Homo Sociologicus: Neither a rational or an irrational idiot - Ratmond Boudon

Abstract

As the social sciences deal witactions, they have to use a ththeory: the rational-utilitarianby social, cultural or biologicathree theories are important convincingly puzzling phenotially general. They are not sinType III can by contrast be cthe rational-utilitarian theoryas irrational idiots. These aggbeings answer the situations ththey perceive as strong: by be

Key words: rational choice, ciour.

Resumen. El homo sociologicu

Puesto que las ciencias socialeindividuales, tienen que utilizmente tres tipos de teoras: lamiento como causado por fueen el sentido de Nisbet. Las trdo su capacidad para explicar que las teoras del tipo I y II erhay fenmenos familiares quepueden pretender generalidadria trata a los seres humanos cidiotas irracionales. Estas agreseres humanos responden a lasmentos que perciben como po

Palabras clave: eleccin raciodel comportamiento.

Papers 80, 2006 149-169

Homo Sociologicus: Neither a Rational noran Irrational Idiot

Raymond BoudonUniversit de Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV). Centre dtudes Sociologiques de la [email protected]

Papers 80 001-312 13/12/06 10:53 Pgina 149h macrophenomena which are caused by individual humaneory of human behaviour. They use basically three types of theory, the causalist theory which sees behaviour as causedl forces, and the rational psychology in Nisbets sense. Thein the sense that they have shown their capacity to explainmena. Type I and II theories have been claimed to be poten-

ce there are familiar phenomena they are unable to explain.laimed to be general. Amartya Sen has made the point that treats human beings as rational idiots. Type II treats them

ressive metaphors draw the attention on the fact that humaney are confronted to by devising systems of arguments whiching cognitively rational.

ognitive rationality, axiological rationality, theories of behav-

s: ni idiota racional ni irracional

s estudian macrofenmenos causados por acciones humanasar una teora del comportamiento humano. Utilizan bsica-

teora racional-utilitaria, la teora causal que ve el comporta-rzas sociales, culturales o biolgicas, y la psicologa racionales teoras son importantes en el sentido de que han demostra-convincentemente fenmenos enigmticos. Se ha pretendidoan potencialmente de aplicacin general. No lo son, dado que son incapaces de explicar. Las del tipo III, por el contrario,. Amartya Sen ha argumentado que la teora racional-utilita-omo idiotas racionales. Las teoras del tipo II los tratan comosivas metforas llaman la atencin sobre el hecho de que los situaciones con las que se enfrentan ideando sistemas de argu-derosos: esto es, siendo cognitivamente racionales.

nal, racionalidad cognitiva, racionalidad axiolgica, teoras

A typical analysis: Durkh

Durkheim (1967[1897])political crisis appears. Thof the Third Republic: tboth in Austria and Prusnations which was to be this counterintuitive corous national or internatiwhat happens in the outspersonal problems. Onceconfidence in the fact thship is increased.

I think this analysis inplifies a procedure charac

An investigation beginrelation between two variaences. Thus, a study on nvation that some type ofeat oil from vegetal rathethat the correlation reflectwhen it will have been posible for the correlation.ducted carefully enough, to a genuine causal relatibeing unfinished, since thcauses the macroscopic c

So, a general rule of aorder to explain a macroscthe ultimate elementary cnomenon. As far as the sohave given this general ruelementary causes of any actions. Once this evidenhow are human actions v

150 Papers 80, 2006 Raymond Boudon

Contents

A typical analysis: Durkheim analyses a correlation

Three theories of behaviour

Type I or II?

Is Type I general?

Choosing Type II instead of Type I?

Type III model

Type III model and Webers methodological writings

The importance of the discussion

References

Papers 80 001-312 13/12/06 10:53 Pgina 150eim analyses a correlation

observes that suicide rates go down when a seriousey go down in France at the time of the main criseshe Dreyfus and Boulanger Affaires. They declinesia during the tension and the war between the twoconcluded by the Prussian victory at Sadowa. Whyrelation? Because, Durkheim suggests, when a seri-onal crisis appears, people cannot help worrying atide world and are provisionally deterred from their this psychological mechanism is made explicit, ourat the correlation reflects a genuine causal relation-

cludes an essential methodological teaching: it exem-terizing, not only sociology, but all sciences.s often with some macroscopic observation, as a cor-bles, not only in sociology but also, say, in the life sci-utrition is likely to start from the macroscopic obser- cancer appears as less frequent among people whor than animal origin. But, one will be really certains a genuine causal relationship only from the momentssible to describe the elementary mechanisms respon- And, even when the design of experiment is con-so that there is little doubt that the correlation is dueonship, the investigation will still give the feeling ofe question will remain as to from which elementary

ausal relationship come from.ny scientific investigation in any science is that, inopic phenomenon, the analyst should try to identityauses responsible for the observed macroscopic phe-cial sciences are concerned, Weber and Schumpeter

le a name: methodological individualism, since thesocial phenomenon are obviously human individualt principle is recognized, crucial questions appear:

alidly explained? What are their causes? Is it possible

to identify these causes? How? These questions raise the more general ques-tion as to Which theory of behaviour for the social sciences?.

This question has been and is still intensively debated in the social sciences,because it is crucial. It seems to me the point can be made that the variety ofanswers the social sciences have given and give to this basic question can bereduced to three basic types.

Three theories of behaviour

Type I. The first Type is i(RCT), also called the eas Gary Becker (1996) or sidered as the theory of bthis model, people do whathem a maximum satisfacbe qualified as utilitarianthat people do what they will generate. This type Bentham. It has been rev

Type II. According to thecases be explained as the by socialization effects, evolution, as the productetc. While these forces caunderlying them are biolobiology in the present statto which they explain bewhen they deal with psyc

The second Type of mpologists, as Clifford Geerhave intentions, but theypsychological, cultural orof the individuals themseintentional behaviour shotrol of individuals. The pist, though this appellationcan be causes.

Type III. The third modeimplicitly by Tocqueville ers. They consider that thmind of the individual. Tunderstandable, as inspireFollowing Nisbet (1966),

Homo Sociologicus: Neither a Rational nor an Irrational Idiot Papers 80, 2006 151

Papers 80 001-312 13/12/06 10:53 Pgina 151llustrated by the so-called Rational Choice Theoryxpected utility model. According to theorists suchthe late James Coleman (1986), RCT should be con-ehaviour valid for all social sciences. According tot they do because they think that their action will givetion. The kind of psychology used in the RCT can. It can also be called consequential, since it assumesdo in consideration of the consequences their actionof theory was developed systematically by Jeremyivified in the last years.

second type of theory, behaviour should in mosteffect of psychological, cultural or biological forces:by cognitive biases, as the outcome of biological of some instinct such as the instinct of imitation,n be psychological or cultural, the ultimate causesgical. They cannot in most cases be disentangled bye of the art though. For this reason, the forces thankshaviour have the status of mere conjectures, excepthological mechanisms known since ever.odel is used by many sociologists and many anthro-tz (1984). They do not deny the fact that individuals maintain that their intentions are determined by biological forces, i.e. by causes beyond the controllves. They contend that intentional as well as non-uld generally be explained by causes beyond the con-sychology used by this model can be called causal- raises the objection that not only forces but reasons

l is used explicitly by Max Weber. But it is also usedand even by Durkheim and by many of their follow-e cause of an individual action is its meaning in thehey regard individual actions as being in principle

d either by understandable motivations or by reasons. I propose to call rational the kind of psychology used

in this model. This psychology is the psychology developed by Aristotle, andby the French moralists of the 17th century. In a word, it is no other than the psy-chology used in everyday life, or in institutional life, in police stations or injudiciary institutions for instance. This type of rational psychology is used inthe example from Durkheim I mentioned earlier: when the fire burns outside,I forget for a while grumbling about my personal problems: an understandablereaction. Tocqueville shows that in 1789 the French people had reasons to be hos-tile to the clerics which the British people had not. Hence the macroscopiceffect that the French enligone or than the German Asoldiers had reasons to prexplains the quick diffusioEmpire. Neither Tocquevist psychology. They considtional, as produced by hidrational possible explanat

Of course, the three works are eclectic in the spsychology. But still, it cmake little use of rationaDurkheims or Max Webepsychology and use essen

This discussion is far answer given to the quesences should preferably utheir analyses, as I will try

Type I or II?

I will illustrate this point els to another can lead totionable one.

In a study on Vietnamwondered why all traditionimity rule as the basic coquestion as to why this ruEast Asia, but also in Afrrently used in traditional most available explanationsecond type of behaviourto devise and apply the u

They mobilize generaple have a weak feeling ofexist only as one part of


Papers 80 001-312 13/12/06 10:53 Pgina 152htenment was much more anticlerical than the Britishufklrung. Max Weber has explained that the Romanefer the monotheistic to the polytheistic cults. Thisn of Christianity in the first centuries in the Romanille, nor Durkheim, nor Weber had a use for causal-er that an action, belief, or attitude can be held as irra-den forces, exclusively from the moment when all

ions have been exhausted.

types I have distinguished are ideal types: manyense that they use simultaneously the three types ofan be recognized that, say, Clifford Geertz analysesl or of utilitarian psychology, while Tocquevilles,rs analyses, say, have no use for the causalist type oftially rational psychology in the above sense.from being merely speculative. On the contrary, thetion as to which theory of behaviour the social sci-se determines to a large extent the effectiveness of to suggest.

by showing that shifting from one of the three mod- substitute an illuminating explanation for a ques-

in the twenties of the last century, Popkin (1979)nal Vietnamese village societies had adopted the una-nstitutional rule. He looked at the literature on the

le is commonly accepted in village societies, in Southica and elsewhere. In fact the unanimity rule is cur-village societies around the world. Popkin noted thats of this phenomenon use a model belonging to theal theory: they assume that people were motivatednanimity rule under the effect of cultural forces.lly the assumption that in traditional societies peo- their individuality; that they have the impression tothe group; that consequently the group itself is in

their mind the only subject able to legitimate a collective decision; and final-ly that to them unanimity is, so to say, a criterion ensuring them that the deci-sion comes from the will of the group as such.

In other words, the current explanation of the phenomenon illustrates thesecond type of psychology: people are supposed to favour the unanimity ruleunder the effect of impersonal cultural forces. They perceive themselves as amere part of the group under the influence of these forces and consequently findnatural to consider that a decision is worth being enforced only when thegroup has given an unam

Two objections, thougthat the unanimity rule isthe unanimity rule prevailIn that sense, his opinionmajority rule. Second objethe unanimity rule, a colleflict and after a long discuwhole, the causalist explansince it postulates the existin the mind of people, andals have less power under it ignores and fails to accowhich always appears as s

Popkin made the poineasily acceptable explanatitheory, a theory which experally treated as a basic decorganization of a collectivIf it is decided that all mis considered as lawful, thly be long. At the other ethat his decisions would would be quick. In othergroup whose agreement ithe longer the time takener the proportion of peopa decision is considered asto the risk of seeing a dectheory assumes furthermocosts as a function of the convex. This assumption da decision except a last opthan convincing less stubbthe curve relating the numfirst type of cost, i.e. the leing convex function of n.


Papers 80 001-312 13/12/06 10:53 Pgina 153biguous verdict.h, can be raised against this type of explanation. First: another name for the veto right. In societies wheres, every single member has the capacity of saying no. has more weight than under any other rule, as thection: in traditional village societies operating underctive decision is often taken in an atmosphere of con-ssion, as the very notion of palaver indicates. On theation introduces an assumption which is both heavy,ence of cultural forces able to implant representations controversial, since it accepts wrongly that individu-

the unanimity than under the majority rule. Finally,unt for the well-known phenomenon of the palaver

oon as the unanimity rule is adopted in any context.t that Rational Choice Theory provides a much moreon. He started from Buchanans and Tullocks (1962)lains why in our societies the majority rule is very gen-ision making rule. This derives from the fact that thee decision procedure is exposed to two types of costs.embers of the group should agree before a decisione time used in the decision-making process will like-xtreme, if a dictator were appointed in the sensebe treated as lawful, the collective decision process words, the higher the proportion of people in thes requested before a decision is considered as lawful, to reach a decision. On the other hand, the high-le in the group whose agreement is requested before lawful, the smaller the proportion of people exposedision enforced with which they would disagree. There that the two curves representing the two kinds ofnumber of people whose agreement is required, areerives from the consideration that, when all agree on

ponent, convincing him will likely be more difficultorn opponents. So, it seems plausible to assume thatber n of people whose agreement is required to the

ngth of the decision process, is a monotonous increas- As to the other cost, similar reasons lead to assume

that the curve representing it as a function of n is convex. Under these assump-tions, the sum of the two costs will in broad conditions be minimum when nis equal to half the total number of members. This explains why the majorityrule is the rule normally accepted and considered legitimate in many situa-tions.

But there are also circumstances where it is not, even in our societies.Thus, by contrast with the adoption of an ordinary new law, a change in theconstitutional law will require, say, a two third majority because, there,the time curve is moved to the right: given the importance of the decision,one wants to be sure thaeven if the decision takesis dictatorial in all armisince taking too much tition.

Popkin proposes to couse generally the unanimVietnamese traditional villof the subsistence type. Tat most the local consumpwould prevent for instanpoorest slice in the popurule, some members of thwould consequently not representing the second tright in the case of this tyagree. On the other handeties than in modern socthe producers only a smalof time spent to take a deeties.

Of course, it cannotsocieties have effectively pose that they have in minwell that a minority livesoutlaw this traditional insthat the majority rule wasbasis of considerations whtheory. On the whole, Pocompetitor: it includes noarbitrary assumption; it i

So we have here a casfrom a model interpretinto a model interpreting itinite scientific progress. Gthe RCT appears as much


Papers 80 001-312 13/12/06 10:53 Pgina 154t it is not imposed to a too great number of people time. As to the decision rule on the battle field, ites, because here the time curve is moved to the left,me to reach a decision may be fatal in a war situa-

nsider that the question as to why village societiesity rule is a special case of this general theory. Theage societies are characterized by an economic regimehere is no economic surplus; the production coverstion. If the majority rule, say, was accepted, nothingce the group from forbidding gleaning. Now, thelation lives from gleaning. So, under the majoritye society would be heavily threatened. Such a rule

be considered legitimate. In other words, the curveype of costs, the external costs, is moved far to thepe of society. These costs are very heavy except if all, time has much less value in traditional village soci-ieties, since the subsistence economy requires froml part of the time available to them, so that the lengthcision is much less important than in modern soci-

be supposed that the members of the consideredthis theory in mind. Still, one can legitimately sup-d a rough intuitive version of the theory. They know from gleaning and that a majority could decide totitution for instance. Leo Moulin (1953) has shown invented in the convents of the Middle Ages on theich anticipated literally on Buchanan and Tullocks

pkins theory is much more easily acceptable than its heavy assumption, no contradiction with data, no

s congruent with the relevant data.e where shifting from a Type II model to a Type I,g peoples behaviour as the effect of cultural forces as rational in the sense of the RCT appears as a def-iven the criteria generally used to evaluate a theory, better than the alternative one.

Is Type I general?

Should we consider the behavioural theory of Type I as general, though? Myanswer is no. For the reason that a number of phenomena appear as reluctantto be explained by this model, in spite of the sustained efforts made to explainthem by Type I theories.

The case of voting is illuminating in this respect. RCT assumes that peo-ples actions are always motivated by the objective of generating some out-come. RCT assumes, in other words, an instrumental or consequential theo-ry of action: that actors arare going to produce.

Now, no single vote isWhy do people still vote?view as to the actual impoto explain the origin of ththat would lead most peopthe outcome while it has ever been taken seriously. influence of their ballot, i

An alternative theory have an influence (Ferejohtial election has shown thprobability of a particularSo that, if we want to elaboutility to most people of tthe infinitesimally weak type of argument Pascal should bet that God existsactually exists would condfor him to believe in Godclose to zero as wished. Asment with the mathematity as close as wished to zeare we ready to assume thpresident rather than Y apnity in the flames of Hell

Other theories belonwhich assumes that abstethough. In some areas andthe eventual reprobationcontrol of their neighbouknows whether I have vot

Many other theories ciling RCT with the fact vote.


Papers 80 001-312 13/12/06 10:53 Pgina 155e motivated by the consequences they imagine they

likely to have any effect on the outcome of the poll. A possible answer is that they tend to have a biasedrtance of their vote. But in that case it is necessary

is bias. Does it come from some psychological forcele to believe falsely that their vote has an impact onactually no impact? I doubt that such a theory hasThough some people may have a wrong view of thet is very unlikely to suppose that most voters have.would be that people still bet that their ballot cann et Fiorina, 1974). The 2000 American presiden-at it can. But even in this very particular case the

ballot having an influence was a priori close to zero.rate on this assumption, we have to suppose that the

he election is so high that it compensates, so to say,probability of any ballot being pivotal. This is theused when he tried to convince the atheist that he. Since not believing in the existence of God if Godemn the atheist to damnation, it would be rational even if the probability that God exists would be as a mathematician, Pascal plays in this famous argu-cal paradox that the infinite multiplied by a quanti-ro without being zero is equal to the infinite. Butat the eventuality of candidate X being elected as

pears to all voters as important as spending the eter-?ging to Type I have been tried, such as the theoryntion has a cost. The theory is highly speculative, circumstances, people may want effectively to avoid induced by abstention because they are under thers. In others, they are not. Thus, in Paris, nobodyed or not.could still be mentioned, which attempt at recon-that a non negligible number of people do actually

Since none of the theories belonging to Type I appears as really convincing,they lead to the conclusion that most people see that voting is a non conse-quential behaviour and that their vote is not going to make the difference.Common sense tells us that people vote because they have a positive attitudetoward democracy and hold elections as an essential ingredient of democracy,so that they vote if they think, say, that X is definitely better than Y. This expla-nation takes us away from RCT. But it is a good theory in the sense that allthe statements it includes are acceptable and that they lead moreover to con-sequences congruent with ation in the rate of particticipation will generally impression that none of t

An argument often hexpressing behaviour by influential science to daynor a sufficient sign of a considered as the model oreality as it is, not necessaognize himself in the theo

Voting behaviour is nples, as the ultimatum gato share 100 between hal. If B accepts As proposgrant respectively to A anthe experimenters pockething like 70 for me, 3satisfactory outcome fromstances equal sharing.

In the same spirit, Fregroups are proposed to dthe territory of their commonetary compensation ibe proposed in the case ofrate of people accepting thpensation is proposed.

These counter exampThey are probably sufficithe obvious reason that mactor, while other actionsRCT is valid exclusively w

Amartya Sen has oncis a rational idiot. He mwould correspond to the pactor of RCT, should for league who, as a true bel


Papers 80 001-312 13/12/06 10:53 Pgina 156data. In particular, it can explain satisfactorily the vari-ipation: it predicts for instance that the rate of par-be lower in the case where many citizens have thehe candidates offered to them is palatable.eard on RCT is that it is better because it allowssimple equations. As biology, the most active and, however shows, equations are neither a necessaryscientific approach. The time when mechanics weref all sciences is over. The aim of science is to describerily to put it into equations. Now, no voter will rec-ries proposed by RCT on voting.ot a singular case. RCT fails in many other exam-

me. In this game, A is asked to propose as he wishesimself and B. B can only accept or reject As propos-al, each receives the part of the 100 A proposed tod B. If B refuses As proposal, the 100 remain int. If RCT were valid here, A would propose some-0 for B, since B would accept and A would get a his proposal. In fact, A proposes in most circum-

y (1997) relates an interesting experiment where twoecide whether they would accept nuclear waste onmunity. The local authorities would be proposed a

n the case of the first group. No compensation would the second group. Against the prediction of RCT, thee nuclear waste is greater in the case where no com-

les are taken among many possible other examples.ent to show that RCT cannot be held as general for

any actions are not inspired by their utility to the appear even as not consequential. In other words,hen restrictive conditions are met.

e said that the social actor as described by the RCTeant that a real human being whose constitution

ostulates describing the homo conomicus, the socialinstance not vote. As a matter of fact, I know a col-iever in RCT, actually does not vote. I always won-

dered whether he was serious or joking. The social actors of RCT are rationalidiots in the sense that in a prisoners dilemma game they would easily gen-erate a catastrophe. Axelrod (1984) has tried to make them a little less idiotin the case of repeated prisoners dilemma games in the sense that in that case,they can play the tit-for-tat strategy, i.e., offer the other player to cooperate.If the other accepts and if none of them is tempted by the short term benefitsthat a treason strategy would generate, the catastrophe will be avoided. In realrepeated prisoners dilemma games it can occur though that actors cannot usethe axelrodian strategy, as illustrated by the case of the arm race between the USand USSR in the second not help behaving as ratiountil a brilliant innovatiDefence Initiative, the Stafollow. By so doing, the fiin the sense that he destrwas able to do so because player is exhausted, if a pappear to him as too costo end the game.

The difference betweter has a good theory of tuation. He is rational inentist is rational. He is co

Choosing Type II instead

The failures of RCT are pularity among sociologistRCT contradicts their favogists accept the idea thachological, cultural or soc

Thus, Clifford Geertzanthropologists should fothat, as norms and valuesall cultures to find them ainant in their society undanthropologists call social

Socialization effects dby sociologists. First of all,fashion. Then, socialisati21]) explains that in the diers had been educated imonotheistic cults appearthe Mithra cult and then Csocialization apparently


Papers 80 001-312 13/12/06 10:53 Pgina 157part of the 20th century. Here, the two actors couldnal idiots and went on a long time with the arm raceon brought the arm race to an end: The Strategicr War. It had the effect that the other player could notrst player was not rational, but rather intelligent,oyed the repeated prisoners dilemma game. And hehe had built a good theory of the situation: the otherrogram of arm development is devised which wouldtly, he would have no other choice than to propose

en a rational and an intelligent actor is that the lat-he situation and of the ways able to modify the sit- the sense, not of RCT, but in the sense where a sci-gnitively rational.

of Type I?

robably to a large extent responsible for its unpop-s. But this unpopularity is also due to the fact thatourite model. For many sociologists and anthropol-t explaining behaviour means identifying the psy-ial forces causing behaviour. states in an influential article that sociologists andllow literally Montaignes teaching, when he claims are different through cultures and as people tend ins valid, people believe in the norms and values dom-er the action of these forces which sociologists andization effects.o exist beyond doubt. But they are too easily evoked their existence is generally demonstrated in a circularon often does not work. Thus, Weber (1988 [1920-Roman Empire, most roman civil servants and sol-n the traditional polytheistic roman religion. Whened in the Roman Empire coming from the Orient, as

hristianity, they were strongly attracted by them. So,did not work properly in this case. Simmel (1892)

observed on his side that socialization can easily have opposite effects: a per-son who has had a hard youth can as well become egoistic as generous; a personeducated liberally as a youngster can educate his own children in a liberal orauthoritarian fashion.

Behaviour is also often explained in the social sciences by psychologicalforces. Thus, cognitive psychologists have observed that people consider asevident solutions to simple mathematical or statistical problems which are falsein the eyes of the mathematician or of the statistician. In many experiments,people appear as underestimrelation where there is noevoking psychological bigrounded in a circular fathough. Sometimes, an efThus Tooby and Cosmidence they registered in somof men in the early stagestural. Moreover, even if thexclusively some particularprobabilities, but not for relation where there is nobiases themselves needed

Dawkins (1976) theorsome biological featuresDawkins propose to intrmemes, and to explain culted from one individual toexplained by the fact that er. Dawkins theory develosical theories which propby an imitation instinct, atation. The attractiveness oit took benefit of the suctheory of biological evolutologists and anthropologi

The type II model advogists and anthropologistsby some psychological, bistances. But, as the Type

In some cases it worksDamasio (1994, 2003) obrutal change in the behthe change in behaviourdescribes the case of a socwho made a mistake whilaged and became whimsi


Papers 80 001-312 13/12/06 10:53 Pgina 158ating or overestimating probabilities, as seeing a cor-ne, etc. Psychologists explain this phenomenon byases. In most cases, the existence of these biases isshion by the effects they are supposed to explain,fort is made to guess where these biases come from.es (1992) claim that the biases in statistical infer-e experiments come from the hunting experiences

of mankind. Such assumptions are highly conjec-ey could be empirically tested, they would explain

biases. They explain the under- or overestimation ofinstance that people in some experiments see a cor-ne. Still, these writers have well perceived that theto be explained.y of memes is fashionable today. Genes explain why are transmitted from one individual to another.oduce the notion of cultural genes, which he callstural evolution by the fact that memes are transmit- another, in the same way as biological evolution is

genes are transmitted from one individual to anoth-ps actually in a new vocabulary a variant of the clas-ose to explain behaviour by socialization effects, ors the theory developed by Tarde in his Laws of imi-f Dawkins theory seems mainly due to the fact that

cess, influence and prestige of the well establishedion and that it rewords theories popular among soci-sts.ertised by Geertz, by Dawkins and by many sociol- according to whom behaviour should be explainedological or cultural forces is valid in many circum-I model, it is not general. beyond doubt. To take an obvious example: whenbserves that some lesion in the brain provokes aaviour of an individual, we have little doubt that is due to the lesion in the brain. Thus, Damasioiable, open, lively and pragmatic mining engineere he manipulated an explosive, had his brain dam-cal and egocentric. In that case, we have no doubt

that the change in the state of the brain is the cause of the change in thebehaviour.

We are obviously very far from this unambiguous situation when a soci-ologist, an anthropologist or a psychologist explains the behaviour of adultsby some experience in their childhood or by the effect of socialization, say.Here, the cause is in most cases conjectural. As a matter of fact, the conceptof socialization is in most cases descriptive rather than genuinely explanatory.When a sociologist states that Roman peasants believed in many gods becausethey were socialized in the traditional polytheistic roman religion, this amountsto saying that, as their parThis statement registers areported earlier, this caseproperly as far as Roman pthe civil servants.

Or, to come back to thnitive psychology, saying ta correlation where there ito some bias, does not saybias has the status of a stenword if it could be shownof the brain explaining th

Generally, words like representation and the oththan explanatory. This poin the case of the conceptical or evolutionary proceof competence.

At this point of our diexample and many othersOn the other hand, the Ttle about their nature, thther Type I nor Type II mmakes a good point whenable than theories explaincal forces. But he is wrowhen he assumes that we Type I and Type II modelare not condemned to seerational exclusively in theforces beyond his control

I will leave aside the ema at a low cost by assumI model when they chooseirrational in the sense of follow a norm.


Papers 80 001-312 13/12/06 10:53 Pgina 159ents, they were themselves educated in this religion. fact rather than a causal relationship. Moreover, as I raises the question as to why socialization workedeasants were concerned, but not with the soldiers and

e examples of application of the Type II model in cog-hat a subject underestimates some probability or seess none under the effect of a bias, because he is exposed more than saying that he is mistaken. The notion ofographic descriptive notion. It could cease to be a mere that biological evolution, say, has produced a wiringe bias. Otherwise we are left with a black box.meme, bias, frame, socialization effects, habitus, socialer concepts of the same type are descriptive rather

int was already convincingly made by Popper (1976) of frame. Such words postulate conjectural biolog-sses which take the social scientist beyond his realm

scussion, we can conclude that, as shown by Popkins, models of Type I can lead to illuminating theories.ype II models are also useful. Though we know lit-ere are such things as socialization effects. But nei-odels can claim to be valid generally. Becker (1996)

he writes that RCT can be scientifically more accept-ing behaviour by cultural, psychological or biologi-

ng when he makes this statement general and alsowould be faced to the dilemma of choosing betweens. In the provocative vocabulary of Amartya Sen, we the homo sociologicus either as a rational idiot being instrumental sense or as an irrational idiot led by.clectic writers who think they can solve the dilem-ing that people are rational in the sense of the type the appropriate means to reach their objectives, butthe type II model when they select an objective or

Type III model

By difference with the behavioural theory of Type I, the Type III theory con-siders in Schtzs vocabulary Weil-motive beside Wozu-motive. By differencewith Type II, it uses only marginally the notion of forces. In a nutshell, itsmain difference with the other two models lies in the fact that it uses ordinarypsychology, rational theory in Nisbets sense, as its favourite theory of behav-iour.

Before discussing the I will illustrate it. I will exwill have the incidental aDurkheims actual analysealready mentioned this poof crisis situations on suicidchological mechanism useapproach.

In a particularly brilliathese particular actions whbelieve in the effectiveneson which many pages havrain rituals have the capanot. While many explanaDurkheim succeeds solvinlogy.

Magical rituals as rainsupposed to produce an eof the effect of rain on thcal practices raises no partiour lies rather in the beli

An easy solution to thbelief: to assume for instasocialized to believe that proposed notably by Lvyof forces he christened prithe primitives, in the voence rules different from onality is culture dependenern days by Needham (19the theories they developeuniversal would in fact bHuntington (1996) goes eof universality is a particu

With his deep sense oexplanation of magical bone: that Westerners woul


Papers 80 001-312 13/12/06 10:53 Pgina 160model from a theoretical viewpoint in more detail,amine carefully an example from Durkheim. Thisdvantage of stressing, against a current view, thats do not use Type II, but rather Type III models. Iint when I recalled Durkheims analysis of the effecte rates. Hirschman (1982) has elaborated on the psy-

d by Durkheim in this analysis, using also a Type III

nt analysis, Durkheim wonders why people executeich we call magical rituals. They do so because theys of magical recipes. A difficult enigmatic questione been written is then: why do people believe that

city of producing rain, while objectively they havetions use controversial psychological assumptions,g the question by using rational ordinary psycho-

rituals are instrumental, in the sense that they areffect, rain fall. Of course rain fall is wished becausee growth of plants. This instrumental side of magi-icular question. The puzzling aspect of this behav-ef that magical rituals would be objectively useful.is problem is to use a Type II model to explain thence that the magician and his customers have beenrain rituals are effective. This type of solution was-Bruhl (1960 [1922]): he postulated the existence

mitive mentality. They would make that the brain ofcabulary of Lvy-Bruhls time, is submitted to infer-urs. Lvy-Bruhl supposes in other words that ratio-t. The same type of solution was endorsed in mod-72), Beattie (1964) or Sahlins (1995). According tod, the rules of inference which we use and considere particular and characteristic of our own culture.ven as far in this vein as to say that the very notionlar feature of Western culture.f methodology, Wittgenstein (1967) saw that thiseliefs is unsatisfactory and proposes an alternatived wrongly assume that the primitives would believe

in the effectiveness of magic. According to Wittgenstein, magical behaviourshould be interpreted as expressive rather than instrumental: the primitiveswould not really believe in the efficiency of their rituals. They would ratherexpress by their rituals their desire that rain falls.

Wittgensteins theory is definitely more palatable than the theory devel-oped by Lvy-Bruhl and his followers. It uses ordinary psychology and belongsto our Type III. Wittgenstein was conscious that the widespread Type II the-ories of magical rituals were scientifically unsatisfactory. Unfortunately, histheory is false in the sense uals would have no effecmagical beliefs. Accordinfalls on a root in the bushfall is the effect of mechaeffect of magical factorshave fallen if he had beenlucky. As Evans Pritchaexplanations is commonsome states of affairs by lu

So, primitive peopletal value. To be able to enassume that the primitibelieve. But in that case This is more easily said thpatible with many obserspeaking countries of blache observed that people bverted to Christianity. Whfrom a soteriological viewical remedies offered by thfrom which they came.

Both Weber and DurHorton, propose a Type IIical rituals which is much

Weber (1976 [1922])sentence: to the primitimeans that to us Westerneing. The operation thankpieces of wood, is groundrituals as magical becauseprimitives, the distinctiequally magical. Weber methe laws of the transformthem is clear. That they wble. In other words, the pway of making fire, but th


Papers 80 001-312 13/12/06 10:53 Pgina 161that people reject with force the idea that magical rit-t: they refuse the expressive interpretation of theirg to Evans Pritchard (1968[1937]), when a Zande, he shows when interviewed that he knows that hisnical forces, but he sees it at the same time as the. He knows, as we do, that he would plausibly not more careful, but also if he would have been morerd says, this combination of objective and magical to the Azande and to Westerners: we also explainck. Evens Pritchard uses here ordinary psychology. are convinced that their rituals have an instrumen-dorse Wittgensteins answer, we should be ready toves do not believe effectively what they say theywe would have to explain this false consciousness.an done. Moreover, Wittgensteins theory is incom-vations, as Hortons (1993, 1982): in the Englishk Africa where he had conducted his investigations,elieve in magical practices even when they have con-en asked why, they answer that Christianity is goodpoint, but that it has the defect of missing the mag-e magical rituals derived from the animistic religion

kheim and their followers, as Evans Pritchard orI solution to the problem of the explanation of mag- more acceptable than its competitors. encapsulates the theory he defends by a compactve fire making is as magical as rain making. Thisrs, there is a difference between fire- and rain mak-s to which the primitive makes fire, rubbing two

ed on objectively valid laws. By contrast, we see rain they are not objectively grounded. To them, to theon is meaningless: they see fire and rain making asans here that we make a difference because we know

ation of energy. That the primitives have not learntould have discovered them intuitively is implausi-rimitives have probably discovered empirically thee theory thanks to which they explain this technique

is likely as magical as the theory supporting their rain making techniques.There is no reason to suppose with Lvy-Bruhl that the brain of the primi-tives is wired in a way different from ours. It suffices to take seriously theobvious fact that they have not learnt physics on school benches, and that theyhave no reason to see intuitively laws that Westerners have discovered aftermany centuries. There is no reason for them to make a difference between theway they explain fire making and rain making, while for us there is a strongreason.

Durkheim did not knideas. When the primitivhow which has been discnext. But they also need tnot be determined empirry. As they have no acceslogical theory from the relin their society. For religiscience in Western societicedures derived from this comparable to the technious difference is that the not this show, as Lvy-Bruotherwise; that they are n

Not only, objects Duas any modern scientist dfrom the Duhem-Quine data, the normal reactionrather than to reject the also because he does not kso that it is reasonable folikely reconcile the theoryhistory of science shows. This is also what the maghe will assume, say, that have been, etc. Durkheima thesis widely accepted b

Another objection raied, magical recipes fail inrain rituals are practised ifall, a correlation betweenwith/without rain will be spurious. But Westerners g

On the whole, Durkhnative theories of magicaleasily and convincingly a much more frequent in Eu


Papers 80 001-312 13/12/06 10:53 Pgina 162ow Webers sentence, but he elaborates on the samees grow some plant, they use much empirical know-overed and transmitted from one generation to theo know why plants grow, wither and die. This can-ically. So they need to forge some biological theo-s to science in the modern sense, they draw this bio-igious interpretation of the world treated as legitimateon represents the legitimate source of knowledge, ases. As to the magical recipes, they are technical pro-religious theory of the world. So, magical recipes arecal recipes Westerners draw from science. The obvi-recipes derived from science are more reliable. Doeshl postulates, that the brain of the primitives is wiredot, say, as sensitive as Westerners to contradiction?

rkheim, they dislike contradiction, but they treat itoes: by inventing auxiliary assumptions. We know

thesis that, when a theory fails to explain some new of any scientist is to invent auxiliary assumptions

theory, because the theory explains many data andnow a priori which element in the theory is wrong,r him to assume that an auxiliary assumption will with the data. This is what the scientists do, as the

This is what they should do, as epistemology shows.ician does. In the case where the magical rituals fail,they have not been executed exactly as they should anticipated very clearly the Duhem-Quine thesis,y historians and philosophers of science.sed by Durkheim himself is that, being unground- 50% of the cases. Durkheims answer is that, as then the period of the year where rain is more likely to the two variables days with/without rituals and days

normally observed. The correlation will of course beround also often their beliefs on spurious correlations.eims theory is much more acceptable than the alter- rituals available on the market. Moreover, it explainsnumber of puzzling data: why magical practices wererope in the 16th or 17th centuries than in the 14th cen-

tury, and more frequent in the modern parts of Europe: more frequent inNorthern than in Southern Italy or than in Spain, say. It explains on the wholemany comparative data, some of them have been discovered a long time afterDurkheim proposed his theory, for instance by Thomas (1973). On thewhole, Durkheims Type III theory works beautifully where several Type IItheories have failed.

Durkheim uses here ordinary rational psychology. The primitive peopleneed recipes to grow their crops. Durkheims central thesis is that they arerational in the same way ahave strong reasons to b

Evans Pritchards (19because they show also, intives use the same inferencthe Azande manipulate logstudent. Cole and Scribnemaster the rules of logical

I have tried to show emodern sociology, that Tses (Boudon, 1998a, 200well as Durkheim or WePritchard and others, alwasatisfied with the explanaindividuals are guided by

Type III model and Web

I borrowed my main examElementary forms of religioRules of sociological methothe latter he prohibits anyfamous motto states: explaaux par des faits sociauxcide, he always uses ordintion of the reasons as toCatholics, bachelors thanof magical rituals. In all texplores by making themas understandable in Webmotivations which we evwhich I do not intend to to do with the methodolo

This discrepancy doeswritings are sketchy. Whmodel illustrated by the ewith Type I and II model


Papers 80 001-312 13/12/06 10:53 Pgina 163s scientists are. To the best of their knowledge, theyelieve in the effectiveness of their magical recipes.68 1937) or Hortons (1993) work are fascinating agreement with Durkheims intuition, that the primi-e rules as any scientist. When they take their oracles,ical calculus with a greater virtuosity than any westernr (1974) have shown that in Liberia, the primitives inference as well as any American student.lsewhere, taking several examples from classical andype III models are used in many illuminating analy-3, 2005). The greatest sociologists, Tocqueville, asber and others, the greatest anthropologists, Evansys use Type III models. It is exceptional to see themtion that some phenomenon is due to the fact that psychological, social or biological forces

ers methodological writings

ple from Durkheim as a kind of provocation. In hisus life little remains from what he had stated in thed and generally in his methodological writings. In psychological explanation of sociological facts as thein social facts by social facts (expliquer les faits soci-

). In his explanation of variations in the rates of sui-ary rational psychology though, as in his explana-

why Protestant commit suicide more often than married people, etc. The same is true of his analysishese analyses, he explains the social phenomena he the outcome of individual actions which he treatsers sense: as explainable by the kind of reasons andoke normally in everyday life. For various reasonsexplore here, his methodological writings have littlegy he uses effectively in his analyses. not appear with Weber, though his methodologicalen they are made less sketchy, we get the Type IIIxamples I have just presented, which, by differences, can be considered as genuinely general.

So, let us make Webers methodological ideas more explicit and articula-ted with one another.

The idea of comprehension means that we can in principle find the causesof any piece of behaviour or of any belief, even if at first sight it appears asstrange to us, as irrational in the current sense of the word. This is the casefor instance of magical beliefs. They give an impression of being strongly irra-tional. Still, as Durkheim and Weber have shown, they can be convincinglyexplained in the sense that their causes can be identified in a convincing way.These causes are the reasobelieve. The motivations iable to survive. The reasonbeen identified by Durkhetheories of the world froextract technical recipes frories to the data and elimiSo, to explain an action, evstructing the motivations

Another point of thereasons and motivations othe rules generally used wwood cutter makes this pyard, I will explain his bereasons. Maybe he is coldtheory will be rejected if other one, until I reach asons borrowed from the oall the available observatunderstandable motivatiotimately propose an irrattrend to cut wood.

Another very importanthat the expression beinmeaning actually: behavsons perceived as strong afrom Durkheim on magicthe magical rituals are exof the primitives.

Another important pocan be instrumental andbetween instrumental andty does not necessarily tak

The meaning of this ncussed. Sukale (1995) weninterpretation is that we camental rationality and co


Papers 80 001-312 13/12/06 10:53 Pgina 164ns and motivations people have to believe what theyn this case are clear: to have a sufficient crop to bes why they endorse the idea that magical rituals haveim and Weber. The primitives have at their disposalm which they draw magical recipes, exactly as weom our scientific theories. They confront their the-nate eventual contradictions using the same devices.en apparently irrational as rain rituals, means recon-and reasons of the actors. comprehension theory is that reconstructing thef an actor amounts to building a theory followinghen building any theory. Webers example of theoint clear. If I see somebody cutting wood in his

haviour by evoking some possible motivations and and wants to burn the wood in his chimney. Thisthe weather is warm and I will have to find some theory lending to the actor motivations and rea-rdinary rational psychology and compatible with

ional data. In the case where I would fail to findns and reasons, and only in this case, I would legi-ional explanation as: he suffers from a compulsive

t point which can be derived from Webers notes isg rational can be treated as a shorthand notationing, acting or believing on the basis of a set of rea-nd well articulated with one another. The exampleal rituals provides a clear illustration of this point:

plained by a set of articulated reasons in the mind

int is that some of the reasons explaining an action some not. The very distinction made by Weber axiological rationality shows that, to him, rationali-e an instrumental form.otion of axiological rationality has been much dis-t even as far as to say that it is meaningless. My ownn and have an interest to distinguish between instru-gnitive rationality. Instrumental rationality means:

looking for the best means to reach a goal. Cognitive rationality means: findingthe good explanation of a phenomenon. As to axiological rationality, I pro-pose to see it as a special case of cognitive rationality. If this interpretation which is not to be found in Webers work but which can be regarded aselaborating on his intuitions- is accepted, being axiologically rational means:finding a set of strong and strongly articulated reasons leading to a normativeconclusion. I have tried elsewhere to illustrate this idea by an example taken fromAdam Smith, where he wonders why the British public in his time was con-vinced that miners shouldthis puzzling collective belmind of the public by a sa brilliant example of axcontemporary illustration

A further important pchology should not be mposes to explain behavioued, so that using deep psrealm of scientific theorie

The above principles analyses we owe to sociolotheory of Type III. All recbination with non instrumspecial case being what W

Also, it can be shown in the frame of the behaable by the behavioural thsee that, if no compensatnuclear waste on the terriop the theory that they wto accept a sacrifice for thepensation is proposed, peposed to them and that thnot very interesting. Becaof people, those to whomquently. That the same oto show that the proposalpeoples minds in the two

I have tried to show texplained by Type II models: one need not to postuwith a highly conjecturashown both by the a prioteriori by actual analysesbehavioural theory of Tythe behavioural theory of


Papers 80 001-312 13/12/06 10:53 Pgina 165 be definitely paid more than soldiers. He explainsief by showing that this conclusion was derived in theet of strong reasons, strongly related to one another:iological rationality (Boudon, 1998b). I will evokes in a moment.oint is that the resources of the so-called deep psy-obilized because the forces thanks to which it pro-r are in most cases conjectures which cannot be test-ychology takes sociological theories away from thes.lead many of the most convincing and illuminatinggists. Most of them use in other words the behaviouralognize that instrumental rationality appears in com-ental rationality, the rationality I called cognitive, aeber christened axiological rationality.that the phenomena which appear as unexplainablevioural theory of Type I are in most cases explain-eory of Type III. Freys paradox can be solved if weion is proposed, people will accept more easily thetory of their community, because they tend to devel-ill consider themselves and will be considered as able sake of the general interest. By contrast, when com-

ople tend to develop the theory that a bargain is pro-ey feel entitled to judge that the bargain is actually

use the proposal generates two theories in the mind compensation is offered accept the proposal less fre-bservation was made in two different contexts tends tended to induce the same system of reasons in the contexts.hat the findings of cognitive psychology generallyels could also easily be explained by Type III mod-late that the wrong answers are produced by biases

l origin (Boudon, 1996). On the whole, it can beri arguments I have tried to develop, but also a pos- of empirical data, that the difficulties met by thepe I and II can in many cases be solved by using

Type III.

The importance of the discussion

To conclude, I will point to the fact that the former discussion is importantnot only from a scientific but also from a general viewpoint.

Suppose we want to explain why most of us have a negative reaction towardfemale genital mutilation. An explanation using the behavioural theory of TypeII would assume that cultural forces and socialization effects make that wehave a feeling of cruelty, while other cultural forces make that this practice wasand still is widely adoptedSuch explanations are proGeertz (1984). It is difficuwould use the behaviouraioural theory of Type III wa means of social control athan another is found we Durkheim (1960 [1893]) point that social control Tocqueville (1986 [1840]) that our moral sensibility est minds in Greece and be abolished. They acceppensable to the economic which did not have recoutoward slavery developed.impossible to abolish slavethe sugar market, but he cfeelings and reactions towsons. The Greek saw slaverthis view once it had beencentury universal vote washown it was not. All theaxiological and instrumen18th century had strong ainstrumental reasons not

I will evoke a final exapproach to rationality whThe example deals with dthe public to current even

In an article of Decemes an interesting sociologiof the law can arouse littleviolations can generate moGermany, the deputy polito torture the captured kihe had every reason to be


Papers 80 001-312 13/12/06 10:53 Pgina 166 in many societies without arousing the same feeling.posed by important writers as Shweder (2000) or

lt to imagine an explanation of this difference whichl theory of Type I. An explanation using the behav-

ould assume, say, that female genital mutilation isnd that as soon as a means of social control less crueltend to require that the less cruel means is adopted.developed this kind of explanation when he made thetends to become over time more and more liberal.developed the same kind of model when he remarkedtoward slavery has irreversibly changed. The great-Rome, he states, never imagined that slavery couldted it because they thought it was functional: indis-system. Then, forms of social organization appearedrse to slavery. From that moment a negative feeling In the 18th century, Montesquieu wrote that it wasry in the Antilles because this would deeply disturbonsidered it as against nature. In other words, theard an institution result from a set of articulated rea-y as indispensable. It was no more possible to endorse shown that it was not. Still at the end of the 19th

s considered as a dangerous institution, until it wasse familiar examples illustrate the tension betweental rationality. The political men at the end of thexiological reasons to condemn slavery and strong

to abolish it.ample to illustrate the importance of the cognitiveich characterizes the behavioural theory of Type III.

ifferences in the moral reactions and sensitiveness ofts.ber 24, 2004, the International Herald Tribune rais-cal question. It wonders why very serious violations reaction in a given context while much less seriousre reprobation in another. The article reports that ince chief of Frankfurt was found guilty of threateningdnapper-murderer of an 11-year-old child, thoughlieve that a kidnapped childs life hung in the balance,

and, in this sense, threatening torture of the young man who had seized himwas justified. By contrast, while the US has used torture at the Abu Ghraibprison in Baghdad and in Guantnamo, there is no strong sign that the pub-lic is outraged by these actions. The public reaction can be explained in thetwo cases by reasons. But, as the German and the American contexts are dif-ferent, the reasons were different. The decision of the German judge was explic-itly justified by reference to the German past. By contrast, the Americanpublic, victimized by a terrible act of mass murder and witness to the dailyterror bombings in Iraq, seems inured to the torture being conducted, sup-posedly, in its interest.

The same type of cognin the treatment of Stalinan ex-Nazi, because Stalinof morally and socially acis seen as inspired by devi

Men are neither ratioway they do because theyIn many cases they have toare faced to. Durkheims identist behave in the sameal theory of the homo soci

My final guess is thaTocquevilles or Durkheimhas become impressionisTocquevilles, Durkheimproduced convincing maciour of Type III rather thatoday.

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Homo Sociologicus: Neither a Rational nor an Irrational IdiotAbstractResumen. El homo sociologicus: ni idiota racional ni irracional

ContentsA typical analysis: Durkheim analyses a correlationThree theories of behaviourType I.Type II.Type III.

Type I or II?Is Type I general?Choosing Type II instead of Type I?Type III modelType III model and Webers methodological writingsThe importance of the discussionReferences

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