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RUSSIAN PSYCHOLOGY AT THE TURN OF THE21ST CENTURY AND POST-SOVIET REFORMS IN

THE HUMANITIES DISCIPLINESJulia VassilievaMonash University

The author traces the changes in Russian psychology in the past 25 years and linksthese changes to the earlier Russian legacy of Lev Vygotsky (18961934) andAleksei N. Leontiev (19031979). The move into the 21st century coincided forRussian psychology as well as for the Russian society at large with the reforms of

perestroika, leading to greater openness in the academic sphere. In particular,Russian psychology was able to connect in a more free and fundamental way withits own heritage and with various developments around the world. The author

discusses how these factors affected continuity and innovation with regard to the 2dominant theoretical perspectives in Russian psychologythe culturalhistoricaltheory of Vygotsky and the theory of activity, initially developed by Leontiev. Theauthor argues that while there are now original and substantial shifts within Russianpsychologynamely toward the new paradigm characterized by various researchersas organic psychology, nonclassical psychology, or even post-non-classicalpsychologythe issues of agency and meaning, which were central for the previousgeneration of Russian psychologists, such as Vygotsky, Leontiev, Luria, Zapor-ozhets, Rubinstein, and others, continue to inform the development of the disciplinein the 21st century.

Keywords: Russian psychology, cultural historical theory, activity theory,

nonclassical paradigm, social constructionism

For Russian psychology, as well as for Russian society as a whole, thetransition from the 20th to the 21st century was marked by the broad scale reformsof perestroika and glasnost. Initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev, these reforms wereaimed at democratization of Russian society and the introduction of a free-marketeconomy. The changes, many of which are still very difficult to judge in terms ofeither positive or negative results, affected all aspects of post-Soviet society:political, ideological, economic, and cultural. Significant shifts and transforma-tions were experienced by Russian academia at the organizational and scholarship

levels. It is well known that in the Soviet period, science was forced to make anunwanted but overpowering alliance with ideology (e.g., Joravsky, 1970). The

Julia Vassilieva gained her BA in psychology from Moscow State University and her profes-sional doctorate in counseling psychology from Swinburne University, Australia. She is currentlycompleting her PhD on narrative psychology at Monash University, Australia. Her research interestsinclude history of Russian and Western psychology, narrative theories and methods in psychologyand literary studies, and psychology and culture.

I wish to express gratitude to Wade Pickren for his interest, support, and help in preparation ofthis article for publication.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Julia Vassilieva, Centre forComparative Literature and Cultural Studies, Monash University, VIC 3800, Australia. E-mail:[email protected]

History of Psychology2010, Vol. 13, No. 2, 138159

2010 American Psychological Association1093-4510/10/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0019270

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history of scholarship in the USSR supports Foucaults (1980) thesis about thepower and knowledge nexus, namely, that knowledge is both produced and usedby power to further its control over subjects. As Nikolas Rose (1998) has shownin his Foucault-inspired analysis of the history of the psy disciplines, which hedefines as all those disciplines which since about the middle of the 19th centuryhave designated themselves with the prefix psypsychology, psychiatry, psycho-therapy, psychoanalysis (p. 11), such disciplines are critical in shaping a partic-ular subjectivity on the one hand and are inextricably linked to power on the other:

The history of these disciplines is part of the history of the ways in which humanbeings have regulated others and regulated themselves in the light of certain gamesof truth. But, on the other hand, this regulatory role of psy is linked to questionsof the organization of political power that have been quite central to shaping ourcontemporary experience. The history of psy, that is to say, is intrinsically linkedto the history of government. (Rose, 1998, p. 11)

As a part of the humanities, the development of psychology during the Sovietera was severely affected by ideological pressure. The pressure was particularlystrong given that many of the issues central for the disciplinethe developmentof consciousness and the psyche, the relationship between individual and society,the educational and developmental aspectswere directly linked with the ideo-logical position of the Soviet state. The politics of glasnost, encompassingopenness and freedom of speech, removed some of this pressure and helped createthe conditions for an unprecedented development of the Russian humanities.

Perhaps the first and most unambiguous benefit for psychology of glasnost

was the change affecting translation and publication of psychological and philo-sophical literature. The period of glasnost facilitated the publication and freecirculation of texts that were previously unpublished because of censorship oravailable only to limited readerships. These publications encompassed the Rus-sian psychological heritage, as well as the vast array of Western psychologicalsources. Even though some of Lev Vygotskys pivotal texts were publishedbefore, it was only in 19821984 that Vygotskys writings (a vast bulk of whichwere previously unknown to the broader audience) were published in six volumes.Such fundamental oeuvres as the philosophical heritage of P. Florensky, V.Solovev, V. Rosanov, and D. Andreev came to light.1 This was followed byrepublication and translation of previously censored Western psychological liter-ature. For example, psychoanalysis enjoyed immense popularity in Russia in thebeginning of the 20th century and even during the first few years after the OctoberRevolution of 1917, when many works of Freud and his followers were translatedand published, but beginning in the 1930s, such publications stopped (Etkind,1997). It was only in the 1980s that Russian audiences regained access to thedevelopment of psychoanalytic thought over the preceding half-century, including

1 For example, P. A. Florensky, Collected Writings in 4 Volumes (Moscow: Misl, 1999); V. S.Solovev, Collected Writings in 4 Volumes (Moscow: Misl, 19881990); D. L. Andreev, The Roseof the World(Moscow: Prometei, 1991); V. V. Rosanov, Selected Writings in 2 Volumes (Moscow:Pravda, 1990).

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translation of two volumes of Lacans writings.2 In the 1990s, a number ofpsychoanalytic institutes were opened in different locations in Russia: first, theEastern European Institute of Psychoanalysis in St Petersburg (1991), then theInstitute of Psychoanalysis in Moscow (19951997), followed by the Institute ofPractical Psychology and Psychoanalysis (1997), and the Institute of Psychoanal-

ysis and Social Management (2005) in the same city. The process was supportedand reinforced by a presidential decree issued by Boris Yeltsin titled On theRevival and Development of Philosophical, Clinical and Applied Psychoanalysisin 1996.3 In addition, definitive works in philosophy, literary criticism, anthro-pology, and cultural studies, such as the writings of Heidegger, Jaspers, Derrida,Barthes, and Foucault, finally became available to Russian readers.4

On the organizational level, the explosion in publication was paralleled by theemergence of a great variety of psychological training centers, schools, institutes,and departments all over the territory of the former USSR. If before perestroikathere were only four departments of psychology in the whole country (Moscow,

Leningrad, Tbilisi, and Kiev), now in Moscow alone there are more than 50 placesoffering various psychological training and qualifications. They embrace differenttheoretical orientations and follow various practical models. Such developmentswere facilitated by the renewed contacts between Russian scholars and theirWestern colleagues.

The visits of the leaders of humanistic and existential psychology, CarlRogers in 1986 and Victor Frankl in 1987, gave a huge boost to the developmentand institutional organization of humanistic psychology in Russia, leading to theestablishment of the Soviet Association of Humanistic Psychology in 1990, on thebasis of which the High School of Humanistic Psychotherapy was founded in

1994. The initiative was supported by the Association of Sciences of the USSRthrough the project Humanistic Psychology: History, Methodology and Perspec-tives.5 Other approaches were just as eagerly embraced by the Russian psycho-logical community; training in a variety of approaches that had not previouslybeen taught in Russiafrom gestalt to family therapy, and from psychodrama to

2 J. Lacan, Le Seminare, Les Ecrits Techniques de Freud, Livre I. Translated by M. Titova(Moskva: Gnosis/Logos, 1998); J. Lacan, Le Seminare, Le Moi dans la Theorie de Freud et dans laTechnique de la Psychanalyse, Livre II. Translated by M. Titova (Moskva: Gnosis/Logos, 1999).

3 Psychoanalyse.RU. Available at http://www.psychonalyse.ru4 For example, M. Foucaults selected works were translated and published under the title Will

to Truth (selected writings; Volia k Istine, translated by S. Tabachnikova, Moscow: Kastal, 1994);The Archeology of Knowledge (1969) was translated in 1996 (Archeologia Znania, Kiev: Nika-Centre); Madness and Civilization (1961) was translated in 1997 ( Istorija Bezumija v KlassicheskuyEpochu, translated by I. Staf, St. Petersburg: University Book). R. Barthes, An Introduction to theStructural Analysis of Narrative (1966), was translated in 1987 (Vvedenie v Structurnyi AnalysPovestvovatelnich Tekstov, translated by G. I. Kosikov, Moscow: MGU); Barthess selected workson semiotics and poetics were translated in 1989 (Izbrannie Raboty. Semiotica. Poetica, translatedby G. I. Kosikov, Moscow: Progress). J. Derrida, On the Name (1995), was translated in 1998 (Esseob Imeni, St. Petersburg: Aleteia); The Postcard: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond (1972) wastranslated in 1999 (O Pochtovoi Otkritke ot Socrata do Freida I ne Tolko, translated by G.Michalkovich, Minsk: Sovremienniy Literator); and Of Grammatology (1967) was translated in2000 (O Grammatologii, translated by N. Avtonomova, Moscow: Ad Marginem).

5 The history of development of existentially humanistic psychology in the post-Soviet era.HPSY.RUExistential and Humanistic Psychology. Available at http://hpsy.ru/eng/

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neurolinguistic programmingbecame freely available. At the same time, thetraining institutions often offered counseling or psychotherapeutic services, whichhad been practically nonexistent before perestroika, when psychological inter-vention beyond academia was limited to its use in an applied fashionineducational or industrial settings.

The combination of these three fundamental changesfree access to thepreviously censored Russian and Western psychological and philosophical heri-tage, deregulation in the educational sector, and the emergence of a rich psycho-logical practicecreated unprecedented conditions for further developments inRussian psychology. They also simultaneously posed two major challenges forRussian scholars: First, they needed to find a position with regard to the wholevariety of Western psychological schools; second, they needed to reflect criticallyon their own heritage, that is, the development of the discipline during the Sovietperiod.

These are the tasks that colored the development of Russian psychology in the

past 20-odd years. They are most obvious within the fundamental domain ofRussian psychological scholarshipgeneral psychology, which is the main focusof the present article. In particular, I focus on the recent developments within thetwo most influential theoretical models in general psychology: Lev Vygotskysculturalhistorical theory and Aleksei N. Leontievs theory of activity. Thehistory of these theories also brings into sharp relief how ideology, politics, andpower shaped scientific development and academic organization in the USSR.The tightening of party control over science in the 1930s led to an effectivebanning of Vygotskys culturalhistorical theory, and it was only after Stalinsdeath and the subsequent thaw during Khrushchevs rule that the rehabilitation ofVygotskys heritage began, reaching its culmination during and after perestroika.

A. N. Leontievs activity theory followed a diametrically opposite trajectory: Itrose steadily to dominance from the mid-1930s to the end of the 1970s, when thefirst indications of critique started to emerge, but it was only after the collapse ofthe Soviet state that full-scale criticism became possible, reaching in some casesto calls for rejections of the theory of activity altogether. It is not difficult to seenow why these psychological theories became implicated in the ideological struggle:Both theories strove to address the issue that was central for psychologythegenesis and functioning of consciousness, the central issue for the Soviet ideo-logical programit was the production of the consciousness of a new type onwhich the progress toward communism was predicated.

Vygotskys CulturalHistorical Theory and Its Influence

on Contemporary Russian Psychology

Lev Vygotsky had a short but momentous scientific career, which coincidedwith a turbulent period in the history of Russian society and science. Vygotskywas born in 1896, graduated from Moscow University in 1917the year of theOctober Revolution and establishment of the Soviet statechanged his course ofstudy from medicine, law, and literature to psychology in the early 1920s, anddied in 1934 at the age of 37 from tuberculosis amid Stalins growing reign ofterror. Having entered the psychological scene in 1924 with a critique of reflexo-

logical psychology, in the next 10 years Vygotsky produced the most extraordi-


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nary body of work: Psychology of Art (1925), The Problem of the CulturalDevelopment of the Child(1928), The Instrumental Method in Psychology (1930),The History of the Development of the Higher Psychological Processes (19301931), Tool and Sign in the Development of Child (1934), and Thought and

Language (1934). These works marked a gradual progress toward the elaboration

of the main tenets of Vygotskys culturalhistorical theory: the thesis regardingthe mediated nature of higher psychological processes, the role of culturaltoolssigns and wordsas mediators, the notion of interiorization, the conceptof the zone of proximal development implying the notion of an adult as anothermediator. His theorizing reflected a number of influences, heterogeneous andsometimes seemingly contradictory. As a devoted student of literature, philoso-phy, and aesthetics, Vygotsky in his theorizing placed a heavy premium on therole of semiotic aspects of culture. He attentively followed various psychologicaldevelopments around the globe and drew freely on the work of such internationalcontemporaries as Kurt Koffka, Sigmund Freud, Karl and Charlotte Buhler,

William Stern, Pierre Janet, Jean Piaget, William James, James Mark Baldwin,and others. At the same time, he was striving passionately to create a true Marxistpsychology. However, the overall direction of his research did not find support onthe ideological front, and from the early 1930s Vygotskys work was increasinglycriticized. Vygotskys emphasis on semiotic mechanisms and their role in thedevelopment of consciousness and higher mental processes was the main focus ofcritique. Giving precedence to signs and cultural mechanisms versus practicalactivity provided grounds for an accusation of the culturalhistorical theory ofidealisma serious charge, as Soviet science was supposed to be encompassed bythe Marxist principle of materialism. Vygotsky was further attacked for cosmo-politanism, referring to the interconnectedness of his work with various psycho-

logical schools around the world. Finally, his interest in intellectual testing,despite his well-known critique of conventional intellectual tests, was labeledreactionary. From the official Soviet position, using tests always served topreserve the status quo and represented the less educated as intellectually inferior,thus running against one of the main Bolshevik dogmas to portray the proletariatas the avant-garde of historical development. In 1936, these attacks culminated inthe issuance of a special Decree of the Communist Party condemning pedology,the interdisciplinary study of educational psychology that emphasized testing. Thedecree effectively outlawed the culturalhistorical theory for the next 20 years(Bakhurst, 1996).6 After 1956, following Stalins death, Vygotskys works were

allowed to once again enter into the official psychological discourse. Thought andLanguage, previously published posthumously in 1936, became the first ofVygotskys books to be republished in 1956, but it took nearly 30 years forVygotskys collected works in six volumes to finally be published in 19821984.

As Jerome Bruner noted, in an uncanny coincidence Thought and Languagewas republished in the same year1956from which historians of science datethe birth of the Cognitive Revolution. Bruner speculated that at the time

6 The most notorious criticism of Vygotskys approach along these lines was delivered by thefollowing authors: Talankin (1931), Feofanov (1931), and Razmyslov (1934). For an extendeddiscussion of this criticism, see Chapter 16 in Van der Veer and Valsiner (1991) and Bakhurst(1996).

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something was altering the intellectual atmosphere, something that Vygotsky hadhelped foment (Bruner, 1986, p. 72). As Michael Cole (2004) further observed,the American translation of Vygotskys work, starting with the MIT Presspublication ofThought and Language in 1962, and followed by Mind and Societyin 1978 (a collection of excerpts and essays arranged by Luria and Cole and

translated by the latter) resulted in the so-called Vygotsky boom that came asa surprise to both Cole and the publisher. However, it was only with thepublication of Vygotskys collected works, first in Russian, and their subsequenttranslation into English in 19871999, that Vygotskys heritage could be seen inits totalityboth in Russia and abroadas a metapsychology that encompassedthe phylogeny, cultural history, ontogeny, and moment-to-moment dynamics ofhuman functioning as a lifelong process of becoming (Cole, 2004, p. xi).

The atmosphere of openness created by perestroika reforms not only made thepublication of previously forbidden materials possible, it also helped create morefavorable conditions for an impartial, nonideologically motivated analysis (e.g.,

Kozulin, 1990; Wertsch, 1985). Arguably the most comprehensive historicalanalysis of Vygotskys oeuvre was delivered by Van der Veer and Valsiner (1991)in their monograph Understanding Vygotsky: A Quest for Synthesis. Among otherissues, these authors delineated four themes along which we can see Vygotskysmajor contributions to psychology: his insistence on dialectical synthesis, hisconsistent developmental perspective, his antireductionist stand, and his develop-ment of a new methodology. These themes have lost none of their currency andin fact could greatly benefit psychology today. Van der Veer and Valsineridentified as one of the aspects of major deficiency in contemporary psychologyits conservatism in the methodological area in the fundamental way psychology

approaches its objects of investigation, even though outcries about crises inpsychologys traditional methodology can be heard from time to time (Van derVeer & Valsiner, 1991, p. 399).

Vygotskys understanding of methodology in a broad senseas an episte-mological and gnoseological foundation of psychologyhas attracted significantresearch interest and generated a wide-range academic debate in Russian psy-chology over the past 25 years. One of the first works in this direction was A.Puzyreys (1986) groundbreaking monograph CulturalHistorical Theory of L. S.Vygotsky and Contemporary Psychology. According to Puzyrey, the state of crisisin psychology diagnosed by Vygotsky in his definitive study Historical Meaningof Crisis in Psychology (1927) has remained throughout the 20th century. Fol-lowing Vygotsky, Puzyrey argued that the crisis stems from fundamental flaws inthe methodological assumptions that psychology endorses. Puzyrey drew atten-tion to the fact that academic psychology chose to follow the classical method-ology of the natural sciences, which, he argued, is not suited for the studying ofpsychological phenomena. The fundamental assumption of natural science meth-odology is that the object of its research exists independently of the knowledgeabout it and the procedures employed to acquire such knowledge. Neither the actof acquiring knowledge, experiment, nor the factual content of knowledge itselfcan and should affect or change the laws regulating the functioning of the objectunder consideration. Knowledge within the natural science paradigm always

remains external with regard to the object of investigation. Puzyrey argued


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persuasively that such an assumption cannot be transferred onto phenomenastudied in psychology, which represent what he terms a nonclassical situation.

Unlike the natural sciences, where knowledge and procedures are applied tostudy and describe an object that exists independently of them, in psychology suchknowledge and procedures become constitutive with regards to the very laws thatregulate the operation of its objectthe living human being. Therefore, theyshould be understood as specific means and devices that organize or transform thepsychological apparatus or affect their mode of functioning. The nonclassicalsituation that psychology faces stems from the following paradox: The knowledgethat is acquired in the process of a psychological inquiry becomes incorporatedinto the very object it studies. According to Puzyrey (1986), this is what wasunderstood by Vygotsky and surmised in his notion of psychotechnic action.

The use of the notion of psychotechnics by Vygotsky needs to be clarified.Historically, it can be traced back to the work of Henry Pieron and HugoMunsterberg on applied psychology. In his influential book Psychology and

Industrial Efficiency, Munsterberg (1913) defined applied psychology as a tech-nical science delivering psychological means in achieving certain industrial orbusiness ends. Vygotsky reconceptualized the notion of psychotechnics, ex-panding its meaning to broader ways of influencing and regulating human behav-ior and psychological processes, and referring first and foremost to the developingcharacter of such processes. Although he found Munsterbergs emphasis onpractical aspects of psychology to be of enormous value, he rejected the latterselaboration of applied techniques as such. What Vygotsky saw in Munsterbergsproject was the need to elaborate psychological methodology as not only based onbut embedded in practice, as the only possible solution to the crisis in psychology.

He wrote about Munsterbergs psychotechnics: despite the fact that it hascompromised itself more than once, that its practical meaning is very close to zeroand the theory often ludicrous, its methodological meaning is enormous. Theprinciple and philosophy of practice isonce againthe stone which the buildersrejected and which became the head stone of the corner. Here we have the wholemeaning of the crisis (Vygotsky, 2004, p. 304).7

Vygotsky insisted that the relationship between psychological theory andpractice should be reconfigured, so that practice, which was at the periphery,should move to the center. He wrote,

A psychology which is called upon to confirm the truth of its thinking in practice,which attempts not so much to explain the mind but to understand and master it,gives the practical disciplines a fundamentally different place in the whole struc-ture of the science than the former psychology did. . . . Practice pervades thedeepest foundations of the scientific operation and reforms it from beginning to theend. Practice sets the tasks and serves as the supreme judge of theory, as its truthcriterion. It dictates how to construct the concepts and how to formulate the laws.(Vygotsky, 2004, p. 304)

7 The phrase the stone which the builders rejected and which became the head stone of thecorner from Psalm 18, Verse 22, was used by Vygotsky as an epigraph to the essay HistoricalMeaning of Crisis in Psychology.

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Clearly, Vygotskys emphasis on practice was grounded in Marxist materi-alism, but his specific take on practice differed significantly from the officialSoviet reading of Marx. Vygotskys understanding of practice had much less incommon with the dominant Soviet ideological concept of labor, and focused noton the objective in the subjectobject relationship, but on subjective. Ultimately,

Vygotsky was interested in how practice penetrates, shapes, and forms thesubjective plane, and how it is inextricably linked with agency and development.In this context, Vygotsky understood psychotechnics as an essence of practice,and, as such, his understanding of psychotechnics was markedly different from itsconnotation in the psychological and sociological discourses in Soviet Russia.Psychotechnics, as it was used in Soviet industry in 1920s and 1930s, referred totechniques of training that could mold and reshape the laborer to meet thedemands for skilled workers in the expanding economy (Bauer, 1952). ForVygotsky, psychotechnics had a much broader meaningit equally encompassescognitive development, concept formation, and self-control to name a few psy-

chological functions. Psychotechnics surmises their practical, developmental, andmediated character.Thus, as Puzyrey comments, practice is seen by Vygotsky not as external to

psychology or limited to the use of psychology in an applied fashion, but aspsychologys internal body of functioning, its mode of operation. Only within this(practical) mode can we correctly understand and orient psychological method-ology. In Puzyreys view, such methodology should be based on the followingassumption: Neither the phenomena nor the laws that regulate them can beassumed to exist before or independently of a psychotechnic action; it is onlythrough such action that they come into being. When we come to the point ofstudying psychological phenomena, we are always dealing with transformed

forms, transformed by the use of signs and by the psychologists own intervention(Puzyrey, 1986). The important consequence of this for Puzyrey is that psychol-ogy can only study phenomena in the process of their development or becomingthe principle implied by Vygotskys genetic method. When the process of for-mation, or becoming, is over, we can only discern the fossilized form. Thisfossilized form is the end of the thread that links the present to the past(Vygotsky, 1978, p. 64).

Within this paradigm, development is not posited as a natural or organicprocess. From the point of view of culturalhistorical theory, development occursas a result of applying special systems of psychotechnic actions to oneself, a

process that necessarily includes the use of signs or sets of significations in whichthe historically accumulated experience is crystallized in a cultural form. Suchdevelopment happens not in a linear cumulative way, but through the tact oftransformation (Puzyrey, 1986).

The principle of development understood in such a way encompasses, ac-cording to Puzyrey, all the areas of Vygotskys culturalhistorical theory and canbe stretched to the point of developmental imperative, or creating a human beingof a new typenot only fully self-actualizing, but constantly overcoming thelimits of such self-actualization. Puzyrey argues that an impetus to such under-standing is contained in Vygotskys Psychology of Art. Vygotsky understoodworks of art as specific psychological tools, which presuppose as a condition of

their existence a project of a possible man, whose self-realization and self-


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development exceed anything we can find in actuality. Following the path ofVygotskys Psychology of Art, Puzyrey suggested this area of psychology to beconsidered as a laboratory where such a possible man can be constructed. Sucha project would be even more ambitious than the one formulated by humanisticpsychology, which suggested that peak experiences in human functioning

should be taken as the norm (Puzyrey, 1986).Such a reading of Vygotsky presented significant challenges for Russian

academic psychology in the 1980s when it was just emerging from the period ofstagnation, and such a view has not been accepted unquestionably even now.However, it stimulated discussion of some issues critical for psychology and withtime has been taken up by a number of researchers. In a recent definitivemonograph, Methodological Analysis in Psychology, one of the leading authori-ties on methodological issues in psychology, F. Vasiluk, rearticulated and rein-forced such psychotechnic understanding of the culturalhistorical theory anddelivered an analysis of the current situation in Russian psychology in light of

Vygotskys ideas (Vasiluk, 2003).Following Vygotskys emphasis on the centrality of psychological practicefor the functioning of the discipline, Vasiluk highlights the significance of theemergence of practice of psychology as an independent field in postcommunistRussia. He argues that before, while psychology functioned in an applied capac-ity, its relationships to other disciplines were not only characterized as subordinateand regulated by demands and expectations for concrete recommendations andguidelines, but it also represented the relationships of a science positionedexternally with regard to the philosophically, methodologically, and scientificallydifferent areas of practice. The emergence of psychological practice withinpsychological science itself in the form of psychotherapy and counseling has

radically changed this situation, creating in the words of Vasiluk, a living bodywithin the psychological discipline proper, driving its development by posing andaddressing fundamental methodological problems (Vasiluk, 2003).

Vasiluk further outlines the critical dimensions along which he envisions theformation of a new psychology, psychotechnic in essence: the values, the audi-ence, the subject of knowledge, the role of contact, the process and procedures ofresearch, the knowledge, the object of theory, and the relation between the objectand the method. He insists that a psychotechnically based psychology should notendorse only a single value of scientific truth; instead, it should make its choicein the context of all major values of truth, goodness, beauty, divinity, and

usefulness, among others. Whereas the majority of psychological works in Russiauntil very recently had been written for academic psychologists, the new psy-chology has as its primary audience the practicing psychologist, who is positionednot outside but inside the psychological action. Unlike the classical, positivisti-cally oriented psychology where psychologists make every effort to occupy aneutral position of objectivity in the process of research, the results of whichalways aim at being independent of the researchers views and involvement, thepsychotechnic knowledge can only be obtained from a nonindifferent position,oriented to help, compassion, and empathy, orientations that are themselvesencompassed by culturally and historically specific value systems.

Moreover, whereas in the classical paradigm the researcher always has a

dominant position above his or her subjects, in the psychotechnic paradigm, the

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subjects or clients turn into active collaborators. In fact, such a process ofknowledge can only occur from the dialogical position. Furthermore, the proce-dures that are most adequate to the acquisition of such knowledge should not berigid, unidirectional experimental programs, but flexible, not wholly determinedand wholly programmed ways of interacting with the subjects. Such interaction

should also allow for the utilization of knowledge by subjects and facilitate theirself-reflection, self-development, and growth. The character of knowledge that ismost conducive to the dynamics of the psychotechnic process is the knowledgefrom inside, emotionally experienced as well as cognitively reflected. The objectof the theory consequently is not something that can have the status of objectivereality given and existing before and independently of human activity; on thecontrary, the object is exactly this human practice, taken from inside, as person-ally meaningful, as my practice. Finally, the relation between the method and theobject in the psychotechnic system is opposite the one advocated by the naturalsciences. If in the latter the method tries to become transparent and recede into the

background, revealing the phenomenon as it is in its natural form, indepen-dently of the method, in the former method it is positioned at the center, as theexplicit conditions that are central to the development of the phenomenon underconsideration and, in fact, constitutive with regard to it. The method, the re-searcher, and the subject in their mutual practice form an indivisible unit ofanalysis in this case, its minimal monad (Vasiluk, 2003).

It is also of paramount importance, Vasiluk insists, that the new psychology positsa human being as holistic and treats him/her as such. For him, such a holistic approachcan be implemented if we accept the inextricable links between consciousness,practice, and culture as a context for studying psychological phenomena. Vygotskysculturalhistorical theory provides an ideal basis for such a paradigm. As Vasiluk

notes, Vygotsky understood consciousness itself as cultural and practical at the sametime, in terms of its genesis, structure, and functioning. Vasiluk highlights thathistorical for Vygotsky meant genesis of consciousness, but not in terms of its naturaldevelopment. The specificity of Vygotskys historicity lay in its artificial character,forged in the process of mutual cooperative activity, mediated by cultural tools andsigns. Finally, Vasiluk urges this new psychology to become a real force in societyand rise to the level of tasks with which people deal. He insists that the newpsychology should firmly position itself in the domain of the humanities, and by doingso acknowledge its link with the cultural and semiotic sphere. Furthermore, arguesVasiluk, psychologists should accept responsibility for the powerful effect that their

actions can have on people with whom they engage in their practice: In ourprofession we are responsible, concludes Vasiluk in his monograph, whether peoplewho choose to consult us will be searching in their souls for Oedipus or Christ(Vasiluk, 2003, p. 226). (The strong religious connotations that are discernible inVasiluks theorizing indicate another important shift in the contemporary Russianpsychology. Following the collapse of communism, in parallel with a restoration ofthe religious dimension in the Russian society, religious ideas started to be referenced,utilized, and developed in psychology; e.g., Bratus, 1994). However, what is at stakehere for Vasiluk, even more than the value orientation of psychological practice, is theissue of constructed versus given character of psychological phenomena.

Similar methodological issues in the humanities, and in psychology in particular,

have been at the center of attention of another prominent Russian methodologist,


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Vadim Rozin (2000, 2001, 2003, 2004). He distinguishes two types of discourses thathave dominated the development of psychology as a discipline: The first is based onthe model of natural science and engineering practice, and the second one is sensitiveto the nature of phenomena studied in the humanities. He argues that in contrast to thenatural sciences, knowledge in the humanities should always acknowledge the posi-

tion of the researcher and the fact that such knowledge becomes constitutive towardits object. Such a situation follows from the cultural, semiotic, and self-reflexivecharacter of the phenomena under consideration. Within this general strategy ofknowledge in the humanities, he distinguishes a special form of knowledge that isdeveloped within psychological practice, such as counseling or therapy. Such knowl-edge may only be productive if it can be used in the process of solving some importantproblems within this practice: help, understanding, compassion, and so forth. Suchknowledge is determined not by the immanent laws of psychological theory, but by thedynamics of interaction. Rozin (2004) defines such knowledge as knowledge-event,which can take place only through an encounter with another personality (p. 133).

The testimony of the growing strength of these various methodological develop-ments in Russian psychology today is the establishment of the journal Postneklas-siceskaya psikhologija [Post-non-classical psychology], which has been published byMoscow State University since 2004. The advocates of post-non-classical psychologyextend methodological implications of Vygotskys culturalhistorical theory, whilealso acknowledging correspondence with such developments in Western psychologyas the narrative movement, particularly the work of Jerome Bruner (1986, 1990),Theodore Sarbin (1986), and Michael White (White, 2007; White & Epston, 1990),all of whom were at least partially inspired by Vygotsky, as well as by socialconstructionism, particularly the work of Kenneth Gergen (1999, 2001, 2009). Suchdialogue between contemporary Russian scholars and their counterparts in the West

testifies to the new state of psychological scholarship in Russia, where psychology isable to reconnect with its heritage, as well as with developments in theory and practiceabroad. In a way, the development of the ideas sowed by Vygotsky in the first thirdof the 20th century, such as the role of signification or social constructionism, whichwas artificially interrupted in Russia because of ideological restrictions, was continuedin the West through the work of scholars like Bruner and Gergen in the 1960s whenRussian psychology was in a state of stagnation. Now, Russian psychologists are ableto reconnect with this broken thread. In doing so, they also observe that the appro-priation of Vygotskys ideas in the West often remains only partial, precisely becauseof the limited access to the primary texts that characterized the field for so long. On

the other hand, these rather problematic lessons from the history of science reinforcean acute self-reflective attitude among Russians psychologists, which can be instruc-tive for their counterparts in the West who are often reluctant to engage in criticalanalysis of their discipline.

A. N. Leontievs Activity Theory and Its Reexamination in

Contemporary Russian Psychology

Whereas over the past 25 years, Vygotskys culturalhistorical theory hasbeen increasingly gaining prominence in Russia and internationally, it was thetheory of activity developed by A. N. Leontiev that came to dominate Soviet

psychology for much of the 20th century. The independent status of A. N.

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Leontievs theory of activity and Vygotskys culturalhistorical theory is anobject of ongoing debates in Russian psychology. The canonical assumption ofSoviet psychology that there was a succession between Vygotskys culturalhistorical theory and A. N. Leontievs theory of activity came under scrutiny inthe wake ofperestroika reforms. It has become acknowledged that although there

are numerous theoretical links between Leontievs and Vygotskys works, thereare also profound differences. Some scholars believe that interconnectednessoutweighs the differences (D. Leontiev, 2003) and that in fact we can treatVygotskys and Leontievs approaches as aspects of one paradigm. This view hasculminated in the introduction of the notion of culturalhistorical activity theory,or CHAT, which has not, however, acquired a conventional meaning or becomewide spread (Cole, 1996; Stetsenko, 2005). Other psychologists argue that thesetwo theories represent two unique perspectives (Kozulin, 1990; Van der Veer &Valsiner, 1991; Vasiluk, 2003).

These theories are linked historically. A. N. Leontiev was a student of

Vygotsky, and was profoundly influenced by his theorizing. However, the formereventually emerged as an independent figure, developing his own program ofresearch and attracting a cohort of followers. Later in his career, A. N. Leontievserved as head of the Psychology Department at the Faculty of Philosophy ofMoscow State University from 1950 to 1966. He then became the founding deanof the newly established Faculty of Psychology at the Moscow State University,where he worked until his death in 1979, thereby acquiring a powerful organi-zational and theoretical control over the development of the discipline.

The contradictions between A. N. Leontiev and Vygotsky started to emergein the early 1930s, not long before Vygotskys death in 1934; this was the period

that became critical for Soviet psychology. Beginning in 1929, Stalin started totighten ideological control in various areas of art and science. Different psycho-logical groups were forced to demonstrate their fidelity to the Marxist ideal ofobjective science. Soon, all independent psychological developments were sup-pressed, and the ideological machine of the Soviet state compelled psychologiststo derive psychological categories directly from the works of Marx, Engels, andLenin.

Even before this campaign reached its full swing, A. N. Leontiev decided toleave Moscow with a group of collaborators, including Alexandr Zaporozhets andLidia Bozhovich, for the Ukrainian city of Kharkov, where they eventuallyestablished a program of developmental research, moving significantly away fromthe culturalhistorical paradigm elaborated by Vygotsky (Yasnitsky & Ferrari,2008). As Kozulin (1996) notes, Ideological caution, honest scientific disagree-ment, and also a misunderstanding of certain of Vygotskys ideas all wereintricately interwoven in the phenomenon that later became known as Leontievstheory of activity (p. 113). The fundamental disagreement between the Kharko-vites and Vygotskys position concerned the relationships among consciousness,activity, and reality. In particular, A. N. Leontievs group began to argue thatVygotsky overinflated the role of signification. Consequently, they played downthe role of a sign as the chief mediator in favor of practical activity. Indicatively,it is precisely this central issue concerning the relations among consciousness,

activity, and reality and the role of signification that became the major focus of


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critique, revision, and expansion 70 years later when it became possible toexamine the theory of activity from ideologically neutral positions.

A. N. Leontiev (1947) first outlined the theory of activity in his Essay in theDevelopment of Mind, followed by the highly influential Problems of the Devel-opment of Mind(1959/1981). His most comprehensive expression was in Activity,

Consciousness, and Personality (1975). Following the translation of the volumeinto English in 1978, the theory has generated limited but steady interest in theWest (e.g., Engestrom, 1999; Kaptelin & Nardi, 2006; Wertsch, 1979). (Someterminological problems must be acknowledged here. The difficulty of translatingas activity the Russian term Dejitelnost is as notorious as it is unavoidable. InRussian, the word comes from the same root as delodeed and is closelyassociated with postupokact or causeand as such implies a higher degree ofagency than the English word activity. Semantically, the German Taetigkeit iscloser to the original Russian meaning.8)

A. N. Leontiev positioned the category of activity as both a core and as an

explanatory principle of all aspects of psychological life. In this theory, percep-tion, attention, memory, imagination, cognition, and emotions derive from activ-ity, while they are simultaneously treated as actions of a particular type. Further-more, consciousness and personality are posited as derivative of praxis, as well.Such a scope of application was allowed by the broad definition of activityelaborated by A. N. Leontiev:

Activity is a molar, not an additive unit of the life of the physical, material subject.In a narrower sense, That is, at the psychological level, it is a unit of life, mediatedby psychic reflection, the real function of which is that it orients the subject in theobjective world. In other words, activity is not a reaction and not a totality ofreactions but a system that has structure, its own internal transitions and transfor-mations, its own development. (Leontiev, 1978, p. 50)

A. N. Leontievs attempt to formulate an overarching physiological paradigmencompassed by the idea of human praxis can be seen as a counterpart to theMarxist philosophical understanding of man and its function within society, wherelabor is posited as a definitive mode of operation of the former and productiveforces as a major determining factor of the latter. The strong ideological under-pinning no doubt contributed significantly to the rise of the theory of activity tothe status of the official Soviet psychological doctrine, which it occupied until theend of the 1980s. For example, the volume A. N. Leontiev and Contemporary

Psychology (Zaporozhets, Zincenko, Ovchinnikova, & Tichomirov, 1983) reaf-firmed the dominance of the activity paradigm at the time in all the areas ofgeneral psychology and beyond. In their contributions to the volume, the leadingRussian psychologists such as B. Bratus, V. Stolin, V. Vilunas, U. Gippenreitor,V. Liaudis, S. Smirnov, N. Talyzina, and V. Munipov argued that the theory ofactivity can constructively encompass research on personality, self, motivation,attention, memory, perception, and educational and organizational psychology.

The obvious limitations of the theory of activity, namely that it cannotadequately address such phenomena as human interaction, creativity, culture,

8 See A. N. Leontievs (1978) discussion of this issue in Chapter 3 of Activity, Consciousness,and Personality.

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consciousness, semiotization, and spiritual life, were not acknowledged until thereforms of perestroika were well underway. The strong demand for appliedknowledge and growth of the psychotherapeutic movement in Russia at that timealso brought to the fore another limitation of the theory of activity, the fact thatit was elaborated overwhelmingly on the abstract philosophical plane. This made

its application in any settingclinical, organizational or educationalhighlyproblematic.

Indicatively, it was the leading philosophical journal in Russia, VoprosyFilosophii, which held in 2001 a discussion regarding the status of the theory ofactivity at the beginning of the 21st century. The broad range of publicationsattested to two almost diametrically opposite positions among the scholars:Whereas some (Svirev, 2001; Gromyko, 2001) affirmed that activity theory is notonly functioning well, but has an enormous potential for further development,pending modifications, others argued that the activity theme has lost its previouspopularity both within philosophy and psychology (Lektorskij, 2001, p. 56).

Taking this criticism one step further, Lazarev (2001) stated, The activityapproach which was elaborated several decades ago to solve a crisis in psychol-ogy, today finds itself in a state of crisis (p. 33).

Similar debates have been going on within the psychology discipline propersince the 1990s. Whereas some scholars have held to the view that psychologicalphenomena are entirely reducible and explainable through the category of activity(e.g., Tichomirov, 1993), others (e.g., Smirnov, 1993) have argued that activityrepresents only one of the ways of describing and explaining psychologicalreality. This critique has led to the formation of two opposite positions: Accordingto one, the major tenets of activity theory should be preserved, but some modi-fications should be made in different areas (personality, cognition, meaning);

according to another, it is precisely these fundamental assumptions that should beradically critiqued and dismantled. The developments of these two lines in thepast 15 years are exemplified by the work of four leading Russian psychologists:Asmolov and D. Leontiev on the one hand and Rozin and Zincenko on the other.

The first position is well represented by Alexandr Asmolov and DmitryLeontiev, both affiliated with the Department of Psychology at Moscow StateUniversity (incidentally, D. Leontiev belongs to the third generation of psychol-ogists in A. N. Leontievs family, the history of this family reflecting as it werethe fate of the theory of activity itself).

Both Asmolov and D. Leontiev made a sustained attempt to readdress two

major issues in general psychology, personality psychology and the problem ofmeaning, within the overarching activity paradigm. Asmolov (2001) strives toexpand the model of personality functioning offered by the activity theory.Whereas the subject assumed within the canonical theory of activity was thesocialhistorical subject rather than psychological individual, Asmolovs tries toshift the emphasis toward the latter pole.

A.N. Leontiev defined personality as a hierarchical structure of motives,anchoring personality firmly in the overall dynamics of actions: The structure ofpersonality represents in itself a relatively stable configuration of principal mo-tivational lines arranged hierarchically within itself (A. N. Leontiev, 1978, p.221). Asmolov adheres to the main principles of A. N. Leontievs approach,

positing activity as such a reality within which both psychological development


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and personality can be explained. Furthermore, similarly to A. N. Leontiev, hedefines the main mechanism of personality development as orientation amongvarious mutual activities, choice, and self-determination. However, Asmolovsdefinition of personality extends A. N. Leontievs model by trying to addresscontextual determinants:

The evolution of the mode of life, the development of psyche in bio-genesis,sociogenesis and person-genesis lead to the emergence of personality as a specificelement of the system, responsible for the orientation in the world of socialrelations. The development of personality does not center around the individual onits own, assimilating influences of the surrounding milieu, but around the firstmutual acts of behavior, which transform the microsocial situation of personalitydevelopment. (Asmolov, 2001, pp. 112113)9

Asmolov, therefore, rearticulates and problematizes the subjectworld dichot-omy. In this context, he further introduces the notion of mans world (mirceloveka): Neither the world on its own, nor the man on its own become the basisof social activity as the nature of human existence. The understanding of manthrough the notion of mans world changes radically the face of psychologicalscience (Asmolov, 2001, pp. 6668). As such, Asmolovs notion of mansworld represents an important step in overcoming one of the deficiencies withinthe canonical activity paradigm: the separation of an individual on the one handand the world on the other, including historical, cultural, and situation-specificvariables. Whereas the canonical activity paradigm posited objective world asa higher level philosophical abstraction, au par with a social individuum, whowas understood as a subject of grand historical narrative, Asmolov makes anattempt to reintroduce a breathing, living human being as a subject of psychology.

From a similar position of extending activity theory, D. Leontiev (2003)reconceptualized the category of meaning. He pointed out that within the tradi-tional activity paradigm, the problem of meaning has been addressed in a narrowrealm of activity. The mechanism accounting for the production of meaning hadbeen elaborated by A. N. Leontiev within the three-level model of activity whereactivity corresponds to motive, actions relate to aims, and operations are deter-mined by the conditions under which activity unfolds. The meaning of an actionwas thought to arise out of the relationship between motives and goals of actions:

No matter whether these motives are or are not perceived by the subject, theysignal themselves in the form of his experiencing an interest, a desire, or a passion;

their function, taken from the aspect of consciousness, is that they evaluate thelife significance for the subject of objective circumstances and his actions in thesecircumstances, giving them personal sense that does not directly correspond totheir understood objective meaning. (A. N. Leontiev, 1978, p. 150)10

As D. Leontiev acknowledged, the category of activity, as elaborated by A. N.Leontiev, represented a theoretical abstraction extracted from the wholeness ofreal life. He suggested that it is time to expand the scope of research on meaningand return to the world at large as the real context of an individuals life. To this

9 English translation by the present author.10 English translation by the present author.

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end, D. Leontiev introduced the notion of world of life, and insisted that sucha notion should be central for the ontology of psychological phenomena, includingthe category of meaning. D. Leontiev further incorporates in his frameworkculture as a field of collective meanings and art as a mechanism of meaningformation, correcting an important deficiency within the traditional activity par-

adigm: lack of attention to the semiotic sphere.Both Asmolovs concept of mans world and D. Leontievs notion of

world of life can be compared with Bourdieus (1990) notion of habitus, whichsimilarly attempts to bridge the subjectiveobjective antinomy of the socialsciences. On the other hand, both D. Leontievs and Asmolovs interventionsresonate with phenomenological and existential approaches, thus echoing thetradition of Russian ethical philosophy. An earlier attempt to reintroduce thistheme into the psychological context in Russia was made in 1958 by Rubinsteinin his unfinished bookThe Man and the World(celovek i Mir) (Rubinstein, 1997).Although this theme can be treated as reappearing rather than entirely new, its

importance cannot be overestimated.Taking the critique of activity paradigm further, Rozin (2004) noted that theintroduction of such notions responds to the dilemma critical for contemporaryRussian psychology: either take into consideration the achievements in other areasof the humanities, such as cultural studies, sociology, semiotics, and challenge thetraditional psychological focus on the isolated human being, or by keeping itintact, jeopardize the further development of psychology as a discipline given thatit is becoming obvious that it is starting to lose ground in the study of the humanbeing to the above-mentioned approaches in the humanities. Rozin (2004) himselfintroduces the notion of psychological reality to address this problem (p. 17).He defines psychological reality as a system of events connected by a particular

rule or logic. Various psychological realities are determined on the one hand byparticular semiotic factors (language, knowledge, schemes), and on the other, theyrepresent felt, experienced phenomena. Rozin delineates such realities as realityof self, reality of dreams, reality of art. But overall, Rozins project is different inits scope, impulse, and direction to the ones undertaken by Asmolov and D.Leontiev; Rozins aim is not to extend the theory of activity, but to radicallychallenge it.

He began by reflecting on the historical conditions and needs that gave rise toactivity theory and argued that it was introduced in psychology to provide aframework for the raising, constructing, and molding of a new socialist type of

mentality and personality. According to Rozin, it is the failure of the socialistexperiment to produce this new type of personality that has become one of themain grounds of the contemporary critique of the activity theory. Rozin noted thatinstead of a uniform Soviet approach to education, there are various pedagogicalsystems practiced now in Russia: religious schools, esoteric schools, schools thatendorse the ideals of classical knowledge, or on the contrary, embrace values ofconsumerism. Furthermore, instead of the unidirectional line of control from topto bottom so characteristic of the Soviet pedagogical system, the ideas of peda-gogical cooperation and participation have become increasingly popular. Theunderstanding of development itself has changed; more and more often it isunderstood not in line with the natural science model, but through the framework

of the humanities. Finally, Rozin highlighted the role that culture plays in


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contemporary life. It is time to realize, he argued, that culture does not lag behindthe various processes in society by reflecting them; on the contrary, culture itselfhas become one of the major determinants of such processes (Rozin, 2004).

Activity theory has also been vigorously criticized by V. P. Zincenko. Aprominent figure in the Russian humanities, a member of the Russian Academy ofScience since 1992, whose long career went from pioneering organizational andlabor psychology in the 1960s in Russia to the establishment of the Institute forthe Study of Man in the 1990s, Zincenko also belongs to a psychologicaldynasty. His father, P. I. Zincenko, worked closely with A. N. Leontiev and wasrecognized as the leading authority in the study of memory. After having workedwithin the theory of activity paradigm for several decades, in 1997 Zincenkoturned to reexamine this paradigm in the most radical and uncompromisingmanner in his monograph Osip Mandelstams Staff and Mamardasvilis Pipe. Themonograph examined the role that ideological pressure played in imposingtrivially appropriated Marxist dogma to such issues as consciousness, personality,

and development in psychology.Zincenko (1997) showed that activity theory was formulated at such a level

as to provide a mediating link between the Marxist philosophy and empiricalpsychological description. Such an interdisciplinary approach facilitated Marxistassumptions in psychology. That is, man was understood first and foremost as asubject of activity and a product of social relations. This position was furtherelaborated in a number of assumptions about primacy: the primacy of externalover internal, the primacy of activity over consciousness, the primacy of the socialover the individual, and the primacy of interiorization over exteriorization. Ac-cording to Zincenko, such assumptions reflected the unrelenting struggle against

idealism that was a leading theme for Soviet philosophy and, consequently, forSoviet psychology. As a result, the latter fell prey to the assumption of rigiddeterminism of psyche and behavior. Consequently, it could not even approachsuch phenomena as free will, free deeds, and free personality (Zincenko, 1997).

Zincenko asserted that the belief that the phenomena of consciousness,personality, and development could be explained through the category of activityled to critical distortions in Soviet psychology. Given that consciousness wasunderstood as born out of and within activity, as well as mediated by activity, itsindependent existence was vigorously denied. The theory of activity bent overbackward to acknowledge the regulatory role of consciousness in activity but at

the same time not to recognize it as an independent force apart from activity.Consciousness as such was never acknowledged.

To challenge these assumptions, Zincenko turned to the heritage of the poetOsip Mandelstam and philosopher Merab Mamardasvili.11 He made an extensiveuse of their ideas to understand consciousness, personality, and psychological

11 Osip Mandelstam (18911938), a celebrated Russian poet and essayist, one of the mostdistinctive voices of the Silver Age (as the period of beginning of the 20th century is often calledin philology), who perished in Stalins camps. Merab Mamardashvili (19301990), an eminentRussian philosopher of Georgian origin, whose works explored the relationship between conscious-ness and language, challenging the notion of truth and objectivity and introducing the concept of thenonclassical ideal of rationality.

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development in a radically new way. In particular, Zincenko argued for therecognition of consciousness as an independent force beyond activity.

Zincenko developed his critique of Soviet psychology as applicable beyondthe academic context, that is, in its relation to society and culture. To do so, hetraced how ideological dogmas were translated into the language of psychology

and articulated as theoretical models. He then went on to show how they wereapplied in the production, construction, and molding of human beings of aparticular type, the notorious homo sovieticus:

Every effort was made to destroy or not to allow the links, which are natural forhuman beings, to emerge between activity and consciousnesson the one hand,and consciousness and personalityon the other; to deprive consciousness of itsinherent generative qualities. The situation in psychology was just a pale shadowof what was happening with the collective consciousness of people in real life.(Zincenko, 1997, p. 174)12

Zincenko further pointed out the paradoxical situation surrounding the oper-ation of the theory of activity in Soviet Russia. That is, the theory, which by itsvery definition aimed at studying agency and which should find its ultimateexpression in free deeds, was operating in a society where free deeds werepunishable.

Against this background, Zincenko outlined his new approach, which hecalled, organic psychology, and which, he argued, should be able to deal withthe problems of freedom, death, fate, ethics, and values. He began, however, bydeconstructing the dichotomy of objective and subjective in psychology andclaimed that not only in ontology, but in gnoseology as well, the opposition ofobjective and subjective represents a grave mistake (Zincenko, 1997, p. 10).13

He argued that the border between objective and subjective, internal and external,body and soul should be thought of as permeable rather than solid. For Zincenko,both ideal and real forms represent living configurations. Drawing on the majortenets of Vygotskys culturalhistorical theory, Zincenko showed that the trans-formation of the ideal form into the real one occurs through mediation bypsychological tools, among which Vygotsky privileged signs and words, whileZincenko included symbol and myth, as well. Zincenko argued that such culturaltools do not represent petrified, solidified embodiments of human actions; rather, theyshould be treated as living practices themselves. The important methodologicalimplication that has followed from this logic is that the process of analysis of

psychological phenomena should not be detrimental to their living, developing nature.Zincenko further introduced a new developmental model to account for theemergence of consciousness, personality, and sense of agency. In the impetus ofthis generative progression, Zincenko positioned live movements and nondiffer-entiated forms of activity, out of which behavior and activity in the traditionalsense are born. In their turn, behavior and activity generate consciousness, whichfurther gives rise to free actions and deeds. Finally, the latter evolve intopersonality, which then can generate new forms of behavior. This generativeprogression, which he calls a genome of culturalhistorical development, is

12 English translation by the present author.13 English translation by the present author.


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organized along the vertical of spiritual development. The latter is defined as asearch, as work, as a practical activity, as an experience through which the subjectallows for self-development, personal growth, and the finding of truth (Zincenko,1997, p. 148). This development progresses along seven levels, from the level ofactivity mediated by signs to the level of spiritual functioning of a suprahuman

being (dukho-chelovek). As such, Zincenkos intervention makes a passionateattempt to reinstate categories banished from the official Soviet psychology:deeds, responsibility, soul, ideal, spirituality, individualism, man, and God.

Conclusion

Overall, it seems that the main change in Russian psychology over the past 25years has been a general move toward an elaboration of a new paradigm that hasbeen variously characterized as organic psychology, nonclassical psychology,or post-non-classical psychology. The contours of this paradigm are becoming

evident in both the ontological and epistemological domains. The cardinal shiftwith regard to ontology is to posit man not in isolation from the real context of hisexistence but as an inextricable part of it. This is evident in the introduction ofsuch notions as mans world, the world of life, psychological reality, andthe problematization and destabilization of rigid dichotomies of ideal and real,subjective and objective, external and internal, interiorization and exteriorization.This move is paralleled by an even more ambitious attempt to forge a newmethodology, one adequate to the study of the unique nature of psychologicalphenomena and their impact on culture. This is represented in the elaboration ofthe psychotechnic paradigm. There is no doubt that on the whole such a devel-opment would have been impossible without the radical changes in the Russian

society and academia that have taken place over the last quarter of a century.However, the vectors of this development also attest to the continuity of traditionsin Russian psychology and philosophy.

Russian scholars have drawn on the rich heritage of Russian psychologicalscienceVygotsky, A. N. Leontiev, Luria, Zaporozhets, Rubinstein, and othersand the philosophical input of the earlier 20th century thinkers such as Florensky,Solovev, and Bakhtin for whom the issues of agency and meaning, just as for thecurrent generation of Russian psychologists, were central. However, it may besuggested that the valorization of the themes of meaning and agency and prob-lematization of the relation between psychology and society were also paradox-

ically heightened by the period of totalitarian rule. It is against the danger ofdestruction of meaning-making by ideological dogma, against the continuousthreat to freedom, and against the use and misuse of psychology in the process ofproducing consciousness of a new typeof the notorious homo sovieticusthatthe urge to preserve and keep such values has been most strongly felt. Moreover,it is perhaps this experience of survival against the odds and careful self-reflectionand self-analysis into which Russian psychology engaged after the collapse of theSoviet system that represents the most valuable lesson that can be learned.

The dynamics between power, politics, ideology, culture, and the humanitiesthat the history of Russian psychology has demonstrated so vividly is by no meanslimited to that country alone. Soviet psychological scholarship was not an excep-

tion, but was rather a paradigmatic case, which made the lines of such influences

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particularly visible. No doubt, psychologys position in the post-Soviet era isbeing refigured in the context of a free-market economy, anticollectivist culturalpolitics, and an overriding value of consumerism. Although such analysis isbeyond the scope of the present article, there is a firm basis to believe that atradition that has survived dramatic highs and lows in the 20th century will be

capable of dealing with the new pressures and challenges of the 21st withoutlosing its originality.

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Received February 3, 2009

Revision received January 6, 2010Accepted February 9, 2010 yy

History of Psychology

Call for Papers: Psychology, Politics, and Public Policy

History of Psychology invites manuscripts for a special issue on the historical inter-

sections of psychology, public policy, and politics. The goal of the special issue is to

examine the ways in which public policy and politics have been influenced by the

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discipline and profession of psychology, as well as the use of psychological insights and

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