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Hostage, Inc.Author(s): Rachel BriggsSource: Foreign Policy, No. 131 (Jul. - Aug., 2002), pp. 28-29Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLCStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3183414 .

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PRIME NUMBERS

[Balancing Risk and Reward In 1999, Latin America was the site of nearly 80 percent of the world's kidnappings. Because the crime is often seen as uniquely Latin American, its root causes remain unexplored. Yet countries elsewhere-the Philippines, India, and Pakistan, for instance-have long-standing kidnapping problems as well. And a comparison across countries and regions reveals a common, profit-driven profile. First, kidnappers need networks to sustain their activities over the long term. Second, they operate where there is relatively low risk of being caught. And third, significant financial reward, from either local middle classes or multinational companies with local presence, must be probable. Most important, kidnappers must balance the risks against the rewards. Therefore, kidnapping doesn't happen where risk is low, as is the case in failed states, where the rewards are unlikely to make the effort worthwhile. Conversely, in rich countries, where the returns are highest, tough standards of law enforcement carry the highest risk and thus ward off kidnappers.

Kidnapping top ten

1.Colombia 2. Mexico 3. Brazil 4. Philippines

5. Venezuela 6. Ecuador 7. Former Soviet Union 8. Nigeria

9. India 10. South Africa

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[Nabbing Their Own Kidnapping tends to make the headlines at home only when a compatriot has been taken, and this publicity exaggerates Western publics' sense of their own risk abroad. In reality, the vast majority of hostages are locals. In Mexico and Brazil, only 4 percent of hostages are foreigners because both countries have significant local wealth. Nigeria is an exception: Foreigners account for 80 percent of hostages, largely due to local poverty, which makes kidnappers dependent on the rich pickings of foreign oil workers on the Niger Delta.

ito Percentage of domestic hostages Percentage of foreign hostages

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[Price List In this fast-growing criminal industry, kidnappers globally take home well over $500 million each year, and the figure is rising. The market value of hostages depends on their ability to pay- ranging from as little as $200 for a local farmer to $2,000 for a local professional to tens of thousands of dollars for a foreign aid worker to several million for the CEO of a large multinational. Ransom levels also differ between countries. Ransoms tend to be lower in Brazil, where the majority of cases are "quick-naps" in which hostages are held for just a few hours or days and are forced to withdraw their credit limit from ATMs. In Colombia, kidnappers operate in rural areas, where they can hold hostages longer and bargain harder.

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K idnapping in the 1980s, when the Beirut hostage cases were making headlines, became both a tabloid

staple and the stuff of high diplomacy. Groups motivated by political goals demanded everything from

the release of a few prisoners to the dissolution of Israel. Although still widely regarded as political crimes perpetrated by fanatics, today's kidnappings, which affect 10,000 people annually, neither make much news

nor much of a political point. Instead, kidnapping has become a big business in many countries--one in which kid-

nappers adapt their business models in response to market conditions and carefully balance the risks of operating

against the rewards on offer. I By Rachel Briggs

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[King of Kidnapping Colombia has earned its title as the "kidnap capital of the world." Kidnappers face few risks: Detection is rare, and impunity stands at approximately 95 percent. El Tiempo, the national daily newspaper, estimates that 80 percent of kidnappings are carried out by the country's main guerrilla groups, the Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). Estimates about how much the groups earn from kidnapping vary from $150 million to $500 million per year. The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee guesses that 40 percent of the FARC's budget comes from kidnapping, with the rest coming from the drug trade and extortion.

Rachel Briggs is manager of the Risk and Security Programme at The Foreign Policy Centre, a London think tank, and author of The Kidnapping Business (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2001).

Source: Data are from the Control Risks Group (CRG) and represent only cases that CRG can confirm.

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