pressure situations are yet to be

understood clearly.

The human capacity for achievement and

breaking points, even in the supportive

atmosphere of a high-performance team, has

limits. Whether new applications of technology,

changes in social mores and the demands of ultra-

high performance will combine to push team

members to those limits is an area for further

study. Ulmer (2001) surmises that even self-

actualized individuals, the Renaissance men of the

special forces, will need personalized guidance and

management:

Many careful observers of organizational change

have concluded that the future battlefield, full of




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speed and enhanced lethality and smaller operating

units and an urgency for local decision making to

adapt to rapidly changing conditions, will requiremore and better leadership, not less. The thinking

is that with routinely widely dispersed information

combined with the need for local innovation tomove inside the enemys own decision cycle there

must be particularly strong mutual trust between

leader and follower (p. xxxvi).

Academic research on teams often mentions

management and leadership only in passing.

Management is needed to define tasks that need to

be done, to form teams of members with

complementary skills and personalities and then to

empower the team to do its job. Sundstrom (1991)

suggests that the role of management is primarily

facilitation: providing the tools and even office

space which will foster the work of teams.

In the final analysis, this may be what separates

ultra-high performing teams from high-performing

teams. The higher the stakes, the more intense the

reaction and the fewer the people who will even try

to be part of the team. The challenge for

management is to provide a team with a challenge

that is reachable, not one that will endanger both

the team and the organization.

References

Baloff, N. and Doherty, E. (1989), Potential pitfalls in employeeparticipation, Organizational Dynamics, Vol. 17 No. 3,pp. 51-62.

Barry, J. and Hirsh, M. (2001), The fight ahead. Commandos:

the real tip of the spear, Newsweek, October 8, p. 37.Clancy, T. (2002), Shadow Warriors: Inside the Special Forces,

Putnam, London.Clancy, T., Gresham, J. (contributor) and Yarborough, W. (2001),

Special Forces: A Guided Tour of US Army Special Forces,Pan Macmillan, London.

Collins, M. (1995), High-performance teams and their impacton organizations, Journal for Quality and Participation,Vol. 18 No. 7, unpaginated download from Ebsco BusinessSource Elite.

Gladwell, M. (2002), The personnel department, The NewYorker, July 22, pp. 28-30.

Gustafson, K. and Kleiner, H. (1994), New developments inteam building, Industrial and Commercial Training,Vol. 26 No. 9, pp. 17-22.

Katzenbach, J. and Smith, D. (1993), Wisdom of Teams: Creatingthe High-Performance Team, Harvard Business SchoolPress, Boston, MA.

Kolenda, C.D, McCaffrey, B.R. and Ulmer, W.F. Jr (Eds) (2001),Leadership: The Warriors Art, 2nd ed., The Army WarCollege Foundation Press, Carlisle, PA.

Labich, K. (1996), Elite teams get the job done, Fortune,February 19, p. 90.

Potten, R. and Sepp, K.I. (2001), The renaissance force:selecting soldiers and forging teams for specialoperations, in Kolenda, C.D., McCaffrey, B.R. andUlmer, W.F. Jr (Eds), Leadership: The Warriors Art, 2nd ed.,The Army War College Foundation Press, Carlisle, PA,p. 327.

Priest, D. (2002), Team 555 shaped a new way of war:special forces and smart bombs turned tide and routedTaliban, Washington Post, April 3, p. A01.

Rumsfeld, D. (2002), 21st century transformation of US armedforces, speech given on January 31, available at:www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020131-secdef.html (accessed June 23.

Sundstrom, E.D. (1991), Supporting Work Team Effectiveness:Best Management Practices for Fostering High

Performance, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA.Truskie, S.D. (1999), Leadership in High Performance

Organizational Cultures, Quorum Books, Westport. CT.Ulmer, W.F. Jr (2001), Introduction, in Kolenda, C.D.,

McCaffrey, B.R. and Ulmer, W.F. Jr (Eds), Leadership:The Warriors Art, The Army War College Foundation Press,Carlisle, PA, p. xxxvi.

Further reading

Arostegui, M.C. (1995), Twilight Warriors, St Martins Press,

New York, NY.Entin, E. and Serfaty, D. (1999),Adaptive team coordination,Human Factors, Vol. 41 No. 2, p. 312.

Likert, R. (1961),New Patterns of Management, McGraw-Hill,New York, NY.

National Institute of Standards and Quality (1998), Ten years ofbusiness excellence for America, available atwww.nist.gov/public_affairs/baldrdist.pdf (accessedSeptember 2, 2002).

US National Archives and Records Administration (n.d.),Eli Whitney and the need for an invention, article onDigital Classroom Web site, available at:www.archives.gov/digital_classroom/lessons/cotton_gin_patent/cotton_gin_patent html (accessedSeptember 2, 2002).




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How far is to far

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