Heinrich Schwendemann (2003), " 'Drastic Measures to Defend the Reich at the Oder and the Rhine...

Journal of Contemporary History Copyright ? 2003 SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, Vol 38(4), 597-614. [0022-0094(200310)38:4;597-614;036342]

Heinrich Schwendemann

'Drastic Measures to Defend the Reich at the Oder and the Rhine .. .': A Forgotten Memorandum of Albert Speer of 18 March 1945

Ever since he gave evidence at the Nuremberg Military Tribunal in 1946,1 or rather since the publication of his Erinnerungen,2 controversy has surrounded the personality of Albert Speer, who held a unique position in the nazi system of rule as star architect, arms minister and for many years Hitler's close confi- dant.3 If, on the one hand, a consensus developed that Speer's claim to have known nothing about the extermination of the Jews was a life-long lie,4 on the other hand there is widely-held general agreement that Speer sabotaged Hitler's command to make a 'desert' out of Germany in the spring of 1945.5 What had already been verified at Nuremberg in documentary evidence pro- duced by Speer's defence counsel, Flachsner, and appears to have been confirmed by Speer's staff6 was why there were judged to have been mitigating circumstances which saved his life: he had been the one to tell Hitler that the war was lost. It was he alone, therefore, who had prevented the unnecessary destruction of the means of production in the occupied territories and in Germany.7

It is Speer's personal motivation which is contested here, not his actions in the spring of 1945. Was he an opportunist who shortly before the end of the war tried to save his own skin, or - as Speer himself claimed - had he been distancing himself further and further from his patron since the spring of 1944

See also H. Schwendemann, 'Lebenslaufer iiber verbrannter Erde. Vom Riistungsminister zum Widerstandler: Wie Albert Speer die eigene Biographie riickwirkend besch6nigte' in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, no. 97, 26 April 2000, 52.

1 Der Prozefl gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militdrgerichtshof. Niirnberg 14 November 1945-1 Oktober 1947, vol. 16 (Nuremberg 1948), 475-647 (hereafter IMT). 2 A. Speer, Erinnerungen (Frankfurt 1969). 3 A. Reif (ed.), Albert Speer. Kontroversen urnm ein deutsches Phdnomen (Munich 1978); M. Schmidt, Albert Speer: Das Ende eines Mythos. Speers wabre Rolle im Dritten Reich (Bern 1982). 4 C. Dipper, 'Der Speer-Legende zweiter Teil' in Neue Politische Literatur, 41 (1996), 193-5. 5 See, for example, U. Schlie, 'Albert Speer und das Dritte Reich' in idem (ed.), Albert Speer. 'Alles was ich weif'. Aus unbekannten Geheimdienstprotokollen vom Sommer 1945 (Munich 1999), 243-84, esp. 278-84. 6 IMT, vol. 16, 530-3; IMT, vol. 41, 417-42, 490-4, 497-507. 7 Printed in Reif, op. cit., 218-22, see esp. 221.















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Journal of Contemporary History Vol 38 No 4 Journal of Contemporary History Vol 38 No 4 Journal of Contemporary History Vol 38 No 4

on moral grounds, because his diabolical traits were becoming ever clearer to Speer, in order to rescue what could still be rescued? Both points of view are put forward in the most recent Speer biographies by journalists who knew him personally. Van der Vat depicts Hitler's only friend in the last phase of the war as an opportunist who tried to flee from his responsibility,8 while Gitta Sereny9 and Joachim Fest'? almost seem to describe Speer as a secret resistance fighter. Both Sereny and Fest were able to develop a relationship with Speer based on trust and subscribed to Speer's own interpretation of his role in the spring of 1945 - as described in his Erinnerungen and in personal conversations with him.11 In the media publicity for Sereny's and, particularly, Fest's book,12 the view prevailed that Speer had been the only person during the end phase of the war to have shown any responsibility within the nazi leadership.

There is, however, a memorandum from Speer to Hitler, dated 18 March 1945, in the files of the ministry of armaments kept in the Federal Archive in Berlin, which shows Speer's superficial and highly responsibility-conscious actions in a different light.13 Because this document was not mentioned at

Nuremberg, Speer was able to manipulate the pre-history of the infamous 'Nero order' according to his own interests.14 When the Federal Archive, at that time still in Koblenz, allowed Speer, after his release from Spandau prison, access to the files of the ministry of armaments to help him write his memoirs,15 he was given the opportunity, which he well knew how to use, either not to mention those events which might compromise him or to reinter-

pret them for his exoneration. Speer's manipulative skills, of which historians have already provided evidence in other areas, such as his responsibility for

putting forced labourers and concentration camp prisoners to work,'6 are also

8 D. van der Vat, Der gute Nazi. Albert Speers Leben und Liigen (Berlin 1997), 289-356.

9 G. Sereny, Das Ringen mit der Wahrheit. Albert Speer und das deutsche Trauma (Munich

1995), 529-627. 10 J.C. Fest, Speer. Eine Biographie (Berlin 1999), 299-381. 11 The parallels between Fest's biography of Speer and Speer's Erinnerungen, which was Fest's

most important source, are evident for this period. Fest, who spent two years helping Speer write

his Erinnerungen (Speer, op. cit., 527; van der Vat, op. cit., 493-7; Fest, op. cit., 441) can in no

way substantiate his claim to have been a 'distanced chronicler' (Fest, 364). A political biography of Speer which considers the position of historical research at that time and thereby satisfies

scientific standards has still to be written. 12 For contemporary press reviews of Fest's biography of Speer, see J. Fest, 'Speer-Hitlers unglickliche Liebe', interview in Rheinischer Merkur, no. 42 (October 1999), 8. Positive reviews:

R. Rietzler, 'Seele verkauft', Der Spiegel, 20 September 1999, 264f; A. Pfeiffer, 'Des Teufels

Lieblingsarchitekt', Stuttgarter Zeitung, 29 October 1999. Negative reviews: N. Frei, 'Nach-

gelernt Schuld', Neue Ziircher Zeitung, 12 October 1999; V. Ullrich, 'Die Speer-Legende', Die

Zeit, 23 September 1999, 51f; N. Berg, 'Die Zukunft der Vergangenheit', Badische Zeitung, 30

October 1999. 13 BA (Federal Archive of Germany), R 3/1537, Memorandum of 18 March 1945, 2-6.

14 IMT, vol. 16, 531-52, esp. 545ff. 15 Speer, op. cit., 527. 16 U. Herbert, Fremdarbeiter. Politik und Praxis des 'Ausldnder-Einsatzes' in der Kriegswirt-

schaft des Dritten Reiches (Bonn 1999); K. Orth, Das System der nationalsozialistischen

Konzentrationslager. Eine politische Organisationsgeschichte (Hamburg 1999), 48, 80, 168-72,









































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Schwendemann: A Forgotten Memorandum of Albert Speer Schwendemann: A Forgotten Memorandum of Albert Speer Schwendemann: A Forgotten Memorandum of Albert Speer

evident in his account of events which led to his coming into conflict with Hitler in March 1945.

The dramatic high point in Speer's Erinnerungen is his initiatives to prevail upon Hitler to renounce his 'scorched earth' policy on the territory of the Reich in March 1945. Nobody knew better than Speer what consequences the planned destruction of Germany's own infrastructure would have, as he and his ministry had taken part in the 'scorched earth' warfare in the retreat from the east. When Anglo-American troops first occupied the border areas in western Germany in September 1944, Hitler had already issued a basic order to the Wehrmacht and party which commited them to fight according to the princi- ples of ideological warfare on the territory of the Reich and which anticipated the 'Nero order': 'Every bunker, every housing block in German towns and every German village must become a fortification where the enemy either bleeds to death or the occupying forces bury man upon man in its ruins. There are two choices: to hold one's ground or be destroyed.'17 By arguing that the production of important components would be the prerequisite for getting production back on track after reconquest, Speer had no difficulty in persuad- ing Hitler that factories should be closed temporarily by removing those components in the event of retreat.18 Because Hitler planned to win back the lost territories through a large-scale offensive in the west - a plan which corresponded with Speer's ideas - both were completely in agreement with a policy of paralysis of production rather than one of destruction.

The collapse of the Eastern Front and the occupation of Upper Silesia by the Red Army in the second half of January 1945 caused Speer to realize - rather late - that the war could no longer be won through the production of armaments. He sent Hitler a memorandum on 30 January 1945 along these lines.19 It was only in March 1945, however, as Anglo-American troops launched their decisive final offensive on the Rhine, as the advance into the Ruhr was about to take place and in the east the Red Army was preparing itself on the Oder for the conquest of Berlin, that Speer seemed to have become aware of the self-destructive consequences of the 'all or nothing' ideological warfare which the leaders of the Wehrmacht, acting on Hitler's orders, were rigorous- ly waging at the fronts.

On 7 March 1945, Speer told the industrialists of the Ruhr that the strategy of paralysis then in place was to continue to be pursued so that the economic

243-8; M. Zimmermann, 'Arbeit in den Konzentrationslagern. Kommentierende Bemerkungen' in U. Herbert, K. Orth and C. Dieckmann (eds), Die nationalsozialistischen Konzentrationslager. Entwicklung und Struktur, vol. II (Gottingen 1998), 730-51.

17 Hitler's order of 16 September 1944 quoted in H. Schwendemann, 'Strategie der Selbst- vernichtung: die Wehrmachtfiihrung im "Endkampf" um das Dritte Reich' in R.-D. Miiller and H.-E. Volkmann (eds), Die Wehrmacht. Mythos und Realitat (Munich 1999), 224-44, esp. 228f. 18 IMT, vol. 16, telex from Speer to Bormann, 15 September 1944, 417-20; BA R 3/1623, letter from Speer to the Gauleiters in the west, 16 September 1944, delivered by Bormann 'on behalf of the Fuhrer', 53/R. 19 BA, R 3/1535, Memorandum of 30 January 1945, 'Zur Ristungslage Februar-Marz 1945'.













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potential of the Ruhr remained intact, 'in the event of the enemy advancing further'. For this reason he intended to contact the commanders-in-chief of the army units in the west, to obtain a corresponding directive from Hitler.20 It thereby became apparent that Speer was reckoning on a speedy end to the war as a result of the Allied advance into the territory in front of the Ruhr, and for him the preservation of the economic potential of the Ruhr area had become acute. However, he left the Ruhr industrialists in no doubt as to his desire to ensure the continued conduct of the war. Speer arranged for arms production to concentrate on munitions because of the supply problems at the front. Also his directive, that supplies to the Ruhr population be given precedence, justi- fied Speer in claiming the need to maintain the people's 'powers of resistance' and thereby the production of arms.21

Speer's description in his memoirs of how, while on his way to the Western Front, he had the impression that Hitler's orders would have resulted in the Reich territory becoming 'scorched earth'22 is confirmed in Goebbels' diary entries. Speer voiced his criticism to Goebbels of the preparations to blow up bridges in the event of a further retreat from Reich territory, and of Hitler's decision to evacuate the population forcefully from the last remaining areas west of the Rhine - the Saarland, the Palatinate and parts of Hesse-Nassau. In addition, he gave Goebbels to understand that 'economically, the war is so to speak lost'.23 Speer, who found support in Goebbels, tried to persuade his Fuihrer to withdraw his order to carry out a policy of 'scorched earth' on the territory of the Reich, but - and this should be stressed - Speer did not call on Hitler to end the war.

Speer's very attempt to ask Hitler to change his plans with regard to the forced evacuation of the territories on the left bank of the Rhine resulted in disaster. In his Erinnerungen, Speer reports almost in outrage that during the night of 18/19 March, Hitler decided to have these territories cleared against the will of the war-weary population on the march.24 However, he withholds the fact that on 15 March he had sent a decree from Hitler to all those in the

highest party, military and government positions, including the directors of the German national railway (Reichsbahn), indicating that, following Speer's 'sug- gestion', the Fuihrer had stipulated that 'the order of priority regarding trans-

port' due to the 'greatly reduced availability of transport' . . . was to be deter- mined 'only by its immediate value for the conduct of war'. 'The following order is to be followed in evacuations: Wehrmacht for operational purposes, coal, food for the evacuation. Even refugee transportation can only be given permission to leave after complete fulfilment of this requirement, when there is

20 BA, R 3/1623a, memo of Speer of 7 March 1945, 18-23, esp. 18-19.

21 Ibid., 19-20. 22 Speer, op. cit., 242. 23 E. Frohlich (ed.), Die Tagebiicher von Joseph Goebbels, Teil 2 Diktate 1941-1945, vol. 15:

Januar-April 1945 (Munich 1995), entries of 14 March 1945, 500f and of 15 March 1945, 511.

24 Speer, op. cit., 444f.



















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really no unused empty space available.'25 Yet Speer's aim to prevent a forced evacuation in the west by this order26 failed because in his order of 19 March to evacuate the territories to the west of the Rhine, Hitler referred explicitly to the above-mentioned allocation of transport and ordered that the population be marched back if necessary.27

But Speer's transport order of 14/15 March was to have catastrophic reper- cussions in the east, where the real refugee drama was taking place. As opposed to the west where the majority of the population was not greatly afraid of an Anglo-American occupation, millions in the east fled from the violence of the Red Army. A large part of the misery of the refugees in the east stems from the fact that the Wehrmacht demanded that absolute priority be given to military transport on land and water. There was, therefore, not enough transport capacity available for the civilian population who had to put up with chaotic conditions on their journey westwards. Millions of East Germans were run down by the front and hundreds of thousands died because they were unable to reach safety quickly enough.28

Speer had already made it clear in the second half of January 1945 that he placed military needs above the interests of the East German population. Ten days after the start of the Soviet winter offensive on 22 January 1945, when three to four million people were fleeing from the Red Army29 and news was spreading everywhere of the large-scale violence of the Red Army soldiers, Speer once again instructed the Gauleiter in the east that 'the armaments industry, including water and energy supplies, should carry on working until the enemy makes it impossible for them to continue'. The paralysis of factories should occur only 'at the last possible moment'.30 Speer, who was at that time staying at the headquarters of Army Group (Heeresgruppe) A in Upper Silesia where he was able to witness at first hand the plight of the refugees,31 was only concerned that the production of arms, particularly in the Upper Silesian industrial district, be maintained for as long as possible - and certainly until the Red Army had seized parts of Upper Silesia. Speer's economic strategy of holding out to the end contributed significantly to the Gauleiter's giving

25 BA, R 3/1623a, 28/R, Circular by Speer, 15 March 1945, re order of transport for evacuations, 28/R in M. Moll (ed.), 'Fiihrer-Erlasse' 1939-1945 (Stuttgart 1997), Doc. 392, 485. 26 BA, R 3/1623a, memo from Speer, 7 March 1945, 22. 27 BA, R 3/1623a, Circular by Bormann, 19 March 1945, re evacuation in the west, 42f. 28 Schwendemann, op. cit., 236-41. 29 BA, NS 19/2606, note of 22 January 1945, 46. 30 BA, R 3/1623a, Communication from the Reich Ministry of the Interior (Jacobi) to Speer, 24 January 1945, 8, containing a copy of a circular from the Reich Ministry of the Interior (Stuck- hardt) of 22 January1945 to the Reich Defence Commissars of East Prussia, Danzig-West Prussia, the Wartheland, Lower Silesia, Upper Silesia, Pommerania, Mark Brandenburg, Sudetenland. Speer had already issued a similar edict in July 1944: BA, R 3/1623, Speer's edict of 26 July 1944 re retransfer from the east, 3f. 31 Speer claims in his memoirs to have taken photos of the refugees and shown them to Hitler in the hope that he 'might arouse his sympathy'. Hitler, however, had 'vigorously pushed [the photos] away. Speer, op. cit., 430.









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evacuation orders so late in the day in Upper Silesia and the other eastern districts.32

Speer's transport order, which Hitler enforced in the middle of March 1945, resulted in 'practically no more refugee trains'. In this way, by means of the Ftihrer order which was valid until the end of the war, Speer secured the transport interests of the army at the expense of the civilian population.33 Speer, who boasts in his memoirs that he always represented the needs of the refugees to Hitler,34 did not mention this transport order, since it would infer that by this time he had already written off the East German population.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that in his memoirs Speer also tried to con- ceal the fact that he had reached the pinnacle of his power on 18 February -

when Hitler made him a kind of transport dictator, whose job it was to allo- cate the ever-decreasing transport capacity in the face of a transport crisis, continuously worsened by the Allied bombings.35 This increase in power is only worth a brief mention in a footnote by Speer,36 but he also emphasizes the fact that in his first decree of 19 February37 he had been entitled to give absolute priority to the 'unconditional' implementation of troop transport and not the feeding of the population, as he later tried to suggest.

Besides Speer's attempt to prevent the forced evacuation of the seemingly unreliable Germans west of the Rhine, the focal point of his activities was to prevent systematic 'scorched earth' warfare on his own territory. To this end he adopted a two-pronged approach, turning to the army command as well as to Hitler. He was able to win over Guderian, who up to then had put into

practice Hitler's order to halt at the Eastern Front, and who, now that the war could last only a few more weeks according to Speer's economic forecast, tried to distance himself from Hitler. Following a discussion with Speer, on 15 March Guderian drew up an order to limit the blowing-up of bridges to what was militarily necessary and to prevent the destruction of factories by paralysis measures.38 However, this order remained a draft because Hitler, together with Keitel and Jodl, the Army High Command leaders who were in charge of the war in the west, rejected it.39

32 BA, R 22/3372, Report from the Provincial High Court President and the Public Prosecutor

in Kattowitz, Neisse, to Reich Minister of Justice Thierack, 1 February 1945, 302R.

33 The list of priorities for rail transport had been drawn up at the beginning of March; the

'Fuhrer order' had yet to be issued: P.E. Schramm (ed.), Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der

Wehrmacht 1940-1945, vol. IV/2, entry for 6 March 1945, 1150.

34 Speer, op. cit., 430, 441. 35 Hitler edict on the formation of a transport headquarters of 18 February 1945 in 'Fiihrer-

Erlasse', Doc. 388, 481f. 36 Speer, op. cit., note 5, 581f. 37 Printed in Ursachen und Folgen. Vom deutschen Zusammenbruch 1918 und 1945 bis zur

staatlichen Neuordnung Deutschlands in der Gegenwart. Eine Urkunden- und Dokumenten-

sammlung zur Zeitgeschichte, vol. 22 (Berlin 1975), 528-31, esp. 530.

38 BA, R 2/1623a, draft of an order of 15 March 1945 re measures for destruction in one's own

country, 31-3. 39 H. Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten (Stuttgart 1995), 384; IMT, vol. 41, Guderian's

statement at Nuremberg, 10 May.1945, 510-14; Speer, op. cit., 442.





































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Speer's now famous memorandum to Hitler of 15 March 1945, in which he draws together the arguments to which Guderian and Goebbels had already agreed, played a key role in the way he dealt with Hitler.40 In the memorandum, Speer forecast that the war could only last another four to eight weeks from an economic point of view, and he therefore demanded that Hitler not destroy industrial areas, mines, electricity works, transport sites, etc. 'in the event of the battle being drawn further into the territory of the Reich'(!) but rather to put them temporarily out of action. Speer 'understandably' had no objection to bridges being blown up across the 'big streams' in order to keep the enemy at bay, but he did object to the detonating of every bridge in the country, particularly Berlin, because that would make it impossible to get supplies to the population. In view of the approaching end of the war, he also demanded that priority be given to feeding and clothing the population.

However, Speer did not demand that Hitler bring the war to a speedy conclusion, and thereby end the misery of the population and deaths at the fronts. A remark made by Speer shows how cold-bloodedly he accepted the population loss, when, in the language of nazi ideology, he spoke of, 'a tough selec- tion' which 'would contain a good kernel of this unique people for the distant future'. He used an almost schizophrenic argument to try to blame the enemy for any further destruction: 'If the enemy wants to destroy the people and the very basis of their life, then it must carry out this work itself.' Elsewhere he wrote: 'and so the historical shame should fall on them'. On the other hand: 'We must do everything to enable the people to preserve the basis of their life to the very end, even in the most primitive of forms.'41 Speer was already looking to save his image - and at this point in time also that of his Fuhrer - from history.

Speer's later comment that he dented all of Hitler's 'self-made taboos'42 with this memorandum, which exposed the relentless propaganda of final victory as a chimera, is definitely true. But Speer, because of his special standing with Hitler, was also the only person who could allow himself to take such a step.43 To prepare Hitler for their next private discussion, Speer took steps in advance to offset the effect of his memorandum of 15 March.44 At Nuremberg, Speer and his secretary, Annemarie Kempf, testified that Hitler knew of the contents of the memorandum before Speer handed it over in person on the night of 18/19 March.45 In his Erinnerungen, Speer claimed that he had sent Hitler the memorandum via von Below, his liaison officer, which von Below confirms in his own memoirs.46 In addition, Speer asked Hitler's adjutant, Schaub, for a

40 IMT, vol. 16, Speer's memorandum to Hitler, 15 March 1945, on the economic situation in March-April 1945 and the consequences, 420-5. 41 Ibid., 422, 425. 42 Speer, op. cit., 442. 43 According to Hitler's Lufwaffe adjutant, von Below, in his memoirs: N. von Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant 1937-45 (Mainz 1980), 405. 44 Speer, op. cit., 443. 45 Testimony by Speer, IMT, vol. 16, 547; testimony by Annemarie Kempf, ibid., 503. 46 von Below, op. cit., 404f.









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photo of Hitler, personally inscribed, for his (Speer's) fortieth birthday on 19 March.47 In this way, Speer cleverly included a memento of their personal relationship.

But there has now come to light in the files of the ministry of armaments a three-page memorandum drawn up and personally signed by Speer on 18 March, which is unambiguously aimed at Hitler in form and content48 and which represents the missing act in Speer's production of his planned meeting with Hitler on the evening of 18 March. Gregor Janssen quoted five sentences from this memorandum - which was not presented at Nuremberg - in his thesis on the ministry of armaments, without, however, recognizing the explo- sive nature of its contents. Janssen only commented that Speer had handed over this memorandum to Hitler on 18 March.49 His study was published in 1968 by Ullstein Verlag, which also published Speer's Erinnerungen a year later, and on the initiative of his doctoral supervisor, Walter Hubatsch, the first edition of the study already existed in the form of a dissertation for Speer to refer to during his time in Spandau.50 The prisoner would surely have read the chapter about his role in the spring of 1945 thoroughly. Since Speer makes no mention in his memoirs of the memorandum, which he had surely seen again in the files of the federal archive, its contents must have been dynamite to him.51 There is no doubt that it would have called into question the justifi- cation strategy he adopted at Nuremberg. Moreover, the fact that Speer did not correct Janssen is proof enough that he had indeed handed over this memorandum to Hitler on 18/19 March. Speer's silence, therefore, resulted in this document's disappearance from the scene. His vivid presentation of the events of the middle of March 1945, together with Speer's other memoranda already published in the Nuremberg documents, obviously made an impression on his biographers. Schmidt is the only one to have also cited the passages which Janssen published,52 but the more recent portrayals by Sereny, van der Vat and Fest overlook the fact that Speer drew up a second memorandum to Hitler on 18 March 1945. One indication is to be found in Dietrich Eichholtz's third volume of the 'History of the German War Economy 1939-1945'. In a footnote, Eichholtz notes the 'curiously strong' language of the memo without giving it a full reference.53

47 Speer, op. cit., 443-5. 48 BA R 3/1537. Handwritten on the cover - presumably by Speer's secretary - 'Memo-

randum of 18 March 1945'. The memo's heading, 'Albert Speer Berlin W 8 18 March 1945' is

almost exactly the same as that of the memorandum of 15 March 1945: 'Albert Speer Berlin, 15

March 1945'. 49 G. Janssen, Das Ministerium Speer. Deutschlands Riistung im Krieg (Berlin 1968), 310f.

50 Schmidt, op. cit., 20; van der Vat, op. cit., 478f, 574. 51 Speer attempted to play down Janssen's study in Spandau (letter from Speer to Wolters, 28

October 1964 in Schmidt, op. cit., 20) and 'concealed' it in a footnote in his memoirs. Speer, op. cit., 542, note 6. 52 Schmidt had not seen the memorandum himself, but used Janssen as his source: Schmidt, op. cit., 152, note 71. 53 Eichholtz printed the memorandum of 15 March 1945 in its entirety, but only mentioned the

















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Schwendemann:A Forgotten Memorandum of Albert Speer Schwendemann:A Forgotten Memorandum of Albert Speer Schwendemann:A Forgotten Memorandum of Albert Speer

Speer was able to hide the existence of the second memorandum at Nuremberg because there were only two copies of it: the original, which was given to Hitler, and the carbon copy, which he kept. There were in any case no witnesses to his discussion with Hitler in the early hours of 19 March 1945. The fact that he mentioned his 'note' which 'I handed over to you on 18 March' in his later letter to Hitler also came to his aid.54 Speer was actually referring to the memorandum of 15 March, for it was this one that gave rise to his conflict with Hitler.

Speer's secretary, Annemarie Kempf, told Gitta Sereny decades later that on the evening of 18 March Speer had taken two copies of the 15 March memorandum to the Fiihrer's headquarters for von Below to hand to Hitler, with the comment that it was 'better to be safe than sorry'.55 But this is not conclusive: according to all the other witnesses, Hitler had already received the memorandum. It is incomprehensible that Speer took two copies of the same memorandum to Hitler one evening in order to hand these over to his adjutant. What is conclusive, however, is the statement made by Speer's secretary that Speer did take two memoranda to Hitler, namely those of 15 and 18 March, which were similar in content and together formed a whole. If Speer had forecast in the first memorandum that the war could only last another four to eight weeks, in the second he sought to show Hitler a way out, by offering the Fuhrer his ser- vices as a kind of saviour, thus securing his favour. The text is as follows:

Albert Speer Berlin W 8, 18 March 1945

As economic breakdown can hardly be avoided and every kilometre of territory which is now lost accelerates the breakdown immeasurably, drastic measures to defend the Reich at the Oder and the Rhine are to be taken.

Successful warfare on the other side of both rivers is no longer imaginable. Our armaments situation and fuel supply will then render us powerless in the face of all enemy warfare when the enemy has crossed the rivers heavily armed and is able to resume mobile warfare.

For the battle in the next eight weeks it is therefore necessary that all the soldiers in the barracks are led to the front regardless of the new postings who can be deployed at a later time.

It is necessary that the Army Groups from east and west are given ruthless right of access to the soldiers found within a boundary between both fronts. (1)

If this does not happen, the soldiers will remain too long in their home area and the breakthrough formations of the enemy will meet our soldiers exercis- ing on their military training area, as happened to our troops on the advance into France.

one of 18 March in a footnote. D. Eichholtz, Geschichte der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft 1939-1945, vol. 3: 1943-1945 (Berlin 1996), 662, note 212.

54 Speer's letter to Hitler of 29 March, printed in IMT, vol. 41, 425, here 427; Speer's testimony at Nuremberg: IMT, vol. 16, 546f; Speer, op. cit., 442-5. 55 Sereny, op. cit., 561. Fest also refers to this version of events. Fest, op. cit., 338.





















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It is further necessary to send to the present front all territorial army (Volkssturm) special formations which the Gauleiters have stationed and armed in their home districts. All regions of the Reich from now on will only be defended at these two rivers.

XXX

The supreme commanders of the army groups must be granted absolute authority over the Wehrmacht in their area, and thereby be able, in spite of all difficulties, to deploy all parts of the Wehrmacht for their own purposes.(2)

It is impossible for the anti-aircraft units stationed at the front to be under a different commander from the army units. Thereby impossibly long lines of command become necessary and difficulties arise when quick decisions are required.

XXX

The economic exploitation of North and Central Norway and of Upper Italy is

exceptionally restricted because of the transport situation. For this reason the war economy can be ignored in these areas, thereby free-

ing up a larger number of divisions which are equally urgently needed at both rivers.

XXX

Only when these measures have been carried out can the situation at the front be secured.

Every step back will greatly accelerate defeat. By holding out tenaciously (3) on the present front for a few weeks we can win the enemy's respect and per- haps bring about a favourable end to the war. Signed Speer (his own signature)

Speer was suggesting that the final battle at the Rhine and Oder, where the western and eastern fronts ran, be waged as long as possible, a strategy intended to prevent the remaining territory of the Reich ending up as a battlefield which in turn would result in the further destruction of Germany's economic

potential. All available forces, therefore, were to be concentrated at both rivers. Speer's suggestions of withdrawing the troops in Norway and Upper Italy and of handing over to the army authority over the territorial army

(Volkssturm) and the anti-aircraft units of the Luftwaffe corresponded to the

demands of the supreme commanders of the army groups and the General

Chief of Staff of the Army High Command (OKH), Guderian,56 with whom

Speer was in contact. But Speer, like Hitler, in no way wished to capitulate something he never demanded of Hitler - rather, he wanted 'to win the

enemy's respect' by way of a kind of final duel and in this way achieve a


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56 Guderian, op. cit., 374. 56 Guderian, op. cit., 374. 56 Guderian, op. cit., 374.

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'favourable' conclusion - an absurd idea to want to turn the almost total defeat of nazi Germany into a competition.

Speer thus shows himself to be a high-risk player who - just like his Fuihrer - wanted to stake everything with one throw of the dice in the vain hope of forcing the turn of events. If Hitler was thus consciously calculating the downfall of the German people, Speer was risking a giant bloodbath, the concentrated destruction of the Wehrmacht and territorial army (Volkssturm) at the Rhine and Oder. Just like Hitler and the army command,57 Speer showed no scruples in using young recruits or badly-trained and poorly-armed territorial army troops as 'cannon fodder' for the sake of an illusionary dream.

In any case, Speer left open the question of what should actually happen to the civilian population in the battle zone. Because he wanted to prevent further evacuations, it can be concluded that the population would not be brought to safety. On top of this, Speer had to take into account that with each day that the war was prolonged the carpet bombing by the Allies continued, creating huge numbers of victims amongst the German population and wreaking dreadful destruction of infrastructure and industrial plants. From his point of view, however, the Allies were 'historically to blame'.58 It goes without saying that Speer and Hitler did not come into conflict over the memorandum in which Speer set himself up as military strategist, who was, however, really only able to offer exhortations to hold out, because Hitler had ordered the unconditional holding of the front at the Rhine and Oder and had decided to continue the war as long as possible. Nor had Speer suggested anything else.

The conflict was inflamed by his memorandum of 15 March, not so much because of the 'defeatist' prognosis that the end of the war was in sight, but more because Speer, as Hitler told Goebbels, 'displayed tendencies which could not be brought into line with the national socialist view of war'.59 The views Hitler expressed on the night of 18/19 March 1945, that 'if the war is lost, so too is the Volk', or, that he would prefer to destroy 'the basics which the Volk needs for its most primitive survival', because the Volk [would have] shown itself to be weaker',60 must have made it clear [to Speer] how resolute Hitler was in conducting his politics and the war along social Darwinistic lines, according to which the weak too would be responsible for the downfall of the German people.

With the so-called 'Nero order' of 19 March 1945,61 which Speer had indi- rectly provoked, Hitler reversed the demands of the 15 March memorandum and committed the Wehrmacht and the NSDAP to further withdrawals on the principle of the self-destruction of industrial, transport, news and supply installations. The Fiihrer showed how his destruction mania was intent on

57 Schwendemann, op. cit., 232-6. 58 Speer repeated this in his letter to Hitler of 29 March 1945, in IMT, vol. 41, 428. 59 Goebbels-Tagebiicher, vol. 15, entries for 28 March 1945, 619f and 31 March 1945, 643. 60 The authenticity of this quote is verified in Speer's letter to Hitler of 29 March 1945. IMT, vol. 41, 428. 61 Fiihrer-Erlasse, Doc. 394, 486f.













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making a 'desert' out of Germany. He did, however, adopt one of the suggestions in Speer's second memorandum and on 21 March ordered all army training units to be stationed behind the western and eastern fronts so that 'enemy breakthroughs in depth at the fronts can be caught and blocked off'.62

The 19th of March 1945 must have signified a break in Speer's relationship with Hitler: to all appearances Speer expected Hitler to accept his demands to 'preserve our power as a Volk' and his suggestions to continue the war. In this way, Speer's later statement in his letter to Hitler that 'my belief in a favourable change in our fate remained unbroken until 18 March' is not to be considered as a tactical manoeuvre, but rather as a reflection of his expecta- tions at the time.63 It was only later that it became clear to him that Hitler really did intend to 'drive the Germans to a heroic defeat'.64 This realization and the beginning of the Anglo-American offensive on 22 March with its speedy operational breakthrough on the right bank of the Rhine led Speer to consider it advisable to distance himself from Hitler and to attempt to hinder the implementation of the order to destroy.65 In addition, Speer seems to have come to an understanding with the Reich Minister of Finance, Schwerin-Krosigk, an

exponent of the conservative leadership elite, also to leave open all political options dealing with the Allies without regard to Hitler66 - a plan by which

they both surely wished to be able to secure their own survival after the war.

Hitler, to whom news was brought of the opposing views of his 'favourite minister' by Speer's rivals, suspected him of wanting to evade the 'responsibility' which 'we' - as Hitler wrote to Goebbels - 'had to carry anyway' and

presented him with an ultimatum on 28 March to commit himself to 'the prin- ciples of his present conduct of the war'.67 Speer's letter to Hitler dated 29 March 1945 in which he is supposed to have rejected the ultimatum, provides further key evidence of Speer's position in his relationship with the Fiihrer.68 In connection with Hitler's remarks of 19 March, he again turned against the idea of destroying the foundation of the lives of his own people, the responsibility for which, however, he was concerned anew to lay at the door of the

enemy, who had to 'take the historical blame on itself'. He asked Hitler to

62 BA/MA, RM 7/102, Hitler's order (signed by Keitel) of 21 March 1945 to the Wehrmacht

leadership, 99f; RH 2/334, note from the Commander-in-Chief of the reserve army of 26 March

1945, concerning the transfer of the reserve training units behind the western and eastern fronts,

Aktion Leuthen, 27. 63 IMT, vol. 41, Speer to Hitler, 29 March 1945, 426.

64 Speer had told Goebbels on 14 March that Hitler himself had emphasized in Mein Kampf with regard to the first world war 'that there is no place in the politics of war for leading the

people to a heroic downfall'. Goebbels-Tagebiicher, vol. 15, entry for 14 March 1945, 501.

65 For a chronological list of Speer's activities against the 'Nero order' up to 30 March 1945,

about which there are almost only later statements, see Eichholtz, Geschichte der deutschen

Kriegswirtschaft, vol. 3, 664-7. 66 BA, R 3/1624, Schwerin von Krosigk to Speer, 29 March 1945, 6.

67 Goebbels-Tagebiicher, vol. 15, entry for 28 March 1945, 619f; Speer, op. cit., 457-9.

68 IMT, vol. 41, letter from Speer to Hitler of 29 March 1945, 425-9; Annemarie Kempf's

testimony, 505; IMT, vol. 16, Speer's testimony, 550.







































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withdraw his order to destroy of 19 March and promised in return to resume work 'with greater energy'. At one point, as Frankfurt was being captured by American troops, Speer declared - in line with his memorandum of 18 March - that it was 'our duty to make every effort to increase resistance to the utmost'.69 Characteristically, Speer made no mention in his memoirs of this sentence, which his memorandum of 18 March pointedly includes!70 Just like his Fiihrer, Speer now also called upon the 'better Providence' which '[can] still change our future: we can only contribute to the eternal future of the German people by maintaining a strong position and our unshakeable belief in it'. Hitler's armaments minister had come to the end of his tether and took refuge in propaganda slogans. No wonder that Speer was later embarrassed by this letter; in his Erinnerungen he describes it as a 'weak performance'.71

Speer's description of his discussion with Hitler on the night of 29-30 March 1945, to which again there were no witnesses, is sparse. Everything, however, points to the fact that Speer, in conversation with Hitler, voiced precisely those opinions which he had formulated only hours before in his letter. In any case, Speer did admit to having assured Hitler of his 'unconditional' loyalty.72 Goebbels commented on this in his diary: 'Speer has climbed down a peg'.73 However, Speer's renewed solidarity was the reason Hitler modified his order to destroy industrial plants, for which Speer had once again been given responsibility and also the authority to order measures of paralysis under certain conditions.74 Speer noted that the outcome of his discussion with Hitler had been that the Fiihrer had 'established that there was no point in a "scorched earth" policy for such a small territory as Germany. Such a policy could only work in large territories like Russia.'7s

As we know from Goebbels' diary, the 'Emergency Defence Programme' which was then in operation was also discussed on 30 March. Although Speer tried to give the impression in his Erinnerungen that he had had nothing to do with arms production since January 1945,76 this claim can in no way be upheld. In the enforcement decree for the 'Nero order' which Speer formulated, he had once again adopted the principle that 'arms production' should be maintained 'right up to the last possible moment',77 although factories should be protected from self-destruction whilst the remaining parts of Speer's arma-

69 Ibid., 429. 70 The comparison between Speer's letter and the quotations in his memoirs shows that in the final passage he suppressed those testimonies which were not sympathetic to him, and did not indicate where he had made omissions, so that the sense was distorted. Speer, op. cit., 459. 71 Ibid., 460. 72 Ibid., 460f. 73 Goebbels-Tagebiucher, vol. 15, entry for 31 March 1945, 643. 74 IMT, vol. 41, enforcement decree of Hitler of 31 March 1945, 433f; Speer's enforcement regulations for the Fiihrer decree of 30 March 1945 re measures for paralysis and destruction, 435-7. 75 BA, R 3/1623a, memo of Speer, 30 March 1945, 75. 76 Speer, op. cit., 440. 77 IMT, vol. 41, 433.









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ments empire saw to it that the fronts were still being supplied with arms, which was precisely what was needed to prolong the war.78 Speer drew no con- clusions from the fact that the awful destruction which was being inflicted on Germany's economic potential day after day by the Allied bombings would last until the Wehrmacht stopped fighting.

In April 1945 Speer, on Hitler's authority, tried to prevent bombings being carried out by means of further orders concerning supplies, transport and communications installations, as well as through his own intervention.79 The consequent implementation of the 'Nero order' would, however, no longer have been possible, because, as Bormann himself pointed out, there were no explosives for 'sustained destruction'.80 Klaus-Dietmar Henke, one of the few historians to take a critical stance vis-a-vis the 'Speer Myth' of 1945,81 has drawn attention to the fact that the quick advance of the Allied troops in the west and the rapid decline in loyalty towards the NS regime in the last weeks of the war stood in the way of the implementation of Hitler's order to destroy. Speer in no way acted in isolation in April 1945 in order to prevent 'something worse', but it was rather down to 'a thousandfold alliance of the sensible' at the local level who sought to avoid pointless destruction.82 On the other hand, self-destructive warfare continued to be waged with undiminished force as the leaders of the Wehrmacht took literally Hitler's ideological basic command to continue fighting 'to the last breath'. Above all, it was on the Eastern Front, where the soldiers lived in fear of the wrath of the Red Army, that units literally fought to total self-destruction.83

The fact that Speer allowed himself to be impressed by such 'heroism' can be seen in his letter to the Lower Silesian Gauleiter Hanke, who carried out Hitler's command to fight 'to the last man' and without regard for the civilian

population in the 'defence' of Red Army-beleaguered Breslau. On 14 April Speer wrote to Hanke that Germany would not go under, hailed him at the same time as one of German history's 'heroes' whose 'greatness . . . would later be of inestimable value to the people', and wished him a 'beautiful and

dignified' death in action.84 Speer's flight to his Fuhrer shortly before the Red

78 Because - according to what Speer told the Ruhr staff - there were 'too many guns' but at the same time not enough munitions, two-thirds of the entire iron quota would be used in the manufacture of munitions and only one third in the production of weapons and tanks. BA, R

3/1623a, memo of Speer, 7 March 1945, 21f. 79 The corresponding orders can be found in BA, R 3/1623a, 130-40. 80 BA, R 58/976, Bormann to Kaltenbrunner, 4 April 1945, 117. 81 Others included W. Naasner, Neue Machtzentren in der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft 1942-1945. Die Wirtschaftsorganisation der SS, das Amt des Generalbevollmdchtigen fur den Arbeitseinsatz und das Reichsministerium fur Bewaffnung und Munition/Reichsministerium fur Riistung und Kriegsproduktion im nationalsozialistischen Herrschaftssystem (Boppard 1994), 188-96. 82 K.-D. Henke, Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands (Munich 1995), 429-35, esp. 432. 83 Schwendemann, op. cit., 232-44. 84 Printed in B. and H. Heiber (eds), Die Riickseite des Hakenkreuzes. Absonderliches aus den Akten des Dritten Reiches (Munich 1993), 396f.















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Schwendemann:A Forgotten Memorandum of Albert Speer Schwendemann:A Forgotten Memorandum of Albert Speer Schwendemann:A Forgotten Memorandum of Albert Speer

Army surrounded the capital city of the Reich fitted into this pathos of downfall.85 His farewell to Hitler in the early hours of 24 April indicate that Speer remained loyal to his Fuhrer to the end and that there was no break in their relationship.

Speer's depiction of himself as a secret resistance fighter from the autumn of 194486 does not stand up to scrutiny. In the second half of 1944 Speer was second to Goebbels as the engine of 'total war', a ruthless mobilization of German 'Volkskraft' (power of the people), and he had seen to it that arms production continued, despite great problems in all areas.87 Hitler repeatedly expressed his 'unreserved admiration' for his 'ingenious organizer'.88 Despite the fact that in his memoranda Speer kept warning of further setbacks89 if Hitler's demands were not complied with, until the middle of January 1945 he appeared ever optimistic to Hitler, Goebbels and other ministerial colleagues, Gauleiters, generals and the staff of his own ministry that he could even increase armaments so long as the Wehrmacht could hold the existing economic area and no more skilled workers were conscripted into the army.90 This is what Speer promised Hitler after Anglo-American troops invaded France at the end of August 1944, 'not only to maintain the present record high level' of armaments production in an economic sphere confined to Central Europe, 'but to increase it considerably'.91 Even on 4 January 1945 he told Goebbels that he saw 'confidently into the future. There is still so much national

85 Speer, op. cit., 479-89; edited by Fest, 360-9. 86 Speer already maintained in summer 1945 when interrogated that he had practised 'active resistance' against Hitler since January 1945; Schlie, op. cit., 74; see also Speer, op. cit., 409f. 87 Janssen, op. cit., 267-92; Naasner, op. cit., 183-8; Eichholtz, Geschichte der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft, op. cit., vol. 3, 49f, 79f; R.-D. Miiller, 'Albert Speer und die Riistungspolitik im totalen Krieg' in Das Deutsche Reich und der zweite Weltkrieg, vol. 2: Organisation und Mobilisierung des deutschen Machtbereichs, 2. Halbbd.: Kriegsverwaltung, Wirtschaft und personelle Ressourcen 1942-1944/45, 275-773, here 744-73. The conversations between Goebbels and Speer during this period, which are documented in Goebbels' diaries (vols 13 and 14), show that, despite their rivalry, both were the most important protagonists of 'total war'. See, for example, Goebbels-Tagebiicher, vol. 13, entry for 3 September 1944, 398f; vol. 14, entry for 1 December 1945, 308f. 88 Goebbels-Tagebiicher, vol. 14, entry for 2 December 1944, 321, 329f; W.A. Boelcke (ed.), Deutschlands Riistung im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Hitlers Konferenzen mit Albert Speer 1942-1945 (Frankfurt 1969); memo of Speer, 5 November 1944, conversations with the Fuihrer, 1-4 November 1944, 431. 89 The various memoranda of the second half of 1944 are located in the BA under catalogue number R 3/1518-1530. 90 BA, R 3/1553, text of Speer's speech to the Gauleiters on 3 August 1944, 87-132; R 3/1556; main points for a lecture by Reichsminister Speer to the members of the Reich cabinet, 3-5; ibid., Speer's appeal in December 1944 'to the makers of German armaments!', 137-9; R 3/1557, Speer's speech to the third course of commanding generals and corps commanders on 13 January 1945, 144-80; see also Naasner, op. cit., 182-9 and Miiller, op. cit., 753-73. 91 According to Hitler the borders of this area - which was to be defended in all circumstances - should be the Somme to the west, the alps to the south, southern Norway to the north and in the east along the front between the Baltic and the Carpathian mountains, including parts of Hungary. Goebbels-Tagebiicher, vol. 13, entry for 22 August 1944, 290.







611 611 611




strength at our disposal that we will always be able to deal with such problems that are inevitable in the sixth year of war.'92

Speer even influenced Hitler's strategic decisions. At his behest, Hitler moved the centre of the war command to Hungary to secure that country's oil and bauxite deposits.93 It was due not only to the withdrawal of divisions for the Ardennes offensive in the west, but also to the move to Hungary because of a monthly production of about 23,000 tonnes of fuel94 - that the front in the eastern Reich broke up within a few weeks in January 1945 under the blows of the Soviet winter offensive - with all the catastrophic conse-

quences for the East German civilian population fleeing in fear of their lives.95 The capture of the Upper Silesian industrial area by the Red Army in the last

weeks of January 1945 presented the first decisive turning-point for Speer. It was only then that he informed Hitler that the war could no longer be maintained on economic grounds. However, Speer used his influence - as of

February 1945 he had also become transport dictator - to 'force out of the arms production . .. anything which could still be forced out of it' so that the Wehrmacht could continue to wage the hopeless war.96 As he had already promised on 13 January 1945 at the beginning of the Soviet winter offensive, in a speech to commanding generals of the front, Speer found himself continu-

ally journeying to sectors of the eastern and western fronts to the Chiefs of Commands and Chief Quartermasters of the Army Groups, in order to find out what their supply problems were - particularly of fuel and munitions and to provide a solution.97

That Speer tried to show Hitler an alternative in his memorandum of 18 March 1945 was in no way strange. All Hitler's other henchmen also sought a

92 Goebbels-Tagebuicher, vol. 15, entry for 4 January 1945, 58. On 12 January 1945 he again told Goebbels that he saw '1945 as being not too unfavourable': ibid., entry for 12 January 1945, 111. 93 BA, R 3/1621, Speer to Guderian, 15 December 1944, 4; Boelcke, op. cit., 427f; BA, R

3/1532, Speer's memorandum about the fuel situation, 19 January 1945, 12-19; G. Wagner (ed.), Lagevortrdge des Oberbefehlshabers der Kriegsmarine vor Hitler 1939-1945 (Munich 1972), 637f. 94 According to Speer's memorandum of 19 January 1945 it was a question of a monthly production of 15,000 tonnes of petrol (22 per cent of Germany's monthly production of petrol) and 8000 tonnes of diesel (11 per cent). 95 Schwendemann, op. cit., 236-41. 96 According to the agreement between Speer and Goebbels of 30 January 1945. Goebbels-

Tagebiicher, vol. 15, entry for 30 January 1945, 271f. 97 Speer conceals this in his memoirs, ibid., 441. Speer had explained to the commanding generals and corps commanders 'that I spend a great deal of my time at division headquarters, with the corps, with the armies. Contact between the front and the armaments [ministry] in the

homeland cannot be short enough. I hope that I will soon meet one or other of you on my travels

and find out about your concerns directly at the front.' BA, R 3/1557, Speer's speech of 13

January 1945, 144f. For Speer's travels to the front: BA R 3/1545, Reichminister Speer's journey to the Eastern Front in January 1945; Centre for the preservation of historical documentary collections, Moscow, 1275-2-288, record of the commander-in-chief of the second army, Weiss, of 25 January 1945; telephone conversation between Weiss and Himmler of 25 January 1945, 104; Goebbels-Tagebiicher, entry for 31 January 1945, 283.



























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way out in the face of total defeat in the spring of 1945. If Ribbentrop tried to establish contact with the west with Hitler's uninterested approval, Goring and Himmler did so behind the Fiihrer's back. Even Goebbels, who had con- tinual tried to persuade Hitler to adopt a 'political solution', still hoped to enter into negotiations with Stalin after Hitler's suicide.98 Speer, who had told Goebbels of his desire 'to attempt a political solution"'99 and indicated as much in his memorandum of 18 March to Hitler, was in any case the only one who, by dint of his position of trust, dared to contradict Hitler by protesting openly against a 'scorched earth' policy. However, there was no break in his relations with his Fiihrer whom he assured of his 'undivided' loyalty. He proved this loyalty by supporting the continuation of the war, rather than asking Hitler to capitulate. These were probably the deciding reasons why, aside from personal considerations, on 30 March 1945 Hitler reinstated Speer's full power of authority which enabled him to give orders preventing pointless bombings in April 1945. In spite of this, the Wehrmacht's fanatical defence, to the point of self-destruction, which was carried out by the Wehrmacht leadership acting on Hitler's command with no consideration for the civilian population, soldiers and material assets, formed the basis of the German war strategy until after Hitler's suicide.100 As a result of the hopeless defensive action against the last great offensives of the anti-Hitler coalition in March and April 1945, many towns and areas were turned into 'desert', which is what Hitler wanted to achieve through his order of 19 March 1945.

The fact that Speer, in a gross overestimation of his abilities, saw it as his task, as the future economics and production minister in the Donitz adminis- tration,101 to rebuild the destroyed Reich can only be described as an ironic twist of history. It was, after all, Speer who had held the main responsibility for the war being 'maintained' on economic grounds for so long when, in its last phase, there was an exorbitant loss of life and massive destruction in the Reich. In any case, his strategy in the memorandum of 18 March 1945 began to take shape for him personally. His apparently calculated manoeuvring in spring 1945, when he was already looking to the time after the war, gave him, as opposed to the others whom Hitler had trusted, the opportunity to experi- ence a 'favourable end of war', not least because, as Hitler's general manager

98 B. Martin, 'Die deutsche Kapitulation: Versuch einer Bilanz des Zweiten Weltkrieges' in Freiburger Universitdtsblditter, 130 (1995), 45-70, here 52-5; idem, 'Verhandlungen uber separate Friedenschlisse 1942-1945. Ein Beitrag zur Entstehung des Kalten Kreiges' in Militdr- geschichtliche Mitteilungen, 1976, 95-113; H. Stehle, 'Deutsche Friedensfiihler bei den West- machten im Februar/Marz 1945', VfZ, 30, 1982, 538-55. 99 Goebbels-Tagebiicher, entry for 31 January 1945, 271, and 1 February 1945, 290. A number of nazi leaders had hoped that Goebbels would be able to persuade Hitler to adopt a 'political solution'. For details of January 1945: ibid., entries for 28 January 1945, 250ff, 257, and 31 January 1945, 284; Goebbels' memorandum for a special peace deal with the Soviet Union of 21 September 1944 in Goebbels-Tagebiicher, vol. 13, 536-42. 100 Schwendemann, op. cit., 232-44. 101 BA, R 3/1625, Speer to Schwerin von Krosigk, 15 May 1945, 25f; Fest, op. cit., 373f.







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614 Journal of Contemporary History Vol 38 No 4

of the material conduct of the war, he could 'win the enemy's respect' at Nuremberg.

Translated by Helen F. McEwan


is currently working as an academic adviser in the History Department at the University of Freiburg. He is the author of Die

wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem deutschen Reich und der Sowjetunion von 1939 bis 1941 (Berlin 1993) and Hitlers

Schloss. Die 'Fiihrerresidenz' in Posen (Berlin 2003).

















Heinrich Schwendemann (2003), " 'Drastic Measures to Defend the Reich at the Oder and the Rhine...

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Transcript of Heinrich Schwendemann (2003), " 'Drastic Measures to Defend the Reich at the Oder and the Rhine...

Heinrich Schwendemann (2003), " 'Drastic Measures to Defend the Reich at the Oder and the Rhine...

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