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Herbert Hoover and Federal Farm Board Wheat·

By C. Roger Lambert

, n recent years Herbert Hoover, the man and the President, , has been the subject of serious investigation and rein­

terpretation. No longer does any serious student porlray Hoover as a nineteenth century laissez faire LOol of bigI business or as a simple hard-hearted reactionary comenl to see his fellow Americans slarve in depression. Was

Hoover the direct ar1d knowing precursor of Ire New Deal and ex­pansion of the state, or was he so bound by his inflexible moral prin­ciples that he could nol acl, or was he an incompetent politician pushed by conditions and forces beyond his competency to direct'?' The Federal Farm Board and the handling of the vast wheal surplus provide some interesting suggestions.

As farmers experienced a chronic depression in the 1920s some farm spokesmen demanded positive federal action to guarantee equality of economic conditions for agriculture. Although there were variations. the most popUlar expression of that position was the McNary-Haugen proposal. Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce from 1921 LO 1928. maintained, to the dismay of many farm spokes­men, an active interest and role in the making of farm policy. Hoover saw McNary-Haugenism as price tilting which he strongly oppo~d.

He preferred a program of long-term stabilization. Farmers must follow the course of enlightened businessmen and build ··strong voluntary associations" which under competenl managers could provide the kind of guidance necessary to successful farming. The governmenl role should be to assist farmers in achieving this "busi­ness-like" solution rather lhan in assuming a supervisory role over farming.'

After winning the presidency in 1928. Hoover called a special session of Congress 10 legislate his farm program. Although the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929 proclaimed the objective of pUlling agricullure ··on a basis of economic equality with other in­dUSlries," the measure was designed to do whal Hoover had advo­cated-make agriculture efficient and create the Farm Board to help eSiablish cooperatives but without significant federal involvement in

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lOver and loard Wheat­.ambert

over, the man and the President, _ious investigation and rein­oa any serious student portray cntury laissez faire tool of big ard-hearted reactionary content :ans slarve in depression. Was IIrSor of the New Deal and ex­Ind by bis inflexible moral prin­s be an incompetent politician 'ond his competency to direct?' ldling of the vast wheat surplus

e depression in the 192()s some : federal action to guarantee .piculture. Although there were ilion of that position was the loover, Secretary of Commerce e dismay of many farm spokes­making of farm policy. Hoover

ing which he strongly opposed. m stabilization. Farmers must usinessmen and build "strong ::r competent managers could Iry to successful farming. The :Irmers in achicving this "busi­tuming a supervisory role over

1928, Hoover called a special farm program. Although the

9 proclaimed the objective of :onomic equality with other in­to do what Hoover had advo­create the Farm Board to help ~ificanl federal involvement in

r ~ c""...."""";" Cktobor 1974 A. facUlty """III ofmlluioJ for lb.. ".dy_

farming or marketing. Hoover viewed assistance to the farmer as a long-term reform project and not a device for immediate price relief. )

In mid July L929, Hoover mel with his chairman of the Farm Board, Alexander Legge of International Harvester. LO consider policy guidelines for the Board. The President had prepared a .. Memo­randum on possible procedures" which emphasized thai the "funda­menial purpose .. is to build up farmer-owned and farmer-con­trolled institutions for marketing the Carmer's crops and La use the funds and authority provided to the Board for this purpose." He suggested thaL wheat was the "firsl commodity" that the Board should assist. In more than two legal size pages, the President outlined steps to aid wheal producers-marketing cooperatives which "should be

gradually molded into cooperation and coordination with each other" and a national wheat corporation to lend to member co­operatives and to provide marketing facilities. The farmers were to own and control these organizations but so long as they were in debt Lo the Board they should be guided by its policies. The President did not reject purchases of wheat for stabilization purposes but suggested that it be done only with the approval of the Board:

During its first months of operation the Federal Farm Board followed the cautious course envisioned by Hoover. Legge, who proved a dominant force and claimed that even the President did not in­Ouence Board policy, emphasized that the primary problem of farm­ers was their e:o.:cessive individualism and "lack of organization." Marketing difficulties and overproduction could only be resolved through collective action. The Board would concentrate its efforls on "the expansion and strengthening of the cooperative movement" and would not buy commodities. Legge declared that the Board was not a "relief organization" concerned with helping "those in distress" but was concerned with the elimination of the "cause of distress,'"

As the first step in the long-term program for wheat, three board members met with wheat marketing cooperatives and farm organiza­tion leaders on 26 July 1929. The Board recommended the formalion of the Farmers National Grain Corporation, a centralized wheat marketing organization. It was emphasized by the Board that the new corporation should concentrate on the efficient marketing of grain and not on stabilization efforts to raise or .!iCt prices, although stabilization. with Board approval, was not ruled oul.'

Even this cautious position put the Board in the middle, a position it never really e5'=aped, Wheat farmers, faced with a large carryover, a bumper crop and declining prices, exp«:ted a much more positive approach to the resolution of their problems. Walter Newton, Secre­tary to the President and friend of grain men in Minnesota, reported

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on )0 July thal some of his friends had been surprised by the creation of Ihe Farmers National and fell "that il cannOl meet with Ihe chiefs ideas." Throughout its life the Board would be attacked by the special grain trade interests, the Chamber of Commerce. a commiuce of the American Bar Auocialion, as well as many individuals. The private grain men insisted that the Board ....as unfair, even trying to destroy them. a charge which one member of the Board partially verified. Others accused the Board of competing in private businesses, socialism, un-Americanism, and Sovietization. Even before appoint· men I of Ihc Board. a writer told Hoover that the legislation was "so objectionable thal it's n:Juseating," that it was unfair special privilege for farmen, and that Congress was a "bum:h" of "Bolsheviks.'" As the Board became more active. farm interests allackcd it for not ,jdoing enough or not doing the right things, while others attacked it for doing too much.

The Board's cautious long·term policy was probably doomed after the depression started. Wheat surpluses brought demands by' farmers for more action; the stodrmarket collapse applied pressure 10 prices and to cooperative organizations~ and price declines brought great political pressures as well as threatening the stability of the cooperatives. Aller some months of careful, cautious loans [0 co­operatives, in lale October the Board sought to mainlain wheal prices through a vast loan program. As prices continued 10 decline, the Board created the Gram Stabilization Corporalion in February 1930 to buy wheat. Arter three and one-half montns of attempts to peg wheal prices and lhe acquisition or over sixty' million bushels of wheal tn.e Board ceased purcnases and Chairman Legge announced that there were no runher plans to stabilize wheat prices.' ,.

Over lhe next five momhs members of the Board declared ',".'- re­pealedly thai the Board was not a relief organization. The Secretary of Agriculture. Anhur M. Hyde, warned lhat "the Stabilization Corporation cannot be used as a permanent remedy to rel1eve farm surpluses"· Legge warned that farmers who continued the production of surpluses for lhe Board to buv were in for a rude awakening ror there would be no Curther purchases ofwheal.'"

Although Legge insisled that lhe Board could not play the role oC "San La Claus," he arlnounced on 17 November 1930 thal lhe StabilizalJon Corporation nad resumed purcnases of wheat. For the next six and one-half monlhs Ihe stabilizatIon effort continued at a dizzy pace. By June 1931 the Board controlled approxImately 2:;0 million bushels of wheat. When the Board began ils massive loan policy lale 1929, it fixed prices for no. I wheal at 1.18 in Chicago; by June 1931 wheat was less Ihan 57 cents in Chicago. It was reponed that farmers were receiving 27 cents or less in Oklahoma." Obviously ~\abilization did no\ keep wheal prices at a reasonable level. but whal

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lid been surpriKd by the crealion 1'1 il cannot meet with the chief's I would be attacked by the special

of Commerce, a committee of wcJl al many individuals. The

Board was unfair, even trying to mcmm of the Board partially

f wmpcling in private businesses, wiclization. Even before appoint­)Over tbat the legislation was "so lbat it was unfair special privilege ,a "bunch" of "Bolsheviks.'" As iI1D interests attacked it for not .l things, while others attacked it

m policy was probably doomed t lurpluses brought demands by market collapse applied pressure alions; and price declines brought I threatening the stability of lhe :>f careful, cautious loans 1O co­d sought to maintain wheat prices prices continued to decline, lhe

on Corporation in February 1930 >ohalf months of attempts 1O peg Iver sixty million bushels of wheat irman Legge announced that there ~t prices.' mms of the Board declared re­rclief organization. The Secretary

warned that "the Stabilizalion ermanenl remedy to relieve farm lClS who continued the production i1iere in for a rude awakening for :>fwheal.'" he Board could nOt play the role on 17 November 1930 lhal lhe med purchases of wheat. For the ilabil;zation effort continued at a lrd controlled approximalely 250 .oard began its massive loan policy ~heat al \.18 in Chicago; by June in Chicago. It was reported that

>r less in Oklahoma." Obviously ~ at a reasonable level, but what

prices would have been without purchases can not be determined. Too, purchases apparently helped to save the wheat cooperatives. The low wheat prices and the vast government slock of wheal would hang over the farmer, the grain markel, the Farm Board, and the Hoover Administration.

The explanation for (he desertion of the conservative. long-term resolution of farm problems for the rather adventurous purchase confused many observers. Farmer and political pressure for a more positive aid program was constant, but there was little evidence to indicate great responsiveness. During the first purchase period, Board members insisted that wheal prices were unnaturally low and that purchases were a reasonable investment This was designed to give psychological relief as well as to maintain farm prices and purchasing power. Arter the second great buying period, Board members talked about relief for farmers, saving banks from collapse, and general de­pression relief. All of these concerns may have exerted some influence but the most recent scholarly study of the Board suggests that the motive was to save the farm cooperatives. The Board had loaned vast sums to wheat cooperatives. With the price decline, these cooperatives were in danger of financial collapse thus threatening the whole long­term farm policy. This was particularly true before the second pur­chase period. Governor Clyde Reed of Kansas wired the Presidenl that prices were "insufficient in many cases to cover loans already made" and that the cooperativcs were in danger of bankruptcy. Others ex­pressed the same fear." Thus, the Board probably made the stabiliza­tion purchases to save the cooperative program which was the base of its long-term farm policy. With the first purchase of wheal, the problem became what to do about surplus production and with the wheat owned by the government. Few saw lhe "staff of life" as a great opportunity for good; most saw il as a great burden. For two years, the Board devoted much time lo trying to control surplus production and to ways of disposing of 250 million bushels of wheal without further endangering the domestic or foreign markel or its own existence.

In the spring and summer of 1930, the agriculture officials launched a major acreage reduction campaign for wheat. By June the Board held almost 70 million bushels of wheal, prices were going down. farmers expected a bumper crop, and critics werc vociferous in their attacks on the activities of the Board. The wheat stale- Kansas­proved to be the center of connict for the Board. Some farmers warned that they "would pile" their crops on the ground before selling it at the depressed price. Legge supponed the idea of farmers holding wheat off the m<lrket to help Ihe price situation, but he insisted that the only permanent solution was to reduce output. Farmers, he argued, should form cooperative groups which would give lhem con­

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nol not only over \he marketing bu\ also the prod\lc\ion of wheal. Legge. Hyde, and experts from Washington toured the wheat bell. especially Kansas, explaining the surplus and market condilions, urging farmers to voluntarily reduce wheat acreage, and debating wilh lhe governor and farm experts. Reduclion, the people from Wash­ington insisted, was lhe only way farmers would ever get more from their wheat. Allhough Governor Reed demanded lhat the Farm Board buy more wheaL, the Administration spokesmen bluntly said that they would not buy wheat and insisted lhat the fate of the farmer wasup LO the farmer."

The wheat regions proved unreceptive to lhe reduclion campaign. Legge engaged in a prolonged and at times bitter debate with Ma.\: and Louis Levand. lWO Wichita newspaper publishers. In one of his presentations Legge said that the "biggest hog will always lie in the nough," and suggested that Kansas farmers should ask themselves jf they were in the "hog trough." The Levand:; immediately charged thal Legge had said Kansans were in lhe trough and demanded lhat he resign. Legge attempled to explain but ended telling the Levand, "logotohell."L4

More important was the farmer response to the reduction cam­paign. The Karuas Cily Star polled ils readers and found 77 percent opposed to reduction. Some farmers insisled that the Board proposal was "bunk," "hot air" or warned that they would "boot the first 'white collar' that comes on my farm and tells me what to raise." Others emphasized the moral issue. They talked about hunger in America and throughout the world, pointed to under-consumption "on account of the millions of unemployed thal cannot buy," and e.\:pressed fear "of the wrath of God if I should slack my besl effort to supply food." Others poked fun at Legge and Hyde and questioned the wisdom of Lhe President;

What a pily our Herbert lacked the wisdom of thal old Egyplian king! He could have found a Joseph who would have known whal to do wilh that pesky surplus. Now provi­dence with this awful drought is wiping oul all our surplus grain with a vengeance that fairly lakes the hide off Mr. Hyde and that leaves not a leg for Mr. Legge to sland On." Some emphasized lhat the Department of Agriculture had spenl

money for many years helping farmers to increase production and was now preaching just the Opposile. Agricultural e.\:perts from Kan­sas Stale and Te.\:as A & M strongly opposed the reduction campaign. There was no significant cooperalion with the effort. Although a few farmers made slight reductions in acreage. the cuts came primarily in the eastern wheat area (a long·time trend) and from lhe effecls of the drought." The Farm Board continued to voice support for acreage

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at also tbe production of wheal. .Ibington toured the wheat belt, surplus and market conditions,

ICC wheat acreage, and debating Reduction. the people from Wash­InneT'S would ever get more from Reed demanded lhal the Farm listration spokesmen bluntly said insisted that the fate of the farmer

:eptive to the reduction campaign. at times bitter debate with Ma'l ••paper publishers. In one of his biggest hog will always lie in the La farmers should ask themselves 'he Levands immediately charged in tbe trough and demanded that Ilin but ended telling the Levands

:r response 10 the reduction cam­I its readers and found 77 percent • insisted that the Board proposal tbat they would "boot the first

Inn and tells me what to raise." Ie, They talked about hunger in ~, pointed to under-consumption employed that cannot buy," and if I should slack my best effort to Legge and Hyde and questioned

ked tbe wisdom of that old : found a Joseph who would at pesky surplus. Now provi­is wiping out all our surplus airly takes the hide off Mr. for Mr. Legge to stand on."

larlment of Agriculture had spent 'mc:rs to increase production and t. Agricultural experts from Kan­,opposed the reduclion campaign. In witb the efTor\. Although a few acreage, the cuts came primarily me trend) and rrom the effects or tinued to voice support ror acreage

cuts" and according to some even threatened retaliation against those who refused to cooperate, but the emphasis shifted in 1931 to the disposal orthe wheat which had been purchased.

, The serious drought of 1930 offered the Board hope for reducing

the stockpile of wheat. With weather conditions severely limiting feed crop output and affecting wheat production. the Administration leaders saw an opportunity to rid the nation of e'lcess wheal. Legge declared that the Board was not a relief organization and could not give wheat to drought victims, but he urged that farmers feed wheat. The Board and the Department of Agriculture pointed out that wheat was cheaper and equally as nutritious as corn. They issued pamphlets

\ on the feeding of wheat to livestock. Although some wheat was used for feed purposes, by mid 193 L the ownership of 250 million bushels of wheat was still a problem to the future of the Board. '3 That stock­pile had a frightening innuence on the grain market and on the hopes of farmers.

Early in 193L, the Board announced that it would sell its wheat in such a way as not to harm the regular market. This immediately brought widespread protests from farmers and grain men who demanded that the Board set a minimum price of 85 cents to one dollar and pledge that i' would not sell wheat until the market price reached

that level. Senator Arthur Capper, Vice-President Charles Curtis, farm spokesmen, and othen pressed the demand. One of the more inleresting expressions came from Mrs. R. D. Rood of the Republican National Committee from Oklahoma. After pointing out that farmers were receiving only 27 cents for no. I hard wheat and accepting the Board's assurance that the price guarantee would not help wheat prices. Mrs. Rood warned that the Board's position had aroused "the active hostility and opposition of the people ...." She urged that aI guarantee would have "great psychological and resultant political

I value in showing that the Administration was willing to go the limit to help the farmers in their extremity." Although in March the Presi­dent urged that the Board push its sale of wheat. he reversed himself and persuaded the Board to offer the appearance of compromise-a pledge that sales would be limited to live million bushels a month." Although some wheat was sold at very low prices and the Board worked out some large sales to China and Germany on most unfavor­able credit terms, and traded wheat to Brazil for coffee, lO the basic problem remained.

From the IIrst e'lpression of concern about the wheat surplus, Americans demonstrated interest in its use. The character of their proposals indicates the depth of their feelings and also the confusion that reigned in the country. One movement in 1930 was an "eat more" campaign. Secretary Hyde declared that "there would be no farm

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surplus if there w~re diet e~peru :. Others. touk up this{\Q

refrain and urged that each American eat "one more slice" of bread a day in order to erase the surplus.. The Civic and Commerce Asso­ciation of Minneapolis organized an energelic "eat more" drive. They aUal'ked dieting. >Uggesled that AmeriLan~ did not eat enough, and sloganiled "eat one more slice of bread each day and help the falmer." When someone proposed that Hoover recommend the program, his aide, GeLlrge Akerson, replied: "Frankly and confidenlially Perry, I am wondering if the beal has been too much for your folks oUl there."" Although the "eat more" campaign did not become the great national mO\'ement its backers desired. similar proposal> can· tinued to appear.

Many proposc::u thal tIlt: wheat be dona led to the hungry Chinese: Americans seemed convinced that the Chinese were alwa)s hungry. One proposed that every wheat grower give 20 percent of his output 10 the stan'ing Chinese; anoLher suggesLed thaL the Chamber of Commerce lead a drive 10 collect one dollar !rom every American 10

buy wheat felf the hungr~ Chinese. It was suggested that every American family buy a barrel of llour; the flour could be used at home or donated ,0 charity. Others. orged Hoover to simply give the unground wheat to the needy and teach them to boil iL with a little salt to provide a good nutritious diel for only a couple of cents a day.';

The use uf the surplUS wheat for relief was a significant issue throughuul the Hauver Administr<llion. President Hoover. once c<llled the "world's greatest Relief Administrator" by Senator Joe T. Rohin­son of Arkansas, was nor prepared for the role of depression relieL" Although some saw in the Farm Board wheat a gre<lt nppmlunil)' for Hoover to aid the drought-stricken and unemployed. the President did nut respond."

As the 1930 drought developed, many well·meaning citizens suggested that the wheat either be given or sold on fa~'orable terms til. the druught nCllm~ Set:rel:H!' Hyde insisted, all. the contrar). that the government should no more feed droughl victims than others who were needy. To start such a program would be "treading all. dangerous ground ." IL WOUld, he warned, "constitute a dangerous step toward the dole system."

Pre5~ure In 19)0 came from the Economic Conserv:Hion Com­millee he<lded by J. R. McCleske) and from Democratic poJiti..:ians such as William Gibb, McAdDo. McAdM warned thal i\ would be "a trave.Hy if deserving hut unfortunate people are permitted to suffer hunger because the government hoard," wheat. JLle T. Robinson. Senator from Arkansas, at McAdoo's sogge.~tion, pressed Congress for relief use of the wheat John Pollard, Governor of Virginia. told Hoover that all j{ would take to get relief use of the wheat was a wurd

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perts .." Others took up this 'jean eat "one more slice" of bread ts. The Civic and Commerce Asso­m energetic "eat more" drive. They ,mericans did not eat enough, and rread each day and help the farmer." lover r«ommend the program. his 'Frankly and confidentially Perry, been too much for your folks oUl re" campaign did not become the ers desired. similar proposals con­

1 be donated to the hungry Chinese: I the Chinese were always hungry. 'ower give 20 percent of his outpUt

suggested thaI the Chamber of "ne dollar from every American to l:Se. 11 was suggested that every Dour; the nour cOlild be used at

r5 urged Hoover to simply give the leach them to boil It with a little diet for only a couple of cents a

I fOr relief was a significant isslle tion. President Hoover. once called iillrator" by Senator Joe T. Robin­I fOr the role of depression relief.'" "ard wheal a great opportunity' for and unemployed, the President did

perl, many well-meaning citizens riven or sold on favorable terms to e insisled, on the contrary, that the )ught victims Ihan oLhers who were ~ould be "treading on dangerous led, "constitute a dangerous step

he Economic Conservation Com­and from Democratic politicians

cAdoo warned that it would be "a lie people are permitted to suffer oards" wheaL Joe T. Robinson, )O'S suggestion, pressed Congress ()lIard, Governor of Virginia. told relief use of the wheat was a word

from the President. McCleskey warned that "the desperation born of hunger breeds a mental attitude which cannot be permitted to gain a foothold among so large a mass of our people as are now destitute." He also tOld Hoover that the "public thought was that the President should do something definite and practical and immediate to help feed the people who are hungry now." Alexander Legge re­emphasized that the Board was not a relief agency and that it had no authority to give its wheat or money away, but he did indicate his willingness to sell the wheat to charity organizations for relief pur­poses.

1n 1931 the drive for relief use of surplus wheat continued with

• one of the interesting efforts that of Isaac Sprague and the Porto Rico Child Health Committee. Sprague told Theodore Roosevelt. governor of Porto Rico and son of the former President. that he had donated one dollar to the Committee and that this was enough for 20 meals. He considered this good use of money but reported that he had been able, using unground wheat "boiled into porridge" Lo prepare "reasonably palatable. and unquestionably nutritious meals" for "three tenths or u cent per meal.'· A number of people came up with the idea of using unground wheat as a cheap but healthy food for the needy. Sprague also contacted the Farm Board and Walter Gifford. chairman of the President's Commillee on Unemployment Relief. The Farm Board responded that it was not a relief agency and could not "give away any of the whear," Roosevell considered the suggestion worthy and wrote:

You have hit the nail on the head, Why should some be starving because they have nothing to eat, and others broke because they cannot sell their wheat. AtleaSl if it cannot be sold it can be ealen. I will make another attack on that formidable animal, the serpent of red tape, and sec if there is anything else I can do to diseotangle its tails."

Roosevelt, if he made any real effort, had no mOre success than others. E. N. Hopkins of the Meredith PUblishing Company led another

efforl to get the wheat "dislributed to the worthy poor" through some charity group. Hoover was warned about the "violent talk from per­sons of the industrial and agricuhural classes," and possible "class strife:' Hopkins emphasized the necessity of feeding "starving humanit~,,, and ~uggested that Hoover could not only gain credit but also "stabilize farm prices and stop the mouths of thousands of people who are criticizing the governmenl."" \\/arnings of this type were common in 1931. but the President either refused to hear them or was unable 10 unders\and them. Hoover's attitude was best summed up in a January 1932 letter to Walter Gifford. After stating that relief seemed well in hand through the traditional local authorities except ror "cerlain sore spots," Hoover continued:

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H we could have the sum of fhe 10 len milljc<'l~ of dollars pl~ted al your dig­posallo be used 10 supplemem lhe efforts 01 local commjtt~s under your di­rection. we .:vuld cerlainly &.Void all lhe infinile evih or the Federal Go.'ern­ment enlering inlo lhi~ problem. 11 seenu 10 me a malt!!"! ...,lTthy of consider­ation by subslanlial men in lhis coumry thatlbey should place you in position 10 assure the passage or the wimer Wilh lhe same success thaI we p3ssed lasl winler and without a breakdown in our fundamental ideas of governmenl. It seems 10 me thaI it is worth the effort or your calling upon .uch men \0 learn if lhey will not pledge Ihemsel~es 10 give you this supporl which is needed for lhis purpose,"

Wilh this declaration of belief, Hoover made no errort to use the wheat or to seize the relid iniliative. Clearly, keeping the federal govern­ment out of relief and relying on wealthy individuals look priority over assistance to the needy.

Congress took up the wheal question in the winler of 1931-1932. Again the Farm Board emphasized that the wheat should be paid for, and President Hoover waS understood to oppose donalion of the wheal for relief. Congress, however, approved in two grants the donation of 85 million bushels of wheat to the Red Cross for distribUlion to the needy with no restriction on origin of the need.'· The Presidenl, White House reporls indica led, opposed the measure but would sign the bill; as lhe government would be giving a commodity ralher than cash il was nOl considered a dole.'o Chairman James C. Stone of the Farm Board termed it an "extremely bad principle" to use money provided for aid to agriculture jn general relief. AnOlher member of lhe Board argued that jf there was need to save "anyone anywhere from being hungry we should lake anything anywhere and give il" but the Board should be repaid for the wheal.""

In a year, the Red Cross approved for dislribution over eight and one-half million barrels of flour to 5,140,955 families in all bUl 45 of the 3,072 counties of the nalion. It committed over seventy-three million bushels of the donted wheal. ll Allhough Hoover ilpparently disliked the idea, by 1932 it would have been all but impossible lo refuse this most limited relief effort.

The distribution was a major turning point in thal it initiated the role of the government in federal food relief. In 1937, larry Richey, an aide to president Hoover, claimed the "Hoover Administration bought eighty-five million bushels of wheat ... and distributed them to the people on relief as a gift." Although his statemenl was not quile accurate, it indicated the marked change in atmosphere that five years had brought

President Hoover was convinced thill an expanded bureaucratic governmenl which actively involved itself in the farming industry and provided dircel aid lo needy individuals represented a "clear and pres­ent danger" lo the American System. He said thaI he would never per­

':.~~ mit Americans to slar~·e and that when necessary he would lake action. .~ ~~~l§;':'9';1d

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III millions of dollars placed al your dis­fforu oflox:aJ commitlees under your di­the infinite evils or the Federal Govern­III!mI 10 me II matler worthy of consider_ try thai they should place you in position rith Ihe same IUCCesS Lhlll we passed la.1 :JUl mlldamental ideas or governmenl. II , oryouT calling upon such men to learn pYe you this support which is nceded fOT

lOver made no effort to use the wheat ::tcarly, keeping the federal govern­fealthy individuals took priority over

question in the winter of 1931-1932. d tbat the wheat should be paid for, ood to oppose donation of the wheat ...oved in two grants the donation of c Red Cross for distribution to the of the need":' The President, White tbe measure but would sign the bill; iDg a commodity rather than cash urman James C. Stone of the Farm .d principle" to use money provided Wef. Another member of the Board Jive "anyone anywhere from being nywhere and give iI" but the Board

ovcd for distribution over eight and 15.140.955 families in all but 45 of . It committed over seventy-three 81.'1 Although Hoover apparently Id have been all but impossible to

turning point in that it initiated the rood relief. In 1937, Larry Richey, imed tbe "Hoover Administration Is of wbeat .. and distributed lift.1I Altbough his statement was he marked change in atmosphere

::cd tbat an expanded bureaucratic t ibelf in the farming industry and :uaIs represented a "clear and pres­n. He said that he would never per­~en necessary he would take action.

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Allhough he accepted Reconslruclion Finance Corporation relief loans to state governments, he never accepted that the time for federal relief had come." He was not without support in hjs opposition to federal aid. As one correspondent declared:

We Americans don't give doles 10 unemployed labor a. the Engli~h. do ","'hen II man ceases [0 be able [0 suppon himself, If he caUs this condition tu

those in charge or loral P0I}T law~, he will be senL Lo lhe poor house, not for hiS

benefit and advamage. for he lose. hil right to VOlt, bUI for the benefit of so­I l'ie'>'. w he rna)' be SlIl'ed from the temptation 10 steal and thereby injure hi.\ neighbor's pro'r'C'r1l~'.

Another correspondent urged Hoover to slop "helping the Farmer. I It is too bad how the Government is being swindled helping these burn

farmers ,.. He continued: The more you help people lhe more hcJplc5~ lhey become. Folks lhallhe Red Croh helped and olher charitable instilulions are jU~l getting back from plea~ure lrip~ lo lhe RockY5 and Calirornia. The Red Crou !lour lO the needy i~ II huge joke. Ha. Ha."

Another urged that Hoover stand firm against the "Senate Demo­gogs" for the "Roman Nation and Civilization fell when they fed the mob from the public crib."l' Hoover's views were not that simplistic nor was he a disciple of William Graham Sumner, but there was a reluctance to change to meet new conditions and an apparent reluc­tance to recognize new conditions.

Clearly the Depression changed the rules for both farm policy and relief to the needy and presented an even greater "clear and present" danger to the ~ystem as the expanded state Hoover feared. It was in their own beu intere~ts for farmers 10 reduce wheat acreage voluntarily but to expect them to do so in the midst of the depression wa~ terribly unrealistic. Local government and charitable relief were more in the American tradition !han federal aid. but to have expected five or ten million dollars, given b}' wealthy individuals. to see the country through the winter of 1932 was equally unrealistic. With his reputation as a relief administralor. Hoover could have seized upon the drought crisis in 1930 and the growing unemployment problem, and used the Farm Board wheat to launch a vast national voluntary­federal humanitarian relief movement. With a minimum of federal involvement, he could have maintained the initiative and perhaps limited the development of the "stalism" which he so feared. Instead he quoted the Grover Cleveland maxim lhat "lhe people support the government. the government should nol support the people."!' He could have led. but he refused.

There is no simple explanation as to why he forfeited leadership in the Depression. Clearly Hoover as nol a laissez faire President. He initiated the Farm Board in 1929 before the Depression. He sought

31

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