HOW DO YOU PROVE ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS?THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS ARE:(1) THE ACCUSED IS IN POSSESSION OF AN ITEM OR OBJECT WHICH IS IDENTIFIED TO BE A PROHIBITED DRUG; (2) SUCH POSSESSION IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY LAW; AND (3) THE ACCUSED FREELY AND CONSCIOUSLY POSSESSED THE SAID DRUG.[1][40]Ruled the Supreme Court in the above-stated case:As regards the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165 against accused-appellant Aure, We also find that the elements of the offense have been established by the evidence of the prosecution.The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.[2][40]In the instant case, a brown bag was found inside the car of accused-appellant Aure. It yielded a plastic sachet of shabu weighing 86.23 grams wrapped in red wrapping paper, small plastic sachets, and an improvised plastic tooter. Considering that during the sale to Bilason, it was from the same bag that accused-appellant Austriaco took the sachet of shabu, per order of accused-appellant Aure, the owner-possessor of said bag and its contents is no other than accused-appellant Aure, who has not shown any proof that he was duly authorized by law to possess them or any evidence to rebut his animus possidendi of the shabu found in his car during the buy-bust operation.Defense of denial is inherently weakThe sachet containing the dangerous drug was positively identified by MADAC operative Bilason during the trial as the very sachet with white crystalline substance sold and delivered to him by accused-appellants. Thus, accused-appellants denial is self-serving and has little weight in law. A bare denial is an inherently weak defense,[3][41] and has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can be easily concocted but difficult to prove, and is a common standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of RA 9165.[4][42]Time and again, We have held that denials unsubstantiated by convincing evidence are not enough to engender reasonable doubt particularly where the prosecution presents sufficiently telling proof of guilt.[5][43]In the absence of any intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute such crime against the accused-appellants, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty stands.[6][44] Especially here, where an astute analysis of MADAC operative Bilasons testimony does not indicate any inconsistency, contradiction, or fabrication.

For the successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the following elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.

The commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction, which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller.[9] Settled is the rule that as long as the police officer went through the operation as a buyer and his offer was accepted by appellant and the dangerous drugs delivered to the former, the crime is considered consummated by the delivery of the goods.

buy-and-bust operation - an undercover operation by narcotics detectives to catch unsuspecting drug dealersundercover operation - an operation involving secret work within a community or institution

Crimes Relative to Opium and Other Prohibited Drugs(The provisions of Article 190 to 194 have been repealed. First there was R.A. 6425 known as the Dangerous Drugs Law of l972 as amended by R.A. 7659. This law has in turn been replaced by R.A. 9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Some salient provisions are summarized hereunder).

A. Change in the classification of dangerous substances. The old classification between Prohibited and Regulated Drugs have been replaced by classifying dangerous substances into (i) Dangerous Drugs (DD) and (ii) Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals (CP/EC)

DD and CP/EC are not defined but refer to those substances which are enumerated in the list of schedules prepared and adopted by International Conventions.B. Factors Affecting Criminal Liability:1.The kind of dangerous substance involved: the penalty is higher if what are involved are DD.2. The Act performed by the accused such as:a. Importation

b. Sale, trading, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation. (Note: The quantity of the substance involved is immaterial)c. Maintenance of a den, dive or resort Being an employee or visitor of a den, dive or resortd. Manufacture of a DD or CP/EC or drug paraphernalia

e. Illegal chemical diversion

f. Possession of a DD

(i). The possession of different substances give rise to separate charges of possession even if the drugs were seized in the same place and occasion ( PP. vs. Empleo, 503 SCRA 464; PP. vs. Tira 430 SCRA 134) . Thus one may be charged for possession of Marijuana separate from possession of shabu (methamphetamine hydrocloride)

(ii). One may be charged for sale of shabu and a separate charge of possession of another gram of shabu which was not the subject of the sale

(iii). One charged for sale or delivery may be convicted of possession if the sale or possession was not proven

(iv). In this charge of possession, the quantity of the substance determines the penalty to be imposed

(v). Possession may be actual or constructive. Actual possession is when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion or control of the accused or when he has a right to exercise dominion or control over the place where it is found ( PP vs. Tira,430 SCRA 134)

Thus a person may be convicted for possession of drugs found inside his bedroom even if at the time of the seizure, he was physically absent there from ( PP vs. Torres, Sept. 12, 2006)

f. Possession of DD or drug paraphernalia during parties, social gatherings or meetings or in the proximity of at least two persons ( these are new provisions)

d. Use of DD provided the accused is not charged for possession

e. Cultivation or culture of plants classified as DD or sources thereof. This need not be in a plantation. One plant of marijuana in a flower pot is included

f. Offenses by physicians and drug stores: (i) failure to maintain and keep records of transactions of any DD or CP/EC (ii) Unnecessary prescription (iii) Unlawful prescription

g. Two new acts are included:

(i). Acting as a Financier: a person who pays for, raises, or supplies money for, or underwrites any of the illegal activities involving dangerous substances

(ii). Acting as a Protector or coddler: a person who knowingly and willfully consents to the unlawful acts provided for in the law and who uses his influence, power or position in shielding, harboring, screening or facilitating the escape of any person whom he knows or has grounds to believe has violated the provisions of this Act in order to prevent the arrest, prosecution and conviction of the violator

j. Attempt or conspiracy. Note that the law does not include possession as being the subject of an attempt or conspiracy ( Is this omission intentional or by oversight? )3. The Quantity of the dangerous substance if the act of that of possession4. The presence of special aggravating circumstances.a). These vary according to the act of the accused. Thus in the act of importing: that the accused is a diplomat or a financier. In cases of sale, delivery, administration or transporting: that it took place within a radius of 100 meters form a school; the use of a minor or a mentally incapacitated person; or that the victim is a minor or a mentally incapacitate person; or that the DD is the proximate cause of the death; or that the suspect is a financier

b). The application of these circumstances is doubtful considering that the penalties provided for by the Act do not follow the nomenclature and scheme of the penalties under the Revised Penal Code and they do not have periods

C. New Acts punished: The law seeks to address certain abuses by law enforcers as well as causes of unsuccessful prosecution or dismissal of drug cases filed in court.1.Creation of a new qualifying aggravating circumstance applicable to offenses under the Revised Penal Code consisting of a POSITIVE FINDING FOR THE USE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS. This must be corroborated by a confirmatory drug testa). Under the old law what constituted an aggravating circumstance was that the accused committed a crime while under the influence of drug. Under the new law, the accused need not be high on drugs during the time of committing of a crime so long as the test showed he is a user of drugs

b). The application of the new qualifying aggravating circumstance poses a problem to felonies which do not have qualified forms such as parricide, threats, physical injuries, robbery. ( In such a case it is suggested the circumstance must be appreciated as a special aggravating to give meaning to the intent of the congress to punish more severely the users who commits crimes)

2. Defining and Penalizing the offense of Planting of Evidence i..e planting of any dangerous substances in the person, house, effects, or in the immediate vicinity of an innocent individual for the purpose of implicating, incriminating or imputing the commission of any violation of this Act

a). If what is planted is not a dangerous substances the crime is that of Incriminating an Innocent Person/Incriminatory Machination under the Revised Penal Code.

b). The penalty is death

3. Penalizing any public officer who misappropriates, misapplies or fails to account for the DD/CP/EC, paraphernalia, proceeds or properties obtained form unlawful acts. ( Note: Consider this as Malversation or Infidelity of Dangerous Drugs, Drug paraphernalia and Drug Proceeds)

4. Penalizes the following acts of law enforcers:

a). Failure or refusal after due notice, to appear as witnesses for the prosecution

b). Failure of the immediate superior to exert reasonable efforts to present the witness in court

c). Failure of the immediate superior to notify the court of the transfer or re-assignment of a witness during the pendency of the case to another territorial jurisdiction. Note that the transfer of re-assignment to the witnesses to another territorial jurisdiction must only be for compelling reason and provided the court was notified 24 hours in advance.

5. Defines and Penalizes the act of Delay and Bungling in the Prosecution of Drug Cases i.e. the prosecution causes the unsuccessful prosecution or the dismissal through patent laxity, inexcusable neglect or unreasonable delay. There must first be an Order of dismissal or Judgment of acquittal, based on the fault of the prosecution.

6. In case of conviction:

a). the convict suffers the accessory penalty of disqualification to exercise civil rights and political rights and that rights are suspended during the pendency of an appeal from such a conviction.

b). After conviction by the RTC: there shall be hearing for the confiscation and forfeiture of unexplained wealth of the accused. In case the article declared forfeited is a vehicle, the same shall be auctioned not later than five days from the order of confiscation or forfeiture

7. Prohibition against plea bargaining and disqualification from probation for those convicted of drug trafficking

8. Provides as a ground for removal from office of an elective official; that of having benefited from the proceeds of drug trafficking or receipt of any financial or material contribution or donation from persons found guilty of drug trafficking.D. Provisions Against Act affecting the Integrity of the evidence or their possible appropriation by agents:

1. Conduct of a Physical Inventory and Photographing of the Evidence

a. Immediately upon the arrest, seizure or confiscation

b. In the presence of (i) the accused or person form whom the articles were taken or his representative (ii) a representative form the DOJ (iii) representative from the Media and (iv) an elected official. These persons must also sign the written inventory

2. Submission of the article within 24 hours to the Crime Laboratory for Quantitative ( how many kilos or grams) and qualitative ( what kind of substance was involved) examination

3. Requirement that the results of the crime laboratory examination must be under oath

4. Upon the filing of the Information in Court:

a. Conduct of an ocular inspection or examination of the evidence by the court within 72 hours. This may be in the place were the evidence are kept if the same cannot be presented in court, or the evidence are actually brought and presented in court.

b. Destruction of the articles within 24 hours following the inspection but representative samples are taken and preserved

5. Destruction of the representative samples after conviction, forfeiture and confiscation of other proceeds of the crime and

E. Provisions intended to benefit the drug dependent- the following are applicable only if the charge is for the use of DD/CP/EC :

1. Community service in lieu of imprisonment

2. Exemption from Criminal Liability for first time offenders who underwent treatment and rehabilitation in a Drug Rehabilitation Center under the supervision of the Dangerous Drugs Board and were discharged thereafter

3. Suspension of sentence of a Minor First Offender

a). A minor is one who is over 15 at the time of the commission of the offense but below 18 at the time of sentencing

b). The suspension is discretionary upon the court. Contra the Family Court Law ( RA 8369) which provides that the suspension is mandatory)

c). The minor is placed under the supervision of the Dangerous Drugs Board and is for a period ranging from 6 to 18 months

d). Upon favorable recommendation by the Board the court shall discharge the accused and dismiss all the proceedings

e). All records shall be expunged and the minor shall not be criminal liable for perjury for concealment or misrepresentation of refusal to acknowledge or recite any fact concerning his case.

F. Provisions to expedite drug cases:

1. The Preliminary Investigation shall be terminated within 30 days from filing and the Information hall be filed within 24 hours from the termination of the investigation

2. Trial shall be terminated not later than 60 days from ate of filing of the Information

3. The decisions shall be rendered within 15 days from submission for decision

G. Miscellaneous Provisions:

1. Requirement of a Mandatory Drug Test in the following:

a). Application and renewal of drivers license

b). Application for firearms license or permit to carry

c). Annually for Officers and members of the AFP, PNP and other law enforcement agencies

d). For all persons charged before the Prosecutors Office for an offenses punishable by imprisonment of not less than 6 years and one day

e). For all candidates for public office whether appointive or elective, national or local

2. Requirement of a Random Drug test

a). For high school and college students with parental consent and subject to the rules and regulations of the student handbook

b). For officer and employees of public and private offices subject to the companys work rules and regulations

3. Strengthening and Professionalization of the Fight against Drug Menace:

a). Creating of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency ( PDEA) as the implementing arm of the Dangerous Drugs Board

b). the NARCOTICS group fo the other law enforcement agencies are abolished

c. Establishment of a PDEA ACADEMY which shall be responsible for rte recruitment and training of PDEA agents and personnel and whose graduates shall comprise the operating units of the PDEA

H. Principles:

1. Drug cases are where the principles of Instigation and Entrapment are most often applied

2. Buy-bust operations are recognized as one of the most effective means of arresting criminals in flagranti. Where the arrest is due to a buy-bust the presentation of the buy-money is not essential, and as a general rule, the identification and presentation of the civilian informer is considered privileged

3. If the accused is a CICL and the penalty is Life Imprisonment, said penalty shall be understood to be Reclusion Perpetua thereby the minor is still entitled to all the beneficial effects arising from his minority, such as the reduction of the penalty by degrees

EOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. SAMROD PENDATUN y KASAN, RICHARD NUEZ y SANITA, CANAPI AMBALGAN y BAGUNDONG alias PIA, NOEL LANTIKAN y PEREGRINA, JOVEN CASEM y MENKO alias SARIP, SARAH PENDATUN y PANDIAN and TARHATA TATA SALMORE y WATAMA alias THATA, appellants.D E C I S I O NYNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:On appeal is the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 311 finding appellants Samrod Pendatun y Kasan, Richard Nuez y Sanita, Canapi Ambalgan y Bagundong alias Pia, Noel Lantikan y Peregrina, Joven Casem y Menko alias Sarip, Sarah Pendatun y Pandian and Tarhata Salmore y Watama alias Tata, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of selling 982.1 grams of shabu, a regulated drug, sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering them to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and costs.Appellants were charged with violation of Section 15, Article III in relation to Section 21 (b), Article IV of RA 6425, as amended, in an Information which reads:2That on or about May 25, 1999, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without license or legal authority, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, pass and distribute to PNP member/poseur buyer methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) a regulated drug weighing 982.1 grams contained in a self-sealing transparent plastic bag which was placed in an orange plastic bag with mark Emporia Department Store, in exchange for six (6) pieces of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) Bills marked money separately placed on top of several pieces of bond paper used as boodle money.Contrary to law.On May 25, 1999 at around 9:00 in the morning, a confidential agent went to the office of Police Senior Inspector Romualdo Iglesia, Chief of the Service Support Office of the PNP Narcotics Group at Camp Crame, Quezon City, to relay an information about a group of Muslim drug traffickers operating in Metro Manila and nearby provinces. It was determined that the drug deal would take place in San Pedro, Laguna at around 4:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon of that day. Police Senior Officer Iglesia then designated the team that would conduct the buy-bust operation. PO2 Wilfredo de Leon, as the assigned poseur-buyer, was given P3,000.00 placed on top of a stack of boodle money. At around 2:30 in the afternoon, the arresting team, composed of 12 to 15 police officers on board five cars, proceeded to the target area. When they arrived at the Petron Gasoline Station along South Expressway, PO2 De Leon, together with the confidential agent, alighted from the car to await the arrival of the suspects. After five minutes, a white taxi with three unidentified passengers arrived. When they met, the confidential agent introduced PO2 De Leon to the three persons, later identified as appellants Canapi Ambalgan alias Pia, Samrod Pendatun, and Richard Nuez, as the prospective buyer of shabu. After an exchange of pleasantries, the three drug dealers demanded to see the money. PO2 De Leon, insisted however, that they first show him the stuff. Appellants Pia, Samrod, and Richard left but returned later with appellants Tarhata Tata Salmore, Sarah Pendatun, Joven Casem and Noel Lantikan. Joven Casem handed the plastic bag he was carrying to Tata who passed it on to the poseur-buyer. After examining the contents of the plastic bag, PO2 De Leon gave the pre-arranged signal. He then took out his gun and introduced himself as a narcotics agent, while the other police officers rushed to the scene to arrest the seven suspects.Police Inspector Ma. Luisa David, forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, examined the specimen substance and found that the same was methampethamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug.On the other hand, appellant Tarhata Salmore testified that among the seven appellants, only Sarah Pendatun was familiar to her. She narrated that on May 25, 1999 she was accompanied by Sarah to Taguig where they met with appellants Richard Nunez, Joven Casem, and Canapi Ambalgan. Since the group was planning to go to Laguna, Tarhata volunteered to go with them so she can visit her uncle, a sidewalk vendor, whom she has not seen since December 1998. They boarded a taxi with Richard taking the front seat while she, Sarah, Joven and Canapi on the back seat. Tarhata placed the plastic bag containing a kilo of mangoes which she bought for her uncle on the floor between her legs. Upon reaching the McDonalds Restaurant along South Expressway, Richard instructed the taxi driver to stop, after which all of them alighted from the taxi; that somebody asked her to carry a plastic bag but could not recall who it was; and that she placed the bag on a monobloc chair outside the restaurant. Moments later, she entered the restaurant with appellants Noel Lantican and Samrod Pendatun when they met the rest of the group. Then her male companions went out of the restaurant, leaving her and Sarah inside.Samrod motioned for her to pick up the plastic bag on the monobloc chair, so she went outside and followed Samrod.Tarhata and Samrod went towards the back of the restaurant, where she noticed a woman and an old man, together with Noel Lantikan, standing beside a red car. When she went near the vehicle, Noel Lantikan shoved her inside. The three individuals then boarded the car, followed a little later by Samrod Pendatun. The unidentified woman ordered her to hand over the plastic bag. At this juncture, several men appeared and pulled the four of them out of the vehicle. Their captors dragged them towards a flesh-colored van and they were brought to Camp Crame.Appellants Richard Nuez and Noel Lantikan narrated a substantially similar version of the incident. Specifically, Richard Nuez testified that on May 25, 1999 at around 10:00 in the morning, his childhood friend from Laguna, appellant Noel Lantikan, came to visit him at his house in Fairview, Quezon City. Appellant Lantikan invited him to go to his house in Los Baos, Laguna to visit their friends. On their way to Laguna, the jeepney they were riding stopped at a Petron gasoline station along the South Expressway to gas up. They asked permission from the driver to use the comfort room which was located behind McDonalds Restaurant. While inside the rest room, they were suddenly pushed down the floor and manhandled by two armed men. They were then dragged outside towards a vehicle which brought them to Camp Crame.Appellant Samrod Pendatun testified that on May 25, 1999, he was on board a bus on his way to Calamba, Laguna to see his uncle. Before he could reach his destination, however, the bus he was riding developed engine trouble near the McDonalds Restaurant, which was located along the South Expressway. While the bus was being fixed, he went inside the restaurant to call his wife who arrived in a taxi at around 4:00 in the afternoon. Not long after, three men collared and forcibly brought them to a waiting car.Appellant Canapi Ambalgan testified that on May 25, 1999, he had just finished his lunch in a restaurant in Quiapo when Joven Casem, a friend from his hometown, came to see him. Casem asked if he could accompany him to Laguna to visit a relative. On their way to Laguna aboard a taxi, they asked the driver to stop by the McDonalds restaurant because they wanted to take a snack. Before they could finish their snack, however, several men collared the two of them and shoved their faces on the table. Appellant Canapi was led towards a vehicle where he was forced to lie down. Later, he found himself at Camp Crame. Appellant claimed that he was tortured to admit the possession of the plastic bag containing the prohibited drugs. He insisted that, except for Joven Casem, he had not met any of his co-accused before.In denying the charges, appellant Joven Casem recounted that he went to Manila to look for his sister who got lost after being abandoned by her recruiter. In the morning of May 25, 1999, he and his uncle went to the Muslim mosque in Quiapo to look for her. By chance, he met appellant Canapi Ambalgan, an old friend. Canapi invited him to go to Laguna. Along the way, however, they were arrested and detained at Camp Crame. He revealed that, like the other appellants, he was also maltreated by the arresting officers.For her part, appellant Sarah Pendatun narrated that in the morning of May 25, 1999, she was inside her house in Taguig, Maharlika Village. Her husband, appellant Samrod Pendatun, had just left to go to the recruitment agency in Manila. At around 1:00 in the afternoon, she received a call from her husband telling her to proceed to the McDonalds Restaurant at the South Expressway. She arrived there at around 3:00 p.m., and had a snack. It was then that three men pulled her husband and brought him outside. Thereafter, the men returned and ordered her to board a vehicle.The trial court gave full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and rendered a decision finding the seven appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of selling 982.1 grams of shabu, a regulated drug, the dispositive portion of which reads:3IN VIEW THEREOF, the prosecution assisted by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Melchorito M.E. Lomarda has duly established the guilt of all accused beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of a Violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425, as amended, for having sold, in conspiracy with one another, 982.1 grams of shabu, a regulated drug, to a poseur-buyer without any authority of law.WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing each of the accused Samrod Pendatun y Kasan, Richard Nunez y Sanita, Canapi Ambalgan y Bagundong @ Pia, Noel Lantikan y Peregrina, Joven Casem y Menko @ Sarip, Sarah Pendatun y Pandian and Tarhata Salmore y Watama @ Tata to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and to pay the costs of suit.The Officer-In-Charge of this court is hereby directed to turn over the evidence consisting of a plastic bag containing 982.1 grams of shabu to the Dangerous Drugs Board for its proper disposition.SO ORDERED. Hence, this appeal based on the following grounds:4I.THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE ACTS OF THE ACCUSED COLLECTIVELY AND INDIVIDUALLY DEMONSTRATE THE EXISTENCE OF A COMMON DESIGN TOWARDS THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE SAME UNLAWFUL PURPOSE, THUS CONSPIRACY IS NOT EVIDENT;II.THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ADMISSION MADE BY ACCUSED T. SALMORE SUBSTANTIATED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GUILT OF ALL ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT;III.THE SHABU SEIZED WAS INSIDE A CLOSED PACKAGE AND IS NOT IN PLAIN VIEW, THEREFORE, IT CANNOT BE SEIZED WITHOUT A WARRANT;IV.THE LOWER COURT DISREGARDED THE FACT THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED WERE VIOLATED, SPECIFICALLY, THE DEFENSE OF NUEZ AND LANTIKAN THAT THEY WERE AT THE WRONG PLACE AT THE WRONG TIME; THE PENDATUNS SPOUSES ALLEGATION THAT THEY WERE MANHANDLED; AND AMBALGAN AND CASEMS CLAIM THAT THEY WERE SIMILARLY MALTREATED FOR NO APPARENT REASON.To buttress their stance, appellants contend that the trial court erred in finding that their presence at McDonalds was and of itself, a conspiracy. They claim that the incredible admission made by Tarhata Salmore betrays material contradictions with the narration of PO2 De Leon resulting in the failure by the prosecution to meet the required quantum of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt to convict them of the crime charged.Appellants further claim that the shabu allegedly seized by the authorities was placed inside a closed package and was not in plain view. Hence, it could not be seized without a warrant. Furthermore, they protested the alleged illegal tactics employed by the arresting officers to extract confessions from them which violated their constitutional rights.Appellants contentions are bereft of merit. The trial court was correct in giving full weight and credence to the prosecutions evidence.The testimonies on how the buy-bust operation was conducted exposed in clear and distinct terms the intention of the malefactors to engage in the illegal sale of shabu.As recounted by prosecution witness De Leon, and corroborated by the other prosecution witnesses, the Narcotics group acted on the information by the confidential agent that a group of Muslim drug traffickers operating in Metro Manila was about to conduct an illegal drugs deal. At the designated place, the confidential agent introduced the poseur-buyer as a prospective buyer of shabu to appellants Pia, Samrod and Richard.The three demanded to see the money in exchange for the shabu in their possession. The three left for a while but returned later with Tata, Sara, Jovi and Noel. It was appellant Jovi who handed the plastic bag to Tata who in turn gave it to PO2 De Leon.The presence of the seven accused at the locus criminis was confirmed by Tarhata Tata Salmore who also testified that on the date of the incident, she and the other appellants Sarah Pendatun, Richard Nunez, Joven Casem, and Canapi Ambalgan decided to go to Laguna. Along the way, the taxi stopped by the McDonalds Restaurant along the South Expressway. There, they met Noel Lantican and Samrod Pendatun inside the McDonalds Restaurant. It was Samrod who asked appellant Salmore to pick up the plastic bag she was made to carry. She also identified Noel Lantikan as the one who, together with a woman and an old man, shoved her inside the red car before the arresting officers swooped down upon the group and brought them to Camp Crame.The presence of the seven appellants at the scene of the crime was not only established but the participation of each of the appellant in the aborted drug deal was clearly described and proved by the prosecution witnesses. Jurisprudence has firmly entrenched the following as elements in the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs: (1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and (2) he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a dangerous drug.5 These essential ingredients were duly proved in the case at bar. Appellants sold and delivered the shabu to the police officer posing as buyer. It was seized and identified as a prohibited drug and subsequently presented in evidence. Appellants were fully aware that they were selling and delivering a prohibited substance. They were all present when the plastic bag containing the prohibited substance was handed over to the poseur-buyer. Possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession. Hence, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi. In this respect, appellants defense of denial withers in the face of the positive identification by PO2 De Leon who enjoys in his favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of his job.The trial court accorded full credit to the testimony of PO2 De Leon as substantiated by the other arresting officers and at the same time, dismissed the self-serving and uncorroborated testimonies of the Appellants. We find no reason to disagree. Well-settled is the rule that in the absence of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal.6 Moreover, the defense failed to prove any ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to impute a serious crime that would put in jeopardy the life and liberty of innocent persons.Appellants alleged that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of a conspiracy among the seven accused, as it did not show a common plan or design among them. We find otherwise. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. As a rule, conspiracy must be proved as convincingly and indubitably as the crime itself. It is not necessary, however, that conspiracy be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement to commit the crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused which show a joint or common purpose and design, a concerted action and a community of interest among the accused.7We find that conspiracy exists in this case. While there is no showing of direct evidence that appellants agreed to commit the crime, their acts and the attendant circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime disclose a common design that would make all of them co-principals in the crime committed. As the records would show, appellants Pia, Samrod and Richard conducted the preliminaries to the transaction when they tried to ascertain the identity of the supposed buyer and made inquiries on the availability of the drug money. Satisfied, they then brought to the scene appellants Tata, Sara, Jovi and Noel who delivered the prohibited substance. This indubitably demonstrates a concerted effort on the part of the appellants in perpetrating the illegal sale. We can deduce from their collective conduct a common design, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. Needless to state, when conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.8Neither can we sustain appellants erroneous invocation of the plain view doctrine. The plain view doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.9 It finds no application where the appellants, as in this case, are caught in the act of committing a crime. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of the buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized but are even duty- bound to arrest them even without a warrant.In the instant case, there is reasonable suspicion that the package in the possession of the culprit contains the prohibited item, which the arresting officer came across, not inadvertently, but on purpose. It bears noting that the package containing the illegal substance was seized only after it was examined and voluntarily placed by one of the appellants in the possession of the arresting officer posing as buyer.Appellants decry the alleged maltreatment and abuse they experienced in the hands of the arresting officers. While we do not condone and in fact condemn the penchant by some members of the police force in resorting to extra-constitutional means to extract, for which reason evidence so obtained are deemed inadmissible, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the conviction of herein appellants rests, not on any evidence so obtained, but on the strength of the prosecution evidence showing their guilt beyond any iota of doubt.The penalty prescribed under Section 15 of Article III, in relation to Section 20 of Article IV, of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA 7659, for unauthorized sale of 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride is reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos.In the case at bar, as the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death consists of two indivisible penalties, appellants were correctly meted the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua, conformably with Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code that when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.10 As to the fine, considering that the amount of shabu sold was 982.1 grams, we find the amount of P500,000.00 as reasonable.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, finding Samrod Pendatun y Kasan, Richard Nuez y Sanita, Canapi Ambalgan y Bagundong a.k.a. Pia, Noel Lantikan y Peregrina, Joven Casem y Menko a.k.a. Sarip, Sarah Pendatun y Pandian and Tarhata Salmore y Watama a.k.a. Tata guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 15, Article III of RA No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the fine of P500,000.00 and costs, is AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 70569 January 7, 1987PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.MICHAEL MADARANG y SANTOS, accused-appellant. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Roman C. Vilialon IV for accused-appellant. FERNAN, J.:Michael Madarang y Santos appealed from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union, Branch 33, convicting him in Criminal Case No. 567-BG of a violation of Section 4, Article II, of Republic Act No. 6425 [Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1675] and sentencing him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000. 1Madarang, together with Cirilo Juan y Polas, was charged in an information dated January 26, 1983, as follows: That on or about the 12th day of July, 1982 at Sitio Gabor, Barangay Bilis, Municipality of Burgos, Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and without any justifiable cause and not being authorized by law, sell Eight Hundred [800] grams of dried Marijuana leaves with flowering tops, a prohibited drug, to Pfc. Roberto C. Viloria, a member of the Integrated National Police, a Government agent who pretended as buyer. Contrary to Sec. 4, Art. 11 of R.A. 6425 as amended by P.D. 1675. 2 Juan, who evaded arrest, has not been tried and is still at large. 3 Only Madarang was convicted. The lower court based its finding of guilt on the prosecution's evidence. Thus: In the early morning of July 12, 1982, Integrated National Police Sergeants Alejandro Basallo and Roberto Viloria of the San Fernando Police Station in La Union were tipped by a civilian informer [identity undisclosed] that certain drug pushers would be selling about four kilos of dried marijuana leaves valued at P2,800 in Barangay Bilis Burgos, La Union. Acting on that information and with the permission of his station commander, Basallo formed a combined Integrated National Police [INPI/Naval Intelligence Bureau [NIB] team composed of himself and Viloria and Eduardo Pascua and Douglas Abalos of the NIB of Poro Point, La Union. Adopting a strategy to entrap the drug dealers, it was agreed that Viloria would pose as the buyer, Basallo as the driver and Abalos and Pascua as passengers. 4 Said officers, clad in civilian clothes, and the informer proceeded to Barangay Bilis, about two kilometers away, on board a borrowed passenger jeepney. This was actually their second attempt to apprehend the suspected drug dealers. Earlier, on June 9, acting on the same information, they waited in Sitio Gabor for the drug pushers, but the intended sale failed to materialize as the latter did not appear. 5 The combined team arrived in Sitio Gabor, in Barangay Bilis at past ten in the morning. After parking the jeepney along the Naguilian Highway, the civilian informer left while the rest waited by the j jeepney. 6 At around 2:25 in the afternoon, the civilian informer returned and informed the group that the marijuana dealers were in a house situated about two hundred meters from where they were waiting. They backed up the jeepney, stopping a few meters from the house indicated. Several minutes later, two men came down from the mountainside and approached the jeepney. They were the accused Cirilo Juan and Michael Madarang. Juan was holding a plastic bag. 7 The civilian informer introduced the two to Sgt. Viloria, who was then seated inside the jeepney, as the buyer. Thereupon, Madarang and Juan boarded the vehicle and sat opposite him. Villoria asked the two the price of their marijuana. Madarang promptly replied that it was P600 a kilo and showed one stalk as sample. Viloria inspected the rest of the marijuana leaves wrapped in manila paper inside the plastic bag. He tried to bargain for a lower price but Madarang insisted on the original price of P600. Viloria relented and accepted the offer ["Sige ngarud"]. He took out his wallet from his back pocket, but instead of paying, he showed Juan and Madarang his police Identification card and Identified himself as a police officer. This caught Madarang and Juan by surprise, who could not make any move. The other members of the team, then standing at the side of the jeepney, boarded the vehicle, arrested the drug peddlers and confiscated from Juan the plastic bag containing dried marijuana leaves with flowering tops. 8 The peace officers then proceeded to the Burgos Police station and had the apprehension of Madarang and Juan recorded in the police blotter. 9 Thereafter, they brought Madarang and Juan and the confiscated marijuana to the police station in San Fernando, La Union, where they were investigated, detained and subsequently released. 10 Meanwhile, a miscroscopic test and thin layer chromatography conducted on the confiscated marijuana leaves with flowering tops [about 800 grams] at the Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory unit in Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, where they were delivered by Sgt. Basallo for examination, positively confirmed that the same were really marijuana. 11 After a prima facie finding by the provincial fiscal that the offense complained of had been committed by the accused, Juan and Madarang were ordered re-arrested. 12 Madarang voluntarily surrendered and upon arraignment pleaded not guilty. 13 Trial ensued and eventually the judgment of conviction under review was promulgated. During the trial the defense adduced the following evidence: Michael Madarang, 18 [born on March 19, 1964], single, and a vocational student taking practical electricity, testified that at noontime of July 12, 1982 [Monday] he was sleeping alone in his house located along the Naguilian Highway because he was sick with influenza. 14 At around one o'clock in the afternoon, Cirilo Juan came to his house and asked him to accompany the former to meet certain persons. Since he knew Juan since childhood and was quite close to him, Madarang agreed to accompany Juan though he felt weak. They walked in the direction of Siping, a road leading to the Naguilian Highway. Madarang noticed that Juan was holding something wrapped in cellophane. He asked Juan what the object was but the latter did not answer him directly. Juan appeared excited and in a hurry. 15 Madarang and Juan stopped at the house of Trifon Gallardo where Juan was immediately met by Felix Biwang, who was with two men standing in the yard. Juan talked with the two strangers, after which they [Juan and the two strangers] boarded a jeepney parked about 50 meters down the road. Madarang remained where he was until Juan waved at him to join them inside the jeepney. 16 There were other men inside. Madarang sat beside Juan who was then holding the cellophane bag. Madarang heard Viloria requesting Juan to open the bag. Madarang peered inside but he did not know what the contents were. After Viloria inspected the contents, he suddenly drew his gun and Identified himself and the other men as police officers. He placed them under arrest. Because of shock and fear, Madarang remained speechless and made no protest. 17 They were then brought to the Burgos municipal building and afterwards to San Fernando where they were detained for twenty-two days. It was only during his detention that Madarang found out that he was arrested for illegal possession of marijuana. He was very angry with Juan for getting him involved. Upon his release, he went to his brother's house at Tabok, Kalinga, Apayao, to avoid Juan. He stayed there for about five months. However, upon learning that he was going to be arrested because of a case filed against him, he voluntarily surrendered to the authorities on March 4, 1983 prior to the service of a warrant of arrest upon him. 18 In this appeal, Madarang contends that the trial court erred in discrediting the eyewitness testimony of Felix Biwang and in finding him guilty of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt. Madarang disavows knowledge of the contents of the plastic bag and denies involvement with Juan in the sale of marijuana. The issue is credibility. Felix Biwang, a forty-two-year-old farmer from Barangay Bilis Burgos, testified that in the morning of July 12, 1982, he was in the house of Trifon Gallardo, his father-in-law, having a drink with neighbor Virgilio Sabado. Two men, whom he did not know, came looking for Cirilo Juan. 19 Juan arrived at 10 o'clock on board a Marcitas bus. He conversed with the two men for a few minutes. Biwang heard them ask Juan "where is it?" ["Ayanna ngay?"]. Then they separated and Juan left the two men in the yard. 20 At about 1:00 p.m Juan reappeared holding a bag. He was followed by Madarang. Juan rejoined the two men and they boarded the jeepney parked nearby while Madarang stayed near the house. After ten minutes, Madarang joined them. Although Biwang was about 100 to 120 meters away, he could see them because he was standing near the stairs, facing the jeepney. He could not, however, hear their conversation. Then he saw Juan and Madarang being handcuffed and the vehicle moving towards the municipal building. 21 When first queried about his relationship with Madarang, Biwang stated that that was the first time he had seen Madarang. He however changed his testimony and admitted that Madarang and Juan were his neighbors in Burgos. He volunteered to testify in court because he was requested by Madarang's mother to whom he had related what transpired in the early afternoon of July 12th, two months after said incident. 22 The lower court correctly rejected the testimony of Biwang. By and large, it was replete with incredulities and vacillations. If at all, it only served to emphasize the fact that Madarang was with Juan at the time of the incident and that they were together inside the jeepney when the sale of narcotics was effected to a poseur-buyer. Biwang might have seen what had taken place, but his account is insufficient to disprove Madarang's complicity. By his own admission, he was too far to hear what was being said by the persons inside the jeepney. His version therefore cannot prevail over that of the police officers who were actually present in the vehicle when Madarang, in conspiracy with Juan, negotiated the sale of the marijuana leaves for P600 a kilo. Viloria, who posed as the buyer, and Basallo clearly and positively Identified Madarang as the seller of the marijuana. The latter's defense that he only accompanied Juan and that he was completely unaware that the plastic bag actually contained illegal drugs cannot overcome the positive and unequivocal statements of the two peace officers that it was none other than Madarang who personally fixed the price of the marijuana leaves of P600 a kilo and who stood firm against Viloria's attempts at haggling. We have carefully examined the records and find no sufficient reason to depart from the trial court's appraisal of the evidence of the prosecution and the defense. We are constrained to give credence to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses, more so when they are law enforcers who are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary. 23 There was an attempt by Madarang to discredit the police officers who arrested him. He accused them of extorting money from his mother in exchange for dropping the charge against him. He added that since his poor mother could only afford a small amount, they decided to frame him up. Thus, he claims that his inclusion as a co-conspirator was prompted by "ulterior motives." Madarang's mother, who executed an affidavit attesting to the foregoing was not however, asked, by the defense counsel to testify in court to elaborate on the matter and to be cross-examined by the prosecution. 24 For someone as desperate as Madarang who was caught red-handed peddling illicit drugs, such an imputation of wrong doing, so easily fabricated, can be expected. In the case of People v. Adriano, 133 SCRA 132, the factual background of which is similar to the case at bar, We ruled that: It is a clear case of res ipsa loquitur. His imputation to the police of attempted extortion and maltreatment do not weaken the fact that he was caught red-handed in possession of contraband. The presumption that the police performed their duties regularly was not overthrown Moreover, one thing sticks out like a sore thumb throughout this case. We refer to the unusually submissive stance displayed by Madarang after the entrapment. As correctly observed by the trial court, if Madarang were indeed innocent of the crime imputed to him as he now vehemently insists, why did he not make a vigorous protest at the time he was placed under arrest inside the jeepney, or while enroute to Burgos and up to the time he was brought to the police station in San Fernando, La Union, where he was put in jail? His lame explanation that he was surprised and shocked by the sudden turn of events is wholly unsatisfactory because an unwarranted arrest would naturally elicit an indignant protest from an innocent man. Moreover, he meekly signed, after reading, a waiver, for his safekeeping for seven days without inquiring from the authorities why he was being detained. And finally when he confronted Juan with the latter's non-disclosure of the real contents of the plastic bag, he allegedly felt angry but he kept it to himself despite the grave nature of the charge against him. All considered, we hold that Madarang committed an act in direct violation of Section 4, Article 11 of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended, which provides: Section 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. If the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed. That the marijuana leaves may have belonged to Juan is of no moment. Ownership and possession are not indispensable elements of the crime under consideration. The mere act of selling or even acting as broker in a sale of marijuana and other prohibited drugs consummates the crime under Section 4. When Madarang negotiated the sale without authority of Juan's marijuana leaves to Viloria who posed as a buyer, he took a direct and active part in the crime. His guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. EDEN DEL CASTILLO, appellant.D E C I S I O NAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:Eden del Castillo appeals from the decision dated June 27, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. CBU-54778, finding her guilty of violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended; and imposing on her the penalty of reclusion perpetua.She was indicted under an Information dated August 2, 2000 which reads:That on or about the 31st day of July 2000, at about 10:30 A.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent and without being authorized by law, did then and there have in her possession and control or use the following:A- Three (3) big heat sealed plastic packs of white crystalline substance weighing 294.86 grams;B- Eight (8) medium heat sealed plastic packs of white crystalline substance weighing 12.33 grams;C- Fifty three (53) heat sealed plastic packets of white crystalline substance weighing 4.75 gramslocally known as shabu, containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding license or prescription.CONTRARY TO LAW.Upon her arraignment, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial thereafter ensued.The prosecution presented the following witnesses: PO3 Leopoldo Bauzon, PO3 Alfredo Petallar, P/Insp. Mutchit Salinas and PO2 Brazilio Borinaga. Their testimonies proved the following facts:On July 21, 2000, a search warrant was issued by Judge Isaias Dicdican of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Cebu City, authorizing the search and seizure of shabu and its paraphernalias in the house of appellant located in M. Borgonia Street, Hayco, Mabolo, Cebu City. At about 10:30 in the morning of July 31, 2000, a team composed of Police Chief/Insp. Pablo Gacayan Labra II, Bauzon, Petallar and Borinaga, PO2 Ricardo Baclayon, Jr. and PO1 Jeric Cuyos Toring, went to the subject house to implement the search warrant. The police officers accompanied by three barangay tanods, namely: Wilfredo Wasawas, Mansueto Toong and Leonico Sagosa, entered the house, saw appellant and served the warrant on her. At that time, appellant was with her grandmother Elena Rivaral Garcia, the registered owner of the house, and Servando del Castillo, appellants brother, in the living room. The police officers pressed them by telling them not to move and they were asked to just sit down while the search was on-going.The raiding team divided themselves into two searching groups. The first group composed of Bauzon, Toring and one barangay tanod searched the upper portion of the house and found three large plastic packs of white crystalline substance. The second group, composed of Baclayon and Borinaga, searched the ground floor and found eight medium heat-sealed plastic packs of white crystalline substance and fifty-three heat-sealed plastic packets of white crystalline substance; two disposable lighters, one pair of scissors, one tooter, one puller and an improvised hacksaw. Servando voluntarily surrendered five small packs of white crystalline substance. Appellant was arrested and informed of her constitutional rights, specifically, the right to counsel to which she replied that she has a lawyer who will represent her. Petallar then prepared an inventory of the seized articles and appellant was made to sign the same. PO3 Bauzon and PO3 Petallar explained that the inventory receipt was dated July 24, 2000 although the raid was conducted on July 31 because their office had earlier prepared the blank form. A copy of the inventory was given to a tanod and thereafter appellant and Servando were brought to the police station while the items seized were brought to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination.P/Insp. Mutchit Salinas, chemist of the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office, who conducted the laboratory test on these substances confirmed that the specimens submitted for testing were positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride known as shabu.The defense presented the following witnesses: Elena R. Garcia, Jaime Garcia and appellant herself who testified to establish the following facts:The house subject of the search on July 31, 2000 was owned by Elena, appellants grandmother, and her late husband, Jose Garcia, as evidenced by a copy of Tax Declaration No. 01-30651 in the name of Jose Garcia; that only Brent Lepiten, Elenas grandson, was living in the house while appellant was living with her parents in San Vicente Village, Wireless, Mandaue City, a distance of about five kilometers from Elenas place. On July 31, 2000, Elena, who was in the upper portion of the house with her son, Jaime, who happened to sleep in her house the night before because he had a drinking spree with some friends, went downstairs because of the thudding sound from their door. Appellant, who was in the house to visit her grandmother, was having breakfast when the door was opened. Several men entered the house and instructed them to sit down. Two of these men carrying an envelope went upstairs and woke up Jaime Garcia. Jaime then went downstairs and these two men without the envelope followed two minutes later. Appellant and the other occupants were told to wait for the arrival of the tanods. Then, the same two men who earlier went upstairs went up again with a tanod and when they came down, they had with them an envelope, the contents of which were spread on the table and were listed down. Appellant was then asked to sign a paper where a listing of the contents of the envelope was made but she requested to contact her lawyer which was denied. She was forced to sign otherwise she would be handcuffed. The list of the inventory was neither read to her nor did they leave a copy for her or to any of the occupants. Appellant declared that the search warrant was served on her but she never read it nor was it read to her.On June 27, 2001, the trial court rendered its assailed decision finding appellant guilty as charged. The decretal portion of the decision reads:WHEREFORE, finding accused Eden del Castillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. The seized or confiscated items are declared forfeited in favor of the government and the same shall be disposed of in the manner allowed by law.In convicting appellant, the trial court ratiocinated:After a careful analysis of the testimonial and documentary evidence on record, the Court is of the well considered view and so holds that the prosecution was able to establish the fact that the accused had indeed, with deliberate intent and without being authorized by law, in her possession and control or use on or about July 31, 2000 at about 10:30 A.M. the following:A - Three (3) big heat sealed plastic packs of white crystalline substance weighing 294.86 grams;B - Eight (8) medium heat sealed plastic packs of white crystalline substance weighing 12.33 grams;C - Fifty three (53) heat sealed plastic packets of white crystalline substance weighing 4.75 gramslocally known as shabu, containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding license or prescription. The members of the Philippine National Police (PNP), by virtue of a Search Warrant issued against Eden Garcia del Castillo by Judge Isaias Dicdican and implemented on July 31, 2000 resulted in the acquisition of said items. The items were submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for analysis and the result is positive for the presence of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, or locally known as shabu. No less than the accused signed the Receipt for Confiscated Articles signifying that the Raiding Team of the Philippine National Police had actually seized and confiscated certain items or articles from the herein accused. The prosecution then was able to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. 7659 reads as follows:SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. 7659 reads as follows:SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:. . .3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylampetamine hydrochloride; . . .Hence, the instant appeal with the following assignment of errors:ITHE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO STATE IN ITS JUDGMENT A CLEAR AND DISTINCT FINDINGS OF FACTS (WHICH) PROVED THAT ACCUSED DID NOT OWN THE HOUSE WHICH WAS SEARCHED.IITHE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO STATE IN ITS JUDGMENT THAT THE ARTICLES SEIZED BY VIRTUE OF A SEARCH WARRANT WERE NOT TURNED OVER TO THE ISSUING COURT IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW.IIITHE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RAIDING TEAM FAILED TO ISSUE A DETAILED RECEIPT OF SEIZED ARTICLES AND TO GIVE A COPY THEREOF TO THE LAWFUL OCCUPANT IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW.IVTHE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT BY THE RAIDING TEAM ORDERING ACCUSED TO SIGN THE INVENTORY AFTER THE ARREST WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IS VIOLATIVE OF HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT.VTHE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RAID WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE PRIVACY OF ELENA R. GARCIA, AS OWNER OF THE HOUSE BEING SEARCHED, AND NOT THE HOUSE OF ACCUSED EDEN DEL CASTILLO.VITHE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation and Motion in lieu of appellees brief praying that the decision under consideration be reversed and set aside and that the appellant be acquitted.We agree with the OSG. The appeal is meritorious.Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, provides:SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.The essential elements of the crime of possession of regulated drugs are the following: (a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and, (c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug.In People vs. Tira, we explained the concept of possession of regulated drugs, to wit:This crime is mala prohibita, and as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with another.Thus, conviction need not be predicated upon exclusive possession, and a showing of non-exclusive possession would not exonerate the accused. Such fact of possession may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inference drawn therefrom. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had knowledge of the existence of the presence of the drug in the place under his control and dominion and the character of the drug. Since knowledge by the accused of the existence and character of the drugs in the place where he exercises dominion and control is an internal act, the same may be presumed from the fact that the dangerous drugs is in the house or place over which the accused has control or dominion, or within such premises in the absence of any satisfactory explanation.Prosecution witnesses failed to establish that the house where the shabu and other shabu paraphernalias were found belongs to appellant. On the other hand, defense evidence clearly showed that the subject house belongs to appellants grandmother, Elena Garcia, who testified in direct examination as follows:ATTY. RIVERAL:Q You stated in your personal circumstances that you are a resident of Mabolo, Cebu City. Do you own a house?A Yes, I owned a house.Q With whom are you living therewith?A My grandson.Q What is the name of your grandson living with you at that house?A Brent Lepiten.Q You stated that you owned a house in Mabolo, Cebu City which was the subject of the search. Do you have any evidence to show that you owned that house?A Yes, I have.Q Showing to you this machine copy which is Tax Declaration No. 01-30651 in the name of Jose Garcia. Is this the tax declaration evidencing your ownership and possession of your house?A Yes, that is the one.Q How are you related to Jose Garcia?A My husband.Q Where is he now?A He is already dead. ATTY. RIVERAL:We request Your Honor that the machine copy of the tax declaration be marked as our Exhibit 1.COURT:Mark it.ATTY. RIVERAL:Q The house which you mentioned belongs to you, how many storeys are there?A Two storeys.ATTY. RIVERAL:Q You mean the ground floor and the upper portion?A Yes, sir.Q Where do you usually take your rest in the evening?A In the upper portion.Q Do you know accused Eden del Castillo?A Yes, she is one of my grandchildren.Q Where is she living?A San Vicente Village, Wireless, Mandaue City. Q Is accused Eden del Castillo still single?A She is still single.Q With whom is she living with before the arrest?A Together with her auntie Edna Aballe.Q How about her parents?A Sometime(s) when they traveled at Badian only Eden is in the house together with her auntie but they stayed in their house.Q On July 31, 2000 in that evening who was sleeping at the upper portion of your house? A Myself and my grandson.Q You are mentioning of Jaime, who is this Jaime?FISCAL LABORTE:The witness was only asked who slept at the upper portion and she answered myself and my grandson.ATTY. RIVERAL:Q You mentioned one Jaime Garcia, why was he there?A This Jaime was able to sleep in the house at that time considering that his wife was abroad.. . .ATTY. RIVERAL:Q That Jaime Garcia you said where did he take his rest that night?A At our house.Q In what portion thereof?A At the upper portion. The evidence of the prosecution failed to establish by competent evidence that appellant is the owner or at least shared the ownership of the house where the shabu was found. PO3 Petallar testified that based on their own casing operation, appellant frequented the subject house to eat meals; that they were not sure that the house was owned by appellant but only believed that she had belongings therein since she frequented the same. PO2 Borinaga testified it was a public knowledge that appellant was living in the subject house since she was a child. Thus, there is no competent evidence that appellant had control and dominion over the place where the shabu was found. The claim of appellant that she has her residence in San Vicente Village, Wireless, Mandaue City and that she was only a visitor in the house that belongs to her grandmother at the time of the search was not rebutted by convincing evidence.While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is issued, however, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under appellants control or possession.The prosecution likewise failed to prove appellants possession of the shabu at the time of her arrest. It bears stressing that at the time the raiding team conducted the search, appellant and the other occupants were asked to stay in the living room. PO3 Petallar did not find any drugs on appellants body nor was there anything unusual or suspicious noted in her person.Notably, the policemen testified that they found the shabu in the upper portion of the house, however, it was not shown at all in whose room it was found. In fact, the defense evidence showed that at the time the two policemen went upstairs, Jaime Garcia, appellants uncle, was asleep and was awakened by the policemen who asked him to go down. This was corroborated by PO2 Borinaga who testified on cross-examination that while he was downstairs, there was a person upstairs who came down. Moreover, it was appellants grandmother and the latters grandson, Brent, who were staying in the upper portion of the house. Also, the shabu found at the ground floor of the house does not conclusively establish that it belongs to appellant since it was not found together with the other things of appellant. To reiterate, she was not the only person who had access to the entire house. In fact, it was also shown by the prosecution that a certain Servando, appellants brother, voluntarily surrendered five small plastic packs of white crystalline substance. We find that the prosecution failed to prove convincingly that the seized shabu belonged to appellant.Moreover, the manner in which the search was conducted on the subject house failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 8 (formerly Section 7), Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, which provides:SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises, to be made in presence of two witnesses No search of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.Clearly, the search of the house must be done in the presence of the lawful occupants and it is only in the absence of the former that two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality may be called upon to witness the search. While appellant and the other occupants of the house were present during the search, they were not allowed to actually witness the search of the premises. They were in the words of the policemen pressed, i.e., they were asked to stay put in the sala where they were seated while the simultaneous search was on-going in the upper and lower portions of the house. They should be the ones that should have accompanied the policemen while the search was being done and not substituted by the barangay tanods in their stead. We held in People vs. Go:As pointed out earlier, the members of the raiding team categorically admitted that the search of the upper floor, which allegedly resulted in the recovery of the plastic bag containing the shabu, did not take place in the presence of either the lawful occupant of the premises, i.e. appellant (who was out), or his son Jack Go (who was handcuffed to a chair on the ground floor). Such a procedure, whereby the witnesses prescribed by law are prevented from actually observing and monitoring the search of the premises, violates both the spirit and the letter of the law:Furthermore, the claim of the accused-appellant that the marijuana was planted is strengthened by the manner in which the search was conducted by the police authorities. The accused-appellant was seated at the sala together with Sgt. Yte when they heard someone in the kitchen uttered ito na. Apparently, the search of the accused-appellants house was conducted in violation of Section 7, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which specifically provides that no search of a house, room or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. This requirement is mandatory to ensure regularity in the execution of the search warrant. Violation of said rule is in fact punishable under Article 130 of the Revised Penal Code.As we have ruled in Eduardo Quintero vs. The National Bureau of Investigation, et al., a procedure, wherein members of a raiding party can roam around the raided premises unaccompanied by any witness, as the only witnesses available as prescribed by law are made to witness a search conducted by the other members of the raiding party in another part of the house, is violative of both the spirit and letter of the law.That the raiding party summoned two barangay kagawads to witness the search at the second floor is of no moment. The Rules of Court clearly and explicitly establishes a hierarchy among the witnesses in whose presence the search of the premises must be conducted. Thus, Section 8, Rule 126 provides that the search should be witnessed by two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality only in the absence of either of the lawful occupant of the premises or any member of his family. Thus, the search of appellants residence clearly should have been witnessed by his son Jack Go who was present at the time. The police officers were without discretion to substitute their choice of witnesses for those prescribed by the law.. . .The search conducted by the police officers of appellants residence is essentially no different from that in People v. Del Rosario where this Court observed:We thus entertain serious doubts that the shabu contained in a small canister was actually seized or confiscated at the residence of the accused-appellant. In consequence, the manner the police officers conducted the subsequent and much delayed search is highly irregular. Upon barging into the residence of the accused-appellant, the police officers found him lying down and they immediately arrested and detained him in the living room while they searched the other parts of the house. Although they fetched two persons to witness the search, the witnesses were called in only after the policeman had already entered accused-appellants residence (PP. 22-23, tsn, December 11, 1991), and therefore, the policemen had more ample time to plant the shabu. Corollary to the Constitutional precept that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved (Section 14[2], Article III, Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines) is the rule that in order to convict an accused the circumstances of the case must exclude all and each and every hypothesis consistent with his innocence (People vs. Tanchoco, 76 Phil 463 [1946]; People vs. Constante, 12 SCRA 653[1964]; People vs. Jara, 144 SCRA 516[1986]). The facts of the case do not rule out the hypothesis that accused-appellant is innocent.We also find that the raiding team failed to comply with the procedures on search and seizures provided under Sections 11 and 12, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:SEC. 11. Receipt for the property seized. The officer seizing the property under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the premises in whose presence the search and seizure were made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property.SEC. 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to the court. The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.Clearly, the detailed receipt of the inventory must be given to the lawful occupant. In this case, however, PO3 Petallar admitted that the inventory receipt was given to the barangay tanod despite the presence of the appellant and her grandmother which is a violation of the rule.Likewise, the police officers failed to deliver the seized items to the court which issued the search warrant. It was commanded in the search warrant that the seized articles be brought to the court which issued it to be dealt with as the law directs. Under the rule, the seized property must be delivered by the officer to the judge who issued the warrant. It must be accompanied with a true inventory thereof duly verified. The police officers all testified that the confiscated shabu was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. Faced with the same circumstance, we held in People vs. Gesmundo:On the issue of non-delivery of the seized marijuana to the court, the trial court held that it takes judicial notice of the usual practice of the San Pablo City police force of retaining possession of confiscated specimens suspected of being marijuana by immediately forwarding them to the NBI or to an NBI accredited physician for preliminary examination and/or laboratory examination before filing a case with the city prosecutors office. The mere tolerance by the trial court of such a practice does not make it right. Clearly, such practice violates the mandatory requirements of the law and defeats the very purpose for which they were enacted. Speculations as to the probability of tampering with the evidence cannot then be avoided.The trial judge cites the case of Yee Sue Koy, et al vs. Mariano Almeda , et al. (70 Phil 141) to justify the retention by the police and the NBI of the custody of the allegedly confiscated specimens. While in said decision, this court recognized the fact that the objects seized were retained by the agents of the Anti-Usury Board, instead of being turned over to the Justice of the Peace of Sagay, yet the Court also held that it was for the reason that the custody of said agents is the custody of the issuing officer or court, the retention having been approved by the latter. Thus, approval by the court which issued the search warrant is necessary for the retention of the property seized by the police officers; and only then will their custody be considered custody of the court. Absent such approval, the police officers have no authority to retain possession of the marijuana and more so, to deliver the property to another agency, like the NBI.Moreover, the inventory receipt was not certified under oath by any of the members of the raiding team as required by the rule but was signed only by appellant and her brother.The trial court erred in relying on the receipt of confiscated articles to establish that the raiding team had actually seized the listed items therein. First, it is highly irregular that the inventory receipt was dated July 24, 2000 when the actual raid was conducted on July 31, 2000. We find the explanation unacceptable given that the receipt was already prepared earlier than the search. Such discrepancy affects the integrity of the inventory receipt. Second, appellant signed the receipt without the assistance of counsel. It was established that at the time she signed the receipt, she was already under custodial investigation. The testimony of PO3 Petallar is revealing:Q When you saw the articles seized you were of the impression that they were illegal?A Yes, sir.Q Because of that impression you held Eden del Castillo in custody of the law?A Yes, sir.Q You handcuffed Eden del Castillo immediately?A No, we do (sic) not handcuffed (sic) Eden del Castillo.Q Although you do (sic) not handcuffed (sic) Eden del Castillo, the accused but virtually she was already held in custody of the law?A We effected the arrest.Q So you begun listing down the articles which is supposedly seized?A Upon the delivery of the seized articles from the searching parties I began listing.Q You listed the articles in that prepared form, correct?A Yes, sir. Q In your joint affidavit, you stated in paragraph 7 That we informed her Constitutional Right provided under the 1987 Phil. Constitution?A Yes, sir.Q You informed her of her right under the Constitution because you wanted her to claim ownership of the seized articles?A We just informed her about her constitutional right.Q So that after informing her of her constitutional right she signed this receipt or inventory of seized articles, correct?A Yes, sir.Q So you asked her by interrogation or question whether or not you will concur to the entries listed in this inventory?A Yes, sir.Q You also asked her that the search was conducted in a very orderly manner?A Yes, sir.Q You also asked her that nothing was destroyed or lost inside the house?A Yes, sir.Q That you also asked her that the members of the raiding team did not in any manner subjected (sic) them to unreasonable treatment?A Yes, sir.Q And that they were not exposed to embarrassment?A Yes, sir. Q Since you shoot (sic) several questions and informing her of the constitution(al) right(s) under the 1987 Constitution did you tell her that you have the right to be assisted by counsel?A I told her that. . . .COURT:Q After you had told the accused that she is entitled to have counsel now what did the accused say, if any?A She told me that she would get a lawyer.ATTY. RIVERAL:Q In effect, did she get a lawyer?A Not immediately.. . .Q Thereafter was she able to get a lawyer?A When we arrived at the camp her sister told us that she had already hired a lawyer.Q In effect, did that lawyer appear in the camp?A I never saw.Q So accused would (sic) sign (sic) that instrument without the assistance of counsel?A Yes, sir.While PO3 Petallar testified that appellant was read her constitutional right, it was not clearly shown that she was informed of her right not to sign the receipt and that it can be used as an evidence against her. If appellant was indeed informed of her constitutional right, it is unusual for her to sign the receipt acknowledging ownership of the seized items without the assistance of counsel considering that she wanted to get a lawyer. In People vs. Go, we found the inventory receipt signed by appellant inadmissible for being violative of her custodial right to remain silent, thus:After the inventory had been prepared, PO2 Abulencia presented it to appellant for his signature without any showing that appellant was informed of his right not to sign such receipt and to the assistance of counsel. Neither was he warned that the same could be used as evidence against him. Faced with similar circumstances, this Court in People v. Gesmundo stated:It is true that the police were able to get an admission from the accused-appellant that marijuana was found in her possession but said admission embodied in a document entitled PAGPAPATUNAY previously prepared by the police, is inadmissible in evidence against the accused-appellant for having been obtained in violation of her rights as a person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense. The records show that the accused-appellant was not informed of her right not to sign the document; neither was she informed of her right to the assistance of counsel and the fact that the document may be used as evidence against her.In People vs. Policarpio, this Court held that such practice of inducing suspects to sign receipts for property allegedly confiscated from their possession is unusual and violative of the constitutional right to remain silent, viz:What the records show is that appellant was informed of his constitutional right to be silent and that he may refuse to give a statement which may be used against him, that is why he refused to give a written statement unless it is made in the presence of his lawyer as shown by the paper he signed to this effect. However, he was made to acknowledge that the six (6) small plastic bags of dried marijuana leaves were confiscated from him by signing a receipt and to sign a receipt for the P20.00 bill as purchase price of the dried marijuana leaves he sold to Pat. Mangila.Obviously the appellant was the victim of a clever ruse to make him sign these alleged receipts which in effect are extra-judicial confessions of the commission of the offense. Indeed it is unusual for appellant to be made to sign receipts for what were taken from him. It is the police officers who confiscated the same who should have signed such receipts. No doubt this is a violation of the constitutional right of the appellant to remain silent whereby he was made to admit the commission of the offense without informing him of his right. Such a confession obtained in violation of the Constitution is inadmissible in evidence.The Inventory Receipt signed by appellant is thus not only inadmissible for being violative of appellants custodial right to remain silent; it is also an indicium of the irregularity in the manner by which the raiding team conducted the search of appellants residence.Assuming arguendo that appellant did waive her right to counsel, such waiver must be voluntary, knowing and intelligent. To insure that a waiver is voluntary and intelligent, the Constitution requires that for the right to counsel to be waived, the waiver must be in writing and in the presence of the counsel of the accused. There is no such written waiver in this case, much less was any waiver made in the presence of the counsel since there was no counsel at the time appellant signed the receipt. Clearly, appellant affixed her signature in the inventory receipt without the assistance of counsel which is a violation of her right under the Constitution.In all criminal cases, it is appellants constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus in People vs. Del Norte, we said:We detest drug addiction in our society. However, we have the duty to protect appellant where the evidence presented shows insufficient factual nexus of her participation in the commission of the offense charged. In People vs. Laxa, we held:The governments drive against illegal drugs deserves everybodys support. But it cannot be pursued by ignoble means which are violative of constitutional rights. It is precisely when the governments purposes are beneficent that we should be most on our guard to protect these rights. As Justice Brandeis warned long ago, the greatest dangers to liberty lurk in the insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning without understanding. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE on the ground that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of appellant Eden del Castillo. She is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged against her and her immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered unless she is lawfully held in custody for another cause.The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to forthwith implement this decision and to inform this Court, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was actually released from confinement.The shabu and other shabu paraphernalias seized during the search are forfeited in favor of the State.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.HUANG ZHEN HUA and JOGY LEE, appellants.D E C I S I O NCALLEJO, SR., J.:This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Metro Manila, Branch 259, convicting the appellants of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.The Case for the ProsecutionPolice operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) under the Department of Interior and Local Government received word from their confidential informant that Peter Chan and Henry Lao,2 and appellants Jogy Lee and Huang Zhen Hua were engaged in illegal drug trafficking. The policemen also learned that appellant Lee was handling the payments and accounting of the proceeds of the illegal drug trafficking activities of Lao and Chan.3 PO3 Belliardo Anciro, Jr. and other police operatives conducted surveillance operations and were able to verify that Lao and appellant Lee were living together as husband and wife. They once spotted Chan, Lao, the appellants and two others, in a seafood restaurant in Bocobo Street, Ermita, Manila, late in the evening. On another occasion, the policemen saw Chan, Lao, and the appellants, at the Celicious Restaurant along R. Sanchez Street, Ermita, Manila, at about 8:30 p.m. They were spotted the third time at the Midtown Hotel at about 7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.4 The police operatives also verified that Chan and Lao resided at Room Nos. 1245 and 1247, Cityland Condominium, De la Rosa Street, Makati City, and in a two-storey condominium unit at No. 19 Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand Villa, Sto. Nio, Paraaque, Metro Manila.5On October 25, 1996, SPO2 Cesar N. Teneros of the PARAC secured Sea