HIGH-RISE FIREFIGHTING Effective Firefighting Operations ...
Transcript of HIGH-RISE FIREFIGHTING Effective Firefighting Operations ...
HIGH-RISE FIREFIGHTING
Effective Firefighting Operations in High-Rise Towers A disciplined proactive command and deployment system can be used to reduce time-lag
delays in high-rise firefighting operations. It requires pre-planning and pre-determination of
how reconnaissance can be deployed effectively and rapidly on arrival to (a) locate the fire;
(b) control the primary risk zone and (c) establish a Forward Command role at the Bridgehead.
Paul Grimwood PhD; FIFireE
Paul Grimwood is in his 45th
year of service in the UK and
is currently the Principal Fire
Protection Engineer at Kent Fire
and Rescue Service. Following
operational service with London
Fire Brigade, Merseyside FRS,
West Midlands FRS and a six
month detachment to the New
York City Fire Department in
1976, Paul obtained his PhD in
Fire Engineering at Glasgow
Caledonian University this year.
His research into the amounts
of firefighting water required
to optimise structural fire
attack has since formed part of
the BS 7974 (5) suite of UK fire
engineering guidance documents
and National Operational
Guidance (NOG) package.
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T he Bridgehead provides a safe
working 'platform' from which to
launch fire-fighting and rescue
operations and should be located in or
near a stairway, at least two floors below
the fire. A Standard Operating Procedure
(SOP) should determine. The three primary
roles to be undertaken in the Incident
Command function:
Lobby Commander
2 Forward Fire Commander
3 Search and Rescue (S&R) Commander
• The Lobby Commander will be the
senior fire officer on an initial two
engine attendance that arrives together
or closely within a minute of each other.
T The fire in Sa if Be lhasa Tower,
Dubai, in October 2012
• Where the second engine is
delayed, the first officer on scene
should undertake the Forward Fire
Commander's role and form part
of the initial Reconnaissance Team,
establishing control of the fire lifts
and reporting to a relatively 'safe'
floor at least 3-5 floors below the
lowest reported fire floor.
• The second arriving officer will
become the Lobby Commander and
will deploy additional crew members
to make up secondary support to the
primary reconnaissance team.
• Where the Incident Commander
has deployed as the Forward Fire
Commander then the next arriving
senior fire officer (depending on level
of command) can either report to
the lobby and take command of the
incident, or report to the Bridgehead
as the S&R Commander.
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•
• The S&R Commander (based at Forward
Fire Command) should be deployed to
deal with the deployment of search and
rescue teams above the Bridgehead,
based on the priority triaging of
occupant assistance calls received.
A high level of communication and
coordination is needed here.
Some common problems encountered at
high-rise tower fires over the past twenty
years fall into the following categories-
• Non-sprinkle red buildings allowing
fire to spread rapidly
• Poor pre-planning and lack of
familiarisation with the building
• Inadequate fire resistance (or fire
stopping) in some buildings
• Combustible cladding or insulation
on external walls
• Inadequate staffing or resources on
the primary response
• Under estimating the physical
demands placed on firefighters
at working fires
• Ineffective Incident Command Systems
based on 'reactive' approaches
• Inadequate channels of communication
and ineffective use of existing channels
• Inadequate firefighting water provision
matched with the potential fire load
• A lack of understanding, or awareness,
of building air dynamics common to
tall buildings
• Complacency!
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Proactive Incident Command System (ICS) The author's research in the city of Kuala
Lumpur in 2008, a city encompassing
over 450 tall buildings, demonstrated
how a proactive response can reduce
intervention times. The standard
approach there to high-rise firefighting
was, as in most places, based upon a
'reactive response' incident command
system. The author's research prompted
a change to a 'proactive' system of
incident command and response and
this enabled a reduction in response
and deployment times by at least four
minutes (water on the fire) (Figure One).
In this trial, the Proactive ICS plan
established a Bridgehead (Forward
Command post) within eight minutes
on level18 and enabled water to be
applied on the fire within eleven minutes,
following arrival on-scene. A secondary
support hose-line was never achieved
within time-scale under the 'reactive'
approach. The most glaring issue was
the inability to maintain a constant
attack on the fire, under the 'reactive'
approach, due to insufficient staffing
at the fire floor.
As firefighters are generally exposed
to high heat build-up as fire develops
between the concrete floor slabs their
time at the fire is often reduced to
10-15 minutes. This means relief crews
should be ready for deployment from
the Bridgehead (Forward Command) to
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HIGH-RISE FIREFIGHTING
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..a. Figure One: Reactive timings (upper) versus
Proactive timings (lower) achieved by the two
response and deployment strategies implemented
in the same building, before and after training.
The Proactive ICS also enabled careful management
of staffing deployments to ensure the fire attack
remained uninterrupted and supported.
arrive on the fire floor and at the nozzle
ahead of time. This is a critical point that
is often forgotten and failure to do this
often allows the fire to develop rapidly
beyond control. Two recent office tower
fires in London and Madrid have seen
'first response' firefighters incapacitated
by rapidly developing fires between the
concrete floor slabs as they were exposed
to high heat conditions on the fire floor
for just ten minutes. This required second
and third waves of firefighters to involve
in their rescue rather than firefighting,
causing the fires to burn beyond any
immediate control.
In order to establish an optimum
response and intervention model for
high-rise tower fires it is important to
analyse and prioritise the command
roles and tactical objectives that are
achievable according to the weight
of attack in a staffing and command
perspective. It is also important to assess
the risk profile according to any particular
building's occupancy, life risk, fire load
and in built fire protection features.
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Advantages of the proactive response
• Established immediately at arrival
on-scene
• Not prone to stagnation (time delays
and down time caused by a reactive
approach)
• Ability to work in separate teams,
coordinated by sector commands
• Responsive and adaptable to rapid
changes in circumstances
• Adequately staffed in order to fulfil
key command roles from the outset
• Able to communicate effectively
between pre-determined spans
of control
Proactive command and response
means pre-planning the Standard
Operating Procedure (SOP) or Tactical
Plan, in advance of arriving on-scene.
It's about an immediate deployment of
a reconnaissance team with equipment
using a Rapid Ascent Team (RAT)
approach. It's about locating the fire
quickly, taking immediate actions that
might contain fire spread (like closing
a door if safe to do so), and setting up
the Forward Command Bridgehead
reading for ongoing operations. Getting
adequate staffing into place at the
bridgehead to allow for a three team
cycle relief to each hose-line operating is
also important (one crew on the nozzle,
one crew next in on the nozzle and one
crew in rehabilitation before a second
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entry is allowed). So for each hose-line in
operation a minimum of 6-12 firefighters
are required in the 3-cycle relief.
Primary Response Operations (ICE) In the UK we use a response plan
(Figure Two) that encourages three
tactical approaches to be followed beyond
any immediate rescue attempts taking
place. These are-
Intervention (fire attack)
2 Containment
3 Evacuation
Intervention means an immediate hose
line (or aerial water tower) is placed as
part of a life safety function to stop a fire
spreading beyond control. This might
occur in an open-plan office area where
we literally have a few short minutes
to ensure adequate firefighting water
reaches the fire before the involved fire
load becomes too big to handle or spreads
vertically. This will start to occur as the
fire spreads beyond 200 square metres
of floor area.
A containment action might include
surrounding the fire with hose-lines or
aerial water towers, to prevent lateral and
vertical fire spread.lt may also involve
closing doors and controlling ventilation
flow paths to and from the fire. An external
fire behaviour observer can be located at
a safe point to observe and communicate
warning signs of exterior window failures,
<II Figure Two: Primary
response tactical
decision making on the
fire floor (ICE) -Choose
the optimum solution
first after any immediate
rescue considerations,
based on internal and
external conditions and
occupants who may be
at risk in the primary
risk zone (hallways,
corridors and possibly
un-protected stairways).
smoke and fire conditions, fire spread
to upper floors as well as how the wind
might be impacting on the fire itself. This
information is critical to any decisions
on the fire floor, prioritising intervention
ahead of evacuation or containment.
Evacuation of immediate (primary
- near the fire) or secondary (further
way) zones are of immediate concern.
Prior to opening a door to the fire zone,
might it be more beneficial to oversee an
evacuation from the primary zone that
could be compromised by smoke and heat
escaping into an escape corridor(primary)
or stairway (secondary), for example. In
some cases it might be more beneficial
to 'defend' occupants in place. However,
uncontrolled movements of occupants
in areas at risk can easily lead to serious
injuries or even death. Unconscious
occupants are sometimes found in
escape routes after the fire has been
extinguished, where firefighters failed to
place evacuation ahead of a firefighting
intervention.
Firefighting Water The most recent research undertaken
by the author involved investigation
into the quantities offirefighting water
required to effectively extinguish building
fires. This work involved some detailed
analysis of over SAOO UK building fires
occurring from 2009- 2012. At each fire,
water was flowed and breathing apparatus
was worn.
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T Figure Three: Research graph based on 5,401
building fires in the UK, from 2009-2012 where
water was flowed and firefighters wore breathing
apparatus. The data demonstrates a series of curves
for dwelling, industrial/storage, and all otherfires
(based on the midline), that show optimum flow
rates in accordance with average fire loading and
floor area. To fall below these flow-rates may expose
firefighters to longer duration fires that will require
additional resources and staffing.
u
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The research with Glasgow Caledonian
University demonstrated the optimum,
minimum and critical rates of flow (Litres/
minute/m2 floor area) before excessive
fire damage occurs and firefighters are
exposed to increasing levels of heat.
Where fires are approached during the
growth side of the development curve,
the following flows are recommended for
early stage fire suppression:
•
..a. Fire in a tower block under construction,
Jumeirah Lake area, Dubai January 2010.
• Critical flow-rates, below which a
developing fire is unlikely to be controlled.
• Minimum flow-rates where suppression
is achievable but firefighters face severe
and punishing conditions.
• Optimum (adequate) flow-rates where
control of the fire is achievable without
unnecessary punishment to firefighters.
The following graph shows where
the flow-rate is optimised (as used by
firefighters) against various occupancies
according to compartment size and fire
load. The quantity in flow required in
dwellings is far less than in industrial or
storage buildings per square metre of fire
involvement and all other occupancies,
such as offices, hotels, retail and schools,
flow somewhere around the midline
(validated through research by Stefan
Sardqvist). To fall below these 'optimum'
flow-rates will expose firefighters to
greater risk by extending the time to
extinguishment. also leading to greater
levels of fire damage within the building.
1(111111 For more information, go to ~ [email protected]
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