Herald of Free Enterprise Car Ferry Disaster

(Source: Colin Boyd, Case Studies in Corporate Social Policy in Post, Frederick, Lawrence & Weber, Business and Society, New York, 1996)

“It is with profound sadness that I must introduce this report with the tragic loss of the “Herald of Free Enterprise” off the Belgian coast. The Herald is a Townsend Thoresen ship and, as you know, Townsend Thoresen became part of P&O in January. At the time of writing the precise cause of the disaster is unknown. We have instituted an immediate investigation and of course both the British and Belgian governments are conducting enquiries. Whatever the outcome of these you may be assured that the safety of our ships and those who man them and travel in them is our overriding priority.”

So began the sombre letter by chairman Jeffrey Sterling introducing the 1986 P&O annual report, published in April 1987. The roll-on/roll-off passenger car ferry Herald of Free Enterprise capsized in the approaches to the Belgian port of Zeebrugge en route to Dover in England at 7.05pm local time on March 6, 1987. There was a light easterly breeze and the sea was calm. The ship had a crew of 80 and carried 459 passengers, 81 cars, 3 buses, and 47 trucks. She capsized in about 90 seconds soon after leaving the harbour, ending on her side half-submerged in shallow water. Only a fortuitous turn to starboard in her last moments prevented her from sinking completely in deeper water.

Following the capsize a heroic search and rescue operation was mounted. At least 150 passengers and 38 members of the crew lost their lives, most inside the ship, from hypothermia, in the frigid water. Many others were injured. It soon became apparent to the rescuers that the Herald of Free Enterprise had left the port of Zeebrugge with her bow doors open. The death toll was the worst for a British vessel in peacetime since the sinking of the Titanic in 1912.

The Cross-Channel Transport Market

The English Channel between England and the continent of Europe is one of the most heavily travelled water ways in the world. In 1985, a total of 20,056,000 passengers and 3,387,200 cars, buses, trucks, and unaccompanied trailers crossed the Channel by ferry. The most popular crossing is the shortest one, between Dover and Calais in France, a 22-mile trip that takes 90 minutes.

The mixture of demand for channel ferry services was changing. Passenger travel had remained stable since 1982, but freight traffic was increasing. Part of this increase was due to increased trade (particularly since Britain became a member of the European Economic Community), and part was due to the technological advance represented by the introduction of roll-on/roll-off (ro-ro) ships. These ships, essentially flat pontoons covered by a superstructure, have bow and stern doors which enable vehicles to drive on and off via adjustable ramps at the dock.. The speed of ferry loading and unloading is vastly improved for a ro-ro ship, reducing the unproductive time a ship spends in port.

Competition on cross-channel ferry services was influenced by the British government’s July 1984 privatisation of Sealink UK Ltd, previously a subsidiary of government-owned British Rail. At that time Sealink UK, its European state-owned counterparts, and Townsend Thoresen dominated the industry. Historically, channel ferry services had functioned mainly as the sea link between rail terminus points at channel ports.

Other changes in the ferry industry included the introduction of high-capacity mixed freight and passenger “jumbo” ferries; reductions in crew levels, despite the strong opposition of the maritime unions; the modernization of dock-side facilities to help speed ferry turnaround time; the

introduction of special freight-only ro-ro ferries; and the promotion of a wider range of fares, especially for day trippers and off-peak travel. These changes were similar to trends in other transport sectors, notably the airline industry.

The Channel Tunnel poses an extreme threat to the ferry industry. In 1986, after 100 years of aborted attempts to initiate a tunnel project, and against the bitter opposition of the ferry operators, the French and British governments finally gave the go-ahead to the project. The 30-mile-long dual railway tunnels underneath the Channel would commence operations in 1994.

The Capsize of the Herald of Free Enterprise

The Herald of Free Enterprise, like her sister ships Pride of Free Enterprise and Spirit of Free Enterprise, was a modern ro-ro passenger/vehicle ferry designed for use on the high-volume short Dover-Calais ferry route. She could accelerate rapidly to her service speed of 22 knots. She was certificated to carry a maximum of 1,400 persons.

At 433 feet long and 7,950 gross tons, the Herald was of record size at her launching in 1980 and was one of the prides of the 22-ship Townsend Thoresen fleet. She had two main vehicle decks and at Dover and Calais double–deck ramps connected to the ferry, allowing simultaneous vehicle access to both decks. At Zeebrugge there was only a single-level access ramp which did not allow simultaneous deck loading. Ferry turnaround time was longer at this port. This single ramp could not quite reach the upper vehicle deck and so water ballast was pumped into tanks in the bow of the Herald to facilitate loading.

When the Herald left Zeebrugge on March 6, 1987, not all the water had been pumped out of the bow ballast tanks, causing her to be some 3 feet down at the bow. Mr Stanley, the assistant bosun, was responsible for closing the bow doors. He had opened the doors on arrival at Zeebrugge and then supervised some maintenance and cleaning activities. He was released from this work by Mr Ayling, the bosun, and went to his cabin. He fell asleep and was not awakened by the “harbour stations” public address call alerting crew to take their assigned positions for departure from the dock.

The bosun left the car deck at the “harbour stations” call to go to his assigned station. He later said, “It has never been part of my duties to close the doors or make sure that anyone is there to close the doors.” The chief officer, Mr Leslie Sabel, was in charge of loading vehicles. He stated that he remained on the car deck until he saw – or thought he saw – Mr Stanley threading his way through the parked cars toward the door control panel. He then went to the bridge, his assigned position for departure from dock.

The Herald backed out of the berth stern first. The Herald had a new design of clamshell doors which opened and closed horizontally. This design made it impossible for the ship’s master, Captain David Lewry, to see from the bridge if the doors were opened or closed. As the ship increased speed, a bow wave began to build up under her prow. At 15 knots, with the bow down 3 feet lower than normal, water began to break over the main car deck through the open doors at the rate of 200 tons per minute.

In common with other ro-ro vessels, the Herald’s main vehicle deck lacked subdividing bulkheads. If water entered the deck, it could flow from end to end or from side to side with ease. The flood of water through the bow doors quickly caused the vessel to become unstable. The Herald listed 30 degrees to port almost instantaneously. Large quantities of water continued to pour in and fill the port wing of the vehicle deck, causing a capsize to port 40 seconds later. The Herald settled on the sea bed at slightly more than ninety degrees with the starboard half of her hull above water. There had been no chance to launch any of the ship’s lifeboats.

Under the 1894 Merchant Shipping Act, a Court of Formal Investigation of the capsize of the Herald of Free Enterprise was held in London between April and June 1987 before the Wreck Commissioner, the Hon. Mr Justice Sheen, a respected judge. The court had investigative powers, the power to suspend or remove a Merchant Officer’s Certificate of Competency, and the power to determine who should contribute to payment of the investigation’s costs. The court had no other powers.

What follows are extracts from the report of the court of formal investigation –

The Management of Townsend Thoresen

“….a full investigation into the circumstances of the disaster leads inexorably to the conclusion that the underlying or cardinal faults lay higher up in the Company. The Board of Directors did not appreciate their responsibility for the safe management of their ships. They did not apply their minds to the question: What orders should be given for the safety or our ships?

“The directors did not have any proper comprehension of what their duties were. There appears to have been a lack of thought about the way in which the Herald ought to have been organized for the Dover-Zeebrugge run. All concerned in management, from the members of the Board of Directors down to the junior superintendents, were guilty of fault in that all must be regarded as sharing responsibility for the failure of management. From top to bottom the body corporate was infected with the disease of sloppiness…It is only necessary to quote one example of how the standard of management fell short…It reveals a staggering complacency.

“On 18th March1986 there was a meeting of Senior Masters with management, at which Mr Develin was in the Chair. One of the topics raised for discussion concerned the recognition of the Chief Officer. Mr Develin said, although he was still considering writing definitions of these different roles, he felt ‘it was more preferable not to define the roles but to allow them to evolve.’ That attitude was described by Mr Owen, with justification, as an abject abdication of responsibility. It demonstrates an inability or unwillingness to give clear orders. Clear instructions are the foundation of a safe system of operation.

“It was the failure to give clear instructions about the duties of the Officers on the Zeebrugge run which contributed so greatly to the cause of this disaster. Mr Clarke, [counsel] on behalf of the Company, said it was not the responsibility of Mr Develin to see that Company orders were properly drafted. In answer to the question, ‘Who was responsible?’ Mr Clarke said, ‘Well in truth, nobody, though there ought to have been.’ The Board of Directors must accept a heavy responsibility for their lamentable lack of directions. Individually and collectively they lacked a sense of responsibility. This left, what Mr Owen so aptly described as, ‘a vacuum at the centre.’

“…Mr Develin [Director and Chief Superintendent] was prepared to accept that he was responsible for the safe operation of the Company’s ships. Another director, Mr. Ayers, told the Court that no director was solely responsible for safety. Mr Develin thought that before he joined the Board, the safety of ships was a collective Board responsibility.

“… as this investigation progressed, it became clear that shore management took very little notice of what they were told by their Masters. The Masters met only intermittently. There was one period of two and a half years during which there was no formal meeting between Management and Senior Masters. Latterly there was an improvement. But the real complaint, which appears to the Court to be fully justified, was that the “Marine Department” did not listen to the Complaints or suggestions or wishes of their Masters. The Court heard of four specific areas in which the voice of the Masters fell on deaf ears ashore.”