How Do We Read the Bible (by Freda Oosterhoff)

7/30/2019 How Do We Read the Bible (by Freda Oosterhoff)

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HOW DO WE READ THE BIBLE? (1)F. G. Oosterhoff

Clarion, v. 53 (27 August 2004), n. 18, pp. 438-441

(edited forReformed Academic, 3 November 2009)

Some years ago a book appeared in the Netherlands which deals with Reformed views on

the authority of the Bible. Entitled Woord op schrift, it contains essays by four men, all of whomhave (or have had) connections with the theological university of the Reformed Churches

(liberated) in Kampen.1 Some of these essays have caused a good deal of discussion and even

controversy among Reformed people in the Netherlands. This is especially the case with thecontributions of A. L. Th. (Ad) de Bruijne, professor of ethics at the university.

Within our own churches little or no attention has been given to the matter. In my opinion

the issues De Bruijne raises are important enough, however, to demand further notice. After all,

we have a relationship with the Dutch churches and we should know what is going on amongthem. Indeed, we may even learn from them. I therefore decided to devote a series of articles to

De Bruijnes essays.

A global viewThe issues De Bruijne raises are hermeneutical ones, which means that they concern the

rules of biblical interpretation, specifically as these apply to the use and understanding of theBible in modern times. A specific question he seeks to answer is whether Reformed theology

will benefit if it makes greater use of figurative or non-literal explanations of parts of Scripture

than has generally been done in the past.

De Bruijnes articles are technical and therefore not always easy to understand. They are,as I said, also controversial. Although some Reformed theologians have expressed appreciation

for the work, others have censured and rejected it. The term biblical criticism has even been

used. This charge (which has been rebutted by a majority of Reformed theologians) is based inpart on speculative statements by De Bruijne, some of which he has since withdrawn or

qualified. In part it is also a result of the essays technical nature and, perhaps, of carelessreading. Occasionally, it seems to me, critics base their accusations on arguments that have beentaken out of context and are analysed apart from the authors qualifying statements.

All this is not to deny that there are aspects in De Bruijnes work that demand further

discussion. We will come to that in due course. I only suggest that, especially because of the

level of difficulty, misunderstandings about his views and intentions easily arise. I realize thatthey may arise also in connection with my rendering of De Bruijnes arguments. In an attempt to

keep them to a minimum, I will begin by giving an overview of his message and in doing so

avoid technicalities wherever possible. Once his intentions are clear, details should fall intoplace, and this should make it easier for the reader to evaluate the work. In my overview I follow

an article which de Bruijne himself published in the Reformed periodicalDe Reformatie.2

The

article was based on an oral explanation of his views to a congregational gathering somewhere inthe Netherlands.

Recognizable questionsIn this article De Bruijne points out that in Woord op schrifthe is dealing with questions

concerning the Bible which we all recognize. One of these is why today we keep some biblical

commands and not others. The Bible states, for example, that we should not ask interest on our

money; that we may not swear an oath; that we are not to sell our land; that women must covertheir heads when praying. Today we believe that this type of command is conditioned by the


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culture and time of writing and therefore no longer applicable. But increasingly people suggestthat if on these points we can interpret the Bible in our own way, then the same should be

possible in other areas. And so they ask for the possibility of bypassing biblical commands in

such matters as divorce, remarriage after a divorce, women in office, homosexual relationships,pre-marital sex and cohabitation, and so on.

Another type of problem concerns historical passages in the Bible. Biblical authors

followed an approach that differs from the modern-western one. For one thing, they placed amuch greater stress on story or narrative than is the case in modern history writing. They also leftroom for what may appear to us as discrepancies. Some of these are caused by a symbolic use of

numbers. Examples can be found in Old Testament genealogies and also in the genealogy of

Jesus in the first chapter of Matthew.3

In many cases, it appears, the composer of the genealogyleft out names, a thing that would be unacceptable in modern history writing. And there appear to

be discrepancies in other parts of the Bible as well. Bible-critical scholars have long used such

apparent errors as proof that the Bible is not Gods inspired Word but simply a human document.This Bible-critical scholarship has a wide reach and has over the years been instrumental

in drawing many a member of the church away from the faith. Rather therefore than ignoring the

problems in question, De Bruijne says, and also rather than simply repeating traditional answers,Reformed theology must deal with the issues, and this is what he attempts to do. He emphasizes

that he is not dictating answers but is simply making suggestions that can be evaluated by others.

In this manner, he hopes, can the discussion get underway and progress made in our

understanding of Scripture.

Are the confessions not sufficient?

Critics have asked De Bruijne if it is really necessary to search for new answers. Isnt theReformed doctrine about the Bible sufficiently explained in the Belgic Confession? De Bruijne

replies that he fully endorses this Reformed symbol. He also points out, however, that the Belgic

Confession originated in the sixteenth century and that it was directed against RomanCatholicism and Anabaptism. Since that time much has happened with respect to our knowledge

of the Bible and of the times and cultures wherein it was written; and Reformed people who

agree on the confession can have different opinions with respect to issues that arose later.

Biblical inspiration

De Bruijne uses the doctrine of biblical inspiration as an example. Disagreements exist

as to its nature, with some claiming that inspiration is essentially mechanical (the dictationtheory), while others promote an organic view. That difference cannot be resolved with reference

to the confession, for it is silent about it; and this applies to various other matters as well. Some of the modern-day problems have come to the fore, as I mentioned, because of

modern Bible-critical scholarship. De Bruijne refers to the reaction of Abraham Kuyper and

Herman Bavinck to this scholarship. Both men, he observes, sharply rejected the Bible-critical

approach and its conclusions. Yet they also admitted that critical theologians sometimes come

with new knowledge and insights, and that we may not ignore their findings. It was in partbecause of such new knowledge that Kuyper and Bavinck proposed their theory of organic

inspiration. According to this theory God did not dictate the contents of the Bible but employed

human authors whose personality, experience, and specific gifts affected the manner in whichthey wrote. To be sure, these men were guided by the Spirit and therefore proclaimed not human

wisdom but Gods own word. Nevertheless, the human element was not to be denied. Kuyper

and Bavinck were unable, however, to answer every question concerning biblical inspiration andauthority. And in l981 professor J. Kamphuis wrote that the doctrine of organic inspiration was

not really satisfactory either. Further reflection continued to be necessary. [See in this connection


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John van Poptas remarks onReformed Academic regarding Dr. J. Fabers suggestion thatperhaps we should speak of covenantal inspiration instead.]

The need for further reflection on this and other issues has not been denied in Reformed

circles. Mentioning Synod Assen 1926 (the synod that condemned Dr. J.G. Geelkerkens viewson Genesis 3), De Bruijne shows that the theologians who censured Geelkerken knew that a

simple No! was not enough. Also among the later liberated Reformed theologians (for example

in Dr. K. Schilders weeklyDe Reformatie

), suggestions were made to come to a newformulation of the doctrine of scriptural authority. And when Dr. C. Trimp in 1967 issued asharp protest against the synodical churches retraction of the verdict against Geelkerken, he at

the same time made clear that the Reformed Churches would be remiss if in their reflection upon

the Bibles authority they stopped with Assen 1926.Continued reflection is necessary, De Bruijne believes, not in the last place for the sake

of the younger members of the church, those within as well as those outside the university. They

often get the impression that Reformed theology is simply walking around questions about theBible and in fact ignoring them, even though the questions are very real to these members

themselves. They are confronted with them in their studies and their general environment. Those

who find themselves in this type of situation easily adopt an either-or attitude: eitherthey takethe questions seriously but then find it difficult to remain Reformed, or they decide to remain

Reformed but do their best to ignore the questions. They hide their head in the sand, so to speak.

De Bruijne believes that if Reformed theology does not act here, it will contribute to a

situation wherein more and more people doubt the Bible and leave the church. He adds that as apastor in a university city (Rotterdam) he himself knew of many who had left because their

questions remained unanswered. In short, more must be done than simply repeating traditional

responses. Attention must be given (always within the framework of the confessions) toquestions with which todays believers struggle.

Biblical historyAfter this general introduction, De Bruijne explains in theReformatie article the views he

expressed in Woord op schrift. In his contributions to that book, he points out, he dealt with two

issues, namely history writing and ethical commands in the Bible.

As to the first topic, critics of his work have left the impression among some churchmembers that according to him we dont have to take biblical history all that literally. Such an

impression, he writes, is altogether mistaken. His argument is, rather, that the Bible gives real,

literal history and presents it with great exactness. He therefore emphatically rejects the view thatsince ancient-eastern culture stressed symbolism a great deal, historians belonging to that culture

were not really concerned with literal historical truth, but simply and unconsciously mixed fact

and symbol.Over against such reasoning he insists, with specific reference to recent studies on the

topic, that ancient-eastern historians were quite capable of distinguishing between literal and

symbolic language, that in fact they did so distinguish, and also that they were very much

concerned with literal truth. And what applies to eastern historians in general applies to thewriters of biblical history in particular. They, too, were careful to distinguish between fact and

symbol and to stress the truth element.

Narrative conventionsThe biblical authors concern for literal truth and accuracy, De Bruijne says, is his

primary message on biblical history writing. Within that framework he develops his secondarythesis, which is that if we may see biblical authors as real ancient-eastern historians, then we

must also note that they used the conventions of ancient-eastern historiography. An instance of


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such a convention is the conscious use of symbolism in a historical narrative, such as the non-literal use of numbers, a point to which I already referred. This is only one example. There are

various other usages in biblical narratives that, as typically ancient-oriental, differ from modern

ones.Do such insights help us? De Bruijne is convinced they do. In the first place, they can

enable us to resist the lure of Bible-critical ideas. In opposition to the assertion that Scripture is

not at all interested in what really happened, we can show that serious modern research (alsoresearch by non-Christians) has reached an entirely different conclusion. Secondly, they can helpus relativize so-called discrepancies in the Bible. These will often disappear not because we

resort to an old-fashioned kind of harmonizing, which frequently comes across as artificial, but

because we recognize that our problem is caused by the narrative strategy the historian followed.Thirdly, knowledge of biblical narrative conventions helps to clarify to us the meaning of the

historical passage in question. For by the manner in which a historian narrates a certain history

he conveys his vision on that history. This means in the case of the Bible that in the mannerof

narration the Holy Spirit Himself reveals an aspect of the meaning of a certain event. I hope to

come back to this in a later article.

EthicsTurning to ethical commands in the Bible, De Bruijne mentions the lamentable fact that

as a Reformed community we hardly have a lifestyle any more wherein one can recognize what

the Bible calls the image of Christ. We know Gods commands very well, but in an ever-increasing number of instances we suggest that the one we happen to be concerned with was

conditioned by the times and culture in which it originated and is therefore no longer relevant for

us. As to the cause of this situation, he suggests that at least part of the answer must be sought inthe mannerwe use Scripture in determining our lifestyle and ethics. That manner, he believes, is

(1) too small, and (2) too individualistic.

The Bibles overall themeFirstly, our manner of using Scripture in ethical matters is too small. We try to derive our

lifestyle as closely as possible from the Ten Commandments and from other Bible texts that are

written as commands. But that does not always work. Sometimes more than one explanation ofthe specific command is possible. Sometimes we realize that the biblical situation was quite

different form ours. And sometimes we have to acknowledge that the Bible does not provide us

with a direct answer to our specific question. Quite often the result of all this is that we decide tofollow our own opinion. This happens today with different themes: the keeping of the Sunday as

day of rest, divorce and remarriage, and so on.

To overcome this restricted usage of the Bible in ethical matters, De Bruijne suggests thatwe begin our reflections on good and evil by concentrating on all Gods works and words; that

we also consider the way God is directing our own lives; and that we attempt to answer questions

about good and evil from these perspectives.

This means that if on certain points there are no direct commands, we are not withoutguidance. Aware of the Bibles overall theme and intention, we will often know how we are to

direct our lives. This approach will also frequently enable us to translate an ancient command

into present-day terms and so to apply it to our own time and situation. For to stress the Biblesoverall theme does not mean that this theme is to replace Gods concrete demands. Attention to

scriptural teaching as a whole may never push aside a specific command of God which is

applicable today. That would suggest a diminishing of the Bibles influence on our life andlifestyle. Rather than diminishing that influence, he wants to enlarge it.


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What he is trying to do in the matter of ethics, De Bruijne explains, is what Reformedtheologians have long tried to do in the field of dogmatics. Precisely as a result of the renewal of

redemptive-historical Bible-reading around the middle of the previous century, the insight grew

that we must not base doctrine on all sorts of disconnected proof texts. These are all too oftentaken out of their context. Rather, Reformed theologians said, we must base our doctrine on the

totality of the Bibles redemptive history. This means that biblical history is not to be treated as

illustrationof a timeless dogma that has been derived from loose and disconnected proof texts,which are often quoted out of context, but that it is recognized as the foundation of dogma. In the

same manner, he adds, he does not want to derive ethics from a timeless universal law, but

from Gods deeds in history, and within that framework to localize the divine commands.

IndividualismThe manner in which we use Scripture in ethical matters is not only too small, De Bruijne

believes, but also too individualistic. At times we operate unconsciously with the idea that wehave to find out privately, all by ourselves, what is good and evil. In times when there is still

something like a consensus on ethical matters in society at large, such an approach is perhaps not

too dangerous, but in a secular and radically individualistic society like ours it leads to ongoingfragmentation. One can point to Gods unchanging commands, but all too often the answer is:

Thats how you see things; I explain them differently. Yet the Bible teaches that the Christian

lifestyle is a thing that characterizes the Christian community, and that as such it must be clearly

recognizable to unbelievers.De Buijne therefore pleads for a type of congregational ethics an approach wherein

believers togetherdiscover from the Bible what is good and evil. He makes clear that by using

the term congregational ethics he does not imply a replacement of the biblical message bycommunal deliberation. The term is chosen, rather, to stress the need for a congregational,communcal listeningto the Bible. He believes that if we do this if we learn to follow Christ

together, as a community, in our post-Christian society we will again recognize that GodsWord speaks to the situation and the questions of today.

So much for this general and non-technical overview of de Bruines position on biblical

authority. In the next instalment I will turn to his articles in Woord op schrift.

1C. Trimp, ed., Woord op schrift: Theologische reflecties over het gezag van de Bijbel (Kampen: Kok, 2002). Contributors are

professor-emeritus C. Trimp, prof. B. Kamphuis, the rev. J.J.T. Doedens, and prof. A.L.Th. de Bruijne

2 A. L. Th. De Bruijne, Woord op schrift: de bedoelingen,DeReformatie, May 3, 2003, pp. 564-68.

3 For examples of the symbolic use of numbers in the Bible, see NIV Study Bible, Introduction to Genesis, Literary Features. Asis well known, the numbers 7 and 10 and their multiples signified completeness. For the use of these numbers, see the genealogiesof Cain, with 7 names (Gen. 4), Seth, 10 names (Gen. 5), Shem to Abraham, 10 names (Gen. 11), Perez to David, 10 names (Ruth

4), and Abraham to Christ, 3x14 names (Mat. 1).


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Clarion, v. 53 (10 September 2004), n. 19, pp. 462-465


METAPHOR AND EXEGESISWe turn to the first of Ad de Bruijnes essays. It is entitled Hermeneutiek en metaforie and

deals with the use of figurative language in biblical exegesis in general. In the other two essays, which I

hope to discuss later, De Bruijne focuses respectively on the use of figurative language in historical

passages in the Bible, and on the question whether a non-literal approach can help us in our search forbiblical guidance in matters oflifestyle and ethics.

In all three essays the author is in discussion with the Reformed theologian B. Loonstra,1

who

promotes an extensive use of non-literal explanations in the belief that this will help overcome thestrangeness of the Bible for modern people a strangeness that is caused by the cultural differences

between biblical and modern times. Because much of what De Bruijne writes is in reaction to Loonstra, I

will in what follows more than once state the latters position before discussing De Bruijnes own.

Metaphor its nature and useWhen speaking of non-literal or figurative language, De Bruijne often makes use of the term

metaphor. Before I proceed with the discussion of his work, some preliminary remarks about themeaning and usage of this term are in order.

The word metaphor is derived from the Greek verb for to transfer, and this naming is apt:

when we speak metaphorically, we speak of one thing in terms that are transferred (or borrowed) fromanother. When we do this primarily for adornment, we speak of a literary metaphor. In our days it is

increasingly recognized, however, that metaphors have also a cognitive function which means that they

play a role in the process of knowing and understanding. One reason why this is so is that language and

knowing are connected, and that it is difficult for us to understand something new unless we can

approach it with words and images that are already familiar. These words and images the metaphorsupplies.

Metaphors are used in all fields of knowledge, including theology. Among theologians who wereaware of the role played by figurative language in religious understanding was John Calvin, who often

spoke of the use of metaphor in Scripture and in scriptural exegesis.2

He referred to it, for example, when

explaining the Bibles anthropomorphic speaking about God, such as His sleeping and waking up, Hishands and feet, His eyes and ears. The Bible speaks here metaphorically. It uses words and images from

our earthly reality in order to acquaint us with a different reality, namely a spiritual one.

Calvin shows that the Bible uses metaphoric language to convey other truths. The description ofhell as a place of punishment by fire and sulphur and brimstone, for example, is metaphorical. So is the

description of heaven. Here again, this-worldly terms (such as golden streets, pearly gates, and so on) are

employed, and necessarily so, for it would be difficult for us to envision, in Calvins words, the blessedimmortal life, unless it be shadowed out by some figures adapted to our capacity.

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Metaphor and image

Metaphors, then, help our understanding by describing the unfamiliar in familiar terms. Theyserve not only our logical, but also our imaginative understanding. There is something pictorial about the

metaphor; and what applies to pictures, namely that they can be worth a thousand words, applies to

metaphors. Let us take as an example the truth that God cares for us and gives us what we need for this


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life and the life to come. This can be stated in literal language, and the Bible often does so. But Scripturegives the message also by using metaphors, and in doing so opens up new and unexpected associations.

One such metaphor is Gods speaking of Himself as the shepherd of his people. By using this

figure of speech He conveys the message of his care and providence, just as He does in literal language.But as the author of the Twenty-third Psalm shows, there are additional meanings which are not

communicated by a more literal statement. The metaphor brings to the psalmists mind the abundance of

green pastures and still waters, it reminds him that he does not have to fear evil even when going throughthe valley of the shadow of death, it speaks to him of a shepherds rod and staff that not only disciplinebut also bring comfort. When the Lord Jesus applies the metaphor to Himself, further meanings are

disclosed. We learn that his sheep hear and recognize his voice, that He knows the name of each one of

them, that He seeks the sheep that goes astray and carries it home on his shoulders, that He not onlyprotects his sheep but gives his life for them (John 10). We learn also something about ourselves about

our stubbornness, our proclivity to go our own way, our helplessness, our utter need for guidance. In

those senses we are indeed like sheep. (See also the well-known words of Isaiah 40:11 on Gods care forus as our shepherd, and the passage on shepherd and sheep in Ezekiel 34.)

What applies to the metaphor of the shepherd applies to other figures of speech the Bible uses

when speaking of God and Jesus Christ such as those referring to God as a rock and fortress, a sun andshield, a fountain of living water, a vine-dresser; and those referring to Christ as the door, the way, the

vine, the bridegroom, the cornerstone, and the Lamb of God. Another example of metaphoric speaking in

Scripture is Christs statement at the Last Supper that the bread and wine are his body and blood. Here

again the associations are many, as Lords Days 28 to 30 of the Heidelberg Catechism make clear.This example reminds us at the same time that we may not forget the special nature of metaphors.

They refer to something that is real, but they do not give a literal description. While they tell us

something about reality, they do not tell us everything. They both reveal and conceal. The example of theLords Supper further reminds us that we can go astray when interpreting something literally that is

meant metaphorically. In explaining the Lords words in the upper room, the Roman Catholic Church

has failed to distinguish between literal and figurative. Its teaching that bread and wine become the literabody and blood of the Lord has led to a magical view of the sacrament.

Finally, it must be kept in mind that metaphors focus on one aspect or set of aspects while

leaving out others. We are therefore often given many different metaphors. But this limitation does not

make the cognitive value of figurative language inferior to that of literal language. We are finite beings,and as is increasingly recognized in our days, all our knowledge is partial, also that which is conveyed in

a literal manner. What is important is not the type of language that is employed (literal or figurative), but

which of the two conveys most clearly the intended message. Sometimes this is best done by literal,sometimes by figurative language.

And again, the former is not necessarily more expressive than the latter. Here, too, we can learn

from Calvin. He wrote, as we saw, that the biblical description of hell as a place of punishment by fireand brimstone is a metaphorical one. But as one of his commentators points out, this is certainly not to

say that Calvin regarded flaming fire and brimstone as what some of our contemporaries (even

theological contemporaries) would naively call a mere metaphor, meaning thereby that it means either

nothing or almost nothing. For Calvin it meant the ultimate horror of separation from God, which wecan neither imagine nor express properlywith our words4

May we replace biblical descriptions?De Bruijne gives much attention, we noted, to B. Loonstras views on the role of metaphor in the

Bible and in biblical exegesis. An important element in the latters theory (an element that De Bruijne

rejects) is the idea that all biblical language is metaphoric and that the strangeness of the Bible can beremoved, or at least alleviated, if we interpret certain elements that the author intended literally in a


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figurative sense. This can be done, for example, by modernizing some of the Bibles figurativelanguage.

Loonstras argument runs as follows. In inspiring Scripture the Holy Spirit adapted Himself to

the culture of the times. This explains why the human authors of the Bible describe spiritual and otherunfamiliar truths metaphorically, i.e., by using words and images from their own world. This is a proper

procedure; only in this manner could the original readers understand the message. But because

worldview and world-picture keep changing, later readers will have difficulty understanding andapplying the message unless they replace the original descriptions and metaphors with ones that reflectthe way in which they themselves visualize reality. Such a replacement, according to Loonstra, is

therefore justified and sometimes even required.

There are exceptions. Loonstra distinguishes between foundational metaphors and illuminativeones. The former, to which God in the course of history gave a special redemptive-historical content,

must be retained. Loonstra mentions in this connection covenant, creation, atonement, incarnation,

resurrection, final judgment, and kingdom of God. Furthermore, the Bible teaches that redemption takesplace by means of Gods deeds in history. If the abandonment of certain metaphors places the historicity

of these deeds in jeopardy, then again their replacement is unacceptable. In short, foundational

metaphors must be kept, no matter how strange they may seem. Illuminative ones, on the other hand,may beupdated in order to prevent unnecessary estrangement (pp. 116f.).5

An example: Christs ascension

Loonstra gives various examples. I am using the one concerning Christs ascension, because itnot only gives a clear description of Loonstras theory but also shows the differences between his views

and those of De Bruijne.

In describing the ascension, Loonstra writes, the biblical author made use of the then currentconception of the universe, which was a hierarchical one. Heaven was situated at the highest level, then

came the earth, and then hell, which was located at the very bottom, within the bowels of the earth.

According to this world-picture [sometimes referred to as that of the three-decker universe], Christascended literally when leaving this world that is, He moved up to a higher place. The modern image

of the universe is very different from the one we meet in the New Testament. For people living today, the

earth, rather than being the centre of the universe, is a mere planet circling around its sun and occupying

an infinitesimal spot in boundless space. In the modern picture of the universe there is no longer an upand down, an above and below. And so, while the event of Christs return to the Father is to be

interpreted as truly historical and factual, we are justified, according to Loonstra, in replacing the

particular New Testamentpresentation of the event by a more modern one, according to which Jesus didnot ascend from an earth below to a heaven above, but moved to another dimension, namely to the

space of God (115f., 144, 148).

De Bruijne disagrees with Loonstras replacement theory. While admitting the role of the thencurrent world-picture in the event and narration of Christs ascension, he questions the assumption that

modern readers can give meaning to the text only if they replace the original presentation with a modern

one. Much of the estrangement we moderns feel in our contact with the Bible, he suggests, is a result of

the fact that we absolutize our modern world-picture and want to know things on our own terms. But thatis not a proper approach. A better means of bridging the gap between then and now is to relativize our

present-day way of looking at things and to develop a real interest in what is different from our situation

and culture. If we look at the Bible as an object of knowledge, we will understand that we indeed shouldattempt to understand it on its own terms, for we do the same with other things we seek to know. What

we must realize is that it was not only in the narration of the ascension event, but also in the manner in

which it in fact took place, that God accommodated Himself to the views of the times. In reading of theevent, we simultaneously realize that what we are told really happened andthat the people to whom it

was first revealed had another view of reality than we have. There is no need to replace that view with


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our own, although it is possible, if we wish, to supplementthe biblical presentation with a modern one,such as that of a multi-dimensional universe (144f).

To believe that biblical metaphors can be replaced is, De Bruijne believes, to misjudge the

uniqueness of the language God used in giving His revelation. Also when replacing only thosemetaphors which (in Loonstras words) do not have a redemptive-historical content, we risk losing

essential aspects of the biblical message. This is evident in the example of the ascension. It is true that

the historicity of Christs return to the Father does not depend on a world-picture that places heavenabove the firmament. But that presentation involves associations and incorporates meanings that are lostwhen we replace it with the modern view of the universe. For one thing, in the description of Christs

return to heaven as a going from low to high, we are reminded of Gods ascending Mount Zion in

Davids times, an event that forms a type of fore-shadowing of Christs ascension (Ps 68, Eph 4).Furthermore, the association between heaven and height is found in other biblical messages. Examples:

Jesus receives the highestplace; after His suffering and death He rises above sin and misery; we can lift

up our eyes to heaven; from heaven He looks down to oversee and govern all things; the heavenlyJerusalem where Gods throne is established fulfills a type of central function with respect to the earth,

just as Zion did with respect to the country of Israel (148f.).6

All this, De Bruijne concludes, strengthens him in his conviction that we must not replacebiblical descriptions and metaphors, no matter how strange they appear to us. The fact that God used

them in His providential care means that they have a particular fitness to be vehicles of His revelation, a

fitness that our substitutes lack. Although we tend to describe them as pure metaphor, it is possible to

speak here of a form of literalness. In any case, we must hold on to the fact that Christ has literallyascended; that He looks down on us so that we can look up to Him (149).

Knowing in relationshipIn the foregoing we concentrated on one disagreement between De Bruijne and Loonstra, namely

that concerning the question whether biblical descriptions and metaphors can be replaced. We must give

attention to yet another disagreement, which also falls within the general category of figurative speakingin the Bible. It concerns Loonstras assumption that all biblical language is metaphoric and that this is

necessarily so, because if God wants to reveal something about Himself He mustspeak metaphorically

and use representations from our world.

De Bruijne disagrees with this view. For one thing, he points out, it threatens to make God andHis revelation dependent on our experience and on the language that we, human beings, have come to

see as significant in our interaction with the world. But this ignores the fact that God Himself chooses

words and that He takes these words not as metaphors from a reality that is foreign to Him, but from ahuman language to which He has from the very beginning given the capacity to speak rightly about Him

(143, 145f.)

Furthermore, Loonstras teaching suggests that there is an absolute separation between subjectand object, or between man and God. De Bruijne believes, however, that we can and must speak of

knowledge in relationship. He refers to the work of the English theologian Colin E. Gunton, who has

written about the role that this concept plays even in fields of secular knowledge, including science.

Philosophers of science are beginning to realize that knowledge of the world of nature is possible for usbecause we are connected with that world, being part of the same reality. This suggests that the old idea

of a radical dualism or division between the subject (the knower) and the object (the known; in this case

the world of science) is being replaced by a more integrative and holistic one (141f.). A noteworthyimplication is that we are no longer imprisonedby our language and its metaphors, as indispensable as

both are in the process of knowing. There are other avenues to knowledge and truth.

Again following Gunton, De Bruijne believes that the same concept can be applied to religiousknowledge and understanding; that there also we can speak of knowing in relationship. As there is a

connection between the human spirit and the surrounding world, so there is one between the human spiri


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and God. It is true and De Bruijne strongly emphasizes this that we are speaking of different realities,and that the relationship is not the same as that between the human being and the world. It should also be

kept in mind that God teaches us directly and personally; that His Spirit dwells in us. But the point of

comparison is that in both cases our knowing and speaking is not to be seen apart from our relation tothe other (143).

ConclusionLoonstra tries to remove some of the strangeness of the Bible for modern readers by a moreextensive use of the possibility of non-literal interpretation. He suggests two specific ways. One, which

we discussed in the foregoing, is to interpret elements in the Bible which the author intended as literal, in

a figurative sense. Part of this procedure is to replace outdated descriptions and metaphors in the Biblewith modern ones. For reasons that will have become clear in the foregoing, De Bruijne rejects this

approach.

He adopts, however, the other suggestion of Loonstra, which is that we should be open to thepossibility that biblical writers may consciously have included metaphorical elements in passages where

we do not expect them, and that we should take care to interpret such elements as intended. With

Loonstra, he warns against an attitude in Reformed theology according to which figurative language isheld by definition to be less capable of conveying truths than literal language (152-59). Such an attitude,

he argues, has a restrictive effect on biblical exegesis. When meeting problems (for example in historical

sections) it is not in principle wrong to assume that the writer may have intended parts of these sections

metaphorically. De Bruijne admits that it can be difficult to decide when we can speak of suchmetaphorical elements in a literal context, but concludes that we do not have to rely on literary pointers

alone (160). In what follows we will see how he applies these views.

NOTES

1 Loonstra is a member of the Christelijke Gereformeerde Kerkin the Netherlands; de Bruijne of the Gereformeerde Kerken(liberated).

2 Calvin did so in the context of his theory of accommodation (according to which God in His revelation accommodates Himselfto the limits of our intellectual and moral capacities). For examples of Calvins views on the role of metaphors and related tropesin Scripture and biblical exegesis, see Roland M. Frye, Calvins Theological Use of Figurative Language inJohn Calvin andthe Church: A Prism of Reform, ed. Timothy George (Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990), pp. 172-94; and Dirk W. Jellema,

Gods baby-talk: Calvin and the errors in the Bible, The Reformed Journal, April 1980, pp. 25-27.

3 Jellema, p. 26.

4 Frye, p. 179.

5Page references within the text are to Woord op schrift.

6 For a similar explanation by John Calvin (who more than once admitted that scientifically speaking there is no place above theskies), see Frye, p. 177.


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Clarion, v. 53 (24 September 2004), n. 20, pp. 488-491


HISTORY AND METAPHOR

We now turn to De Bruijnes second essay, wherein he deals with the question whether it will

help Reformed theology if, more so than is normal within the Reformed tradition, some aspects of

historical passages in Scripture are explained not literally but metaphorically.1

In seeking an answer to this question, De Bruijne is still in discussion with his colleague B.

Loonstra. One of Loonstras arguments is that ancient historians (including biblical ones) were not

greatly interested in historical accuracy. They wrote their accounts not first of all because they wanted to

relate what actually happened, but in order to frame a theological message. In the process they used avariety of conventions, such as metaphors and other non-literal language as well as saga, elements of

myth, and pseudepigraphy (the placing of a text on the name of a well-known person who had not in fact

written it). They did so not to deceive but because the approach was a normal one at the time, and

because no strict distinction between literal and non-literal was required (112-16).Because he believes this to be the nature of biblical historiography, Loonstra concludes that we

can interpret certain historical passages figuratively even when the biblical authors presented them asliteral. This means in effect that we can deny their historicity. But because biblical accounts do not have

the pretension of being historically exact, such a denial is no real problem, although, as we saw in the

previous instalment, an exception must be made for descriptions with a redemptive-historical content.

Biblical historicity: a Jewish view

Having summarized Loonstras argument, De Bruijne refers to the work of two scholars who

have specialized in the study of biblical and other ancient historiography. Both men contradictLoonstras conclusion, showing that ancient-eastern historians were vitally interested in historicity and

truth, and that the same applied to biblical authors.The first of De Bruijnes witnesses is the Jewish Old Testament scholar and ancient historian

Baruch Halpern, who in one of his studies focuses on the historical books of Joshua up to and including

Kings (162-7). Halpern shows that these books intend to do justice to the facts, including even the

smallest details, and that in this respect they do not differ from modern-western historiography. An

investigation of the sources the biblical historians used, as well as a comparison with what we knowfrom extra-biblical sources, are among the factors that lead to this conclusion.

Halpern distinguishes between what happened and history. The former term refers to the

endless number of occurrences that we experience from day to day, often without being able to makeconnections. History is the discipline which organizes (some of) these facts into a coherent whole. It is

a means ofrepresenting the past. As such, history necessarily has a literary dimension. It needs a

narrative structure to show connections, deal with cause and effect, offer interpretations, and also tobring a message; for history always has an ideological or didactic or tendentious component. All this

means that the writer concentrates on some facts, rather than on others. There is no true historian who

does not select. Sometimes he focuses on political data; at other times he leaves such data out andrestricts himself to facts dealing, for example, with religious matters. In historical narratives, Halpern

continues, there are also white spots areas where the sources are very limited. The historian tries to

fill in these spots as well as he can, but historical accounts necessarily have a measure of probability.

They are also apt to contain errors: e.g., an inaccurate date, or a mistake caused by the misunderstanding


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of a source. These various elements do not detract, however, from the historians intention to do justiceto the past. They characterize all serious historiography.

Narrative conventionsAlthough the desire for accuracy is the same, Halpern states that there are differences between

the historiography of biblical times and of today. Far more so than their modern counterparts, ancient

historians presented their history in story form. They also made use of narrative conventions that werecurrent in their times. These were well known to their readers, but they are unfamiliar to us and theirusage must therefore be explained. One of these conventions is the symbolic meaning of numbers, which

I mentioned before. Another is the use of dialogue and direct speech. When a modern historian has to

give the words of a historical figure he does not usually have an exact text before him and reportsindirectly. That is, he gives a summary or a paraphrase of what was said. But in the same situation

historians in the ancient orient (and also in classical Greece) often used direct speech, and so left the

impression that they were quoting literally. This was done also when it concerned words spoken insecret, and even when the historian referred to a persons unspoken thoughts. The fact that we cannot

take such direct speech as literal does not mean that it is historically unreliable. The convention served

the goal that all proper historians pursue, namely to give a faithful presentation of what was actually saidand thought.

Another convention Halpern mentions is that of hyperbole or exaggeration. The original readers

recognized this convention and interpreted it properly, whereas we have to be alerted to it. A report, for

example, that a tyrant ripped open all pregnant women does not necessarily imply numericalexactness, but may simply be a means the author used to indicate that great cruelties were visited upon

the tyrants victims. In the same way, we must assume that hyperbole is used when we read that a city

was destroyed to the last man when later it appears that there were still men present. And various otherexamples could be given.

Halpern also believes that sometimes fictional elements were inserted into the narrative. He

himself disbelieves in miracles and therefore considers a text like 1 Kings 13 (which relates the story ofthe man of God who in the days of Jeroboam I came from Judah to prophesy at Bethel) as fictional.

Halpern thinks that this story may have been consciously inserted as figurative, although he also

considers the possibility that the author mistakenly believed that the events had actually taken place. But

generally, this type of story, he believes, was recognized as figurative and inserted to throw light on thetotal message; and while we have difficulty distinguishing such fictional stories from the historical ones

surrounding them, this was not the case with the immediate readers, who were familiar with the

convention.To summarize: Halpern rejects the view that biblical history as a whole is metaphoric, that it

serves as nothing more than a means of conveying a message, and that it does not claim true historicity.

He esteems the reliability and professionalism of biblical witnesses much higher than many criticalscholars do. He also makes clear that, if we want to understand the biblical message, it is essential that

we keep in mind the different narrative conventions. At the same time he criticizes confessional scholars

for trying to explain all claims as historical and factual and so ignoring the possible figurative aspects of

a story. Their belief in the historicity of 1 Kings 13, which he himself considers fictional because itcontains miracles, serves him as an example.

Halperns attitude toward the supernatural makes clear, De Bruijne concludes, that we can make

only a critical use of his work, while nevertheless admitting its value for a biblical hermeneutics.Especially valuable are his arguments in support of the Bibles historicity and his explanation of ancient-

oriental narrative conventions (168).


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An evangelical voiceThe second expert De Bruijne introduces is the Old Testament scholar V. Philips Long, an

evangelical theologian who, unlike Halpern, believes the Bible to be the infallible word of God. De

Bruijne concentrates on Longs study The Art of Biblical History, 1994. In this book Long builds onHalperns work but, because of his Christian convictions, comes with additional information that can

help Reformed hermeneutical reflection (168-83).

Like Halpern, Long distinguishes between history as the totality of past occurrences on the onehand, and history as it is told and written (historiography), on the other. Again like Halpern, he points outhat written history does more than simply recount facts. It is a composition, which means that it takes

the form of a narrative wherein events of the past are presented in a coherent and ordered manner, so that

their significance becomes clear. History as the totality of past occurrences and written history, Longpoints out, are both part of Gods revelation. His work of salvation is establishedin his historical deeds.

The significance of these deeds He Himselfexplains by means of the historians selection, ordering,

description, and explanation of the historical facts.Unlike Halpern, Long does not believe in automatically assigning supernatural elements like

miracles and divine revelations to the domain of the non-historical. He suggests a method for

determining whether a certain passage in the Bible is meant historically or not. Among the things that hesuggests the exegete has to keep in mind are the following two:

(1) The exegete must determine what type of truth claim the historian makes. Does a certain book

have the intention of giving historical information or not? The claim for the book as a whole affects the

parts according to a top-down structure. If it appears that the author presents his entire text as history,then this applies also to the parts, unless these are clearly meant figuratively. The fable of Jotham in

Judges 9 and the parables of Jesus have characteristics which distinguish them from the surrounding

passages and are clearly not meant to be taken literally. In the case of the speaking donkey of Balaam(Numbers 22) such distinguishing characteristics are absent, and therefore this section must, with the

book of Numbers as a whole, be taken as historical.

(2) The exegete must apply the test of internal consistency (i.e., are there contradictions whichgive rise to doubt as to the texts historicity?) and of external consistency (i.e., does the passage come

into conflict with what we know from other sources?).

If Jericho was not razedLong considers also the question whether, in attempting to establish the historicity of certain

texts, we can distinguish between the central message of the Bible and what would appear to be more

peripheral or marginal information. We have seen that Loonstra makes this type of distinction when heinsists that certain presentations in the Bible can be taken figuratively (even though presented as literal)

but that this may not be done with texts that have a redemptive-historical content.

Long questions the validity of such a distinction. In this connection he refers to the destruction ofJericho (Josh. 6), an event that liberal historians have often presented as non-historical. He borrows from

another author, who quoted Pauls confession, If Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is in

vain and your faith is in vain (1 Cor. 15:14) and who paraphrased it by asking, If Jericho was not

razed, is our faith in vain? Long believes that we have to take that question seriously. The book ofJoshua, he points out, claims to give history, and this claim is compromised if we should conclude that

the destruction of Jericho did not take place. That would have consequences for our trust in the Bibles

central message. We accept that message as true for the same reason that we accept the account ofJerichos razing as true, namely through the witness coming to us in the Bible. If we conclude that the

account of Jerichos razing is not to be taken literally, although it is clearly presented as such, then our

confidence in the trustworthiness of Scripture as a whole cannot remain unaffected.De Bruijne appears to agree with this point of view. He further remarks that in any event it is

difficult to establish precisely which texts are central and which peripheral. The so-called


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redemptive-historical facts are not restricted to what we confess, for example, in the Apostles Creed. Asseveral of the Psalms show, the category also includes elements not mentioned in the Creed, such as the

flood, events occurring in the times of the patriarchs, the exodus, the desert experience, the conquest of

Canaan, the history of David, and so on. Often it is impossible to distinguish between biblical Fact andfact (179f.).

Some applicationsApplying the arguments of Halpern and Long, De Bruijne shows how they correct a number ofLoonstras conclusions, and also how they can help us with various problems in biblical interpretation.

As examples of the latter he mentions, inter alia, elements in the accounts of the beginning of Sauls

kingship and of the conquest of Canaan, as well as the fact that in the New Testament the first threegospels place the cleansing of the temple at the beginning of Jesus public ministry whereas John places

it at the end (172-6, 180, 181f.). An awareness of narrative conventions and the application of literary

analysis enable us, he shows, to eliminate what have long been considered inconsistencies orcontradictions in biblical history. By ignoring these conventions, and in general by attempting to explain

literally what is intended figuratively, we do not uphold the Bibles truth claim but in fact obscure its

message. De Bruijne therefore stresses once again the need for greater openness among us for thepresence of narrative conventions and other figurative elements in the Bible (184f).

While rejecting Loonstras conclusion that all biblical language is metaphorical, de Bruijne

emphasizes once again that a text can have a literal as well as a metaphorical meaning. We had an

example of this in his explanation of the biblical account of Christs resurrection (see the previousinstalment). Returning to the same Bible passage, De Bruijne mentions the cloud that, according to Acts

1:9, hid Jesus from the disciples sight when He ascended. In the light of Longs criteria there is no

reason, he writes, to believe with Loonstra and others that the cloud may not have been literally there.We must regard it, however, as a literal element which has at the same time a metaphorical surplus

value. The cloud was there, and by its veryphysical presence it symbolizedthe divine glory (178).

De Bruijne sees a similar metaphorical message in some of the direct speech we find in ScriptureAgreeing with Halpern that the use of direct speech was an ancient-eastern narrative convention, he

mentions the difficulty some Reformed believers have in accepting it as non-literal. In many instances

the Bible itself, however, claims no absolute literalness for direct speech. The differences among the

evangelists in their rendering of human words, and even of the words of Jesus Himself, make this clear,as do other parts of Scripture.

As to the possible metaphorical surplus value of direct speech, De Bruijne draws attention to

the words of Rahab to the two spies (Josh 2), and suggests that the narrator (that is, the Holy Spirit) usedthe convention here to reveal the meaning of the episode. Rahabs speech repeated promises that God

had given to Joshua with respect to the conquest of Canaan. What Rahab actually said and what is

recorded is materially the same; but the specific form served to underline the specific promises givenearlier. These promises required faith. Rahabs message confirmed that Gods promises were indeed

reliable (183).

SummaryTo summarize what we have covered so far: With reference to the work of experts like Baruch

Halpern and V. Philips Long, De Bruijne has argued convincingly that biblical authors were as much

concerned with historical accuracy as are modern historians. Rather than considering historicity of onlysecondary interest, biblical historians knew that the truth of their message depended on that historicity.

Texts that were clearly intended as literal and literally accurate must therefore be interpreted as such.

At the same time De Bruijne has made clear that figurative elements do play an important role inhistorical accounts. Such elements the author has consciously incorporated in his historical narration. In

various cases they form a second layer on top of the literal meaning of the text and depend on that


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meaning. In addition, there is the matter of ancient-oriental narrative conventions. An awareness of theseconventions and their nature makes it possible, De Bruijne has shown, to resolve a good many

problems in historical accounts in the Bible. Elements that used to be labelled discrepancies or

errors make perfect sense when the narrative conventions are kept in mind. This applies not only to thesymbolic use of numbers, the use of dialogue and direct speech, and the use of hyperbole, but also to

apparent repetitions, gaps, and other literary usages in narrative accounts. Another function of

narrative conventions is that they allow the author to show the meaning of the events he narrates andexplain them as acts of God.

Questions

The insights related above have been quite widely accepted as positive among De BruijnesReformed colleagues. His essay on biblical history contains, however, a number of controversial

elements as well. They include the following:

1. Although he rejects Halperns view that accounts of the supernatural are necessarily figurative,De Bruijne agrees that ancient-eastern narrative conventions allowed for the inclusion offictive elements

in historical accounts, and that we may meet this convention also in the Bible. Referring to Halperns

idea of white spots, he suggests that this may apply, for example, to the book of Genesis especiallyto the first 11 chapters, but to a lesser extent also to the history of the patriarchs (187-90). For these early

events there were few literary sources available. Although it is possible that God revealed directly much

of what happened, it is also possible, he argues, that the historian was forced to make use of popular

traditions, which, as he will have realized, will have contained facts as well as fiction. It will have beennecessary for him, moreover, to paint lengthy and complex periods with simple brush strokes. De

Bruijne believes that in such cases the possibility of inaccuracies in the account increases. Rather than

implying direct revelation, inspiration means that, here as elsewhere, the Holy Spirit led the historianswork in such a way that the outcome gave a reliable account of the period in question. The special

guidance of the Spirit did not replace the historians normal craft but directed it to Gods special goal

(187).I should add here that De Bruijne later qualifies the above by stating that the sources the historian

used may well have contained divine revelation to earlier believers. A case in point is Abraham. In

Genesis 18 God revealed to Abraham his plans for the future. It is to be expected, De Bruijne writes, that

God will have given his prophet information about his work in the past as well. On he same occasion DeBruijne also comes back on his statement that in the use of his sources the historian may have been

inaccurate and made errors. He now calls that a useless and groundless speculation. Although such

errors are theoretically possible, one can assume them only if one meets a concrete problem. Generalstatements on the matter are speculative and should be avoided.2

(2) Another controversial element concerns De Bruijnes proposed explanation of Genesis 6:1-4,

where we read about the sons of God who married daughters of men (190-93). Although he does notwant to give a definitive interpretation, he considers the possibility that the biblical author made use of

well-known pagan myths according to which gods had sexual relations with human beings, and that he

consciously applied these myths in an antithetical manner, namely in order to denounce them. We may

have an account here, he suggests, of humankind before the flood trying to establish a connection withheaven on its own conditions specifically by the creation of idols. The flood would then be Gods

judgment on human idolatry.

More about these issues, and about the discussion to which they have given rise, in the nextinstalment.

1 Page references within the text are to Woord op schrift.

2De Reformatie, May 31, 2003, p. 644.


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Clarion, v. 53(8 October 2004), n. 21, pp. 510-513


REACTIONSWe now come to the reception of De Bruijnes essay on biblical historiography. VariousReformed periodicals have published articles about his work, but we will concentrate on the weeklyDeReformatie. On May 17, 2003, that periodical, in cooperation with the theological university in Kampen,

hosted a conference at which six Reformed theologians from different church backgrounds discussed andevaluated De Bruijnes contributions. In the morning three of these men dealt with the essay on biblical

history, in the afternoon the other three discussed the one on ethics. De Reformatie subsequently

published these speeches, together with De Bruijnes introductions and responses.1

The majority of myreferences will be to these presentations.

Is a hermeneutical overhaul necessary?The presentations suggest that one reason for the disagreements on De Bruijnes work is ones

view of the needfor comprehensive hermeneutical work by Reformed theologians. As De Bruijne points

out in his introduction to the conference, the conviction that inspired his work was that this need is

indeed urgent. It is more than time, he believes, for Reformed theology to deal with questions about theunderstanding and use of the Bible in modern times. He adds that those who do not share his conviction

who have, as he puts it, no antenna for the hermeneutical question will for that very reason already

have reservations with respect to his essays (p. 642).The first speaker at the conference, Dr. G. van den Brink, admits that he belongs to that

category.2

Attempts at a serious hermeneutical overhaul, he points out, often lead to polarisation among

believers and are in any case unnecessary, since we have an excellent consensus on scriptural authorityin articles 3 to 7 of the Belgic Confession. Why add to that? he asks. He himself feels at home with the

remark of A.A. van Ruler that it is far more interesting and worthwhile to reflect upon the contents of

Scripture than to labour on a definition of its formal nature. That, he argues, is in any event an

impossible task, just as it is impossible to come with a fully satisfactory theory of biblical inspiration.The Bible is too great a book to be caught in human formulas. He is convinced, moreover, that we will

never be able to protect the Reformed doctrine of biblical authority fully against the dangers coming

from the Bible-critical tradition on the one hand, and fundamentalism on the other. We must of course dowhat we can, but the best means of guarding against negative influences from both left and right is still

to be found in the confession.

But if he rejects the need for Reformed theology to come with a new hermeneutics, Van denBrink believes that there is a need for a periodical reflection on hermeneutical issues primarily as a

means to stay informed about what is happening in the field. When it is seen in these terms, he heartily

welcomes De Bruijnes work, which he finds informative and helpful. Especially important, he says, is

the evidence it provides about the striving for historical accuracy among biblical historians. He believesthat in drawing attention to the work of experts like Baruch Halpern and V. Philips Long, and in general

in insisting upon the literal-historical intention of biblical historians, De Bruijne leads Reformed

theology in the right direction. He does that also by showing the potential of literary analysis and of anawareness of narrative conventions such as those of dialogue and direct speech.

Fiction and mythVan den Brink questions, however, De Bruijnes idea that ancient-eastern and biblical narrative

conventions allowed for the introduction of fiction into what was presented as a literal-historical passage


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He believes that on this point De Bruijne follows Halpern too uncritically, and that by doing so hecontradicts his own primary thesis namely that biblical authors were careful to distinguish between fact

and fiction. If they intended to introduce fiction or myth in an historical account, we may assume that

they marked that very clearly. Van den Brink believes that occasionally we may be able to notice suchmarkings, for example in the statement about the sons of God in Genesis 6, but even here he has his

questions. Generally, he writes, he agrees with the theologian A. Noordegraaf, who urged caution

because elements like myth and saga have all too often been used to deny the factuality of the event.Halperns decision to consider 1 Kings 13 to be fiction because of his disbelief in miracles teaches us tobe extraordinarily critical with respect to any suggestion about the presence of myth or other forms of

fiction in historical texts unless, of course, there are explicit pointers to such a presence.

A similar conclusion is reached by the German theologian A.D. Baum, a New Testament scholarwho studied in Kampen.3 Baum also mentions De Bruijnes suggestion that the practice of inserting

fiction and myth may have been followed, especially in cases where sources were scarce. Questioning

that assumption, he states that he knows of no historical sources from the Greek and Roman (andtherefore the New Testament) period that mention such a usage. He also doubts that it existed in Old

Testament times. As has been well attested, biblical historians wrote with literal-historical intent.

Historicity and metaphorAlthough expressing doubt on the matter of fictive elements in historical accounts, Baum

welcomes De Bruijnes statements regarding the truth claim of biblical history. As to the historical books

of the New Testament, his own area of expertise, he fully endorses De Bruijnes position. NewTestament historians lived in the Greco-Roman world, and the available evidence makes clear, he

remarks, that a primary rule for historians in this world was to tell the literal truth. We have manuscripts

from ancient historians and philosophers wherein they state this in so many words. That New Testamenthistorians honoured the same rule is evident, for example, in the work of Luke. This author shows his

close association with the prevailing practice by modelling the prologue to his books on that of

contemporary secular historians and by emphasizing that he has carefully investigated everything fromthe beginning (Luke 1:3). Baum concludes that Greco-Roman and New Testament historians were

inspired by the same love for truth as modern ones are. Because he is not an Old Testament scholar he

hesitates to make a similarly definitive pronouncement with respect to Old Testament historiography, but

he is inclined to support De Bruijne here over against Loonstra.Baum further agrees with De Bruijne that Reformed theologians should be more open to the

metaphoric potential of historical texts in the Bible for example, by noticing the possible metaphoric

surplus value of literal passages. The New Testament itself provides examples here. Paul interpretedthe Israelites passing through the Red Sea as pointing to baptism and saw in the two sons of Abraham

an allegory of two covenants. At no point did Paul state that the passages were intendedas figurative; he

simply interpretedthem as such but without denying their literal-historical truth. Something similarapplies to the New Testament accounts of Jesus miracles. The accounts of his healings, for example,

refer to what literally happened but symbolize at the same time a different event, namely the forgiveness

of sins.

And finally, Baum supports De Bruijnes reference to ancient narrative conventions. One of themost striking ways in which biblical history writing differs from its modern counterpart is in its dealing

with quotations and in the use it makes of direct speech. When quoting from the Old Testament, New

Testament writers often do not do so literally. And the statements Jesus made at certain occasions areusually reported differently in the different gospels. The same convention, he remarks, was evidently

followed in the Old Testament. In the books of Genesis up to and including Kings there are close to 100

instances where peoples statements are cited in direct speech, and in practically all cases the choice ofwords in the second citation differs from that of the first. By way of example, Baum suggests a

comparison between Genesis 24:1-27 and Genesis 24:34-49.


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Baum goes on to show that this usage was an accepted convention in Greco-Romanhistoriography, and that it was not seen as detracting in any way from the accuracy of the statements in

question. Ancient historians took pains to make this clear, explaining that although their choice of words

differed from the original, the meaning remained the same. In short, as Baum concludes, The literaryfreedom of the ancient historian concerned only the form of the direct quotations and not their historical

content. Both writers and readersrealized this. He remarks that the convention may seem strange to

us, but that at least in one respect we come close to following it. His reference is to the work oftranslation. A translator uses different words from those used in the original, but this in itself does notmake his work unreliable. As long as it gives a correct translation of the original words in the receiving

language, it is considered an accurate and legitimate rendering.

Inerrancy and infallibilityThe last of the three speakers on biblical historiography is H.J. Room, pastor of the Reformed

church at Harderwijk.4

Room, who specializes in Old Testament studies, joins Van den Brink and Baumin expressing doubts about De Bruijnes suggestion that fiction and myths may have been inserted in

what is presented as a literal historical passage. With respect to De Bruijnes statements regarding white

spots and broad brush strokes in Genesis 1-11, he remarks that much in these chapters is, in fact,narrated in detail and with great precision. In his opinion the differences between Genesis 1-11 and the

rest of the book are not as profound as is sometimes assumed.

At the same time, he expresses appreciation for De Bruijnes initiative and emphatically rejects

allegations that his work is of a Bible-critical nature. De Bruijnes goal is, rather, to achieve a clearerunderstanding of the Bibles intention and message. In the process he does not hesitate to refer to

questions and issues that tend to come to the fore in discussions on biblical authority. This openness

makes him vulnerable, for misunderstandings arise easily, but it does not justify the accusation of aBible-critical attitude.

Room emphasizes that he makes his presentation as part of a discussion that is being held within

the legitimate boundaries of Reformed theology. It is in this context that he raises a number of questionsof his own. The most important one is a methodological one: in his opinion De Bruijne approaches many

of the issues he raises in too global a fashion. Much of Rooms presentation is devoted to attempts to

refine the method.

In this connection he also touches upon the matter of biblical inerrancy. De Bruijne spoke ofpossible errors and discrepancies in the Bible, and considered the possibility that these existed already in

the original manuscripts and not only in the copies we now have (Woord op schrift, pp. 185-7). Room

agrees with him on this point. He also believes, however, that de Bruijne could have spoken moreguardedly on the topic of biblical errors. Apparent errors always occur within a context, and that context

may be unclear to us. Often the problem is a lack in our understanding, as a result of which we see errors

where they do not necessarily exist. He believes that in any case we should be sparing in using the worderror when speaking about the Bible. After all, we are dealing with the Word of God.

At the same time Room notices that we are confronted here with a gap in Reformed teachings

about biblical authority. As far as he can see, Reformed theology has never explained the relationship

between the doctrine of biblical infallibility and the possibility that the Bible contains errors. It has oftenrejected the fundamentalist theory of inerrantism (according to which there are no errors in the original

manuscripts, only in the later copies), but without explaining how the inerrrantist position differs from

that on biblical infallibility. Room concludes by suggesting that we will be wise in our reading ofScripture to pay attention to the manner in which the Lord Jesus Himself spoke about the Bible.

ResponseIn his response,5 De Bruijne gives a good deal of attention to the issue of fictive elements in

accounts that are presented as historical. Criticisms on this point had reached him from more than one


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direction, and he had already in his introduction to the conference admitted that in Woord op schrifthetoo readily followed Halpern on this point (644).6 De Bruijne repeats this admission in his response to

the three speakers, but adds that much is still unclear. While it is not possible to state definitively that the

convention existed in Old Testament times, it is equally impossible to prove that it did not exist. Thereare indications, also in the work of conservative scholars on ancient historiography, that may point to the

contrary. Further research is necessary (739f.). De Bruijne leaves it at that. But as critics have rightly

argued, such a convention, if it indeed existed, would seem to contradict de Bruijnes principal thesis thabiblical historians took great care to distinguish between fact and fiction.Another topic in his response concerns the matter of errors and discrepancies in Scripture, for

example in the early chapters of Genesis (although not only there). In connection with Rooms remarks,

de Bruijne admits (as he already did in his introductory speech) that he should have spoken with greaterreserve. He also agrees with Rooms comments regarding the lack of consensus among Reformed

theologians on the question of biblical infallibility. On the one hand, many a Reformed exegete speaks

freely about possible errors in Scripture, but on the other we subscribe to the doctrine of biblicalinfallibility. It is often stated that this doctrine does not imply faultlessness. But then what does it imply?

De Bruijne continues to reject, as he did in Woord op schrift, the theory that although the manuscripts we

now have may contain some errors, the original manuscripts were faultless. That, he says, is purespeculation; and it fails to explain why God should have provided faultless original manuscripts, which

got lost, and then allowed errors to appear in the manuscripts that were preserved.

De Bruijne says he understands why people hold to this theory. Fearing a careless use of the

Bible, they sooner adopt a forced explanation than allow questions about the trustworthiness of thescriptural text. He believes, however, that offering forced explanations is in the end counter-productive

and will only aggravate the problems. It is time, he thinks, to improve our theology regarding biblical

infallibility. But in the meantime we should indeed be careful in our speaking of possible errors in theBible. If we continue using the word, it would be good always to speak of apparent errors, or

problems for which the idea of an error would seem to offer the most satisfactory solution (752f.).

The use of mythLastly, there is the matter of the antithetical use of myth in the Bible. We have seen that de

Bruijne suggests that possibility in connection with the passage in Genesis 6 about sons of God

marrying daughters of men. According to this view, the passage would be interpreted not literally butmetaphorically. In spite of the criticism the suggestion has aroused, De Bruijne maintains his original

position. To make a critical use of myth (and in the process to negate it), he argues, is different from

inserting a fictive story. In response to the concern his suggestion has aroused he does, however,introduce some qualifications. Firstly, he admits that he knows of no other convincing example in

Scripture, so that the use of the convention, if it indeed existed, will have been exceptional. Secondly, he

explains that the idea is not to be defended simply because it could happen in ancient-orientalhistoriography. The exegesis must do justice to the biblical text. Scripture explains itself. At the same

time, he adds, the text must not be isolated from its context. It is in the interaction between text and

context (biblical, but also historical and cultural) that we seek to understand the text as God gave it at a

specific time and place (753).De Bruijne further points out that none of the prevailing literal interpretations does justice to all

aspects of the text. Earlier he had already argued that it is not uncommon among orthodox theologians

dealing with this passage to rely heavily upon external context something for which he himself hasbeen criticized. He mentions that orthodox theologians have suggested, for example, that the sons of

God may have been angels, or else that the term may have referred to tyrants, and both explanations

have been supported with reference to extra-biblical sources.7

A major difference between thesesuggestions and de Bruijnes, however, remains: in the former cases the literal-historical meaning of the

text was preserved, whereas in de Bruijnes it is not. One problem with his suggestion is no doubt his use


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of the word myth (see in this connection the warning by A. Noordegraaf), but another is that hisproposal is once again difficult to square with his principal thesis that what is presented as literal in the

Bible must be interpreted as such (although it may be shown to have a metaphorical surplus value).

In conclusion, it may well be that de Bruijnes suggested interpretation of Genesis 6:1-4 raises asmany questions as it seeks to solve. It would seem that the most we can say at this moment about the

passage is, in the words of H.J. Room (p. 672), that we do not (yet) quite understand what we are told

here, and leave it at that.In the next instalment we turn to de Bruijnes essay on ethics.

NOTES

1 See the issues of May 31 up to and including July 26, 2003. References to these presentations within the text will have only the

page number(s) ofDe Reformatie.

2 Dr. van den Brink teaches dogmatics on behalf of the Nederlands Hervormde Kerkat the University of Leiden. His

presentation appears inDe Reformatie of May 31, 2003, pp. 645-9.

3 For Baums presentation, seeDe Reformatie, June 7, 2003, pp. 663-9.

4 For Boons comments see ibid., pp. 669-675.

5 For De Bruijnes response, seeDe Reformatie of June 28 and July 5, 2003, pp. 737-41 and 751-5 respectively.

6 His opening speech to the historiographical discussion appears inDe Reformatie of May 31, 2003, pp. 642-5.

7 See de Bruijne in Woord op schrift, pp. 190f., and also inNader Bekeken, May 203, pp. 138f., where he is in discussion with Dr.H.J.J.C.J. Wilschut, Reformed pastor in Assen.


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HOW DO WE READ THE BIBLE? (5)By F. G. Oosterhoff

Clarion, v. 53 (22 October 2004), n. 22, pp. 543-547


CHRISTIAN ETHICS

Christian ethics and the Christian lifestyle are the topics of A. L. Th. de Bruijnes final essay in

Woord op schrift. The question he seeks to answer is to what extent it is possible today to apply biblical

passages containing ethical directions not literally but metaphorically. My references in what followswill be primarily to this essay, although I will give attention also to two explanatory articles which De

Bruijne wrote later and which were published in the weeklyDe Reformatie.1

The hermeneutical questionIn the first instalment of this series I mentioned some of the problems people meet today when

attempting to base their ethical choices on the teachings of the Bible. One of these concerns matters onwhich Scripture is silent, such as todays medical ethics and other issues that are unique to modern

society (forexample the use of the media, tourism, and investments).2 Another is why today we follow

some of the biblical commands, but not all of them. The Bible says, for example, that we may not sell

our land, take interest on money, or swear an oath; yet modern Christians do all these things. Apparentlythis type of command was embedded in and conditioned by the culture within which it was given. The

question that is being asked today is why this is not true of other commands as well for example of

those concerning divorce and remarriage, women in office, the observation of the Sabbath, pre-maritalsex, and homosexual relations. How do we know that biblical guidelines on these matters are not also

time-bound?

In an explanatory article De Bruijne explains that the question how we are to base our ethicalchoices on the Bible is not new (Ref., p. 688). The early church already dealt with it. In our times,

however, it has become more urgent, partly as a result of our openness to the outside world. Reformed

people have never believed in isolating themselves from the surrounding culture but have always

interacted with it. This was not too risky as long as that culture honoured a moral code that was in manyrespects derived from the Bible. Today, however, our society is post-christian and pluralistic, and the

wind of a postmodernist relativism freely enters the church through its open windows. It is this factor

that goes a long way in explaining the urgency of the hermeneutical question a question, De Bruijnebelieves, that we cannot ignore if we do not want to add to the deterioration of the Christian lifestyle.

A contributing factor in todays situation is that in our ethical deliberations we have often been

rationalistic and individualistic. We have tended to see the Ten Commandments, for example, as atimeless, universal legal code, which could be divorced from every historical context and interpreted

quite apart from the community of believers. Focusing on the commands as timeless rules, the individual

Christian could by careful logical reasoning, all by him or herself, come to the proper ethical choices

(Ref., 689).This usage, De Bruijne says, has led to a reaction in our postmodern age. It is true, the spirit of

individualism is still strong, but the trust in logical reasoning has greatly weakened. We have learned tha

human reason is never neutral, and also that demonstrative certainty generally escapes us. Reasoninggets us no further than plausibility, that is, conclusions of greater or lesser probability. Even

contradictory positions are often defended by logical reasoning. Those who want to prove that the Bible

forbids homosexual relations, for example, can set up a rational demonstration that many will findconvincing. But those who want to prove the contrary can set up a logical discourse that seems no less

persuasive to others (227f.).


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The subjective element specifically the belief that ones personal desires and feelings should beconsidered plays a role in this type of reasoning, even though the element is covered up. It can also

play a more overt role in the matter of homosexual relationships and in other situations, such as those

concerning divorce and remarriage. De Bruijne gives an example. He writes that one of the problems apastor meets when referring to the Bible in matters of ethics and lifestyle is that the other person explains

the argument as the pastors subjective, personal vision. He counters it with his own vision. For example

if he has been issued a warning, based on the Bible, against a second marriage after an unjustifieddivorce, the answer frequently is: That is your exegesis; my opinion is different. Why would God ask ofme such an impossible way of life? When I read the Bible, I cannot see that (Ref., 784).

In short, what we experience today are an individualistic approach in the making of ethical

choices, a tendency toward rationalism and legalism, and a turning away from the Christian lifestyle andthe command to follow Christ.

Narrative and discipleshipThese developments have convinced him, De Bruijne says, that in ethical matters we must learn

to look at the Bible in a different manner than we have been used to. He refers in his essay to the work of

yet another American theologian, namely Richard B. Hays, ethicist at Yale University. With Hays hebelieves that we must stop looking at Scripture as a book of rules and concepts and receive it for what in

fact it is, namely the history of Gods redemptive deeds in Christ.

That history comes

How Do We Read the Bible (by Freda Oosterhoff)

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