ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL COGNITION

The "Self Digest": Self-Knowledge Serving Self-Regulatory FunctionsE. Tory Higgins

Columbia University

Self-knowledge is conceptualized as a sell digest that summarizes one's relations to the world andthe personal consequences of these relations. It is a handy sourcebook that serves self-regulatoryfunctions. It is distinguished from the classic notion that self-knowledge contains one descriptiveactual self. The self digest contains information about three kinds of actual selves that differ in self-regulatory function: (a) an instrumental self, (b) an expectant self, and (c) a monitored self. Itrepresents not only the actual self but desired (and undesired) selves that reflect different kinds ofself-regulatory focus (i.e., promotion or prevention). It represents not only one's own standpointbut also the standpoint of others whose beliefs one is motivated to take into account. This self-regulatory perspective is used to reconsider self-esteem, self-enhancement, self-consistency, self-pre-sentation, and cross-cultural differences in the self.

Psychologists are fascinated with the "self". It headlinesmore psychological variables than any other concept. It wouldbe difficult, then, to integrate all "self" variables into a singlemodel. More to the point, it is probably not even desirable todo so. What is more useful is to take an explicit perspective onthe self and examine the implications of that perspective. Clas-sic examples of the fruitfulness of this approach are perspectivesthat have considered the self to be a unique cognitive structure(e.g., Markus & Smith, 1981; T. B. Rogers, 1981; Sarbin,1952), a theory about oneself (Epstein, 1973), a biased infor-mation control apparatus (the "totalitarian ego"; Greenwald,1980), or a social construction (see J. M. Baldwin, 1911;Cooley, 1902/1964; Markus & Cross, 1990; Mead, 1934).

I introduce an alternative perspective on the self in this arti-cle. Specifically, I propose that self-knowledge serves self-regu-latory functions by summarizing one's relations to the worldand the personal consequences of these relations. Although thecognitive properties of self-knowledge and its social construc-tion are clearly important, it is the self-regulatory functions ofself-knowledge that are emphasized here. I propose that knowl-edge about oneself as an object in the world is represented be-cause, and to the extent that, it is functional in self-regulation.In brief, I argue for the sovereignty of self-regulation in under-standing the nature of self-knowledge.

The self-regulatory perspective taken in this article integratessignificant aspects of previous perspectives and shares many as-sumptions with them. The self-regulatory functions of self-knowledge, however, are highlighted. This perspective hasformed the underpinnings of my previous work on the self, es-

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to E.Tory Higgins, Department of Psychology, Schermerhorn Hall, Colum-bia University, New York, New York 10027.

pecially self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987, 1991), but ithas been mostly implicit in that work. By making this perspec-tive more explicit and extending its implications, the nature andfunctions of several classic self variables can be re-examinedfrom a common viewpoint.

The starting point of the present perspective is that self-knowl-edge is the subset of a person's stored knowledge that concernshim- or herself as a distinct object in the world (cf. Baumeister,in press-b; Rosenberg, 1979). A person stores information aboutmany objects in the world, and typically several of these objectswill be very important to the person. Stored knowledge about themost significant objects will have many of the same propertiesas self-knowledge, including properties emphasized in previousmodels of the self, such as being a theory or biasing informationprocessing. In contrast to these other properties, the functionalsignificance of self-knowledge is unique because it concerns theonly object in the world that the person must continually regulatein order to survive. From the self-regulatory perspective, there-fore, the special nature of self-knowledge is best understood byconsidering its unique survival functions.

The self-regulatory perspective taken here shares the com-mon assumption that human survival requires adaptation tothe surrounding environment, especially the surrounding socialenvironment. For children to obtain the nurturance and secu-rity they need to survive, they must establish and maintain re-lationships with caretakers who fulfill these needs (see Bowlby,1969,1973). To establish and maintain such relationships, chil-dren must learn how their appearance and behaviors influencecaretakers' responses to them as objects in the world. Childrenmust learn to regulate their appearance and behaviors in linewith these interpersonal contingencies to increase the likelihoodthat caretakers will provide them the nurturance and securitythey need (cf. Bowlby, 1969; Cooley, 1902/1964; Mead, 1934;Sullivan, 1953).

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 19%. Vol. 71. No. 6. 1062-1083Copyright 1996 by the American Psychological Association. Inc. 0022-3514/96/J3.00

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To survive and adapt to their environment, people must alsolearn about their personal capabilities and, more generally,about their own strengths and weaknesses as one kind of objectin the world. Children need to learn, for example, that certainactivities, such as flying like a bird, are beyond their capabilitiesand that to attempt such activities is dangerous. They mustlearn their limits, such as how long they can hold their breathunderwater or stay outside in freezing weather. When choosingbetween alternative means to the same goal, it is adaptive toknow which means best suit one's capabilities. When workingto attain a goal, it is adaptive to know how much effort or per-sonal resources should be expended, given one's capabilities, toattain the goal without wasting resources. Thus, children mustalso learn to regulate their activity engagement to fit their per-sonal attributes.

In this article I introduce the notion of a self digest. A digestsummarizes a body of information, especially contingencyrules and conclusions. A digest serves regulatory functions. Thenotion of a self digest is meant to capture the idea that self-knowledge summarizes information about oneself as an objectin the world in order to serve self-regulatory functions. The no-tion of a self digest, then, is intended to highlight a new concep-tualization of the nature of self-knowledgea summary ofwhat the world is like in relation to oneself.

I propose that what a person stores about him- or herself as adistinct object in the world depends on what information is use-ful for self-regulation. It was noted earlier, for example, thatsurvival depends on learning about those attributes of oneselfin relation to the world that produce beneficial interpersonalinteractions and activity engagements. The self digest representsknowledge about oneself as an object in the world because, andto the extent that, such knowledge facilitates adaptation to one'senvironment. The self digest is a tool for survival. It summarizesa person's relations to his or her world and the personal conse-quences of these relations. It increases the likelihood of effectiveand efficient self-regulation in the service of survival. It is ahandy sourcebook for people about their person-environmentfit that helps them to fulfill their needs when interacting withtheir world.

The conceptualization of self-knowledge as a self digest in-volves no claim that the cognitive properties of self-knowledgeare different from stored knowledge about other kinds of objectsin the world. In addition, there is no claim that only self-knowl-edge contains functional information about the world. On theother hand, only knowledge about oneself as an object in theworld is essential to represent, because self-knowledge concernsthe only object in the world that a person must continually reg-ulate in order to survive. Thus, self-knowledge has a uniquefunctional status among our stored knowledge of objects in theworld. Conceptualizing self-knowledge as a self digest is meantto capture this unique functional status of self-knowledge. Inaddition, the notion of a self digest is intended to emphasizethe self-regulatory nature of self-knowledge rather than the self-descriptive nature of self-knowledge.

Many historical perspectives on the self (which are discussedmore fully later) have conceptualized self-knowledge as a per-son's beliefs about him- or herself, as captured in answers to

questions such as "Tell me about yourself." This conceptualiza-tion of self-knowledge is referred to as self-description, althougha more precise label would be potential self-description, becauseself-description at any one time can vary depending on whichsubset of self-beliefs is currently most accessible. The notion ofa self digest serves as a counterpoint to the conventional ideathat self-knowledge contains information about the self that isself-descriptive (from the person's own viewpoint). It is in-tended to capture the alternative idea that self-knowledge con-tains information about the self that serves self-regulatory func-tions. Rather than answering the question "Who am I?", the selfdigest answers the question "What is my relation to the world?"

Self-knowledge as a self digest would contain quite differentkinds of information than self-knowledge as self-description.For example, information about how others respond to youwhen you fail to be the kind of person they want you to be wouldnot be part of self-knowledge as self-description, but it wouldbe part of self-knowledge as a self digest. On the other hand,information that described oneself, such as some physical char-acteristic, would be included as part of self-knowledge as self-description, but it would not be included in self-knowledge as aself digest unless it were useful for self-regulation. In addition,self-knowledge as self-description involves representations ofdecontextualized "facts" about oneself in isolation, whereasself-knowledge as a self digest involves representations of one-self in relation to other persons and activities in the world andthe consequences of these relations.

The major purpose of this article is to identify the kinds ofinformation that self-knowledge as a self digest would containthat differ from those that self-knowledge as self-descriptionwould contain, and then to consider the implications of suchinformation for classic issues in the self literature. A novel pro-posal of the self digest notion, for example, is that there is not asingle actual self involving a descriptive representation of per-sonal attributes but rather that there are three different actualself-representations serving three distinct self-regulatory func-tions: an instrumental self, an expectant self, and a monitoredself. One implication of there being three different actual selvesserving distinct self-regulatory functions is that there shouldalso be distinct kinds of self-esteem and self-enhancement.

I begin this article with a discussion of the developmental un-derpinnings of children acquiring a self digest, how they learnthe answer to the question "What is my relation to the world?"To have a basic idea about the nature of self digests, it is neces-sary to know something about how self digests are acquired andwhat kind of information they contain. The purpose of the firstsection is to provide this basic background information by dis-cussing three basic principles of self digest acquisition: repre-sentational level, regulatory focus, and strength of self-regula-tory knowledge. Following this, the functional components ofthe self digest are identified and discussed. It is in this secondsection that I introduce the idea of three different actual selves,each serving a distinct self-regulatory function. This sectionalso discusses desired (and undesired) selves and standpointson the self as two additional components of the self digest thatare functionallv intertwined with the three actual selves. In thefinal section of this article I reconsider, from a self digest per-

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spective, both the nature and function of some classic variablesin the self literature, including self-esteem, self-enhancement,self-consistency, self-presentation, and cultural differences inthe self.

Principles of Self Digest Acquisition

To survive in the world, children must learn answers to thequestion "What is my relation to the world?" In this section Ibriefly review the nature of such learning. My colleagues and Ihave previously considered this basic issue in more detail, witha special emphasis on how children learn what their significantothers desire of them (e.g., Higgins, 1989,1991; Moretti & Hig-gins, 1990a, in press; Strauman, 1992). The purpose here is notto give a full account but simply to provide sufficient back-ground for the reader to understand what kinds of informationare contained in the self digest and the principles underlyingtheir acquisition. Three basic principles of acquisition are dis-cussed: representational level, regulatory focus, and strength ofself-regulatory knowledge.

Representational Level

Piagetian and neo-Piagetian models of cognitive developmentdescribe general changes in levels of mental representation (e.g.,Case, 1985; Damon & Hart, 1986; Fischer, 1980; Selman,1980). Using Case's (1985) general theory of intellectualchange, in the following section I describe shifts in the nature ofchildren's self digests as a function of changes in their levels ofmental representation (see also Higgins, 1989, 1991). It shouldbe noted that the ages suggested for each level reflect only whatthe developmental literature has typically reported. These agescould vary considerably across children for many different rea-sons. Because each higher level builds on the information rep-resented at the previous level, however, the sequence of the levelsis considered to be invariant.

Level 1: Early sensorimotor development. By the end of thefirst year of life, children can represent the relation between twoevents, such as the relation between a response that they pro-duce and their mother's response to them. Even at this earlystage, children are capable of the preliminary form of role tak-ing that Mead (1934) describedthe ability to anticipate theresponses of a significant other with whom one is interacting.The contingency "When I produce X, this person responds Y"can be represented. As Mead suggested, the other person's re-sponse Y assigns a meaning to the child's X behavior. Thechild's X behavior now means the other person's Y response toit. This is the beginning of answering the question "What is myrelation to the world?"

Level 2: Late sensorimotor and early interrelational develop-ment. There is a dramatic shift in children's ability to repre-sent events between 18 months and 2 years of age, a periodtraditionally associated with the emergence of symbolic repre-sentation (e.g., Bruner, 1964; Case, 1985; Fischer, 1980; Piaget,1951; Werner & Kaplan, 1963). Children can now representthe bidirectional relationship between themselves and anotherperson as an interrelation between two distinct mental objects:self-as-object and other-as-object (see Bertenthal & Fischer,

1978; Harter, 1983; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979). They canrepresent the relation between two relations: (a) the relationbetween a feature of themselves (e.g., their action, response,physical appearance) and a particular response by another per-son; for example, the relation between the child making a messat mealtime and the mother frowning, yelling, or leaving and(b) the relation between a particular response by another per-son and a particular state that he or she will experience; for ex-ample, the relation between a mother frowning, yelling, or leav-ing and the child experiencing a negative state.

Children at Level 2, then, are capable of a higher level of roletaking that is critical for effective interactionthe ability toanticipate both the response of another to one's action and theconsequences to oneself of the other's response (see Stryker &Statham, 1985). A child's significant others link the child to thelarger society by providing both the social meaning or sharedreality of the child's features (i.e., the response to the child'sfeatures) and the importance of the child's features (i.e., thestate produced in the child by this response). These representedinterpersonal contingencies can be used by children in ameans-end fashion to control their feature production, to plantheir actions, responses, or appearance so as to maximize posi-tive states and minimize negative states.

The new representational capacities of children at Level 2 arealso critical for children's competence self-knowledge. At Level2, children will spontaneously use a spoon to eat, without theneed for the spoon to be placed in their hands or have foodalready on it (see Case, 1985). The spontaneous choice of aspoon as an eating tool that functions as an alternative means(i.e., alternative to eating with one's hands) involves represent-ing an interrelation between two relations: the relation betweenthe spoon and its eating function and the relation between selfand the spoon. It is not a property of the spoon as an object inthe world that is represented, such as the spoon's typical shapeor size. Rather, it is a property of the self in relation to the spoonuse that is representedthe competence knowledge that / amable to use it while eating. This competence self-knowledge at aminimum requires representing oneself in functional relationto the environment, such as "I can use X to do Y and obtain Z."

Level 3: Late interrelational and early dimensional develop-ment. Another dramatic shift in children's representationalcapacity occurs between 4 and 6 years of age. This shift under-lies the classic change from egocentric to nonegocentric thoughtand perspective-taking ability (see Feffer, 1970; Flavell, Botkin,Fry, Wright, & Jarvis, 1968; Piaget, 1965; Selman & Byrne,1974; Werner, 1957). Children at this level can coordinate twoseparate systems of interrelations, such as coordinating observ-able responses with unobservable responses (see Case, 1985).They become capable of inferring the thoughts, expectations,motives, and intentions of others (see Shantz, 1983). Childrenat Level 3 now understand that other people have different atti-tudes about different types of responses, that they prefer sometypes of responses over others. They can understand that per-forming the types of responses preferred by others is related toothers' positive responses to them.

Children at Level 3, then, have the ability to acquire goals andstandards associated with the viewpoint of others on them (see

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Fischer & Watson, 1981; Gesell & Ilg, 1946). They can monitor,plan, and evaluate their features in terms of their relation to thetypes of features that they infer are valued or preferred by an-other person or group. The relation between one's self-featureand another person's response to it is now understood to be me-diated by the other person's standpoint on this feature. Chil-dren's self-features acquire a new kind of interpersonal signifi-cance, one tied to their representations of others' goals and stan-dards for them; that is, to others' guides for them (see Higgins,1989, 1991; see also Sullivan, 1953). Children can now usethese guides as a basis for self-evaluation (e.g., "How am I doingin relation to what my father wants or demands of me?"). Chil-dren can evaluate themselves by assessing the amount of dis-crepancy between their current self-state and the end-state thatothers desire or demand of them. They can then respond to anyperceived discrepancy by taking action to reduce it, or they caneven plan action while taking potential discrepancies into ac-count. In such cases, self-evaluation occurs in the service of self-regulation (see also Carver & Scheier, 1990).

Children's new ability to coordinate two systems of interre-lations also permits an understanding that the relation betweentheir engagement in an activity and the outcome of the engage-ment are mediated by their own condition. They can un-derstand that their performance outcomes are mediated by theirfeelings, effort, and so on. They can represent, for example, thatthey do not perform as well on a task when they are tired.

Level 4: Late dimensional and early vectorial development.Children between 9 and 11 years of age become capable of co-ordinating values along two distinct dimensions (see Case,1985; Fischer, 1980). Not only can they evaluate a particularaction they just performed by considering another person'slikely response to that action, but they also can evaluate how thegeneral traits they believe they possess relate to the general traitsthat significant others desire or expect them to possess; that is,the "type of person" that others desire or expect them to be.

Key questions for competence self-knowledge also have newmeaning now, such as the question "What am I good at?" Thisquestion is now answered in terms of two dimensions: a factualcomparison to others and an evaluative comparison to goals orguides. To be good at something now means to be better thanothers at something that is worthwhile, something that matters,as defined by a represented standard of value. This new self-evaluative ability gives new significance to being "bad" or"good" at something. Children can also now conceptualize re-peated success or repeated failure in terms of a stable ability(see Dweck & Elliot, 1983; Rholes, Blackwell, Jordan, & Wal-ters, 1980; Ruble & Rholes, 1981). Children can attribute theirsuccesses to ability and their failures to lack of effort, or theycan do the opposite (see Dweck & Elliot, 1983; Ickes & Layden,1978; M. L. Snyder, Stephan, & Rosenfeld, 1978). Children atthis level can also use self-instructional plans to control emo-tional states that influence their behavior, such as using plans tocontrol the anger that is related to antisocial behavior (see Mis-chel & Mischel, 1977).

Level 5: Late vectorial development. Children between 13and 16 years of age become capable of interrelating differentdimensional systems, of interrelating different perspectives on

the same object, including conflicting perspectives on the self asan object (Case, 1985; Fischer, 1980; Inhelder & Piaget, 1958;Selman & Byrne, 1974). For the first time two distinct systemsof guides, such as one system involving a peer standpoint andanother system involving a parental standpoint, can themselvesbe interrelated.

Adolescents can represent conflicts between different signifi-cant others' guides for them and, unlike younger children, arecapable of finding solutions to them, thereby constructing reg-ulatory principles beyond being a "good boy" or a "good girl"(see Kohlberg, 1976; Loevinger, 1976). Most significant, ado-lescents are capable of constructing their "own" standpoint,distinct from the standpoint of "others", that can function asthe integrated solution to the complex array of alternative self-guides.

The ability to relate different dimensional systems also in-fluences competence self-knowledge. Indeed, competence self-knowledge and interpersonal contingencies can be integrated inthe service of performance goals. For example, individualsmight know that certain types of relationships or social situa-tions make certain kinds of social interactions more likely andthat their emotional states are different after different kinds ofsocial interactions. Separate from this relationship knowledge,they might also know how their emotional states influence theirmotivation, such as their motivation to prepare for exams, andhow this motivation in turn influences their performance. Byintegrating these two systems of self-knowledge, these individu-als can be highly strategic in their behaviors. There is evidence,for example, that college students use social support in differentways to meet their academic goals (see Cantor, 1994).

In the preceding section I described how the information con-tained in self digests varies in representational level. Develop-mental shifts were examined to clarify the nature of such varia-tion. It is important to emphasize, however, that the kind of selfdigest information described as emerging at each level is notrestricted to individuals at that developmental level. To beginwith, higher level representations are connected to lower levelrepresentations (see Higgins, 1991). For example, trait repre-sentations are connected to the self-features that exemplifythem. Thus, adults' self digests continue to represent self-con-tingencies from lower level representations. Equally important,although adults can function at Level 5, they continue to func-tion at lower levels in different aspects of their lives. It is com-mon for adults in close relationships, for example, to learnhighly contextualized contingencies about which behaviors pro-duce rebuke or thanks from their partners. Adults are also likelyto function at lower levels under stressful conditions, suchas mental load, fatigue, or inebriation (cf. Kruglanski, 1989,1996).

Let us turn now to a second basic principle of self digestacquisitionregulatory focus.

Regulatory FocusTo understand the nature of regulatory focus, it is again help-

ful to begin with a developmental perspective. There is consid-erable evidence that different modes of caretaker-child interac-tion influence the kinds of psychological situations that children

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experience, and it is these psychological situations that under-lie regulatory focus (see Higgins, 1989, 1991). Modes ofcaretaker-child interaction also vary in the likelihood that thechild will acquire strong self-knowledge. Knowledge strength isthe third principle of self digest acquisition and is considered inmore detail later. Some brief discussion of this third principle isnecessary here, however, because the modes of caretaker-childinteraction that produce strong self-regulatory knowledge pro-vide the best insight into the nature of regulatory focus.

Strong self-regulatory knowledge has three properties (seeHiggins, 1989, 1991): (a) high accessibility, where the self-reg-ulatory knowledge units have high activation potential; (b) highcommitment, where the procedural forces of the self-regulatoryknowledge units are high in magnitude; and (c) high coherence,where the procedural forces of the self-regulatory knowledgeunits have a uniform direction. The socialization literature sug-gests that the following variables produce strong self-regulatoryknowledge (e.g., Maccoby & Martin, 1983; Patterson, 1982;Radke-Yarrow, Zahn-Waxler, & Chapman, 1983; see Higgins,1989, 1991, for a review): (a) frequency of exposure to interac-tions that instantiate some self-regulatory knowledge; (b) con-sistency ofinstantiations; (c) clarity ofinstantiations, includingsalience and comprehensibility; and (d) significance of instan-tiations, including the significance to the child of the child -caretaker relationship.

Regulatory focus of caretaker-child modes producing strongself-regulatory knowledge. It should be emphasized from thebeginning that there is no assumption in the subsequent presen-tation that a caretaker uses only one mode in interacting with achild. Still, one mode, or a set of related modes, can predomi-nate for any particular caretaker-child pair. It should also benoted that a child may experience different modes in interac-tion with different caretakers. (Besides parents, caretakers caninclude teachers, babysitters, siblings, camp counselors, etc.).

When caretaker-child interactions have a desired state as thereference point, the interactions can have either a promotionfocus or a prevention focus. In the "bolstering" mode, interac-tions have a promotion focus, such as caretakers hugging andkissing the child when he or she behaves in a desired manner,encouraging the child to overcome difficulties, or setting up op-portunities for the child to engage in rewarding activities. Thecaretaker's message to the child in the bolstering mode is thatwhat matters is attaining accomplishments or fulfillingaspirations"This is what I would ideally like you to do." Inthe "prudent" mode, caretaker-child interactions have a de-sired state as the reference point and a prevention focus, suchas "child-proofing" the house, training the child to be alert topotential dangers, or teaching the child to mind his or her man-ners. The caretaker's message to the child in the prudent modeis that what matters is attaining safety or meeting obligations"This is what I believe you ought to do."

When caretakers have an undesired state as the referencepoint, the interactions again can have either a promotion focusor a prevention focus. In the "love-withdrawal" mode, the in-teractions have a promotion focus, such as ending a meal whenthe child throws some food, taking away a toy when the childrefuses to share it, stopping a story when the child is not paying

attention. The caretaker's message to the child in the love-with-drawal mode is again that what matters is attaining accomplish-ments or fulfilling aspirations, but it is communicated in refer-ence to an undesired state of the child"This is not what Iwould ideally like you to do." In the "critical/punitive" mode,caretaker-child interactions have an undesired state as the ref-erence point and a prevention focus, such as behaving roughlywith the child to get his or her attention, yelling at the childwhen he or she does not listen, and criticizing the child when heor she makes a mistake. The caretaker's message to the child inthe critical/punitive mode is again that what matters is attain-ing safety or meeting obligations, but it is communicated in ref-erence to an undesired state of the child"This is not what Ibelieve you ought to do."

According to this model, then, children socialized by somecombination of bolstering and love-withdrawal modes ofcaretaker-child interaction are likely to acquire a promotionfocus in which survival in the world means attaining accom-plishments and fulfilling aspirations. In contrast, children so-cialized by some combination of prudent and punitive/criticalmodes of caretaker-child interaction are likely to acquire a pre-vention focus in which survival in the world means attainingsafety and meeting obligations.

Regulatory focus effects of strong self-regulatory knowledge.The developmental extension of self-discrepancy theory(Higgins, 1989, 1991) postulates that caretakers who chroni-cally appraise a child in terms of their hopes and aspirations forthe child are likely to respond to the child in a way that directsthe child's attention toward these hopes and wishes for him orherthe ideal self-regulatory system. It is hypothesized thatthis caretaking mode will instill in the child a self-regulatoryfocus on promotion. In contrast, caretakers who chronically ap-praise a child in terms of their beliefs about the child's duty andobligations are likely to respond to the child in a way that directsthe child's attention toward these beliefs about his or her dutiesand responsibilitiesthe ought self-regulatory system. It is hy-pothesized that this caretaking mode will instill in the child aself-regulatory focus on prevention.

Self-discrepancy theory predicts that when regulatory pro-motion is working people feel cheerful (e.g., happy andsatisfied), but when it is not working people feel dejected (e.g.,sad and disappointed). Thus, chronic discrepancies betweenone's perceived actual self and a significant other's (or one'sown) hopes and wishes for oneselfthat is, actual-idealdiscrepanciesshould produce dejection. The theory also pre-dicts that when regulatory prevention is working people feelquiescent (e.g., calm and relaxed), but when it is not workingpeople feel agitated (e.g., nervous and worried). Thus, chronicdiscrepancies between one's perceived actual self and a signifi-cant other's (or one's own) beliefs about one's duty andobligationsthat is, actual-ought discrepanciesshouldproduce agitation. Both correlational studies and experimentalstudies have strongly supported each of these predictions (seeHiggins, 1987, 1996a).

Self-discrepancy theory also predicts that the promotion fo-cus of regulating in relation to an ideal self and the preventionfocus of regulating in relation to an ought self produce specific

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strategic inclinations for attaining the desired end-state. Thepromotion focus should involve an inclination to approachstates that promote the desired goal, such as approaching statesthat match an ideal self-guide, whereas the prevention focusshould involve an inclination to avoid states that threaten thedesired goal, such as avoiding states that mismatch an oughtself-guide. These predictions have also been supported in stud-ies by Higgins, Roney, Crowe, and Hymes (1994).

Let us turn now to a brief discussion of the third principle ofself digest acquisitionstrength of self-regulatory knowledge.

Strength of Self-Regulatory KnowledgeIt was stated earlier that self-regulatory knowledge is stronger

with a history of frequent, consistent, clear, and significant in-stantiations and that strong self-regulatory knowledge is highin accessibility, coherence, and commitment. Managing modesand disciplinary modes of caretaker-child interaction are hy-pothesized to produce stronger self-regulatory knowledge be-cause the caretakers are responsive (i.e., respond differentiallyto desired and undesired behaviors of the child) and sensitive(i.e., closely monitor the attentional state of the child and adapttheir demands to the child's state), and this increases both thefrequency and the consistency of the interactions.

There are also caretaker-child modes that are hypothesizedto produce weaker self-regulatory knowledge (see Higgins,1989, 1991). Children whose caretakers are uninvolved withthem (i.e., who ignore or neglect the child or who are psycho-logically unavailable) are likely to acquire weaker self-regula-tory knowledge, because low involvement would decrease thefrequency of the contingent interactions. Children whose par-ents are either highly permissive (i.e., who take a tolerant, ac-cepting attitude toward the child's impulses, make few de-mands, and avoid enforcing rules or imposing restrictions) oroverprotective (i.e., who supervise, restrict, and control everybehavior of the child) are also likely to acquire weaker self-reg-ulatory knowledge because these noncontingent responses tothe child do not discriminate among the child's behaviors andthus are low in clarity.

Children whose self-regulatory knowledge is stronger shouldgenerally have smaller discrepancies between their actual selvesand their self-guides (from working harder to attain their sig-nificant others" goals for them) but should suffer more from anydiscrepancy they do have (from the greater importance of fail-ing to meet their significant others' standards for them). Theresults of a study by Newman, Higgins, and Vopkles (1992),who compared firstborn children and later born children, wereconsistent with these predictions.

A more direct test of the effect of the strength of self-regula-tory knowledge on the relation between self-discrepancies andsuffering was provided in recent studies by Higgins, Shah, andFriedman (in press), who investigated the accessibility prop-erty of strong self-contingencies. This property was operational-ized in terms of relatively fast response times of participantswhen spontaneously naming the attributes of their ideal guidesor their ought guides. Higgins et al. found that the interactionof the strength of ideal guides and the magnitude of the actual-ideal discrepancy uniquely predicted intensity of dejection-re-

lated suffering, and the interaction of the strength of oughtguides and the magnitude of the actual-ought discrepancyuniquely predicted intensity of agitation-related suffering. Theresults of other recent studies reported in Moretti and Higgins(in press) provide additional evidence that stronger relationshipself-contingencies have important emotional and interpersonalconsequences.

It should also be noted that strengthening self-regulatoryknowledge should strengthen its regulatory focus. A strong reg-ulatory focus, moreover, will influence how new information isprocessed and represented such that self-knowledge acquiredlater is likely to have the same regulatory focus even if thecontent of the self-knowledge changes. This reasoning suggeststhat there could be considerable stability in individuals' ideal orought self-regulationas reflected in stable self-discrepancies,for instancewithout there being stability in the content of theideal or ought self-guides per se. A recent study by Strauman(in press) is consistent with this prediction.

This section's discussion of the principles of self digest acqui-sition has provided some basic background information aboutwhat kind of information is contained in self digests. It is timenow to consider the functional components of self digests.

Functional Components of the Self Digest

Probably the most common use of the term self is to refer torepresentations of the actual self, often referred to as the self-concept. The actual self as one's own beliefs about one's stableproperties as a distinct object in the world has received moreattention than any form of the actual self in classic theories ofthe self (e.g., Epstein, 1973; Lecky, 1961; C. R. Rogers, 1951;Sarbin, 1952; Snygg& Combs, 1949). As discussed briefly ear-lier, the self literature has emphasized one perspective on repre-sentations of the actual self: self-knowledge as self-description.It was noted earlier that a more accurate label would be poten-tial self-description, because a person's self-description at anyone time is only a subset of his or her more accessible self-be-liefs. The philosopher Ryle (1949) suggested that people acquireself-knowledge about their own personal characteristics, whatthey think they are, through self-observation and inference.Bern (1967) and Andersen (1987) have made similar sugges-tions (see also Baumeister, in press-b). The notion of self-sche-mas concerns the ways in which people organize and describetheir own behaviors (Markus, 1980). Self-schemas are said todevelop from repeated categorizations and evaluations of one-self in similar ways by both oneself and others. Such repetitionproduces a clear idea of the kind of person one is in a particulardomain (Markus, 1980). Through abstraction and inferenceacross specific experiences, a person constructs an understand-ing of the kind of person he or she is that can explain his or herbehaviors.

Self-knowledge as self-description answers the question"Who am I?" Indeed, this kind of self-knowledge is explicitlyelicited with "Who are you?" and "Describe yourself" mea-sures, such as McGuire's "Tell me about yourself" measure(e.g., McGuire & Padawer-Singer, 1976). In contrast, self-knowledge as self digest answers the question "What is the worldlike in relation to me?"

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Whereas the question "Who am I?" can be answered withone actual self, I propose that the question "What is the worldlike in relation to me?" requires at least three distinct actualselves that vary in their self-regulatory functions. This sectionbegins with a discussion of these three kinds of actual-self func-tions. It will become clear, however, that any discussion of ac-tual-self functions necessarily involves the other two functionalcomponents of the self digest: desired (and undesired) selvesand standpoints on the self. Actual selves, desired selves, andstandpoints on the self are functionally intertwined (see Cooley,1902/1964; S. Freud, 1923/1961; Homey, 1950; James, 1890/1948;C. R. Rogers, 1961; Sullivan, 1953). A fuller discussion ofthese two additional components is reserved until later, however.The Appendix provides a summary of the proposed functionalcomponents of the self digest.

Actual-Self FunctionsRepresentations of the actual self are involved in three

different kinds of self-regulatory functions: (a) as a conditionleading to some consequence (the instrumental function), (b)as a disposition in relation to some activity or object (the expec-tancy function), and (c) as a current state in relation to somedesired end-state (the monitoring function). Each of thesefunctional relations is considered in turn.

Actual self as a condition leading to some consequence: Theinstrumental self. The earlier discussion of self digest acquisi-tion described learning interpersonal contingencies, such aslearning that my making a mess at mealtime is related tomother frowning, which is related to my feeling bad. The actualself in such cases represents a condition or state of oneself thatleads to certain consequencesthe instrumental self. Instru-mental-self representations provide information about whatwill happen when a person behaves (or fails to behave) in someway or becomes a particular kind of person. The representa-tional level of these instrumental contingencies can vary fromrelatively low levels, such as "When I forget to give my wife atelephone message, she gets annoyed with me" or "When myhair is cut shorter, I feel younger," to relatively high levels, suchas "When I reciprocate the generosity of a friend, the friendshiplasts longer" or "When I try to explain to someone why I believesomething, my own understanding of my position improves." Ineach case the instrumental contingency provides informationabout the consequences of different self-features, and thus self-features can be regulated as a means to increase or decrease thelikelihood of certain ends.

Each of the previous examples involves a contingency fromthe individual's own standpoint. The instrumental self is notrestricted to the "own" standpoint, however. For example, a boymight learn "When other boys think I'm tough, they leave mealone" and "When teachers think I'm tough, they give me ahard time." As this example suggests, it can be beneficial topresent different self-features to different audiences in accor-dance with the instrumental contingency associated with eachaudience's judgment of one's self-features. There can also be aconflict between the instrumental contingency involving one'sown standpoint and the instrumental contingency involving an-

other person's standpoint. For example, a girl in kindergartenmight represent both "When I play with my Barbie dolls, I havea lot of fun" and "When other girls think I like to play withBarbie dolls, they tease me." Again, effective self-regulationwould take these different instrumental selves into accountwhen deciding whether to produce a particular self-feature.

Instrumental contingencies can represent not only the conse-quences of other people's responses to one's self-features butalso, at a higher representational level, the consequences ofmatching (or failing to match) others' desires and demands foroneself. The sole woman in a business firm, for example, mightrepresent the consequences of her matching her boss's image ofthe ideal male employee (cf. Jones, 1964; Mead, 1934). Classicexamples of such instrumental contingencies were providedearlier in the Principles of Self Digest Acquisition section. Asdiscussed in that section, a common outgrowth of socializationis the acquisition of instrumental contingencies that representthe consequences of matching or failing to match a significantother's ideal or ought for oneself, such as "When I am kind toothers, it fulfills my father's hopes for me, and he congratulatesme" or "When I am lazy, I violate my mother's sense of myduty, and she criticizes me."

Actual self as a disposition in relation to some activity or ob-ject: The expectant self. The earlier discussion of self digestacquisition also described acquiring competence self-knowl-edge, such as learning about the self in relation to a spoon andthe activity of eating. As noted earlier, it is not a property of thespoon as an object in the world that is represented, such as thespoon's typical shape or size. Stable properties of the spoonwould be stored as spoon knowledge. Rather, it is a property ofthe self in relation to the tool use that is representedthe factthat I am able to use it while eating. Such competence in rela-tion to this activity (eating with the spoon) predicts a certainkind of experience while I engage in the activity. The actual selfin such cases represents a disposition in relation to some activ-ity or object, where a "disposition" is a relatively enduring prop-erty that predisposes the person to behave in a particular man-ner (see Heider, 1958). This actual-self representation has theself-regulatory function of providing information about whatthe person is likely to experience when engaging some activityor object, such as ease or difficulty, success or failurethe ex-pectant self. For example, an expectant self concerning low abil-ity in some activity, such as poor tennis skills, provides informa-tion to expect difficulty or failure when playing tennis. Expec-tant-self representations provide information about what aperson is likely to experience while engaging some activity orobject.

Representations of different competencies in relation to var-ious activities or objects are one important kind of dispositionfound in expectant selves, but they are not the only kind. Indi-viduals also represent their dispositions to experience pain orpleasure when engaging particular activities or objects, such as"I really enjoy downhill skiing." This is not to say that all pref-erences or attitudes are included as expectant selves. People usu-ally believe that the source of their experience when engaging aparticular activity or object is the inherent nature of the activityor object. That is, it has nothing to do with them. There would

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be no reason in such cases to represent one's own disposition inrelation to the activity or object, because it has nothing to dowith one's disposition. But when people believe that it is some-thing about themselves that accounts for their experience whenengaging some activity or object, then they will represent theirdisposition in relation to the activity or objectan expectantself with a preference or attitude as the disposition.-

As discussed earlier, self-knowledge as self-description, a per-son's beliefs about the kind of person he or she is, has receivedmore attention than any form of the actual self in classic theo-ries of the self (e.g., Bern, 1967; Epstein, 1973; Lecky, 1961;Markus, 1980; C. Rogers, 1951; T. B. Rogers, 1981; Sarbin,1952; Snygg & Combs, 1949). This classic conceptualization ofthe actual self, often called the self-concept, is more similar tothe expectant self than it is to the instrumental self or the mon-itored self. Still, the expectant self differs from self-descriptionor the self-concept in a variety of respects.

One difference between the expectant self and the classic con-ceptualization of the self-concept is that the expectant self rep-resents dispositions in relation to specific activities or objectsrather than representing abstract, decontextualized traits orcharacteristics. But there is another difference that is, perhaps,more critical. According to the classic conceptualization of theself-concept, nicely summarized by Gergen (1971), the self-concept involves individuals' categorizations or definitions ofthemselves as objects in the world. As such, the self-conceptshould be formed according to the rules of object categoriza-tion, which include judgments of similarity and dissimilarity toalternative objects (e.g., Rosch, 1978; Smith & Medin, 1981;Tversky & Gati, 1978). This perspective is reflected in the no-tion that the self-concept contains distinctive self-attributes(e.g., McGuire & Padawer-Singer, 1976). In contrast, the posi-tion taken here is that distinctive self-attributes would not bepart of the represented actual self unless they served a self-reg-ulatory function and, moreover, nondistinctive self-attributeswouldbe represented if they did serve a self-regulatory function.I return to this point later.

The position taken here is that only stable self-propertiesserving a self-regulatory function would be included as expec-tant selves. For example, a man asked about his cooking skillsmight describe himself as being a decent cook, but this wouldnot be an expectant self unless his engagement in the activity ofcooking were a significant experience for him. Indeed, the criti-cal difference between being "schematic" versus "aschematic"on some property (see Markus, 1980) might rest on thisdistinction.

Aschematics on some property, such as independence, aresaid to be individuals who describe themselves as neither pos-sessing the property nor not possessing the property (i.e., as be-ing neither independent nor dependent) and who rate the prop-erty as being low in importance. Markus (1980, p. 116) sug-gested that aschematics are "people who probably didn't thinkmuch about independence or dependence at all." Such peoplemight not think about it because the activities associated withbehaving independently or dependently have no self-regulatorysignificance for them. This might be true even for people whocould describe themselves as independent or dependent when

asked. What might be critical is not the self-description per sebut the importance; that is, whether the stable property serves aself-regulatory function. The expectant self is conceptualized asthose dispositions that do serve a self-regulatory function be-cause of their relation to how some activity or object is experi-enced while engaging it. From this perspective, aschematics onsome property would have no expectant self for that propertynot because it was non-self-descriptive but because it served noself-regulatory function.

As suggested earlier, self-regulatory significance might alsohave implications for how distinctiveness influences actual-selfrepresentations. Self-descriptions can be influenced by the dis-tinctiveness of a self-property in immediate or prolonged situa-tions (see McGuire, McGuire, Child, & Fujioka, 1978; McGu-ire, McGuire, & Winton, 1979; McGuire & Padawer-Singer,1976). McGuire et al. (1979), for example, found that school-children were more likely to mention their gender in their self-descriptions if they came from households where their genderwas in the minority. According to McGuire et al.'s analysis, dis-tinctiveness per se should influence self-description because ofits impact on knowledge activation (cf. Higgins, 1996b). Ac-cording to the present analysis, however, the influence of dis-tinctiveness on expectant selves should depend on its self-regu-latory significance. For example, if a child's gender is in the mi-nority at home, he or she is likely to receive special treatmentby other members of the household. The child's gender as anenduring property would be associated with particular experi-ences while he or she engages gender-related activities, such ashaving his or her experience of gender-consistent games en-hanced by supportive treatment. According to this analysis,some other property that was also distinctive at home, such asdistinctive eye color, would not be included as an expectant selfif it had no influence on the child's activity experiences. Ac-cording to McGuire et al.'s analysis, however, it would still ap-pear in the child's self-description as long as it was salient fromits distinctiveness.

Although the self literature has tended to emphasize individ-uals' own beliefs about their dispositions, individuals also rep-resent the beliefs of other people about their dispositions in re-lation to some activity or object. The classic case of expectantselves from others' standpoints is individuals' representationsof a significant other's expectancies about their dispositions,such as a boy's representation of his mother's beliefs about hisdispositions in relation to school activities, a wife's representa-tion of her husband's beliefs about her dispositions in relationto household activities, or a worker's representation of the boss'sbeliefs about his or her dispositions in relation to job activities.Often an individual and his or her significant others share beliefsabout his or her dispositions in relation to different activities,and shared expectant selves play a special role in self-regulation(see Hardin & Higgins, 1996). But individuals can also repre-sent that their own expectant selves are not shared by their sig-nificant others or that different significant others, such as theirwives and their mothers-in-law, have different expectant selvesfor them. These different kinds of expectant selves and their im-pact on self-regulation have received relatively little attention inthe literature (cf. Olson, Roese, & Zanna, in press).

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Actual self as a current state in relation to some desired end-state: The monitored self. The actual self as a current state inrelation to some desired end-state has received the most atten-tion in control or cybernetic theories of self-regulation (e.g.,Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1990; Higgins, 1987, 1991; G. A. Mil-ler, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960; Wiener, 1948) and in theories ofobjective self-awareness (e.g., Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Thesetheories assume that people are motivated to bring their currentstate in line with some valued or desired end-state, to reach acondition in which there is no discrepancy between their cur-rent state and some desired end-state. As part of the self-regula-tory system needed to accomplish this, people must continuallymonitor or check how much discrepancy exists between theircurrent state and some desired end-state. Monitored-self repre-sentations provide feedback information about how a person isdoing in relation to some desired (or undesired) end-state.

Like the other actual-self representations already discussed,most accounts of the monitoring function implicitly considerthe current state from individuals' own standpointshow theybelieve they are doing from their own points of view. Althoughself-discrepancy theory considers both own and significant-other standpoints on the actual self (see Higgins, 1987), testsof the theory have been mostly restricted to individuals' ownstandpoints. According to the theory, it is not the actual selfalone, but- rather whether it is discrepant from some desiredend-state, that determines people's self-evaluations. In a directtest of this prediction, Moretti and Higgins (1991) found thatpeople's negative actual-self features predicted low self-esteemonly when these features were also discrepant from their idealselves. Indeed, discrepancy from current state to ideal end-state,controlling for actual-self negativity per se, predicted low self-esteem, whereas actual-self negativity per se, controlling for dis-crepancy, did not. These results support the notion of an actual-self representation that functions as a monitored current statewhose discrepancy to a desired end-state provides negative feed-back. When the self-regulatory system is functioning properly,this negative feedback produces action to change the currentstate so as to reduce the discrepancy.

Once again it is important to emphasize that monitored cur-rent states, like the actual-self representations considered ear-lier, can involve representations of the standpoints of others aswell as one's own standpoint. Individuals can represent a sig-nificant other's belief about how they are doing, and this repre-sentation of their current states might not agree with their own.A man, for example, might personally believe that his currentstate is close to some desired end-state but represent the factthat his mother believes that his current state is far away ("Mymother still thinks I'm a failure"). The represented beliefs ofdifferent significant others concerning an individual's currentstate might also be different, such as the difference in viewpointof a mother between her youngest child and her oldest child("My 5 year-old son thinks I'm doing great, but my 14 year-olddaughter thinks I'm falling apart"). Individuals can monitorboth their own and significant others' standpoints on their cur-rent states, and discrepancies to any standpoint on one's cur-rent self can provide negative feedback and spur action tochange.

A final point: Monitored selves are representations of how aperson is doing in relation to some desired (or undesired) end-state. For this reason, if a person acquires a new desired self,perhaps because of a new intimate relationship involving a newsignificant other, then new monitored selves will emerge thatrelate to this new desired self. Such emergent selves again high-light the difference between self-knowledge as self-descriptionand self-knowledge as self digest. From the self-description per-spective, actual-self representations involve beliefs about stableself-properties. From the self-digest perspective, however, it isthe relations between actual-self representations and other men-tal elements that are critical, whether these mental elements arethe responses of significant others to actual-self conditions, ac-tivities or objects related to dispositions, or desired end-states inrelation to which current states are monitored. Because of thisrelational emphasis, the self digest perspective can more easilyaccount for emergent selves. An emergent self does not requirerepeated observations of a new self-property. A change in an-other mental element, such as a new desired self, can generate anew actual-self representation. In Markus's (1980) terms, sucha change in the importance of some attribute could cause anindividual to shift from being aschematic to being schematicwithout any change in self-description.

In sum, actual-self representations as one component of theself digest have three distinct functions: (a) an instrumentalfunction that provides information about what will happenwhen a person behaves (or fails to behave) in some way or be-comes a particular kind of person, (b) an expectancy functionthat provides information about what a person is likely to expe-rience while engaging some activity or object, and (c) a moni-toring function that provides feedback information about howa person is doing in relation to some desired (or undesired) end-state. It should be noted that self-regulation often involves link-ing different actual-self functions. For example, a child couldrepresent both a competence expectant self"I can drawbeautiful pictures"and an instrumental self"When I drawa beautiful picture, Daddy gives me a big hug." This combina-tion of actual selves would produce a strong motivation to drawpictures. But it should also be noted that a preference expectantself might alone provide sufficient motivation, such as the in-trinsic motivation provided by the expectant self: "My favoriteactivity is drawing pictures."

Each of these three actual selves provides unique self-regula-tory information regarding a person's relations to the world.The instrumental self provides information about "how theworld responds to me" such that one action might be selectedover another because others respond to it more positively. Theexpectant self provides information about "how I respond tothe world" such that one action might be selected over anotherbecause the intrinsic experience of engaging in that action ispreferred. The monitored self provides information about "howI am doing in relation to the desires and demands for me" suchthat one action might be selected over another because the ac-tion makes progress toward an ideal self. These are three funda-mental types of actual-self information that can each determineself-regulation under different circumstances or can even be inconflict in some cases.

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In the description of the functions of actual-self representa-tions, the self-regulatory roles of desired (and undesired) selvesand self standpoints have already been considered to some ex-tent. These additional components of the self digest are nowconsidered in more detail.

Desired (and Undesired) SelvesWhen children reach representational Level 3 (around 4-6

years of age), as discussed earlier, they can understand thatother people prefer some types of responses over others and thatothers respond to them in accordance with these preferences.Later, children infer what kind of person other people wouldlike them to be or believe they should be and represent howa desired self from another person's standpoint mediates thatperson's responses to them. To begin with, then, desired-selfrepresentations typically involve the standpoint of others. Later,desired selves from a person's own distinct standpoint develop.The functional significance of own-standpoint versus other-standpoint desired selves is considered below. It should be notedhere, however, that there can also be desired selves that are notexplicitly represented as being one's "own" standpoint as dis-tinct from the standpoint of some "other" person or persons.The classic case of this is early identification processes in whicha child wants to be like some admired person (e.g., a parent,an older sibling, a sports hero) or some fantasy character (e.g.,Barbie). Desired selves from identification processes also occurlater in development, such as desired selves relating to positivereference groups (see Kelley, 1952; Merton & Kitt, 1952).

Many different desired selves have been described in the psy-chological literature. James (1890 /1948) disinguished betweenthe social self, which concerns the self that the highest socialjudge would approve as worthy, and the spiritual self, whichincludes one's own conscience and moral sensibility. Schafer(1967) and Piers and Singer (1971) elaborated S. Freud's(1923/1961) superego/ego ideal conception by distinguishingbetween the superego, which constitutes the moral conscience,and the ideal self, which constitutes hopes and goals. C. R. Rog-ers (1961) distinguished between a person's own belief aboutwhat he or she would "ideally" like to be and what other peoplebelieved a person should be normatively. Self-discrepancy the-ory (Higgins, 1987), as mentioned earlier, organized these andother distinctions by proposing two dimensions underlying de-sired selves: (a) domain of desired selfideal selves (hopes,wishes, aspirations) versus ought selves (duties, obligations,responsibilities), and (b) standpoint on desired selfown ver-sus other. An actual-self discrepancy from each of these fourkinds of desired selves is associated with a distinct kind of emo-tional distress (Higgins, 1987).

Given their critical function as positive reference points, it isnot surprising that desired selves have received the most atten-tion in the literature. But there are other kinds of selves thatfunction as self-regulatory reference points that should benoted. There are undesired selves, for instance, that function asnegative reference points, such as Erikson's (1963) "evil iden-tity", Sullivan's (1953) "bad me", Markus and Nurius's (1986)"feared self", and Ogilvie's (1987) "undesired self". It has beensuggested, for example, that "ought" selves might be repre-

sented not only as positive reference points (i.e., the person it ismy responsibility to be), but also as negative reference points(i.e., the person I must not be or am afraid to be, see Carver &Scheier, 1990; Higgins eta!., 1994).

People's representations of what they might become can alsofunction as reference points. These "potential" selves (James1890/1948), "possible" selves (Markus & Nurius, 1986), or"fantasy" selves (see S. Freud, 1923/1961; Levinson, 1978)have been described as having important self-regulatory effects(Bandura, 1986; Higgins, 1990; Markus & Nurius, 1986; Mar-kus & Wurf, 1987). Many of these possible selves are desirableor undesirable selves and thus should function like the referencepoints already considered. In other cases these selves can func-tion more like counterfactuals; that is, imagined actual selvesthat differ from the current actual self. However, the self-regula-tory significance of even these imagined selves depends at leastin part on their relation to desired selves. For example, Higgins,Vookles, and Tykocinski (1992) found that different patterns ofrelations among the actual self, the ideal self, and either the"can" self (beliefs about who one could potentially become)or the "future" self (beliefs about who one will become) wereassociated with distinct amounts and types of dejection-relatedsuffering,

A notable property of desired selves, as mentioned earlier, isthat each functions as both a goal to be attained and as a stan-dard for self-evaluation. This functional duality of desiredselves produces self-regulatory trade-offs (see Higgins, 1991).As a desired self increases in importance, its desirability as agoal increases. This increases the motivation to attain the goal,which in turn increases the likelihood that the goal will bereached. This is a benefit of a strong desired self. On the otherhand, as a desired self increases in importance, its significanceas a standard for self-evaluation increases. Discrepancies be-tween the current state and the desired state are monitoredmore closely, and negative feedback is more distressing. This isa cost of a strong desired self. This analysis predicts that indi-viduals with strong desired selves are likely to have smaller dis-crepancies between their current state and their desired selves(because goal attainment is more likely), but whatever discrep-ancies they do have should produce greater distress (becausenegative feedback is more intense). As mentioned earlier, theNewman et al. (1992) study provides some support for both ofthese predictions.

Self-StandpointsThroughout the earlier discussion of actual-self functions, a

distinction was made between self-representations from a per-son's own standpoint versus from the standpoint of some otherperson, typically a significant other. A standpoint on the self isdefined as a point of view from which a person can be judgedthat reflects a set of attitudes, opinions, or values (see Turner,1956). Previous self theories have only rarely explicitly distin-guished self-standpoints. One exception is Lewin (1935), whodid distinguish between a child's own hopes and personal goalsand a child's level of aspiration that derives from the expecta-tions of adult authority figures. More often, however, the dis-tinction has not been clear. In S. Freud's (1923/1961) concep-

1072 HIGGINS

tion of the superego, for example, it is not always clear whetherthe superego is an ought-own involving internalization andguilt feelings or an ought-other involving introjected authorityfigures and feelings of fear. According to Mead (1934), there isa developmental stage at which a person's own viewpoint be-comes distinct from the viewpoint of others, but it is not clearwhether this distinction remains over time given that the selfis supposed to be based later on the viewpoint of "generalizedothers" rather than particular others.

Self-discrepancy theory does explicitly distinguish betweenown and other standpoints on the self. Moreover, the theory pre-dicts that different standpoints on the self influence self-regula-tion (see Higgins, Loeb, & Moretti, 1995; Moretti & Higgins, inpress) and emotional vulnerabilities (see Higgins, 1987), suchas shame being associated with discrepancies from others'standpoints on the self rather than one's own standpoint. Someof the effects of self-standpoint have already been described. Letus briefly consider some additional self-regulatory effects of self-standpoint (see also Andersen & Cole, 1990; M. W. Baldwin &Holmes, 1987).

Distinguishing one's own standpoint from others' stand-points on the self requires not only high mental capacity butalso strong motivation. Some individuals may be motivated toconstruct their own standpoints because the standpoints ofdifferent significant others are in conflict, as in the case of pa-rental versus peer conflict. Other adolescents may be motivatedto adopt their own standpoints because engaging in the activitiesdemanded of them by significant others is intrinsically unpleas-ant or has unpleasant consequences. More generally, individualsmay be motivated to construct their own standpoints becausethe beliefs and values represented in significant others' guidesfor them conflict with their current perceptions of social reality(see Hoffman, 1983). In addition, there are some parents whopromote own-standpoint development by encouraging theirchildren to choose their own goals and make their own deci-sions, as in the independence training associated with highachievement motivation (see McClelland, 1961).

When children do construct their own standpoint guides andself-regulate in terms of them, it can have a major impact ontheir relationships with other people (see Moretti & Higgins,in press). Under some conditions, for example, shifting from aconcern with just parental standpoints on the self can benefitpeer interaction by incorporating certain social realities thatwere previously ignored and by increasing sensitivity to the spe-cific concerns of one's interaction partner in the immediate sit-uation (see Higgins, Loeb, & Moretti, 1995; Hoffman, 1983).For example, children who regulate in terms of parental stand-points are concerned with how their parents would view theiractions. Thus, they interact with their peers as desired by theirparents, such as being polite and well behaved, rather than fo-cusing on the desires of their child partner, which might be justto have fun. This may please their parents, but it is unlikely toplease their peers.

Indeed, the results of a study by Klein (reported in Higgins,Loeb, & Moretti, 1995) suggests that the stronger the role ofparental guides in children's self-regulation, the less popular thechildren are with their classmates. Similarly, Moretti (reported

in Higgins, Loeb, & Moretti, 1995) found that undergraduateswith strong parental standpoints (i.e., strong beliefs that theirparents' acceptance and support were contingent on their meet-ing their parents' standards for them) were more likley to sufferfrom a variety of interpersonal problems. Klein and Moretti'sstudies found that strong own-standpoint self-regulation wasnot associated with these interpersonal problems. Still, individ-uals with strong own standpoints can potentially become preoc-cupied with their own goals and needs, which can reduce theirinvolvement in intimate relationships with others (see Moretti& Higgins, in press).

Social forces also influence which significant others' stand-points underlie self-regulation. The classic example of this is theshift from parents to peers that can occur during adolescence.As children move into adolescence in our culture, there is a gen-eral increase in the importance of friends for self-evaluation andemotional well-being (see Hartup, 1983; Larson, 1983; You-niss, 1980). Peers in general and friends in particular increas-ingly become significant others. Moreover, adolescents are morelikely to perceive their parents (more than friends) as authorityfigures who influence them in terms of threats and punishment(i.e., a prevention focus) and to perceive their friends (morethan their parents) as partners sharing mutual goals who influ-ence them in terms of incentives and rewards (i.e., a promotionfocus; see Hunter, 1984; Larson, 1983; Youniss & Smollar,1985). Given parents' emphasis on responsibilities such aschores and homework compared with friends' emphasis onhaving a good time, it is not surprising that adolescents'ideal (friend) self-guides can come into conflict with theirmother(ought) or father(ought) self-guides. There is evidencesuggesting that this conflict increases as adolescents enter highschool and creates confusion-related problems in both self-reg-ulation and self-evaluation (see Higgins etal., 1995;cf. Erikson,1963).

Self-guides from the standpoints of different significant oth-ers, such as parents and peers, need not conflict, and thus ado-lescence need not be a period of emotional stress or turmoil(e.g., Coleman, 1974; Offer, 1969). A person's own standpointalso need not conflict with the standpoints of his or her signifi-cant others. Indeed, when a person has distinct own and otherstandpoints on the self, the emergence of congruence betweenthese self-guide standpoints represents an important self-regu-latory process: internalization ofvalues(Kelman, 1958). With-out such congruence, self-guides from the standpoints of otherscan function like the "felt presence" of others within the self-regulatory system (see M. W. Baldwin & Holmes, 1987). Withinternalization, however, self-guides from own and other stand-points are integrated and are no longer experienced as the "feltpresence" of others (Moretti & Higgins, in press). (For anotherkind of internalization involving shared reality on the actualself, see Schlenker, Dlugolecki, and Doherty [1994] and Tice[1992].)

Internalization of self-guides is likely to increase all of theproperties of self-regulatory knowledge that makes it stronger,by (a) increasing its accessibility by interconnecting multiplestandpoints on the same desired self, (b) increasing its coher-ence by establishing consistency between self-standpoints, and

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(c) increasing commitment to it by combining motivationalforces associated with each standpoint. This suggests that de-sired selves from significant-other standpoints should havegreater self-regulatory significance when they are internalizedthan when they are not. In a recent study by Moretti, Smith,and Higgins (reported in Moretti & Higgins, in press), under-graduates' desired selves from their mothers' standpoints andfrom their fathers' standpoints were divided by whether theymatched the undergraduates' own desired selves (i.e., internal-ized parental guides) or did not match (i.e., "felt presence" pa-rental guides). The study found that actual-self discrepanciesfrom internalized parental guides were stronger predictors ofemotional outcomes than discrepancies from "felt presence"parental guides.

In this article I have introduced the notion of a self digest thatprovides a new conceptualization of the nature of self-knowl-edge. Both the principles of self digest acquisition and the func-tional components of the self digest have been reviewed. Thisself-regulatory perspective on self-knowledge has implicationsfor several well-known self variables in the literature. It is notpossible here to review these variables in detail, but some recon-sideration of them from the present perspective might be useful,if only to suggest the potential utility of the self digest notion.

A Self Digest Perspective on Some Classic Self Variables

In this section I examine some classic variables in the selfliterature from a self digest perspective. Both the nature and thefunctions of these variables are reconsidered.

Self-Esteem. Global self-esteem generally refers to individuals* overall eval-

uation or appraisal of themselves, whether they approve or dis-approve of themselves, like or dislike themselves (seeGreenwald & Pratkanis, 1984; Rosenberg, 1965, 1979; Wylie,1974). Psychologists have been especially interested in low(global) self-esteem (see, e.g., Baumeister, 1993). Two majorquestions in the literature have been "What is low self-esteem?"and "Where does low self-esteem come from?" To address thesecond question, about source, one must begin with the firstquestion, about nature. One cannot understand the nature oflow self-esteem without understanding the nature of self-esteemmore generally. The problem is that our understanding of thenature of self-esteem has been rather limited and constrained.

Historically, the initial assumption regarding self-esteem hasbeen that there is an actual self that is globally evaluated in someway. From a self digest perspective, however, it is not clear whichactual self is being evaluated. Given that there are three distinctactual-self functions, one could imagine the following threeconceptualizations of self-esteem: (a) a global appraisal of in-strumental functioning based on representations of actual-selfattributes leading to positive or negative consequencesinstrumental self-esteem, (b) a global appraisal of expectanciesfor the self based on positive or negative dispositions in relationto various activitiesexpectant self-esteem, and (c) a globalevaluation of current state based on its congruent or discrepantrelation to some desired end-statemonitored self-esteem.

These three conceptualizations of self-esteem need to be dis-tinguished, because they classify people differently. One exam-ple would be the phenomenon of self-handicapping, which is astrategic response to an anticipated loss in self-esteem (e.g., Ad-ler, 1929/1964; Jones & Berglas, 1978; C.R. Snyder & Smith,1982). The classic cases involve people who are receiving socialrewards for their high performance in some activity but don'tbelieve their high performance will continue. The self-handi-capping involves setting up an external attribution, such as be-coming an alcoholic, for the future failure they expect. In suchcases, instrumental self-esteem is high, but expectant self-es-teem is low. As another example, it is not uncommon for verysuccessful people who would score high on instrumental-selfand expectant-self functioning to suffer from low self-esteemand even depression (as measured clinically) because they per-ceive their current selves as failing to meet the very high stan-dards (i.e., desired selves) that they or others hold for them.As mentioned earlier, Moretti and Higgins (1990b) found thatpeople's negative stable self-properties predicted low self-es-teem on both the Rosenberg (1965) and the Coopersmith(1967) measures only when these properties were also discrep-ant from their desired selves. Global negative properties did notpredict low self-esteem on these measures when discrepancyfrom desired self was controlled.

This is not to say that low expectant self-esteem, or low in-strumental self-esteem, would not predict low self-esteem inde-pendently on some other measure of self-esteem. Moreover, itmight be useful conceptually and practically to find ways tomeasure independently each of these kinds of self-esteem pre-cisely because they relate to distinct functions of representedactual selves. Individuals with high monitored self-esteem butlow expectant self-esteem, for example, might maintain theirself-satisfaction by greatly restricting the range of activities inwhich they engage. Indeed, this combination is especially likelyto occur among elderly people.

In addition to there being more than one kind of actual selfthat can be evaluated, there is more than one reference point forevaluating the actual self. To simplify this discussion, consideronly the actual self involved in monitored self-esteem. To sim-plify the discussion even further, consider only the actual selffrom an individual's own standpoint. (The actual self from thestandpoint of others also is important and is considered in thesubsequent discussion of self-enhancement.) When the currentactual self is monitored, it can be evaluated in relation to a va-riety of different desired selves or self-guides. It can be evaluatedin relation to an ideal self-guide or in relation to an ought self-guide. Moreover, it can be evaluated in relation to a self-guideinvolvinga person's own standpoint or in relation to a self-guideinvolving the standpoint of some significant other. Thus, thereare four distinct kinds of self-guides that can function as thereference point for evaluation. Indeed, it is even possible that anundesired self rather than a desired self could function as thereference point.

The nature of global self-esteem varies depending on whatis functioning as the reference point for evaluation. Typically,measures of self-esteem have not been explicit about the refer-ence point involved and have included different items related to

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different reference points. For example, items related to feelingworthless are more likely to reflect low self-evaluation in rela-tion to an ought self-guide, whereas items related to feeling un-fulfilled are more likely to reflect low self-evaluation in relationto an ideal self-guide. Moreover, individuals can have low self-esteem in relation to an ought self-guide but not in relation toan ideal self-guide (Higgins, 1987). Similarly, individuals canhave low self-esteem in relation to an ideal (other) self-guide butnot in relation to their ideal (own) self-guides. Again, it mightbe useful conceptually and practically to distinguish amongthese different kinds of low self-esteem, because each kind ispredictive of distinct kinds of emotional suffering and self-reg-ulatory functioning.

When self-esteem measures have explicitly identified the ref-erence point involved in evaluation, it has usually been theideal (own) self-guide (see Wylie, 1979). With this referencepoint, low self-esteem involves feelings of dissatisfaction anddisappointment (Higgins, 1987). The ideal (own) self-guidemight have received special attention as the reference point be-cause it was emphasized early on by both James (1890/1948)and C.R. Rogers (1961), whose writings on the self were espe-cially influential. Although S. Freud (e.g., 1917/1959) andother psychoanalysts (see, e.g., Fenichel, 1945) emphasized theought self-guide as the reference point, their impact was moreon theories of emotional disorders than on conceptualizationsof self-esteem. But this is an historical oversight. There are cer-tainly cases of extreme low self-esteem that involve intense feel-ings of worthlessness and guilt. There also are cases of low self-esteem that involve the feelings of humiliation described byCooley (1902/1964), who emphasized the ideal (other) self-guide. Rather than simply choosing one of these referencepoints to make explicit, as the self-esteem literature has tendedto do with ideal (own), it might be more useful to explicitlymeasure all basic reference points.

Recent studies of self-esteem have found evidence of yet an-other kind of low self-esteem. This research has found that,compared to high-self-esteem people, there are individuals withrelatively low self-esteem who tend to know less about them-selves, that is, have self-concept confusion, and evaluate them-selves in a globally moderate or neutral manner (see, e.g.,Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989;Campbell, 1990). Referencepoints might also underlie this kind of low self-esteem; specifi-cally, a conflict between reference points. When self-guides arein conflict, a distinct negative psychological situation iscreateda double approach - avoidance conflict (see N. E. Mil-ler, 1944). This type of conflict has been associated in the re-sponse competition literature with a number of consequences,including vacillation, blocking, and "fleeing the field" (see Ep-stein, 1978; Heilizer, 1977; Lewin, 1935; Miller, 1959). Suchconflict should influence self-evaluation and self-esteem. Be-cause there would be vacillation or inconsistency in which self-guide was used for self-evaluation, the same actual-self attributecould be evaluated as a "success" in relation to one self-guidebut as a "failure" in relation to the other self-guide. Thus, indi-viduals with a conflict between self-guides should feel confused,muddled, and unsure of themselves, and have moderate self-evaluations. Studies by Van Hook and Higgins (1988) and byHiggins, Loeb, and Ruble (1995) support these predictions.

A final comment on self-esteem: There has been a tendencyin the literature to describe high and low self-esteem as if theywere stable personality traits like extroversion and introversion.This is misleading. As just noted, the same individual can havehigh, low, and moderate levels of different kinds of self-esteemdepending on which kinds of actual selves and which referencepoints are considered. In addition, self-esteem is not a stablepredisposition in the way that type and strength of regulatoryfocus can be. Self-esteem is a consequence of self-regulatoryprocesses that include self-evaluation as one component. Stabil-ity in self-regulation, as reflected in a strong promotion or pre-vention focus, could even produce instability in self-esteemwhen life transitions change desired selves. Indeed, stability inself-guide strength has been proposed as an explanation for whyself-esteem and emotional health are unstable, especiallyamong females, after the transition into high school (Higgins,1991). Finally, global self-esteem (if there is such a thing)would provide up-to-date summary information about self-reg-ulatory functions, like a thermometer, rather than being a moti-vational force per se (cf. Baumeister, in press-b; Leary, Tambor,Terdal, & Downs, 1995).

Self-EnhancementSelf-enhancement has been referred to as the self-esteem mo-

tive, the desire to think well of oneself (Rosenberg, 1979). So-cial and personality psychologists, especially, have been in-trigued with people's motivation to establish and maintain fa-vorable views of themselves (see Sedikides, 1993). In manytheories, self-esteem enhancement and maintenance are con-sidered to be the primary motives, or even the most basic needs,of people (e.g., Adler, 1954; Allport, 1961; Epstein, 1973;Shrauger, 1975; Snygg & Combs, 1949; Steele, 1988; Tesser,1986). But what exactly is it that is being enhanced and main-tained? To the extent that our understanding of self-esteem israther limited, as suggested earlier, our understanding of howself-esteem is enhanced is constrained as well. The previous dis-cussion of alternative conceptions of self-esteem has direct im-plications for reconsidering the nature of self-enhancement.

There is an implicit assumption in theories of self-enhance-ment that there is one actual self whose evaluation is enhanced.If one abandons this assumption and considers all three kindsof actual-self functions described earlier, would the regulatoryforce of self-enhancement remain the same? To address thisquestion it is useful to consider an alternative to the self-en-hancement motive. Although there is more than one possiblealternative (see Sedikides, 1993; Wood, 1989), the most obvi-ous alternative is the self-assessment, accuracy motive (seeTrope, 1986).

Are the relative strengths of self-enhancement versus accu-racy motives the same for all three kinds of actual-self func-tions? No direct evidence on this issue is available, but it is likelythat the relative strengths of self-enhancement versus accuracymotives would vary across the different kinds of actual-selffunctions. To satisfy the instrumental-self function, it is neces-sary that the actual-self representation be as accurate as possi-ble. Otherwise, it represents a contingency that has never actu-ally happened and, indeed, might never happen. Thus, a moti-

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vation for accuracy rather than self-enhancement shouldpredominate for the instrumental self.

As discussed earlier, the expectant self is closest to what mosttheories of self-enhancement had in mind regarding the natureof the actual self. For this kind of self as well, however, there aregood reasons to be accurate. Representing one's dispositionsin relation to different activities or objects permits long-termplanning and general predictions of the future. This functionwould not be served by inaccurate, self-enhancing representa-tions of the actual self. Thus, there should be a strong accuracymotivation for the expectant self as well.

This is not to say that self-enhancement serves no function.The function emphasized in the literature is to feel good aboutoneselfthe pleasure of positive self-regard. People certainlyprefer pleasure over pain. Thus, to the extent that it is pleasur-able to believe that one's dispositions in relation to differentactivities or objects are positive, people should be motivated toenhance their expectant self beliefs. From a self-regulatory per-spective, however, this is not the only reason for enhancing theexpectant self. Indeed, it might not be even the major reason.The achievement motivation literature has described how in-creasing expectancies of success can increase motivation to suc-ceed and improve performance (e.g., Atkinson & Feather, 1966;Bandura, 1986). Thus, to the extent that self-enhancement in-creases expectanci