HOBSBAWM, E.J. 17th Cent European Econom Crisis

7/23/2019 HOBSBAWM, E.J. 17th Cent European Econom Crisis

1/22

Past and Present Society and Oxford University Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to

Past & Present.

http://www.jstor.org

ast and resent Society

The General Crisis of the European Economy in the 17th CenturyAuthor(s): E. J. HobsbawmSource: Past & Present, No. 5 (May, 1954), pp. 33-53Published by: on behalf ofOxford University Press Past and Present SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/649822Accessed: 23-11-2015 11:49 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of contentin a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

This content downloaded from 87.77.127.12 on Mon, 23 Nov 2015 11:49:35 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ouphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=pasthttp://www.jstor.org/stable/649822http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/649822http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=pasthttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ouphttp://www.jstor.org/


2/22

33

The General

Crisis

of the

EuropeanEconomy

in the 17thCentury

IN THIS ARTICLE I WISH

TO

SUGGEST THAT THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY

passed

through general

risis

during

he

I7th

century,

he ast

phase

of the

general

ransitionrom feudal o

a

capitalistconomy.

Since

1300

or

so,

when

omethinglearly

egan

o

go

seriously

rong

with

uropean

eudal

ociety1

here avebeenseveral ccasionswhen

parts

of

Europe

trembled n the brink f

capitalism.

There is a

taste

of

bourgeois

and

industrial revolution bout

14th-

century

Tuscany

and

Flanders or

early

I6th-century ermany.

Yet it

is

only

from he

middle

of the I7th

century

hat this taste

becomes

more

han

a

seasoning

o an

essentially

edieval r feudal

dish.

The earlier

urban

societies

never

quite

succeeded n

the

revolutions

hey

foreshadowed.From the

early

i8th

century,

however,

bourgeois society

dvanced

without ubstantialhecks.

The

I7th

century

risis

thus

differs

rom

ts

predecessors

n that

it led to as fundamental solutionof the difficulties hich had

previously

tood

n

the

way

of the

triumph

f

capitalism,

s that

system

will

permit.

In this rticle

propose

o marshal omeof

the

evidence

or he existence f a

general

risis,

which s still

disputed

by

some,

nd to

suggest

n

explanation

f

t.

In a

subsequent

rticle

I

propose

o discuss ome

ofthe

changes

t

produced,

nd

how t was

overcome.

It is

veryprobable

hat

great

deal of

historicalwork

willbe done

on

this

ubject

nd

period

n thenext ew

years.

Indeed,

lately

historians n various countrieshave

tentativelyuggested

somethingike that generalcheck to economicdevelopment

or

general

crisis

with

which his

paper

deals.2

It

may

hereforee

convenient

o take

a

bird's

eye

view of the

field,

nd to

speculate

about

some sort

of

working

ypothesis,

f

only

to stimulate

etter

ones,

or further ork.

Evidence

or

a

general

crisis

A

good

deal of evidence

for the

general

crisis is

available.

We

must,

however,

e careful o avoid the

argument

hat

general

crisis quals economic etrogression,hichhas bedevilledmuch of

the discussion

about

the 'feudal crisis of the

I4th

and

I5th

centuries.

It is

perfectly

learthat here

was a

good

deal of retro-

gression

n the

7th

century.

For

the first ime in

history

he

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/22

PAST

AND

PRESENT

Mediterraneaneasedto be a

major

entre f economic

nd

political,

and

eventually

f cultural nfluence nd became an

impoverished

backwater.The Iberianpowers,taly,Turkeywereplainly n the

downgrade:

Venice was on the

way

to

becoming

touristcentre.

With

he

exception

f a few

places dependent

n the

Northwestern

states

generally

ree

ports)

and

the

piratemetropolis

f

Algiers,

which also

operated

n the

Atlantic,3

here was little advance.

Further

orth,

he decline f

Germany

s

patent, hough

ot

wholly

unrelieved.

In the

Baltic

Poland,

Denmark

nd

the

Hanse

were

on the

way

down.

Though

the

power

nd

influence

f

Habsburg

Austria increased

(perhaps largely

because others declined so

dramatically),erresourcesemained oor,hermilitaryndpolitical

structure

ickety

ven t the

period

f

her

greatest

lory

n the

early

i8th

century.

On the other and n the Maritime

owers

nd their

dependencies England,

the

United

Provinces, weden,

and in

Russia and

some minor reas like

Switzerland,

he

impression

s

one

of advance rather

han

stagnation;

n

England,

of decisive

advance. France

occupied

an intermediate

osition,

hough

ven

here

political

riumph

was not balanced

ygreat

conomic dvance

until the

end

of

the

century,

and then

only intermittently.

Indeed an atmospherefgloom ndcrisis ills hediscussionshere

after

68o,

though

onditionsn

the

previous alf-century

an

hardly

have

been

superior.

(Possibly

the

huge

catastrophe

f

I693-4

accounts

or

his.')

It

was in

the

i6th not the

I7th

century

hat

invading

mercenaries

marvelled t

how

much there

was to loot

in

France,

and

men in Richelieu's nd Colbert's ra looked

back on

Henry

V's as a

sort

of

golden

ge.

It

is

indeed

possible

that,

for

some

decades n the middleof

the

century

he

gains

made

in the

Atlantic id not

replace

the losses in the

Mediterranean,

entral

Europeanand Baltic,the totalproceedsfrombothstagnatingr

perhaps

declining.

Nevertheless hat

s

important

s the decisive

advance

n

the

progress

f

capitalism

whichresulted.

The

scattered

igures

or

European

population

uggest,

t

worst

an actual

decline,

t best a level

or

slightly

ising lateau

between

the

mounting

lopes

of

the

population

urve n the later 6th

and

18th

centuries.

Except

for

the

Netherlands,

orway

nd

perhaps

Sweden

nd Switzerlandnd some

ocal

areas

no

major

ncreases

n

population

appear

to be recorded.

Spain

was a

by-word

for

depopulation,outherntalymayhavesuffered,ndtheravages f

the

mid-century

n

Germany

and

Eastern

France are

known.

Though

Pirenne has

argued

that

Belgian population

ncreased,

figures

or Brabant

do

not

seem to bear him out.

Hungarian

34



4/22

GENERALCRISIS

OF

EUROPEAN

ECONOMY

IN

I7TH

CENTURY

35

population

fell;

that of

Poland

even

more.

English

population

growth

robably

loweddown

rapidly

nd

may

ctually

ave ceased

after 630.5 In fact t is noteasyto see whyClarkconcludes hat

the

I7th

century

n most

f

Europe

saw,

ikethe

i6th,

a

moderate

increase

n

population. 6

Mortality

was

certainly

igher

han

in

either

he

i6th or

i8th.

No

century

ince

the

I4th

has

a worse

record

or

pidemic

isease

and recent

workhas

demonstrated

hat

its

ravages

annot

e dissociated

rom

hose ffamine.7

While

hand-

ful

of

ourt

nd

administrative

etropoles

r centres

f

international

trade

nd

finance

rew

o

great

ize

the

number f

great

ities,

which

had

risen

n the

6th

century,

emained

table nd

small nd

medium

townsfrequentlyeclined. This appearsto apply in part even

to the

maritime

ountries.8

What

happened

o

production

We

simply

o not know.

Some

areas

were

plainly

e-industrialized,

otably

taly

which ransformed

itself rom

he

most

urbanised nd

industrialized

ountry

f

Europe

into a

typical

backward

easant

area,

most of

Germany, arts

of

France

and

Poland.9

On

the

other

hand

there was

fairly

apid

industrial

evelopment

n

some

places

Switzerland,

nd

in

the

extractive

ndustries,

ngland

nd

Sweden,

nd an

important

rowth

ofrural ut-workt theexpense f urbanor local craft roduction

in

many

reas

which

may

or

may

not have meant

net

ncrease

n

total

output.

If

prices

re

any

guide

we shouldnot

expect

o

find

a

general

decline

n

production,

or

the

deflationaryeriod

which

followed

he

great

price-rise

f the

pre-I64o

era

is

more

easily

explained

y

a

relative r absolute

alling-off

n demand ather

han

by

a decline

n

the

upply

f

money.

However,

n

the

basic

ndustry

of

textiles here

may

have

been not

only

a shift

rom

old to

new

draperies,

ut a

decline

of total

output

for

part

of

the

century. 0

The crisis

n commerceas

more

general.

The

two main

areas

of

established

nternational

rade,

he Mediterranean

nd

the

Baltic

underwent

evolution,

nd

probably

emporary

ecline

n the

volume

of

trade.

The Baltic

the

European

olony

f

the western

rban-

ized countries

changed

ts

staple exports

from

foodstuffs

o

products

ike

timber,

metals nd

naval

stores,

while ts

traditional

imports

f westernwoollens

diminished.

Trade

as

measured

by

the Sound

tolls

reached

ts

peak

in

I590-I620,

collapsed

n

the

I62os, and declinedcatastrophicallyfter omerecoveryntilthe

I65os,

remaining

n the doldrums

until I68o

or

so.ll

After

650,

the

Mediterranean

ecame ike

the Baltic n

area

exchanging

ocally

produced oods,

mainly

aw

materials,

or

he Atlantic

manufactures



5/22

PAST

AND

PRESENT

and the oriental

goods

now

monopolized

y

the

Northwest.

By

the

end

of

the

entury

he

Levant

got

ts

spices

from he

North,

not

theEast. FrenchLevantine radehalvedbetween

620

and 1635,

sank

almost o zero

by

the

i65os

and

did

not

really

ecover rom

depression

evels

until

afterthe

i670os.

Dutch

Levantine

trade

did

poorly

rom

bout

617

to

about

650.12

Even then

heFrench

hardly

xceeded

pre-depression

evels much

before

700.

Did the

British

nd Dutch sales

drive n the

South

make

up

for osses

n

the

Baltic markets

Probably

not. It

may

barely

have

made

up

for

the decline n

previous

ales of

Italian

products.

The

international

trade n

foodstuffs Baltic

orn,

Dutch

herrings

nd

Newfoundland

fish did notmaintaintsJacobeanevels. The internationalrade

in

woollen loths

may

have

shrunk;

or

was t

mmediately eplaced

by

other

extiles,

or

the

great

centres f

exportable

inen,

Silesia

and

Lusatia,

seem to have declined

omewhat

fter

620. In

fact

it

is

not

unlikely

hat

general

alance

of

rising

nd

declining

rade

would

produce xport igures

hich

id

not

rise

ignificantly

etween

1620 and i66o.

Outside he maritimetates t is

unlikely

hat

ales

on

the

home-markets ade

up

for his.

As

we know

rom

he

9th

century,

hemalaise

f business

annot

be measured imply ytrade ndproductionigures, hateverhese

may

e.

(It

is

nevertheless

ignificant

hat he

whole one f

conomic

discussion

assumed

stable markets and

profit

opportunities.

Colbertian

mercantilism,

t has oftenbeen

said,

was

a

policy

of

economicwarfare or

arge

lices

of

a

world rade-cake f

fixed ize.

There

s

no reason

why

dministratorsnd

traders

for

economics

was not

yet

n

academic

ubject

shouldhave

adopted

iews

which

were

greatly

t variancewith

ppearances).

It

is certain

hateven

in countrieswhich

did

not decline there

were secular

business

difficulties. nglish East India trade languished until the

Restoration.13

Though

that of the Dutch

increased

handsomely,

the

average

nnual dividend f their

East India

Company

ell

for

each

of the

ten-year

eriods

rom he

I63os

to

the

i670s

(including

both), except

for

a

slight

rise in the

I66os.

Between

I627

and

I687

sixteen

years

were

without

ividend;

n

the rest

of

the

Company's

history

rom

602

to

I782

none.

(The

value of ts

goods

remained

stable between

I640

and

i66o).

Similarly

he

profits

f the

Amsterdam isselbank eached

peak

n the

63os

and then

eclined

for coupleofdecades.14 Again, t maynot be wholly ccidental

that

he

greatest

messianicmovement f

Jewish

istory

ccurred

t

this

moment,

weeping

he communitiesf

the

great

rading

entres

-

Smyrna, eghorn,

enice,

Amsterdam,

amburg

off heir eet

36



6/22

GENERAL CRISIS OF

EUROPEAN

ECONOMY

IN I7TH CENTURY

37

with

special

success

n the middle

66os as

prices

eached

almost

their

owest

point.

It is also clearthat the expansion f Europepassed through

crisis.

Though

thefoundations

f

the fabulous

olonial

ystem

f

the I8th

century

werelaid

mainly

fter

65015,

arlier

here

may

actually

have

been some contraction

f

European

nfluence

xcept

in the hinterlands

f Siberia

and

America.

The

Spanish

and

Portuguesempires

f course

contracted,

nd

changed

character.

But it

is also worth

noting

hat the

Dutch did

not maintain

he

remarkable

ate of

expansion

of I6oo to

I640

and their

Empire

actually

hrank n the next

30 years.16

The

collapse

ofthe

Dutch

West ndiacompanyfterhe 64os,and the imultaneousinding-up

of

the

English

Africa

ompany

nd the Dutch West

ndia

Company

in

the

arly

67os

may

be mentioned

n

passing.

It will be

generallygreed

hat he

I7th

century

as one of

social

revoltboth

in Western nd

Eastern

Europe.

This

clustering

f

revolutions,

as led some historians

o

see

something

ike

a

general

social-revolutionary

risis

n the middleof

the

century.17

France

had its

Frondes,

whichwere

mportant

ocial

movements;

atalan,

Neapolitan

and

Portugese

revolutions

marked

the crisis

of

the

Spanish mpiren the 64os; theSwisspeasantwar f 653 expressed

both

he

post-war

risis nd the

ncreasingxploitation

f

peasant

y

town,

while

in

England

revolution

riumphed

with

portentous

results.18

Though peasant

unrest idnot

cease

n

the West

-

the

stampedpaper

rising

which

combined

middle

lass,

maritime

and

peasant

unrest

n

Bordeaux

nd

Brittany

ccurred

n

1675,

the

Camisard

wars even ater19 those ofEastern

Europe

were more

significant.

n

the i6th

century

here

had been

fewrevolts

gainst

the

growing

nserfment

f

peasants.

The

Ukrainian

evolution

f

I648-54 maybe regardeds a major ervile pheaval. So must he

various Kurucz movements

n

Hungary,

heir

ery

ame

harking

back

to Dozsa's

peasant

rebels

of

I5I4,

their

memory

nshrined

in

folksongs

bout

Rakoczy

s that of the Russian

revolt

f

I672

is

in

the

song

about

Stenka

Razin.

A

major

Bohemian

peasant

rising

n i68o

opened

a

period

of endemic

erf

unrest here.20

It

wouldbe

easy

o

lengthen

his

atalogue

f

major

ocial

upheavals

for

nstance

y

ncluding

herevolts f

he

rish

n

164I

and

1689.

Only

n one

respect

did

the

I7th

century

s

a whole overcome

rather han experience ifficulties. utsidethe maritime owers

with

heir

new,

nd

experimental

ourgeois

egimes

most

f

Europe

found n

efficient

nd

stable

form f

government

n absolutism

n

the

Frenchmodel.

(But

the rise

ofabsolutism

as

been

taken

s

a



7/22

PAST AND

PRESENT

direct

ign

f

economic

weakness.21

The

question

sworth

xploring

further).

The

great

ge

ofad

hoc

devices n

politics,

ar ndadmin-

istrationanishedwith hegreatworld mpires fthei6thcentury,

the

Spanish

nd

Turkish.

For the

first ime

arge

territorial

tates

seemed

apable

of

solving

heir hree

undamental

roblems:

owto

have

the

ordersof

government

beyed

directly

ver a

large

area,

how to

have

enough

cash

for the

large

ump-sum

ayments

hey

periodically

eeded,

nd

-

partly

n

consequence

fthis

howto

run

their

wn armies. The

age

of the

great

ndependent

inancial

and

military

ub-contractors

aded with

the

Thirty

Years'

War.

States till

had

to

subcontract,

s

the

practice

f

selling

ffices

nd

farmingaxes bearswitness.22However, he wholebusinesswas

now

officially

ontrolled

y governments,

ot

merely

ontrolledn

practice y

the

fact

hat,

s the

Fuggers

nd

Wallenstein ad

found

to

their

ost,

he

monopoly

uyer

an

dictate

erms s

much

as the

monopoly

eller.

Perhaps

this

obvious

political

success of

the

absolutist erritorial

tates

with heir

omp

and

splendour

as

n the

past

distracted

ttentionrom he

general

ifficulties

f he

ge.

If

only art

f his

vidence olds

water,

e are

ustified

n

speaking

of

a

general

risis

in the

7th

entury;

hough

ne

of ts

character-

isticswas therelativemmunityf thestateswhichhad undergone

bourgeois

evolution. It is

probable

though

ere

we

venture

on the

complex erritory

f

pricehistory23

thatthe

crisis

began

about

620;

perhaps

with he

slumpperiod

from

619

into

the

early

I62os.

It seems

certain

hat,

fter

ome

distortionf

price

move-

ments

by

the

Thirty

Years'

War,

t

reached ts

most

acute

phase

between

640

and the

I670s,though recise

dates are

out

of

order

in the

discussion f

ong-term

conomic

movements.

From hen

n

the

evidence s

conflicting.

robably

he

signs

of

revival

utweigh

thoseof crisisnotonly obviously)n theMaritime tatesbutelse-

where.

However,

he

wild oscillations f boom

and

depression,

the

famines, evolts,

pidemics

nd

other

igns

f

profound

conomic

trouble

n

I680-I720

should

warn

us

against nte-dating

he

period

of full

ecovery.

If

thetrendwas

upwards

rom,

ay,

he

i68os-or

evenearliern individual

ountries it was still

iable

o

disastrous

fluctuations.

It

may,

owever,

e

argued

hatwhat have

described s a

general

crisis was

merely

heresult f

7th

century

ars,

articularly

fthe

Thirty ears'War I618-I648). In thepasthistoriansave n fact

tended

o take

or

rather o

imply)

hisview.

But

the crisis

ffected

manyparts

of

Europe

not

ravaged

y generals

nd

quartermasters;

and

conversely,

ometraditional

cockpits

f

Europe

(e.g.

Saxony

38



8/22

GENERAL CRISIS

OF EUROPEAN ECONOMY IN

I7TH

CENTURY

39

and

the

Low

Countries)

did

notably

better han

more

tranquil

regions.

Moreover,

there has been

a

persistent

endency

to

exaggerate he long-termnd permanent amage done by

X7th

century

wars. We

now know

that

other

hings

being equal)

the

losses of

population,

roduction

nd

capital quipment

f even 20th

century

wars,

whose

destructive

apacities

re much

greater,

an

be

made

good

within

matter f

20-25

years.

if

they

werenot n

in the I7th

century,

t was because wars

ggravatedlready xisting

tendencies f

crisis. This

is

not

to

deny

their

mportance,

hough

their ffects ere more

complex

han

appears

t

first

ight.

Thus

against

he

ravages

of

the

Thirty

Years'

War

in

parts

of

Central

Europewe must et the stimulus t gaveto mining ndmetallurgy

in

general,

nd the

temporary

ooms

t

stimulated

n

non-combatant

countries

to

the

temporary

enefit f Charles in the

63os).

It is

also

probable

hat,

but for

t,

the

great price-rise

would have

ended

in the i6ios

and

not the

i64os.

The

war

almost

ertainly

shifted he incidenceof the

crisis and

may,

on

balance,

have

aggravated

t.

Lastly,

t

is

worth

considering

hether he

crisis

did not to some

extent

produce

a

situation

which

provoked

or

prolonged

warfare.

However,

his

point,

which s

noC ssential o

the rgument,sperhapsoospeculativeobe worth ursuing.

The causes

of

the crisis

In

discussing

he

7th

century

risiswe

are

really

sking ne of

the

fundamental

uestions

bout the

rise

of

capitalism:why

did the

expansion

f the ater

5th

and i6th

centuries ot

ead

straight

nto

the

epoch

of

the i8th

and

I9th

century

ndustrial

Revolution?

What,

n

other

words,

were the obstacles n the

way

of

capitalist

expansion

The

answers,

t

may

be

suggested,

re

both

general

nd

particular.

The

general argumentmay

be

summarized s

follows.

if

capitalism

s to

triumph,

he social

structure f

feudalor

agrarian

society

mustbe revolutionized.

The

social

division

f

abour

must

be

greatly

laborated

f

productivity

s

to

increase;

he

social

abour

force

must be

radically

edistributedrom

griculture

o

industry

while

this

happens.

The

proportion

f

production

which

is

exchanged

n the

supra-local

marketmust

rise

dramatically.

o

long

as

there

s no

large body

of

wage-workers;

o

long

as

most

mensupply heirneeds from heir wnproductionrbyexchange

in

the

multiplicity

f more

r ess

autarchicocal

markets

hich

xist

even n

primitive

ocieties,

here s

a limit o the

horizon f

capitalist

profit

nd

very

ittle

ncentive o undertake

hat

we

may oosely

all



9/22

PAST

AND

PRESENT

mass

production,

he

basis

of

capitalist

ndustrial

expansion.

Historically,

hese

processes

annot

lways

be

separated

rom

ne

another. We may speakof the creation f the capitalist ome

market or

the

divorce f he

producers

rom hemeans

f

production

whichMarx called

primitive

ccumulation

4: the

creation

of a

large

and

expanding

market

or

goods

and

a

large

and available

free

abourforce

o

together,

wo

aspects

f

the same

process.

It is sometimes ssumed

hat

the

development

f

a

capitalist

class and of the

lements f

he

apitalist

ode

of

production

ithin

feudal

ociety utomaticallyroduce

hese

conditions.

In

the

ong

run,

taking

the

widest view over the centuriesfrom

1000

to

I800 this s no doubtso. In the shorter un it is not. Unless

certainonditionsre

present

it

s

by

no means

yet

lear

what

hey

are

-

the

cope

of

capitalist xpansion

will

be

limited

y

the

general

prevalence

fthefeudal tructuref

society,

.e. of the

predominant

rural

ector r

perhaps y

ome ther

tructure hich

immobilizes

both

the

potential

abour-force,

he

potential urplus

or

productive

investment,

nd

the

potential

emandfor

capitalisticallyroduced

goods,

such as

the

prevalence

f

tribaiism r

petty commodity

production.

Under hose

onditions,

s Marx

showed

n the case of

mercantilenterprise25usinessmight dapt tself o operatingn a

generally

eudal

ramework,

ccepting

ts

imitations

nd the

peculiar

demand

for

ts

services,

nd

becoming

n

a

sense

parasitic

n

it.

That

part

of t whichdid so

wouldbe

unable

o overcome

he

crises

of

feudal

society,

nd

might

ven

aggravate

hem. For

capitalist

expansion

s

blind.

The

weakness

f

the

old theories

hich scribed

the

triumph

f

capitalism

o the

development

f

the

capitalist

spirit

or the

entrepreneurial

pirit

is,

that the

desire to

pursue

the maximum

rofit

without

imitdoes

not

automaticallyroduce

that ocialand technicai evolution hich s required. Atthevery

leasttheremust

be mass

production

i.e.

production

or

he

greatest

aggregate rofit largeprofits,

ut not

necessarily

arge

profits

er

sale)

instead

of

production

or

the maximum

rofit er

unit sale.

Yet one

of

the essentialdifficultiesf

capitalist evelopment

n

societieswhich

keep

the mass of

the

population

utside

ts

scope

(so

that

hey

re neither

ellers

f

abour-power

or

serious

buyers

of

commodities)

s that n the shortview the

profits

f

the

really

revolutionary

types

f

capitalist roduction

re

almost

ess,

or

ook

less attractive,han those of theotherkind; especiallywhenthey

involve

eavy apital

nvestment.Christian ior then

ooks

more

attractive

roposition

han

Montagu

Burton. To corner

epper

n

the

i6th

century

would seem

much

sounder han to

start

ugar-

40



10/22

GENERAL

CRISIS

OF

EUROPEAN ECONOMY IN

I7TH

CENTURY

41

plantations

n the

Americas;

o

sell

Bologna

ilks

thanto sell Ulm

fustian.

Yet we

know that

in

subsequent

centuries

far vaster

profits ere chieved ysugar nd cotton hanbypepper nd silk;

and

that

ugar

nd

cotton

ontributed

ar

more

o

the

creation f

a

world

apitalistconomy

han

he

other wo.

Under

certain ircumstances

uch

trade

ould,

even under

feudal

conditions,

roduce arge enough aggregate rofits

o

give

rise to

large-scale

roduction;

or

nstance

f

it

catered

for

exceptionally

large organizations

uch as

kingdoms

r the

church;

f

the

thinly

spread

demand of an entire ontinent

ere concentratednto

the

handsof businessmenn a few

pecialized

entres

uch as the

talian

and Flemish textile owns;if a large lateral extension of the

field f

enterprise

ook

place,

e.g.

by conquest

r

colonization.

A

fair mount f socialre-division as also

possible

without

isturbing

the

fundamentally

eudal

structure f society for nstance

he

urbanizationf theNetherlandsnd

Italy

on

the basis

of

food

and

raw materials

mported

rom emi-colonialerritories.Nevertheless

the imits f the marketwere

narrow.

Medieval

and

early

modern

society

was

a

good

deal more

ike

natural

conomy

than

we care

to recall.

The

i6th and

I7th century

French

peasant

is

said

hardly

to haveusedmoney xcept or his transactionsith heState;retail

trade n German ownswas

unspecialized,

ikethat

n

village hops,

until the late i6th

century.26 xcept among

a

small

uxury

lass

(and

even there

changing

ashion

n

the modern ense

probably

developed

ate)

therate

f

replacement

f clothes

r household

oods

was slow.

Expansion

was

possible

nd took

place;

butso

long

s

the

general

tructurer rural

ociety

ad not been revolutionizedt was

limited,

r created ts own

limits;

nd when t

encountered

hem,

entered

period

f

crisis.

The expansion f the I5th and i6th centurieswas essentiallyf

this

ort;

nd

t therefore

reated

ts own

crisis othwithin he

home

market and the overseas

market. This crisis

the feudal

businessmen who were the richestand most

powerfiul

ust

because hebest

dapted

or

making ig money

n a feudal

ociety

were

unable

to

overcome.

Their

inadaptability

ntensifiedt.

Before

nalysing

hese

things

urther,

t

may

be worth

tressing

that

the

purely

echnical

bstacles o

capitalist evelopment

n the

i6th

and 17th

century

were

not

insuperable.

While the

i6th

centurymaynot have been capableofsolving ertain undamental

problems

of

technique,

such as

that

of a

compact

nd

mobile

source

of

power

which

o baffled

eonardo,

twas

quite capable

of

at least s

much

nnovations

produced

he

8th

century

evolution.



11/22

PAST AND

PRESENT

Nef and

othershave

made us

familiar

with he innovations

hich

actually

occurred,

though

the

phrase

Industrial

Revolution

seems less apt forthe period

I540-I640

than forthe Germany of

I450-I520

which evolved the

printing press,

effective

fire-arms,

watches,

nd the

remarkable dvance n

mining

nd

metallurgy

summarizedn Agricola'sDe Re

Metallica

1556).

Nor

was there

a

crippling

hortage

f capitalor

capitalist

nterprise

r

of

labour,

at

least

in the

advanced reas. Sizeable

blocks of

mobile

capital

anxious

for investment

nd,

especially

n the

period

of

rising

population, uite mportant

eservoirsf free

wage-labour

f

varying

skill xisted. The

point

s,

thatneither ere

poured

nto

ndustry

f

a potentially odernype. Moreover,methods or vercominguch

shortages

nd

rigidities

f

capital

and labour

supplies

might

have

been

utilized

s

fully

s in the

i8th and

I9th

centuries. The

I7th

century

risis

annot

e

explained y

the

nadequacies

f the

equip-

ment for Industrial

Revolution,

n

any narrowly

echnical nd

organizational

ense.

Let

us

now urn

o

themain ausesofthe

risis.

The specialization f feudal capitalists : thecase of taly

The

decline

of

Italy

and

the

old

centres f

medieval ommerce

and

manufacturen

general)

was the

most dramatic esultof

the

crisis. It illustrateshe

weaknesses

f

capitalism

parasitic

n

a

feudal world.

Thus i6th

century

talians

probably

ontrolled

he

greatest gglomerations

f

capital,

butmisinvestedhem

flagrantly.

They

mmobilizedhem

n

buildings

nd

squandered

hem n

foreign

lending during

the

price-revolution

which

naturally

favoured

debtors)

r

diverted hem

from

manufacturingctivities o

various

forms f immobile nvestment. t has been plausibly uggested

that the

failure f Italian manufacture

o

maintain

tself

against

Dutch,

English

nd French

during

he

I7th

century

as due

to

this

diversion

f resources.'7

It

would

be

ironic

o find hat he

Medici

were

taly's

ruin,

not

only

s bankers

ut as

patrons

f

the

expensive

arts,

nd

philistine

istoriansre

welcome

o

observe

hat he

only

majorcity

tatewhich never

produced

ny

art

worth

mentioning,

Genoa,

maintained ts commerce

nd

finance etter han

the rest.

Yet Italian

investors,

who had

long

been aware that

too

large

cathedrals harm business,28were acting quite sensibly. The

experience

f

centuries ad shown

hat he

highest

rofits

erenot

to

be

got

in technical

rogress

r

even in

production.

They

had

adapted

themselves o business

activities n the

comparatively

42



12/22

GENERAL CRISIS OF EUROPEAN

ECONOMY IN

7TH

CENTURY

43

narrow

ield

which emainedor hem

nce

one

eft sidethe

majority

of the

population

f

Europe

as

economically

eutral. If

they

spentvast amounts f capital non-productively,t mayhave been

simply

because

therewas no more

room to

invest

t

progressively

on

any

scale

within he limitsof this

capitalist

ector.

(The

I7th

century

utch

palliated

similar

lut

of

capitalby multiplying

household

oods

and works f

art29

hough hey

lso discovered he

more modern

device of a

speculative

nvestment

oom). Perhaps

the Italians

would have been shocked

nto different

ehaviour

y

economic

dversity; hough hey

had

made

money

for

so

long

by

providing

he

feudalworldwith ts trade nd finance hat

hey

would

not have learnedeasily. However, he generalboom of the later

I6th

century

like

the

Indian summer of Edwardian

Britain)

and the

uddenly xpanded

emands f

the

great

bsolute

monarchies

which

reliedon

private

ontractors,

nd the

unprecedenteduxury

of their

aristocracies,

ostponed

the

evil

day.

When

it

came,

bringing ecay

to Italian trade

and

manufacture,

t

left Italian

finance till

upright, hough

no

longer

dominant.

Again,

Italian

industrymight

well

have maintained ome of its old

positions y

switching

more

completely

rom

ts old

high-quality

oods

to the

shoddier ndcheapernewdraperies f theNorth. Butwho, n the

greatperiod

of

uxury

uying

rom

580-1620

would

guess that he

future

f

high-quality

extileswas limited Did

not

the

courtof

Lorraine,

n the

first

hird f the

century

se more extiles

mported

from

taly

than

from

ll

othernon-French

ountries

ut

together

30

(One

would like to reserve

udgment

n the

argument

hat

Italy

lostgroundbecause

of

higher

roduction

osts for

goods

of

equal

quality,

ntil

tronger

vidence or t is

brought

orward r

untilwe

have

a

satisfactory

xplanation

or he failure f Italian

production,

after romising eginnings,o shift s wholeheartedlyrom owns

to

countryside

s did the

extilendustriesfother ountries.3

)

The

case of

taly

hows

whyparticular

ountries entdown n the

crisis,

ot

necessarily

hy

t occurred. We must

thereforeonsider

the

contradictionsfthe

very

rocess

f

6th

centuryxpansion.

The

contradictions

f

expansion:

Eastern

Europe

The

comparative

pecialization

f

west-European

ownson trade

and

manufacture as

to some

extent

chieved n

the

I5th

and

i6th

centuriesythecreation f a sizeable urplus fexportableood n

Eastern

Europe

and

perhapsby

ocean fisheries.32 ut in Eastern

Europe

hiswas

achieved

y

the

creationf serf

griculture

n a

large

scale;

i.e.

a

local

strengthening

ffeudalism.

This,

we

may uggest,



13/22

PAST AND

PRESENT

had

three

ffects. t

turned he

peasant

nto

ess of

a cashcustomer

than

he

had

been

or

might

have

been.

(Or

else it

forcedhim

off

good-qualitywestern extiles nto cheap locally producedcloth).

It diminished he number

nd wealth

f

the minor

nobility

or he

benefit

f

a

handful f

magnates.

In

Polandthe former

ontrolled

43.80/

of

ploughs

in the

mid-I5th

century,

I.6%

in

the

mid-I7th;

the

share of the latter

rose

from

I3.3

to

30.7

in the

same

period.

Lastly,

t

sacrificedhe iveliermarket f the

towns o

the free

rade

interests f

exporting

andlords,

r

else seized much of whattrade

was

going

for the benefit

f the

already

bloated lords.33

The

expansion

hus

had

two

results.

While

creating

he

onditionsor he

expansionfmanufacturesnWestern urope,t cutdown, or time

at

east,

he

outlets fthesemanufacturesn theBaltic rea

perhaps

its most

mportant

market. The

desire

to cash in

rapidly

n

the

growing

emandfor orn

-

the

Balticnow

began

to feed

not

only

Northern

urope

but

also

the

Mediterranean

tempted

serf-lords

into

that

headlong xpansion

f

theirdominions nd intensification

of

exploitation

hich ed to the

Ukrainian

evolution,

nd

perhaps

also to

demographicatastrophes.34

Thecontradictionsfexpansion:overseas nd colonial markets

Much of

the

radebetween

urope

and the rest

f

the world

had,

as we

know,

been

passive throughout

he

ages,

because Orientals

did not

need

Europeangoods

to the

same extent

s

Europe

needed

theirs. It

had

been balanced

by

bullion

payments,

upplemented

from ime

to time

by

such

exports

s

slaves,

furs,

mberor

other

luxuries. Until

the

Industrial

Revolution

he sales of

European

manufactures

ere

not

important. African

rade,

which

was

not

deficitary, ay

be an

exception

ecauseof

the

taggeringly

avourable

terms f radewhich uropean oods ommandedmong he gnorant

local

buyers

and

indeed

-

almost

by

definition

--

because the

continent

as valued

chiefly

s

a

source

of bullion

until ate n the

I7th

century.

In

I665

the

Royal

African

Company

still

estimated

ts

gain

from

gold

at twice

ts

gain

from slaves.35)

The

European conquest

of the main trade-routesnd of America

did

not

change

his

structure

undamentally,

or ven the Americas

exported

morethan

they

mported.

It

greatly

iminished he

cost

of

Eastern

goods by cutting

ut

middlemen,

essening ransport

charges ndenabling uropeanmerchantsnd armedbands to rob

and

cheatwith

mpunity.

It also

greatly

ncreasedbullion

upplies,

presenting

s

withAmerican nd

African

eters o be robbed o

pay

the

Asian

Pauls.

Unquestionablyurope

derived mmense

windfall

44



14/22

GENERAL

CRISIS


I7TH

CENTURY

45

gains

from

his. General

usiness

ctivity

as

mmensely

timulated

as

wellas

capital

ccumulated;

ut

our

exports

f

manufactures

ere

on the whole notgreatly xpanded. Colonialpowers- in good

medieval

business

tradition

followed

a

policy

of

systematic

restriction

f

output

and

systematic

monopoly.

Hence

there

was

no

reason

why xports

f home manufactures

hould

benefit.

The

benefit

which

Europe

drew

from these initial

conquests

was thus n thenature

f

single

onus atherhan

regular

ividend.

When it was

exhausted,

risis

was

likely

o

follow.

Among

the

colonial

powers

costs and

overheads ose faster han

profits.

In

both

East

and West

we

may distinguish

hree

tages:

that

of

easy

profits,hatofcrisis, nd with uckeventuallyhatof a stableand

moremodest

rosperity.

n

the nitial

haseconquest

r

nterloping

broughtemporarilynchallenged

rofits

t

low costs.

In the

East,

where

rofits

ested n

the

monopoly

f a

restricted

utput

f

spices

and the

like,

the crisis

was

probably

rought

n

by

the

steep

rise

in

protection

osts

against

ld and new

rivals;

rising

ll the

more

steeply

he

more

he

colonial

power

ried o

screw

up

the

monopoly

price.

It

has been estimated hat he

Portuguese

pice

trade

barely

paid

its

way

for these reasons.38 n

the

West,

where

hey

rested

on the cheapbulkproductionf bullion nd otherrawmaterials,

protection

osts

probably layed

a smaller

part,

though hey

also

rose with

piracy

and

competition.

However,

here

the technical

limits

fthe

primitive

rat-hole

mining

fthe

Spaniards

were

oon

reached

even

allowing

for the uses of the

mercury

rocess),

nd

very

possibly

he abourforcewas

virtually

orked

o

death,

being

treated

s an

expendable

asset.37

At

any

rate

American

silver

exports

iminished

fter

6IO

or so.

Eventually,

f

course,

n the

East

colonial

powers

djusted

hemselveso the

new

level of over-

heads ndperhaps ound ew ources f ocal taxationo offsethem.

In the

West

the

familiartructuref

quasi-feudal

arge

states ame

into

being

n the

I7th

century.38

ince

the

economic

asis

of the

Spanish

olonial

ystem

was

broader han he

Portuguese,

he

results

of crisis

would be more

far-reaching.

hus

the

early emigration

to the Americas

emporarily

timulatedhe

export

f

goods

from he

home

country;

ut

as,

inevitably,

any

fthe

colonists'wants

came

to be

supplied

ocally,

he

expanded

manufacturesf

Spain

had

to

pay

the

price.

The

attempt

o

tighten

he

metropolitan

onopoly

merelymade matters orse ydiscouraginghedevelopment,mong

other

hings,

f the

potentially

evolutionary

lantation

conomy.39

The

effects f the influx f

bullion nto

Spain

are too

well-known

to

need discussion.



15/22

PAST

AND

PRESENT

It is

therefore

nderstandablehat

the

old

colonial

system

passed

through

profound

risis;

nd that ts

effects

n

the

general

Europeaneconomywerefar-reaching.A newpattern f colonial

exploitation

which

produced

steadilyrising

exports

of

manu-

factures

rom

urope

did

indeed

replace

t.

(Acting

argely

n

their

own the

sugar

planters

f Northern

razil

had

shown he

way

to it

from he

nd ofthe 6th

century).

Yet the

ure

of the

old

monopoly

profits

as

rresistible

o all

thosewho

had

a

chance

f

apturing

hem.

Even the Dutch

remained

resolutely

old-fashioned n

their

colonialism

ntilthe i8th

century,

hough

heir

ntrepot

position

in

Europe

saved them

rom he

consequence

f

colonial

nefficiency.

Old colonialismid notgrow ver ntonewcolonialism;tcollapsed

and was

replaced

y

t.

The

contradictions

f

the home

markets

There

can be little

doubt thatthe

i6th

century

ame

nearer o

creating

he conditions

or

a

really

widespread

doption

f the

capitalist

modeof

production

han

ny

previous

ge;

perhaps

ecause

of the

impetusgivenby

overseas

oot,

perhaps

because

of the

en-

couragement

f

rapidly

rowing

opulation

nd

markets

nd

rising

prices. (It isnot he bject f his rticleo discuss hereasonswhich

caused

this

xpansion

o follow he

feudal

risis

of the

i4th

and

I5th

centuries).

A

powerful

ombination f

forces,

ncluding

ven

large

feudal nterests40

eriously

hreatened

he

resistance

f

gild-

dominated owns. Rural

industry,

f the

putting-out

type,

which

had

previously

een

largely

onfined o

textiles,

pread

n

various

ountries nd to new

branches f

production

e.g.

metals),

especially

owards he end of

the

period.

Yet

the

expansion

red

its own

obstacles. We

may

briefly

onsider

omeof

them.

Except perhaps in England no agrarianrevolution of a

capitalist

ype

ccompanied

ndustrial

hange,

s

it

was

to do in the

i8th

century; hough

here

was

plenty

f

upheaval

n

the

countryside.

Here

again

we

find he

generally

eudalnature

f the

social

frame-

work

distorting

nd

diverting

orces

which

might

therwise ave

made

for direct dvance

owards

modern

apitalism.

In the

East,

where

agrarian hange

took the

form

f a

revival

of

serfdom

y

exporting

ords,

he

conditions

or

uch

development

ere

nhibited

locally, though

made

possible

elsewhere. In

other

regions

the

price-rise,heupheavalsn andownership,ndthegrowthfdemand

for

grarian

roducemight

well

have ed to the

mergence

f

capitalist

farming

y

gentlemen

nd the

kulak-type

f

peasant

on a

greater

scale than

appears

to have

occurred.4'

Yet

what

happened?

46



16/22

GENERAL CRISIS


I7TH CENTURY

47

French ords

often

bourgeois

who

had

bought

hemselvesnto

feudal

tatus)

reversed

he

trend o

peasant

ndependence

rom he

middle f the 6thcentury,nd ncreasinglyecoveredostground.42

Towns,

merchants

nd local middlemen

nvested

n

the

and,

partly

no doubt

because of

the

security

f

farm

produce

n an

age

of

inflation,

artly

ecause

the

surplus

was

easy

to draw from t

in a

feudal

manner,

heir

xploitationeing

ll themore ffectiveor

eing

combined

with

usury;partly erhaps

n direct

olitical

ivalry

ith

feudalists.43

ndeed,

the

relationship

f

towns nd

their nhabitants

as

a whole to

the

surrounding easantry

was

still,

s

always

n a

generally

eudal

ociety,

hat

of a

special

kind

of

feudal ord.

(The

peasants n the town-dominatedantons of Switzerland nd in

inland

Netherlands

ere

not

actually

mancipated

ntil he

French

Revolution.

4)

The mere xistence

furban

nvestment

n

agriculture

or urban

nfluence ver

the

countryside,

herefore,

id not

imply

the

creation

f rural

apitalism.

Thus

the

spread

f

share-cropping

in

France,

though heoretically arking

step

towards

apitalism,

in fact ften

roduced

merely bourgeoisie arasitic

n a

peasantry

increasingly

xhausted

y

t,

and

by

the

rising

emands f the

State;

and

consequent

ecline.45 The

old social structure

redominated

still.

Two results

may

have followed rom his.

First,

tis

improbable

that

therewas much

technical

nnovation,

hough

he

first

Italian)

handbook n

crop

rotation

ppeared

n the

mid-i6th

entury,

nd

certain hat

the ncrease n

agrarian

utput

did not

keep pace

with

demand.46 Hence towards

he end of the

period

there re

signs

of

diminishing

eturns

nd

foodshortage,

f

exporting

reas

using

up

their

crops

for ocal needs

etc.,

preludes

to the famines nd

epidemics

of

the

crisis-period.47

econd,

the

rural

population,

subjectto the doublepressure f landlords nd townsmennotto

mention he

State),

nd in

any

case much

ess

capable

of

protecting

itself

gainst

amine nd war han

hey,

uffered.48 n some

regions

this

short-sightedsqueeze

may

ctually

have led to a

declining

trend n

productivityuring

he

I7th

century.49

The

countryside

was sacrificed

o

ord,

own nd State.

Its

appalling

ate

f

mortality

-

if

the

relativelyprosperous

Beauvaisis

is

any guide

- -

was second

only

to that of

the domestic

utworkers,

lso

increasingly

ural.50

Expansion

nder heseconditions

red crisis.

Whathappenedn thenon-agriculturalectors epended argelyn

the

agricultural.

Costs

of

manufacture

ay

have

been

unduly

raised

by

the

more

rapid

rise of

agrarian

han of

industrial

rices,

thus

narrowing

he

profit-margin

f

manufacturers.51

However,



17/22

PAST

AND

PRESENT

manufacturers

ncreasingly

sed the

cheap

abour frural

utworkers,

who

were

again exploited

o the

point

of

debility.)

The

market

also had its difficulties. he ruralmarket s a whole must have

proved

disappointing.Many freeholding

easants

benefited rom

the

price-rise

nd the

demandfortheir

goods,

provided hey

had

enough

and to feedthemselves

ven

n

bad

years, regular

urplus

for

ale,

and a

good

head

forbusiness.52

But

f

such

yeomen ought

much more

than

before,

heybought

ess than

townsmen

f

equal

standing,being

more self-sufficient.53he experienceof

i9th

century

rance showsthat middle nd rich

peasantry

s

about as

univiting

marketormassmanufacturess

may

be

found,

nd does

not encouragecapitalists o revolutionizeroduction. Its wants

are

traditional;

most

of

ts wealth

oes

nto

more and and

cattle,

r

into

hoards,

r

nto

new

building,

r

even nto heer

waste,

ike hose

gargantuan

weddings,

unerals,

nd other feastswhich

disturbed

continental

rinces

t the turn f the 6th

century.54

he

increase

in the demand

from

the

non-agricultural

ector

towns, uxury

market,

overnment

emand

tc.) may

for timehave

obscured

he

fact

hat

t

grew

ess

rapidly

han

productive

apacity,

nd that the

persistent

ecline

of

the real income of

wage-earners

n

the

iong

inflation ayactually, ccordingoNef,havestopped thegrowth

of

the demand for

some

industrial

products. 55

However,

the

slumps

n the

export

markets rom

he

late i6ios on

brought

he

fact ome.

Once

the decline

had

begun,

of

course,

an additionalfactor

increased he difficulties

f manufacture:he rise n

labour costs.

For

there

s evidence hat

-

in the

towns t

least

--

the

bargaining

power

f

abour

rose

sharply

uring

he

crisis,

erhaps

wing

o the

fall

or

stagnation

n

town

populations.

At

any

rate

real

wages

rose

inEngland, taly, painandGermany,ndthemid-centuryaw the

formation f effective

ourneymen's

rganizations

n

most western

countries.56

his

may

not have affected

he labour costs of

the

putting-out

ndustries,

s

theirworkerswere n a

weaker

position

to benefit

rom he

situation,

nd their

iece-ratewages

were more

easily

ut.

However,

t s

clearly

ot

negligible

actor.

Moreover,

the

slackening

f

population

ncrease

nd

the

stabilizationf

prices

musthave

depressed

manufacturesurther.

These

different

spects

of the crisis

may

be reduced o a

single

formula: conomic xpansion ookplacewithin socialframework

which

t

was not

yet trong nough

o

burst,

nd in

ways

dapted

o

it rather

han o the world f modern

apitalism. Specialists

n the

Jacobean

eriod

must

etermine hat

ctually recipitated

he crisis:

48



18/22

GENERAL CRISIS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMY IN

I7TH

CENTURY

49

the decline n American

ilver,

he

collapse

of the Baltic market

r

some

of

many

ther

ossible

actors. Once

the

first rack

ppeared,

the wholeunstable tructure as boundto totter. It didtotter,nd

in the

subsequentperiod

of

economic

crisis and social

upheaval

the

decisive

hift rom

apitalist nterprisedapted

to

a

generally

feudal

rameworko

capitalist nterprise

ransforming

he

world

n

ts

own

pattern

ook

place.

The

Revolution

n

England

was

thus

the

mostdramatic

ncident n the

crisis,

nd its

turning-point.

This

nation wroteSamuel

Fortrey

n

1663

in his

England's

nterest

and

Improvement

can

expect

no less than to

becomethe most

great

nd

flourishing

f all others. It could and

it

did;

and the

effects n theworldwereto be portentous.

Birkbeck

ollege.

E.

J.

Hobsbawm

A NOTE

ON

PRICE HISTORY

Long-term price

movements

have been

deliberatelykept

outside the

main

argument,

because

other discussions

of

long-term

economic

development

emphasize

them so

much;

perhaps

too

much.

Nevertheless,

the course

of

prices

calls for some

comment.

The traditional

iew,

as

put

forward

by

Simiand

and

accepted by

Labrousse

and others,

s

that the long price-risecame to an end around

I640

and wasfollowedby a price-fall, r fluctuations ound a stable trend until the second

quarter

of

the i8th

century.

This view seems too

simple.

There are

signs

of a

change

in the

price

trend

between

I605

and

I620;

for nstance n

Spanish

wheat

prices.

Cipolla

has also noted that Milanese

prices

cease to

rise

rapidly

after

605

and continue

steady

or

rising

lowly

from hen

until

I630.

(Allouve-

ments

monetaires

ans

l'dtat

de

Milan

I580-I700.

I952).

We

should

expect

this,

since Hamilton shows

that the

import

of

American bullion reached its

peak

in

I590-I6I0,

though

it

held

up quite

well

until 1620 or so

(American

Treasure,

5).

If

prices

went on

rising

until

640

(or

I635,

which seems

to

have

been

the

turning-point

n

Italy)

it was

probably

due

to

debasementof

coinage,

to

the demand

for

scarce

goods

in the

Thirty

Years'

War,

or to a

combination

of

both. Hence

it

is not

unlikely

hat,

but

forthe

war,

the

period

of

price-fall

orprice-stability ould havebegunin

I610-20.

The end of the war ntensified

the

crisis,

which

undoubtedly

eached ts most

acute

phase

(and

the

owest

point

of

prices)

n the

I66os

and

early 67os.

The

effects f drastic

post-war

deflation

may

be

studied in

the

typical

war-profiteering

ountry

of

Switzerland,

where

they

ed to the

peasant

war

of

I653.

The course

of

prices

differed,

of

course,

according

to

regions

and

commodities,

and

some of the local

and

sectional

phenomena

are still

very

obscure.

No

attempt

can be

made

here to account

for

them.

In

general,

however,

secular

price-movements

ally quite

well

with

the

periods

of the

crisis as discussed

in

the

text.

NOTES

1Perroy,Boutruche,Hilton have discussedthis n recentyears n theAnnales

and elsewhere. See

also the

discussion

among

Dobb,

Sweezy,

Takahashi,

Hilton and Hill

in Science and

Society

I950-53,

and the

general survey by

Malowist

in Kwartainik

Historiczny

953,

I. (I

am indebted

to

the Polish

Institute,

London

for a translation f

this).



19/22

PAST

AND

PRESENT

0

2

Braudel,

La Mediterranee

.

. au

temps

e

Philippe

I,

1097.

R.

Romano,

Industries

textiles t

conjoncture

a

Florence

au

I7e

s.

(Annales

Oct.-Dec.

I952, 5sI).

French historians

regard

the

phase

de contraction

du

I7e

siecle as un faitmaintenant tabli (Rev. Hist. 428 (I953), 379). In what

follows

owe

a

great

deal to

discussion with

J.

Meuvret who

confirmed

many

of

my

non-specialistguesses.

However

I

doubt whetherhe would

agree

with

much of this

paper.

3

C. A.

Julien,

Histoire

de

l'Afrique

du

Nord,

538

ff;

the industrial

revolution in

piracy,

due to

the introduction

f

Northern

sails

by English

and Dutch after

604

may

be noted.

4

J.

Meuvret in

Melanges

d'Histoire Sociale

V,

I944,

27-44;

in

Population,

1946,

653-50

and an

unpublishedpaper

on

the

effects

f the

I693-4

and

I709-10

famines

on

French

diplomacy.

5

There

are,

of

course,

no reliable statistics nd not

always

good

indirect

indices. This

paragraph

is

based,

in

particular,

on:

K.

Larsen,

History of

Norway,I948, 304 (figures nlyforI665 and after);Mayer, The Populationof

Switzerland

(1952),

and Patavino's estimate for

I6o8

which

is as

great

as

M's for

700

in

Nabholz, Muralt, Feller,

Bonjour,

Gesch.

d

Schweiz

II,

5;

H.

Wopfner,

Gueterteilung

.

Uebervoelkerung,

938,

202

ff;

H. v. z.

Muehlen,

Entstehung

d. Gutsherrschaft

n

Oberschlesien ,

n

Vierteljahrschrift

.

Soz.

und

Wirtsch.

Gesch.

XXXVIII,

334-60o;

Beloch,

Bevoelkerungsgeschichte

Italiens

,

I53, 225

ff;

Keyser,

Bevoelkerungsgesch.

eutschlands,

94I,

36I

ff,

304

ff;

Roupnel,

La

vie et la

campagne

dijonnaises

u

I7e

s.;

P.

Goubert,

Problemes

demographiques

du Beauvaisis

au

I7e

s.

(Annales,

Oct.-Dec.

1952,

452-468),

for an

area

which

seems to

have suffered

ather

ess;

G.

Debien,

En

Haut-Poitou;

Defricheurs

u

Travail

(XV-XVIII

s.)

and

for

absence

of

forest-clearing

nd

recovery

f forestsBull. Soc.

Hist. Mod.

Mai-Juillet

953,

6-9;

Pirenne,

Hist. de

Belgique

V,

439-40;

A.

Cosemans,

Bevolke,

ng

v.

Brabant

ende I7e eeuw 939,

220-4;

G. N. Clark, The Seventeenthentury;Rutkowski,

Hist. Econ. de

la

Pologne

avant les

Partages,

927,

9I-2;

Stone

in IX

Congres

International es Sciences

Historiques

I,

I95I,

49-50,

Hoskins,

The

Rebuilding

of

Rural

England

I570-I640,

Past and Present

,

I953.

Op.

cit. 6.

The

same criticism

may

be

made of the estimatesof

Urlanis,

Rost nasielenia

v.

Jewropie

Moscow I94I)

I58

which

seem rather

optimistic.

I am indebted

to

Mr. A.

Jenkin

or

drawing

my

attention o these

figures.

7

S.

Peller,

Studies in

mortality

ince

the

Renaissance

(Bull.

Inst. Hist.

of

Medicine)

I943, 443, 445, 452,

and

esp. 456;

ibid

I947,

67, 79.

Meuvret

and

Goubert

op.

cit. and

the

literature

uoted

in

Habbakuk,

English

Population

in

the i8th

Century

Econ.

Hist. Rev. 2dS.

VI,

2,

I953).

For

the

epidemiology

of the

century,

n addition to innumerable ocal

studies, Haeser,

Gesch.

d.

Medizin u. d. epidem.KrankheitenJena 882), C. Creighton,Hist. of Epidemics

in

Britain

I89I, I894),

L. F.

Hirst,

The

Conquest

f

Plague

(I953);

Prinzing,

Epidemics resulting

rom

wars

(I916);

Brownlee,

Epidemiology

of Phthisis

in

Great Britain

and

Ireland

(Medical

Research Council

I918);

Campbell,

The

Epidemiology

of influenza

(Bull.

Inst. Hist. Medicine

I3,

I943);

W.

J.

Simpson,

A

Treatise

n

the

Plague

(I905).

8

Sombart,

Luxus u.

Kapitalismus,

26-7;

Schmoller,

DeutschesStaedtewesen

in

aelterer

eit,

1922,

60-95;

B.

Bretholz,

Gesch.

Boehmens

.

Maehrens

1924,

III,

61I-3;

Baasch,

Hollaendische

Wirtschaftsgeschichte,

4-5.

Cipolla,

The Decline of

Italy

(Econ.

Hist. Rev.

2

S.V., 2,

1952);

Roupnel, op.

cit. for

reversion

f

Burgundy

to

autarky;

Reuss,

Hist.

de Stras-

bourg,

1922,

28o-6;

P.

Boissonade,

La

crise de l'industrie

languedocienne

I600-I66o

(Annales du

Midi,

I909);

G. Aubin

and

H.

Kunze,

Leinener-

zeugung . .im oestl.Mitteldeutschland,

940.

10

For

figures

f

the

Dutch and Florentine

production,

N. W.

Posthumus,

Gesch.

v. d. LeidscheLakenindustrie

II,

932;

Romano

in

Annales,

oc

cit.

11

Bang

and

Korst,

Tabeller

over

Skibsfart;

A.

Christensen,

Dutch Trade

and

theBaltic about

600

(Copenhagen

I940).



20/22

GENERALCRISIS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMY IN

I7TH

CENTURY

51

12

G.

Tongas,

Relations entre la France et

l'Empire

Ottoman durant

la

premiere

moitie

u 17e

s.,

1942;

P.

Masson,

Le

Commerce rancais dans le Levant

au I7e

s.,

1892,

esp.

130-4,

App.

XV,

236;

H.

Watjen,

D. Niederlander m

Mittelmeergebiet,

909,

145, 149.

13

Bal

Krishna,

Commercial elationsbetween ndia and

England

1601-1757,

caps

ii-v;

S. A.

Khan,

East

India

Trade

n

the 17th

C.,

1923,

74,

ff.

14

C.

de

Lannoy

and

H.

Van

der

Linden,

Hist. de

l'Expansion

des

Peuples

Europeens:

Neerlande

et

Danemark

XVII

et

XVIII

ss.), 1911,

334, 344-5, 363.

The

indebtedness

of

the

Company

was

also

higher

han beforeor after.

J.

G. Van

Dillen,

Bronnen

ot

d.

Geschiedenis.

Wisselbanken,

925,

II,

971

ff.

15

Barbados

began

to

export

sugar

n

1646, Jamaica

started

planting

n

1664.

Haiti re-established

lantation

n

1655,

Martinique

began

it in the same

year,

St. Kitts'

sugar

exportspassed

its

ndigo

exports

n I66o.

(Lippman,

Gesch.

d.

Zuckers,

929).

16

For a

comparison

of its

size

in

1641

and

1667,

J.

Saintoyant,

a

Colonis-

ationEuropeenne,947,27

1-3.

17

B.

Porshnev

in

Biryukovitch,

orshnev,

Skazkin

etc.,

Novaya

Istoriya

1640-1789

(Moscow

1951),

444.

This follows

a

suggestion

of Marx

in

1850

(Sel.

Essays,

ed.

Stenning,

1926,

203).

The

coincidence

has

often

been

noted,

e.g

HOBSBAWM, E.J. 17th Cent European Econom Crisis

Documents

Transcript of HOBSBAWM, E.J. 17th Cent European Econom Crisis