Hobbes e a Retorica

8/3/2019 Hobbes e a Retorica

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Hobbes, Aristotle, and the Materialist RhetorAuthor(s): Mark E. WildermuthSource: Rhetoric Society Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Winter, 1997), pp. 69-80Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3886214

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Mark E. WildermuthHOBBES, ARISTOTLE, AND THE MATERIALIST RHETORStudies of ThomasHobbes's A Brief of the Art of Rhetorique(1637) havefocused primarilyon two questions. First, to what extent does the Briefeinfluence the rhetoric mplementedby Hobbesin laterphilosophicalworkssuchas Leviathan 1651 , and, second, to what degreecan Hobbes's rhetorical heorybe classified as Aristotelian,Rameanor counterreformist?lHowever,an equallyimportant elatedquestionhas been raisedby JohnT. Harwood n his 1986 edi-tion of the Briefe: namely, given that the treatise is eclectic, borrowingfrommany sourcesof theory, o what extent does the Briefe succeed as an interpreta-tion of Aristotle,which is what the treatisepurportso be? Harwoodnotes addi-tions and deletions to Aristotle's Rhetoricin Hobbes's adaptation hat under-score differences nHobbes's andAristotle'spolitics and in theirrelative aith inthe capacity of eloquenceto exert a positiveinfluence on society (13-23). Nev-ertheless, more remains to be said regardingother significantdifferences be-tween Hobbes's andAristotle'srhetorical heories,differences hatnotonly helpilluminate how rhetoricevolved between Aristotle's and Hobbes's times, butwhich also testify to the impactof new materialistphilosophies upontheories ofpersuasion n the seventeenthcentury.I argue that Hobbes's materialism,which is evident not only in the Briefe(1637) but in his Short Tractof First Principles (c. 1630), points him towardadifferentconceptionof materiality rom thatespousedinAristotle'sphilosophy.This, in turn,causesHobbestoreconfigure ignificantaspects of Aristotle'srhe-toricaltheory:most notablythepsychology of audienceresponseinforming heoriginalRhetoricandthefunctionandapplicationof thecommonplacesortopoi.Moving away from Aristotle'sconceptionof organicism,Hobbes embraces amaterialmodel of the mind which causes him to questionthe capacity of thepassions to cooperatewith reasonand effect the ends of persuasion.As he limitsthe roleof passionin his newrhetoric,Hobbes also convertsthecommonplacesinto a matrixof static expositional strategies hat haveconsiderably ess poten-tial thanAristotle'ssystemfor generatingproofs that draw on both reason andemotion for creatingarguments.By embracinga materialist heoryof the mindand the discourse it generates,Hobbes de-vocalizes the topoi, de-rhetoricizesAristotle's theoryof the passions, and therebylimits the power of rhetoric nconcurrencewithhis conservativepolitical ideology. In short,the Briefe showsthatpolitically andphilosophically,Hobbes, from the beginningof his career,uses materialistphilosophy and rhetoricto develop a system of coercive dis-courseformaintaining hestatusquoof theregulatedcommonwealthhe feels isthebest form of government.

The materialistunderpinnings f Hobbes's thinkingareevident in his ShortTracton FirstPrinciples (1630) which he composedjust a few yearsbeforetheBriefe (1637) appearednprint.As MiriamRiekindicates, he ShortTract learly

RSQ:RhetoricSociety Quarterly69 Volume 27, NumberI Winter 1997


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70 RHETORICOCIETY UARTERLYshows thatan interest n motion andmateriality ntrudesuponthe early periodof "non-scientific"humanismdescribedby Leo StraussaspreceedingHobbes'sadoptionof Euclideangeometryand his conversion o the Paduanmethod(Riek20-23; Strauss 170). TheShort Tract s often overlooked by Hobbes scholars(only one moderneditionexists) but it requiresclose scrutinybecause,as Riekindicates,it demonstrates hateven if Strausscorrectlyasserts that Hobbes waskeenly interested n Aristotle's humanistpsychology, Hobbes neverthelessre-futes Aristotle's theoryof perception(70). I would add that the Tractalso laysthe basic groundwork or a conceptionof materiality hat is completely unlikeanythingwe see in Aristotle'sphilosophy-so much unlike it, in fact, that theTract hus demonstrateshow Hobbesmustinevitablydevelop a fundamentallydifferentpsychology of audienceresponsein theBriefe.The Tractmakesclear thatlong beforeDe CorporeandLeviathanare pub-lished, Hobbesconceives of the world as being composedof non-living matterwhich must be acted upon to createmotion. "Nothingcan move it self," saysHobbes, in the Tract, or "Whatevermoveth another,moveth it eitherby activepowerin it self, orby motion receivedby another"1.9).Thekey to understand-ing any phenomenon s studyingthe basic cause and effect relationshipswhichproduceits inherentbehavioror nature."ANecessaryCauseis thatwhich can-not butproducethe [particular] ffect" and "ASufficient Cause is that,whichhathall things requisiteto producethe effect"(I. 13-14).Hence, all things maybe classified either asAgents "whichhaththepowertomove" or Patients"whichhathpowerto be moved"(1.3-4).Even living thingscan be analyzedin such a fashion,for although heir"animalspirits"give themtheappearance f being self-moving agents,theytoo aresubject o lawsof causeand effect andsometimesplay the role of the Patient.Animal spiritscan movethe body but theydo so partlybecause of "Motionreceived fromanother;andconsequentlythey themselves are movedlocally" (III.concl.I).Hobbes makes clear how living thingsaresubjectto materialist aws of mo-tion when he describes his anti-Aristotelian heoryof perception.Hobbes ar-gues, as he would laterin theopeningthreechaptersof Leviathan, hat sense iscaused by motion.After a thoroughexaminationof sensationaccordingto amethod of analysis and synthesis that seems to prefigurehis later more fullydeveloped adaptation f the Paduanmethod,Hobbesconcludesin the Tract hat"actualSenseis aMotion" or"itappeares hatSense(Sensus)is apassive powerof the Animal spirits,to be moved by the species of an externallobject, sup-posed to be present" III. concl.5).We perceive species which emanate materially rom objects-in contradis-tinction otheAristotelianheoryof perceptionwherespeciesareperceivedwhenthe organof perceptiontakes on the form of the object without its matter.Assome modernAristotelian cholarsargue,Aristotle mpliesthatmatter s aliveinsome sense, that t canacquire ormal raitsof objectsperceived, he eye literallygoing red when aredobjectis perceived.Hencethe currentdebateover whether


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RHETORICSOCIETYQUARTERLY 71Aristotle's psychology is compatiblewith modern ormalistpsychology whichis grounded, ike Hobbes's theories,in a more modernmaterialism.2No suchproblemexists for Hobbes who clearlystates in the Tract hat species are emit-ted physically by materialobjects which must re-supplythemselves in somefashion in order o keep emanatingspecies:

we may probably magine, thatas Fyery bodies, which send out mostspecies, are manifestlyandsensibly suppliedwith fuell: so other bodies,sendingout fewer, may have a supplyof nutriment,by convertingotherbodies or species adjacent, ntothemselves . .. (II. concl..6)

Hobbes cannotbe sure how this takes place-but he is certain that "bodyescontinually send out so many substantiall pecies" andsuch "species affect theeye" (II. concl.6). This action creates a Phantasma n the sensorium via "theactionof the object [perceived]uponthe Patient"who observes the object (III.concl. 4). Humanunderstandings thus defined as "a Motion of the AnimalSpirits, by the Action of the brayne, qualifyed with the active power of theexternall object"(III. concl. 6). We comprehend a thing "when we have thePhantasmaor Aparition of it."And, since the "Phantasm s the action of thebraynequalifyedon theAnimal spirits," hen "Understandingas a power) is apassive power in the Animal spirits to be moved by the action of the brainqualifyed" (III. corollaryto concl. 6). Understandingand sensationrepresentthe two basic faculties of the soul and they are both moved "by the species"emanatingfromobjects (III.concl. 10).The psychology of the mind and the model of humanperception n the Tractareconsiderably ess developed than the model of mindpresented in, say Le-viathan-but the materialistunderpinnings f Hobbes's subsequentmodels ofmind are being sketched out here. Certainly,Hobbes does not, for example,fully describe the functions of fancy andjudgmenthere as he does later-buthe does indicate that the mind operateson phantasms hatremainin the mindafter the external objects causing them aregone "as in Dreames"(111.2).ThisanticipatesHobbes's laterdescriptionof memoryandfancy as decaying sensein chapterthreeof Leviathan.Moreover,the model of human behavior atten-dantuponthe theoryof mind andperceptiondescribedin the Tractanticipatesthatof Leviathanand other late works.3In the TractHobbes defines good asthatwhich is pleasurable:"Good s, to everything, hatwhich hathactivepowerto attract t locally" (III. 7). "Whatsoever s Good is desirable;andwhatsoeveris desirableis Good"(111.7).Hobbes, in fact, cites Aristotle as his source forthis theory:"Thisdefinitionagreeswell withAristotle,who definesGood to bethat,to which all thingsaremoved, which hathbeen metaphorically aken,butis properlytrue"(III. 7).Hobbes,however,seems not to realizethat,while he maydescribedesire andperhapseven passion operatingmuch as Aristotledoes, with regard o human


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72 RHETORICSOCIETYQUARTERLYmotivationandbehavior,he neverthelesshasradicallyrevisedAristotle'smodelof themind and ts modesof perception.ForHobbes,the mainmetaphorsorthemind and its operationsare materialistic:he mindis like a physical bodybeingoperateduponby external orces. The mind'sphantasmsare butanalogsof theoutside world,"thesimilitudeor imageof some externallobject"(111.2).Thereis no possibilityfor a direct,moreorganic connection between mind andreal-ity-as suggested by Robinson's readingof Aristotle's theory of perception,wherein the mind takes on the logos or formsof thingsas if objectsthemselvesconstitutea kindof semiotic thatcanbe assimilateddirectly by the understand-ing (74). Hobbes's model suggeststhatmind andrealityworkby the same lawsof causation,but thereis a distinctphysicalor materialboundarybetween thePatientwhich receives and theAgent which causes the motion.Some Hobbes scholarsargue hateventuallyHobbesembracesa theoryof themindwhich showsthatthemindreconfigures ealityas it perceives (Green110;Riek 141-143;Thorpe86-90), butnosuchimplication s discernible nthe Tract.Rather,what emerges in the Tract s a model of the mind which points to itspassivityas a materialobject among (yet physicallydistinctfrom)otherphysi-cal objects which passively obey the laws of motion.Hobbes seems unsuretowhat degree appetite and will can affect the animal spirits-but suggests thatthey have less affect on them than"thespecies of externalobjects"whichpro-duce desireandmotion(III. concl.2).The methodologyof the treatiseimplies that Hobbes has the same faith inlogical analysisandcompositivemethodthathe evinces in his late works.At thesame time, the model of the mind points to the power of images (phantasms)withregard o stirringhumandesire,passionand action.Logic is privilegedas ameans of understandinghe world-but thatsamelogic reveals man to be essen-tially a creatureeasily motivatedby desire createdprimarilyby visual stimula-tion when species emanatefromthe materialworld.As he does laterin his ca-reer, Hobbes finds himself caught between his confidence in reason and hisacknowledgementof the irrational,unrulynatureof humanitythatreasonre-veals andwhichrhetoricians ometimesexploit to the detrimentof thepoliticalorder.Ever concerned with maintainingorderin the kingdom,as the politicalphilosophyof hisThucydydes 1629) shows(Riek36-44;Strauss59-65; Watkins29), Hobbes, when consideringthe role of rhetoric,must ask himself how canpersuasivediscourse akeadvantage f human trengths nd weaknesses o main-tainpublicorder?Scholars ike Zappen(85), Johnston 214) andVictoriaKahn(187) arguethatHobbes, especially in his early career,cannot fully resolve theconflict betweenreason andrhetoric-although he eventuallyunites praxisandtheory in Leviathanby subordinating hetoricto logic. Nevertheless,Hobbesengagestheproblemon a theoretical evel intheBriefe, his intentionbeing to re-configureAristotle'sRhetoric n such a way that ts methodof using reasonandpassion for argumentation an be revised to suit the politics and aims of thematerialist hetor.Hobbes describesways to subordinate assion to reason,thus


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RHETORICSOCIETYQUARTERLY 73enablingrhetoric o cooperatewith logic andpoliticalscience. Hisreconfigurationof rhetoric s sometimesfraughtwith paradox,as we will see later,but the theorystill makespossible the rhetorical lourishZappenandothers see enliveningthelogic of Leviathan.

TheBriefe of theArte of Rhetorique ealizesthatreconfigurationn at leasttwoways. First, howinga cleardistrust f humanrrationality, obbescarefully ubor-dinatespassion o reason hroughoutheBriefe,unlikeAristotlewho, after howinginitialdisdain or pathos n theRhetoric, eemsto expand ts rolein ways suggest-ing (at least to some scholars) hat reasonand emotioncan cooperateas equals,rhetorically. econd,Hobbessimplifiesandalters herole of topicsin creatingar-guments.He betrayshis fearof relying oomuchon commonly-held pinionshererather hanon rigorous ogic thatresists the irrationalide of humannature.Fur-thermore,he eliminates hepossiblecooperationbetweenpathosand logos somescholars ee impliedby Aristotle'sdescription f the topicsandtheirrole inmakingenthymemes Conley300-315;Grimaldi147-151).In Book I of his rhetoric,Hobbes makes clear that while pathos is part ofrhetoric, t is inferior o other kinds of proof.Hobbessays rhetoric"consistethchiefly inProofes;which are... Syllogismes"(I.1). He concedesthatemotionmay play a role but insists "ThatRhetorique s an Art consisting not onely inmoovingthe passionsof the Judge;but chiefely in Proofes"(I.1). The emphasison logos is necessary o maintainorder or"If thisArtconsistedin Criminationsonly,andtheskill to stirreupJudgesto Anger, Envy,Feare,Pitty,or otheraffec-tions; a Rhetorician n well orderedCommon-wealthsand States, where it isforbidden o digressefrom the cause in the hearing,could have nothingto say"(I. 1).Aristotle certainlyshows some concern thatpathoscan be implementedirresponsiblywhen he says that "it is wrong to warp the jury by leadingtheminto angeror envy or pity" (Rhetoric1.1.3 [1354a]) buthe isn't nearly as ada-mantabout the status of pathosas Hobbes.Even as he moves into chapter wo,Hobbes nsiststhat"Thebeleefe,thatproceedes romourinvention, omes partlyfrom the behavior of the speaker;partlyfrom the passions of the hearer:butespecially from the proofsof what we alledge" (1.2).Hobbesshows his concernaboutemotionto theveryendof thethirdandfinalbook of his Briefe, unlikeAristotlewho offersfewer warningsagainst passion-ate discourseas he proceeds.Forexample,as he begins the thirdbook, Hobbesindicatesthat each gesture in a speech shouldproceed"all from one Passion"because when "thereappearemorepassion thenone at once, the minde of thespeakerappearesunnaturall nddistracted" nd,as is "themindeof thespeaker,so the minde of the Hearer" 111.1).As Harwoodsays in note 3, p. 108 of hiscommentaryon theBriefe, no such discussionappears nAristotle's text at thispoint-although Aristotle does warnagainstusing a confused style to conveyemotionin 111.7.3-5.Hobbes, however,seems less concernedaboutstyle than emotionalcontent,expressingthe same doubtabout the mind'sability to process informationde-


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74 RHETORICOCIETY UARTERLYscribed n his ShortTract.Hobbes states n the Tract hat f the mindof subjectAcomes underthe influenceof two sourcesof desire,B and C, the psyche willcancel outpartof theoverloadof sensorydatasimplyby failingto perceive theleast appealing agent: ". . . if B is the greater force than C, then C shall not moveA; becauseA is moved already by B, the strongerAgent; andconsequentlyCshall not be perceiv'd" III.concl.9).A mind confrontedby a rhetorwho mightbe exciting manyappetitesand aversionsvia pathoscould easily become over-whelmedby this information verload.Suchatechnique hereforewoulddefeatthe rhetor'spurposes.Even when the passions are used properly, he maineffect seems manipula-tive, to leave"inebriated thespeaker's]Hearers," s Hobbesputsit (111.6).No-where does Aristotleuse suchdeprecating ermsas Hobbes.Aristotle mpliesattimes that thereexists a kind of internal ogic for emotions which themselvesoften seem coloredby rationalprinciplesofjudgment.In Book II Aristotlesays,"toone who is friendly, hepersonaboutwhom hepassesjudgmentseems to dowrong in a small way; to the one who is hostile, the opposite."Likewise,"to apersonfeeling strongdesire andbeing hopeful, if somethingin the futureis asource of pleasure, t appeares hat it will come to pass andwill be good;but toan unemotionalpersonand one in a disagreeablestate of mind, the opposite"(11.2[1377b-78a]).

UnlikeHobbes,Aristotlesees acomplex,extremelysubtle nteraction etweenrationaland non-rational orces motivatinghumanbehavior:"both hejust andtheunjust andotherssaid to actby theirhabitual haracter)will do thingseitherthroughreason or emotion;but the formerwill do good thingsby characteroremotion, the latterthe opposite."Moreover,"theresurelyareconsequencesofhavingspecific charactersor emotions;for good reputationsandsentiments nregard o his pleasuresfollow immediatelyandequallyfrom the temperateper-son from his temperance" I.10.9-10 [1369a]). Humancharacter,pathos andbehaviorconstitutea kind of seamlessorganiccontinuum orAristotle.Hobbesdoes not evenattempt o interpretuchpassages,beingcontentwith hisparatacticdiagramsof causes and effects of humanbehaviorandaudienceresponsewherereasonoperates ndependentlyof emotionexcept whenclouded by it.Hobbes also ignores certainconnotationsof Aristotle'swordprotaseis in dis-cussing propositionsfor emotionalproofs in Book 11.8[1378a]. As Kennedyasserts in his commentaryon Aristotle's Rhetoric(n.6 121), the termprotaseisimplies thatpathetictopoi might serveas the basis for enthymemes.But ignor-ing such implicationsconforms with Hobbes'sapproach o the topoi which heseeks to simplify and modify in orderto furtherseparatereason andemotion.Hobbes'sparatactic llustrationsof topoi do not capture-nor do they seem in-tended to approximate-the complex quality of topical logic thatpoints to anunderlyinggenerativerhetoricalprinciple.Whendiscussingthe colors of goodandevil, for example,Hobbesalludes to the related opoi of the greaterand thelesser when he sayspeoplenaturally"take hegreatergood rather hanthe lesse;


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RHETORICOCIETY UARTERLY 75and the lesser Evill, rather hanthe greater" 63). But this analysis of the partsofsuch commonplacesdoes not approach he complexityof Aristotle's llustrationshowing how the logic of lesser and greater s connectedto the generativeopera-tions underlyingsuchcommonplacethoughtprocesses:

Things 'follow upon' another n two senses; either simultaneaouslyorsubsequently; or example, knowledgeis subsequent o learning,but liv-ing is simultaneouswith health. Things are productive n three senses;some as being productiveof health;some as food is productiveof health... On these premisesit necessarilyfollows that both the acquisitionofgood thingsandthe eliminationof evils are goods. [And it necessarilyfollows] thatacquisitionof greatergood than a lesser one andof a lesserevil than a greaterone aregoods. (1.6.3 [1362a])

Aristotle s genuinely nterestednarticulatinghe operationswherebyknowl-edge is socialized andvocalized through he commonplacesof civil discourse.By contrast,Hobbesholds such discourse at a distance and offers an objectiveanalysis of (material)causal factors motivatingcertain types of behavioranddiscourse. Hobbes describesa typology of topics that seems gearedto classifycertain commonplacestrategiesparatactically, s if such strategiesconstitutedmolds into which the matterof discourse couldbe poured,almost regardlessofthe specific rhetorical ontextor situation:"Greatand Little, manyand Few, aretakenComparatively o the Most of the same kind" (47). Aristotle, however,describes generalmodes andprinciplesfor creating arguments hatcan be ap-plied in manycontexts:"Andf therearetwocauses, whatcomes fromthe greatercause is greater;andconversely,of the firsttwo principles,the firstprincipleofthe greater hing is greater" 7.6 [1364a]).

By reconfiguring he Aristotelianapparatusof the commonplaces,Hobbescan continue to subordinatepassion to reason and find convenient means ofexploiting pathos without impairing logic. For example, when describingcommonplaceson hate andanger,HobbessimplifiesAristotle'sstrategy n or-der to render hetopoi into a meansof creatinga visualimage (or species) of thespeaker, udge or a defendant hatcan influence the largely passiveemotionsofthe audience.Hobbessays the commonplacesshow "howtheJudgeor Auditormay be madeFriendor Enemyto us; and how ourAdversarymay be madetoappeareFriendor Enemy to the Judge;andhow we would answer our Adver-sary,thatwould make us appeareEnemies to him"(74). But for Aristotlesuchemotions seem to cooperatewith and augmentmore rationalthinking:"Fromthis, then,it is evident that t is possible [fora speaker]both to demonstrate hatpeople areenemies andfriends andto make them so when they are not and torefutethose claimingto be and to bringthose who throughangeror enmityareon the other side of the case over to what ever feeling he chooses" (11.4.32[I 382a]). Aristotlesees the oratoreffecting a conversion n the auditor hrough


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76 RHETORICOCIETY UARTERLYdemonstrationand by tappinginto the psycho-logic of the emotions. UnlikeHobbes, he discusses the linkbetween emotion andtheperceptualapparatusnways suggestingthatemotion isjudgmentalyet needfulof support romlogic inorder to perceivethe immoralnatureof evil: "Painfulactions [inflictedby onepersonon another]are all perceivedby the senses, butthegreatestevils-injus-tice andthoughtlessness-are leastperceived; orthepresenceof evil causes nopain" (11.4.32 [1381a]). Aristotle directs his proofs to an auditor whom hepercievesas aninstinctivelymoralbeing whosejudgmentsareshapedby thoughtandfeeling simultaneously.By contrast,andas if in anticipationof the rhetori-cal and logical strategiesZappen,Johnstonand VictoriaKahn see at work inLeviathan,Hobbesmanipulateseeling fora logical purposebutnotneccesarilyby appealingto the reasonof the auditor.This does not contradictHobbes'sopeningstatement hat ogical proof s thehigher ormof argument-but itclearlyillustrates the theoreticalparadoxfaced by the materialistrhetor whose logicunderscores he irrationalandpassivenatureof the auditor.ThroughoutBook II,Aristotlegives moredetailed accountsof howemotionsoperatein proofs than does Hobbes in parallelsections of his treatise.This nodoubt results in partfromHobbes's desireto presenta brief outline of the Aris-totelianmethod,but Hobbes's deletions are telling. In the section on indigna-tion, for example, Aristotle,unlikeHobbes,describesin detail the relationbe-tween pity, indignationandenvy.Aristotle'sdiscussionemphasizesthe linkbe-tween moraljudgment, pathos and ethos: "All these feelings come from thesame moralcharacter,andopposite feelings from the opposite;for one who ismalicious is also envious;for when someone is distressedat the acquisitionorthe possession of something, necessarilyhe rejoices at its deprivationor de-struction."Therefore, aysAristotle,"all thesethingsarehindrances o pity anddiffer for the reasonsmentioned,so thattheyaresimilarlyuseful [toa speaker]in counteracting eelings of pity" (II. 9.5 [1386b-1387aD).Aristotle seems todescribeakindof dialectical(perhapsdialogical) nteractionbetweenemotions,an interactionthat informs moraljudgment.But no similarconception of anemotional,moralpsycho-logic appears n Hobbes who insteaddescribesa kindof causal chain for manipulatinghejudge's indignation o preventhis compas-sion from affectinghis judgment:"Whosoever hereforewould turnaway thecompassionof the Judge,he mustmake him apt to indignation;and shew thathis adversary s unworthyof the Good, andworthyof the Evill, which happensto him"(82).An even moretelling passage is one which Kennedypointsto in his transla-tion of Aristotleas a sourceforcontentionregarding herelationbetween emo-tional andrationalproofs.Kennedy ndicatesthatone could eitherinterpret hefinal sentence of section 7 in Book II.11as "This concludes an account of howthe emotions are createdand counteracted, rom which are derivedpisteis re-latedto them"or one could addthe clause "andthe topics fromwhich they arederived" n.89 162).If the latterclause is added, then, as Kennedysays in note


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RHETORICOCIETY UARTERLY 7789, this raises the possibility that"topicsabout emotions are to be regardedaspremisesfor enthymemes."Hence, emotionwould play a part n thebasic ratio-nal apparatus or generatingproofs, perhaps uggesting thatreason andemotionplay equally significantroles in persuasion,perhapsoperating simultaneouslyon the auditor.Significantly,Hobbesdeletes this entire passagein Book II. 13 of his treatisewhich parallelsBook 11. 1 of the Rhetoric.Hobbes clearly concedes that emo-tionalarguments annotbe eliminated romrhetoric,butmaintains hatthey aretobe kept subordinateo the rationalaspectsand aims of argument.Not surpris-ingly, Hobbes also eliminatesAristotle's statement n 11.21 hat maxims,whichcan playa role inconstructing nthymemes,can also work on the emotions:"Anexampleof a maximwith pathos s if someonein angerwere to say that t is a liethatsomeone shouldknow himself' (11.21.13 1395a]). AlthoughHobbesagreesthat maxims can be used alone or in enthymemes 11.22),he simplydeletes anyadvice on combining them with pathos.Suchdeletions most likely were not solely the resultof Hobbes's needto keephis own treatisebrief;nor can they be ascribedonly to the possible influenceofRameanorreformedAristotelian hetoric.As manyof the Hobbes scholarscitedabove haveshown,Ramusandthe reformedrhetoricsdoubtless shapedmuch ofHobbes'sthinkingaboutrhetoric,butthese influences cannotfully accountforwhat in particular purredHobbes'seclectic method.Clearly Hobbesintendstoproducea conciseadaptationwhich can be usefulto hispupilWilliamCavendish,andclearlymuchof thestyle andformatting f theBriefecan be attributedo therise of the printculturewhich Ong describes(148). Nevertheless, as the worksof many scholarsindicate,ThomasHobbes frequentlyputs his own distinctivemarkuponthe systems of thinkingfrom which he borrows.4NeitherGalileo'smethodnorEuclid'sgeometryresistHobbes'stendency o reconfigure he think-ing of others to suit his own rhetoricaland politicalpurposes.The same may besaid of Aristotle'sRhetoricwhich, in Hobbes's hands, undergoesa transforma-tion thatmakesit, as some haveargued,a usefultheoryof discourseforcreatingthe kind of philosophy espousedin Leviathan.Whenplaced in its propercon-text withHobbes'searlymaterialistphilosophyas articulatedn the ShortTract,theBriefereveals tself to be theblueprint or a theoryof discoursewhich wouldeventuallybe implementedby Hobbes to describe a statewherein,as VictoriaKahnsays, rhetoricwould no longerbe necessary (190).The Briefe, however,is of interestnot only for what it teaches us aboutthenewrhetoricsof the seventeenthcenturynor only for the text'ssignificant nter-actionbetweenphilosophyandrhetoric.Hobbes'streatisealso pointsto the dif-ficulty of reclaimingthe classical rhetoricalheritagein moderntimes when adifferent ense of materialityhasreplacedAristotle's.Aristotle'sRhetoric s stillconsideredby manytheoreticians o be the seminaltext for rhetorical heory,butHobbes'sBriefe representsa seminalattempt o updateand translate hattext foran audiencewhichcontinuesunconsciouslyto separate tself from the verydif-


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78 RHETORICSOCIETYQUARTERLYferentoralandclassicalculturewhich gave birth o rhetoric.No text better llus-trates he difficultiesandrisksinvolved nreclaiming hatclassical heritage hanHobbes's Briefe of the Arte of Rhetorique. As debate concerning the theoreticaland ideological value of Aristotle'sRhetoric is renewed (Neel 85-90; Walzer81-85), it should be notedthatourperceptionsof Aristotle,like Hobbes's,mustnecessarily be influencedby ourpresentistbias. If we are to do more thanreadAristotle throughthe lens of hindsight, as Hobbes sometimes does, we mustwork to comprehendbetter he ideology,psychology and epistemologyinform-ing Aristole'sRhetoricbefore we praise it, condemn t or adapt t to ourpresentpurposes.Muchworkremains o bedone as we attempt o evaluateAristotleandthe rhetorical radition hat succeededhim.

University of Texas of the Permian BasinNotes1. See DavidJohnston;VictoriaKahn 155-192;WilliamMathie 281-298; Wil-liam Sacksteder30-46; QuentinSkinner 1-61; JamesZappen65-91.2. Burnyeat 15-26; CodeandMoravciski129-145; Cohen57-73; CharlesKahn

359-379; Nussbaumand Putnam27-35; Sorabji 195-225;Whiting 75-91.3. For detailed discussion of Hobbes on human behavior,morality and prin-ciples of pleasureand aversion,see Gert 16-20; King 194-196; Thorpe 22-23;Strauss133-134;Watkins150-151.4. Leo Straussarguesthatthe real basis of Hobbes's thinking s his own experi-ence (x), whileArnold Green, lookingover a long traditionof Hobbes scholar-ship, argues hatHobbes's eclecticismis so distinctive hatHobbes standscloserto the presenttime than to any interveningperiod (ix).

Works CitedAristotle.On Rhetoric:A Theoryof CivicDiscourse. Trans.GeorgeA. Kennedy.New York:Oxford Up, 1991.Burnyeat,M.F. "Is An AristotelianPhilosophyof Mind Still Credible?"Essayson Aristotle's De Anima. Ed. Martha C. Nussbaum and AmelieOkensbergRorty.Oxford:ClarendonP, 1992. 15-26.Code,Alan andJuliusMoravciski."ExplainingVariousFormsof Living".Es-says on Aristotle's De Anima. Ed. Martha C. Nussbaum and AmelieOkensbergRorty.Oxford:ClarendonP, 1992. 129-145.Cohen S. Marc."Hylomorphism ndFunctionalism".Essays on Aristotle's DeAnima. MarthaC. Nussbaum and Amelie OkensbergRorty. Oxford:ClarendonP, 1992. 57-73.Conley,Thomas."Pathe ndPisteis:Aristotle,Rhet.II.2-11."Hermes110 (1982):300-3 15.

Gert, Bernard. Thomas Hobbes's De Homine and De Cive. Gloucester, Mass:Peter Smith, 1978.


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RHETORICSOCIETYQUARTERLY 79Green, Arnold W. Hobbes and Human Nature. New Brunswick: TransactionPublishers, 1993.Grimaldi, William. Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle's"Rhetoric".Wiesbaden: teiner, 1975.Hobbes, Thomas.A Briefe of the Arte of Rhetorique.The Rhetorics of ThomasHobbes and Bernard Lamy. Ed. John Harwood. Carbondale andEdwardsville:Southern llinois UP, 1986.-. CourtTraiteDes PremiersPrincipes/Short Tracton the First Principles de1630-1631. Trans. Jean Bernhardt.Paris: Presses Universitaires deFrance, 1988.

. Leviathan.Ed. RichardTuck. Cambridge:CambridgeUP, 1991.Johnston,David. The Rhetoricof Leviathan.Princeton:PrincetonUP, 1986.Kahn,CharlesH. "Aristotleon Thinking."Essays on Aristotle's De Anima. Ed.

MarthaC. NussbaumandAmelie OkensbergRorty.Oxford:ClarendonP, 1992. 359-379.Kahn,Victoria.Rhetoric, Prudenceand Scepticism n the Renaissance. Ithaca:CornellUP, 1985.King, Preston.The Ideology of Order.New York:Routledge, 1974.Mathie, William I. "Reason and Rhetoric in Hobbes's Leviathan". nterpreta-tion 14 (1990): 281-298.

Neel, Jasper."WrongAbout Aristotle's Voice"Rhetoric Society Quarterly26(1996): 85-90.Nussbaum,MarthaC. and HilaryPutnam."ChangingAristotle'sMind."Essayson Aristotle's De Anima Ed. Martha C. Nussbaum and AmelieOkensbergRorty.Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1992.Ong,Walter . Ramusand theDecay of Dialogue. Cambridge:HarvardUP, 1958.Riek, Miriam.The Golden Landsof ThomasHobbes. Detroit:WayneState Uni-versityP, 1977.Robinson,Daniel N. Aristotle'sPsychology.New York:Columbia:UP, 1989.Sacksteder,William."Hobbes:Philosophicaland RhetoricalArtifice".Philoso-phy and Rhetoric 17 (1984): 30-46.Skinner,Quentin."ThomasHobbes: Rhetoric and the Constructionof Moral-ity."Proceedings of theBritishAcademy76 (1990): 1-61.Sorabji,Richard."Intentionality hysiologicalProceses."Essays on Aristotle'sDe Anima. Ed. MarthaC. Nussbaumand Amelie Okensberg Rorty.Oxford:ClarendonP, 1992. 195-225.Strauss,Leo. ThePolitical Philosophy of ThomasHobbes: Its Basis and Gen-esis. Trans.ElsaM. Sinclair.Chicago:U of Chicago P, 1966.Thorpe,ClarenceDe Witt. TheAestheticTheoryof ThomasHobbes. New York:Russell andRussell, 1964.Walzer,Arthur.Rev.of Aristotle'sVoice:Rhetoric,Theory ndWritingn Americaby JasperNeel. RhetoricSociety Quarterly26 (1996): 81-85.Watkins,J.W.N.Hobbes'sSystemofIdeas.London:AveburyPublications,1968.


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80 RHETORICSOCIETYQUARTERLYWhiting,Jennifer."LivingBodies."Essays on Aristotle'sDeAnima. Ed. Martha

C. NussbaumandAmelieOkensbergRorty.Oxford:ClarendonP,1992.75-9 1.Zappen,JamesP."Aristotelian nd RamistRhetoric n ThomasHobbes'sLevia-than:Pathos versus Ethos andLogos."Rhetorica 1 (1983): 65-9 1.

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