HIGH DRIVER TURNOVER AMONG LARGE LONG-HAUL MOTOR

CARRIERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

Christopher L. Ferrell

Thesis Prepared for the Degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS

December 2016

APPROVED:

Alicia Re Cruz, Major Professor Beverly A, Davenport, Committee MemberTerrance Pohlen, Committee Member Lisa Henry, Chair of the Department of

Anthropology David Holdeman, Dean of the College of

Arts and Sciences Victor Prybutok, Vice Provost of the

Toulouse Graduate School

Ferrell, Christopher L. High Driver Turnover among Large Long-Haul Motor Carriers:

Causes and Consequences. Master of Science (Applied Anthropology), December 2016, 122

pp., 14 figures, 88 numbered references.

My thesis provides evidence supporting a theory asserting that the high level of

competition that exists between motor carriers operating within long-haul trucking is the most

significant factor contributing to the continuously high driver turnover rates affecting the entire

logistics industry. I explore how long-haul truck drivers internalize the conflict between their

identity and the aggressively competitive environment within which they work. Social science

authors, industry reports, and truck driver feedback from my own ethnographic study are

analyzed for contexts in order to explore the current operating definition of success for motor

carriers in both monetary and human terms.

ii

Copyright 2016

by

Christopher L. Ferrell

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many people have earned my deepest gratitude for making the conduct of my research

and this written thesis possible. I would like to thank each of my committee members, my client

sponsors, and my internship employer for all of their input and efforts made on my behalf

throughout the conduct of my research and writing. To my Committee Chair, Dr. Alicia Re Cruz,

I thank you for helping me to frame my analyses from less familiar points of view that this work

may have increased value to a wider audience. To my Committee Member Dr. Beverly

Davenport, for the years of continual feedback and support, for all of your editing and

suggestions, and for your confidence in my ability to transmit complex ideas better than I

realized. I would like to thank Dr. Terrance Pohlen for your guidance and action-oriented

networking which put me in contact with my internship research job at Transplace. Significant

contextual analysis was born from my efforts in that position. To Tom Sanderson, the CEO of

Transplace and to whom I was a direct report, I thank you for your enthusiastic interest in my

research, and for all of the transportation market research I learned under your direction.

Finally I would like to thank both of my project signatories. Vince Washington and Burton Weis,

both formerly of USA Truck, Inc. for their interest in my research and for agreeing to be my

project signatories’, and for extending to me the courtesy of allowing me to conduct my driver

interviews at their respective locations in Denton, Texas and Van Buren, Arkansas. Finally and

most importantly I thank my sister and brother-in-law, Letishia and Oscar Sanchez. You’ve each

given me so much more than shelter during my graduate school experience.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................................................iii LIST OF FIGURES .............................................................................................................................. vi CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1

1.1 Project Overview ..................................................................................................... 1

1.2 Project Context ....................................................................................................... 2

1.3 Project Goals ........................................................................................................... 4 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................................... 6

2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 6

2.2 Driver Turnover Studies .......................................................................................... 6

2.3 Industry Reports.................................................................................................... 19

2.3.1 American Trucking Associations Driver Turnover Data: Transplace Analysis................................................................................................................... 20

2.3.2 Freight Transportation Report (FTR): Transportation Intelligence Report ................................................................................................................... 21

2.3.3 Morgan Stanley Freight Transportation: Truck Load Freight Index (TLFI) Report ....................................................................................................... 24

2.3.4 American Trucking Associations (ATA) Truckload Tonnage Report ......... 26

2.3.5 Avondale Partners Industry Update Report ............................................. 28

2.4 Social Science Theoretical Frameworks of Analysis.............................................. 33

2.4.1 Masculine Characteristics and Neoliberal Policies: Connecting the Local to the Global .................................................................................................. 36

CHAPTER 3. METHODS .................................................................................................................. 45

3.1 Research Design Background ................................................................................ 45

3.2 Client Acquisition .................................................................................................. 47

3.3 Institutional Review Board .................................................................................... 49

3.3 Description of Client Location(s) ........................................................................... 50

3.4 Barriers to Project Initiation ................................................................................. 50

3.5 Multi-Site Expansion ............................................................................................. 53

v

3.6 Methods: Recruitment, Interviews, and Analysis ................................................. 55

3.7 Analytical Development and Grounded Theory ................................................... 58 CHAPTER 4. FINDINGS ................................................................................................................... 61

4.1 The People ............................................................................................................ 61

4.2 The Coding Process ............................................................................................... 66

4.3 Thematic Codes and Categories ........................................................................... 67

4.3.1 Quotes ....................................................................................................... 67

4.3.2 Identity ...................................................................................................... 67

4.3.3 Drivers on Identity .................................................................................... 68

4.3.4 Driver Perceptions and Treatment ........................................................... 72

4.3.5 Relationships ............................................................................................. 79

4.3.6 Communication ......................................................................................... 80

4.3.7 Pay ............................................................................................................. 90

4.3.8 Pay Problems ............................................................................................ 94

4.3.9 Home Time ................................................................................................ 96

4.3.10 Effective Training ...................................................................................... 99

4.3.11 Federal Regulations ................................................................................ 104 CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................................................... 105

5.1 Overview ............................................................................................................. 105

5.2 Research Questions Revisited ............................................................................. 105

5.2.1 Response to Question 1: Why Have Turnover Rates Been High for So Long? ...................................................................................................... 105

5.2.2 Response to Question 2: What are the Impacts of Sustained High Turnover Rates? ..................................................................................... 106

5.2.3 Response to Question 3: How Can Motor Carriers Reduce Turnover and Increase Retension? ................................................................................ 109

5.3 A Contextual Story from Personal Experience .................................................... 109

5.4 Future Research Recommendations ................................................................... 112 REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................ 114

vi

LIST OF FIGURESPage

Figure 1 ATA & Transplace Analysis of National Driver Turnover Rates....................................... 21

Figure 3 FTR Driver Shortage History & Projection....................................................................... 22

Figure 4 FTR Active Truck Utilization History & Projection........................................................... 23

Figure 5 Morgan Stanley Truckload Freight Index August 2014 ................................................... 26

Figure 6 ATA & Transplace Seasonally Adjusted Truck Tonnage August 2015 v.1 ....................... 27

Figure 7 ATA & Transplace Seasonally Adjusted Truck Tonnage August 2015 v.2 ....................... 28

Figure 8 Avondale, Energy Information Administration, & Transplace Carrier Failures .............. 30

Figure 9 Avondale & Transplace Report on Largest Motor Carrier Fleet Sizes ............................ 31

Figure 10 Drivers by Race.............................................................................................................. 61

Figure 11 Drivers by Sex ................................................................................................................ 62

Figure 12 Drivers by Age ............................................................................................................... 62

Figure 13 Drivers by Years of Experience and Number of Employing Carriers............................. 65

Figure 14 Average Number of Years between Driver Turnover Events........................................ 65

1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Project Overview

High truck driver turnover rates have been a problem for all motor carriers for over 30

years (Keller & Ozment 1999). My thesis research focused on the most problematic area of

driver turnover and aimed to identify the causes of and possible solutions to the high driver

turnover rates in the combined category of long-haul1, for-hire2, and truckload3 motor carriers.

The research questions this study addresses are:

1. Why have turnover rates been high for so long?

2. What are the impacts of sustained high turnover rates?

3. How can motor carriers reduce turnover and increase retention?

For this study, a single, large4, long-haul, truckload motor carrier agreed to be my

research client. Over the course of several months, sixteen drivers were recruited for voluntary

participation in recorded long-form interviews. Research methodology centered on the

collection and analysis of the recordings. Additionally, observations made during the data

collection process, economic and industry reports, and personal long-haul driving experience

contribute to my analysis.

Previous studies related to high driver turnover rates have consisted of qualitative data

analysis generally procured through the use of short-form questionnaires designed to elicit

1 Generally refers to interstate route carriers averaging more than 500 miles per length-of-haul 2 For-hire carriers are all carriers available to customers outside of private carriers, such as Wal-Mart’s own trucking company. Private carriers, though a sizable portion of the industry, are not examined in this report. 3 Truckload refers to a trailer filled to capacity, usually with like items, intended for a single customer, generally a long distance from the point of origin. 4 Large motor carriers are identified by multiple industry reporting agencies including the ATA and Avondale Partners as reaching or exceeding an annual revenue of $30 million.

2

brief responses from drivers (Keller & Ozment 1999; Min & Emam 2003; Johnson, et al. 2011).

Another approach often combined with the previous method has been quantitative analysis of

collected or otherwise project-generated data (Richard, LeMay & Taylor 1995; Rodriguez et al.

1998; Global Insights 2005; Staplin & Gish 2005; Burks, et al. 2007; Suzuki 2007; Garver,

Williams & Taylor 2008; Suzuki, Crum & Pautsch 2009; Harrison & Pierce 2009; Taylor, Garver &

Williams 2010; Cantor, MacDonald & Crum 2011; LeMay et al. 2013; Costello & Suarez 2015). I

contend that these studies have fallen short of identifying the causes of driver turnover

because they do not sufficiently address broader, more meaningful questions regarding the

economic environment in which the trucking industry operates, nor have they adequately

explored the social mechanisms which influence driver intentions to quit. The differences in this

study are fourfold. First, I draw more substantially from the historical, sociological, and

anthropological disciplines for my framework of analysis. Secondly, I frame my analysis in light

of interpreted transportation market reports which describe the economic environment within

which high driver turnover is occurring. Third, I add to this study insights gained from my own

four years of personal experience as a long haul truck driver, and 15 months working as logistics

market researcher. Finally, and most importantly, I step beyond the literature review, my own

personal experience, and the ethnography that anchors this study to develop a synthesized

theoretical approach used to understand more of the mechanisms at work in the long-haul

segment of the trucking industry which perpetuate the problem of high driver turnover.

1.2 Project Context

This report provides compelling evidence supporting a theory asserting that the

extremely high level of competition that exists between motor carriers operating within the for-

3

hire, long haul, truckload industry is itself a significant factor contributing to the continuously

high driver turnover rates that affect the entire logistics industry. Additionally, motor carriers

and industry researches have failed to acknowledge the importance of the driver’s ability to

negotiate their own working conditions from within their current motor carrier. Generally,

competition is understood to have consequences resulting in winners and losers. Toward

understanding high driver turnover, this report examines the price winners must pay in

exchange for success, however ‘success’ is defined. Industry reports and truck driver feedback

are analyzed for contexts in order to explore the current operating definition of success within

the trucking industry. Situated at the center of this competitive battle between industry

juggernauts and small carriers alike, are truck drivers, including those that were interviewed for

the purpose of this study. My critical analysis of recorded driver responses provides a more

complete understanding of the costs involved with driver turnover in both monetary and

human terms.

The following details further describe the size and scope of this issue. In 2010, the

truckload industry was comprised of roughly 1.7 million commercially licensed truck drivers

with roughly half of them operating in the for-hire truckload segment examined in this report

(Burks 2010). The combined revenue controlled by the for-hire segment was $376.1 billion in

2013 (Cassidy 2015). The average annual rate of driver turnover for large motor carriers within

the for-hire truckload segment is usually above 90% (Costello & Suarez 2015). Adjusted for

inflation, the average, conservatively estimated cost for replacing a single driver is about

$11,000 (Rodriguez 1998). The collective cost of high driver turnover across the trucking

industry is not insignificant, potentially exceeding $8 billion annually.

4

1.3 Project Goals

This report reveals the mechanisms at work which have contributed to sustaining high

levels of driver turnover for the past thirty years. Beyond this, the report explores what some of

the human components have been in terms of image, identity, and dignity among truck drivers

operating in such an extremely competitive, high turnover environment. Recommendations are

offered which may reduce turnover, increase retention, and improve the human working

experience for those disposed to the job and lifestyle of long haul truck driving. It is possible

that by refocusing industry efforts in a combined approach toward improving driver retention

that carriers and their customers can find a profitable business model that is more socially

responsible and sustainable than current pursuits of profit through competition alone.

The discussion of the literature that follows will describe the problem more fully. In it, I

review previous driver turnover studies, identifying both their value and what this report

intends to add to the collection of related literature on the topic. Additionally, industry reports

are reviewed in order to contextualize the economic environment for a better understanding of

the forces at work which lie outside the scope of change for any single motor carrier. Finally,

selected social science authors are introduced in order to examine a few of their theoretical

frameworks used to explore worker attitudes and motivations related to labor and their

connection to broader economic conditions.

The next chapter describes the research methodology used for this thesis project. Data

collection instruments, interview formats, and related material are introduced in order that

5

readers may have a complete understanding of how the research was carried out, from client

acquisition, to data gathering, analysis, and final reporting. Descriptions of places and people

are also provided where necessary for a better understanding of the development of this

research from beginning to end.

In the final chapters I present my findings, theoretical analysis, and personal reflections.

I describe how my findings directed me to the theoretical models I selected, which are

introduced in the next chapter. Additionally, I describe the analytical process of interpreting

driver feedback obtained from recorded interviews, and how this content was analyzed and

categorized in order to develop a more coherent picture of driver attitudes about the industry

and their place in it. Finally, an overall synthesis of this research effort is discussed in order that

this study is framed in the context of prior studies while providing new and expanded contexts.

Recommendations are provided for motor carriers in order that this thesis may contribute a

positive impact on the industry of trucking, for drivers and carriers alike. My personal

reflections on the scope of this project close the report. This brief chapter presents developing

trends important for understanding coming changes in near future of the transportation

industry. I share a few excerpts from my interview with Andy Weiblen, a design engineer and

the Director of Product Placement with Peterbilt, one of the most iconic truck manufacturers in

the world. Additionally, I was able to attend the Great American Truck Show held in Dallas,

Texas in 2015. While there I participated in a discussion forum with several top industry

executives on the topic of truck driver turnover. The context of the discussion is provided in the

Findings chapter as well as the links to the videos of the discussion which are available for

viewing on YouTube.

6

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The literature review for this study is divided into three sections: 1) prior driver turnover

studies, 2) trucking industry market reports, and 3) social science themes which explore the

applied frameworks of neoliberalism and masculinity. The first section examines twenty-one

studies produced over the past twenty-eight years that focus on high truck driver turnover

within the long haul truckload segment of commercial transportation. Most were selected

largely based on their continual reference from successive and related studies over time. The

second section contains reports from sources such as the federal government, freight and

financial consulting firms, and transportation executives that describe the industry and add

practical context to this study. The third and final section introduces the anthropological,

sociological, and historical literature from which my own theoretical analysis adopts its

approach.

2.2 Driver Turnover Studies

This section provides a description of key similarities and differences among the

previous driver turnover studies with regard to their intentions and methodological

approaches. Following this brief comparative description, more detail is explored from selected

studies as I find them applicable or informative. The section closes with my overall assessment

of the studies reviewed here before moving onto the industry report data in Section Two in

order to provide a comparative overview of all twenty-one studies. A brief description of each

7

study’s intent, methodology, sample, and findings distill the 450 pages of material into a useful

tool that may provide assistance to future researcher’s on their journey to further our social

science understanding of this topic.

As stated previously, the twenty-one driver turnover studies examined in this section

were selected largely based on their continual reference through successive and related studies

over time. Such references to previous and unique driver turnover studies are made to varying

degrees within the studies reviewed here, ranging from zero to eleven. Given this observation,

a reasonable degree of certainty can be assumed that all or nearly all previous driver turnover

studies are covered within this literature review. The occasion for searching for as many prior

studies as possible was an organic development in my research and typically not deemed a

requirement for a literature review. However, most of the reports were relatively short and

quickly revealed a great degree of similarity with respect to missing contextual and analytical

components I intend to remedy with this thesis. The first key missing component has been a

lack of industry and economic contexts that better describe the wider operating environment in

which high driver turnover is occurring. Another missing component has been a failure to more

completely capture and more deeply examine the reported experience of truck drivers with

sufficient analytical rigor.

Significant portions of the previous driver turnover studies relate to organizational

behavior, marketing, and methods of data analysis or explanations of the validity of statistical

instruments designed for the study. However, the general contexts of organizational behavior

theory have not been sufficiently adapted to provide the required understanding or specific

solutions designed for immediate application within the long-haul motor carrier labor model.

8

For example, building affective commitment within the target employee pool, in this case truck

drivers, does not happen in the same way for driver managers. Driver managers may benefit

from the general application of organizational behavior modification approaches, but they must

then be able to transmit that influence to their drivers. Long haul truck drivers rarely visit the

headquarters or branch locations of their employing motor carrier. Their primary link to the

firm then, is through remote communication with their assigned driver manager. This is a

critically important detail, and it will be explored further in the Findings chapter. Some of the

remaining material contained within previous studies are acknowledgements of articles

published within industry journals that, while discussing driver turnover as an ongoing issue, do

not themselves refer to other unique driver turnover studies.

Most of the driver turnover studies share similarities in at least three ways: 1) their

research scope, 2) methodological approaches, and 3) final deliverables or suggestions. Two of

the twenty-one studies however are decidedly dissimilar, and are detailed first. They are the

American Trucking Associations’ 2015 Driver Shortage Report, the 2005 Global Insight report,

and The U.S. Truck Driver Shortage: Analysis and Forecasts from the American Trucking

Associations (Costello & Suarez 2015, Global Insight 2005). While dissimilar to the main

collection of studies discussed here, these first two studies are in fact similar to one another in

that they provide a current assessment and forecast of the state of driver turnover and

shortage using government databases as source material. They were both prepared by or for

the American Trucking Associations (ATA). Neither make any references to the other studies

related to driver turnover. Rather, both draw data from the Bureau of Labor and Statistics (BLS)

and the Census Bureau regarding current levels of driver employment and to assess current and

9

future industry demand. Using annually gathered data, comparative analyses are constructed

for economic projections that forecast growth trends in the transportation industry. Using a

similar method combined with undisclosed participating motor carriers, the American

Transportation Research Institute (ARTI), the research group within the ATA, has been

publishing reports that monitor driver turnover rates for large and small truckload (TL) carriers

as well as less-than-truckload (LTL) carriers since 1994. The ATA now posts quarterly driver

turnover updates on their webpage (http://www.trucking.org). These ongoing continuously

updated projections, as well as the two specific studies examined here are developed primarily

for the purpose of informing industry stakeholders of driver turnover rates and the growing

need for attracting and training greater numbers of replacement truck drivers. Of these two

studies, the 2005 Global Insight report discloses much more developed economic analyses. The

report concludes with a short description of the industry, and is the first to identify 2014 as a

year where the problem of driver turnover would be overshadowed by the problem of a driver

shortage, as has in fact come to pass (Global Insight 2005). The 2015 ATA report is much briefer

and reaffirms the findings from the 2005 Global Insight report. As much is reflected in the title,

The Truck Driver Shortage Analysis (Costello & Suarez 2015). To be clear, within the context of

each of these reports, a driver shortage is not a new phenomenon, but a waxing and waning

condition that has occurred many times over the years. As such, a driver shortage is typically

regarded as an exacerbated condition related to high driver turnover (Dobie, Rakowski, &

Southern 1998). It is important to note that BLS data is simply not refined enough to offer a

truly accurate analysis of value simply because the term “heavy-duty truck” as applied to the

data includes too wide of a definition. The BLS data includes trucks incapable of the typical

10

80,000 gross vehicle weight combination (GVWC) rating in question for Class 8 trucks. The BLS

GVWC rating is defined as 26,000 pounds or higher. This is just over the limit of a large pickup

and a double-axle trailer. Also, and importantly, no distinction between long-haul carriers

versus local carriers is made.

The next report is also uniquely different from the remaining studies being reviewed

here. It focuses specifically on the reportable costs of driver turnover in the truckload sector.

While it shares similarities with several of the other studies to follow in its data gathering

methodology, it is like the previous two reports in that it also does not refer to previous driver

turnover studies. In fact, it provides no bibliography at all. All content within The Costs of

Truckload Driver Turnover report is generated from its four-page, mail-in surveys, returned

from fifteen different motor carriers of various sizes and modes of transportation (Rodriguez, et

al., 1998). The data is distilled into categories that assess costs associated with driver exit,

recruitment, training, hiring and orientation. Items such as the cost of idle equipment, lost

business opportunities, and driver applicant drug screening among several other cost-item

categories are estimated. While the report makes clear the shortcomings of incompletely

submitted data and explains why the cost estimates provided by the study are considered

conservative, it has been referred to so consistently over time within the industry and

throughout the remaining studies in this literature review, that it could be regarded as the de

facto authoritative model detailing many of the costs associated with replacing a truck driver.

The average, conservative estimate provided in the report for the cost per driver replaced was

about $8,000 (Rodriguez, et al., 1998). Adjusted for inflation, according to the Bureau of Labor

and Statistics with a targeted average of 2% annually, the $8,000 figure becomes $11,000

11

today, again, conservatively (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/). As has been established, it is within

large, truckload motor carriers that driver turnover is the highest. For instance, a single, large

motor carrier with 2,300 drivers, such as the client carrier for this study, USA Truck, Inc., can

face a 100% driver turnover rate or higher within a single year. That carrier would spend an

estimated $25 million on driver turnover alone. To put that figure into context, the Transport

Topics Top 100 list for 2015, showed USA Truck, Inc.’s reported net profit for the same year was

$11 million; over two times less than what was likely spent on reseating trucks (Transport

Topics Top 100 2015 http://www.ttnews.com/top100/companies/profile.aspx?co=usatruck).

Such figures, regarded as conservative estimates, illustrate the ceaseless concern and necessity

for ongoing research among large, long-haul motor carriers to identify the causes of and

provide solutions for the problem of high truck driver turnover.

Of the remaining eighteen studies, three were largely qualitatively focused, and the

remaining fifteen were quantitatively focused. Most gathered their primary data by way of

questionnaires administered either in person or via return mail or a combination. A few added

focus group discussions in order to develop or verify their survey questionnaire construction

(Keller & Ozment 1999; Fournier, Lamontagne, & Gagnon 2012). The remaining few collected

archived data to make analyses (Corsi & Fanara, 1988 and Staplin & Gish 2005). There was a

fairly uneven mix between studies that gathered data from a single motor carrier versus from

multiple motor carriers. 13 received data from drivers or management and support personnel

across multiple carriers, where only 3 focused on a single motor carrier. One study gathered

data from industry executives and analysts that may not have been directly affiliated with any

particular motor carrier (Harrison & Pierce 2009). A few studies had a more limited scope and

12

provided only a proposal for a developed statistical or financial instrument. The statistical

instrument was to be used to predict and possibly provide a targeted interception related to

driver quit-events by continually monitoring particular parameters that affect turnover on a

daily basis (Suzuki, et al., 2009). The financial instrument was only a proposal with no actual

applied turnover study conducted. The stated goal was to develop a decision making tool to

allow carriers to determine minimum driver retention times required to recoup the cost of

turnover per driver (Suzuki, 2007). Finally, two of the studies were heavily geared toward

assessing safety costs and concerns associated with driver turnover (Corsi & Fanara, 1988 and

Staplin et al. 2003). Within the report The Costs of Truckload Driver Turnover assembled by

Rodriguez et al. referred to earlier, a section detailing safety costs receives limited attention, as

indeed the entire report is quite brief. The assertion by these last two studies is that drivers

that have increased turnover frequency have a corresponding probability of having previously

been, or are now predisposed to, becoming crash-involved. There is an associated cost related

to crashes resultant from high turnover drivers that can be more difficult to pin down as a clear

line-item cost, but that nonetheless affects a carrier’s profit margin in measurable ways as are

detailed within these studies (Corsi & Fanara 1988; Staplin & Gish 2005). It is not difficult to

imagine that between combining federal regulations, different equipment, dissimilar routes and

management policies between motor carriers, that a driver moving from one employer to the

next in short order can lose focus and thus exacerbate a scenario that predisposes them to

crash involvement. Alternatively, a retained driver would likely only ever be expected to

accommodate a limited number of changes, and those infrequently, thus increasing the

likelihood of more focused and safer driving habits.

13

For all of the driver turnover studies conducted to date, readers can observe that the

solutions offered transform over time, and in some cases appear to nearly reverse themselves.

From two of the studies, the 1990 study Occupational Loyalties Among Truck Drivers by Beilock

& Capelle, and the 2015 study The Truck Driver Shortage Analysis by Costello & Suarez, there is

a distinct shift in the stated recommendations (Beilock & Capelle 1990 and Costello & Suarez

2015). For example, the 1990 study conducted by Beilock & Capelle suggests that carriers focus

their retention efforts on the older, less educated drivers, with more years of driving

experience. The reasoning behind not focusing retention efforts on the younger demographic is

threefold. First, the opportunity cost of changing jobs or even changing career paths is lower for

younger drivers, thus they are more disposed to doing so. Second, in light of the low

opportunity costs, added managerial time and effort spent on retaining younger drivers has had

a demonstrably reduced chance of success. Third and finally, within the context of any motor

vehicle, whether a Class 8 truck or personal automobile, younger drivers simply account for

higher crash-involvement rates (Beilock & Capelle 1990). By contrast, current efforts by the ATA

are geared toward lifting restrictions on interstate commercial driver age limits, reducing it

from 21 to 18 (Costello & Suarez 2015). This appears to denote that industry researchers and

leadership have completely forgotten why this approach was a bad idea in the first place. More

to the point, even if the efforts for reducing the age limit succeed, this maneuver simply shifts

the locus of the problem rather than providing a solution. Industry executives must remember

that attracting new drivers through recruitment campaigns is only part of the solution.

Retention, while linked to recruitment as it relates the operational capacity of a motor carrier,

must be considered as an altogether separate issue. Retention, then is primarily confined to the

14

relationship between truck drivers and driver managers, and has little to do with recruitment

efforts.

Among other studies, the 1990 Beilock & Capelle study suggested more selective

recruitment efforts, noting that older, more experienced, and less educated drivers have

previously been identified as better targets for retention efforts. Other studies however, tend

to focus on specific events or improved communication efforts. In short, 10 out of the 21

studies suggested some form of a rapid assessment that could be categorized as either a

targeted or an event-driven approach toward focused retention efforts. The remainder of

studies adopted less immediate, more broadly focused approaches toward understanding what

prompts driver intentions to quit or remain with a given carrier. Targeted approaches examined

specific driver demographics or surveyed drivers for preferences in order to isolate particular

driver characteristics for retention efforts (Beilock & Capelle 1990; Richard, LeMay & Taylor

1995; Keller & Ozment 1999; Min & Emam 2003; Suzuki 2007; Garver, Williams & Taylor 2008;

Taylor, Garver & Williams 2010). Some of the targeted or event driven items would be pay,

home-time, driver-to-management relationships and communication, or responsiveness. Event-

driven approaches largely focused on the empathic communication abilities of driver managers

in relating to drivers, or relied on data captured by motor carriers such as mechanical break

downs or scheduling issues that may add stress to a driver’s work (Suzuki, Crum & Pautsch

2009; Cantor, Macdonald & Crum 2011; LeMay et al. 2013). Either approach, whether targeted

or event-driven, has been intended to allow carriers to focus retention efforts more selectively

in order that a reasonable level of productivity could be maintained. Collectively, the nine

studies that focused on targeted and event-driven approaches, have been heavily oriented

15

toward the development of statistical instruments with a narrow band of application. Large

portions of these reports are dedicated to the analysis and validation of these instruments. As a

result, a more holistic, qualitative, and contextualized understanding of the driver turnover

problem is precluded. The creation of these instruments may eventually prove invaluable.

However, attempting to apply the suggestions from these studies without first addressing the

wider contexts of the economic and transportation market conditions can only ever hope to

produce less than inspiring results. More on this will be explored in the next section regarding

transportation market reports.

Stephen Burks, an economics professor and long experienced industry analyst, is

credited for a number of driver studies, labor and management studies, and a fairly complete

description of the entire trucking industry (Burks et al. 2007; Burks et al. 2010). Only one of

Burks’ studies is examined here, Using Behavioral Economic Experiments at a Large Motor

Carrier: The Context and Design of the Truckers and Turnover Project (Burks et al. 2007). The

study details the development of an intelligence quotient instrument and survey experiments

administered to drivers and compares the results to historical hiring data between two distinct

periods over a four year span. The report details the degrees of risk aversion among driver

applicants with respect to costs they incurred due to financing their driver training. The major

finding confirmed that out of 5,000 distinct driver observations (implying far fewer positions

were actually available at any one time during the four-year study due to turnover events)

76.4% voluntarily quit, and 23.6% were involuntarily discharged. Importantly, a significant

portion of the drivers that voluntarily quit, did so within about three months of their hire date.

This suggests that many drivers were so disappointed with the job, that they willingly breeched

16

contract agreements regarding debt repayment for their driver training. Often, such debt is

waived or reduced after about one year of employment per the aforementioned contracts.

Burks suggests that drivers in such a position will have little hope of repaying the debt following

early voluntary termination (Burks et al. 2007). However, he fails to acknowledge that there are

now and have been other motor carriers willing to facilitate the transfer of such debt and

administration of its repayment. This is often accompanied with a modified or renewed

contract in order to attract drivers in such positions, enticing them to give trucking a second

chance with a different motor carrier, and consequently facilitating driver turnover.

There are other details within the report which are either inaccurate or incomplete. For

instance, the assertion that small truckload carriers “set prices for the whole market” is

misleading (Burks et al. 2007). This is an important detail, because it gets at the heart of

competition, which has a tremendous impact on the conditions that perpetuate a high driver

turnover industry. Small carriers can often secure higher rates in the spot market specifically

because there is room to charge a premium due to loads having not been booked under

contracts. However, higher rates are not guaranteed, and what small truckload carriers

sometimes gain in spot market rate premiums quickly diminishes in light of the fact that they

cannot guarantee capacity to large clients. As a result, smaller carriers cannot compete for

contracts offered to larger carriers that can guarantee higher levels of capacity coupled with

lower per mile rates. This means that rather than having loads booked in advance over the

course of calendar months, spot market loads are booked from one load to the next and can be

highly variable with respect to per-mile rates and frequency. As such, market volatility from fuel

prices or contractions in freight availability in specific regions or during particular seasons, will

17

have a more immediate and adverse effect on smaller carriers less able to absorb such market

shifts. While small carriers can often negotiate for higher rates on the spot market, it is the

large carriers able to secure capacity-related contracts that set the pricing floor. By establishing

the lowest price, large carriers control the competitive rates sought by customers. In this more

complete description then, it becomes obvious that it is actually large motor carriers that “set

prices for the whole market,” not the reverse.

The remaining studies have higher degrees of qualitative approaches, and offer valid

conclusions with respect to observations described. However, they become almost rhythmically

repetitive. All of the studies discussed here in section one offer similar solutions, and they are

often vague. In spite of having been described in previous turnover study findings and

suggestions, the list is generally always the same and usually underdeveloped. Some studies

add or drop one suggestion for another, but the list contains the following items and in about

the same order of significance: increased pay, more home time, improved communication,

career advancement opportunities offered through a formal driver hierarchy, realistic job

descriptions for new hires, improved driver image, and better treatment at shippers and

receivers. Again, there is merit in each of these studies, and I agree with the suggestions. Still,

after 28 years and over 21 studies, the turnover problem each of these studies is attempting to

address remains unmitigated. One conclusion offered in the 2009 study, Examining Truck Driver

Turnover and Retention in the Trucking Industry by Harrison and Pierce, states that, “knowledge

of successful strategies, without their application, suggest that the trucking industry can

tolerate the condition.” Further, the Harrison and Pierce study goes on to cite a 1996 study

stating that, “the majority of top managers said that driver turnover made no difference among

18

major factors affecting company effectiveness” (Harrison & Pierce, 2009). Finally, a Canadian

study from 2012 entitled Interactions Between Dispatchers and Truck Drivers in a High Turnover

Context had absolutely the best contextual descriptions. The roles of drivers and dispatchers

are described in terms of their interactions and attendant barriers, making this my favorite

report form the lot (Fournier, Lamontagne & Gagnon 2012). Beyond doing a fantastic job of

describing the operations of a large motor carrier, the explanation of a more nuanced approach

toward improving communication skills among driver managers and drivers is refreshing. Very

few of these studies reviewed here adequately acknowledge how critical the roles of driver

managers are for motor carriers, especially large ones. Driver managers often have anywhere

from 50 to 90 drivers they must attend to on a daily basis (Kahaner, 2016). This is assessment is

also confirmed from my personal experience. In any case, such arrangements require

extraordinary effort on the part of driver managers that can at best only be done in a reactive

rather than proactive manner. Assisting drivers in their career development doesn’t even enter

into the equation.

Before any carrier can influence an improved selection process for new driver managers

with the requisite skillset, and better train the currently positioned driver managers they

already have, the number of drivers assigned to each will need to be greatly reduced. Carriers

need to create an environment where driver managers receive much more training and are

offered better than average pay. Doing so will allow driver managers to more proactively

engage with their assigned drivers, address problems before they escalate to ‘quit events’, and

anticipate their assigned driver’s needs more readily. Budgeting resources and time for this

reorientation of resources would likely add to the cost of driver turnover in the short run.

19

However, per the costs discussed earlier from the 1998 Rodriguez, et al. study, the requisite

funds are already available to implement such a change, whether as a small pilot program, or a

more aggressive approach (Rodriguez, et al. 1998).

I believe that if industry-wide changes can be made and recognized by all relevant

parties within the motor carrier as well as the motor carrier customers, positive results could be

yielded within relatively short order. Shippers and consignees must also view the truck drivers

that visit their locations as a shared resource, and do their part to improve retention rates as

well. After all, long-haul truck drivers spend more time with the personnel from the clients they

haul for than they do with their own personnel from their employing motor carrier. Still,

internal development of the motor carrier must be viewed within the context of the wider

operating environment, as will be discussed in the next section concerning manufacturing,

production, and trucking industry reports.

2.3 Industry Reports

Drawing on my experience as a commercial truck driver and subsequent experience as a

researcher within a large logistics firm, I will provide concise descriptions of five selected

industry level reports currently being utilized by motor carriers and other industry executives.

These reports are generally used for monitoring available capacity in the transportation market.

I suggest that they can also provide a more complete understanding of the driver turnover

environment. Similarly, industry executives must draw upon a much broader collection of

reports beyond these four in order to facilitate operational decisions. Items such as retail sales,

auto sales, Class 8 truck sales, home sales and the rate of industrial manufacturing and

production are all monitored for signs of growth or contraction. So too must researchers and

20

managers look outside of their specific motor carrier(s) being studied in order to gain an

environmental context regarding the climate of driver turnover. Changes in specific market or

commodity areas tend to correlate with shifts in the operational tempo of the transportation

industry. Critically, this feature has been minimal or absent in nearly all of the previous driver

turnover studies. Where wider economic and industry context has been included, it has

primarily served as a descriptive backdrop, and not sufficiently linked to its effect on high driver

turnover. Notably, some sources referred to in this section did not exist at the time of prior

studies, and thus were not available for contextualizing the issue of turnover. By analyzing the

reports selected here which offer greater context regarding the driver turnover environment,

operational decision-making can be better facilitated for items pertaining to driver recruitment

budgets, customer contract rates, equipment sales or purchases, and other variable-cost

operations. While useful, many of the reports are insufficient by themselves. They must be

linked to corresponding data or observations that are specific to the motor carrier. These

reports are composites assembled by combining representative samples from participating

motor carriers and production or manufacturing industries and as such contain aggregated

data. Stated simply, these reports are nationwide and tend to provide a homogenized

descriptions of the industries they represent and can obscure regional, seasonal, and specific

market variation.

2.3.1 American Trucking Associations Driver Turnover Data: Transplace Analysis

The American Trucking Associations is the primary source for the tracking and reporting

of driver turnover rates from selected participating motor carriers operating large and small

truckload (TL) companies as well as less-than-truckload (LTL) companies. The graphic below

21

reflects only the large truckload segment which is the focus of this thesis. Data is reflected from

the past 7 years, and is updated on a quarterly basis. Aside from the recession period that starts

off the graph, the data reflects a steady, high national rate of driver turnover.

Figure 1 ATA & Transplace Analysis of National Driver Turnover Rates

2.3.2 Freight Transportation Report (FTR): Transportation Intelligence Report

FTR is a consulting and reporting firm that offers freight and financial forecasting across

all transportation modalities be they air, rail, shipping, or trucking. FTR collects data from a

selected group of participating motor carriers and has a proprietary reporting model. The bulk

of the report is essentially a distilled collection of other reports from both government and

private sources accompanied by expert analysis for contextualizing the data. Like the ATA, FTR

provides its own independent driver shortage analysis. Both draw their data from the Census

Bureau and the Bureau of Labor and Statistics, but each arrive at very different conclusions. The

FTR data estimates are much higher, ranging from 100,000 to over 200,000, as opposed to ATAs

fairly steady estimate of about 35,000 to 40,000. Validating which of the two reports is correct

22

is not necessarily required as the real benefit rests within the recognition that two independent

industry sources agree that the driver shortage is a large problem by either estimate. The added

value of the FTR driver shortage report is the 5 years of historical tracking and the 12-month

forecast it offers.

Figure 2 FTR Driver Shortage History & Projection

Additionally, the FTR report provides data pertaining to active truck utilization across

the industry. In simple terms, it is an estimated ratio of the number of idle trucks compared to

the number of “active” trucks paired with drivers. The total number of truck-and-driver pairings

is often referred to as capacity. Large motor carriers monitor capacity in order to grow or

reduce their fleet size by varying amounts at regular intervals as other reports and wider

market conditions dictate. For large motor carriers, adjusting the number of available trucks is

generally easier than adjusting the numbers of available truck drivers, which are always

23

assumed to be in limited supply. Again, the FTR report offers 5 years of historical data and a 12-

month forecast.

Figure 3 FTR Active Truck Utilization History & Projection

The impact of the trucking industry operating at or near capacity limits creates an

environment that enables motor carriers to be more selective with the customers they choose

to haul for. More specifically, the freight being hauled can be considered ‘easy’ or ‘difficult’

depending on how much time or labor is required of drivers to load or unload it. An additional

detail to consider are whether such customers are located within recognized productive freight

lanes. Driving empty trucks to meet more remote customers with less desirable delivery

destinations is always a consideration which can reduce lane density among large carriers. Lane

density is a reference to the number of trucks a carrier has in a given area which can help to

24

alleviate service interruptions due to break downs, hours-of-service restrictions, or other

unforeseen difficulties.

A related capacity-sensitive item would be driver time spent at loading docks in excess

of agreed upon load or unload appointments which is considered downtime or dwell time.

Many customers are contentious about paying drivers for such detention while others do so

more readily. Any combination of these factors inhibits the productive potential of a driver’s

paid labor and the carrier’s earnings potential by slowing turnaround time and reducing

capacity to book or dispatch the driver on subsequent loads.

2.3.3 Morgan Stanley Freight Transportation: Truck Load Freight Index (TLFI) Report

The truckload freight index report takes a more refined look at available market

transportation capacity by dividing specific equipment into modalities or trailer types. Dry van,

refrigerated (reefer), and flatbed modes are examined while tankers are not. An important note

is that many large carriers operate across more than one and sometimes all of these modes.

The biweekly TLFI report specifically examines the relative availability of trucks in the spot

market that shippers can call upon to book loads. The spot market encompasses loads that are

not otherwise booked under predetermined contracts. When demand for carrier services in the

spot market is high and capacity is low, a high scale data point is registered on the graph shown

in Figure X and tracked over time. This specific graphic reflects the dry van capacity index.

According the legend in the graphic, March of 2014 registers the highest data points. We can

conclude that demand was higher than average during that period, and that availability was

quite low relative to demand. Conditions during that period would have allowed for motor

carriers to be more selective with their bookings and more likely to receive higher rates as

25

competition for available capacity would have been quite aggressive. Conversely, along the

entire 2009 year, demand was at an all-time low following the housing and financial collapse.

Shippers then, would have been exercising selectivity and price controls during this period

creating a challenging environment for motor carriers. Indeed, as the Avondale Report later

below will show, there was a surge of small motor carrier bankruptcies between 2008 and 2009

due to the low demand from that period. Correspondingly, the ATA driver turnover report

which opened this section (Figure X) reflects the lowest driver turnover rates resultant from

fewer available jobs during that same period.

In addition to the graphic provided, the TLFI report also offers feedback from industry

personnel working in three different segments of transportation: carriers, shippers, and

brokerage services. This commentary, again offered biweekly, provides a qualitative dimension

to the data reflected in the graphic. Generally, the responses from people in different segments

of the industry correlate to cost pressure shifts from one segment to the next as reflected in the

graphic. Another benefit of this report is its ability to demonstrate where the shifting locus of

competition is located. Competition is either focused between shippers willing to pay more for

carrier services when capacity is in limited supply, or between carriers willing to accept less

when relative capacity is abundant.

26

Figure 4 Morgan Stanley Truckload Freight Index August 2014

2.3.4 American Trucking Associations (ATA) Truckload Tonnage Report

This report is related to the one just described and adds context to the available

capacity description. Every month the ATA releases a truck tonnage report which reflects an

index of total truck tonnage shipped during the previous month. The inherent value of the

report is that it allows visibility of the actual increase or decrease of shipped goods by weight,

rather than cost, so there are no inflationary or fuel surcharge adjustments required to

understand it. It simply shows by weight that more or less goods were shipped by truck during

the most recent month. From the history reflected in this report combined with the previously

described capacity report from Morgan Stanley, a more comprehensive picture of truck

capacity and availability emerges. For the Aug ’08 and ’09 section on the graphic below, we see

27

a precipitous decrease in reported tonnage when demand was low subsequent to the effects of

the Great Recession. Demand then rises steeply in Aug ’10. The two graphics below reflect the

same data in two different ways. The first shows current-year tonnage contrasted with year-

over-year changes. The second graphic shows ten years of history and reveals a moderate rate

of increased tonnage each year. Some of the increased shipped tonnage is at least partly due to

reduced vehicle weight, allowing more tonnage to be shipped with lighter trucks and trailers.

Figure 5 ATA & Transplace Seasonally Adjusted Truck Tonnage August 2015 v.1

28

Figure 6 ATA & Transplace Seasonally Adjusted Truck Tonnage August 2015 v.2

2.3.5 Avondale Partners Industry Update Report

The Avondale Partners Report offers quarterly updates detailing the number and

average size of motor carriers that have declared bankruptcy during the previous quarter. This

data is often paired with fuel price data in order to demonstrate how its relative volatility can

impact motor carrier failure rates. The fuel price relationship shows that when prices are stable,

even if high, motor carriers are less likely to fold than if fuel prices are fluctuating heavily. The

fuel price relationship to carrier failure rates is only weakly correlated and has an upper and

lower bound where everyone suffers or benefits from rapidly climbing or falling fuel prices. The

late 2014 to 2015 trend in the graphic below shows the number of quarterly failures reduced,

as the price of fuel was high, but stable for several months, then drops precipitously. There was

a comparatively higher average failure rate during the 2009 to 2010 period when the price of

29

fuel was lower on average, but much less stable. The salient fact is that the reports reflect how

fixed costs are easier to manage than variable costs.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the motor carriers that fail tend to be small, possessing

between 25 and 35 trucks on average. This is generally because they are less able to absorb

market volatility from both highly variable fuel costs and competitive rates offered by larger

motor carriers. Additionally, small motor carriers do not wield significant economies of scale

afforded to larger carriers which allow them greater leverage in negotiating the price of

variable costs such as fuel as well as fixed costs such as trucks and trailers. What is particularly

interesting is what becomes of the small motor carriers subsequent to their failure, as detailed

in these two short excerpts from the Avondale Partners report summary:

[T]he recent trend whereby a carrier buys a smaller carrier for the trucks and drivers, and

then retires the bottom 10-20% (oldest trucks or unsafe drivers).

With the continued growth of the major truckload carriers and the widespread

application of advanced technology, the barriers to entry have been raised significantly

and there are now firms in a position to force consolidation. We find it easy to predict

that the truckload industry consolidates into an oligopoly in the coming decades.

Further evidence is even presented within the most recent study from the previous

section. Within the ATA’s 2015 Truck Driver Shortage Analysis, the following quote is shared

concerning growth opportunities for a large, long-haul, truckload firm:

A significant amount of freight is being turned down… We’ve looked at acquisitions

because we can’t grow organically.

-Robert Ragan, Chief Financial Officer,

Melton Truck Lines in Tulsa, OK. Sourced from Transport Topics, July 14, 2014.

30

Figure 7 Avondale, Energy Information Administration, & Transplace Carrier Failures

Interestingly, the Avondale report also offers a table detailing the total number of trucks

controlled by the 11 largest for-hire truckload carriers. Totals remain relatively flat for an eight

year period, actually contracting slightly from 74,041 to 70,703 from 2006 to 2014. The data

suggests that the overall size of the industry has remained relatively fixed throughout the

available reporting period.

$0.00

$0.50

$1.00

$1.50

$2.00

$2.50

$3.00

$3.50

$4.00

$4.50

$5.00

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

Failed Carriers Averaged 25 to 35 Trucks Each

Company Failures Fuel Prices

31

Figure 8 Avondale & Transplace Report on Largest Motor Carrier Fleet Sizes

Finally, the trend reflected in the Avondale Partners Report is further validated by an

article in the Journal of Commerce via financial data provided by SJ Consulting Group. The

article states that, “trucking revenue has become increasingly concentrated as the number of

carriers with more than $1 billion in annual revenue more than doubled over the last decade”

(JOC 2016). The report goes on to indicate that 24% of all revenue from the for-hire

transportation industry, $89.8 billion, was divided among just 23 U.S. trucking companies in

2013. By contrast there were only 11 carriers with more than $1 billion in revenue in 2003 (JOC

2016). Yet, as we can see in the above graphic, the number of trucks among the largest carriers

has remained relatively unchanged, even slightly reduced. This trend suggests that the largest

carriers are gaining revenue and market share (to what degree is difficult to tell) through their

32

acquisition of smaller, failed carriers. The additional benefit of such acquisitions is likely a

discount inherent in such a process on equipment replacement costs. New trucks acquired from

a failed carrier are likely obtained at even deeper discounts than the large carrier could

negotiate for from truck manufacturers directly.

To clarify, the description of ‘size’ within the truckload industry is twofold. First, there is

control over a given number of trucks, and by extension, drivers. Second, there is control over

revenue. This detail, taken together with the reports discussed above suggest that ‘growth’

within the for-hire truckload industry has occurred predominantly as a result of larger truckload

carriers absorbing and consolidating smaller, bankrupted carriers. The smaller carriers usually

fail simply because they are small. Unable to leverage economies of scale, and burdened with

higher per unit costs mean that smaller carriers pay more to compete per unit of capacity than

do larger carriers. Also, their smaller size makes them more vulnerable, prone to failure from

anything from unstable fuel prices to inclement weather shut-downs, but most of all, extreme

levels of competition.

While this environmental description of the industry may seem distant from the subject

of high driver turnover, it must be understood before any hope of addressing the issue of driver

turnover can be attempted. The vacuum created in the wake of such an extremely competitive

environment is filled with hundreds of small to medium-sized motor carriers collapsing every

quarter. By not understanding this wider operating environment, researchers and motor

carriers fundamentally preclude any serious attempt geared toward improving organizational

development for the sake of reducing driver turnover at large, long-haul motor carriers. All

carriers are competing for a share of a market that is keen on rewarding the lowest bidder.

33

While there are some successful companies that recognize the value of ongoing relationships

and longer term and higher paying contracts with select carriers, this is only relatively speaking.

Over time, even ‘good’ rates gets bid down. The de facto rule has become that if the carrier can

survive 100% driver turnover rates as a known cost, then there is little incentive in pursuing

dubious and potentially expensive retention efforts through increasing driver pay (Harrison &

Pierce 2009 and Stephenson & Fox 1996 22). More on this in the Theoretical Analysis chapter.

The third and final portion of this literature review follows and examines applicable themes

explored by social science authors.

2.4 Social Science Theoretical Frameworks of Analysis

Some of the authors reviewed in this final section of the literature review focus on the

trucking industry specifically while all authors address the area of labor more generally. This

section provides some of the most important insights for understanding the issue of high driver

turnover because of the authors’ ability to link wider economic contexts regarding labor with

specific human behavior. The selected texts were written by several social science authors from

disciplines including history, sociology, and anthropology. While parts one and two of this

literature review presented previous driver turnover studies and the relevant analysis of

transportation market reports, this final part is intended to introduce authors that have

examined human behavior related to labor and capital. These authors provide frameworks of

analysis that I will later use to examine driver feedback from my own recorded interviews.

First among them is David Harvey who scrutinizes the global impact of broader macro-

economic realities on the human condition under neoliberalism, the laissez-faire economic

policy development from the late 1970’s to present. Shane Hamilton, Michèle Lamont, Andrea

34

Cornwall, Frank G. Karioris, Nancy Lindisfarne, and Michael Agar make up some of the

remaining authors covered in this section. These authors examine human behavior related to

labor and capital on a more local or interpersonal level while providing applicable contexts

necessary for better understanding the mechanics underlying the larger, more complex

political-economic conditions introduced by Harvey. In a similar way, the next chapter explores

how the perpetuation of high driver turnover in the long-haul trucking industry is related to

driver interactions with their employing motor carriers.

The broad theoretical category employed by David Harvey is political economy with a

strong Marxist critique of capitalism. In Harvey’s The New Imperialism, he focuses his view on a

contemporary understanding of neoliberalism. Harvey uses his theoretical model of

‘accumulation by dispossession’ to better characterize neoliberalism This more focused

application of neoliberalism according to Harvey reveals that ‘growth’ in recent years among

the wealthy core nations is largely a function of political economic strategies that

disenfranchise the global periphery. Put another way, the accumulation of capital among the

wealthy elite occurs by the dispossession of the world’s most vulnerable populations. The top

grows by consuming the bottom, while no net growth actually occurs (Harvey, 2005). Harvey

lays out four tenets of accumulation by dispossession which either work independently or in

concert with one another.

1. Privatization and Commodification – Previously public domains and resources such

as water, telecommunications, and transportation are increasingly opened to new

methods of profitability rather than regarded as available for public use.

2. Financialization – Unregulated speculation and predatory lending practices.

3. The Management and Manipulation of Crises – Witness the 2008 housing and

financial crash of 2008. Who benefited? Who did not?

35

4. State Redistributions – The ongoing state-level management of privatization and

social program cutbacks. Evident when media reports the economy is recovering,

but also reports that few individuals are experiencing personal economic recovery.

An additional complex point is that problems associated with the pursuit of the

neoliberal agenda can be moved both geographically and demographically. An example of

accumulation by dispossession is evident from the recent Great Recession in the U.S., brought

on by predatory lending practices in the housing market. The burden was quickly relocated

away from the wealthy elite, and toward more vulnerable populations with the aid of political

power. The housing market quickly devolved into the subsequent banking collapse. The banking

collapse was tethered to the U.S. Federal Reserve Banking System that rewarded overleveraged

risk among large private banks. The bank bailout was then paid for by American consumers

rather than the banking system. Eventually, as reports of economic stability increased in the

U.S. subsequent to the bailout arranged by the U.S. government, many people lost their homes

to foreclosure or their 401K investments or both. What damage could not be absorbed by

American consumers, was exported elsewhere. Witness the austerity measures in Greece and

other complications arising within Portugal, Ireland, Italy, and Spain among the nations of the

European Union. The geographic relocation of financial burdens out of the U.S. and into Europe

has since been exported elsewhere across the globe in a myriad of ways outlined by Harvey,

evident in multiple examples over recent years (Harvey, 2005).

Readers may still be familiar with the oft reported phrase, “When the U.S. gets a cold

the rest of the world gets the flu.” It would appear this has been more by design than

coincidence. Harvey does not suggest that all of the costs associated Western profligacy are

exported to the global periphery in their entirety. Inequality and varying degrees of vulnerable

36

populations exist within the U.S. and at each geographic or demographic shift along the way.

The key to accumulation by dispossession is to defraud specific populations for all they’re

worth, while falling just short of a revolutionary response. The ‘Occupy Wall Street’ movement

was the beginning of just such a populist reaction. While the movement was afforded some

time and broad media coverage, it was dismantled relatively quickly and quietly by police action

on the pretense of public safety and social responsibility (Kishore, 2011). A painfully unfunny

irony. This methodology in the neoliberal context is called “managed crises”, and is the third

component of Harvey’s four-part accumulation by dispossession model (Harvey, 2005). While

the model of accumulation by dispossession may not be perfect, it remains a sturdy explanation

for my research purposes. I have found analogous situations in my own project, which I detail in

the Findings section of this report.

2.4.1 Masculine Characteristics and Neoliberal Policies: Connecting the Local to the Global

David Harvey quips in A Brief History of Neoliberalism, “freedom’s just another word”

(Harvey, 2005). In an attempt to understand how the characteristics of personal identity are

related to large, political-economic systems of governance, terminology is a good place to start.

The term semantics is too often offered as an oversimplified argument or explanation for such

phenomena, but its actual definition gets at the heart of the matter, as psychological belief in

given terminology has long been proven an effective political tool. Independence is a synonym

for freedom, as well as a characteristic of masculinity. While a strong male gender affiliation is

present, masculinity in this context is not necessarily intended as a description of the male

gender nor of normative male gender roles. A few other characteristics associated with

masculinity beyond independence are self-reliance and personal responsibility. Anyone can

37

exhibit these characteristics. Generally speaking these traits are considered praiseworthy;

something to be aspired toward. However, in the neoliberal context, the appropriation of such

terminology is only part of the linguistic exercise associated with the manufacture of consent

(Harvey, 2005). Consent is generated in a form of syllogistic ideology. In the U.S., politicians

attempt to influence voting behavior or gain financial support by espousing the national

benefits and personal pride associated with self-reliance and personal responsibility. Politicians,

however, are often not paragons of the ideologies they tout and are often rightly accused of

employing propaganda. Propaganda of course ties back to semantics ensuring a kind of

perpetual cognitive loop.

From the broad context that David Harvey posits regarding the use of terminology, we

can then look to other authors for more detailed analyses of masculinity, and how the term and

its interpretations are manipulated as a primary vehicle for manufacturing consent among the

populace, even, perhaps especially for purposes that are not in the best political or economic

interests of the people from whom consent is sought. Shane Hamilton’s Trucking Country: The

Road to America’s Wal-Mart Economy is the next step, moving from the broadly political to the

trucking industry specifically. The long development arc of trucking from pre-war agriculture of

the 1930’s through the period of deregulation in the early 1980’s witnessed the profession

become imbued with much imagery and ideology about its independent entrepreneurs.

Hamilton submits in the final chapters of his text that economic and political appropriations of

the term masculinity served as the key to getting enough support from such drivers to enact

deregulation after a hard-fought political struggle. Many drivers, independent owner operators

and company drivers alike, were in favor of deregulation, which allowed the market, not the

38

government, to set rates. However, the deregulated trucking environment quickly revealed

itself for what it really was: for company drivers, labor unions disappeared, and with them,

wage protections. For owner operators, the sharp focus on markets - now free to set their own

rates, saw profits evaporate as small carriers began to operate at or below cost just to stay in

business. Shipping and receiving clients scrambled to find the lowest possible rates in the

proverbial race to the bottom (Hamilton 2008).

Michael Belzer later published Sweatshops on Wheels: Winners and Losers in Trucking

Deregulation in 2000 offering an explanation of the negative impacts on truck drivers due to

deregulation up to that point, though its damage was readily evident to drivers and carriers of

the day. I do not extensively explore Belzer’s book here although he is a widely recognized

expert on economics and the trucking industry as well as a former truck driver. The title of his

text however suggests congruency with the findings from the authors I do cover. Each suggests

that the level of competition unleashed subsequent to the deregulated transportation industry

became the primary motivation behind big business decisions and remains so to this day, often

with deleterious effects for drivers and carriers alike.

For a closer look at trucking prior to deregulation, Michael Agar and Lawrence Ouellet

provide similar ethnographic accounts. Agar, an anthropologist, interacted with and recorded

interviews from 9 different owner operators over a period of 40 days. His interviews and over-

the-road experiences with independent truck drivers as well as other research and industry

group meetings became the material for his 1986 book, Independents Declared (Agar 1986).

Similarly, Ouellet, a sociologist and former truck driver, relied on interviews and personal

experience. He also provided an auto-ethnographic account of his own driving experience.

39

Ouellet returned to truck driving for his thesis research in order to gain a more immediate

account of his experience as a truck driver with the goal of publishing his 1994 book Pedal to

the Metal (Ouellet, 1994). The accounts provided by each author are convincing and rang true

of much of my own four years of personal experience as a long-haul truck driver, in spite of the

decades that separated each of our experiences.

The central theme explored by Agar is that of duality and paradox. Just as Harvey

suggested that “freedom is just another word” so too does Agar conclude this about the terms

independence and independents as related to independent owner operators in trucking prior to

deregulation. Agar informs us that the formerly federally regulated trucking environment was

not exactly a picnic either, as different states had different requirements about types of freight,

gross vehicle weight, and fuel or highway taxes which made interstate travel a daily challenge

for all truck drivers. Agar highlights the myriad ways that customers, employers and law

enforcement personnel made the truck driver incredibly dependent on these disparate groups

working together for the driver’s benefit; a situation that rarely developed as drivers hoped.

However, meeting these challenges and managing to earn a living while doing so evoked an

emotional concept linking the modern day truck driver to the pre-war farmers of old. A near

Rockwellian iconography of the ‘Last American Cowboy’ emerged and was popular among

truckers before it was irrevocably distorted by movies such as Convoy or Smokey and the Bandit

among others. It’s important to remember that neither image was necessarily ever true,

although appeals to the former can still be detected. Paradoxically, from Agar’s truck driver

interviews regarding driver experiences, and following the generalized descriptions about the

hero/cowboy imagery, the term was much more readily applied in a very specific and

40

immediate sense as a pejorative. Cowboys of this latter variety were ‘all show and no go.’ Most

professional drivers would describe this group as unsafe and unprofessional yahoos that were

not fit for the job. Simply having the inside perspective was enough to distinguish the difference

between the two with a single glance. Drivers were either trying to earn a living or a reputation;

the two pursuits rarely aligned, then or now (Agar, 1986).

Ouellet on the other hand set out to understand the mechanics behind high effort

among truck drivers. Using masculinity as a framework of analysis, Ouellet posits two extremes

that had to be navigated by each driver as they learned their environment and the people they

were working with and for. The first is that of high effort branded as ignoble, carried out by a

driver labeled a class traitor. The second is the high effort driver as a model of masculinity. He is

both proficient and professional. According to Ouellet, the level of effort - whether high or low -

and the perceptions of drivers, peers, and their supervisors has everything to do with a driver’s

sense of autonomy in negotiating working conditions. They must have a familiar and accessible

manager with whom to negotiate such terms frequently. The number of wins over losses

resulting from such negotiations as well as standing perceptions of ownership and fairness play

a part in getting a driver to invest their high effort of their own volition. The perceived

autonomy afforded by this negotiability largely differentiated non-union work from work

carried out under the more prescribed labor of unions. While unions had more prescribed rules

and regulations which fostered regularity and predictability in the workplace, they did not

necessarily engender extraordinary displays of effort. By exerting high effort in order to gain or

maintain certain privileges which have high extrinsic or intrinsic value according to one’s peers,

the extra effort is deemed as valid. Intrinsic values are of course more difficult to explain to

41

outsiders. Thus advancement, of a sort, was not as rigidly prescribed as it would be for union

workers. One example of an intrinsic value among many offered by Ouellet is the affordance

offered by driving a Peterbilt over a Mack. A driver in a Peterbilt, seen by other drivers, is

instantly endowed with all the benefits of desired perception afforded by the marketing of the

Peterbilt brand. Even if the assigned driver does not own the truck, and merely drives it for the

owner, the value of association is not altogether lost. The owner can then go further by

‘allowing’ the assigned driver to add items to the truck’s interior and exterior. Additions such as

radios, chrome and the like enhance the perceptions of customization and by extension,

ownership. Such privileges could also build the unspoken expectation of high effort from the

invested driver over time, confounding these intrinsic rewards with a shorter shelf-life. Such

negotiations were a continuous process (Ouellet, 1994).

The specific intrinsic value of being associated with a particular truck type or brand

above any other is called into question in light of the advent of autonomous vehicle technology.

What is masculine or noble about a machine that can run night and day for days on end without

rest? What about this work has anything to do with the human carrying it out? I will explore

this idea further in the final chapter, as the reality of autonomous trucks is very much upon us,

and likely to take root well ahead of autonomous cars. On a final note, the perceptions of

ownership also harken back to original Marxist theory. It calls into question the level of concern

about the truck driver proletariat ever seizing control of the means of production. If the driver

is already convinced, at least in some negotiated sense, that he already has ownership of the

means of production, any fears of revolutionary action or even simple labor disputes are

significantly mitigated.

42

The final themes discussed here are a continuation of masculinity in the neoliberal

context with the addition of the element of dignity. Here, the context is built around life and

labor in a very general, even global sense – and in more contemporary settings. Masculinities

Under Neoliberalism edited by Andrea Cornwall, Frank Karioris, and Nancy Lindisfarne, is an

anthology of ethnographies of the ‘anthropology in’ variety. Within it, 16 additional

contributing authors of greatly varied backgrounds detail instances of masculine

contextualization reflected in behavior described by differing groups from around the globe.

There are explorations of the “neoliberal self” and the “entrepreneurial self” and ideas about

self-making and self-management that influence human behavior in ways so obvious they

appear to defy examination. The ethnographies present masculinity as overtly present,

deliberately constructed, and hegemonic in several cross-cultural comparisons. As was

suggested by Lawrence Ouellet in the specific context of truck driver’s attitudes toward labor,

the act of negotiation and renegotiation reappears. In this context however is a global and

sociological fact of identity formation as much as it is an individual and psychological need

(Cornwall, Karioris, & Lindisfarne, 2016).

In Michèle Lamont’s The Dignity of Working Men, the element of dignity is used to

arrive more obliquely at masculinity within neoliberal contexts. Lamont’s work is more complex

in that she compares labor among men from differing socioeconomic tiers as well as across race

and between men in the U.S. and in France. Here, I examine only the contexts of laborers in the

U.S., and discover her findings remarkably similar to Larry Ouellet’s work in Pedal to the Metal.

Beyond being French (at least in name) and sociologists, the work published by each were

separated by only about 6 years; Ouellet in 1994 and Lamont in 2000. Both agree that the

43

meaning of work is at least partially created by the shared experience of carrying it out among

peers and supervisors. According to Ouellet, this is largely an intrinsic meaning created

between the self, coworkers, and supervisors (Ouellet 1994). Lamont however asserts it is this

and more. Work, and the status it affords the laborer, is shaped by the self, peers,

subordinates, superiors, and family alike. All play a role in the meaning, value, and perceptions

of dignity about the work. The individual we want to be and personal estimations about what

must be done in order to achieve our conceptual image is the compromise between the

idealized self and the real self. Rationalization becomes the mortar holding the two together.

When examined closely, it is this rational, so easily dismissed, that reveals much about the

wider contexts of identity formation and its relationship to our work lives (Lamont, 2000). As is

suggested in the Masculinities Under Neoliberalism text, we are all compelled to find or create

meaning regarding our identity. Often, we fall short of acknowledging the wider sociological

contexts that exert such tremendous control over the mechanics of our rationale (Cornwall,

Karioris, & Lindisfarne, 2016).

The revelation offered by Masculinities Under Neoliberalism is the comparison of well-

established notions of gender norms. The assertion is that gender is culturally constructed and

thus differential rather than fixed. However, even in the contemporary and globalized world,

we continue to conceive of gender as dichotomous. This is a well-established form of inequality,

because masculine versus feminine is quickly converted to a conception of dominant versus

subordinate. Following this logic, identifying gender norms is paralleled by identifying and

subsequently navigating the channels of power and perception. Right or wrong, the

gender/power path is navigated for purposes that span from survival to advancement, and

44

perpetually reinforces itself in the lived social experience. The experience is typically confining

or limiting but often accepted, and usually without question if it is even perceived. It becomes

naturalized. In a similar manner, wealth inequality has become naturalized, as gender terms

associated power through masculine characteristics are appropriated in political language

through semantics as described earlier by Harvey and Hamilton. New inequalities proliferate in

multiple directions and on multiple tiers from the gender/power core (MUN, 2016).

Each of the authors reviewed in this section offered themes regarding masculinity in the

neoliberal context and how these themes relate to the construction of identity. After a brief

review of methods in the next chapter, I will share my findings in light of these themes. In the

findings chapter, I will refer back to the themes discussed here as they relate to the responses

of the drivers interviewed for this ethnographic study and examine the similarities and

differences. Further context will be provided from my own truck driving and related industry

experience in the final chapter, Personal Reflections.

45

CHAPTER 3

METHODS

3.1 Research Design Background

Previous studies have focused on large data collections gathered from motor carriers

pertaining to driver employment dates, pay, and other related and recordable employment

details. Also, brief responses from drivers collected through short interviews or surveys have

often been used in conjunction with the recorded employment data. The use of long format

interviews are the primary differentiator between this study and all other turnover studies

reviewed earlier in this report. My personal experience as a long haul driver allowed me to take

an ethnographic approach. I acted as both the primary researcher and a key informant.

In preparation for the client acquisition process, a research proposal was created and

refined through the spring and summer months of 2014. The original timeline within the

proposal suggested an approximately three month long project. This was largely hypothetical,

and based loosely upon a rapid assessment program (RAP) design and my own understanding

of large motor carrier organizational structure. In practice, the project that was actually carried

out took much longer, was less collaboratively designed, and completed far fewer components

than were outlined within the original research proposal. This was to be expected to some

degree as the research proposal was a hypothetical created prior to acquiring a willing research

client.

46

In addition to the research project development and execution, my outside committee

member Dr. Terrance Pohlen recommended me for a paid internship at Transplace, a large

third party logistics (3PL) firm located in Frisco, TX. Dr. Pohlen’s intention was for me to gain a

corporate level understanding of the logistics industry in order to assist in my research. Briefly,

a 3PL is a brokerage service that offers the outsourcing logistical of solutions. Basic

transportation can be coordinated between carriers, warehouses or other consignees, or even

provided by the 3PL directly. Transplace is a ‘zero-asset’ 3PL, meaning they provided no trucks,

but arranged coordination of logistics through the sale and service of software known in the

industry as Software as a Service or SaaS. I interviewed for and was offered the position as a

direct report intern for Tom Sanderson, the CEO of Transplace. Mr. Sanderson was made aware

of my driver turnover research objective and offered his assistance toward accomplishing that

end. I accepted the position and effectively acquired a second research client which afforded

me insights in to the industry I would not otherwise have had access to. While I could speak to

the wider issues about the transportation industry, terminology, and abbreviations related to

the job without hesitation, there was much about the internship that was completely new to

me. The combination of my regular academic coursework, the execution of my research

project, and the new internship at Transplace translated into a fairly steep learning curve. As

anthropology goes, I had achieved complete success with placing myself well outside my

comfort zone. However, much of the internship research work at Transplace related directly to

the trucking industry and other macro-economic reports. As a consequence I was afforded

some of the most significant contributions toward framing my turnover research analysis.

47

The following paragraphs describe the client acquisition process and address the

differences between what was originally proposed, what was actually executed. I also detail

how the compromise between planning and execution was carried out during the data

collection phase of the research project. Finally, I explain the process of recruitment, interviews

and how the specific instruments were used.

3.2 Client Acquisition

With my research proposal in hand, I set about deciding how to best acquire a research

client fitting the ‘large motor carrier’ description. There were many things to consider, chief

among them was that I was still a full time graduate student completing my second year of

study at UNT. As such, I would need to remain relatively tethered to the university. Excessive

travel was likely to interfere with my academic performance in my remaining coursework.

I first attempted to secure my former employer, Stevens Transport, by a phone call. I

departed the company in 2009 on excellent terms and had been invited to join the company in

a non-driving capacity at the headquarters terminal in Dallas, TX. I spoke with two people with

whom I was quite familiar in an attempt to gain client research approval. In retrospect I realized

that the 5 intervening years that had passed since my employment may have left any memory

of me as little more than cursory. Still, I had befriended one person via social media much

earlier and knew that I was not altogether forgotten. It is also likely that my positionality with

respect to their conception of me was simply beyond reconciliation. Beyond any lack of

recollection about my former employment, or failure to reconcile my new researcher status, I

believe the phone call to have been the primary roadblock to gaining buy-in, interest, or

approval for the research project. I would require the rich medium only afforded in a face to

48

face visit. Although I was disappointed with the way the phone call had gone, I did not

abandoned the idea of visiting the terminal in person for another try.

After again considering my ongoing coursework for the 2014-2015 academic year, I

selected USA Truck, Inc., for two reasons. First, USA Truck was also among the group which

corresponds to my research focus area as a large, long-haul, irregular-route, motor carrier. In

fact they are among the top 12 largest for-hire motor carriers in the United States. The second

consideration for selecting USA Truck was anticipating my eventual need to solicit driver

interview participants. USA Truck had a small maintenance terminal located in Denton, Texas.

At the time I believed this proximity was going to be a major factor in contributing to the ease

of acquiring recorded interview sessions with current truck drivers. Long form driver interviews

were a central feature of the research proposal that differentiated this project from others, and

I did not expect them to be easy to obtain. I also believed that the proximity of the Denton

terminal would afford me more frequent visits in order to gain a degree of observational insight

about the carrier and its operations on a day-to day-basis. While some of my expectations were

realized, others were disappointed and adjusted for in other ways.

I was introduced to USA Truck by Vince Washington during the summer of 2014. Mr.

Washington was then the USA Truck Safety Director of the Denton Truck Terminal. Our first

meeting was centered on a discussion about my intention of acquiring USA Truck as a thesis

client. I thought it best to make my introduction and pitch at the same time rather than risk

obscuring the message through an email or a phone call. With the Stevens Transport

experience in mind, I did not expect my visit with USA Truck to go very well, as this was my first

attempt to go directly to a carrier location. During the initial meeting Vince Washington quickly

49

agreed to help me navigate the path toward corporate approval for the research project. Upon

hearing further details about the project and research goals during subsequent meetings, Vince

shared that he was very much in favor of the project. Following a teleconference call with my

committee chair, Dr. Alicia Re Cruz, Vince repeated his approval for the project and explained

that corporate approval would be the next step. His personal endorsement and enthusiasm for

the project likely assisted my chances for gaining formal approval at the corporate tier that

followed. In relatively short order, I received approval from Burton Weis, then the Director of

Human Resources of USA Truck headquarters located in Van Buren, Arkansas. This brought my

attempts to secure a research client to a close much more quickly than I had anticipated. With

formal approval acquired, I returned to the university in order to obtain guidance on university

approval.

3.3 Institutional Review Board

Following creation of the research proposal and the process of formal client acquisition,

the Institutional Review Board (IRB) within the University of North Texas (UNT) required an

application be filed along with all supporting documents to be used in the conduct of research.

The primary concern of the IRB was to ensure that research conducted on human subjects

involved no more than minimal personal risk to participants that were likely to be outweighed

by the benefit, if any, of participation. The supporting documents included 1.) Signed forms that

declared formal recognition of the client research arrangement, 2.) The research proposal 3.)

Signed consent to conduct interviews at public locations other than on client premises, 4.)

Participant informed consent forms, 5). Driver surveys, 6.) Interview guides, 7). Recruitment

50

flyers and 8). Business cards. With the application completed, and requisite supporting

documents submitted, the IRB granted approval for research to begin on December 1st 2014.

3.3 Description of Client Location(s)

The USA Truck Terminal in Denton Texas was located near the interstate, in a large

concrete lot that shared adjoined offices with other logistics and maintenance companies. The

main structure was a building that ran down the center of a concrete lot with access to

different businesses available from the north or south facing sides of the building. There were

about 6 large maintenance garages for trucks at the west end of the building belonging to USA

Truck. Additionally, there was a small administrative office where Vince Washington worked,

and a driver’s lounge, which could seat about 4 people comfortably. Behind the offices and

truck garages was a large fenced in trailer drop-yard. This area was operated by USA Truck in

order that drivers stopping by for truck maintenance could drop their trailers before having

their truck serviced. Shop floor access was restricted for safety reasons, and this greatly

reduced my area of observation to Vince’s office and the driver’s lounge. I was largely

concerned with access to drivers, and my arrangement was such that I could stop by during

normal operating hours to gain such access as I wished. However, normal operating hours at

this terminal were the standard Monday through Friday from 8:00AM to 5:00PM. This was yet

another restriction imposed on the project in exchange for the price of proximity.

3.4 Barriers to Project Initiation

During the few months that elapsed between my first meeting with Vince Washington

and gaining corporate level research approval from Burton Weis, I visited the Denton Truck

Terminal several times. The realization of the limitations imposed by the small size of the

51

terminal had already become clear by the time I gained final approval. There was little in the

way of organizational structure that could be observed as this location was essentially a

maintenance outpost. While there were many other motor carriers I was aware of that had

larger terminals located on the south side of Dallas, Texas near Stevens Transport, the idea of

regular visits of that distance during an ongoing interstate widening project combined with the

remaining regular academic year was a very real deterrent for me. I decided to remain

dedicated to USA Truck in spite of the small size of the location and organizational observation

limitations.

Further, all of the research instruments submitted to the IRB had been created without

collaboration with my USA Truck contacts Vince Washington and Burton Weis. Whenever the

subject was broached, the response was generally that I should simply do what I thought was

best. While I gained their approval, and their enthusiastic approval, there was little in the way

of collaboration in developing a more holistic approach toward completing each of the study

components within the original research proposal. For all that I was carrying at the time, I

decided to simply narrow my focus on acquiring driver interviews as quickly as possible. I

resolved to address the next research component after sufficient progress with driver

interviews began to accumulate. At the core of the originally designed research project was a

driver-centered focus, and this was currently being made available. As demonstrated in the

previous research, this group has at times, proven to be difficult to gain access to.

Being limited as a solo researcher, the process of gathering a sufficient number of driver

interviews for a qualitative study turned out to be a lengthy one. By February 2015, two months

after gaining final project approval, I had obtained only two interviews. Both had been acquired

52

by way of driver-intercept at the USA Truck terminal and conducted off-site at the Travel

Centers of America Truck Stop (T\A) also located nearby in Denton Texas. Anticipating the small

driver lounge to be a problem, I acquired signed corporate approval from Tom Liutkus, the Vice

President of Marketing and Public Relations for T\A, to conduct interviews there prior to

gaining final IRB research approval. Relative confidentiality could be maintained at the truck

stop diner and the visit, I thought, could break up the monotony of the sometimes hours-long

wait for trucks to have repairs completed. As it turned out, it is still remarkably difficult to

convince strangers to get in your car for the short ride in spite of any apparent benefit.

These first two interviews were carried out in much the same way I had imagined and

planned for. Otherwise, recruitment was quite difficult. I spent a good deal of time alone in the

driver lounge simply waiting for drivers to materialize. As it turned out, many drivers preferred

to pass the time waiting inside their trucks prior to receiving maintenance service instead of in

the driver lounge. As a result, they were rendered unapproachable, because you can never

know a long-haul drivers schedule and they may simply be trying to sleep while they have the

opportunity to do so. From lived experience, I followed a self-imposed rule against recruiting

drivers from their trucks.

A greater portion of my time at the site was spent striking up general conversation with

one driver or another whenever they were present in the drivers lounge or in a common area

outside, such as a picnic table at the end of the building where some drivers would sit and

smoke cigarettes during fair weather. While I made it clear who I was and why I was there

relatively quickly, I did not always immediately solicit a driver for an interview until the

conversation turned to the topic of driver turnover. Many times the response was a polite no,

53

although the willingness to continue the conversation was almost never abated. I was reminded

of the familiarity of the topics and friendly exchanges between drivers about topics such as the

weather ahead at the next destination, or what is was like last week in another state. Politics,

immigration and the poor driving habits of ‘four-wheelers’ (cars and trucks not commercially

operated or the motoring public) was typical then as now. I took notes inconspicuously, often

after drivers walked away and tried to learn as much as I could about the general experience of

the drivers and USA Truck experience specifically while I was there.

3.5 Multi-Site Expansion

With March fast approaching and spring break along with it, I resolved to self-fund a

week-long visit to the USA Truck headquarters location in Van Buren, Arkansas. I contacted

Burton Weis a few weeks prior to my travel window and explained the difficulty I had been

having in securing driver interviews at the Denton, Texas location during the previous two

months. While I had expected the density of drivers to be low as a result of the winter months

and corresponding reduction in all logistics traffic, my ratio of visits-to-secured-interviews

seemed to be affected by other factors related to the small size of the terminal. The idea of the

headquarters visit was well-received, and Mr. Weis made arrangements such that I would be

afforded expanded access at the Van Buren site. I would also be able to meet my project

signatory in person, as well as see more of the organizational layout of the company. I booked a

hotel for six days, addressed any maintenance on my car, packed my bags and made the trip

with plenty of driver interview informed consent forms, surveys, interview guides, and my voice

recorder to capture the number of interviews I needed in the course of my week long stay.

54

With two in hand at the time, I was hoping for a total of twenty by the end of my scheduled

week.

I drove out to Van Buren on Sunday in order to arrive ready to get to work Monday

morning securing driver interviews. Over the course of the next five days, I visited the USA

Truck site in Van Buren every day, starting at 8:00AM and staying until 5:00PM. That first

Monday I met with Burton Weis who quickly introduced to me to Christina Carter, the Executive

Administrative Assistant. I was given a security badge for access to both buildings on the site.

There was a corporate headquarters building consisting of two floors and arranged with senior

executives along the walls and more junior personnel arranged toward the center in several

bullpens of cubicles on both floors. The amount of overhead denoted from the signage hanging

over each department was daunting, though not entirely unfamiliar. The second building was a

single floor, steel-sided building that was arranged for the reception of newly recruited driver

applicants. Both full, formal training was being offered to new drivers as well as orientation for

experienced drivers that had recently been hired. I was given an office to use in this building to

conduct interviews for the duration of my stay.

Located near my temporary office, separated by a large cubicle open office area and a

short corridor, was the drivers lounge. The lounge was large and had three main areas. The first

was a kitchen and vending area with restrooms nearby. The second, a more dimly lit area with

large recliners and a television mounted on the wall. The third area near another exit opposite

the office I was occupying had several table and seat fixtures similar to what might be seen in a

fast food restaurant. Another television was mounted on the wall here. Drivers could be seen

sleeping in the recliners, watching television, socializing, or busily working on their laptop

55

computers. The drivers lounge was located next to the maintenance bays, and drivers could

frequently be seen visiting the shop floor presumably seeking status updates on their trucks

readiness. Often other administrative personnel would walk through looking for a particular

driver or applicant.

3.6 Methods: Recruitment, Interviews, and Analysis

I brought a small acrylic stand the size of a sheet of paper in which I displayed my

recruitment flyers and business cards. I dressed in a polo and slacks each day while also wearing

the USA Truck ID Badge I was issued. While I did not want to wear a jacket and tie, being too

casual with jeans and a t-shirt also did seem to send the right signal. As it was, experienced

drivers could seldom be differentiated from trainees without close observation and I did not

want to add to the confusion. For most of the week I would simply walk around the building or

sit in certain areas for a while and join in impromptu conversations among drivers or trainees.

Invariably drivers or students would ask one another and myself what each was doing there.

Some were awaiting paperwork to complete the hiring process, some were taking a break from

training and others were waiting on truck repairs. There were other reasons given, but these

were the most typical. I would offer to whomever asked that I was there to conduct volunteer,

confidential interviews with drivers in order to better understand the professional driver

experience, discover issues related to turnover, and attempt to inform USA Truck of possible

suggestions that may improve the motor carrier experience. In short, that I was a third party,

primarily pursuing my degree requirements and that USA Truck was helping to that end in

exchange for anonymous feedback from their drivers. Some version of this, either shorter, or

56

more elaborate was offered several times a day while I was searching for drivers willing to sit

for interviews.

I averaged about three interviews per day, with some coming closer together in rapid

succession and others being spread so far apart I worried that the trip might not have been

worth the effort. By 5:00PM on Friday I had manage to add 12 interviews to the 2 I already had

for a grand total of 14. I felt I had made tremendous progress, and learned so much more about

the company and its drivers, but still I was far from my goal of 20 interviews. I decided the rest

would need to be acquired back at the Denton, Texas location, and with the weather warming

up, was optimistic about wrapping up the driver interview portion soon. Unfortunately,

recruiting from the small terminal in Denton proved to be equally as difficult as before. I

recorded 2 more interviews from the Texas location before I decided to conclude the driver

interview portion of the project with a total of 16. Given my role as the interviewer and in light

of the multiple occasions of recorded material playback, I believed the 16 interviews sufficiently

captured the driver perspective.

I created an interview guide and followed it although not rigidly. As the primary

researcher, I wanted the drivers to reveal what they felt was relevant or about which they were

passionate about with respect to their experience as a driver. My own four years of long haul

trucking experience combined with academic training and my role as an industry researcher

provided me with the requisite insight needed to steer the drivers back to relevant topics

whenever the conversation began to drift to peripheral or even unrelated topics. Generally, I

tried to allow the driver to do most of the talking and I followed up with questions that sought

57

to clarify their story as they told it. As such, discovery, rather than the confirmation of a

preconceived hypothesis, was central to my efforts.

A total 16 interviews were conducted averaging about one hour each. Additionally, each

driver completed a one-page survey for the purposes of quickly recording demographic

information. The demographic survey was adapted from an earlier qualitative study which I had

participated in during the year prior. Once drivers appeared voluntarily committed, I reviewed

with them the informed consent form which was signed before moving forward. Drivers were

reminded that their participation was completely voluntary, and that they could terminate the

interview at any time without consequence. Following the informed consent process, the

surveys were completed and returned to the researcher which aided the interview process by

allowing the researcher to focus on specific details about the driver being interviewed. Also,

completing the survey prior to the interview allowed time for the continuation of friendly

chatter that had preceded the driver agreeing to the recorded interview and potentially recover

from any rapport that may have been lost during the review and signing of informed consent

forms. This process allowed the drivers to focus on their employment experience and related

issues they felt were pertinent to their careers as long haul commercial truck drivers prior to

the recording actually beginning. Almost every driver showed interest in my study and seemed

genuinely happy to help. Only one driver initially volunteered and then opted out prior to

signing the informed consent form.

Following the interview phase of the project, I tabulated the survey data and transcribed

the recorded interviews verbatim. I then began a qualitative analysis of the interviews. To

facilitate this process, I used a qualitative data analysis software program a program called

58

MaxQDA 12. Each of the transcription were analyzed for specific events that were relevant to

the driver experience. Similarities across transcribed interviews became codes as like elements

were found. Eventually, the specific codings themselves grew in number and were themselves

re-categorized into a smaller number of more general themes. The following portion of this

report details how code and theme process was developed.

There were over one thousand total codings listed in the code system of the MaxQDA

12 program. An explanation of the themes, codes, and sub-codes will follow. The five primary

themes are listed in the order of project frequency. There is some overlap between the themes,

but generally only as a pair of themes coded together. Some sections were coded across three

or more thematic categories, though this was not often.

It is important to note that the frequency with which a theme, code, or sub-code

appears has a somewhat obvious general implication regarding its level of importance.

However, the frequency is not solely indicative of importance. Rather, more clearly defined,

well explained or emphatic utterances given by the interviewees’ added subjective weight or

importance to given themes. While the coding process was an iterative process, it was informed

by my own relevant experience as a former long-haul truck driver and training as an

ethnographer.

3.7 Analytical Development and Grounded Theory

It is important to understand that my analysis was primarily focused on discovery. The

transcribed interviews were the driving force which guided my analytical process. In the social

sciences this is referred to as grounded theory. The analytical approach is grounded in the

59

findings. What this means in simpler terms is that before my literature review was complete,

and well before my theoretical frameworks for analysis were selected, I began my analysis with

only my driver interviews. I conducted them. I transcribed them. I read them. I listened to

them. I did the latter two several times. Patterns began to emerge through this process. As the

coding process followed, a more organized and complete picture developed. With this data, I

was able to select the final authors and texts required for my analysis. I did not force my data to

fit an established model. Rather, I found components of existing theoretical models that fit my

data. These were presented in the third section of the literature review from the previous

chapter.

Following the completion of the transcriptions and prior to completing the coding

process, I attempted to reconnect with my client. I wanted to provide them with an update on

my progress and gain feedback about ideas I had regarding feedback from the company’s driver

managers. This is when I learned that the Denton Truck Terminal location was being

permanently closed and that my local contact, Vince Washington, had been laid off. Upon

further investigation I learned that Burton Weis, my project signatory at the corporate level,

had left the company after more than 20 years of employment. I was concerned about any

further development and the final conclusion of the project. After a few failed attempts at

gaining buy-in from the new Vice President of Human Resources, I decided to refocus my

attention to completing the analysis of the material I had on hand. Most of the drivers I

interviewed reported that they had previous experience with other long haul trucking

companies. As a consequence, I concluded it should be possible to present my findings to any

long haul carrier with roughly equivalent relevance.

60

Finally, to add a wider degree of context and a bit of color to this thesis, I have also

included a few additional items of interest. The first is a response I received from a question I

posed while attending an executive-hosted discussion forum at the Great American Truck Show

in Dallas, Texas last year. The forum was sponsored by CCJ Digital Magazine and the video link

with the applicable time stamp is listed in the next chapter. The second item lists a few of

excerpts from a transcribed interview with I conducted with Peterbilt’s Design Engineer and

Director of Product Placement, Andy Weiblen in 2015.

61

CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS

4.1 The People

Here I provide a general description of the group of drivers interviewed. More specific

characterizations of each driver accompany the excerpts from transcribed interviews as they

are explored in the coding section that follows. Racially, the group consisted of 8 Whites, 6

Blacks, and 2 Hispanics. 14 were male and 2 were female. The average age of the group was 45,

with a median age of 46. As far as race, gender, and age, the group interviewed for this project

is a good representative sample with roughly similar demographic distributions found at the

national level across the broader industry of commercial transportation (Burks 2010; Short

2014).

Figure 9 Drivers by Race

62

Figure 10 Drivers by Sex

Figure 11 Drivers by Age

63

Going further, over two thirds indicated they were not married. This is distinctively

different from the early 1980’s when most drivers reported being married (Hamilton 2008).

Two thirds also indicated they had children, but that most of them were mature, independent

adults at the time of the interview. About one fourth still had young children at home (minors).

Three drivers indicated they did not maintain a physical address. These drivers claimed they

frequently stayed with friends or family during their time off if they did not otherwise travel

alone during their time off and stay at a hotel. All of the 16 (100%) drivers interviewed

indicated they had completed high school, while 5 (31%) had completed a four-year degree,

and 3 (19%) had completed 2-year degrees. Two drivers indicated “some college” or “1 year of

college”, bringing the total combined years of higher education for the group to about 28.

Half of the drivers claimed some form of Christianity as their religion while the

remaining half chose not to disclose any information about the topic. Strikingly, 11 (70%)

claimed no political affiliation. Shane Hamilton, the historian and author discussed in the

literature review earlier, noted more prominent and aggressive political affiliation from the pre-

Deregulatory trucking era (Hamilton 2008). The median number of years of experience in long

haul trucking was 6, with 8.8 years being the average. Years of experience ranged from 6

months to 34 years. From all of the drivers interviewed, 140 was the total combined years of

experience. Each driver indicated an annual wage derived from truck driving from between

$30,000 to $60,000 with the median selected range of income being $30,000-$40,000 annually.

Two of the drivers were lease or owner operators at the time of the interview, with two

more drivers interested in becoming owner operators. Three divers indicated they had tried the

64

lease or owner operator approach in the past, either with USA Truck or another company, but

had returned to the company side claiming it to be less volatile and more profitable.

Finally, with the exception of one outlier reporting 21 different employers, the mean

and median number of carriers each driver had previously worked for was 2. With the outlier,

the average number of employing carriers rises to 3 per driver, although the median remains

the same at 2 years. Given that the mean and median number of years of experience for each

driver was 6 and 8.8 respectively, this would indicate a lower than average turnover rate for

this group of drivers as a whole. With some variability based on using the mean rather than the

median years employed per carrier, the turnover rate for this group is still about once every 3

years, which is much better than the industry average of once per year. It’s far better still than

the not uncommon 3 per year turnover rates. However, I created the 2 tables below to better

illustrate the turnover rates from this group of drivers just discussed.

65

Figure 12 Drivers by Years of Experience and Number of Employing Carriers

Figure 13 Average Number of Years between Driver Turnover Events

66

4.2 The Coding Process

All of the master codes serve as themes with codes and sub-codes assigned for greater

detail as needed. Many excerpts from the transcribed interviews were directly assigned to the

broader themes without need of greater specificity. There were 44 categorical headings to

include all master codes / themes, codes, and sub-codes combined. Theme and code

development was an iterative process. There were a few occasions early on while learning both

the software and developing a greater familiarity with the content of each transcription where I

simply threw everything out and started over. Because the MaxQDA program is so intuitively

developed with the coding process in mind, my third attempt gained enough traction such that

I could make both small and fairly significant changes in the master code and sub-code

arrangement without need of starting over.

The following section begins by providing brief explanations of the major themes

identified in this project. Each thematic explanation is accompanied by several contextual

excerpts from the interview transcriptions. More specific codes or sub-codes from the major

themes are also explained where necessary for understanding the selected excerpts with

greater detail.

67

Table 4.1.

Total sections of coded text 1079

7 Master Codes (Themes)

0. Quotes 187

1. Identity 267

2. Driver Perceptions & Treatment 215

3. Communication 147

4. Pay 99

5. Effective Training 87

6. Home Time 49

7. Federal Regulations 28

4.3 Thematic Codes and Categories

4.3.1 Quotes

This particular category is less of a code and more of an early reflection or insight shared

by a driver, or a succinct phrase, or story they shared. All of the quotes were later assigned to

more relevant codes or thematic categories. Quotes were something I highlighted recognizing

their significance, but not yet their specific applicability. No excerpts are shared from this loose

category as it is largely an artifact from the early process of coding.

4.3.2 Identity

This theme captures feedback that drivers shared about life as an over-the-road truck

driver. The material ranges from their entry into the industry, past and present employment as

a driver, and other details that were relevant to this study. There is some crossover shared with

other themes that will be explored later. In short, this theme captures the history of

experiences that relate to how being a truck driver affects or shapes the respondents’ identity.

Within Identity as it is examined here, there are a number of sub-codes. Within identity, lies a

68

significant element of masculinity. Masculinity or masculine traits are further detailed under

identity as self-reliance, personal responsibility, and even resignation. Resignation is here used

to describe a form of acceptance or tolerance for seemingly unfair or untenable situations

resulting, at least in part, from a continual naturalization of internalized inequality on the part

of truck drivers. Early on this theme began as stories, and was at one point on my list of items

to eliminate until further reading about the framework of identity and masculinity established

its importance and indeed its centrality. The ideas shared earlier by Lamont, Hamilton, and

others from the literature review in their separate anthropological, sociological, and historical

work helped me to develop this theme and the context for exploring it. Further reflection and a

modification to the coding process saw this category emerge as the most qualitatively and

quantitatively significant component within the project. The following are several excerpts from

transcribed interviews which help contextualize this theme in greater detail. For many of the

excerpts, I have removed my own prompts or responses in order to convey only the driver’s

sentiments. However, when needed, my own comments are included. Additionally, ellipses

appear in driver responses where I have removed portions of text that did not succinctly further

develop the context for an assigned theme.

4.3.3 Drivers on Identity

Here, drivers indicate some of the reasons they enjoy being a truck driver. Similar

sentiments were reflected by most all of the drivers I interviewed, with several using nearly

identical language.

Driver 1: I like the fact that you ain't got nobody right over your shoulder you know?

You've got that freedom even though you’re working for some company, you still got that

69

freedom that you work for yourself. You can choose your hours that you want to drive.

You can choose how long you want to drive.

Driver 2: Well, the independence. The freedom. Yeah. You don't have to deal with a boss.

You don't have to deal with anything. As long as you’re on a load assignment. As I said, I

deliver for Staples. The Staples stuff. On my load, I go to every city. When I am there, I

pull up the next destination. I go for one week without speaking with anyone. The

freedom. That part is the only thing I like about this job.

Driver 4: I like the different scenery. I like getting paid to go visit my family and friends. I

know people from the military. If I want to go somewhere, I can just get a load there. I

like the freedom of being independent. If I want to talk to somebody, I turn my CB on. If I

don’t want to talk to somebody, I turn the CB off, and I turn my music up. You know? It’s

an individual thing. I don’t like if I have to go stay in the factory. You’ve got somebody

standing over you. They’re telling you what to do. They’re telling you how to do it. They’re

telling you when to do it. All I have to do is be responsible in this job. Pick up on time.

Deliver on time. Don’t tear up the equipment. Be safe. You know what I’m saying? I like

the independence of the job. And the pay don’t hurt, don’t get me wrong. The pay is good.

So, it’s a win-win the way I look at it, all the way around.

Driver 9: I like that there is nobody behind me looking over my shoulder all the time. All I

have to do is do my job and I'm in the upper 90% of good.

Driver 11: No micro managing. I don't like being micro managed. I like being given a task...

Driver 12: The one thing that I’ve always loved about truck driving is I don’t have a boss

looking over my shoulder. I can turn and stop when I want, I can start when I want. And

good money.

Most of the drivers interviewed shared the strong conviction that there were truck

drivers, and then there was everyone else, or as we call it in anthropology, an “Us” and “Them”

mentality. Excerpts such as the ones shared below, and others that were similar, although

perhaps less direct, get at how the drivers identify as truck drivers and not just as ‘a person or

laborer that is currently driving a truck.’ When asked about advancement opportunities or

70

becoming a driver manager, the following responses were given by two drivers. The idea was

expressed in different ways by different drivers, but these two responses were the most

concrete.

Driver 1: I can't even keep up with myself. I couldn't keep up with fifty other damn

drivers. I don't envy their job. I wouldn't want to do their job. Hell no.

Driver 5: I would never want to do it because I enjoy being out on the open road too much.

No. I’m strictly… I’m staying a driver.

Here, drivers speak generally about some of the problems they’ve had with their current

or previous employers. Each expresses a very palpable sense of internal conflict with respect

their feelings about the problems they have encountered. Whether by financial need, or a

sense of personal responsibility, the drivers indicate that they do not simply elect to quit

working for a given carrier based on a few mishaps or minor injustices. Rather, voluntary driver

separation from a motor carrier appears to result from several unresolved conflicts over time.

Driver 1: The Company on one hand, has been good to me. But then there's been some

issues here and there. Maybe some my fault, maybe some their fault. I'm not really going

to put the blame on either or. Maybe some of it needs to go half and half I should say.

Maybe some of the blame goes on them. Maybe some of the blame goes on me,

and equal it out.

Driver 5: Well Central was… well, it was a good company. It really was. But, they started

screwing me over on miles, and didn’t… They still owe me about $2,000 in missed pay.

Driver 8: Well, I’m contracted to USA, but USA don’t have nothing to do with my truck.”

Chris: “OK, so that’s definitely owner op. So you could drop USA, and contract to someone

else?

Driver 8: Yeah. If they make me mad. But, they done made me mad plenty of times. I’ve

done been through the ringer with a whole bunch of dispatchers.

71

Driver 10: I actually let it go too long. If you see it's going wrong, the best thing to do is

get out of it then because it's only going to get worse. With Panther I made the mistake

of saying next week it would be better and then next week it would be better and it only

got worse. I had no revenue coming in and it actually made my situation worse each week.

If you see that you need to...kind of like end that business relationship right then and

there. Because it's not going to get any better.

This final set of excerpts related to identity explore some of the more common

circumstances related to turnover events in the life-context of truck drivers. They illustrate how

turnover events can be considered a part of the identity-forming process through becoming and

often remaining a truck driver. Each event described below shares its terminus with a driver

either newly entering into or returning to truck driving as a career. Only one driver below, Driver

11, provides the slightest hint of a romantic view toward trucking, but then quickly follows this

sentiment with rather flat pragmatism. Additionally, Driver 14 mentions taking a year to get “over

the shock of the industry.” This is informative considering the typical turnover timeframe among

new drivers occurs well inside the one-year mark.

Driver 9: Well, I quit Swift and tried to save my marriage. I went into construction after

that. I was doing well in construction and making good money and then the construction

crisis hit and there was no construction jobs. I thought, what can I do?5

Driver 11: I was a prison guard for almost twenty years. Just something I saw on the

road on my way to work, and just decided it was something I want to do. It is what it is. I

still have a job. It pays the bills.

Driver 12: I guess I grew up that way, where I was always around it and I had to be

there. That was my livelihood because somewhere, no matter what else I've tried, I've

always landed with the trucks.

Driver 13: Okay. Well, I became obsolete in the field of land survey. Basically just to

derive income, I turned to trucking. I went to a CDL school locally in Fort Royal, Virginia.

And just went online and applied for just about all of the major training companies. USA

5 The Avondale Partners Report shares a nearly identical story in the body of their quarterly industry analysis.

72

was the first one to send me a bus ticket. Once I got over the shock of the industry… I

just started my 8th year.

Chris: You got to USA Truck and got over the shock of the industry... How long did that

take to you if you can remember?

Driver 13: A good year because I was concentrating on learning how to control the

vehicle and deal with pulling into a shipper or a receiver and 15 trucks in front of me.

Driver 14: I kept quitting and coming back for a couple of reasons, right? Those reasons

were: they pay me well and also I know most of their shippers. Before I came back last

year, I had another job that offered me more than double the monies they offer here.

Chris: Sign on?

Driver 14: Yeah. And more miles ... more money per mile. But, I say, let me go back to

USA because I know their routes, I know how it works, all of that. You know? I know all

of that... before I go to somewhere else I don't know nothing about it. So, in that respect

I think I'm going to be staying here until I open my own business, but other than that I'm

not going nowhere else.

To varying degrees, every driver interviewed expressed a similar sense of resignation

that could be likened to the excerpts shared above. Some part of them believes that accepting

the working conditions within a given motor carrier as they are, is simply a reality which they

are powerless to change. Beyond their sense of resignation, was also a sense of gratitude for

having a job at all; even if it was not the best job. The sentiment was frequently implied or

explicitly stated. According to this group of drivers, and I suspect more than these, the

overarching perception of drivers today is that there appears to be little room for negotiating

their working conditions, and by extension, their identity. I investigate this more directly with

the theme of driver perceptions and treatment.

4.3.4 Driver Perceptions and Treatment

With this theme I draw out more of the nuance embedded in each of the interviews.

The selected excerpts tend to be slightly longer as a result. Within them, drivers discuss their

own perceptions, as well as what they believe are the perceptions of others. Throughout a

73

variety of situations, respect emerges as a central tenant of this theme. Additionally, within this

theme, as well as from the previously discussed theme of identity regarding resignation, there

is usually a story that relates to some form of struggle that must constantly be mediated by the

driver. Despite this, a surprising sense of optimism shared among the majority of the drivers

interviewed is continuously revealed.

In the excerpts below, the interviewed drivers share their assessment of other truck

drivers, both from their own company and more generally from the industry as a whole. While

not all of the views shared were entirely negative, there was at least a slight negative bias when

discussing other truck drivers. Truck drivers who were also trainers or who had college degrees

tended to have fewer negative opinions to share about other drivers. This is likely due to how

education and training can change or influence our general outlook to be more other-oriented.

I believe the sentiments captured here reflect the results from years of frenetic turnover, and a

hiring process that has been attempting to keep pace. The process has contributed to an

industry wide image problem for truck drivers. That image problem is acknowledged by the

drivers I interviewed and most recently with in the 2015 Truck Driver Shortage Analysis

produced by the American Trucking Associations (Costello & Suarez 2015).

While new, federally mandated safety regulations are restricting the applicant pool in

many ways, the applicants that are being deemed ‘qualified’ by meeting the newer but simple,

minimum requirements to fill available positions may not necessarily be the best candidates.

The barriers to entry into the industry are still relatively low, and with no professional selection

criteria being implemented short of verifying applicants are meeting minimum requirements,

74

the problem of turnover has likely been exacerbated. This is not a new phenomenon, but a

continuing one.

Driver 3: People think all truck drivers are jerks. And that’s not necessarily true. I’ve met

some very mean people, who were truck drivers, who were just angry. I’ve also met

some of the nicest people in the world here.

Driver 4: If they’re not married, don’t have a family, this can be good for them. That has

a lot to do with turnover. Like me, I’m older, my child is 32 years old. She’s in the

military. You know? I don’t have any responsibilities. I don’t care about going home. You

know what I’m saying? When I first came out here, I’d stay out for a month, two

months. What am I gonna go home to? My stuff is in storage. You know? I came out

here to drive. But, that’s just me. A lot of people come out here not knowing what to

expect. That’s one reason you got a high turnover. Then they come out here and they

see, for example, if they are young, or even in their thirties, and they got a wife and kids,

and the kids and family at first they are going to like it because daddy gone for a second.

But when daddy starts being gone too long, you are not there, you are missing a lot of

the games. And then the wife is missing you, it’s a lot of aspects when you have a family.

Can the family deal with you being gone? Can you deal with being gone from the family?

Family time is important to drivers. And that has a lot to do with some of the turnover.

Driver 9: The respect from other drivers has just gone downhill in the last ten years, I

think.

Driver 10: I went to truck stops and started asking for good companies and this is the

one that was praised. All the drivers are happy, happy, happy. Because I knew if I went

to a truck stop they would give me the truth.

Driver 13: The worst thing going on… This is going to sound judgmental. The worst thing

is having to deal with these other, sometimes downright despicable, always selfish,

drivers. There is no professionalism out there.

Driver 14: Not everybody that works out of this building is meant to be a truck driver.

They’re just trying something new and most likely they're not going to like it. You can

tell. You get a student and in a couple of days you're like, oh, this guy ain't going to

make it.

In the next set of excerpts, drivers continue to share opinions about new drivers and

some add their thoughts about being new to truck driving themselves. Dispositions toward new

75

drivers are often correlated to a given driver’s current level of experience. Clear differences

between drivers emerge. The biggest differentiator appears to be years of experience.

Experience is usually not a visible distinction that other drivers can make. It must be disclosed

from one driver to another, and is usually only done in a trainer-to-trainee scenario; a

relationship most drivers don’t share with one another. Alternatively, some drivers, with

relatively few years of experience, expressed bitterness or contempt toward still-newer drivers.

This contempt was usually expressed in a very general, non-specific way. The salient point here

is that longer term drivers appear to have a better disposition toward all other drivers, new and

experienced alike. It’s relatively unsurprising when someone decides they are predisposed to

thriving in the work environment of long distance trucking. Experienced drivers are more

patient, knowledgeable, and tend to practice developmental leadership. Not just with other

drivers, but with carrier clients as well. This is a benefit that ought to be more aggressively

pursued by motor carrier retention efforts.

Thoughts from drivers with three years or less experience:

Driver 1: And that's another thing I don't understand. It's like OK, if you got a driver

that's been with the company for years, why don't you take a little bit more pride in him

instead of these newcomers and giving them whatever they want? Just anybody that's

been with the company for three years. If they ask for an extra day off, what is the

problem on giving them an extra day off so he can spend it at home with his family? Is

that load really more important than that driver's family? And I understand that if the

wheels ain't turnin', if that truck's not on the road they're not makin' no money. I

understand that, but come on.

Driver 3: When I noticed my checks weren't that big and I wasn't getting the miles that

they promised me. You know? I was like I can't do this. It's not enough compensation for

being away from your family for a month at a time. Or a month and a half. And, on top

of that, they didn't want to get me home whenever I requested home time. That was

another big issue with them. I worked for C.R. England in 2013. And I stopped doing it

76

for a couple of years after that. I had had such a bad experience with England. You

know? I kind of assumed all companies were just the same.

Driver 6: His name was Tom Gallant. He has a little website. I didn’t really care for them,

but I liked the emblem. It has a shark on it. For Gallant, the G, looks like a shark. The rest

of it looks like a great white shark, on the truck and the trailer. I thought it was kind of

cool. That’s one reason I stayed with them so long, even though 28 cents a mile sucked,

but… I stayed there despite the pay. Yes, I was barely making it. Yes I was making rent.

So I realize it wasn’t really like all the glamour and glory like that you know? It was a

struggle. But, I’m glad I stayed there for 2 ½ years, got my belt. I said, OK, I’ve got 2 ½

years of complete seasons.

Driver 15: Right, and about two years ago, maybe it was a year and a half ago, they had

a survey of only certain drivers, but it was the experienced drivers, and it was like three

questions. I don't remember all three of them, but I know one of them was about better

pay, and the only reason I know about that is because we did a survey and more drivers

said better pay was the only reason for being here. They increased the wages, but not

for the experienced drivers, but for the people coming into the company. The logic is

well, we're going to pay more money for people that ain't here yet to get them in the

door, but you're already here so why should we give them a raise? Tell me how does

that keep your experienced drivers? You're asking your experienced drivers these

questions, but you're rewarding the people that don't work here yet. That right there,

that's a negative for me.

Thoughts from truck drivers with 5-10+ years of experience:

Driver 4: He [Safety Manager] told me, he said look, they [driver mangers] have a board

of let’s say 75 people on their board. They might not ever meet the person that they’re

talking to. You’ve got a truck. They know you by your [truck] number. What’s your truck

number? 2731. When you call in, the first thing they ask you is what’s your truck

number? Now, the people that’s around me, and deal with me, not only do they know

my truck number, they know my name. Because I made a good effort, for one, to go

meet them. To see them face to face. So now I’m not just a truck number. I’m not even

just a name. I’m a person. Because, it makes a difference. It makes you stand out. So, I

want them to know. That personalizes it. How about that? I want them to know who I

am.

77

Driver 5: All you’ve got to do is take care of the driver. If the driver needs home time.

Get him home. If the driver needs a little extra help financially, help him out. Let him

pay you back in installments. Make the driver happy, your company is going to succeed

and you’re going to keep them.

Driver 9: The thing I dislike probably is the compensation. I don't think there is adequate

compensation for somebody being out on the road 325 days of the year. There's not a

shortage of drivers, there's a shortage of pay.

Driver 16: What I tell young drivers, because like I say, every time we get to a terminal

we talk, other drivers will come up and start a conversation. What I found to be true and

what I tell them all is, driving a truck is a great way to maintain a relationship, but you're

not going to build a relationship being a truck driver. If you're newly married, let's say

been married less than 3 to 5 years, you're not going to be happy driving a truck

because you're still trying to build that relationship with your wife. But if you already

have that relationship built and you're just maintaining that relationship, then truck

driving is for you.

A lot of these young drivers, I've listened to their stories, they're talking about

their paycheck is $200, $300 a week and I'm looking at them like they're crazy. I'm like, if

my check is ever under $750 somebody's going to get fired. How do you work all week

and bring home a $200 or $300 paycheck? As you listen to them, then you find out

they're sitting in the truck stops, they're wasting time. They don't know how to manage

their log book. That's another thing, driving for all these different companies, you have

to know how to manage that log book. I'm not going to say you ‘work the log book’, but

if you manage it properly, you're going to make proper money. If you're willing to work

you're going to make good money.

While still speaking about experience and new drivers, the next three excerpts reveal

more details about the driver’s disposition, work ethic, and career orientation. Some drivers,

whether trainers or not, appear more inclined to adopt a position of mentorship and

developmental practice toward their less experienced counterparts.

Driver 10: I've got a sunshiny personality so you are going to... even if you are mad, I'm

going to make a good, positive thing out of it. That kind of... the average driver probably

wouldn't but because of me being in management, having to work with FDA, USDA, and

that type of thing, and some of them were really, really nasty. You kind of train yourself

to not look at things as hard as the average person would or not to become rebellious

78

because it's only going to hurt you more. That background really helps me in this

industry as far as dealing... being a good customer service person.

Driver 11: Well here, you can't turn loads down. I don't turn nothing down. Whatever

you tell me to do, it's your truck, I'm going to do it. If I can do it, I'm going to do it. As

owner op, I was the same way. I'll do it. A little, small run would set up for a big run.

That's how I see it. Why turn down a little, small run just to sit there for a couple hours

when you can already get loaded and start rolling? I kind of try to be a proactive man,

instead of reactive. I just try to be positive.

During my research, these stories and more like them began to coalesce and allowed me

to formulate a generalized working model of truck drivers. From the details discussed in this

chapter, I conceived the following three ideas:

Each driver has a particular level of resignation, and it usually takes a while to

burn through it. By this I mean there are some minor injustices or unfair

situations that people possessing the constitution for long-haul truck driving are

willing to accept; at least for a while.

Although explored only briefly thus far, most drivers also possess a fairly robust

sense of optimism.

Most drivers do not feel that avenues of reconciliation or renegotiation of their

terms of employment are readily available to them.

As a result, when drivers are ready to exercise their freedom, or their independence,

and defend the dignity of their work, they accomplish all of these things with a ‘quit event’. A

quit event is essentially the external manifestation of internal conflict reaching a breaking point

within a given driver. Once a driver is navigating the hiring process with a new employer, they

are effectively renegotiating their working conditions, likely receiving one-on-one time from

support personnel, and probably not being made to feel like an interruption while doing it.

Sign-on bonuses such as those on offer for the past few years ranging from $500 to $5,000 can

make this method of renegotiating working conditions especially attractive.

79

4.3.5 Relationships

Before moving on to the next theme of communication, which reveals much about the

working relationships between drivers and support personnel, primarily driver managers (also

referred to as dispatchers), the final few excerpts from this theme of driver perceptions and

treatment provide a primer for understanding driver relationships with driver managers.

Driver 15: There is actually this one guy that works nights and most weekends who was

really cool to work with. Again, he acted like he cared, but I tell you what, I would rather

work with Marsha or Annie, which were the two daytime dispatchers that I've dealt with

at 20 cents a mile than 90% of the night crew that I've dealt with at 25. I would rather

get paid less and deal with people like Annie and Marsha. You know what I mean? It just

goes by so much…

Driver 16: Now, for some reason I've got two fleet managers. I've got one Sunday,

Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday, then I got another one Thursday, Friday, and

Saturday. They switch off on Wednesday's. Matt and Mike. Matt I love. He takes care of

me. He runs me. He's concerned about me. On Thursday, Friday when I get Mike... He's

the laziest and worst dispatcher I’ve had. But I tolerate him because Matt will make it

up. … On Friday I'm going to send a reminder, "I'm due home on Saturday, tomorrow,"

and 9 times out of 10 I'll have to like, "Look, I'm going home. Not only just to my off

time, I'm starting my 7 days of vacation." There's no give on this. This is my vacation

days. If it's off time, we can play with it for a day or so, but this is my vacation time.

Chris: What is it that you like least about truck driving?

Driver 6: The least about truck driving? The dispatchers. They yell from point A to point

B. OK. They give you this time frame to this time frame. They don’t ever account, OK, I

might have a flat tire. Oh, I might break down. OK, call, yeah, we’ll reschedule you. But

why are you shutting down? I’m tired. I just spent four hours in a traffic jam going

nowhere. I’m tired.

Driver 8: That’s the whole key to driving over the road. If you and your dispatcher don’t

get along, you know, it’s going to make it harder for you on the road. And if they don’t

understand you… The worst thing about USA is that they hire a lot of young people over

there that never drove before. So if you never drove before, you don’t know what really

goes on out there. So if you tell me I’m in New York, and you want me to get to

Richmond, Virginia, talking about on the map it only says 50 miles, but…

80

It is apparent from each of these excerpts that there is a type of person that makes an

effective driver manager. Discussions about the previous driving experience of driver managers

are popular among truck drivers, but they are not well grounded. These are just two very

different types of employment. While the added experience of a former driving career could

likely prove beneficial for a driver manager, and likely has, it is simply a relatively rare occasion

that a driver stops over-the-road driving to become a driver manager. I asked several drivers

about this, none of whom cared much for the idea themselves. A few of their responses were

shared in the previous set of excerpts on identity. I was asked to stay on with my former long-

haul carrier as a driver manager at the conclusion of my own OTR experience. I know more now

about why I declined the position than I did then. Simply stated, it wasn’t who I was. So what

constitutes a good driver manager? Beyond descriptors such as responsiveness, patience, and a

genuine concern for the welfare of their assigned drivers, I believe more study should be

focused on discovering the answer to this very important question. Suffice it to say, drivers are

keenly aware of when they have a good driver manager and when they do not. There was a

component in my original research proposal that accounted for this needed understanding, but

I was simply unable to accommodate it as an independent researcher in the time I had available

to spend with my client motor carrier.

4.3.6 Communication

This theme identifies occurrences of both good and bad communication between

drivers and carriers across a variety of mediums such as the telephone, Electronic-On-Board-

Recorders (EOBR), Global Positioning Systems (GPS), and email or equivalents from specialized

‘in-truck’ platforms or the driver’s own personal laptop computer. Relationships is an

81

important sub-code and describes how drivers either do or do not get along with driver

managers or other driver support personnel. The communication theme identifies most of the

concrete examples that motor carriers should be alerted to. Drivers are essentially virtual

workers as far as managers are concerned. Still, most labor models that appear under the rubric

of ‘organizational behavior’, whether virtual or not, fail to account for the unique arrangement

of personnel that exist within long-haul, irregular-route, motor carriers. The people that motor

carriers are most concerned with managing, are physically the most distant. Additionally, by the

nature of the work, they are virtually more distant as well. By this I mean that a driver cannot

be on the phone, whether with a hands-free device or not, and effectively communicate with

their carrier while also tending to the demands of their job such as driving or any of the other

myriad peripheral tasks associated with pick-ups and deliveries. The management of, and

communication with drivers should be centered on the driver’s schedule; a schedule that is

constantly in flux. Effectively, the driver requires support ‘on-demand.’ Such support should not

be delivered at the convenience of the carrier, but at the convenience of the driver. Yet

typically the former is what is practiced. Of course compromise is required for any job, but the

ideal target should be clearly defined and worked toward collectively. The excerpts that follow

provide insight from drivers and describe how they understand communication in the various

contexts of long haul driving.

The first set of excerpts from the theme of communication examines the relationships

between drivers and driver managers from the driver’s point of view. It appears that most

drivers understand that clear signals must be issued from both parties. There are periods when

drivers are new, new to their current employing motor carrier, or new to their current driver

82

manager. Each new relationship can result in communication that is at least initially icy. When

mutually beneficial communication becomes established, attempts are made from both parties

to maintain the working relationship. However, the nature of the industry can often prevent

such effective working relationships from going on for too long, as driver managers tend to be

promoted or even quit themselves. Being assigned a new driver manager can be a stressful

event for truck drivers. However, working relationships appear to be reestablished in relatively

short periods of time with respect to their overall duration. Finally, some drivers are

temperamentally more likely to become frustrated when they are unable to effectively transmit

the importance of any particular request.

Driver 1: Well I usually just call them dispatchers, fleet managers, and then they went to

the driver manager. For me, they're all fleet managers. I don't care. Me and my other

buddies, we call them flunkies. (Laughter) Some of 'em are good. Some of 'em are bad.

To my understanding, what happens at USA Truck, the planner6 actually gives the driver

a load. And you got this driver manager or fleet manager or flunkies like we always like

to call them, standing in the middle, and actually they're getting the crap from both

ends. You got your good dispatchers, and you got your bad ones. Some that, the only

way to get along with them is to just cuss at them. That's the only way you can get along

with them.

Driver 10: Lack of communication. Or sitting for two or three days. Like Panther. That

was another thing that they did. You may get dispatched Monday and you may not get

another [load] until Wednesday or Thursday. They'll tell you, well “you are in a non-

productive area, you should have positioned yourself in a productive area.” You

dispatched me to this area. I didn't put myself or place myself here, you put me here.

“Well that's not a productive area, we are going to try and get you something. It may be

Wednesday or Thursday before they get you something.”

Driver 11: I've worked with several fleet managers. They've all been great. When they

gave me the news that they were doing away with the [my local] position, I was a little

6 “Planner” is an operational term for load planner; a person that tries to organize load assignments by paid miles, pick-up and delivery times, and other details before any adjustments must made for a particular assigned driver.

83

upset with USA Truck, and I was looking for other positions with other companies. My

fleet manager that I have now, I worked with her when I first started working local. She

called me, and said that she runs a dedicated fleet now, she wants me on her fleet.

That's how I got to stay with USA Truck. Now I’m with her.

Driver 16: Once I've run with a driver manager, I know they try to keep hold of me

because they know I'm a good driver. I'm not boasting. I just know I'm a dedicated, good

driver and I like to stay out and run. Like I say, normally I stay out 6 to 8 weeks, maybe

longer because to me it's like why go home? I'm not making any money when I'm going

home. Like I say, most of the time I have my wife in the truck with me.

Driver 2: From the time I got into my fleet, for the last nine years... [I have had] four

fleet managers. And, we got along very well. We have gotten along very well. They have

been nice to me. I haven't had to complain too much. And as I said, this wage, is

guaranteed. It has made it possible for me not to bug my fleet manager. Whether or not

he gets me a load, I still get paid. If he does not get me a load, I could just go home and

wait. But I'm ready to go. You know?

Chris: So four fleet managers over nine years is fairly steady?

Driver 2: That is very steady.

Chris: Would you say that you experience any stress whenever your fleet manager does

change?

Driver 2: Yes! A lot of stress.

Chris: And then how much time would you say it takes for you to sort of vet the new

driver manager?

Driver 2: It takes about a month.

Chris: About a month?

Driver 2: Yes, it takes about a month to build that rapport. You know? To build that

understanding. Sometimes you call them, and especially with my accent, the guys might

not understand what I am saying. But I don't need much. I just want my miles. Give me

my miles. And my home time. I'll tell you in advance this week or next week, send me

straight home. And I expect that. Once in a while, they have called me, and said you

know what man, we have a load here, why don't you run this load, and then you can go

home. I am flexible with that. You know? Unless it’s like a birthday for my daughter,

then I'm more like just send me home.

Chris: How many driver managers have you had in this time?

Driver 5: Oh, let’s see. I had… one, two, and um… three.

Chris: In two years?

84

Driver 5: Yeah. Well, two of them were promoted. I was like dangit! I liked the second

one a lot.

Chris: So, ostensibly, you lost two driver managers because they were doing such a good

job?

Driver 5: Right.

Chris: But you’ve gotten along with all of them?

Driver 5: Oh yeah.

Chris: I imagine it’s still stressful when they change, I mean at least for a little while?

Driver 5: Well, yeah, because you have to get used to another person. They might be

different from the one you had previous.

Chris: How long, for you, do you think that time period is? When basically, they’re on

your probationary clock?

Driver 5: I’d say I give it about a month. Maybe see how they’re going to run me. If

they’re going to give me break-down pay like they should, layover detention, and stuff

like that. If they do a good job, I’ll be like alright, I’ll keep you. I’m happy.

The next set of excerpts from the theme of communication explore driver interaction

with and understanding of the Electronic On-Board Recorder (EOBR). PeopleNet and

QualComm are EOBR platforms that are mentioned by name but the reference is simply about

the in-cab or in-truck communication device generically known as the EOBR. With the industry-

wide federal mandate for all motor carriers, large or small to equip their trucks with EOBRs

before the end of 2017, this information should prove particularly beneficial.

Before proceeding I will need to describe the primary functions of the EOBR and how

the driver must work with it. The EOBR has several functions, and more capabilities are being

integrated as technology advances. The first item a driver is tasked with in using the EOBR is

recording and reporting their federally regulated hours-of-service on a daily basis. The next

item is what is known as the ‘cycle of service’ which tracks load assignments from the time they

are dispatched to the driver until they are delivered to the customer. The cycle begins with the

85

driver acknowledging or accepting the load assignment. In some cases, a driver may refuse a

load or choose one load out of three being offered. Either way, it is through the EOBR that the

driver communicates their intentions. Typically, the assigned load is accepted by the driver

after a brief review of their available hours-of-service and a cursory trip plan is created for

executing the load assignment.

From that point, the motor carrier has electronic visibility of the driver via their assigned

truck and the load assignment that has been accepted. At some point after accepting the load

assignment, the driver receives additional information, including routing information, fuel

stops, delivery date(s), times, and addresses. The driver eventually arrives at the shipper in

order to acquire the load, often from a pre-loaded trailer. This is known as a drop-hook, where

the driver drops an empty trailer and hooks up to a loaded one already staged at the shipper.

Alternatively, the driver must put their own empty trailer into a dock door assigned at the

shipper for what is called a live load. Drop-hooks are more expedient and allow a driver to get

underway much more readily. But, this is not always possible, especially for smaller carriers that

cannot afford the surplus of trailers to stage with client shippers. In either case, the trailer

being dropped or loaded must be clean, usually prior to arriving at the shipper. If the load is

refrigerated, the trailer must also have requisite amount of fuel on board, and in some cases,

be cooled to the required temperature before loading can take place. It should be understood

that cooling a 53 foot trailer down to -20 Fahrenheit does not occur quickly. Such details are

worked out by the driver in the trip planning phase prior to or immediately after accepting the

load assignment.

86

Next, the driver sends a message to the carrier indicating that they have acquired the

bill of lading from the shipper, and are loaded and rolling. Some shipping facilities have truck

scales on site that allow a driver to determine both legal axle, and legal gross vehicle weight

before proceeding. If not, the driver must determine the nearest available truck scale and ‘axle

out.’ If the weight is legal, the driver proceeds to the final destination, or first destination if

there are multiple stops, sending messages from the EOBR at each point to indicate both arrival

and departure times. Multiple stops are less typical for long-haul carriers, but not unheard of.

However, if the weight is over gross, or beyond what adjustments can be made by the driver

over given axles, they must return to the shipper to have the product reduced, reloaded, or

both. This is usually not an expedient process. The driver can usually make adjustments by

sliding the rear set of wheels on the trailer, known as tandems, forward or aft. This shifts

weight from the trailer set of axles to the tractor axles or vice versa. Additionally, the driver

may slide the fifth wheel at the front of the trailer backward or forward, which also

redistributes the weight of the load between the tractor and trailer, to include the steering axle

on the tractor. As you can see, this process can go favorably or not with respect to time, and

most drivers carry extra stress until the moment legal weight can be confirmed for the newly

acquired load assignment.

The driver will continue to send updates on a daily basis about their available hours-of-

service and progress updates or estimated time of arrival until they reach their final

destination. Once the load assignment is complete, the driver will indicate whether or not they

have an empty trailer and that they are available for the next load assignment. Bear in mind

87

that this cycle can typically repeat 10 to 15 times or more before a driver receives a single day

off.

Drivers share their thoughts about the electronic on-board recorders:

Driver 12: I love the new electronic logs because the companies cannot get over on you.

Back when you did the paper logs, they'd actually tell you, to fudge it a little bit.

Driver 13: Each company is little bit different on that. Here, it's [under] five miles per

hour and less than seven-tenths of a mile. There's ways that you can kind of trick it here

and there. The idea is that there are things that you can do that benefits you as far as

saving your work time.

Driver 15: Technically, if a message comes over, you're supposed to respond to it. That's

the only reason they're sending a message is to respond, but like I said, you don't know

if it's from your dispatcher or from somebody else.

Chris: There should be a way to differentiate.

Driver 15: You would think there would be… but there's not, not while you're driving. I

mean, if there's a way to do it, then nobody knows it. That pisses me off, pulling over to

find out, "Oh, yeah, we have a world truck championship in so and so." It's like I don't

give a flying… Then it takes you sometimes, depending on the time of day, it takes you

fifteen minutes to get back on the road.

Driver 16: I had more problems with the electronic logs. Like I said, the paper logs is no

problem, because like I said, the years of experience I had it was managing the paper log

with no problem. With the electronic log, it took me about a year to learn how the ins

and outs of the electronic. I first got it in May of last year, probably around February of

this year is when I started feeling comfortable with it.

Driver 4: [W]hen I talk to somebody, the first thing I say is who is this? And I write down

the name. David in break-down. And when I send a message, I say per David in break-

down. Or per Mary is dispatch. Or whatever. So now not only am I telling you what I’m

doing, I’m telling you who told me to do what I’m doing. That covers me.

Driver 5: I got in trouble one time for blessing them out on the PeopleNet. It’s like, you

don’t need to say that. Well, you need to start helping me more, and I won’t.

Driver 9: Now, the new log books, the FMCSA is just as bad as the EPA. They are a bunch

of gestapo. Because now instead of having fifteen minutes and being a professional

88

driver and being able to go an extra 10 miles to where you can safely stop, you have to

stop right there or you are in violation of your log book. So now it's to the minute.

You're going to see people, you likely got 7/10th of a mile. As soon as everybody's

mandatory to have that fucking electronic log book in their trucks, you are going to see

people pulling out onto the on ramp, stopping, and then going on duty driving. It takes

fifteen minutes to get out on the exit ramp and go to the restroom, is fifteen minutes. I

call it the toaster because the only thing it is designed to do is burn your hours. If you're

burning your hours, you're burning your paycheck. That electronic log is designed to

burn your hours.

Playing the game, man. I swear to God it's like that. Or you get to a shipper and

you think, it's going to be quick, and the next thing you know they're at five hours and

they haven't even started unloading you. Five hours! You go, fuck, I should have done

[EOBR logged] my post trip as soon as I got here. That way, I could get my ten-hour

break in because the truck hasn't been moving for five hours.

Clearly, drivers shared different feelings regarding use of the EOBR. For some drivers,

mastering it provided them with an additional tool for negotiating their working conditions. For

others, with less experience using it, it was viewed as another impediment to their professional

productivity or a form of external restriction designed to further squeeze them financially. For

all, the EOBR is a contentious item that ultimately still requires manual input from the driver to

account for changes in their duty status. It is incorrect to suggest that the electronic logging

system within the EOBR cannot be manipulated in similar ways to the paper logbook that

preceded it. Still, this does not mean its utility is lost. In the past, a host of people were

assigned to the compliance department at large motor carriers in order to pore over the paper

logbooks in order to determine their accuracy. With a system that is entirely electronic,

scanning for typical errors and violations is likely much easier. However, scanning for violations

is not always so straightforward. This is one reason why the e-log system is still only as reliable

as the driver using it. For this reason, carriers will still require some compliance personnel to

89

review e-log records, and they will need to have a keen contextual understanding of logging as

well as a sufficient understanding of the driver’s working environment in order to detect

violations or unsafe logging practices. The EOBR system is electronic, not automatic. While

certain events can trigger it, most can be overridden by the driver in a given time frame. Still,

the majority of the information transmitted by the EOBR is a result of direct input by the driver,

just as with the paper logs that they are replacing.

The final set of excerpts under the theme of communication relates to what is typically

referred to as Night and Weekend Dispatch. As the title implies, it refers to the personnel that

take over operations of a motor carrier during the nights and weekends and become the

alternate points of contact for drivers. The selected excerpts were the most succinct for

explicating the issue, but most drivers shared similar stories. The driver’s requests are

generalized here, but the stories they refer to pertained to anything from clarification of a pick-

up number for a given load assignment, to approval for truck repairs. Sometimes, as a result of

requiring a truck repair, approval for funds for a hotel room would be another typical request.

Trucks can spend several hours inside a maintenance bay at a repair facility, and drivers are not

allowed to be in the truck during that period.

Driver 14: You're in the middle of nowhere and try to get the pickup number or... it used

to be really bad. Oh man! Especially at night or on the weekend.

Driver 5: Yeah, when you got something come up out on the road, and you really need

to talk to them, it takes them forever to answer the phone. Weekend dispatch, they’re

terrible. They don’t hardly ever answer the phone. But once you’ve got them on the

phone, and you’re calling because you need something, and then they still tell you they

can’t get it to you. And you’re asking why. Well they say, we can’t do that, we’re just the

weekend or night dispatch. Really, that’s the only thing I’ve got an issue with, is

communication. Everything else is fine.

90

Driver 7: That’s another thing. Night and weekend dispatch. I haven’t really had a whole

lot with this company. Issues I mean, with the night and weekend dispatchers. They’re

actually pretty decent with this company. It’s just, like, say you have an issue with a load

or something like that. You talk to your dispatcher and for some reason if you call night

dispatch, they have no clue. Or, night dispatch, you tell them, and then you call your

[day] dispatcher, and they have no clue. So they’re communication is lacking

somewhere.

Drivers must tread carefully when seeking pre-approval or reimbursement for both

typical and atypical expenditures because they can find themselves liable for the costs that

should be covered by the carrier provided the prescribed protocol is followed. Over the course

of month, this can add up to significant figure. Typically, this information should make it to the

driver’s assigned driver manager. The driver manager then ensures all expenses the driver has

followed protocol for are reimbursed, or follows up on the driver’s behalf with the appropriate

department when mistakes or atypical situations arise. The apparent communication barriers

that exist between night and weekend dispatch, regular assigned driver managers, and the

drivers themselves can be a frequent and impactful source of tension which contribute to the

escalation of quit events among truck drivers. This is an issue that motor carriers should be

more alerted to and prepared to engage with in order to find an effective solution.

4.3.7 Pay

This theme covers all references to pay as it pertains to a driver’s regular wages,

guaranteed minimums, sign-on bonuses, special or irregular compensation such has layover or

detention pay, and the driver’s observation of receiving the “advertised” number of miles from

a given carrier. ‘Miles’ discussed in this context is equivalent to pay, as all drivers interviewed

were paid on a per-mile basis. While driving more than 3,000 miles in any 7-day period is

91

possible, it is not necessarily typical for a solo operator. Most drivers reported averaging

around 2,500 per week. Variable pay rates based on years of experience, or safe, on-time

delivery records, as well as accurate expense management, make any given report of the

number of miles driven somewhat difficult to estimate an accurate pay equivalency. Therefore,

in addition to asking drivers about their assigned number of miles from their current employer,

USA Truck, Inc., I simply asked if they felt they were being fairly compensated for the work they

were doing. All but one of the sixteen drivers interviewed answered in the affirmative. The

responses ranged from resounding enthusiasm, to more muted approval. The most concise

excerpts are listed below. However, most did have stories about previous employment where

fair compensation appeared to be a consistent point of contention.

Many drivers were emphatic about asserting their pay was good. Some more flatly

stated that their pay was adequate. Again, although not all of the driver responses to the

question of pay were as straightforward as the excerpts listed here, only one driver asserted

that their pay was not adequate. There are earlier references to the approval of pay however, I

have repeated the comments from driver’s 12 and 14 regarding their satisfaction with pay here.

The remainder of excerpts regarding approval of pay mentioned here are appearing for the first

time.

Driver 1: What do I like about truck driving? Well, I like the pay. The pay is good. It’s

been the highest paying job I’ve ever had to be honest with you. Even when I was

working as an electrician... well, I still make more driving.

Driver 2: Yes. I'm telling you, that there is nothing like that guaranteed minimum. It

makes all the difference.

92

Driver 3: To be honest, what I like the most is the pay. Compensation. And getting to see

America is a big plus too. You know, I’ve never been out of Texas before I got a trucking

job.

Driver 4: Driving a truck, to me, is simpler. It’s easier. And it’s fun. And it pays better.

Chris: Alright. And so far, even though it hasn’t been much time, you’re happy here for

the most part?

Driver 6: For the most part. The pay’s good.

Driver 7: I came looking for something new. Something that was close to my pay

bracket. You know, the pay that I needed. And, of course I heard about USA doing all of

their changing and everything. And then I came here.

Driver 9: The thing I dislike probably is the compensation. I don't think there is adequate

compensation for somebody being out on the road 325 days of the year.

There's not a shortage of drivers, there's a shortage of pay.

Driver 11: Yeah, pay is fine.

Driver 12: The one thing that I’ve always loved about truck driving is I don’t have a boss

looking over my shoulder. I can turn and stop when I want, I can start when I want. And

good money.

Driver 14: I kept quitting and coming back for a couple of reasons, right? Those reasons

were, they pay me well and also I know most of their shippers.

Driver 16: My wife loves the paychecks. We love the paychecks. Truck driving, it meets

my needs. It lets me live a good life. If somebody else was going to pay me the same

amount of money I make as driving truck doing something else, I'll go do it. Like I say, it's

all about the money to me, how much money am I making.

These driver responses regarding pay, as well as the excerpts that precede and follow it,

are important primarily because most of them suggest that turnover within the industry results

from factors beyond that of pay alone. While acknowledging that this group of drivers turns

over less frequently than that of the national average, (from figure x) many of them reported

93

that job satisfaction as a truck driver requires something more. That something is what has

been shared within the themes being discussed here. Pay is certainly an important item.

However, so too is the culture of a company. A company that values their driver’s identity,

values their unique work-life scenario, and seeks to build relationships with their driver’s while

communicating with them effectively. This runs in stark contrast to the current executive

leadership understanding of the problem. Many tend to simply view the problem of driver

turnover in terms of pay alone, while not adequately identifying other, less visible mitigating

factors that relate to the experience of fair or acceptable working conditions.

There are several articles in industry publications such as the Journal of Commerce

article by William Cassidy (Cassidy, 2013) which explore this subject and underscore the

primacy of pay. As much was confirmed for me when I visited the 2015 Great American Truck

Show in Dallas, Texas. There was a discussion forum hosted by CCJ Magazine where the

President and CEO’s from three of the largest motor carriers in the U.S. were present to answer

questions from those in attendance. David Broughton of the Avondale Partners Report referred

to throughout this thesis was also among the panelist. Werner Enterprises Derek Leathers,

Swift Transport John? And Covenant Transport David Parker. While there, I managed to pose

the following question to the moderator:

“Other than offering late model equipment, sign-on bonuses, and increased regular pay

packages, what other strategies are you employing in order to decrease turnover and increase

retention in response to the current driver shortage?”

David Parker of Covenant Transport launched into an emphatic assertion that pay alone

would solve the problem of driver turnover. While he acknowledges other variables are at work

other than pay, and that the industry as well as his company have many problems to solve, he

94

does so only vaguely. He then quickly acknowledges how elusive a target the question of pay

has proven to be, and that it will likely continue to be so. I do not mock his frustration. I

empathize with it, and hope to offer a new perspective with this thesis. The video can be

viewed with the following link. The discussion is worth viewing in its entirety and is divided into

two parts. The specific question and response I refer to can be viewed and heard at this link

beginning and ending at the following time stamps:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BIyS3Yg_va0&app=desktop [01:04:18 through 01:09:30].

4.3.8 Pay Problems

Here, drivers share stories about problems they have encountered related to pay,

downtime, or the ineffective utilization of their work day. There is little that is more frustrating

to a long haul truck driver than not earning when they cannot otherwise be home or with their

family. Additionally, a few drivers describe incentives they’d like to see offered. Through a few

of the short stories in these excerpts, readers can get a sense of just how exasperating or

exhausting a day in the life of a long haul truck driver can be.

Driver 1: I'm giving them an ETA. I'm going to be there at this time tomorrow, so start

looking for me a pre-plan. "Oh I ain't got nothin' yet." Well what do you mean you ain't

got nothin' yet? Come on now. I'm giving you a day's advance. I'm at least giving you 10

hours in advance on what time I'm going to be there. And then sometimes I have sat for

a couple of hours waiting for my next load. And I'm callin' 'em up, "Where's my freakin’

next load at?" You know? Get real.

Driver 2: With this job, as I was training, when I lived in Dayton, Ohio, we used to run to

Brownsville, Texas and back. It was a good run for me. And then after that, we lost the

account. So, I went back on the road. But after a while, we were not getting the miles

that two guys need. We were getting like 3,000 miles.

Chris: For a [training] team?

95

Driver 2: For a [training] team. It wasn't enough. You know. It wasn't enough. And, at

the time, they did not pay extra. I could run alone, 3,000 miles, and make the same

money. And be by myself. You know? So...

Chris: So, you described break-down pay, that’s when you’re here on the yard for

example, and receive $75 a day, because your truck is in for service.

Driver 4: Well, break-down is when your truck breaks down. I was in West Virginia about

three weeks ago or four weeks ago, stuck in the snow. I picked up a trailer with the

lights out and had to put it in the garage to get it fixed. You can’t drive with the lights

out. That’s a ticket. And points. So I had to stop at a TA, there was a long line. People

were breaking down. It’s winter time. They’re breaking down for all kinds of reasons. So

it took a day to get it into the shop. OK? Then when they got it into the shop, they fixed

the three lights. When I got up the next morning to do my pre-trip, two of them were

still out. So I had to put it back in the shop. That’s another day. That’s not my fault that

the stuff has got to get fixed. So therefore, that brings up break-down pay. So I had

ended up spending four days there. I got paid four days’ break-down.7

Driver 4: OK, with detention pay, you go to get a load. The load is not ready. For

example, I went to a Coca-Cola place one time to pick up some stuff and my

appointment was at three o’clock. By the time I got around to the dock, and I got

loaded, and they brought me the papers out, it was eleven or twelve o’clock at night.

That’s ten hours of waiting to get a load. That’s detention. After six hours, we get paid

detention pay. I think that’s $50 bucks or something like that.

Driver 6: Me, I think it would be a nice incentive, if USA says OK, from November to

November, accident free, with no tickets, no tickets issued, no non-preventable

accidents, blah, blah, blah, blah, they should give at least a $200 to $300 bonus to the

driver. Saying hey, you did good. You went from one year to one year, accident free.

Yeah, so you know, they put your name on a plaque, oh he’s got this years, this many

miles, OK. That’s nice.

Driver 9: They come up with this “even better” rewards program. I don't want a reward,

just show me in my paycheck. A lot of companies pay incentives, safety incentives,

would be good. If you have a driver that wrecks a trailer every six weeks, then he's not

7 $75 per day at 4 days comes to $300. The drivers I interviewed were all making close to or more than $0.30 per

mile, and averaged 2,500 per week or more. So the average 4 day run at 500 miles per day would have come to

about $600; double that of break down pay. I make this note to clarify that there is little incentive for drivers to

prefer the option.

96

going to get an incentive bonus. This company doesn't even input in your 401(k) so

there is no profit sharing at all. That's, as I said I was loyal. If there's a better opportunity

that presents itself…

Chris: That's all it would take?

Driver 9: That's all it would take.

Chris: A nice sign on bonus?

Driver 9: After sixteen years, I'd probably get my own truck.

Driver 11: I didn't care much for the reefer [refrigerated trailer]. Where you had to sit

with it. I was always early, and I had to sit for a day or two, until my appointment.

There's no compensation for that.

Driver 14: One day it took me the whole day chasing down an empty trailer in Dallas,

Texas.

Chris: To find one or get one repaired?

Driver 14: To find one. I'm talking about to find one. It took me the whole day. I left my

house eight in the morning, was supposed to go out. I went back home that night

because I couldn't find an empty.8

4.3.9 Home Time

The surprising element of this theme was its relative lack of frequency. This perhaps had

to do with my own biases toward the interview group and my mistaken readiness to dispense

with the topic as a given in order to get at more nuanced details from other areas. Home time is

indeed an important aspect for long haul truck drivers, as has already been shared by several of

them in several of the previous excerpts. There were few exceptions for my interview group.

While being away from home for extended periods of time is a given for long haul truck drivers,

the responsiveness from their driver managers and the effective coordination of getting drivers

home when they request it can be highly variable, and on occasion, even contentious. This

8 Chasing down a trailer occurs by the direction of a motor carrier, and was not the result of the driver wandering aimlessly about the DFW area.

97

likely has much to do with the drivers own ability to plan and communicate effectively as a

comparison of the excerpts below indicates. What this theme lacked in frequency, it made up

for in very emphatic examples shared by drivers, especially with respect to family matters

which are explored here. Atypical life circumstances such as family member illness or children’s

birthdays are examples that can prompt a driver to request unplanned or unscheduled home

time. Or, these events can be planned and requested in advance and where the driver simply

attempts to communicate their lack of flexibility in the given instance, as has been shared from

the previous excerpts. The excerpts below sufficiently describe more typical scenarios and

driver feelings about home time.

Driver 1: Okay, fighting for home time. Okay, you're out for 3 weeks, 4 weeks and you're

supposed to be... it seems like when I get closer and closer to home time, they want to

send you further and further away. In which that don't make no sense to me. But I know

they've got a method to their madness. And it got to get you here it maybe try and get

you a load from there to there. And I understand that. And then you know after you

stayed out for 4 weeks and you go home for your 4 days which you know, and you try to

ask for an extra day off. Or an extra two days off. They want to give you a hard time

about it sometimes… Like USA Truck says, family first, family first. But you know, in my

three years of experience, I would like to know whose family actually comes first.

Because, it can't be that... well. It can't be the drivers’. It just can't be. Because, nobody

else's family suffers more than the drivers’.

Driver 11: Home time for me, my fleet manager, I never have a problem getting home. I

mean, you know, I'm away from home, I miss home. Yes, I tell her... these days, and I

know it's not a travel agent where she's going to get me on that date. She gets me

around there. If I need an extra day, too. Because my wife, she's off on certain days,

with being a correctional officer. She's a supervisor, so she works six days, three days.

She's only off three days. Her time rotates. I try to stay out three weeks. No more than

three weeks.

Driver 14: You just... it's something I can't do nothing about... it's a family matter.

Missing out on the family. Doing the homework. Because I know if I was home, my

98

daughter would be better in school. That's one fact. That's what it is. It's not easy when

you got kids driving a truck. I always tell my students... the first question that pops out

of my mouth is, "Do you got kids?" If they say, "No." I'm like, "This is going to be a good

job for you." If they say, "Yes." I say, "Man, you going to be missing a lot." 'Cause when

you got kids, things are different. It's a sacrifice. Kids. It’s not just about having them. It's

about being there for them. It's not about sending them money. It’s about teaching

them how not to say this... what not to say and what to say in public. It's not about just

feeding them. It's about educating them. Helping them do their homework and such.

When you’re out here, you're helping nobody do homework, are you? Are you taking

somebody to the doctor now? See? There's a lot of sacrifice, driving a truck... It's not

just about a job. It's about giving your life away for family related reasons.

Driver 2: It's a brutal job. You know, you are out there for two weeks. And without

family. It doesn't work well. It's even tougher for a man with kids. Especially if those kids

are young.

Driver 4: If I take… you know… I run for, like two weeks, I take two days off. Or, like, I got

a women’s Christian retreat that we are going to, I think in June, so what I’ll do, is I’ll

stay out for like two months, so I can take five days off. Because you get a day off every

week that you’re out. So if I want five days, that means I’m going to have to stay out for

five weeks. Which I don’t have a problem with it.

Driver 6: I say everybody should get home at least every 14 days. After I’ve been out

here 14 days, I’m getting burned out. I’m getting tired. That truck beats the crap out of

you.

Driver 9: There was a couple of times when a student got out and there wasn't

somebody ready and then I went out three or four weeks. I lost my wife over the deal,

though. Driving a truck, you don't really have a good relationship, because you're gone

the whole time. I got divorced over that, but that's okay.

Driver 8: Truck driving was one of the things that would get me away. Trying to get me

to run from my problems, or whatever. And man I got out there and started driving and

kind of liked it you know. I love it now. The only… the biggest problem is home time.

Chris: It’s the nature of the beast.

Johnny: Yeah, you know you have to be out here.

Chris: When you’re requesting home time, do you have any problems with that?

Johnny: No, not now.

Chris: And, as far as what you like least about it [truck driving]?

99

Driver 8: I’m not going to say home time because everybody probably says home time.

Chris: Well, they do, and it is, I mean it’s inescapable. But if there was a second worst

thing? Like next to home time if home time is first.

Driver 8: Other than that?

Chris: I mean it could be home time only. If nothing else comes to mind it may be just

that.

Driver 8: Home time.

Home Time has varying degrees of importance to different drivers. Obviously, everyone

needs time off from work. Most drivers need to actually return home to get it. Several drivers

are content to enjoy time off while continuing to travel, as USA Truck permits provided the

truck is secured at an approved lot for the duration. Several drivers indicated their

understanding with respect to flexibility on both their part and the part of their employing

motor carrier regarding regular time off. Several also indicated that there are times or

circumstances when they must be rigid or at least less flexible with time off requests. The

remainder regard time off as something they try to minimize as much as possible simply in

order to maximize their earnings potential. Family dynamics have a lot to do with the outlook of

this latter group, and there are likely relatively few drivers in such a position as to be

responsible for only themselves, as evinced by the continuing struggle over finding and keeping

drivers in the first place. Still, next to pay, home time was one of the most important factors

that have influenced this group of driver’s intentions to quit.

4.3.10 Effective Training

The emergence of this theme was among the least expected. Drivers are already giving

up significant portions of their time away from home and family, but seldom use that as an

excuse to give short shrift to training new drivers. Many drivers I interviewed were either

100

currently driver trainers, had formerly been driver trainers, or were interested in becoming a

driver trainer. All expressed the profound impact that their own training had on their outlook of

the job, particularly the character of their own trainer. There are many concrete examples of

driver experiences that likely influence intent-to-quit decisions here that motor carriers should

be alerted to. By and large most of the drivers felt that training was an important component of

their career. Most expressed a sincere desire to implement their own training effectively, and

scorned those whom they felt did not take training seriously. The following excerpts explore

driver experiences as a trainee or as a trainer.

Driver 1: I went to school with Northwest Arkansas Community College, and I got my

CDL, which was a better program than what these other big companies want to send

you to, I feel like. Because of the fact that first of all it was cheaper. A hell of a lot

cheaper. And then I got like two months of over the road training, versus other people

I've talked to that went through the training with USA Truck, and only had like 3 weeks.

Chris: You started somewhere else?

Driver 2: Swift.

Chris: And you received your training through the company?

Driver 2: They had a small training facility in Memphis, Tennessee, called Swift Academy.

I was there for... I trained at the school for three weeks. And then after that I was on the

road for four weeks. And then they hired me.

Chris: And you stayed with them for...?

Driver 2: I stayed with Swift for a very short time. I stayed with them for about three

months.

Chris: Oh, wow!

Driver 2: But, the reason I left, I was let go. I did not leave on my own. The on the road

training was not sufficient.

Chris: Sure.

Driver 2: So, when they let me go, to be a driver by myself, I was not really ready.

Chris: So they did not fire you? They just allowed you to leave without penalizing you for

repayment of the school or training?

Driver 2: Yes. It was also that I felt I needed more training. But, they could give me that.

101

Chris: I hear about this from a number of different companies. But many people won’t

admit that.

Driver 2: Well, I learned on my own. I don't know what to say. It was really rough. And

also, the trainer... (Expression of discontent) When you train somebody, you need to...

the trainers you select, must be people who have interpersonal skills. You know, who

are able to deal with people who are slow in learning, people who are fast in learning,

and also people who are from different backgrounds. All of us have histories for where

we started. If you cannot relate across the divide, you're not going to get the results. I

eventually became a trainer myself, with USA Truck. I trained for two years. I trained 24

guys.

Chris: Wow! That's a good feeling though.

Driver 2: Yeah!

Chris: So USA was your second company?

Driver 2: Yes. And with USA Truck, I went back to over-the-road training. Not the school,

but with a trainer. And after one month, I was OK.

Chris: Good trainer?

Driver 2: A good trainer, and a really good guy. We got along well. I learned a lot. At the

time I lived in Ohio. In Dayton, Ohio. I drove alone for about one year, and they asked

me if I wanted to be a trainer. I've been with USA now for nine years. When I agreed, I

knew what it was. You know, what I had gone through myself. You know, the trainer I

had at Swift, and then the trainer I had at USA. It all made a big difference. A really big

difference.

Driver 3: Well, I first started trucking with C.R. England. It's a carrier based out of Salt

Lake City, Utah. I started with the company as a trainee. I didn't have a CDL at the time.

They put me through school, I got my CDL, and I started driving over the road for them.

The pay was not as good as it was here at USA Truck. We got $0.22 per mile… That was

in 2013. I had a great trainers when I was with C.R. England. They trained me well. I

stayed with them for a total of six months until I worked off my student contract. When

I noticed my checks weren't that big and I wasn't getting the miles that they promised

me. You know? I was like I can't do this. It's not enough compensation for being away

from your family for a month at a time. Or a month and a half. And, on top of that, they

didn't want to get me home whenever I requested home time. That was another big

issue with them. I stopped doing it for a couple of years after that. I had had such a bad

experience with England. You know? I kind of assumed all companies were just the

same.

102

Driver 7: I do everything in my power. I want them, everybody that gets on my truck to

succeed. If this is what they want to do. But I put them through the paces to make them

have that decision before they get off my truck.

Driver 8: So I ended up, after I drove for a year or two, by myself, I ended up being a

trainer. And I trained for a year. Then I decided I wanted to get my own truck. I’m more

a people person. So I can get along anybody, you know. I had some fun with the

students.

Driver 11: It's ridiculous. I see it. I've gotten a lot of students that been on other trucks.

They get on my truck. We don't do it this way. [They say], “The way you're doing it

makes much more sense.” Easier to adjust… to learn. I try not to make a big deal about

it. It's this or that, either do this or do that. This is the right way, this is the wrong way.

I'm not going to argue. I'm not in prison. I'm not arguing. I'm here to train. You don't

want to learn, I can't train you if you don't want to learn. I tell them [the motor carrier],

he's not learning. The other thing is, if you try to... how we say it in prison is, you try to

‘big-ass me’. You try to act like you're tougher than me, and try to rub my nose in it, or

you try to argue with me on everything I say to do, and you don't want to do it.

Chris: Constantly oppositional.

Driver 11: I call it being aggressive. I'm not here to argue and fuss. It's either you do it, or

you don't. You don't do it, someone else is out there to learn, wants to learn, and you're

just taking up space.

Driver 12: They need to stop a lot of these driving schools that just teach them how to

get their license and put them in with a company. I can tell you why there's a

turnaround like there is. A lot of times I'll sit and tell the young ones, I'll say, "Truck

driving is not a job. It's a lifestyle." Now, these new kids coming out, I'm sorry, I wouldn't

trust them. They got trainers out there that should not be trainers. Because they do not

know what they're doing.

Driver 14: Most of the time they're going to be here for the year and finish their

training. They going to tell you. You can sense it. All they talk about is "After a year...

after a year..." But if you have these students get in your truck and you're riding on the

highway and all of a sudden they be like... on the phone with another company.

Chris: (Laughter) Sorry. So, I gather you just let them do their business?

Driver 14: Yeah. I am not their father.

Chris: Yeah. Sure. Right okay. That just strikes me as funny.

Driver 14: I be like man, this guy is not going to do three months with USA. And it's not

going to surprise me if that guy will not do two months with USA.

103

From the last set of excerpts above, Driver 12 suggested that new drivers be made to

understand that long haul trucking was “not just a job, but a lifestyle.” This comment has more

depth than might be readily apparent. Lifestyle then, reconnects to the theme of masculinity,

independence, self-reliance and resignation rolling them up into one an umbrella term that

turns attention away from a lack of compensation, home time, or any other negative aspect of

the job. I’ve heard many truck driver trainers use this description before, and have probably

used it myself while addressing or attempting to overcome the angst of new driver trainees. In

this manner, buy-in is acquired from the population of truck drivers, and many of the problems

within the industry are passively perpetuated by the drivers themselves from the time of their

training onward. One of the previous turnover studies from the American Trucking

Associations, the 2015 report entitled, Truck Driving Shortage Analysis, describes lifestyle in the

following way:

When new to the industry, many drivers are assigned routes that put them on the road

for extended periods of time before they return home, typically a week or two. Therefore,

it is not just a career, but a lifestyle that does not fit with everyone’s desires or needs.

Eventually, many drivers move into regional or local driving positions with tenure.

(Costello & Suarez, 2015).

There are a number of challenges that could be made to this definition, but it’s sufficient for the

purpose of demonstrating how the term is offered as a sufficient or ostensibly obvious

explanation for the hardships of the job, and how the industry gains buy-in among truck drivers

for this type of meaning making and distillation of identity as conceived of by employing motor

carriers. The term serves as an avenue for the reconciliation of internalized conflict among

drivers attempting to make sense of their work-life identity by implying that increased wages,

104

more responsive driver managers, increased home time, etc. are all unnecessary provided

someone possess the wherewithal to be a truck driver in the first place. Stated another way,

someone might ask: If this job doesn’t pay enough, get you home often enough, or offer you

sufficient respect and recognition, then perhaps it’s just not who you are? There are further

examples of the term being used in similar contexts within the 2015 CCJ Market Movers Driver

Trucking Executive Panel discussion video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BIyS3Yg_va0 at

the following time stamps: 1:04:00 – 1:19:00.

4.3.11 Federal Regulations

The theme captured codings that discussed regulatory topics, from hours-of-service

(HOS) requirements and changes to the new electronic on-board recorder (EOBR) technology.

This was not a significantly insightful theme, and there is little in the way of material apart from

what has already been discussed to interpret deeper meanings from. Drivers generally shared

negative feelings about the federal regulatory environment, most notably with the last HOS

change, but little else. There were seldom clear examples that drivers could recall which

described the effects of the most recent HOS change regarding the 34-hour restart rule. There

were primarily two categories of responses. The first was that there was little to no impact on

the driver’s normal working routine during the period that the 34-hour restart rule change was

in effect. The second category, consisting of only a few drivers, recalled a single instance where

they were affected by the change. While a negative consequence was described, the situations

were not dissimilar to a severe weather event where productive working hours were lost, but

not by any extreme measure, even as a typical working week goes for most long haul truck

drivers.

105

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

5.1 Overview

In this final chapter I offer my study conclusions, provide suggestions for further

research, and share my own personal reflections about the research process and the limitations

I encountered. First, I will revisit the primary research questions, and briefly explain what my

conclusions are. Next, I will offer suggestions for future research that may help to further our

understanding of driver turnover while filling in any missing components my own study failed to

provide. Following these research recommendations, I will share personal reflections about my

research process and how I intend to continue my analysis for further development and

application within the logistics industry.

5.2 Research Questions Revisited

Here, I will now revisit the original research questions and provide my conclusions to

each. The goal of this study was to identify:

4. Why have turnover rates been high for so long?

5. What are the impacts of sustained high turnover rates?

6. How can motor carriers reduce turnover and increase retention?

5.2.1 Response to Question 1: Why Have Turnover Rates Been High for So Long?

There are several factors which have perpetuated high truck driver turnover rates over

the past 30 years. Many of these factors have been identified by studies that have preceded my

own as discussed in the literature review in the second chapter of this thesis. Within all three

sections of my literature review, there have been descriptions regarding the nature of

competition within long-haul trucking. Most of the prior driver turnover studies, my analysis of

106

the trucking industry market reports, as well as the books by Michael Agar, Shane Hamilton,

and Lawrence Ouellet all identify the intensity of competition as a major factor within the

industry. I contend that it has been the single greatest mitigating factor affecting the

perpetuation of high driver turnover rates. In the most pointed analysis, the 2008 study by

Harrison and Pierce entitled Examining Truck Driver Turnover and Retention in the Trucking

Industry states that, “knowledge of successful strategies, without their application, suggest that

the trucking industry can tolerate the condition” (Harrison & Pierce, 2008). Stated another way,

success, at least at the macro-economic level as evinced within market industry reports, has

been less about the development of driver careers or service excellence within any single motor

carrier, and more about creating conditions that increase the intensity of competition.

At the national and even international level for some of the larger motor carriers,

economics of scale are relied upon to succeed. Large carriers use their sizable and kinetic

market force to maintain and advance conditions which can squeeze both smaller and less-well

capitalized carriers into failure, eliminating competition. The impact of such competition is not

just the success of one motor carrier over another. Truck drivers, especially those employed by

carriers that that go bankrupt, or those acquired by larger carriers, or even the drivers already

employed by an acquiring carrier, are all significantly impacted by these market shifts which are

manifested, I believe, in high driver turnover.

5.2.2 Response to Question 2: What are the Impacts of Sustained High Turnover Rates?

One of the most significant impacts of sustained high truck driver turnover rates has

been the growth of the number and size (by revenue) of larger and larger motor carriers. For

any number of reasons, new, small, motor carriers continue to enter the market every year

107

which has been sustaining a long battle of attrition. As explained within the Avondale Partners

Report, I agree that conditions are slowly heading toward a long-haul carrier oligopoly.

“With the continued growth of the major truckload carriers and the widespread

application of advanced technology, the barriers to entry have been raised significantly

and there are now firms in a position to force consolidation. We find it easy to predict

that the truckload industry consolidates into an oligopoly in the coming decades.”

There are other reports that appear to bear this out. Within the ATA’s 2015 Truck Driver Shortage

Analysis, the following quote is shared concerning growth opportunities for a large, long-haul,

truckload firm:

A significant amount of freight is being turned down… We’ve looked at acquisitions

because we can’t grow organically. Robert Ragan, Chief Financial Officer, Melton Truck

Lines in Tulsa, OK. Sourced from Transport Topics, July 14, 2014. (Costello & Suarez

2015).

Additionally, financial data provided by SJ Consulting Group within a recent Journal of

Commerce article states that, “trucking revenue has become increasingly concentrated as the

number of carriers with more than $1 billion in annual revenue more than doubled over the last

decade” (Cassidy 2015). The report goes on to indicate that “24% of all revenue from the for-

hire transportation industry, $89.8 billion, was divided among just 23 U.S. trucking companies

in 2013. That’s 23 out of hundreds of thousands. By contrast there were only 11 carriers with

more than $1 billion in revenue in 2003” (Cassidy 2015).

Michael Agar observed the possibility of a scale-driven market eventually coming to

dominate the market in the closing chapter of his 1986 ethnography Independence Declared.

“Rate competition in the deregulated marketplace will reward large carriers who can take

advantage of operating efficiencies that come with size” (Agar 1986). Shane Hamilton described

108

the evolution of the process in, Trucking Country: The Road to America’s Wal-Mart Economy

with this detail, “Deregulation transformed the trucking industry in the 1980s, bringing chaotic

and cut-throat competition reminiscent of the 1920s” (Hamilton 2008). Finally, Lawrence

Ouellet from his book, Pedal to the Metal, states that, “Competition was conducted above the

safety net of price regulation that put a limit on how much prices could be slashed” (Ouellet

1994). These are just a few of the examples where competition is discussed in all three of the

aforementioned books, and there are other books besides. Including Michael Belzer’s 2000

Sweatshops on Wheels, which all support the idea that the writing has been on the wall for

some time regarding the direction and impact of such extreme levels of competition within the

trucking industry.

The net effect of the sustained, extreme levels of competition within long-haul trucking

and the growth of large motor carriers, has meant that motor carriers have created conditions

where the primary focus has been on profit and growth and not on organizational

development. As such, large motor carriers tend to treat their drivers as equipment

equivalents, where maintaining a given number of drivers is the central objective rather than

the development of professional driving careers. There are a number of details which suggest

that investing in the professional development of the driver workforce can be more profitable

and more rewarding than simply enduring continued high driver turnover rates. It is however, a

more complex solution. The question now, as the industry has become so inured to the

negative human impacts of competition, is how to go about creating a path for just, equitable,

and effective change with respect to career development for long-haul truck drivers.

109

5.2.3 Response to Question 3: How Can Motor Carriers Reduce Turnover and Increase

Retention?

Offering a direct response to the final research question fell outside of the primary

research I was able to personally conduct. However, several well-informed recommendations

can be made based on the research I was able to do as well as an applicable story from my

personal long-haul truck driving experience. Here, I will share a vignette from my driving

experience during the years between 2005 and 2009. It was this event in my driving career

which has not dulled in my memory from the day I experienced it, and what became the

impetus for this study. I will further contextualize my experience in light of the findings from

the driver interviews discussed in the previous chapter in order to demonstrate some of the

disconnects between motor carriers and the truck drivers they find so difficult to retain. Finally,

I will explain how the sustained, high level of competition and it’s itinerate high driver turnover

negatively impacts drivers attempting to make sense of their work-life identity.

5.3 A Contextual Story from Personal Experience

I worked for a Dallas-based long-haul, irregular route, over-the-road, motor carrier for

four years. I was employed by only one motor carrier for the entire time I accumulated my

500,000 miles of safe, accident-free driving. As a reference point for that number, the Moon is

about 250,000 away from the Earth. So, I like to say that my driving career, by distance, took

me to the Moon and back. One evening, having recently returned to the Dallas headquarters

after a continuous three-month stint over the road, I was approaching the dispatch window to

get under my next load assignment. Bear in mind, that for the previous 48 hours I was

undergoing mandatory compliance checks and ongoing safety and ethics training. I opted not to

110

take any time off, because of all of the protocols that had added up during my time away, too

much time would be required to ‘square up’ and take time off. This was downtime, or unpaid

time on the yard that was nonetheless required. At the time I referred to it as the “you’ve got

to pay to play” policy. The training classes would emphasize the importance legal log book

compliance, safe trip planning and safe driving, and all of the other myriad items that a driver

carries on their shoulders that are not paid for by the mile. For added flavor, one of the Safety

Directors would deliver an animated story about a driver who had experienced the tragic and

worst-case scenario of colliding with, or rather driver over, a car with his 18-wheeler which

resulted in the horrific death of both of the car’s occupants. It was replete shouting and given

an emotional delivery and was ultimately ruled a preventable accident that resulted in the truck

driver going to prison.

With my safety and compliance checklist complete, I then headed for the dispatch

window for my next load assignment. Upon arrival, a familiar face pushed over to me a stack of

paper, including the bills of lading and the load assignment details. The details of the trip are

unimportant. What is important is that I identified with a glance that I would not be able to

deliver the load as issued. I could tell it would require a modified delivery time in order to make

a safe, legal delivery possible. Before I could voice my concern, a hand gently came down over

the papers with just the index finger touching the stack and sliding it one inch closer to me

through the window accompanied by these words, “You’ve got a fast truck, driver. You can

make that load if you want it.” I suddenly felt like I was standing outside myself looking on as

this was happening in front of me. So many things ran through my head in an instant. This was a

moment when my internalization of the conflict between personal, professional ethics and the

111

need to create and maintain value with my employer came to the most crisp confrontation I’ve

ever experienced. My decision was made quickly, in an effort to mask my struggle, although it

did not seem quick at the time. I wanted to ask why the person issuing me that load, with full

knowledge of its details, and my standing limitations, would do so with such casual disregard.

These were not specifically limitations of mine, but limitations that would apply to any driver. I

wanted ask if they were aware of the safety, compliance, and ethics training that I had just

completed over the course of the previous 48 hours, just to earn the privilege to return to the

dispatch window and get back to work only to find myself in this position. I decided that there

were two sides to this house. One side “slows you down” with all of the safety, compliance, and

ethics training that all goes unpaid. The other side gets you paid miles. This dispatcher was

trying to get me loaded and rolling, that was their job, and they were doing it right then. Was I

going to refuse it? I could have. I pondered waiting until something legal became available, and

how typically waiting in that manner can cost a driver a day or more in productive, paid driving

time. Here I was with a load assignment right in front of me. It had good miles for a run out of

Dallas, and put me in a place where I knew I would be given a next dispatch quickly. I took the

load. I falsified my logbook and I made it work. I was unable to feel proud about how productive

I was being, because I entertained only worst-case scenarios throughout the duration of the trip

and ultimately felt like a negligent, self-serving criminal for my effort. Ultimately I left trucking

as a direct result of similar events that followed over the years. I would have nightmares about

driving off the road, fully cognizant in my dream, but unable to move my arms to control

anything. Another variation would be to wake up in the sleeper berth of the truck and leap into

the driver seat, stunned that I could have been so tired that I just crawled into bed while the

112

truck was rolling, only to find that I was safely parked, having stopped, eaten, and shut down

everything as normal, but forgotten. This I concluded, was the collective force of internalized

conflict over time within someone that admittedly, may not have had the best constitution for

long-haul truck driving. But under these conditions, who does?

5.4 Future Research Recommendations

My experience has been explained with more detail than the responses from the drivers

I interviewed for this study in the previous chapter. In this way, I have acted as my own key

informant, lending insight from personal experience to my analysis and interpretation of the

responses from other long-haul truck drivers. The similarities between our experiences are

centered on the way truck drivers internalize the conflict between their identity and the

aggressively competitive environment within which they work. Several examples of the conflicts

drivers contend with emerged from within the major themes in the findings chapter. To briefly

review there were:

Identity formation in light of a widespread negative image for truck drivers.

Freedom from supervision versus increased monitoring technology.

Passion for travel versus the need for more home time.

Pay versus acceptable and ethical working conditions

Resignation toward minor injustices versus gratitude for a job.

Beyond serving as well-supported future research areas, these more nuanced

interpretations derived from the major themes of this thesis provide a sharper focus for motor

carriers to consider in their pursuit to further develop their recruitment and retention efforts.

As these are largely resultant from my specific study, done with only a single motor carrier and

with a limited number of participants, it should be noted that these areas of focus would all be

113

geared toward in-house improvement of retention for any given large motor carrier. The larger,

macro-economic factors which underlie the human element are of even more pressing concern.

By this I mean to suggest the necessity for future researchers to assist motor carriers in

developing partnerships with their clients rather than remaining focused on negotiating rate-

driven, short-term contracts. By doing so, carriers may allow their clients to play a shared role

in driver retention efforts. After all, long haul drivers will typically visit and revisit client

locations far more frequently than their own motor carrier headquarters or its satellite

locations.

114

REFERENCES

1. Keller, Scott B., & John Ozment. Managing Driver Retention: Effects of the Dispatcher.

Journal of Business Logistics 1999. Volume 20, Issue 2; ProQuest ID 212596557. Pp. 97.

2. Ibid.

3. Min, Hokey, & Ahmed Emam. Developing the Profiles for Truck Drivers for Their

Successful Recruitment and Retention: A Data Mining Approach. International Journal of

Physical Distribution & Logistics Management 2003. Volume 33, Issue 1/2; ProQuest ID

232592649. Pp. 149.

4. Johnson, James C., Dennis N. Bristow, Diane J. McClure, Kenneth C. Schneider

Determinants of Job Satisfaction among Long-Distance Truck Drivers: An Interview Study

in the United States. International Journal of Management Vol. 28 No. 1 Part 2 Mar 2011

Pg. 203-216.

5. Richard, Michael D., Stephen A. LeMay, & G. Stephen Taylor. A Factor-Analytic LogitApproach to Truck Driver Turnover. Journal of Business Logistics 1995. Volume 16, Issue1; ProQuest ID 212646534. Pp. 281.

6. Rodriguez, Julie, Michael Kosir, Brenda Lantz, Gene Griffin, & Janice Glatt. The Costs ofTruckload Driver Turnover. Upper Great Plains Transportation Institute 1998. NorthDakota State University. Fargo, ND. www.UGPTI.org.

7. Global Insight, Inc. The U.S. Truck Driver Shortage: Analysis and Forecasts. 2005.www.iitr.edu/pdf/ATADriverShortageStudy05.pdf.

8. Staplin, Loren, & Kenneth W. Gish. Job Change Rate As A Crash Predictor For InterstateTruck Drivers. TransAnalytics. LLC, Kulpsville, PA. Accident Analysis and PreventionVolume 37. 2005. ProQuest ID 68704589. Pp. 1035–1039.

9. Burks, Stephen V., Jeffrey Carpenter, Lorenz Goette, Kristen Monaco, Aldo Rustichini, &Kay Porter. Using Behavioral Economic Field Experiments at a Large Motor Carrier: TheContext and Design of the Truckers and Turnover Project. 2007. National Bureau ofEconomic Research. Cambridge, MA. ProQuest ID 1688698914.http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w12976. Pp.1.

10. Suzuki, Yoshinori. Truck Driver Turnover: What Rate Is Good Enough?

115

International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management Volume 37, Issue 8. 2007. Pp. 612-630. © Emerald Group Publishing Limited. ProQuest ID 232594400. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/09600030710825685.

11. Garver, Michael S., Zachary Williams, & G. Stephen Taylor. Employing Latent Class Regression Analysis to Examine Logistics Theory: An Application of Truck Driver Retention. Journal of Business Logistics Blackwell Publishing. © Council of Logistics Management. 2008. Volume 29, Issue 2. ProQuest ID 212658074. Pp. 233.

12. Suzuki, Yoshinori, Michael R. Crum, Gregory R. Pautsch. Predicting Truck Driver

Turnover. Transportation Research Part E 45. 2009. 538–550. Department of Logistics, Operations, and Management Information Systems, College of Business, Iowa State University, Ames, IA. Department of Economics, College of Business and Public Administration, Drake University, Des Moines, IA.

13. Harrison, Haskel D., Julianne Pierce. Examining Driver Turnover and Retention in the Trucking Industry. Center for Intermodal Freight Transportation Studies. 2009. Sparks Bureau of Business and Economic Research, Fogelman College of Business and Economics. The University of Memphis. Memphis, Tennessee.

14. Taylor, G. Stephen, Michael S. Garver, and Zachary Williams. Owner Operators:

Employing a Segmentation Approach to Improve Retention. The International Journal of

Logistics Management, Vol. 21 No. 2, 2010. pp. 207-229 © Emerald Group Publishing

Limited. 0957-4093. DOI 10.1108/09574091011071924.

15. Cantor, David E., John R. Macdonald, & Michael R. Crum. The Influence of Workplace Justice Perceptions on Commercial Driver Turnover Intentions. Journal of Business Logistics, 2011. Volume 32, Issue 3; © Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals. ProQuest ID 1766834180. Pp. 274–286.

16. LeMay, Stephen A., Larry Johnson, Zachary Williams, and Michael Garver.

The Causes of Truck Driver Intent-to-Quit: A Best-Fit Regression Model.

International Journal of Commerce and Management. Vol. 23 No. 3, 2013. pp. 262-272.

© Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 1056-9219. DOI 10.1108/IJCoMA-03-2013-0028.

17. Costello, Bob and Rod Suarez. Truck Driver Shortage Analysis 2015. American Trucking

Associations, Roanoke, VA.

18. Faulkiner, Michael Robert. A Three Essay Examination of Current Pay and Safety Issues

in the Truckload Sector of the Motor Carrier Industry. 2016. Wayne State University

Dissertations. Paper 1397. http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/oa_dissertations/1397.

116

19. Burks, Stephen, Michael Belzer, Quon Kwan, Stephanie Pratt, & Sandra Shackelford.

Trucking 101: An Industry Primer. United States. Transportation Research Board.

Trucking Industry Research Committee. December 2010. Accessed November 4, 2016.

http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/circulars/ec146.pdf. Transportation Research

Circular E-C146.

20. Cassidy, William. "Trucking Revenue Increasingly Flows to Biggest Carriers." Journal of

Commerce, April 8, 2015, 1. April 8, 2015. Accessed November 4, 2016.

http://www.joc.com/trucking-logistics/trucking-revenue-increasingly-flows-biggest-

carriers_20150408.html.

21. Costello, Bob and Rod Suarez. Truck Driver Shortage Analysis 2015. American Trucking

Associations, Roanoke, VA.

22. Rodriguez, Julie, Michael Kosir, Brenda Lantz, Gene Griffin, & Janice Glatt. The Costs of

Truckload Driver Turnover. Upper Great Plains Transportation Institute 1998. North

Dakota State University. Fargo, ND. www.UGPTI.org.

23. Costello, Bob and Rod Suarez. Truck Driver Shortage Analysis 2015. American Trucking

Associations, Roanoke, VA.

24. Global Insight, Inc. The U.S. Truck Driver Shortage: Analysis and Forecasts. 2005. www.iitr.edu/pdf/ATADriverShortageStudy05.pdf.

25. Ibid.

26. Costello, Bob and Rod Suarez. Truck Driver Shortage Analysis 2015. American Trucking

Associations, Roanoke, VA.

27. Dobie, Kathryn, James P. Rakowski, & R. Neil Southern.Motor Carrier Road Driver

Recruitment in a Time of Shortages: What Are We Doing Now? Transportation Journal

1998. Volume 37, Issue 3; ProQuest ID 204593238. Pp. 5.

28. Rodriguez, Julie, Michael Kosir, Brenda Lantz, Gene Griffin, & Janice Glatt. The Costs of

Truckload Driver Turnover. Upper Great Plains Transportation Institute 1998. North

Dakota State University. Fargo, ND. www.UGPTI.org.

29. Ibid.

117

30. Transport Topics Top 100. American Trucking Associations.

http://www.ttnews.com/top100/companies/profile.aspx?co=usatruck.

31. Keller, Scott B., & John Ozment. Managing Driver Retention: Effects of the Dispatcher.

Journal of Business Logistics 1999. Volume 20, Issue 2; ProQuest ID 212596557.

32. Fournier, Pierre-Sébastien, Sophie Lamontagne and Julie Gagnon.

Interactions between Dispatchers and Truck Drivers in a High Turnover Context. ©

Département des Relations Industrielles, Université Laval - ISSN 0034-379X – RI/IR, 67-2,

2012, Pg. 263-282.

33. Corsi, Thomas M. & Philip Fanara, Jr. Driver Management Policies and Motor Carrier Safety. Logistics and Transportation Review 1988. Volume 24, Issue 2; ProQuest ID 197433538.

34. Staplin, Loren, & Kenneth W. Gish. Job Change Rate As A Crash Predictor For Interstate Truck Drivers. TransAnalytics. LLC, Kulpsville, PA. Accident Analysis and Prevention Volume 37. 2005. ProQuest ID 68704589. Pp. 1035–1039.

35. Harrison, Haskel D., Julianne Pierce. Examining Driver Turnover and Retention in the Trucking Industry. Center for Intermodal Freight Transportation Studies. 2009. Sparks Bureau of Business and Economic Research, Fogelman College of Business and Economics. The University of Memphis. Memphis, Tennessee.

36. Suzuki, Yoshinori, Michael R. Crum, Gregory R. Pautsch. Predicting Truck Driver

Turnover. Transportation Research Part E 45. 2009. 538–550. Department of Logistics, Operations, and Management Information Systems, College of Business, Iowa State University, Ames, IA. Department of Economics, College of Business and Public Administration, Drake University, Des Moines, IA.

37. Suzuki, Yoshinori. Truck Driver Turnover: What Rate Is Good Enough? International

Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management Volume 37, Issue 8. 2007. Pp. 612-630. © Emerald Group Publishing Limited. ProQuest ID 232594400.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/09600030710825685.

38. Corsi, Thomas M. & Philip Fanara, Jr. Driver Management Policies and Motor Carrier Safety. Logistics and Transportation Review 1988. Volume 24, Issue 2; ProQuest ID 197433538.

39. Staplin, Loren, & Kenneth W. Gish. Job Change Rate As A Crash Predictor For Interstate Truck Drivers. TransAnalytics. LLC, Kulpsville, PA. Accident Analysis and Prevention Volume 37. 2005. ProQuest ID 68704589. Pp. 1035–1039.

118

40. Corsi, Thomas M. & Philip Fanara, Jr. Driver Management Policies and Motor Carrier Safety. Logistics and Transportation Review 1988. Volume 24, Issue 2; ProQuest ID 197433538.

41. Staplin, Loren, & Kenneth W. Gish. Job Change Rate As A Crash Predictor For Interstate Truck Drivers. TransAnalytics. LLC, Kulpsville, PA. Accident Analysis and Prevention Volume 37. 2005. ProQuest ID 68704589. Pp. 1035–1039.

42. Beilock, Richard & Russell B. Capelle, Jr. Occupational Loyalties Among Truck Drivers.

Transportation Journal 1990. Volume 29, Issue 3; ProQuest ID 204583318.

43. Costello, Bob and Rod Suarez. Truck Driver Shortage Analysis 2015. American Trucking

Associations, Roanoke, VA.

44. Beilock, Richard & Russell B. Capelle, Jr. Occupational Loyalties Among Truck Drivers.

Transportation Journal 1990. Volume 29, Issue 3; ProQuest ID 204583318.

45. Costello, Bob and Rod Suarez. Truck Driver Shortage Analysis 2015. American Trucking

Associations, Roanoke, VA.

46. Beilock, Richard & Russell B. Capelle, Jr. Occupational Loyalties Among Truck Drivers.

Transportation Journal 1990. Volume 29, Issue 3; ProQuest ID 204583318.

47. Ibid.

48. Richard, Michael D., Stephen A. LeMay, & G. Stephen Taylor. A Factor-Analytic Logit

Approach to Truck Driver Turnover. Journal of Business Logistics 1995. Volume 16, Issue

1; ProQuest ID 212646534.

49. Keller, Scott B., & John Ozment. Managing Driver Retention: Effects of the Dispatcher. Journal of Business Logistics 1999. Volume 20, Issue 2; ProQuest ID 212596557. Pp. 97.

50. Min, Hokey, & Ahmed Emam. Developing the Profiles for Truck Drivers for Their Successful Recruitment and Retention: A Data Mining Approach. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management 2003. Volume 33, Issue 1/2; ProQuest ID 232592649.

51. Suzuki, Yoshinori. Truck Driver Turnover: What Rate Is Good Enough? International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management Volume 37, Issue 8. 2007. Pp. 612-630. © Emerald Group Publishing Limited. ProQuest ID 232594400. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/09600030710825685.

119

52. Garver, Michael S., Zachary Williams, & G. Stephen Taylor. Employing Latent Class Regression Analysis to Examine Logistics Theory: An Application of Truck Driver Retention. Journal of Business Logistics Blackwell Publishing. © Council of Logistics Management. 2008. Volume 29, Issue 2. ProQuest ID 212658074.

53. Taylor, G. Stephen, Michael S. Garver, and Zachary Williams. Owner Operators:

Employing a Segmentation Approach to Improve Retention. The International Journal of

Logistics Management, Vol. 21 No. 2, 2010. pp. 207-229 © Emerald Group Publishing

Limited. 0957-4093. DOI 10.1108/09574091011071924.

54. Suzuki, Yoshinori, Michael R. Crum, Gregory R. Pautsch. Predicting Truck Driver Turnover. Transportation Research Part E 45. 2009. 538–550. Department of Logistics, Operations, and Management Information Systems, College of Business, Iowa State University, Ames, IA. Department of Economics, College of Business and Public Administration, Drake University, Des Moines, IA.

55. Cantor, David E., John R. Macdonald, & Michael R. Crum. The Influence of Workplace Justice Perceptions on Commercial Driver Turnover Intentions. Journal of Business Logistics, 2011. Volume 32, Issue 3; © Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals. ProQuest ID 1766834180. Pp. 274–286.

56. LeMay, Stephen A., Larry Johnson, Zachary Williams, and Michael Garver.

The Causes of Truck Driver Intent-to-Quit: A Best-Fit Regression Model. International

Journal of Commerce and Management. Vol. 23 No. 3, 2013. pp. 262-272. © Emerald

Group Publishing Limited. 1056-9219. DOI 10.1108/IJCoMA-03-2013-0028.

57. Burks, Stephen V., Jeffrey Carpenter, Lorenz Goette, Kristen Monaco, Aldo Rustichini, &

Kay Porter. Using Behavioral Economic Field Experiments at a Large Motor Carrier: The

Context and Design of the Truckers and Turnover Project. 2007. National Bureau of

Economic Research. Cambridge, MA. ProQuest ID 1688698914.

http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w12976.

58. Burks, Stephen, Michael Belzer, Quon Kwan, Stephanie Pratt, & Sandra Shackelford.

Trucking 101: An Industry Primer. United States. Transportation Research Board.

Trucking Industry Research Committee. December 2010. Accessed November 4, 2016.

http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/circulars/ec146.pdf. Transportation Research

Circular E-C146.

59. Burks, Stephen V., Jeffrey Carpenter, Lorenz Goette, Kristen Monaco, Aldo Rustichini, &

Kay Porter. Using Behavioral Economic Field Experiments at a Large Motor Carrier: The

Context and Design of the Truckers and Turnover Project. 2007. National Bureau of

120

Economic Research. Cambridge, MA. ProQuest ID 1688698914.

http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w12976.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. Harrison, Haskel D., Julianne Pierce. Examining Driver Turnover and Retention in the Trucking Industry. Center for Intermodal Freight Transportation Studies. 2009. Sparks Bureau of Business and Economic Research, Fogelman College of Business and Economics. The University of Memphis. Memphis, Tennessee.

63. Kahaner, Larry. Dispatchers to Drivers: ‘Don’t Blame Us’. Driver Management Resource

Center. Fleet Owner. February 16, 2016. http://fleetowner.com/driver-management-

resource-center/dispatchers-drivers-don-t-blame-us.

64. Rodriguez, Julie, Michael Kosir, Brenda Lantz, Gene Griffin, & Janice Glatt. The Costs of

Truckload Driver Turnover. Upper Great Plains Transportation Institute 1998. North

Dakota State University. Fargo, ND. www.UGPTI.org.

65. Harrison, Haskel D., Julianne Pierce. Examining Driver Turnover and Retention in the

Trucking Industry. Center for Intermodal Freight Transportation Studies. 2009. Sparks

Bureau of Business and Economic Research, Fogelman College of Business and

Economics. The University of Memphis. Memphis, Tennessee.

66. Stephenson, Frederick J., & Richard J. Fox Driver Retention Solutions: Strategies for For-Hire Truckload (TL) Employee Drivers. Transportation Journal 1996. Volume 35, Issue 4; ProQuest ID 204590962.

67. Harvey, David. The New Imperialism (Clarendon Lectures in Geography and

Environmental Studies). Kindle Edition. Oxford England: Oxford University Press, 2005.

68. Ibid.

69. Kishore, Joseph. Amidst Police Crackdown, Widespread Public Support for Occupy Movement. October 27, 2011. Published by the International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI). https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2011/10/occu-o27.html.

70. Harvey, David. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Kindle Edition. Oxford England: Oxford

University Press, 2005.

121

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. Hamilton, Shane. Trucking Country: The Road to America's Wal-Mart Economy.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008.

74. Agar, Michael. Independents Declared. Vol. 4. Ethnographic Inquiry. Washington, D.C.:

Smithsonian Institution Press, 1986.

75. Ouellet, Lawrence. Pedal to the Metal: The Work Life of Truckers (Labor and Social

Change). Kindle Edition. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1994.

76. Agar, Michael. Independents Declared. Vol. 4. Ethnographic Inquiry. Washington, D.C.:

Smithsonian Institution Press, 1986.

77. Ouellet, Lawrence. Pedal to the Metal: The Work Life of Truckers (Labor and Social

Change). Kindle Edition. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1994.

78. Cornwall, Andrea, Frank G. Karioris, and Nancy Lindisfarne. Masculinities Under

Neoliberalism. London, UK: Zed Books, 2016.

79. Ouellet, Lawrence. Pedal to the Metal: The Work Life of Truckers (Labor and Social

Change). Kindle Edition. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1994.

80. Lamont, Michéle. The Dignity of Working Men: Morality and the Boundaries of Race,

Class, and Immigration. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.

81. Cornwall, Andrea, Frank G. Karioris, and Nancy Lindisfarne. Masculinities Under

Neoliberalism. London, UK: Zed Books, 2016.

82. Ibid.

83. Harrison, Haskel D., Julianne Pierce. Examining Driver Turnover and Retention in the

Trucking Industry. Center for Intermodal Freight Transportation Studies. 2009. Sparks

Bureau of Business and Economic Research, Fogelman College of Business and

Economics. The University of Memphis. Memphis, Tennessee.

84. Costello, Bob and Rod Suarez. Truck Driver Shortage Analysis 2015. American Trucking

Associations, Roanoke, VA.

122

85. Cassidy, William. "Trucking Revenue Increasingly Flows to Biggest Carriers." Journal of

Commerce, April 8, 2015, 1. April 8, 2015. Accessed November 4, 2016.

http://www.joc.com/trucking-logistics/trucking-revenue-increasingly-flows-biggest-

carriers_20150408.html.

86. Ibid.

87. Agar, Michael. Independents Declared. Vol. 4. Ethnographic Inquiry. Washington, D.C.:

Smithsonian Institution Press, 1986.

88. Hamilton, Shane. Trucking Country: The Road to America's Wal-Mart Economy.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008.