Helicopter precision approaches using GNSS
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Transcript of Helicopter precision approaches using GNSS
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Helicopter precision
approaches
using GNSS
Philip Church
25 April 2013
Presentation for IET EC3 Section
1
Helios is the leading management and technology
consultancy in air transport
We aim to be our customers’ first choice
Company overview
Performance
improvement
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improvement
RegulationRegulation
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Safety & securitySafety & security
EnvironmentEnvironment
Technology & innovationTechnology & innovation
Planning & procurementPlanning & procurement
TrainingTraining
Performance
improvement
Performance
improvement
RegulationRegulation
Business economicsBusiness economics
Safety & securitySafety & security
EnvironmentEnvironment
Technology & innovationTechnology & innovation
Planning & procurementPlanning & procurement
TrainingTraining
• leading consultancy specialising in air
transport, airports and in Air Traffic
Management
• Also working in space, rail, maritime,
telecoms and defence
• Established in 1996
• Joined Egis, an international
engineering and infrastructure group,
in January 2013
• Headquarters in Farnborough UK
• Turnover: ~£5M
• Over 70% of revenue from exports,
mainly within Europe
• Two Queen’s Awards for
Enterprise (2004, 2009)
Customer base
Services areas
Overview
2
Difficulties of the offshore environment
‘Existing’ approach procedures
‘Safety’ assessment of ‘existing’ procedures
Proposed mitigations
Future steps
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Difficulties of the
offshore environment
3
4
Operations
Helicopter precision approaches using GNSS 5
Helicopter precision approaches using GNSS 6
Helicopter routes in the North Sea
Helicopter precision approaches using GNSS 7
Platform locations in the North Sea
8
Flights during low cloud base
• Navigation based on Airborne Weather Radar Approach
(ARA)
• Defined in:
• TSO C63c - (Airborne Weather and Ground Mapping Pulsed
Radars)
• TSO C102 - (Airborne Radar Approach and Beacon Systems for
Helicopters)
9
Standard first established in 1959!!
The ARA
10
No vertical guidance / Low level turns
ARA guidance
11
+-- LUM +-- BRG
ON/OFF +-- CRTSDMAP MISD NAVD FND
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Existing regulatory
(equipment)
requirements
12
Equipment carried
13
Industry standards
• Standards checked in relation to weather radar:
• TSO C63c - (Airborne Weather and Ground Mapping Pulsed
Radars)
• TSO C102 - (Airborne Radar Approach and Beacon Systems for
Helicopters)
• AC 90-80B - (Approval of Offshore Standard Approach
Procedures, Airborne Radar Approaches, and Helicopter En
Route Descent Areas)
• RTCA DO-172 - (MOPS for Airborne Radar Approach and Beacon
Systems for Helicopters)
• RTCA DO-173 - (MOPS for Airborne Weather and Ground
Mapping Pulsed Radars)
• Standards checked in relation to radio altimeter:
• TSO C87 – (Airborne low range radio altimeter) 14
What do the standards describe?
• Maintenance requirements
• Performance requirements
• accuracy
• range
• azimuth
• target size
• Test procedures
• during maintenance
• during pre-flight checks
15
Point of interest
AC 90-80B
TSO C63c TSO C102
DO-172 TSO DO-173
Indicated range error:
• ± 0.2NM for displays of
5NM or less
Indicated range error:
• < 10% of actual target
distance, or
• 1NM, whichever greater
Indicated range error:
• < ± 600ft (2) for
distances of 5NM or less for
Phase I
• < ± 300ft (2) for Phase II
• < 5% of indicated range
for ranges > 5NM
16
RDR-1400 technical specifications
• Certification:
• Radar certified by FAA to:
° TSO C63b
° TSO C102
• Installation and maintenance manuals supplied in accordance
with TSO.
• Repairs are upon fault indication or pilot malfunction report.
• Reliability:
• False alarm rate is 5 indications per 120º scan i.e. 10-6.
• Accuracy with respect to range and azimuth meet and exceed
the +/- 2% requirement of TSO DO-172 and 173.
• Expected MTBF of 1600 hours in continuous use.
• Analyzed to have a probability of generating misleading data of
2.18 x 10-6.
17
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Safety concerns
18
Mandatory Occurrence Reports (MORs)
20
Event type Number of
occurrences
First report Latest report
Incorrect or unavailable wind data
provided
4 April 1976 November 2003
Incorrect QFE/QNH to a/c 6 December 1977 February 2001
Crashed in poor visibility 1 November 1981
Loss of separation between helicopters 1 November 2004
Descended below decision height 1 June 2003
NDB procedural problem 1 March 1983
Helicopter landed on wrong rig 11 July 1989 November 2004
Misidentified rig 2 May 1990 August 1994
NDB off on rig 1 March 1981
NDB interference 4 April 1986 June 1994
Loss of weather radar 1 February 1984
Erroneous ADF display 1 April 1996
Loss of displays 1 August 1999
Malfunction of altimeter 5 August 1985 March 2001
Helicopter Operations Monitoring Programme
(HOMP) events
• The two incidents recorded are:
• Helicopter climbing into cloud on approach
° Flight crew inadvertently climbed 50ft into cloud base
• Helicopter breaking vertical minima on approach
° Flight crew incorrectly flew approach at below minimum descent
height
21
Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting
Programme (CHIRP) - Hazards
• Pilot descending below MDH
• Weather radar not calibrated
• Approach too close to rig (horizontal minima now
changed)
• Approach below deck height (vertical minima now
revised)
• Miscommunication between crew
• Weather radar not calibrated
• Crew breaking minima / ad quality of Met data
• Pilot descending below MDH
22
Risk matrix assessment
• EASA CS 25.1309 risk matrix
• EASA probability classification
23
Severity
CATASTROPHIC HAZARDOUS MAJOR MINOR
Fre
quency PROBABLE UNACCEPTABLE UNACCEPTABLE UNACCEPTABLE TOLERABLE
REMOTE UNACCEPTABLE UNACCEPTABLE TOLERABLE NEGLIGIBLE
EXTREMELY REMOTE UNACCEPTABLE TOLERABLE NEGLIGIBLE NEGLIGIBLE
EXTREMELY IMPROBABLE TOLERABLE NEGLIGIBLE NEGLIGIBLE NEGLIGIBLE
Frequency category Quantitative description
PROBABLE Failure condition frequency is more than 10-5 per aircraft flight hour
REMOTE Failure condition frequency is between 10-7 and 10-5 per aircraft flight hour
EXTREMELY REMOTE Failure condition frequency is between 10-9 and 10-7 per aircraft flight hour
EXTREMELY IMPROBABLE Failure condition frequency is less than 10-9 per aircraft flight hour
Offshore Weather Radar Approaches – Safety
assessment
24
Conflict Scenario
Severity
Probability
Result
1a. The flight crew approach the wrong installation and come into
conflict with another helicopter.
CATASTROPHIC
EXTREMELY
IMPROBABLE
TOLERABLE
1b. The flight crew land on the wrong installation and it is in an
unsafe condition.
CATASTROPHIC
EXTREMELY
REMOTE
UNACCEPTABLE
2a. The helicopter comes into conflict with the sea due to crew error.
CATASTROPHIC
< EXTREMELY
IMPROBABLE
NEGLIGIBLE
2b. The helicopter comes into conflict with the sea due to altimeter
failure
CATASTROPHIC
EXTREMELY
IMPROBABLE
TOLERABLE
3a. The helicopter comes into conflict with an obstacle due to flight
crew error.
CATASTROPHIC
EXTREMELY
IMPROBABLE
TOLERABLE
3b. The helicopter comes into conflict with an obstacle due to the
absence of the obstacle on the weather radar display.
CATASTROPHIC
EXTREMELY
IMPROBABLY
TOLERABLE
4a. The helicopter comes into conflict with the destination installation
due to flight crew error.
CATASTROPHIC
REMOTE
UNACCEPTABLE
4b. The helicopter comes into conflict with the destination installation
due to unannunciated weather radar malfunction.
CATASTROPHIC
EXTREMELY
REMOTE
UNACCEPTABLE
So something better is needed
• Manually interpreted
approach
• Reliance on the weather
radar for obstacle
clearance
• Helicopter operations can
be limited by lack of
navigation equipment
25
• GPS/SBAS can help, but limited use so far
• Increasingly dependent on GPS with gradual removal
of NDB’s from platforms
CAA requires action
• CAA Paper 2009/06 noted failings of current facilities
and improvements from GPS stating:
26
“… the fact that most hazards remain "TOLERABLE" (not
"NEGLIGIBLE") means that it is not a panacea and still has
shortcomings in areas such as vertical navigation. It is
recommended that work continues to address these
shortcomings …”
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Benefits of RNAV
27
The change in navigation
28
Before RNAV
29
After RNAV
30
RNAV vs RNP
• “RNAV” means the aircraft can follow a pre-defined
track with 1 NM accuracy 95% of the time
• “RNP” means the aircraft can follow a pre-defined
track with 1 NM accuracy 95% of the time AND there is
on-board monitoring and alerting that warns the pilot if
accuracy is insufficient
1 Nautical Mile 95% of flight time
1 Nautical Mile 95% of flight time
Track Centerline
For example, RNAV 1:
31
Navigation errors
• Lateral navigation errors (95% of flight time)
• Characterized by the Total System Error (TSE)
Desired Path
Defined Path
Estimated position
Actual position
Path Definition Error Flight Technical Error
Navigation
Sensor
Error
Total
System
Error
TSE is the Root Sum Square (RSS) of 3 errors: PDE, NSE and FTE
The navigation accuracy the aircraft achieves in practice is known
as the Actual Navigational Performance (ANP) 32
So what work has been completed for helicopters
to date?
• Focus on GNSS implementations to date have been
mostly fixed wing
MIELEC 33
The SBAS Offshore Approach Procedure (SOAP)
35
Straight approach – no turning / Vertical guidance
SOAP offers several significant advantages
• Less reliance on weather radar (combined with AIS)
• Independent cross-check against existing altimeters
• Allows a “straight in” procedure from final to missed
approach
• Enables autopilot to lower crew workload
• High navigation accuracy
36
Developed as a safety enhancement to current
procedures
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What about the integrity
of the GNSS signal for
helicopters?
37
Reception of GNSS signals affected more on
rotorcraft
• EGNOS GEOs broadcast SBAS correction message at a
low elevation angle in the operating areas
• Suggests the EGNOS signal may be more vulnerable to
masking and rotor interference than GPS
• Due to its lower specified maximum and typical power levels
• GPS presently radiates well above the specified level
• Structural limitations mean less options of mounting
GNSS antenna
38
CAA PAPER 2003/7 - Effect of Helicopter Rotors on
GPS Reception
North Sea EGNOS reception tests
39
The ‘test’ rig
40
North Sea EGNOS reception tests
Helicopter precision approaches using GNSS 41
North Sea EGNOS reception tests
42
Helicopter pitch and roll angles during flight
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
483,500 484,000 484,500 485,000 485,500 486,000
GPS seconds in week
Pit
ch/R
oll
An
gle
(d
eg)
Pitch
Roll
PRN120
PRN124
PRN126
Taxi-out Take off Orbits Approaches Final approach, landing & taxi to stand
Pitch up
on take
off
Consecutive loss of Geos during orbit
North Sea EGNOS reception tests
43
Helicopter heading during flight trial
0
90
180
270
360
483,000 483,500 484,000 484,500 485,000 485,500 486,000
GPS seconds in day
Magn
etic
hea
din
g (
deg
)
Hdg
PRN120
PRN124
PRN126
Validation of the signal under HEDGE
• Under HEDGE further analysis of EGNOS reception:
• 485 flights = 689 hours, 15 minutes and 44 seconds of flight
• 127 hours of recorded data on different SBAS receivers
• 4,591,662 points analysed
44
Validation of the signal under HEDGE
45
Vertical Standford Plot Horizontal Standford Plot
SOAP equipment integration
Back-end pallet
AIS receiver
GNSS receiver
Development and logging laptop
ARINC 429
serial
converter
47
Flight crew installation
Instrument display
Blanking plate
48
49
On-board installation
Rear pallet installed
Flight crew display
installed
50
Flight crew display
51
Flight trials
Flight schedule approaches
Flight # Approach # Descent slope Wind LDG/GA Approach #
1
1 4° Into GA Data lost
2 6° Out of GA 1444
3 4° Out of LDG 1459
4 Pilot choice Pilot choice Pilot choice 1513
2
1 4° Into GA Data lost
2 6° Out of GA 1024
3 4° Out of LDG 1039
4 Pilot choice Pilot choice Pilot choice 1058
3
1 4° Into GA 1322
2 6° Out of GA 1334
3 4° Out of LDG 1353
4 Pilot choice Pilot choice Pilot choice 1407
53
Lateral path deviations
0
50
100
150
200
250
1 7
13
19
25
31
37
43
49
55
61
67
73
79
85
91
97
103
109
115
121
127
133
139
145
151
157
163
169
175
181
187
193
199
205
211
217
223
229
235
241
247
253
259
265
271
277
283
289
295
301
Erro
r in
me
tre
s
1024 1039 1058 1322 1334 1353 1407 1444 1459 1513
54
Vertical path deviations
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1 7
13
19
25
31
37
43
49
55
61
67
73
79
85
91
97
103
109
115
121
127
133
139
145
151
157
163
169
175
181
187
193
199
205
211
217
223
229
235
241
247
253
259
265
271
277
283
289
295
301
Erro
r in
me
tre
s
1024 1039 1058 1322 1334 1353 1407 1444 1459 1513
55
Flight path errors
• Lateral deviations
• Vertical deviations
1444 1459 1513 1024 1039 1058 1322 1334 1353 1407 Overall
Mean 30.79 56.64 34.97 49.18 27.97 10.87 33.45 8.06 15.73 11.91 26.93
Max 88.53 230.19 164.36 150.07 121.94 60.11 72.97 42.27 48.80 23.05 230.19
Standard
deviation23.49 72.35 38.20 45.60 26.36 7.90 18.80 7.58 13.29 6.36 35.22
1444 1459 1513 1024 1039 1058 1322 1334 1353 1407 Overall
Mean 17.03 11.77 11.03 9.03 9.54 12.88 9.10 9.97 10.12 18.26 11.80
Max 65.97 25.48 28.75 23.60 20.95 24.30 19.07 27.25 36.71 33.28 65.97
Standard
deviation20.39 7.51 7.63 6.58 7.03 6.89 5.14 8.55 11.90 9.37 10.01
Overall
26.93
230.19
35.22
Overall
11.80
65.97
10.01
56
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Future development
57
HMI changes to aid manual descent
58
HMI aid to level off anticipation in manual descent
59
SOAP has successfully validated and continues to
be improved
• Flight crew agreed that SOAP is more precise than
existing low visibility options
• Horizontal and vertical track keeping is precise but
increases crew workload
• Coupling with autopilot required
• Further work in the area will be undertaken
• UK CAA sponsoring HMI enhancements and additional flight
trials
60
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Thank you for your attention