Hostile Climate: The Political Economy of Atmospheric Protection

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HOSTILE CLIMATE? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY of ATMOSPHERIC PROTECTION by Craig Collins, Ph.D. ©

description

Examines climate negotiations: the political actors, economic interests & strategies of rival negotiating blocs. Looks at the major political roadblocks to forging consensus around an effective climate agreement. Examines the role of leadership in foraging a viable treaty.

Transcript of Hostile Climate: The Political Economy of Atmospheric Protection

Page 1: Hostile Climate: The Political Economy of Atmospheric Protection

HOSTILE CLIMATE?

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY of ATMOSPHERIC PROTECTION

by Craig Collins, Ph.D. ©

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The Global Commons • Global  Common  Pool  Resources  (CPRs):  

– Large,  essen7al  resources  that  defy  priva7za7on  &  na7onal  regula7on  because  of  their:  • Enormous  size    

• Indivisible,  fluid  character  •  Examples  of  CPRs:  

– Oceans,  Marine  Fisheries,  Biodiversity,  the  Ozone  Layer,  the  Atmosphere.  

•  Since  no  single  government  or  global  market  can  protect  CPRs,  only  nego%ated  interna7onal  agreements  provide  the  possibility  of  preven7ng  their  overuse,  degrada7on  &  destruc7on.  

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• Interna7onal  Agreements  Have  Many  Poten7al  Weaknesses:  – They  are  difficult  to  nego7ate  &  reach  agreement  on.  • Nego7a7ng  a  treaty  that  is  both  effec7ve  &  acceptable  to  all  essen7al  par7es  can  be  almost  impossible.  

– They  are  hard  to  monitor.  – They  are  difficult  to  enforce.  

• The  “Tragedy  of  the  Commons”  Theory  Says  It’s  Folly.    

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• Holding  one,  big,  complex  interna7onal  treaty  nego7a7on  has  NOT  been  successful.  

• The  most  successful  effort  so  far  has  used  the  Framework-­‐Protocol  nego7a7on  process.  – Success  or  failure  doesn’t  rest  on  a  one-­‐7me  nego7a7on.  

– Learning  &  science  can  foster  agreement,  increase  public  concern  &  improve  the  outcome  over  7me.  

– Public  pressure  has  more  7me  to  get  organized  &  influence  successive  nego7a7ons.    

• However  this  process  can  be  VERY  SLOW!  

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The Framework-Protocol Process • For  Ozone  Nego7a7ons:  Framework  —>  Protocol(s)  

Vienna  —>  Montreal,  London,  Copenhagen…  

• For  Climate  Change  Nego7a7ons:  

Framework  —>  Protocol  

Rio  de  Janeiro  —>  Kyoto  —>  …..  

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Global Warming Negotiations Have Moved at a Glacial Pace

ADer  a  framework  convenGon  was  adopted  at  the  1992  Earth  Summit  in  Rio,  progress  toward  a  substanGve  protocol  was  not  made  unGl  Kyoto  in  1997.    

The  KYOTO  PROTOCOL  commiSed  countries  to:  (1)  emission-­‐reducGon  targets  of  greenhouse  gases  for  each  of  the  

member  countries  (about  5%  for  rich  countries;  less  for  poor).  (2)  a  greenhouse  gas  emission-­‐trading  program.  

•  The  Kyoto  Protocol  wasn’t  implemented  unGl  2005  when  it  was  finally  raGfied  by  enough  countries  (55)  to  bring  it  into  effect.  

The  US  refused  to  ra7fy  this  minimal  agreement  but  finally  agreed  to  resume  talks  in  Copenhagen  (2009).  

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The Treaty Negotiation Process SUCCESS  REQUIRES:  Uni%ng  3  rival  coali%ons  by  overcoming  3  roadblocks  to  agreement.  

A  Coali7on  is  an  informal  alliance  of  like-­‐minded  actors  (na7ons,  groups  &  people)  who  view  their  interests  around  an  issue  in  a  similar  way.  

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WHO JOINS COALITIONS? GOVERNMENTS:  naGon  states  are  the  only  members  that  can  sign  &  enforce  treaGes.  

NON-­‐GOVERNMENTAL  ORGANIZATIONS:    NGOs  are  ciGzen-­‐based,  public  interest,  environmental,  scienGfic  &  business  organizaGons.  (Greenpeace,  Union  of  Concerned  ScienGsts,  the  World  Coal  InsGtute)  

INTERGOVERNMENTAL  ORGANIZATIONS:  IGOs  are  created  by  governments  to  act  as  a  forum  or  provide  a  funcGon.  (the  UN,  UNEP,  IPCC)    

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3 RIVAL COALITIONS

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The  Ac7vist  Coali7on:  CAN,  UNEP,  the  IPCC,  Alliance  of  Small  Island  States  (AOSIS),  Low-­‐Lying  Countries  &  the  EU.  

The  Blocking  Coali7on:  The  Fossil  Fuel  Companies  &  their  NGOs  (GCC  &  Western  Fuels  Assn.),  OPEC….&  ocen,  the  US.  

The  Equity  Coali7on:  Most  Developing  Na7ons  minus  OPEC,  AOSIS  &  Low-­‐Lying  Countries.  

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Merging  these  3  rival  coali%ons  into  a  single  UNITY  COALITION  that  supports  a  strong  atmospheric  treaty  requires  ACTIVIST  LEADERSHIP  to  overcome  3  ROADBLOCKS:  1)  The  Scien7fic  Uncertainty  Hurdle:    

•  When  does  the  evidence  demonstrate  that  a  serious  problem  (requiring  interna7onal  coopera7on)  exists?  

2)  The  Cost-­‐Benefit  Hurdle:  •  Will  the  benefits  of  a  nego7ated  solu7on  outweigh  the  costs  of  ignoring  the  problem?  

3)  The  Equity/Fairness  Hurdle:  •  Can  an  agreement  be  reached  that  will  be  considered  fair  by  all  of  the  par7es  involved?  

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Getting To An Agreement?

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Equity Coalition

Blocking Coalition

Consensus Coalition

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The Blocking Coalition’s Big Advantage • VETO  POWER  •  Since  an  effecGve  treaty  is  impossible  without  the  parGcipaGon  of  all  essen$al  parGes…  

•  The  blocking  coaliGon  can  undermine  any  agreement  by  keeping  even  one  of  these  essenGal  parGes  out  of  the  consensus  coaliGon.  

•  Also,  it  can  use  this  “hold-­‐out”  leverage  to  bargain  for  a  weaker  agreement.  

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The Blockers’ Strategy Keep  the  US  out  of  the  agreement  by  for7fying  

these  3  Roadblocks  to  Ra7fica7on:  

1)  Use  Scien%fic  Uncertainty  to  confuse  policy-­‐makers  &  the  public  to  stall  nego7a7ons.  

2)  Use  Cost  Concerns  to  keep  the  US  (&  other  countries)  out  of  the  Ac%vist  Coali%on.  

3)  Use  the  Equity  Issue  to  obstruct  talks  by  driving  a  wedge  between  Rich  &  Poor  countries.  

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Overcoming  Roadblocks  Requires  Ac7vist  Leadership  

•  AcGvists’  want  to  merge  all  3  coaliGons  into  a  single  “consensus  coali7on”  commiSed  to  an  strong  treaty.  

•  To  do  this,  acGvists  must  convince  the  other  2  coaliGons  that:  –  The  science  is  certain  enough  to  take  precau7onary  ac7on.  

– Ac7on  is  less  costly  than  doing  nothing.  

–  There  are  fair  ways  to  share  the  burden  of  containing  this  atmospheric  danger.  

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The  Ac7vist  Coali7on’s  Strategy  1)  Reduce  the  level  of  scien7fic  

uncertainty  •    Hopefully,  this  will  reveal  the  

universal  dangers  of  stalling,  weakening  or  blocking  an  effec7ve  treaty.  

2)  Crac  a  treaty  that  all  essen7al  par7es  consider  more  beneficial  &  less  costly  than  no  agreement.  •  Make  it  economically  &  poli7cally        costly  for  blockers  to  veto  or  delay.  

3)  Broker  equity  clauses  that  seem  fair  to  all  essen7al  par7es-­‐-­‐North  &  South.  

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Roadblock #1:���Scientific Uncertainty

Does  the  Science  Jus7fy  Taking  Ac7on?  Blockers  Strategy:  

•  Disinforma7on  &  Denial    —Downplay  the  Dangers  

 —Anack  the  Science  

Promote  the  Myth  of  a  Divided  Scien7fic  

Community.    

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The Blocker’s “Scientific Experts” •  Known  as  “The  Skep%cs”    these  scien7sts  are  clustered  into  2  small  groups  commonly  known  as:  The  Phoenix  Group  The  Virginia  Conspiracy   No  more  than  50  scienGsts  were  ever  involved  with  either  of  these  groups.  

 Today,  their  numbers  have  dwindled  to  no  more  than  a  dozen.    

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Loud Voice--Poor Credibility •  The  skep7cs’  views  have  received  

extensive  media  exposure.  

•  But  their  credibility  is  weakened  by:  –  Extensive  funding  from  the  fossil  fuel  industry  &  OPEC.  

–  The  lack  of  PEER-­‐REVIEWED  research.  

Dr. Robert Balling, Jr. •  Research  funded  by:  

EXXON,  Western  Fuels  Assn.,  Kuwait,  Cyprus  Coal  Mining  

•  Received  $900,000  from  coal  &  oil  interests  between  1989  &  1995.  

•   Editor:  World  Climate  Report  (funded  by  Western  Fuels  Assn.)  •   Research  &  travel  funded  by:  Edison  Electric,  CATO  Inst.,  German  Coal  Mining  Assn.  &  Cyprus  Mining.  •   Science  Advisor:  ICE  Informa7on  Council  on  the  Environment  (PR  group  for  Coal  Industry).  

Patrick J. Michaels

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Who To Trust? The  Intergovernmental  Panel  on  Climate  Change  (IPCC)  is  an  IGO  formed  under  the  United  Na7ons  General  Assembly  in  1987.  

Composed  of  over  2,000  scien7sts  from  around  the  world,  the  IPCC’s  job  is  to  assemble  &  analyze  the  best  peer-­‐reviewed  scien7fic  work  on  climate  disrup7on.    

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The IPCC’s Conclusions The  IPCC’s  conclusions  have  been  geung  

steadily  more  definite  &  ominous  over  7me.  

Today,  IPCC  scien7sts  agree:   Global  Climate  is  warming  due  to  human  ac7vity.  

 Faster  warming  increases  nega7ve  impacts.  

 Governments  should  act  immediately.  

 The  poten7al  for  a  run-­‐away  greenhouse  effect  is  becoming  more  likely  every  year.  

 Stabilizing  global  climate  will  require  a  60-­‐80%  drop  in  GHG  emissions  by  2050.  

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• Environmental  groups  support  the  work  of  the  IPCC.  

• However,  they  believe  some  governments  pressure  the    IPCC  to  keep  its  conclusions  7mid  &  understated.  

• The  IPCC  admits  that  its  conclusions  tend  to  error  on  the  side  of  under-­‐es7ma7ng  the  dangers  of  climate  change.  

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Environmentalists  Are  More  Worried  They  point  out  that  many  problems  the  IPCC  predicted  for  the  future  are  already  being  observed:   Glacial  melt-­‐backs,  increased  

severity  of  tropical  storms,  mel7ng  of  north  pole  ice  flows  &  Antarc7c  &  Greenland  ice  sheets,  changing  ocean  currents,  severe  droughts  &  massive  forest  fires,  northern  movement  of  tropical  diseases,  coral  bleaching,  sea  level  rise,  ocean  acidifica7on  &  CO2  loading,  mel7ng  tundra  &  permafrost.  

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The BIGGEST Worry…

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The Runaway Greenhouse Effect This  would  be  the  worst  possible  situa7on.    Once  started,  there  would  be  no  way  of  stopping  it.    

Huge  natural  forces  would  take  over  &  dras7cally  change  the  climate  &  ecosystems  of  our  world  long  into  the  future.  

Biodiversity  would  plummet.    

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Global  Warming  could  spiral  out  of  control  through  poten7ally  disastrous  feedback  loops  in  the  biosphere:    – Permafrost  Melt-­‐-­‐Methane  Release  

– Snow/Ice  Cover  Melt-­‐-­‐The  Albedo  Effect  (Reduced  Sunlight  Reflec7on)  

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Could the Skeptics be Right? • Anything  is  Possible…  • But  all  of  the  moun7ng  evidence  appears  to  be  going  against  them.  

• But  wouldn’t  it  be  wise  to  hope  they’re  right,  but  plan  for  them  to  be  wrong?  – Ader  all,    fossil  fuels  are  a  dwindling  resource  anyway.  

Ques7on:    Since  there  are  only  a    dozen  skep7cs  (whose  research  is  largely  not  peer-­‐reviewed),  compared  to  the  2,000  scien7sts  of  the  IPCC,  why  does  the  media  go  out  of  its  way  to  give  them  equal  7me?    

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The Skeptics Discredited   Moun7ng  evidence,  improved  modeling,  Gore’s  film  &  

serious  climate  disrup7ons  like  Katrina  &  Sandy  are  finally  discredi7ng  the  shrinking  pool  of  skep7cs.  

  By  2007,  the  evidence  became  so  strong  even  Exxon  &  the  Bush  administra7on  were  forced  to  recognize  it.  

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Still, There Is Big Money Pushing Climate Denial

• To avoid looking ridiculous, wealthy conservatives & corporations have begun to fund their anti-science position anonymously.

•  In 2010, this "dark money" amounted to $118 million distributed to 102 think-tanks & action groups with a record of denying climate change or opposing environmental regulations.

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One Down, Two to Go! • But  today,  no  government    opposes  a  climate  treaty  based  on  scien%fic  uncertainty.  

• Yet,  the  Cost-­‐Benefit  &  Equity  Roadblocks  s7ll  remain  in  place…  

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Roadblock #2: Cost Concerns ���The Cost-Benefit Calculus of Climate Action

While  NOBODY  benefited  from  ozone  deple7on…  

•  This  calcula7on  is  less  obvious  with  global  warming.  

Will  there  be  winners  &  losers?  

•  The  skep7cs  say  everyone  may  benefit!  

•  Ac7vists  say:  Rapid  change  with  no  clear  endpoint  means  there  are  NO  clear  winners.  

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The Cost-Benefit Calculus is Shifting in Favor of Action

•  The  environmental  dangers  are  becoming  evermore  costly  &  obvious:  –  Ice  caps  &  glaciers  are  mel7ng  rapidly.  

–  Storms  are  increasing  in  power  &  frequency.  

– Ocean  acidifica7on  &  coral  bleaching  has  become  widespread.  

–  The  risk  of  a  runaway  greenhouse  effect  increases  daily.  

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The Demand for Action is Growing •  Media  coverage  &  ci7zen  

concern  is  on  the  rise.  •  Poli7cal  leaders  &  

candidates  are  addressing  the  issue.  

•  Deep  cracks  are  opening  in  the  blocking  coali7on.  –  Australia  jumps  ship  –  The  insurance  industry  

joins  the  ac7vist  coali7on.  –  Even  some  sectors  of  big  

business  support  GHG  reduc7ons;  •  BCSEF  (Business  Council  for  a  Sustainable  Energy  Future)  

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But  Fossil  Fuels  Are  a  Hard  Habit  To  Kick! •  Rich  na7ons  need  fossil  fuels  to  

remain  rich  &  powerful.  •  Poor  na7ons  want  fossil  fuels  to  

develop.  •  Corpora7ons  (especially  oil  &  coal)  

need  fossil  fuels  to  maximize  profit.  

•  Fossil  fuels  are  the  energy  base  of  modern  civiliza7on.  –  Food  &  water  –  Light,  heat  &  shelter  –  Transporta7on  –  Communica7on  –  Produc7on  &  Trade  

•  CEOs,  poli7cians,  mass  media  &  many  everyday  people  remain  in  deep  denial  about  this  dilemma.  

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Roadblock  #3)  Equity-­‐-­‐What’s  Fair?  •  Are  poor  countries  obliged  

to  cut  emissions  even  without  any  assistance  from  rich  countries?  

•  Are  rich  na7ons  obliged  to  to  help  developing  na7ons  abate  &  adapt  to  atmospheric  disrup7on?  

•  How  much  &  what  kind  of  assistance  should  be  given?    

•  What  ins7tu7ons  &  decision-­‐making  procedures  should  manage  North-­‐South  technology  &  resource  transfers?  

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The Ethical Case for ���Carbon Justice is Strong…

Worldwide,  the  Richest  Sixth  Emit  18  Times  More  CO2  Per  Person  than  the  Poorest  Sixth.

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Per Capita Emissions

Indian woman forms fuel from goat dung

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Equity  &  Atmospheric  Coopera7on  The  Equity  Coali7on  has  made  

par7cipa7on  in  atmospheric  agreements  con7ngent  upon  3  basic  condi7ons:  

•  Rich  countries  must  bear  the  primary  responsibility  for  fixing  these  problems.  They  must  take  the  1st  step.  

•  Poor  countries’  GHG  cuts  are  con7ngent  on  adequate  assistance  from  the  North.  

•  The  South  should  have  as  much  say  in,  &  control  over,  these  assistance  programs  as  possible.  

•  But…Will  rich  countries  agree  to  these  condi7ons?  

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Will  Rich  Countries  Take  These  Equity  Condi7ons  Seriously?  

Four  factors  determine  how  seriously  the  North  takes  these  equity  concerns:  

•  How  seriously  all  rich  naGons  take  this  atmospheric  threat.  

•  How  essenGal  the  North  thinks  the  South’s  parGcipaGon  is  to  fixing  the  problem.  

•  How  credible  the  South’s  threat  to  free  ride  is  if  their  concerns  aren’t  addressed.  

•  How  willing  the  North  is  to  assume  the  costs  of  assisGng  Southern  parGcipaGon.  

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The South’s Limited Leverage

•  The  South’s  unity  &  ability  to  free  ride  made  their  hold-­‐out  threat  credible  &  forced  the  North  to  take  their  concerns  seriously.  

•  This  bargaining  leverage  forced  the  North  to  agree  to  an  ozone  fund  to  transfer  CFC-­‐free  technologies  to  poor  na7ons.    In  1990,  this  fund  was  nego7ated  in  London  (acer  the  ozone  agreement  was  signed  in  Montreal).  

During  Ozone  Nego7a7ons,  the  Equity  Coali7on:  •   Held  the  developed  naGons  responsible  for  causing  the  problem  &  benefiGng  from  CFCs  for  over  50  years.  •   Did  not  feel  it  had  the  resources  to  adopt  CFC  alternaGves  without  assistance.  

They  had  LEVERAGE  because  they  were:  •     Not  threatened  by  ozone  depleGon  as  much  as  the  North.  •   Capable  of  rapidly  expanding  its  CFC-­‐based  refrigeraGon  &  air  condiGoning  industries.  

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But  Overcoming  the  Climate  Equity  Roadblock  is  Difficult  

The  South  is  divided  over  its  commitment  to  hold-­‐out  for  its  equity  demands.  – The  Small  Island  States  &  many  low-­‐lying  countries  are  part  of  the  Ac7vist  Coali7on.  

– The  OPEC  na7ons  are  part  of  the  Blocking  Coali7on.  

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The  Rich  Countries  are  Less  Desperate  than  the  Poor  Countries  for  Climate  Relief  

Unlike  ozone  deple7on…  Climate  Disrup7on  will  harm  poor  

countries  more  than  rich  ones.    

Rich  countries  are  not  as  unified  in  their  desire  to  take  effec7ve  ac7on  on  climate  change.  

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The  Costs  of  Helping  the  South  Cut  Carbon…  Steep,  But  Worth  It?  

• The  cost  of  assis7ng  the  South’s  leap  to  carbon-­‐free  energy  technologies  will  be  steep.  – However,  it  could  produce  vast  &  lucra7ve  new  markets  for  cuung-­‐edge,  carbon-­‐free  energy  technologies.  

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Can Equity Be Profitable? • The  Chemical  industry  profited  from  the  Ozone  Fund.  –  It  helped  them  sell  the  South  new  CFC-­‐free  technologies.  

• BUT  the  Fossil  Fuel  industry  will  NOT  profit  from  a  Climate  Fund.  – Oil  &  coal  companies  don’t  control  the  carbon-­‐free  alterna7ves  market.  

–  They  have  enormous  investments  in  fossil  fuels.  

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Global Gridlock: Cost & Equity Conflicts •  Oil  &  coal  industries  &  the  most  carbon  

dependent  na7ons  resist  effec7ve  ac7on.    They  are  more  concerned  with  a  profitable,  rather  than  an  effec7ve,  agreement:  –  US,  OPEC,  etc.  

•  Large  developing  na7ons  are  most  concerned  with  the  equitability  of  any  agreement.  [“Polluter  Pays”]  –  India,  China,  Brazil,  South  Africa.  

•  The  countries  &  people  with  the  least  to  gain  &  the  most  to  lose  want  to  an  effec7ve  agreement  immediately,  but  they  have  limited  power.  –  Those  who  use  linle  fossil  fuels  but  are  most  

threatened  by  climate  disrup7on:  small  island  na7ons,  low-­‐lying  states,  plus  many  vulnerable  African,  Asian  &  La7n  American  countries.  

•  Some  countries  remain  almost  paralyzed  by  conflic7ng  interests.  –  The  EU,  Australia,  Russia,  Canada.  

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Behind the Impasse--Addiction •  The  interna7onal  system  is  divided  into  highly  compe77ve,  growth-­‐obsessed  corpora7ons  &  na7on  states.  

•  The  growth/profit  impera7ve  drives  the  en7re  global  economy.  

•  Carbon-­‐based  energy  fuels  economic  growth  &  profits.  

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Formal  Nego7a7ons  Are  Just  “The  Tip  of  the  Iceberg”  

Consensus-­‐building  is  a  constant,  complex,  ongoing  process.  –  It  includes  many  types  of  ac7vity  

from  scien7fic  experimenta7on,  computer  modeling  &  inven7on,  to  public  rela7ons,  lobbying,  vo7ng  nego7a7on,  persuasion  &  large-­‐scale  protest.  

It  takes  place  on  several  levels  &  involves  many  kinds  of  people.  –  Ci7zen-­‐ac7vists,  educators,  

voters,  diplomats,  scien7sts,  lawyers,  policymakers,  journalists,  businessmen  &  bureaucrats.  

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The 4 Faces of Leadership Overcoming  each  Roadblock  requires  different  types  of  leadership.  

• Leadership  takes  4  basic  forms:  – Structural  – Diploma7c  

– Scien7fic/Intellectual    – Grassroots  

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Structural Leadership ���“The Carrot & the Stick”

The  US:  Ozone  Ac7vist,  Climate  Blocker.  – By  threatening  to  embargo  CFC  products  the  US  used  its  structural  power  to  push  for  a  strong  ozone  treaty.  

•  This  clearly  demonstrates  the  deep  poliGcal  &  economic  differences  between  ozone  depleGon  &  climate  change.  

•  The  EU  has  not  provided  strong  climate  leadership  either.  

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Diplomatic Leadership ���“Let’s Make A Deal”

•  Diploma7c  leadership  is  vital  for  organizing  nego7a7ons  &  coming  up  with  inven7ve  ways  to  crac  deals  that  sa7sfy  all  sides.  –  These  leaders  can  be  diplomats  from  

different  countries  or  members  of  IGOs  (like  UNEP)  that  are  in  charge  of  organizing  the  nego7a7ons.  

– UNEP’s  use  of  the  Framework-­‐Protocol  Approach  was  a  nego7a7ng  innova7on  that  improved  the  possibility  of  building  unity  around  a  stronger  treaty.    

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Scientific-Intellectual Leadership •  Scien7fic-­‐Intellectual  Leadership  plays  a  central  role  in:  – Discovering  &  studying  environmental  threats  

– Overcoming  the  uncertainty  roadblock.  

•  IGOs  like  UNEP  &  the  IPCC  are  the  hub  of  this  process.  

• Well  known  intellectual  leaders  popularize  scien7fic  conclusions.  – Gore’s  film  

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Grassroots Leadership--Citizen Action •  Grassroots  leaders  are  ci7zen  

ac7vists  who  mobilize  public  pressure  for  a  strong  treaty.  

•  Grassroots  leadership  comes  mainly  from  ac7vist  NGOs.  

•  Effec7ve  grassroots  leadership  raises  public  awareness,  concern  &  ac7vism.  

•  It  can  also  help  discredit  blockers  &  expose  their  narrow  self-­‐interests.  

• Without  it,  the  public  remains  ignorant  &  passive  &  policymakers  rarely  act.  

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Grassroots Leadership & Precautionary Action

• NGOs  take  the  science  to  the  people  &  pressure  policymakers  to  act  on  it.  

• Grassroots  pressure  uses  all  the  avenues  of  domesGc  &  internaGonal  acGvism  to  educate  &  keep  the  heat  on.  – Direct  acGon  –  The  legal  system  –  The  electoral  system  –  The  media  

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Climate  Ac7on:  Inside-­‐Outside  Strategy  A  global  climate  jus7ce  movement  is  applying  “street  heat”  to  demand:  – A  place  at  the  table  for  NGOs  &  vic7ms  of  climate  chaos.  

– A  fair  &  effec7ve  climate  treaty-­‐-­‐NOW  

– A  systemic  shic  away  from  economies  based  on  petroleum  &  profit  toward  socie7es  based  on  equity,  democracy,  renewable  energy  &  ecological  sustainability.  

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The Goal--350 ppm--Can We Make It? The  IPCC  says  we  must  keep  

C02  below  350  ppm  to  stabilize  climate  within  tolerable  limits.  (2©  rise)  

•  We’re  now  at  400  ppm  of  CO2  &  rising  fast.  

At  the  current  rate  of  emissions,  the  global  temperature  will  rise  6©  by  2100.  

Acer  20  years  of  haggling,  world  leaders  haven’t  commined  to  any  significant  cuts.  

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Business-as-Usual vs. the 350 Pathway

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The  red  line  shows  a  global  350  pathway,  the  blue  line  shows  developed  country  emissions  declining  more  than  50%  below  1990  levels  by  2020,  &  to  zero  by  2050.  The  green  line  shows,  by  subtracGon,  the  severely  restricted  emissions  path  that  would  remain  for  the  developing  countries.  

Getting to 350 ppm—The Pathway

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No  Pressure,  No  Change  Concerned,  educated,  involved  ci7zens,  consumers  &  voters  are  essenGal  for  winning  over,  pressuring,  dividing  &  neutralizing  blocking  coaliGon  opposiGon.  

Public  opinion,  ci7zen  pressure  &  ac7vism  are  the  most  effec7ve  counter-­‐weight  to  the  influence  of  money  &  powerful  business  interests  over  policymakers  &  poli7cians.  

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Citizen Pressure Has Some Impact • Obama has directed

EPA to cut power plant CO2 emissions 30% (from 2005 levels) by 2030. – This comes to a 2%

cut per year. • It will achieve a 7%

drop in overall CO2 emitted by the US by 2030.

• This comes after years of climate activism from many groups like Beyond Coal, 350.org, Greenpeace, Sierra Club & many, many others.

• The coal lobby says this is part of Obama’s “War on Coal”.

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Copenhagen--Disastrous Deadlock •  Two  outcomes  from  Copenhagen  (2009):  – Na7onal  leaders  remained  divided  &  deadlocked  over  how  to  confront  climate  disrup7on.  

–  The  grassroots  climate  jus7ce  movement  gained  trac7on,  depth,  maturity  &  strength.    

•  Can  petro-­‐powered  capitalism  solve  the  climate  crisis?  

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Why Copenhagen Went Nowhere •  Obama  wanted  a  largely  

cosme7c  agreement  with  binding  cuts  from  China.  –  Congress  will  block  any  

agreement  that  doesn’t  require  binding  reduc7ons  from  major  developing  na7ons.  

•  China  wanted  substan7al  firm  commitments  from  the  US  before  considering  binding  commitments  itself.  –  Like  the  US,  China  uses  the  

equity  impasse  to  slow  down  &  weaken  the  agreement.    

They  both  blame  each  other  for  inac7on.  

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Stuck  Between  a  Rock  &  a  Hard  Place   ���China vs. US: A Convenient Conflict?

•  The  US  is,  by  far,  the  largest  historical  &  per  capita  consumer  of  fossil  fuels.  

•  The  US  has  the  most  powerful  petro-­‐auto-­‐military-­‐industrial  complex  in  the  world.  –  It  dominates  American  poliGcs  &  

lobbies  against  a  strong  treaty.  

•  Americans  are  fairly  ignorant  &  misinformed  about  climate  change.  –  They  aren’t  sure  it’s  real.  –  They  believe  even  modest  GHG  

cuts  will  harm  living  standards.  

•  China  is  the  world’s  largest  &  fastest  growing  consumer  of  fossil  fuels.  

•  80%  of  China’s  energy  comes  from  coal-­‐fired  power  plants.  

•  China’s  per  capita  use  of  fossil  fuels  is  only  1/5th  of  the  US,  but  it  has  5  Gmes  as  many  people.    –  A  per  capita  doubling  of  GHGs  

would  be  disastrous.  

•  China  has  no  significant  grassroots  environmental  movement  to  pressure  for  change.  

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China-­‐-­‐The  Wild  Card  •  Chinese  leaders  are  commined  to  

rapid  economic  growth.  –  80%  of  power  comes  from  coal;  

2  new  plants  built  each  week.  •  China’s  fossil  fuel  use  soars  higher  

every  year.  –  Oil  use  doubled:  1996-­‐2006  BUT…  

•  China’s  oil  reserves  are  small.  •  Climate  disrupGon  is  already  having  

a  serious  impact.  •  China  is  aggressively  inves7ng  in  

clean  energy  &  low-­‐carbon  technologies.  –  China  &  Germany  lead  the  

world  in  low  carbon  energy  technologies.  

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Who’s Responsible?

In  2004,  China’s  net  exports  accounted  for  23%  of  its  CO2  emissions.  Thus,   much   of   “China’s”   emissions   go   to   producing   products  consumed   in   the   US   &   other   developed   countries.     Who   is  responsible  for  this  polluGon-­‐-­‐the  producer  or  the  consumer?  

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Holding the Planet Hostage •  The  US  lags  far  behind  China,  

Europe  &  Japan  in  clean  renewable  energy  technologies.  

•  America’s  domes7c  &  foreign  policies  are  geared  toward  maintaining  dependence  on,  &  control  over,  fossil  fuels.  

•  Oil,  coal,  auto  &  arms  lobbies  block  poli7cal  progress.  

•  Congress  &  the  President  use  China  as  an  excuse  for  inac7on.  –  They  resist  ambi7ous  GHG  cuts.  

–  They  dismiss  any  climate  debt  to  poor  na7ons.  

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Beware of False Solutions & Scams The  Obama  administra7on’s  efforts  to  

appease  Republicans  &  cater  to  the  nuclear,  coal,  auto  &  ethanol  lobbies  have  produced  many  dead-­‐end  solu7ons  to  climate  change:  –  Clean  Coal  –  Ethanol/Biodiesel  – Nuclear  Power  

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The Nuclear Boondoggle • Obama  has  called  for  federal  support  for  a  “new  genera$on  of  safe  nuclear  power  plants”  to  address  climate  change.    This  is  a  DANGEROUS  DIVERSION.  

• Nuclear  power  is  a  perilous  &  expensive  waste  of  taxpayer  dollars  that  could  be  much  bener  spent  on  solar,  wind  &  energy  conserva7on.  –  In  addiGon,  the  nuclear  fuel  cycle  generates  plenty  of  GHGs.  

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Nukes Are Expensive •  From  1947-­‐1999  the  nuclear  industry  

received  over  $115  billion  in  direct  taxpayer  subsidies.  Including  Price  Anderson  liability  limita7ons,  these  subsidies  reach  $145.4  billion.  –  This  is  25  7mes  more  than  wind  &  solar  

subsidies  over  the  same  period.  –  No  private  company,  anywhere  in  the  

world,  is  willing  to  build  a  nuclear  plant  without  huge  government  subsidies.  

–  Waste  management,  reactor  decommissioning,  pollu7on  from  uranium  mining,  risks  from  nuclear  weapons  prolifera7on,  dangers  of  Fukushima-­‐type  reactor  accidents  &  the  legacy  of  radioac7ve  waste  are  further  hidden  costs.  

–  GHG  reduc7ons  from  energy  conserva7on  &  solar  are  much  cheaper,  safer  &  quicker  to  implement.  

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Nuclear Power Is Dangerous •  Acer  65  years,  no  country  in  the  

world  has  found  a  safe  way  to  deal  with  nuclear  waste  disposal.  –  High-­‐level  radioac7ve  waste  

remains  dangerous  for  several  hundred  thousand  years!  

•  Building  new  nuclear  plants  would  mean  the  produc7on  of  much  more  of  this  dangerous  waste  with  nowhere  for  it  to  go.  –  2,000  metric  tons  of  high-­‐level  

radioac7ve  waste  &  12  million  cubic  feet  of  low  level  radioac7ve  waste  are  produced  annually  by  103  nuclear  reactors  in  the  US.  

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The Ways Forward… •  Build  renewable  energy  

infrastructure  (by  cuung  military  spending):  —Wind,  solar,  high-­‐speed  mass  transit.  

•  Plan  &  build  energy  efficient  communi7es.  –  Short  commutes,  energy  collecGng  

homes  &  buildings,  etc.  

•  Tax  carboniferous  energy,  not  labor.  –  Tax  financial  transacGons  

•  Reduce  global  transport  –  Promote  local  organic  farming  &  

economic  ac7vity.  

•  Help  poor  na7ons  respond  to  climate  change.  

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