Henaff-Anthrop of Gift Exchanges& Recogn

8/9/2019 Henaff-Anthrop of Gift Exchanges& Recogn

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Marcel Hnaff

University of California, San Diego

[Lecture presented at Berkely May 2, 2006 and Brown May 3, 2010; to appear in 2012]

Anthropology of Gift Exchange and Social Recognition

At the beginning of the 80s we witnessed in all developed countries a type of

debate that is still ongoing and that can be summarized as follows: beyond social

justice in the realm of legal equality, income, and labor rights lies another claim that is

no less urgent or fundamental : that of the recognition of the equal dignity to be

granted to every type of social or cultural difference as well as to every type of

marginalized or ignored identity, whether it is related to ethnic origin, sexual

orientation, handicap, or occupation. This issue is familiar to many scholars; we know

how it has particularly developed in the United States. I do not intend to enter into this

considerable and complex debate in this paper. I would just like to note that some

significant philosophers have participated in it in various ways, such as the Canadian

Charles Taylor in hisMulticulturalism and Politics of Recognitionor the German Axel

Honneth in The Struggle for Recognition. The latter elaborated his position based on an

original reading of Hegels early writings; at the core of his book is a proposal to

identify three levels or spheres of claims to recognition.1. that of self-respect in the

legal sphere; 2. that ofself-esteemin the socio-ethical sphere; 3. that ofself-confidence

in relationships of love or friendship. What I find problematic in this type of

presentation is the fact that it is mainly situated from the perspective of the Self. I do

not dispute that this is unavoidable if one is to analyze the problem of recognition as a

subjective claim. But the very concept of recognition precisely implies inter-subjective

relationships. From the outset the response of the other is presupposed in the demand

for recognition. Ricur certainly chose a better approach to this precondition in his last

book, Course of Recognition. But in my opinion we need to go further. We must break

with the theoretical framework provided by HegelsPhenomenology of Spirit, in whichthe well-known section on the struggle for recognition between Master and Servant is

found ; this struggle is a dead-end, since the looser, having ceased to be the equal of

the winner, can no longer recognize him. It seems to me that a different answer to this

dilemma can be proposed; it can be found in Marcel Mauss The Gift--even though

Mauss did not directly deal with this question.


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[1] -Rereading Mauss The Gift

There is something remarkable about the theoretical and literary fate ofthis essay,

which was published in 1924 and did not have a significant impact on anthropological

research, except for scholars who were very close to Mauss himself. Instead, the best

attention it received came from readers who were at the margins of Academia, such as

the group of intellectuals associated with the Collge de Sociologie. Among them,

Bataille presented the most creative reading of Mauss essay by placing the potlatch at

the core of his reflection inLa part maudite. It was only with the publication of Lvi-

Strauss The Elementary Structures of Kinship in 1949 that The Giftreceived its true

scholarly consecration since, as Lvi-Strauss explained, the whole logic of kinship

systems as founded on the exogamic alliance reveals above all a principle of

reciprocity between human groups; exogamy constitutes the rule of gift-giving par

excellence, Lvi-Strauss claimed; the prohibition of incest expresses this requirement,

as S. de Beauvoir immediately understood in her laudatory review published in 1949.

The following year [1950], Lvi-Strauss himself explained in his Introduction to the

work of Marcel Mauss that he had read Mauss essay with extraordinary excitement

and with the feeling that a new intellectual continent was opening up. The debate

surrounding this work was only beginning. Anthropologists, classicists, economists,

philosophers, and other essayists have taken part in this debate. Outside of France, The

Gift, which was for some time little known by scholars, was since translated into many

languages [English, 1967 & 1990]. In France an intellectual movement supported by a

journal whose acronym is Mauss name has developed starting in the 80s. But there is

no question that Derrida deserves credit for bringing a new philosophical dimension to

this debate in seminars from the late 70s, which were taken up again and developed in

chapter 2 of Donner le temps, published in 1991 [Giving time, U of Chicago Press,

1992] . He discussed Mauss in a subtle manner. He also claimed that in the final

analysis Mauss had missed his point since, by emphasizing the requirement for

reciprocityhe reinstated gift-giving as part of self-interested exchange and therefore in

the commercial relationship with which he had sought to distance himself. The purpose

of this presentation is not to discuss Derridas positions in detail (they will be

mentioned again later) but to wonder whether his objection does not show a serious

misunderstanding of the very concept of reciprocity presented as tied to the idea of

self-interest and even profitable exchange. Derrida was not alone in suspecting this

kind of connivances -so did Bourdieu-. But to me the question seems to be a more

complex one. The very concept of gift-giving lends itself to this kind of confusions if it

is not first clarified and even better differentiated. The first urgent task is to present this


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clarification. We must understand the nature of this urgency; my purpose is not to

refine a project of lexical categorization but to understand what is at stake in the

ceremonial gift-giving Mauss discussed. He viewed it as a total social phenomenon.

What does this mean? Is this an extinct practice, since he called it archaic ? How

could it be total and have disappeared? My purpose in reexamining this issue from

new perspectives and by raising new questions is to show -or at least to point out in

this very short presentation- that the gift-giving Mauss discussed implies a conception

of reciprocity that has not only nothing to do with the notion of self-interest but defines

the very core of human relationships. Mauss himself did not clearly establish this

because he still interpreted gift-giving practices in terms of goods (even when these

goods are generously offered) whereas they must be interpreted in terms of symbols of

a commitment between partners. But what is the aim of this commitment? It seems to

me that answering this question requires going beyond Mauss. Here is my point: I

propose to show that this gift-giving relationship constitutes the fundamental gesture

or procedure of public recognition between human groups and that it is what

establishes them as uniquely human and capable of forming alliances and conventions,

thus constituting the very genesis of the political relationship, and from this we will be

able to understand the contemporary situation.

[2] - Clarifying the Concept :the Three Categories of Gift-Giving

When we reflect upon what it means to give we believe we can agree on a broad

definition that applies to every case and could be stated as, giving is providing a good

or service in a non self-interested manner, which means that no reciprocation is

guaranteed or expected. This definition seems perfectly reasonable, yet applying it to

every form of gift-giving can lead to the most serious confusions since ritual gift-

giving precisely includes the strict obligation to reciprocate the gift. We must therefore

acknowledge that the character of oblation (i.e. free offering) that is at the core of this

definition is not relevant in this case. The solution that has generally been chosen to

confront this problem has been to dismiss ritual gift-giving from the scope of this

definition, calling it archaic and suspecting that the requirement of reciprocity

involves the expectation of an advantage (or interest) that would be the damning

evidence for this archaic character. Doing so already performs a discrimination

between true gift-giving (which is supposed to have a character of oblation and be

unconditional) and its impure instantiations that can be identified by their difference

with the definition. In contrast to this approach, one could resort to casuistic

considerations on the amphibology of the word interest in order to associate it in a


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paradoxical way with the word gift so as to preserve this old-fashioned notion of

gift-giving. In my opinion, considering that several models of gift-giving exist and

that they are significantly different from each other is a more promising approach than

claiming to force a single mould onto overly diverse practices.

An effort of clarification is required. Let us start with a few convincing examples.

It is hard to see how the following could be placed under the same label: 1/. the

festivals and gifts that chiefs offer each other in turn in traditional societies; 2/ the

celebrations and presents that parents give to their children on the occasion of their

birthdays or that anyone offers to loved for their enjoyment; 3/ the donations given to

populations on the occasion of catastrophes. - These examples are significant: it can be

considered that they exemplify three main types of gift-giving: a./the first is generally

called archaic, a concept heavily loaded with debatable presuppositions; I prefer to

keep to descriptive criteria and call it ceremonial gift-giving; it is always described as

publicand reciprocal; b./the second can be said to begracious or oblatory ; it may or

may not be private, but it is primarily unilateral. c./the third can be called mutual aid

pertaining to either socialsolidarityor so-called philanthropic activity; it is viewed by

some as constituting the modern form of traditional gift-giving.

When a conceptsuch as that of gift-giving--applies to such different practices

and is open to such divergent argumentations, there is reason to believe that its

definition is imprecise or even confused and that the practices involved have not been

sufficiently described and categorized. Thus it is likely that the three examples given

above do not constitute a homogeneous class of objects.

- The first type is characterized by the obligation to reciprocate the gift that has

been received, as shown by ethnographic investigations; it therefore raises the issue of

reciprocity (which is certainly much more than a mere exchange of good manners). Its

lexical field is that of dosis/anti-dosis in Greek in which anti always indicates the

action in returnthat is called for by the initial action.

- The second type reveals a spontaneous generosity towards to those close to the

giver, which is viewed above all as a psychological or moral quality. Its lexical field is

that of kharis in Greek (one of the primary meanings of which is joy), that of

unilateral giving (there is no such thing as anti-kharis); this recalls the whole of the

theoretical field of Biblical Grace (hen, i.e. favor translated as kharis in the Septuagint,

a term also used by Paul), as well as the term Latin gratiafrom Seneca to Augustine,

and Medieval through Reformation theologies. -

- The third type as opposed to the second- expresses a much more social

dimension of generosity toward either close associates (friends or neighbors, between


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which reciprocity is desirable but not mandatory) or strangers (case in which returning

a gift would not make sense) : this would be the field of the philiaor philanthropia

discussed by Aristotle inNicomachean Ethic. It also encompasses various practices of

solidarity between close associates or members of a chosen community (such as a

religious congregation or a group of friends) and everything Weber described as

pertaining to a religious ethic of brotherhood [die religise Ethik der

Brderlichkeit].

At this point a crucial question must be dealt with : whereas forms of gift-giving

pertaining cases 2. and 3. are still common practice to this day, it is clear that

ceremonial gift-giving as a public form of exchange of presents between groups no

longer constitutes a predominant fact in modern societies. From this point of view

ritual gift-giving is a phenomenon of the past that barely survives in the form of

official gifts. This seems to legitimize the use of the term archaic and to explain the

temptation to identify traces of this practice in the two other forms of gift-giving that

are still occurring. I had the opportunity to show in a recent book1 that an entirely

different approach of ceremonial exchanges is possibleand perhaps required; it

amounts to understanding them above all as exchanges not of goods but of symbols,

more precisely as apublic procedure of reciprocal recognition between human groups.

This reading (the central elements of which I will now sum up) provides a starting

point making it possible to show that in any society that endows itself with a central

organizing authority -such as a city-state and a kingdom, in short every entity that we

now call a State- this public recognition is ensured by law and the whole of civic

institutions. This transformation makes it possible to articulate traditional gift-giving,

the law (as nomos), and the concept of public space.

[3] -Ceremonial Gift Exchange Is neither Economic nor Moral or Legal

What is at stake in the facts discussed by Mauss is the reinforcement of the bond

between the partners, the public prestige granted and gained, and the alliance established.

If we extend his conclusions, we can say that ritual giving is as alien to profitable

exchanges and contractual relationships as it is to charitable giving.

With respect to profitable exchanges, let us note that many observers have proposed an

economic interpretation of gift exchange as barter or trade. Boas considers potlatch as an

archaic form of lending with interest. Such interpretations are found even in the work of

1Hnaff, M. 2010. The Price of Truth. Gift, Money, Philosophy. Stanford, Standford University Press.


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theorists as scrupulous and well-informed as Max Weber and Karl Polanyi. Malinowski,

however, does not make this mistake: he emphasizes the difference between kula and

gimwali (also noticed by Mauss). Kula exchanges do presuppose the existence of an

economy: Trobriand islanders cannot live on gifts alone any more than we do. They

produce food and artifacts, and they must craft the precious objects they exchange. Like

everyone else they exchange ordinary goods for everyday uses. The termgift economycan

thus be entirely misleading if we fail to understand that ordinary economic activity is

subordinate to the central social fact, in which the life of the group is expressed and

transfigured. The nature of kulaexchange is not economic. Its essential function is to bond

different groups through the network of the partners in the exchange. The purpose of

celebrations is not for the partners to offer and gain consumer goods, but to give one

another tokens and public evidence of their intention to live together.

This does not entail that the nature of these ritual exchanges is moral. Their purpose is

not to demonstrate goodness or even solidarity. They do not amount to mutual support.

Ceremonial goods are not intended to help needy recipients survive. They are precious

goods valued as symbols of alliance, as tokens of the commitment of the giver. The

alliance established or renewed involves the public life of the group (as does exogamic

alliance, this most exemplary of exchanges). As such, it belongs to the political sphere. It

is not foremost a gesture of support. This exchange institutes an agreement and sanctions

trust. It may also express an attitude of compassion and solidarity in trials. To the extent

that these exchanges involve morality, it is in terms of the loyalty displayed and the honor

at stake in the alliance, not because of any generous intention. Unlike these collective

practices, charitable actions are admirable to the extent that they are discrete. In the same

way that philanthropy entails no compensation, charitable action entails no reply. The

gesture of ceremonial giving, on the contrary, must be publicand seen by all: it commits

the entire group and determines the prestige of the giver. Because its aim is alliance, it

implies a reply: reciprocation is expected. Alliance is necessarily reciprocal. The

commitment of one partner entails the commitment of the other. We must therefore ask:

are there several, fundamentally different types of giving?

Finally, ceremonial gift exchange is not a legal-type exchange in the sense of a

contractual relationship. In La Foi jure [1922] Georges Davy, a disciple of Mauss,

viewed potlatch as an archaic form of contract. Mauss disagreed. Although in The Gifthe

used the term contract, he did so in the broader sense of pact. In the strict sense, a

contractual obligation has a specific duration. It sets an accounting requirement with

respect to the amount and character of the objects exchanged, and it involves a

constraining legal commitment whose breach is subject to sanctions such as fines or prison


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terms. The aim of a contract is the strict equality and mutual benefit of the partners. A

contract formally bonds them as agents under the law, not as subjects committed in their

very being. Gift exchange, on the contrary, is viewed as obligatory only in the sense that it

involves prestige, honor, and the person of the giver, beyond any equalitarian calculus.

Gift exchange and contract are antithetical concepts.

[4] -Ceremonial Gift-Giving as a Pact of Recognition.

We must first reexamine the question of ceremonial gift-giving. Mauss was not the

first to show interest in this type of social phenomenon, which he also called archaic,

but he was the first who articulated it as a epistemological issue. Without dwelling on

this book which is probably familiar to most of us, I would like to very briefly mention

his main conclusions along with a few questions. 1. Mauss defined procedures of gift

exchanges as a total social phenomena, which means that they encompass everydimension of collective life such as religion, politics, economy, ethics, aesthetics, and

above all that they constitute the central fact around which everything else is

organized; hence this question: what has become of such central facts in modern

societies? Either they have disappeared or their purpose has survived in different

forms; if so, what are these forms? 2. Mauss showed that the gift-giving procedure

consists of three inseparable and mandatory steps: giving, accepting, and reciprocating

the gift. To him this mandatory character appeared as the most enigmatic. Mauss

documented it but did not explain it; is it possible to present a convincing interpretation

of this obligation ? 3. Mauss was clearly aware that this exchange in no way amounts

to trade: he even noted that the well-known kulacircuit of exchange of the Trobriand

Islands, in which precious goods are offered by both partners, coexists with a

profitable exchange calledgimwali, which is considered as the opposite of kula and is

conductedwith entirely different partners. Gift exchanges and commercial exchanges

coexist and belong to two very different realms; how can we understand that the

mandatory response to the gift that was received is not motivated by self-interest? 4.

The last important character Mauss emphasized was that through this exchange of

precious goods what is given is always oneself ; what is literally handed over to theother through the good that is offered is the self of the giver; hence the magic that

protects it. What is implied by this presence of the giver in the thing that is given? Is

this a superstition that should be ignored or the revelation of a relationship that is

specific to the third party constituted by the thing that is offered and absent from the

thing that is sold?


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It is clear that ceremonial gift-giving raises a set of questions that are specific to it

and radically distinguish it from the two other forms of gift-giving. Since it is

impossible to discuss the now considerable empirical collection of materials that has

been gathered for almost a century within the limited framework of this presentation, I

will just present a critical assessment indicating eight variables that can be drawn from

reading field investigations and make it possible to better identify the specificity of

ceremonial gift-giving: 1.goods exchanged: precious objects (or beings); festive foods;

2. procedures: well- established rituals accepted by the partners; 3. level of

communication : public; 4. effects caused or expected : a. strong bonds between givers

and receivers; b. prestige and rank gained; 5. type of choice : mandatory; 6. mode of

relationship: reciprocal; 7. attitude of exchange : generous rivalry ; 8. type of

involvement: personal.

Let us note that the two other types of gift-giving (type II, which I call gracious

and type III, which I call solidarity-based), only share one or two of these variables

with ceremonial gift-giving. It is therefore clear that discussing gift-giving in general

entails a serious epistemological risk. It is not possible to discuss gift-giving without

adding the adjective that specifies the realm in which it is practiced. It is clear that this

forces us to divide what has been called the gift paradigm into three parts or, better,

to acknowledge that there are at least three paradigms rather than a single one. They

can be described as different realms or orders in Pascals sense: each of them has its

own system of justification. Thus reciprocity, which is essential to ceremonial gift-

giving, is not relevant to gracious gift-giving but may or may not be valued within

solidarity-based gift-giving. Similarly, discretion -self-effacement of the giver- which

is often expected (and sometimes indispensable) in gracious gift-giving would make no

sense in ceremonial gift-giving, which is public by definition.

We must then present an entirely different interpretation of ceremonial gift-giving,

breaking even with Mauss. I already mentioned above the central argument of my

hypothesis: ceremonial gift-giving is primarly a procedure of public and reciprocal

recognition between groups within traditional societies. It still remains to determine

what this recognition means and why it occurs through such a procedure. A central

lesson is provided by investigations concerningfirst encounters. Numerous testimonies

have taught us that these encounters primarily take the form of reciprocal exchanges of

presents: the opening gifts. This may seem sensible and courteous to us. Our surprise

arises once these exchanges are presented as mandatorythe alternative being

conflict-- and once we realize that nowadays polite phrases and friendly attitudes are

sufficient for us. The whole question lies in these two previous observations. Nothing


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can better help us understand what is at stake than a short narrative reported by a

British anthropologist2who had heard it in the 70s from his New Guinean informer;

during the 1920s, the latter had witnessed the arrival of the first white man in his

village. It so happens that, according to local legends, the dead could return as light-

skinned cannibalistic ghosts. It was decided that a test would be performed to

determine whether or not this potentially dangerous stranger was a human being. He

was offered some pigs, and the white man, who was a well-informed Australian

administrator, offered them precious shells in return. Then, the informer concluded,

We decided that he was a human like us.3

It seems to me that this story can be viewed as an exemplary parable that can help

us understand the most general meaning of reciprocal, public, and ceremonial gift-

giving as well as its essential relationship with the phenomenon of recognition. The

opening gifts ritual is a procedure of reciprocal recognition in the triple sense of

identifying, accepting, and finally honoringothers. A first question must be raised at

this point: why does this recognition have to occur through exchanged goods? Other

questions arise: what is recognized in the other? What is made possible by this

recognition?

In order to answer these questions -and to increase our surprise- it seemed to me

that we had to move to an entirely different field and wonder whether or not other

animal societies, starting with those closest to us (apes), exhibit behaviors comparable

to these. What the most advanced research on this issue show us, especially those

regarding chimpanzees is that, 1/ mutual recognition as identificationoccurs through

vocal messages, smells, and above all coordinated sets of gestures and attitudes; 2/

recognition as acceptance takes place through postures and procedures of reciprocity

(such as attitudes of appeasement, mutual grooming, sharing of space), but never

through objects given as tokens and kept in exchange for others that are given either

immediately or later(which has nothing to do with the sharing of food among various

mammals or with the mating rituals of certain birds, reptiles, and insects). A. Smith

sensed this quite well : Nobody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of

one bone for another with another dog [1993: 21]. It seems that humans alone resort

to the procedure consisting of committing oneself by giving something of oneself as a

token and substitute of oneself. The fact that an agent vouches for himself in front of

other agents for the duration of a time period can be provisionally considered as

2. Andrew Strathern, The Rope of Moka. Cambridge, Cambridge U Press, 1971, p. xii.

3. He gave us shell valuables in return for pigs, and we decided he was a human like us, in

Strathern, op.cit. ibid.


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defining him as a Self. It is remarkable that this occurs through the mediation of a

thing, a third element that constitutes a token of himself. This recalls the classical

Greek and Roman procedure of thepactperformed through asym-bolon(derived from

ballein: to put; and syn: together), a piece of pottery broken in two, of which each

partner would keep one half that could fit the other as witness for the future that an

agreement had been made. According to this model4, reciprocal gift-giving is nothing

else than the originating gesture of reciprocal recognitionbetween humans, a gesture

that is found in no other living beings in that it is mediated by a thing, but a thing that

comes from oneself, stands for oneself, and bears witness to the commitment that was

made. Forming an alliance -a pact- means bringing together ones own self and the

strangeness of the other through a thing that comes from oneself and is desirable by the

other. This third party brings the two sides together: there is no alliance without an Ark

of the Covenant. The thing given binds the two parties primarily by bearing witness

that the bond has been accepted. This reciprocal recognition through the exchange of

something that specifically belongs to the group (or its representative) and is offered to

the other, is at the core of the exogamic relationship and illuminates the prohibition of

incest, is above all a positive imperative of reciprocity: one is a human being to the

extent that one moves outside of the natural group based on consanguinity by

recognizing and forming an alliance with the other. In order to be oneself, one must

recognize what one is not.

[5] - Understanding obligation and reciprocityThis is in short the new anthropological interpretation of ceremonial gift-giving

that I am proposing ; it obviously does not apply to the two other models of gift-giving,

namely unilateral gracious gift-giving and gift-giving out of solidarity5. Before we can

go forward we must understand how the concepts of symbol, convention, and alliance

are interconnected and how then those of reciprocity and obligation are related to them.

To say that there is an alliance -and in particular an exogamic alliance- means that

there is a pact and therefore an intentional recognition between Us and You

beyond a mere social self-regulation among groups. To say that this alliance brings

together what is not together -performs a sym-ballein- and belongs to the realm of

intentionality means that the encounter between two autonomous beings involves a

4.. It is no more than a model since thesymbolon rite is not in and of itself an exchange of gifts.

5. It also completely leaves aside another form of gift-giving that is not a socialpractice (and

therefore lies outside of my typology) but involves a philosophical decision: a view of being as a

gift (what I call the gift from nobody); for instance, J. L Marions analyses in Being Given, Stanford

U Press, 2002 [Orig.Etant donn, Paris, PUF, 1997]) belong to this category.


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decision to give oneself rules: establishing a convention amounts to engaging in these

rules (which is one of the primary purposes of rituals) and involving oneself : giving

oneself in the thing that guarantees the pact. This is made clear by the definition

presented by Ortigues, In general, symbols are the materials with which language

conventions, social pacts, and guarantees of mutual recognition between liberties are

constituted. Symbols are formative elements of a language considered relative to each

other as constituting a system of communication or alliance, a law of reciprocity

between subjects.6. What has been concluded through the opening gifts is extended

through time by relationships that rituals aim at stabilizing; but above all this is

accomplished through exogamic alliance, which indexes the agreement between

groups on the reproduction of life itself and connects it to the succession of

generations. From the moment the exchange of gifts as a gesture of alliance occurs, it

generates human groups that are regulated by a convention.

In order to better understand this, it may be useful to refer to the triadic relation

theory that was proposed by Peirce, for whom any relationship that implies two agents

and an object of exchange presupposes a norm of exchange; it is therefore not the mere

addition of two separable gestures such as, A gives object b to C and C receives B

from A; from the start and by definition the partners and the thing exchanged are, in

Peirces words, in relationship under a law 7

. Descombes was right to note8 that,

contrary to Russells claim -which reduced all exchanges to two dyadic gestures, A

gives B and C receives B- the gift-giving relationship is not the transfer of a good

from one partner to another but, as Peirce explained, a relationship between the

partners through the mediation of this good. To give is always to give something to

someone; this relation is inherent in all so-called trivalent verbs (such as to give, grant,

provide, bring, deliver, etc.). However, we must go further: ceremonial gift-giving

cannot be reduced to giving something to someone as Descombes seems to believe; to

deliver a good to someone in accordance with some rules instead defines the

contractual relationship (let us recall that to sellis also a trivalent verb). The gesture of

giving -especially ceremonial gift-giving- does not only generate a relationship ruled

by a law but from the start it is and does much more: it is an personalengagement

under a law. It consists of giving oneself to someone through the mediation of

something. In this case the third party represents the Self of the giver (Mauss was right

to emphasize this point) as a token and substitute of him/herself. In the case of

6E. Ortigues,Le Discours et le symbole, Paris, Aubier, 1962, p. 61.

7. C. S. Peirce, Collected Papers, T. I. paragr. 471, Cambridge, Mass. Harvard U Press, 1931-1958.

8. V. Descombes Les essais sur le don inLes Institutions du sens, Paris, Minuit, 1996 ; chap. 18.


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ceremonial gift-giving we must therefore consider a second level of triadic

relationship. There is a shift from the neutral fact of convention -the triadic structure-

to thepersonalgestureof commitment. However this is not sufficient: a third level of

this relationship must now be considered, since the commitment that ceremonial gift-

giving calls for requires the others response, i.e. the obligation of the gesture in return:

what is involved necessarily is therefore a gesture of reciprocity under a law . This

law is the obligation to return the gift. This is what Mauss found surprising; he

reported and documented it but admitted he had no way of explaining it. Introducing

the notion of interest in order to account for this reciprocity amounts to a serious

misunderstanding. What is the meaning of the obligationto respond in ceremonial gift-

giving? It is neither a physical necessity to react (as in the case of living organisms

responding to external stimuli) nor a truly legal obligation (which would provide for

sanctions as is the case when contracts are not abided by) or a moral requirement (in

the sense that it would be immoral not to respond). What we are dealing with is the

structure of a gameand an alternation principleanalogous to that found in any game

between partners and even more precisely in a duel. Entering the game entails having

to reply. Not to respond amounts to taking oneself out of the game. The obligation to

respond lies in this. One does not throw the ball back in order to be generous or

courteous or out of a contractual obligation but because the response is part of the

game, or rather of the system of accepted rules. The inseparable character of the three

terms of the triad concerns not only the relationship between the partners but also their

reciprocal action. The interplay of gift and counter-gift is a gesture of reply that

precisely matches the alternation of blows (in fact, the same partners involved in the

exchange of gifts are also responsible for vindicatory justice in case an offense was

committed). This reciprocity involves neither moral choice nor altruism or charity, but

only the requirement to reply that is specific to action among the living.

We may better understand it through as a fascinating episode of the Shatapatha

Brhamas(one of the oldest Vedic texts) teaches us. The first human being was called

Prajpati (Purusa in some other texts of the Veda) ; Prajpati was everything at the

same time : heaven and earth, air and water, and wind and fire; he was all the living

beings in the universe; he was the universe itself and he also was the first human; but

he was not able to draw a distinction between the various spirits he saw in the universe

and to separate the demons from the gods; therefore he offered them a feast of rich

food; some of them started eating everyone for himself, with gluttony, whereas the

others did something quite different: they took the food with their hands and presented

it to each others mouth. Prajpati then understood that the latter were the gods and


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were the ones that humans must admire and imitate. Let us call this the Prajpati test. If

indeed we consider the Gods' gesture more closely, we realize that it includes no such

thing as charity or even altruism: the Gods do not try to share the food; they do not

need it: the food is abundant and solidarity is not an issue in this case. What are they

doing, then? And why did Prajpati admire their gesture so much? We could--and even

must--answer that by offering food to each other the Gods want to affirm and confirm

the fact that they do exist for each other and that they want to express through the food

that they eat and share the necessity but also the pleasure of being together. The lesson

of wisdom conveyed by this tale tells us that we do not exist alone, that we are by

definition interrelated, and that our own existence is at stake in the very existence of

others; we are by definition constituted through this relation; to be human means to

recognize the fact of this foundational coexistence.

The relationship is agonistic from the start. But there is more to this: the game is

at the same time the pact that is offered and accepted through the goods exchanged9.

I propose to call this fundamental relationship of recognition political. Why ?Because

it is radically different from the social bond that exists in every animal society. The

alliance as an explicit gesture of acceptance through the choice of a token-symbol is

only in evidence in human reciprocal ceremonial gift-giving; it amounts from the start

to a public recognition of the other group and a commitment to coexist and collaborate,

in short to a convention ; this is precisely what Aristotle called apoliteia. The alliance

takes up and encompasses the social bond but it also transcends it by changing it into a

political bond, which is to say an intentional relationship of association. This is the

relationship that is unique to the human animal ; he/she is the zoon politikon in that

through the procedure of recognition he institutes a life under rules. The uniquely

human bond is political in that it is the unique bond between autonomous beings

capable of assigning themselves a law (not necessarily in an explicit manner). It is

therefore clear that an essential articulation exists between human order as reciprocal

public recognition and specifically political instituted order; as an institutional

procedure between groups, ceremonial gift-giving between participants in an alliance

constitutes the very emergence of apublic order-though not necessarily its permanent

historical form. This is what remains to be explained (at least shortly).

9. It can therefore be said that reciprocal ceremonial gift-giving confronts and resolves in a

particularly elegant way the prisoners dilemma (decision-making based on limited information or

involving uncertainty regarding others). One bets on trust and obtains it through a reply guaranteed

by the things given.


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Conclusion :Law, reciprocity and the three spheres of recognition

A first question immediately arises: how is this public reciprocal recognition,

which is performed through ritual exchanges of gifts in traditional societies, expressed

in societies with a central state system? The only possible answer seems to me to be

that this recognition is affirmed and guaranteed by law and by the whole of political

and legal institutions. The true heritage of ceremonial gift-giving will thus not be

found in the realm of the distribution or exchange of goods but in that of rights and

struggles concerning them. It is for historical anthropology to show how this

transformation occurred. This cannot be demonstrated in detail in this presentation.

However, we must recall that the ceremonial exchanges discussed above concern

societies in which the forms of authority are generally identified with the statuses

defined by kinship systems. For this very reason, public relationships between groups

primarily occur through matrimonial alliances. But from the moment an evolution

develops that leads to the emergence of a power entity that transcends kinship groups,

something radically changes (this shift and the crisis that comes with it are expressed

by Greek tragedy, in particular Aeschylus Oresteia). Individuals now appear as

members of a larger-group -such as the city-state or what we now call the State- while

still remaining members of lineages or clans for a long time to come. But the new

identity takes precedence over the old (generating a crisis that is in evidence in

SophoclesAntigoni). What is new is the equal status -isonomia- shared by everyone

under the law -nomos. It pertains to the middle space meson- where allegiances

between chiefs are cancelled in favor of a public recognition that is identically granted

to all. Thus in theIliad, when Achilles, furious at having been despoiled of his share

of booty, has succeeded in having Agamemnon return it to him, he refuses to have it

handed to him directly by the Achaean king; he demands that the goods be placed in

the middle -en to meson- so that they will come from the whole community of the

Greeks, thepolis.

Along with the emergence of the city and from this empty center, the law nomos-

as arbiter was proclaimed and the heroic reciprocity of lineages confronting each other

in the agncame to lose its legitimacy. Justice by arbitration was substituted for the

vindicatory justice that characterized ceremonial gift-giving relationships. A different

history was beginning. From then on every democratic transformation would take

place under the sign of the law and the third party as arbiter and against all forms of

reciprocal allegiance (such as feudal relationships).

My question then become this : if public recognition between groups which is

expressed by ceremonial exchanges of gifts in traditional societies is now guarantied


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by law and juridical institutions in state organized societies, shall we consider that

this formal affirmation or proclamation of rights is sufficient?- My answer would be :

it is necessary but not sufficient precisely because we cannot ignore the fundamental

claim for reciprocity. Therefore I will suggest to distinguish three spheres of

recognition: institutional, traditional and personal.

1/ The first one --institutional/public-- is that of laws, juridical systems, political

and economic institutions constitutes the new public sphere of decision for human

communities. Since it progressive affirmation with the early Modern period the claim

for reciprocity emerged trough the theories of contract (from Hobbes to Rousseau and

today with Rawls), which are indeed theories of social pact where law itself appears as

an object of mutual agreement among citizen. We are true political societies only if we

confirm to each other our agreement to obey to the same laws. For that very reason

the very idea of common law implies equality and constitute the base of any public

recognition.

2/ The second sphere which I call traditional is that of cultural practices forms ofcourtesy, ways of socializing in a workplace, neighborhood relationships, local

celebrations or festivals, and all forms of social relationships. These various

expressions always imply strong or loose forms of rituals and generate a sense of

community, solidarity and reciprocal services. It is certainly in that sphere that the

new claims for various identities find a chance of a strong expression and become

reality. Indeed one thing is to obtain legal or public rights another is to translate it in

forms of reciprocal respect in everyday life.

3/ The third sphere is that of personal relationships as they can be expressed in

love or friendship. This could be the legimimate realm of unilateral gift giving. It isalso the realm of ethical choices where the Kantian imperative of universal respect can

take place.

Or better said in the words of Lvinas : where the face of the Other in any

situation at any place calls us calls me- for an unconditional recognition.

Translated from French by Jean-Louis Morhange

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