HMAS Sydney Commission of Enquiry. · UK lost the HMAS Sydney. Under direct orders from Air...

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From: David Angwin [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Friday, 31 October 2008 9:18 AM To: Katrina Radburn; Radburn, Katrina CMDR Subject: Fw: Captain Burnetts defence- HMAS Sydney update #448 HMAS Sydney Commission of Enquiry. Submission # 1 Captain Burnett wasn't incompetant or stupid. David Angwin. Firstly, the current photo's of the 111 and 26 - Sydney - wreck are not conclusive to the full truth of the situation. -Lifeboats missing, means some got off. Of the 681 on board the HMAS Perth, 329 got off after 4 long lance hits, 8 inch round hits and the rest. Burnett was hunting a Handels Stor Kreuzer, as per orders from C -in - C China Station Singapore. The HSK Classification was new, and nobody at Allied Command knew what it really was. Kreuzer means 6 inch [plus] guns. Allied Command was reading the Japanese Purple Code, the IJF JNA-20 Naval Attache Code, the IJF 25 A Naval Code, and had just broken the RGM Enigma Foreign Key. Direct evidence for breaking the Foreign Enigma Key was the triple sinking of the Atlantis Crew; and against the Geneva Convention, were left in the water to drown. The Japanese codes were no big deal, don't let anyone fool you. The American Army used its format as early as 1898, and my opinion is the system was sold to the Japanese by the US. On the 17th of November 1941, the HMAS Sydney was on convoy protection duty on behalf of the Australian Defence Forces. A direct request from C-in-C China Station Singapore cancelled her RAN duties, and by default she became property of the UK. UK lost the HMAS Sydney. Under direct orders from Air Marshall Brooke - Popham, she was sent to 111 and 26 to engage a German Kreuzer that was being vectored in to that position to stop the Troopship Aquitania from reinforcing Fortress Singapore with 4000 Australian Army Troops on the eve of the original Pearl Harbour strike. Japanese request for assistance, met by German Marine response. Captain Burnett RAN didn't decide to take a 7000 ton modified Leander Cruiser for a quick spin across the Western Australian Coast. He was ordered to. At 111 and 26 in the inbound sealane to Perth, awaited a German Kreuzer registered as a Dutch Neutral to meet and stop the Liner. The Aquitania was expected at noon, as per the German Kapitans Report. Across the horizon came the HMAS Sydney 4 hours later. Burnett ordered to report in. One hundred percent C-in-C China Station operation. Nothing to do with Burnetts personal reasonings, or his need to borrow a 7000 ton Cruiser for a couple of days. Its all about strict RN / RAN Line Command. SUBM.006.0030

Transcript of HMAS Sydney Commission of Enquiry. · UK lost the HMAS Sydney. Under direct orders from Air...

Page 1: HMAS Sydney Commission of Enquiry. · UK lost the HMAS Sydney. Under direct orders from Air Marshall Brooke - Popham, she was sent to 111 and 26 to engage a German Kreuzer that was

From: David Angwin [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Friday, 31 October 2008 9:18 AM To: Katrina Radburn; Radburn, Katrina CMDR Subject: Fw: Captain Burnetts defence- HMAS Sydney update #448 HMAS Sydney Commission of Enquiry. Submission # 1 Captain Burnett wasn't incompetant or stupid. David Angwin. Firstly, the current photo's of the 111 and 26 - Sydney - wreck are not conclusive to the full truth of the situation. -Lifeboats missing, means some got off. Of the 681 on board the HMAS Perth, 329 got off after 4 long lance hits, 8 inch round hits and the rest. Burnett was hunting a Handels Stor Kreuzer, as per orders from C -in - C China Station Singapore. The HSK Classification was new, and nobody at Allied Command knew what it really was. Kreuzer means 6 inch [plus] guns. Allied Command was reading the Japanese Purple Code, the IJF JNA-20 Naval Attache Code, the IJF 25 A Naval Code, and had just broken the RGM Enigma Foreign Key. Direct evidence for breaking the Foreign Enigma Key was the triple sinking of the Atlantis Crew; and against the Geneva Convention, were left in the water to drown. The Japanese codes were no big deal, don't let anyone fool you. The American Army used its format as early as 1898, and my opinion is the system was sold to the Japanese by the US. On the 17th of November 1941, the HMAS Sydney was on convoy protection duty on behalf of the Australian Defence Forces. A direct request from C-in-C China Station Singapore cancelled her RAN duties, and by default she became property of the UK. UK lost the HMAS Sydney. Under direct orders from Air Marshall Brooke - Popham, she was sent to 111 and 26 to engage a German Kreuzer that was being vectored in to that position to stop the Troopship Aquitania from reinforcing Fortress Singapore with 4000 Australian Army Troops on the eve of the original Pearl Harbour strike. Japanese request for assistance, met by German Marine response. Captain Burnett RAN didn't decide to take a 7000 ton modified Leander Cruiser for a quick spin across the Western Australian Coast. He was ordered to. At 111 and 26 in the inbound sealane to Perth, awaited a German Kreuzer registered as a Dutch Neutral to meet and stop the Liner. The Aquitania was expected at noon, as per the German Kapitans Report. Across the horizon came the HMAS Sydney 4 hours later. Burnett ordered to report in. One hundred percent C-in-C China Station operation. Nothing to do with Burnetts personal reasonings, or his need to borrow a 7000 ton Cruiser for a couple of days. Its all about strict RN / RAN Line Command.

SUBM.006.0030

Page 2: HMAS Sydney Commission of Enquiry. · UK lost the HMAS Sydney. Under direct orders from Air Marshall Brooke - Popham, she was sent to 111 and 26 to engage a German Kreuzer that was

All signals to and from Sydney to C-in-C Singapore are still Top Secret plus. Burnett ordered to pursue the fleeing ship. 60 minute chase. Kormoran yields, and hoists a white flag. Burnett ordered to report in. Kormoran crew fumbles flag signals to buy more time as the Sun drops to the horizon. Detmers would have reasoned that the Aquitania was behind the Cruiser escort. He was still on Task. Sydney does a point blank 360 degree circuit around the Dutch Registered merchant ship flying a white flag. Fit and finish of the RGM modified Kreuzer is sensational. The German Kapitan does not blink. Burnett ordered to report in after the close inspection. Does. Burnett stands on the bridge of a State of the Art RN built Cruiser. He knows he has a 5000 mile combat radius. Whatever known German Kruezer would have had to sailed from the Atlantic all the way across the entire Indian Ocean to be at this very remote position. It would need refueling to be combat ready, and then be able to return to the Atlantic. A reasoned appraisal of the situation identifies the Kormoran as the resupply ship. C-in-C China Station Singapore, and Captain Burnett concur. China Station orders Burnett to lock down the ' resupply ' ship. Burnett pulls in behind the Dutch Registered Neutral flying a white flag. 900 yards off the starboard stern. Burnett lines up the RAAF Walrus for a recon launch to check across the Horizon. As per HSK Kormoran survivor Mr Ludwig Ernst, 'the bridge was full of white caps ' All hands scanning the horizon for the mystery German Kreuzer. Walrus launch initiated. Burnett wants to find the Kreuzer, and take it on. Setting Sun interupts the proccedings. Burnett reports in regarding Walrus launch procedure readiness, and notes daylight time restrictions. C-in-C China Station Singapore cancels Walrus launch. Fading light makes the immediate priority the capture of the resupply ship to prevent the refueling of the Kreuzer. Positive tactical advantage. Both Burnett and C-in-C concur. Burnett ordered to capture the resupply ship. As soon as the boarding Launch hits the water, the torpedo starts running. Did Burnett make a mistake ??? Somethings not right. In defence; of a Royal Australian Navy Captain, and his entire Crew., David.

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