Hegel and Colonialism - Lancaster University · 2017-06-30 · Hegel and Colonialism Alison Stone...

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Hegel and Colonialism Alison Stone Abstract This article explores the implications of Hegels Philosophy of World History with respect to colonialism. For Hegel, freedom can be recognized and practised only in classical, Christian and modern Europe; therefore, the worlds other peoples can acquire freedom only if Europeans impose their civilization upon them. Although this imposition denies freedom to colonized peoples, this denial is legitimate for Hegel because it is the sole condition on which these peoples can gain freedom in the longer term. The article then considers whether Hegels basic account of freedom can be extricated from his Eurocentric and pro-colonialist interpretation of the course of history. The article argues that matters are more complicated because that interpretation has significant connections with Hegels conception of freedom as self-determination. Recently there has been considerable discussion amongst Hegel scholars of Hegels views on race. 1 There has been less direct consideration of what Hegel thought or what his philosophy implies regarding colonialism, 2 even though the discourses of race, colonialism and Eurocentrism are entwined. In this article I reconstruct Hegels position on colonialismtaking colonialismto mean the system of European political and economic dominance over the rest of the world which began to form when Columbus and others arrived in North and South America, culminated in the scramble for Africain the late nineteenth century, and lasted into the mid-twentieth century. To reconstruct Hegels position on colonialism I focus on his Philosophy of World History (PWH), for reasons explained in Section I, in which I re-examine the Eurocentrism of the PWHs essential claims. In Section II, I explain how the PWH implies that colonialism is justified on the grounds that it spreads the principle and spirit of freedom. For Hegel, it has only been possible for this principle to be grasped and put into practice in Europe. Therefore, the worlds other peoples can acquire freedom only if Europeans first impose their civilization upon them. Although this imposition denies freedom to colonized peoples, this denial is legitimate because it is the sole condition on which these 1

Transcript of Hegel and Colonialism - Lancaster University · 2017-06-30 · Hegel and Colonialism Alison Stone...

Page 1: Hegel and Colonialism - Lancaster University · 2017-06-30 · Hegel and Colonialism Alison Stone Abstract This article explores the implications of Hegel’s Philosophy of World

Hegel and Colonialism

Alison Stone

Abstract

This article explores the implications of Hegelrsquos Philosophy of World History withrespect to colonialism For Hegel freedom can be recognized and practised only inclassical Christian and modern Europe therefore the worldrsquos other peoples canacquire freedom only if Europeans impose their civilization upon them Althoughthis imposition denies freedom to colonized peoples this denial is legitimate forHegel because it is the sole condition on which these peoples can gain freedom inthe longer term The article then considers whether Hegelrsquos basic account of freedomcan be extricated from his Eurocentric and pro-colonialist interpretation of thecourse of history The article argues that matters are more complicated becausethat interpretation has significant connections with Hegelrsquos conception of freedom asself-determination

Recently there has been considerable discussion amongst Hegel scholars ofHegelrsquos views on race1 There has been less direct consideration of what Hegelthought or what his philosophy implies regarding colonialism2 even though thediscourses of race colonialism and Eurocentrism are entwined In this article Ireconstruct Hegelrsquos position on colonialismmdashtaking lsquocolonialismrsquo to mean thesystem of European political and economic dominance over the rest of the worldwhich began to form when Columbus and others arrived in North and SouthAmerica culminated in the lsquoscramble for Africarsquo in the late nineteenth centuryand lasted into the mid-twentieth century

To reconstruct Hegelrsquos position on colonialism I focus on his Philosophy ofWorld History (PWH) for reasons explained in Section I in which I re-examinethe Eurocentrism of the PWHrsquos essential claims In Section II I explain how thePWH implies that colonialism is justified on the grounds that it spreads theprinciple and spirit of freedom For Hegel it has only been possible for thisprinciple to be grasped and put into practice in Europe Therefore the worldrsquosother peoples can acquire freedom only if Europeans first impose theircivilization upon them Although this imposition denies freedom to colonizedpeoples this denial is legitimate because it is the sole condition on which these

1

peoples can gain freedom in the longer term Further colonialism is necessary tothe ongoing expansion of freedom which is world historyrsquos goal

I argue then that Hegelrsquos PWH generates a case for colonialism In thisI agree with critics of Hegel such as Enrique Dussel and Teshale Tibebu Theyregard Hegel as amdashindeed themdashquintessential Eurocentrist giving lsquothe mostsophisticated rendition of the Eurocentric paradigmrsquo (Tibebu 2010 xxi) and ofthe lsquomyth of modernityrsquo (Dussel 1993)mdashthe myth that modern Europe is theworldrsquos most advanced civilization which is obliged to educate develop andcivilize the others using violence where this mission requires it I also take it that

Eurocentrism hellip emerged as a discursive rationale forcolonialism hellip [but a]lthough colonialist discourse andEurocentric discourse are intimately intertwined the termshave a distinct emphasis While the former explicitly justifiescolonial practices the latter embeds takes for granted andlsquonormalizesrsquo the hierarchical power relations generated bycolonialism and imperialism without necessarily even thema-tizing these issues directly (Shohat and Stam [1994] 2014 2)

As we will see in Hegelrsquos PWH overt Eurocentrism and more implicit pro-colonial reasoning are present in just this fashion One might concludemdashassuming that colonialism was morally wrongmdashthat there is little point studyingHegelrsquos stance on colonialism today I disagree and believe such study importantbecause the international order today remains deeply shaped by the powerrelations established under colonialism so much so that this order can reasonablybe described as lsquoneo-colonialrsquo or as continuing to exhibit a lsquocoloniality of powerrsquo(Quijano 2000) In this context it is important to understand the Eurocentric andcolonialist discourses that still shape the world and to reflect critically on howsome major European philosophers including Hegel have contributed to thesediscourses

An alternative view is that it is worth studying Hegelrsquos stance on colonialismso as to find out what resources he offers us for critiquing it Perhaps we canfilter out his basic account of freedom and its historicity from his Eurocentricnarrative of the actual movement of history and perhaps so filtered out hisaccount of freedom tells against colonialism for denying freedom to manypeoples I consider this strategy for rescuing Hegel from himself in Section IIIthen argue in Section IV that matters are more complicated because Hegelrsquosconception of freedom as self-determination has significant connections with hisEurocentrism and the pro-colonialism that follows from it His philosophynonetheless contains possibilities that can be taken in an anti-colonial directionbut it also contains elements that have real and tenacious links with colonialismwhich we should not overlook

Hegel and Colonialism

2

I World history and Eurocentrism

Hegelrsquos best-known argument regarding colonialism in his Philosophy of Right isthat migration of the European poor to colonies overseas can alleviate moderncivil societyrsquos endemic problems of poverty and over-production (PR sectsect246ndash48267ndash69)3 In this article though I concentrate on the scattered statements oncolonialism in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of World History (PWH) along with thePWHrsquos broader implications4 I focus on the PWH because this is where Hegelargues that history runs from East to West that history proper only unfolds inthe West and that Christian European civilization especially in its latest phase asmodern liberal Europe is the most advanced world civilization (so far at least)That is in the PWH Hegel overtly upholds Eurocentrism or so I will argue inthis section

I understand Eurocentrism informed by Shohat and Stam (2014 esp 2ndash3)as the position that (i) history follows a linear path from Greece through Rome tomedieval then modern Europe all change powered internally to this line(ii) lsquomodern Europersquo includes European-derived cultures in the US Australia andbroadly lsquothe Westrsquo (iii) inherent progress unfolds along this intra-European linetowards freedom equality and other liberal values (iv) where unfreedom hasexisted or still exists in Europersquos past or present this is only because Europe hasnot yet fully worked through and applied its own governing principles of freedomand equality (v) no equivalent progression to freedom and equality has occurredoutside the West This kind of position focusing on freedom is expressed inHegelrsquos PWHmdashhis distinctive mode of approaching history notwithstandingmdashand his Eurocentrism brings pro-colonialism in its wake Irsquoll argue Thus it isfrom the PWH that we can best ascertain how Hegelrsquos thought tells forcolonialism

Regarding Hegelrsquos distinctive approach to history suffice it here to say thatHegelrsquos deceptively simple claim is to apply thought to history (H 78) where lsquothesole conception [or thought] that [philosophy] brings hellip is the simple conceptionof reasonmdashthe conception that reason governs the world and that thereforeworld history is a rational processrsquo (79) That is we aim to discern the immanentreason why real historical events took place to see why it made sense for theseevents to happen why they had to happen to advance historyrsquos overarching goalthe lsquoconsciousness of freedomrsquo (Bewuszligtsein der Freiheit) This goes even for dismalepisodes of decline destruction and suffering we ask how they too played a partin historyrsquos broader advancement This is not a matter of imposing an externallogic or categorial scheme on historical events (81) but rather of discerning theirlogic through interpretation of the recorded facts That said we the philosophicalhistorians bring forward the idea of reason and with it freedommdashthe idea thatthis single goal must regulate all world eventsmdashand we find that the historical

Alison Stone

3

record confirms this lsquoWhoever looks at the world rationally sees it as rationaltoo the two exist in a reciprocal relationshiprsquo (81)

As is well known Hegel holds concretely that world historyrsquos progression inthe lsquoconsciousness of freedomrsquo unfolds over three main stages lsquoone is freersquolsquosome are freersquo lsquoall are freersquo (all containing sub-divisions) corresponding toOriental Classical and Germanic civilizations On lsquoconsciousness of freedomrsquoHegelrsquos views are these Freedom consists in self-determination rationaldecision-making about what ends to follow which impulses to satisfy orwhether to act purely from universal principle instead (HG 148ndash49) All humanindividuals have this capacity for self-determinationmdashlsquoall human beings areintrinsically freersquo (an sich hellip frei H 88) but individuals are not always aware ofthis If they are not then they will fail to exercise develop and actualize theircapacity remaining practically unfree (although ontologically free)mdashfree lsquointhemselvesrsquo (an sich) but not for themselves (88) For instance lsquothe Orientals donot know that spirit or the human being as such is intrinsically free because theydo not know this they are not themselves freersquo (87 my emphasis) As thisimplies if the civilization to which I belong does not treat me as being freemdashsayif my place in it is to be a slave or serfmdashthen I will be unaware of my capacity forfreedom for what I can know depends on what is known in the social worldaround me This is why individual freedom advances in tandem with the sharedconsciousness of that freedom on the part of members of societies and as thisconsciousness is embodied in their practices and institutions As thisconsciousness advances the nature of freedom is grasped more adequately itsdomain is expanded eg from religious to secular affairs and crucially its scopeis expanded ever more people and categories of people are known to be free

As to Eurocentrism Hegel famously states that history moves West like thesun for historyrsquos most advanced stage is the lsquoGermanicrsquo civilization whose spirit isthat lsquoall are freersquo Admittedly for Hegel the insight that lsquoall are freersquo was first wonalbeit only in spiritual form (eg that we may all be saved) by Jesus Christmdashthusin Judaea not Europe (88) But Christrsquos message took hold in ancient Rome notthe Middle East because the Romans already held that some are free native maleslave-holders (HG 450ndash51) The soil was therefore ripe for other Romans to claimthat they shared in freedom too Christianity affording them terms to do so Nextdue to Roman imperialism which spread Christianity the Teutonic tribesencountered and gradually took on Christianity then after the Roman Empirefell spread Christianity through the rest of Europe (S 347ndash49) becoming thelsquobearers of the Christian principle of freedomrsquo (HG 460) Through its adoptionof Christianity Europe emerged as a distinct civilization the lsquoGermanicrsquo orlsquoChristianrsquomdashHegel tends to talk indifferently of the lsquoChristianrsquo lsquoGermanicrsquo andlsquoEuropeanrsquo states (eg 463) lsquoGermanicrsquo then means not lsquoGermanrsquo but lsquoChristianEuropeanrsquo more broadly (see also Mowad 2013 168ndash70)

Hegel and Colonialism

4

Freedomrsquos development continued with the Reformation at last restoringthe principle of the spiritual freedom of all against previously dominant Churchhierarchies The next step the Enlightenment was to grasp that freedom appliesin secular life too in freedoms to own private property choose a profession andspouse participate in public affairs etc Against the excessively abstractrealization of freedom in the French Revolution the most advanced Europeanstates treat determinate social institutionsmdashnuclear family market economyconstitutional monarchymdashas needed to secure these individual freedoms andreconcile them with social membership Overall then European history has beena centuries-long process of working out and putting into practice one definingprinciplemdashthe freedom of all (H 88)

Europe then comes to bear the Christian principle of freedom because ittakes it over from the Roman Empire where in turn Christianity had taken holdbecause the Romans were already conscious that lsquosome are freersquo building on thesame consciousness by the ancient Greeks So that lastmdashthe ancient Greekconsciousness that lsquosome are freersquomdashwas ultimately decisive lsquoThe consciousnessof freedom first awoke among the Greeks and with that they were freersquo (87 myemphases) they made the key transition from unfreedom to freedom Ultimatelythis is why the development from lsquosome are freersquo to lsquoall are freersquo has onlyspontaneously occurred on European soil

The transition that the Greeks made was equally from pre-history to historyHegel says of China and India that we lsquocannot speak here of a proper history assuchrsquo (HG 214) The Oriental civilizations are in world history only ambiguouslyThey are unhistorical insofar as they are not conscious of freedommdashor rather areconscious of it only very inadequately as belonging to one emperor (China)ruling caste (India) or empire (Persia) Consequently individuals in these culturesare not motivated to pursue or advance their own freedom for they do not knowthat they are capable of self-determination in the first place (again the lsquoOrientalsdo not know that hellip the human being as such is intrinsically free because theydo not know this they are not themselves freersquo H 87) Oriental culture containsno inner motor for progressive development to take place by way of individualsbroadening and deepening the scope of an extant yet still incomplete level offreedom Lacking that motor the Orient has no history properly speaking Evenso Hegel includes the Oriental civilizations in world history because they do havea minimal level of consciousness of freedom ie as belonging only to theemperor highest caste etc In contrast for Hegel Africans and indigenousAmericans lack any awareness of freedom their worlds are fully non-ambiguouslypre-historical whereas Oriental pre-history is on the threshold of world historyand to that extent lies partly within it

Hegelrsquos denial of full history to the Orientals sheds light on the kind ofreason he takes to be immanent in historical events which in turn illuminates

Alison Stone

5

his Eurocentrism Whereas the Orientals lack a motor for historical developmentand hence are pre-historical that motor does arise when a given level ofconsciousness of freedom being attained and embodied in social life that level ofconsciousness harbours some inner lsquocontradictionrsquo or tension which propelspeople qua rational beings to bring about change and improvement Theseconditions are first met by the ancient Greeks Another instance mentionedearlier is that the Romans conferred freedom on slave-owners while denying it toslaves giving slaves rational grounds to claim freedom as well In Section IV wewill encounter other instances of this type of historical development through therational response to contradictions

That reason is immanent in historical changes might suggest that in historylogical and temporal development coincide (whereas in say Hegelrsquos Logic thedialectical development of categories is not temporal) This is so to an extentThe pre-historical civilizations of Africa indigenous America and the Orienthave no consciousness of freedom sufficient to harbour self-contradictorylimitations that call for change hence these civilizations actually show nosignificant social change over time for Hegel They are and have ever been thesame embodying time but not history that is no instantiation over time ofthe dialectical-and-rational development of freedom Conversely in Europe thelimitations placed on a freedom that is nevertheless known power developmentsthat are at once rationally warranted and transpire through human agency overtime Yet for Hegel all that exists in space and time is subject to contingency andso realizes rational requirements under an innumerable variety of permutationsarising from the very nature of a spatio-temporal indefinitely complex causallyinterconnected world (EN sect250 and R 22ndash24) For example the Reformationultimately had to happen but it is a contingency that Luther posted his theses inWittenberg in October 15175

But not all that the PWH covers is historical In Africa indigenous Americaand the Orient time unfolds without history Consequently the advancementfrom Africa to the Orient and from China to India to Persia occurs purelyspatially in that each region in turn grasps freedom to successivemdashall highlyinadequatemdashdegrees Conversely historical development (in Europe) takes placein space as well as time not only in space (HG 156ndash57) Where advancementoccurs only spatially its motor is not human reason and agency but geographicalvariation Because we are natural spatially embodied as well as rational beings weare inescapably located in natural surroundings that divide into continentsAmerica Asia Africa and Europe The continentsrsquo features affect how theirinhabitants live and so what level of civilization and consciousness of freedomthey can reach by their own efforts America is weak and powerless yieldingimmature weak and lazy people (193) Africa is dominated by highlands andother non-cultivable areas so that African peoples form no awareness of their

Hegel and Colonialism

6

freedom something people first develop by working on nature (196) Asia isdominated by fertile plains so that its peoplesrsquo focus on agriculture inclines themtowards patriarchal family-based relationships and uncritical obedience toauthority (199ndash200) Only Europe is geographically diverse enough to fosterpeople living in diverse ways and so thinking for themselves (196)

Thus Europersquos physical environment explains why Greek civilization aroseand started the trajectory to modern liberalism Conversely for their part theOrientals advanced beyond the Africans not by thinking rationally about thelimitations of the latterrsquos grasp of freedommdashafter all allegedly they had nonemdashbut due to the Orientalsrsquo more auspicious environmental circumstancesUltimately here what guarantees the progression of stages up to the transitionto history proper is the rationality that for Hegel is embodied in the worldrsquosgeographic divisions6 Then the European natural environment made it possiblefor the Greeks to form a conception of freedom that in turn enabled historicalprogression in time and on the continuing basis of (intra-European) geographicalspace to begin7 (We might still ask though why the successive Oriental viewsthat lsquoone is freersquo were not sufficient to initiate historical progression proper I willreturn to this question later For now let us just note that for Hegel theywere not)

In sum Hegel is a Eurocentrist as defined above (p 3) As per (i) and (iii)he believes that European civilization develops purely internally towards thefuller comprehension and application of its principle of the freedom of all where(ii) this development has come to include that of all of the lsquoWestrsquo eg the USA8

(iv) He explains oppressive episodes in European history either from its not yethaving consistently worked out and applied its own principle of freedom (as withthe hierarchies of the medieval church) or as unavoidable requirements foradvancement (eg the religious wars of early modern Europe) (v) He denies thatany equivalent progression to freedom has occurred or can spontaneously occuroutside Europe Next I argue that it is Hegelrsquos Eurocentrism in particular hissharp divide between European freedom and non-European unfreedom whichgenerates a case for colonialism

II Hegelrsquos case for colonialism

In the PWH Hegel explicitly says relatively little about colonialism but what hedoes say is approving Finishing his account of the European middle ages hepraises the revival of learning the flourishing of fine art and the arrival of thelsquoherorsquo Columbus in the new world (S 411 Hei 204) Columbus he says wasmotivated by the lsquooutwardrsquo urging of spirit to know its own earth and convertnon-European natives to Christianity The reasons why Hegel regards this

Alison Stone

7

positively emerge in the passages on the lsquogeographical conditions of historyrsquo thataddress the lsquonew worldrsquo

It does not matter that Mexico and Peru did indeed havesignificant civilisations since they were of a feebler stock andare long gone The new world has shown itself to be muchfeebler than the old world hellip Some of the tribes of NorthAmerica have disappeared and some have retreated andgenerally declined hellip (HG 192ndash93)

In 183031 Hegel expanded on the new world adding that African Negroes hadto be brought to America to do the physical work of which the weak natives wereincapable (Hei 59) For lsquothe Negroes are far more receptive to European culturethan the Indianshellip [and] it will still be a long time before the Europeans succeedin producing any genuine feeling of self [Selbstgefuumlhl]rsquo in indigenous Americans(S 81) Hegel praises the Church in Latin America for beginning to instildiscipline in the natives through these and other colonial efforts the lsquoauthenticAmericans are hellip now beginning to educate themselves [sich hineinzubilden] inEuropean culturersquo (N 165) Incidentally Hegelrsquos points about indigenousAmericans apply equally to Aboriginal Australians since he includes lsquoNewHollandrsquomdashie Australiamdashin the new world

As for the old world Hegel begins with Africamdashthe lsquoauthenticrsquo sub-SaharanAfrica of the Negroes He contends that the Negroes know no morality andpractice slavery along with polygamy cannibalism and other customs thatembody total ignorance about freedom

Another characteristic fact in reference to the Negroes isSlavery Negroes are taken into slavery by Europeans and soldto America Despite this their lot is even worse in their owncountry where an equally absolute slavery is present for theoverall foundation of slavery is that man has no consciousnessof his freedom yet and so sinks down to a mere thing aworthless object hellip Slavery is in and for itself wrong [Unrecht]for the essence of humanity is freedom but for this man mustfirst become mature [reif] This is why the gradual abolition ofslavery is therefore more appropriate and more right[Richtigeres] than its sudden removal (S 96ndash99)

So European enslavement of Africans involves a degree of moral wrong insofaras Africans have intrinsic capacities for freedom Yet before enslavementAfricans did not know themselves to have that capacity accordingly theyenslaved and mistreated one another and acted merely on their natural desiresThe latter does not constitute freedom Hegel insists if I act from naturally given

Hegel and Colonialism

8

desires I am still not determining for myself how to act So slavery was relativelyan improvement because it lsquomaturedrsquo the Negroes to become aware of theirfreedom lsquoOne must educate the Negroes in their freedom by taming theirnaturalnessrsquo (Hei 70)

We can infer from Hegelrsquos comments that slavery educates in several ways(i) Those enslaved are subjected to European culture and ethical standards (fromeg N 165) (ii) Slavery imposes the discipline of work (eg Hei 59) In workingone learns to hold onersquos natural desires in check and thereby see oneself ascapable of deliberating about or even rejecting them (iii) Work also instils anawareness of onersquos capacity to mould natural objectsmdasha sense of lsquoachievingindependence through onersquos own activityrsquo (61) (iv) Ironically those enslaved thusacquire a sense of private property (61)mdashpartly by learning of Europeaninstitutions of property and partly by imposing form on objects thereby forminga sense of lsquopossessingrsquo them which fosters an appreciation of property9

In sum lsquoSlavery hellip is necessary at those stages where the state [and itspeople] has not yet arrived at rationality It is an element in the transition to ahigher stagersquo (HG 197) Because slavery still has elements of wrong though thefinal step must be for slavery to end However Hegel cautions slavery shouldnot be suddenly abolished because it must end after not before the Negroes havebeen educated through it lsquoIf slavery was altogether wrong then the Europeansshould give the slaves their freedom immediately but in that way the mostfrightening consequences arise as in the French coloniesrsquo (Hei 70)

Hegelrsquos line of thought then takes in slavery and colonization at once(understandably since enslavement of Africans was fundamental to colonialAmerica) Use of slavery in the colonies might be judged wrong because itviolates the rights equality and freedom of the slaves But through being enslavedslaves take steps forward in their consciousness of freedom which they could nototherwise make for Africa is intrinsically pre-historical and unfree so thatfreedom can come to Africans only from without Analogously one might thinkthat colonization was altogether wrong because it violated the rights equality andfreedom of indigenous peoplesmdashbut no for before colonization those peoplehad no awareness of their freedom They lsquoha[d] no sense of private property ofachieving independence through onersquos own activity or of securing onersquos propertythrough rightrsquo (61) By being forced to labour and being disciplined spiritually byagencies such as the Christian church these people will eventually learn abouttheir freedom Until then their subjection while partially wrong insofar as it issubjection is also partially right it is at least an improvement on the nativesremaining in their natural wholly unfree pre-colonial condition

Colonialism is justified on this view because it spreads freedom topeoples who otherwise both lack it and have no native means of acquiring itMoreover the colonizers are justified in extirpating the indigenous cultures of

Alison Stone

9

native peoplesmdashhence Hegelrsquos endorsement of the Christian clergy andmissionaries lsquosetting out to accustom the Indians to European culture andethics [Sitten]rsquo (N 164)mdashsince those indigenous cultures embody unfreedom Wemight wonder whether Hegel regards even the violence and slaughter thatoccurred during the colonization of America as justified He does acknowledgeEuropean especially Spanish violence towards indigenous Americans but he isonly overtly critical of this violence when the colonial project had he saysdegenerated into mere robbery (Hei 204) Moreover he disguises the extent ofEuropean violence by running together indigenous Americans having beenlsquodestroyed and slaughteredrsquo (untergegangen verdraumlngt) having disappeared(verschwunden) and having voluntarily withdrawn (haben sich zuruumlckgezogen N 163see also Parekh 2009) Hegel does not wholly denounce colonial violence becausehe thinks that Europersquos conquest of America was based on a sound goalmdashspreading freedom and the culture of freedom to all peoplemdashand that theviolence that was necessary for achieving that goal was justified But Hegel doesdisapprove of violence when it served merely an unworthy goalmdashrobbery

This is congruent with Hegelrsquos overall approach to violence in history whichhe memorably calls a lsquoslaughterbenchrsquo (Schlachtbank) On his view theconsciousness of freedom advances through each civilization in turn establishingits pre-eminence by prevailing culturally and militarily over its predecessor Tothe extent that war and violence are necessary for progress they are justified(although lsquojustifiedrsquo does not mean lsquoto be celebratedrsquo) Even in these termsthough much of the violence carried out by European colonizersmdashthedecimation of many native American tribes the Middle Passagemdashwent beyondthe minimum necessary to subject non-Europeans to colonial control along theway to their ultimate freedom But likewise in history generally violence hasregularly gone beyond the minimum necessary to propel progress Such excessesare inevitable an aspect of the inescapable contingency of human affairs Theseexcesses of violence are not justified yet we can be reconciled to them as aninevitable albeit non-ideal concomitant of progress (H 90ndash91) PresumablyHegel thinks the same about the excesses of colonial violence

Hegelrsquos overall line of thought is that colonialism is not only justified butalso necessary as part of Europersquos centuries-long process of realizing freedom Alogical step in this process is to extend freedom to non-European peoples afterall the European principle is that all are free This extension can only occurthough by passing through a stage of subjugating non-European peoples sincethey have no native means of acquiring freedom lsquoThe [Negroesrsquo] condition isincapable of any development or culture [Entwicklung und Bildung] and theircondition as we see it today is as it has always beenrsquo (N 190) And lsquothe Negroes cannot move [bewegen] to any culturersquo (Hei 67) Likewise with indigenousAmericans America is new and young because it had no history until the

Hegel and Colonialism

10

Europeans arrived These claims do not mean that Negroes and indigenousAmericans cannot be educated they can But given their native ignorance offreedom they cannot educate themselves but must be educated by Europeanswhich requires that they first be subjected to European control

Hegelrsquos case for colonization could be extended to the Orientals He admitsthat unlike Africans and indigenous Americans the Oriental peoples do have anidea of freedommdashthat lsquoone is freersquomdashbut this idea remains so inadequate as tocount as unfreedom Hence lacking belief in their own freedom Oriental peoplecannot pursue any extensions or advancements of freedom and without suchpursuits to drive historical change their societies remain ahistorical Colonizationof these peoples for educative purposes would therefore be justified As long as apeople is at a low enough level to count as unfree and pre-historical that peoplecan advance only through having the European spirit imposed on it for beingpre-historical it has no native way to attain freedom And indeed Hegel does sayof India that lsquoThe English or rather the East India Company are the lords[Herren] of the land for it is the necessary fate of Asiatic empires to be subjected[unterworfen] to Europeans and China will also some day have to submit to thisfatersquo (S 142ndash43)

We should not be misled by an apparently conflicting statement in thePhilosophy of Right lsquoThe liberation of colonies hellip [is] of the greatest advantage tothe mother state just as the emancipation of slaves is of the greatest advantage tothe masterrsquo (PR sect248A 269) Hegelrsquos paradigm here is American independenceie the independence of what he is explicit and adamant is colonial EuropeanAmerica not Native America (N 165ndash66) That is America merits independenceonce its native populace is reduced or placed securely under European tutelageThis coheres with Hegelrsquos approving reference to independent Haiti in thePhilosophy of Mind (EM sect393A 40) he says that this is a Christian state that theNegroes could only found after having undergone long spiritual servitude Oncea people has been colonized sufficiently to acquire European culture as in Haitithen and only then does that people merit freedom

Hegelrsquos argument for colonialism is of the lsquocivilizing missionrsquo familyEffectively his defence is that colonialism benefits most those who fare worstunder itmdashcolonized peoplesmdashby civilizing and bringing them freedom that theycannot access without passing through colonial subjection For Hegelcolonialism and the advancement of freedom go hand-in-hand

III Saving Hegel from himself

Hegelrsquos PWH implies that colonialism is required to further the realization ofuniversal freedom Does this show that Hegelrsquos conception of freedom is

Alison Stone

11

necessarily bound up with his pro-colonialism If so thenmdashtaking it thatcolonialism was in fact morally wrongmdashpresumably his conception of freedomand its historical development must be rejected (although not necessarily freedomas such of course)

But perhaps that would be to dismiss Hegelrsquos thought too summarily andthereby to do disservice not only to Hegel but also to anti-colonial anddecolonizing thought and activism which after all has regularly drawn on Hegelboth directlymdasheg when Frantz Fanon ([1952] 2008) and Ngugi wa Thiongrsquoo(2012) use Hegel to critique colonialismmdashand indirectly through Hegelrsquosinfluence on Marxism and critical theory Moreover Hegelrsquos thought may stilloffer further anti-colonial resources which remain to be mined We mighttherefore reasonably seek to separate Hegelrsquos basic conception of freedom and itshistoricity from his Eurocentric narrative of history so that when so separatedthat basic conception tells against colonialism Such a viewmdashone that rescuesHegel from himselfmdashis often adopted more or less explicitly by hisinterpreters10 I now want to set out my own version of this type of viewalthough I will go on to complicate it in Section IV

The view is this We can separate the essentials of Hegelrsquos account offreedom from his concrete interpretation of the actual movement of historyHegel was wrong and prejudiced when he dismissed Africans indigenousAmericans and Orientals as unfree and incapable of coming to freedom on theirown Nevertheless his basic account of what freedom is including its necessaryhistorical development remains insightful A better informed judgment ofnon-European peoples would require a very different historical narrative Butthat does not undermine Hegelrsquos basic points that freedom develops historicallyin tandem with the consciousness of it as embodied in different cultures andsocial institutions When we separate these basic points from his actualnarrative we find that these points serve a progressive purpose yielding groundsto reject colonialism

This view dovetails with Hegelrsquos claim that the human capacity for self-determination is universal not confined to Europeans (see eg H 88) Admittedlythough this starting-point is only an abstract universal Self-determination can beactualized only when one is conscious of onersquos capacity for it and thatrequires social and cultural institutions a whole way of life which foster thatconsciousness Such a way of life arose for the first time only in ancient Greecefor Hegel so that actualized freedom does not obtain universallyArguably though given his basic view of freedom and its historicity Hegelcould and should have interpreted all the worldrsquos regions as taking part in thegradual historical unfolding of social institutions that support freedom Hegeldoes not do so because he denies that non-European peoples are conscious offreedom at all Since non-European societies were not conscious of freedom

Hegel and Colonialism

12

even in the restricted ways that the Greeks and Romans were the former had nobasis for moving forward historically by further advancing an already partlyrealized freedom

Thus what underpins Hegelrsquos denial of historicity to non-European peoplesis his sharp division of European freedom from non-European unfreedom Thatin turn is underpinned by his claim that the ancient Greeks made the decisivebreak from unfreedom into freedom The Greeks Hegel says became thedistinctive people they were out of a mixing within them of heterogeneousOriental peoples and their cultures but the Greeks surmounted or overcame(uumlberwinden) this background (HG 214) By doing so the Greeks created theirlsquofree beautifulrsquo spirit (374) The Greeks overcame their Oriental preconditions tolsquomake themselvesrsquo (372 see also 393ndash94)

However this view that the Greeks lsquoovercamersquo the Oriental world ofunfreedom seems overstated by Hegelrsquos own lights For Hegel himself theGreeks mark only the latest phase in a growing consciousness of freedomrunning from China through India to Persia and culminating in EgyptPersiarsquos most advanced province Egypt is the hinge between Orient andOccident in which the human soulrsquos intrinsic capacity for freedom was almostgrasped But it was not quite grasped for the soul was still not distinguishedfrom animal nature a distinction the Greeks went on to make (HG 334 368)That lack of distinction is shown by the way the Egyptians modelled their godsand goddesses on animal species often with animal heads Yet for Hegel theGreeks too stopped short of recognizing that all people have an inherent capacityfor freedom They admitted freedom only to male native-born slave-ownersIn that way their view of freedom remained intermingled with acceptance ofnatural contingency ie accidents of birth sex and geographical location (H 88)So the difference between the Egyptian viewmdashhuman freedom is incompletelydistinguished from (animal) naturemdashand the Greek viewmdashhuman freedom isagain incompletely distinguished from naturemdashappears to be a difference ofdegree not kind11

Hegelrsquos lsquoovercomingrsquo idea therefore sits uncomfortably with his graduatedportrayal of historyrsquos stages That portrayal could be taken to show that belief infreedom is not exclusively European since the Persians and Egyptians already hadversions of that belief To be sure they were inadequate versions (for Hegel)mdashbutthen so was the Greeksrsquo And by extension the Indians and Chinese likewise hadversions of the belief in freedommdasheven more inadequate ones since theyattributed freedom only to lsquoonersquo not lsquosomersquomdashbut where that inadequacy stilldifferentiates these peoples from the Greeks only by degree and not kind (more soin the Indian case since the lsquoonersquo is a whole caste) If the Oriental peoples did haveversions however unsatisfactory of the belief in freedom then Hegel should nothave denied that these peoples are historical For if it is believed that someone is

Alison Stone

13

free be it only lsquoonersquo ruler or caste then others may claim and demand that samefreedom for themselves powering historical change

Now Hegel regards the Africans and indigenous Americans as lackingfreedom more radically than the Orientals yet contrary evidence was available tohim He might for instance have noted the Iroquois Confederacy of five (latersix) Native American tribes founded c1600 and dissolved c1800 a system ofintra- and inter-tribal governance which lsquomaximized individual freedom whileseeking to minimize excess governmental interference in peoplersquos livesrsquo (Johansen1982 9) influencing the American Constitution And Hegel embellishedexaggerated and at times outright distorted his sources on Africa so as to portraya people without any respect for human life freedom or rightsmdashmore so thanthe sources suggested and they were already unreliable (see Bernasconi 1998)12

The way was open to Hegel to recognize Africans and indigenous Americans ashaving views of freedom even if he classed them as even less adequate thanOriental ones With that those peoples would like the Orientals have had anentry to history

Nonetheless Hegel preserves his division of European freedom from non-European unfreedom by counting all the European stages as stages of freedomdown to its lowest level and all the non-European stages as stages of unfreedomright up to where unfreedom is almost freedom but not quite But the placementof this dividing line appears arbitrary Consider for example Hegelrsquos view thatHindus are not conscious of their own freedom because they fail to distinguishthemselves as human agents from nature (HG 256 273ndash81) On Hegelrsquosaccount as wersquove just seen there are ways that the ancient Greeks did not fullyextricate human agency from nature either somdashon his own termsmdashit is not clearthat the difference here is one of kind (history versus non-history freedom versusunfreedom) rather than degree (more or less freedom more or less far along thehistorical path towards full freedom)

Hegel could and it seems should have interpreted much of hismaterial as evidencing how non-European peoples have grasped and practisedfreedom albeit imperfectly We might still find this revised Hegeliannarrative objectionable assuming that it ranks non-European conceptions offreedom as less advanced than European ones Yet once it is admittedthat non-European peoples are historical in principle Hegel would alsohave to trace how historical advances unfolded in those societies so re-interpreting his material once again Each continent would have its own history ofprogression in consciousness of freedom rather than non-Europeancontinents merely paving the way for Europe The several continents wouldhave histories of freedom that run in parallel rather than corresponding tomore or less advanced phases of a single historical line that culminates in modernEurope

Hegel and Colonialism

14

Neither of these revised Hegelian narrativesmdashthe single line or parallel linesversionsmdashsupports colonialism not even the single line model on whichnon-European peoplesrsquo native levels of freedom are although real yetdeficient compared to European ones By recognizing freedom howeverunsatisfactorily non-European cultures would still have the internal potential andmotor to advance to greater freedom In that case colonization would not benecessary for non-European peoplesrsquo achieving freedom and would not bejustified as a necessary step in the realization of universal freedom Anotherplank in Hegelrsquos justification of colonization is that colonized peoples enjoyed nofreedom pre-colonizationmdashso that despite its abrogation of their freedomcolonization did not worsen their position (and ultimately would improve it) Butif these peoples did have a grasp of freedom however imperfect thencolonization stood to worsen their position That risk is especially pronouncedgiven Hegelrsquos own perspective that some violence is necessary for colonizationand given the role of contingency in human affairs that that violence may wellmushroom beyond the necessary minimum Further for Hegel colonizationrequires the extirpation of native cultures but if these are not cultures ofunfreedom then that extirpation is not justified Apparently then Hegel shouldby his own lights have opposed colonialism for his own philosophy generates acase against it

IV The Greeks history and self-liberation from nature

The view just canvassed is that despite the Eurocentrism and pro-colonialism ofHegelrsquos substantial narrative in the PWH his distinctive account of freedom asdeveloping historically through successive civilizations does not in itselfnecessitate his substantive Eurocentrism and when extricated from the latteryields a case against colonialism However we can distinguish weaker andstronger versions of this view More weakly Hegelrsquos basic account of freedomcan be separated from his actual pro-colonialism and so does not necessarilyimply pro-colonialism but contains anti-colonial possibilities as well as thepro-colonial possibilities that Hegel developed from it More strongly Hegelrsquosbasic account of freedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism andwhen so separated this account implies anti-colonialism and has an inherentlyanti-colonial direction I endorse the weaker but not the stronger claim and theweaker one only subject to a significant qualification Hegelrsquos basic account offreedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism but not as easily asSection III suggested This is because Hegelrsquos conception of freedom asself-determination has significant connections with his Eurocentrism

Alison Stone

15

In Section III I suggested that Hegelrsquos divisions Greeksnon-Greeks freeunfree look arbitrary But actually they are not For Hegel

Its [Greecersquos] principle is that self-conscious freedom stepsforth hellip [Regarding t]he unity of spirit with nature hellip thespecificity of this unity [in the Greek case] is to be graspedOne unity is the Oriental hellip consciousness immersed innature a [new kind of] harmony is now to be broughtforth [by the Greeks] in which hellip spirit dominates Spirit nowdetermines nature and this is a spiritual unity hellip (Hei 117 myemphases)

[The] fundamental characteristic [of the Greek spirit is] that thefreedom of spirit is conditioned by and in essential relation tosome natural stimulus Greek freedom is stimulated bysomething other and is free because it changes and produces thestimulus from out of itself (aus sich) (S 238 my emphasis)

Thus the Greeks were free in that they were at home with themselves in theother ie nature But this does not mean that the content of their practices andway of life was determined by natural givens such as the Greeksrsquo given impulsesRather they reshaped these givens and so became at-home-with-themselves inthem In the Greek case then spirit lsquodeterminedrsquo nature whereas previouslyspirit had been immersed or absorbed (versenkt) in nature This Greekdetermination of nature by spiritmdashspiritrsquos investment of nature with meaningof its ownmdashwas made possible by a prior moment first carried out by theGreeks through which lsquospirit is no longer immersed [versenkt] in nature hellip [but]releas[es] itself from nature [sich losmachend von der Natur]rsquo (HG 395ndash96) Thismoment in which the human spirit first releases or sets itself free from naturecorresponds to the overcoming (uumlberwinden) by the Greeks of their mixed ethnicheritage a moment of overcoming through which they became able to remakethat heritage for themselves to make themselves Hegel is explicit that none ofthe worldrsquos other peoples to that point had achieved this

Even so for Hegel the Greeks exercised freedom always with respect tonature and existing givens in the worldmdashre-shaping what they found alreadythere rather than creating a totally new world out of themselves Hence theGreeks did not regard free individuals as being capable of adjudicatingindependently on the given natural and social world through their own reason orof generating norms and principles purely through the exercise of their spiritualfreedom Or as Hegel also puts it elsewhere individual subjectivity was notdifferentiated from social substance but the individual identified fully andunquestioningly with his or her social role and there was no ground for

Hegel and Colonialism

16

independent social criticism (see Hardimon 1993) Connected with all this theGreeks restricted freedom to some people only effectively stipulating that onlythose with certain kinds of naturemdashmale free-bornmdashor natural locationmdashnativeGreekmdashhad the power of self-determination In these ways spiritrsquos freedomremained lsquoconditionedrsquo or limited (bedingt) bymdashalthough not immersed inmdashnature (and see HG 390)

However these limitations contradicted the essence of self-determination asthe Greeks understood it as including a moment of overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature such that the power to overcome nature cannotpossibly be limited by nature (or it would not be a power to overcome nature atall) Thus lsquoin the principle of Greek freedom inasmuch as it is freedom it isimplied that thought must be free for itself rsquo (HG 268)mdashalthough the Greeks fora long time did not explicitly grasp or follow through on that implicationNonetheless in the end that contradiction was what made it possible for theGreeksrsquo exclusion of some people from freedom and their other ways ofrestricting freedomrsquos scope to come in for criticism The criticism came withSocrates and the Sophists claiming that thought can adjudicate rationally on whatis and generate norms by itself (417) In that freedom of thought was therebygrasped as fully independent of nature it was also grasped as universal at least inprinciple In these two ways lsquoThought hellip introduces an opposition [Gegensatz][to the Greek mixture of freedom and nature] and asserts the validity ofessentially rational principlesrsquo (S 267)

For Hegel then Greek culture enabled rational criticism of what isincluding of limited freedom as no pre-Greek cultures did just because theGreeks had established a root opposition between freedom and nature whereaslsquoin the Oriental states in which a lack of opposition is present no moral freedomcan come aboutrsquo (267) Although the advent of rational critique brought on thedemise of Greek culture Europe was thereby also set on the path oftransformative historical change We see then why in his own terms Hegel saysthat non-European peoples could not advance critical claims for freedomrsquosextension but uncritically accepted the authority of their rulersmdashpatriarchalauthority in China caste hierarchy and caste-based restrictions and rituals inIndia and state power in Persia Non-Europeans could not question suchauthorities because their cultures did not grasp freedom as including the momentof overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature and the given Becausefreedom was not grasped as including that moment of human separation fromnature and the given no contradiction was perceived in freedom being limited bynature eg confined to people of certain castes or by given states of affairs egcustomary authority and ritual Non-Europeans lacked a critical motor to drivesocial change hence lacked history propermdashor indeed freedom as properlydistinguished from unfreedom

Alison Stone

17

So for Hegel there is a genuine difference in kind not merely degreebetween the Greek and post-Greek European world on the one hand and thenon-European world on the other the Europenon-Europe divide is notarbitrary but has a philosophical rationale For while the Greek view of freedomwas like non-European views limited and inadequate the former was moreadvanced in one key respectmdashthe inclusion in freedom of a primary moment oflsquoovercomingrsquo naturemdashwhich enabled the Greek and post-Greek European worldto become self-critical self-revising and so historical This is what motivatesHegel to identify Greek and post-Greek European views as views of freedomhowever limited whereas non-European views that might prima facie look likeviews of freedom are still actually modes of unfreedom

Once again we might object that non-Europeans have at times construedfreedom as including this moment of overcoming nature Even on Hegelrsquosaccount Hindus appreciate the human power to abstract from the world inthought He maintains though that this is merely an intellectual withdrawaland that when it comes to practical agency Hindus see human agency as immersedin not including any moment of self-freeing-from nature (see eg S 157ndash58)In response we could with Jaspal Peter Sahota (2016) agree that in classicalIndian thought there has been a tendency to locate human agency within naturebut argue against Hegel that this does not constitute a real absence offreedom but rather a different conception of freedom We might then say thatbecause thesemdashand othermdashnon-European views were still views of freedom thoseviews were still sufficient to motivate social criticism and hence place non-European peoples in history even without the element of overcoming natureHowever such a position would take us further away from Hegelrsquos own accountof the historicity of freedom according which as we have seen that moment ofovercoming nature uniquely new in ancient Greece is crucial in poweringhistorical progression

Hegelrsquos basic account of freedom and its historicity thus has more extensiveand significant connections with his Eurocentrism than I suggested inSection III In particular that account connects with Hegelrsquos denial that non-European peoples are historicalmdashie can come to freedom on their ownmdashandhence with his case for colonialism as the only route along which those peoplescan reach freedom These connections suggest that after all we cannotstraightforwardly take up Hegelrsquos account of freedom and its historicity whilesloughing off his pro-colonialism This is not to say that we cannot separate outthese parts of his thought at all But rescuing Hegel from himself is set to be acomplicated process not quick or straightforward To the extent that such arescue is possible Hegelrsquos pro-colonialism cannot rightly be counted as necessaryto his thought or system Yet his pro-colonialism does have extensive anddeep-seated connections with his other viewsmdashenough to show that it is not the

Hegel and Colonialism

18

case that Hegel should not have endorsed colonialism by his own standardsRather he did and could endorse it coherently in his own terms although otheranti-colonialist possibilities were also available within his own terms which hecould have developed

So the claim that Hegelrsquos account of freedom is inherently anti-colonial isunduly strong Through his understanding of freedom as involving spiritextricating itself from nature that account has sustained links with hisEurocentrism and so his pro-colonialism We can nonetheless envisage variousmanoeuvres by which to maintain that freedom develops historically for all theworldrsquos peoples for example by saying that they have several conceptions offreedom where freedom can but does not have to include self-liberation fromnature Then ancient Greece would initiate one historical pathway to freedombut not the only one Even so Hegelrsquos own account of freedom and its historicitydoes not inherently drive us to make these intellectual manoeuvres but onlypermits them In sum if Hegelrsquos view of freedom does not necessarily implypro-colonialism neither is it inherently anti-colonial We can make distinctionsand qualifications within his thought so as to yield anti-colonial conclusions butthis is only one of several possible lines of development of which his thoughtadmits another being its elaboration into the Eurocentric and pro-colonialsystem that Hegel in fact forged

There is a broader moral Wemdashie the heirs of the European heritage thatruns through philosophy into modern political thoughtmdashshould not let thisheritage off the hook too easily This heritage including Hegelrsquos thought hasbeen implicated in colonialism in various ways To be sure because it extols andarticulates the values of freedom and equality this heritage also furnishesconceptual resources for critiquing colonialism and giving support to anti-colonial struggles and anti-colonial thinkers and activists have drawn on modernEuropean ideas for this purpose For example the Haitian revolutionariesdeclared that they were acting in allegiance to the emancipatory goals of theFrench Revolution This might lead us to suppose that the European politicallegacy is intrinsically liberatory and that theorists in the European traditionmdashHegel includedmdashhave only ever justified colonialism due to unfortunateprejudices that led them to go back on their own principles

I believe that taking that view exculpates our predecessors too quicklyand leaves us at risk of inadvertently embracing ideas inherited from thesepredecessors which actually have deep-rooted internal connections withEurocentric and pro-colonial attitudes This is not to say that we should orcould repudiate these ideas outright Rather in view of their connections withcolonialism we need to think carefully and critically about how far to take theseinherited ideas forward and how we might do so differently My aim has been tohelp us cultivate this caution in Hegelrsquos case by acknowledging that while his

Alison Stone

19

thought harbours anti-colonial possibilities it also has real and tenacious linkswith colonialism of which we should remind mindful13

Alison StoneLancaster University UKastonelancasteracuk

Notes

1 Contributions include those by Bernasconi 1998 2007 2016 Bonetto 2006 de Laurentiis2014 McCarney and Bernasconi 2003 Mowad 2013 Parekh 2009 Purtschert 2010 andTibebu 20102 However see Buck-Morss 2000 andmdashfor highly critical accountsmdashDussel [1992] 1995 and1993 Guha 2002 Tibebu 2010 Also relevant are Bird-Pollan 2014 (on Hegel and Fanon)Brennan 2013 (on Hegelrsquos influence on post-colonialism) Buchwalter 2009 (defending Hegelagainst charges of Eurocentrism) Monahan 2017 (Creolizing Hegel) and Serequeberhan 1989(on colonialism in the Philosophy of Right)3 Ranajit Guha identifies another argument for colonialism in the Philosophy of Rightfrom the lsquorightsrsquo that Hegel claims civilized nations have with respect to less advanced ones(PR sect351 376) These rights Guha argues are lsquorights of conquestrsquo noting Hegelrsquos praise for Britishmilitary victories over India led by Robert Clive (1725ndash74) whose conquests established theEast India Companyrsquos rule over Bengal and other Indian states See Guha 2002 43ndash44PR sect372A 364 and 474 note 1)Abbreviations usedEN=Hegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller Oxford Clarendon PressEM= Hegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind Trans W Wallace and A V Miller Oxford OxfordUniversity Press Cited by paragraph and page numberN=Hegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reason in Historytrans H B Nisbet Cambridge UK Cambridge University PressS=Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NY Prometheus BooksPR=Hegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B Nisbet Cambridge UKCambridge University PressHei=Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink4 Hegel lectured on the PWH in 182223 182425 182627 182829 and 183031 Hismanuscripts of the Introduction from 1822 (rev 1828) and 183031 survive as do manytranscripts between them covering every course Some such as de Laurentiis (2014) are waryof directly attributing to Hegel views notably on race expressed only in the transcripts I agreethat we should disambiguate sources but where multiple independently written transcripts

Hegel and Colonialism

20

converge as domdashextensivelymdashseveral transcripts of the PWH we may take them to bereliable Accordingly I refer to Hegelrsquos manuscripts (abbreviated H) as in Hegel 2011 which isthe English translation of the corresponding volume of the Gesammelte Werke (Hegel 1995) andthe integrated text of the 182223 course composed primarily from Hothorsquos and Griesheimrsquostranscripts (abb HG) included in Hegel 2011 (the German is Hegel 1996) Since the Germancritical edition of the transcripts remains incomplete for materials on Hegelrsquos later coursesI have used Heimannrsquos transcript of 183031 whenever possible (Hegel 2005 abb Hei)otherwise the composite texts produced by Karl Hegel (Hegel 1986) and translated by Sibree(Hegel 1991 abb S) and by Georg LassonJohannes Hoffmeister (Hegel 1988) translated byNisbet (Hegel 1975 abb N) I quote English translations whenever available sometimesadjusted in view of the German5 For more on contingency in Hegel see inter alia Burbidge 2007 esp ch 1 Burbidge stressesthe extent to which Hegel lsquotakes the contingencies of history seriouslyrsquo (2007 9)6 For Hegel lsquonaturehellip is indeed a rational system operating in its own distinct elementrsquo (N 44)The division into continents is rational in that different natural features and their varietiesmdashmountains and plains lands and seas and their fusion and differentiationmdasheach find fullembodiment in different continents (EM sect393 and R 40ndash41) In a sense then non-Europeansare subject to reason and rational progression insofar as nature imposes it on them fromthe outside rather than by exercising rational thought for themselves This coheres withHegelrsquos view that these peoples are immersed in nature out of which only Europeans can liftthem see below7 This recalls Hegelrsquos derivation of time from space in the Philosophy of Nature a derivation thatpositions time as more advanced than space (EN sectsect256ndash57 31ndash36)8 This is evident from eg Hegelrsquos discussion of the colonization of America see Section II9 Hegel connects formation with possession (PR sect56 85ndash86) albeit in the very differentcontext of modern European societies in which private property is institutionalized I leaveunexplored here how far his ideas about slaveryrsquos educative power may be informed by hislordbondsman dialectic10 For instance some interpreters defend Hegel against charges of Eurocentrism and racism(eg Buchwalter 2009 Houlgate [1991] 2015 35ndash37 McCarney in McCarney and Bernasconi2003 Mowad 2013) others stress Hegelrsquos founding importance for anti-colonial thought(Brennan 2013) and numerous readers of Hegel as a thinker of freedom (eg Patten 1999)see no need to discuss his position on colonialism presumably on the grounds that the latteris a merely accidental avoidable part of his thought from which his essential views on freedomcan be extracted11 For Hegel the Greeks were greatly influenced by the Egyptians whose influence theynonetheless overcame Here he is close to accepting what Martin Bernal calls the lsquoancientmodelrsquo of the Greeksrsquo origins a model to which the Greeks themselves adhered later-nineteenth-century Europeans instead espoused an lsquoAryan modelrsquo on which Greek cultureproper arose from northern invaders driving out earlier Egyptian and Phoenician influences([1987] 1991) Bernal argues that the Aryan model had Eurocentric motivations if the Greeks

Alison Stone

21

the supposed originators of Europersquos distinctive culture were actually the Egyptiansrsquo heirsthen given that Egypt is within Africa the EuropeAfrica divide would crumble A furthercomplicating factor is whether the Egyptians were seen as black Africans Bernasconi (2007)argues that Hegel thought so as did most other Europeans of his time Later the Egyptiansrsquoracial status was changedmdashto Mediterranean (ie Caucasian)mdashto hold up the divide betweenEurope-as-white and Africa-as-black Bernasconi suggests that Hegel himself dealt with thepotential anomalymdashof highly cultured black Africans giving much to the Greeksmdashby makingthe EgyptGreece transition the site of the key conceptual transition from unfreedom tofreedom nature to spirit (2007 212ndash13) This ties in with my argument in Section IV thatHegel actually did have grounds on his own terms to construe the apparently gradual EgyptGreece transition as actually being a sharp divide12 Bernasconi (2016) has recently shown how Hegel likewise distorted his sources on China tothe detriment of the Chinese13 I thank Bob Stern and the referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions

Bibliography

Bernal M [1987] (1991) Black Athena The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical CivilisationVol 1 London VintageBernasconi R (1998) lsquoHegel at the Court of the Ashantirsquo in S Barnett (ed)Hegel After Derrida Albany NY SUNYBernasconi R (2007) lsquoThe Return of Africa Hegel and the Question of theRacial Identity of the Egyptiansrsquo in P T Grier (ed) Identity and Difference AlbanyNY SUNYBernasconi R (2016) lsquoChina on Parade Hegelrsquos Manipulation of his Sources andhis Change of Mindrsquo in B Brandt and D L Purdy (eds) China in the GermanEnlightenment Toronto University of Toronto PressBird-Pollan S (2014) Hegel Freud and Fanon The Dialectic of Emancipation LondonRowman and Littlefield InternationalBonetto S (2006) lsquoRace and Racism in HegelmdashAn AnalysisrsquoMinerva An InternetJournal of Philosophy 10Brennan T (2013) lsquoHegel Empire and Anti-Colonial Thoughtrsquo in G Huggan(ed) The Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies Oxford Oxford University PressBuchwalter A (2009) lsquoIs Hegelrsquos Philosophy of History Eurocentricrsquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYBuck-Morss S (2000) lsquoHegel and Haitirsquo Critical Inquiry 264 821ndash65Burbidge J (2007) Hegelrsquos Systematic Contingency Basingstoke Palgrave MacmillanDe Laurentiis A (2014) lsquoRace in Hegel Text and Contextrsquo in M Egger (ed)Philosophie Nach Kant Neue Wege zum Verstaumlndnis von Kants Transzendental- undMoralphilosophie Berlin De Gruyter

Hegel and Colonialism

22

Dussel E [1992] (1995) The Invention of the Americas trans M D Barber NewYork ContinuumDussel E (1993) lsquoEurocentrism and Modernityrsquo Boundary 2 203 65ndash76Fanon F [1952] (2008) Black Skin White Masks trans R Philcox New YorkGroveGuha R (2002) History at the Limit of World-History New York ColumbiaUniversity PressHardimon M (1993) Hegelrsquos Social Philosophy Cambridge Cambridge UniversityPressHegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller OxfordClarendonHegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind trans W Wallace and A V MillerOxford Oxford University PressHegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reasonin History trans H B Nisbet Cambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1986) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Geschichte Werke Vol 12ed E Moldenhauer and K M Michel Frankfurt Suhrkamp [Englishtranslation Sibree]Hegel G W F (1988) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Vols 1-3 edG Lasson Vols 1-4 Hamburg Meiner [English translation of volume 1 Nisbet]Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NYPrometheus BooksHegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B NisbetCambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1995) lsquoVorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der WeltgeschichteEinleitungrsquo in W Jaeschke (ed) Vorlesungsmanuskripte II (1916ndash1831)Gesammelte Werke Vol 18 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown andHodgson]Hegel G W F (1996) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Berlin 182223 Nachschriften von Griesheim Hotho und Kehler ed Karl Brehmer K-H Iltingund Hoo Nam Seelmann Hegel Vorlesungen Ausgew Nachschriften und ManuskripteVol 12 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown and Hodgson]Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink Abb HeiHegel G W F (2011) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Volume 1Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822ndash3 ed and trans R F Brownand P C Hodgson with assistance of W G Geuss Oxford Clarendon PressHoulgate S [1991] 2015 An Introduction to Hegel Freedom Truth and HistoryOxford BlackwellJohansen B E (1982) Forgotten Founders How the American Indians Helped ShapeDemocracy Boston Harvard Common Press

Alison Stone

23

McCarney J and Bernasconi R (2003) lsquoExchange Hegelrsquos Racismrsquo RadicalPhilosophy 119(MayJune) 32ndash37Monahan M (ed) (2017) Creolizing Hegel London Rowman and LittlefieldInternationalMowad N (2013) lsquoThe Place of Nationality in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of Politicsand Religion A Defense of Hegel on the Charges of National Chauvinism andRacismrsquo in A Nuzzo (ed) Hegel on Religion and Politics Albany NY SUNYParekh S (2009) lsquoHegelrsquos New World History Freedom and Racersquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYPatten A (1999) Hegelrsquos Idea of Freedom Oxford Oxford University PressPurtschert P (2010) lsquoOn the Limit of Spirit Hegelrsquos Racism Revisitedrsquo Philosophyand Social Criticism 369 1039ndash51Quijano A (2000) lsquoColoniality of Power Eurocentrism and Latin AmericarsquoNepantla Views from South 13 533ndash80Sahota J P (2016) lsquoHegelrsquos Critique of Hinduism A Responsersquo Hegel Bulletin372 305ndash17Serequeberhan T (1989) lsquoThe Idea of Colonialism in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of RightrsquoInternational Philosophical Quarterly 293 301ndash18Shohat E and Stam R [1994] (2014) Unthinking Eurocentrism New YorkRoutledgeTibebu T (2010) Hegel and the Third World The Making of Eurocentrism in WorldHistory Syracuse NY Syracuse University PressWa Thiongrsquoo N (2012) Globalectics Theory and the Politics of Knowing New YorkColumbia University Press

Hegel and Colonialism

24

  • Hegel and Colonialism
Page 2: Hegel and Colonialism - Lancaster University · 2017-06-30 · Hegel and Colonialism Alison Stone Abstract This article explores the implications of Hegel’s Philosophy of World

peoples can gain freedom in the longer term Further colonialism is necessary tothe ongoing expansion of freedom which is world historyrsquos goal

I argue then that Hegelrsquos PWH generates a case for colonialism In thisI agree with critics of Hegel such as Enrique Dussel and Teshale Tibebu Theyregard Hegel as amdashindeed themdashquintessential Eurocentrist giving lsquothe mostsophisticated rendition of the Eurocentric paradigmrsquo (Tibebu 2010 xxi) and ofthe lsquomyth of modernityrsquo (Dussel 1993)mdashthe myth that modern Europe is theworldrsquos most advanced civilization which is obliged to educate develop andcivilize the others using violence where this mission requires it I also take it that

Eurocentrism hellip emerged as a discursive rationale forcolonialism hellip [but a]lthough colonialist discourse andEurocentric discourse are intimately intertwined the termshave a distinct emphasis While the former explicitly justifiescolonial practices the latter embeds takes for granted andlsquonormalizesrsquo the hierarchical power relations generated bycolonialism and imperialism without necessarily even thema-tizing these issues directly (Shohat and Stam [1994] 2014 2)

As we will see in Hegelrsquos PWH overt Eurocentrism and more implicit pro-colonial reasoning are present in just this fashion One might concludemdashassuming that colonialism was morally wrongmdashthat there is little point studyingHegelrsquos stance on colonialism today I disagree and believe such study importantbecause the international order today remains deeply shaped by the powerrelations established under colonialism so much so that this order can reasonablybe described as lsquoneo-colonialrsquo or as continuing to exhibit a lsquocoloniality of powerrsquo(Quijano 2000) In this context it is important to understand the Eurocentric andcolonialist discourses that still shape the world and to reflect critically on howsome major European philosophers including Hegel have contributed to thesediscourses

An alternative view is that it is worth studying Hegelrsquos stance on colonialismso as to find out what resources he offers us for critiquing it Perhaps we canfilter out his basic account of freedom and its historicity from his Eurocentricnarrative of the actual movement of history and perhaps so filtered out hisaccount of freedom tells against colonialism for denying freedom to manypeoples I consider this strategy for rescuing Hegel from himself in Section IIIthen argue in Section IV that matters are more complicated because Hegelrsquosconception of freedom as self-determination has significant connections with hisEurocentrism and the pro-colonialism that follows from it His philosophynonetheless contains possibilities that can be taken in an anti-colonial directionbut it also contains elements that have real and tenacious links with colonialismwhich we should not overlook

Hegel and Colonialism

2

I World history and Eurocentrism

Hegelrsquos best-known argument regarding colonialism in his Philosophy of Right isthat migration of the European poor to colonies overseas can alleviate moderncivil societyrsquos endemic problems of poverty and over-production (PR sectsect246ndash48267ndash69)3 In this article though I concentrate on the scattered statements oncolonialism in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of World History (PWH) along with thePWHrsquos broader implications4 I focus on the PWH because this is where Hegelargues that history runs from East to West that history proper only unfolds inthe West and that Christian European civilization especially in its latest phase asmodern liberal Europe is the most advanced world civilization (so far at least)That is in the PWH Hegel overtly upholds Eurocentrism or so I will argue inthis section

I understand Eurocentrism informed by Shohat and Stam (2014 esp 2ndash3)as the position that (i) history follows a linear path from Greece through Rome tomedieval then modern Europe all change powered internally to this line(ii) lsquomodern Europersquo includes European-derived cultures in the US Australia andbroadly lsquothe Westrsquo (iii) inherent progress unfolds along this intra-European linetowards freedom equality and other liberal values (iv) where unfreedom hasexisted or still exists in Europersquos past or present this is only because Europe hasnot yet fully worked through and applied its own governing principles of freedomand equality (v) no equivalent progression to freedom and equality has occurredoutside the West This kind of position focusing on freedom is expressed inHegelrsquos PWHmdashhis distinctive mode of approaching history notwithstandingmdashand his Eurocentrism brings pro-colonialism in its wake Irsquoll argue Thus it isfrom the PWH that we can best ascertain how Hegelrsquos thought tells forcolonialism

Regarding Hegelrsquos distinctive approach to history suffice it here to say thatHegelrsquos deceptively simple claim is to apply thought to history (H 78) where lsquothesole conception [or thought] that [philosophy] brings hellip is the simple conceptionof reasonmdashthe conception that reason governs the world and that thereforeworld history is a rational processrsquo (79) That is we aim to discern the immanentreason why real historical events took place to see why it made sense for theseevents to happen why they had to happen to advance historyrsquos overarching goalthe lsquoconsciousness of freedomrsquo (Bewuszligtsein der Freiheit) This goes even for dismalepisodes of decline destruction and suffering we ask how they too played a partin historyrsquos broader advancement This is not a matter of imposing an externallogic or categorial scheme on historical events (81) but rather of discerning theirlogic through interpretation of the recorded facts That said we the philosophicalhistorians bring forward the idea of reason and with it freedommdashthe idea thatthis single goal must regulate all world eventsmdashand we find that the historical

Alison Stone

3

record confirms this lsquoWhoever looks at the world rationally sees it as rationaltoo the two exist in a reciprocal relationshiprsquo (81)

As is well known Hegel holds concretely that world historyrsquos progression inthe lsquoconsciousness of freedomrsquo unfolds over three main stages lsquoone is freersquolsquosome are freersquo lsquoall are freersquo (all containing sub-divisions) corresponding toOriental Classical and Germanic civilizations On lsquoconsciousness of freedomrsquoHegelrsquos views are these Freedom consists in self-determination rationaldecision-making about what ends to follow which impulses to satisfy orwhether to act purely from universal principle instead (HG 148ndash49) All humanindividuals have this capacity for self-determinationmdashlsquoall human beings areintrinsically freersquo (an sich hellip frei H 88) but individuals are not always aware ofthis If they are not then they will fail to exercise develop and actualize theircapacity remaining practically unfree (although ontologically free)mdashfree lsquointhemselvesrsquo (an sich) but not for themselves (88) For instance lsquothe Orientals donot know that spirit or the human being as such is intrinsically free because theydo not know this they are not themselves freersquo (87 my emphasis) As thisimplies if the civilization to which I belong does not treat me as being freemdashsayif my place in it is to be a slave or serfmdashthen I will be unaware of my capacity forfreedom for what I can know depends on what is known in the social worldaround me This is why individual freedom advances in tandem with the sharedconsciousness of that freedom on the part of members of societies and as thisconsciousness is embodied in their practices and institutions As thisconsciousness advances the nature of freedom is grasped more adequately itsdomain is expanded eg from religious to secular affairs and crucially its scopeis expanded ever more people and categories of people are known to be free

As to Eurocentrism Hegel famously states that history moves West like thesun for historyrsquos most advanced stage is the lsquoGermanicrsquo civilization whose spirit isthat lsquoall are freersquo Admittedly for Hegel the insight that lsquoall are freersquo was first wonalbeit only in spiritual form (eg that we may all be saved) by Jesus Christmdashthusin Judaea not Europe (88) But Christrsquos message took hold in ancient Rome notthe Middle East because the Romans already held that some are free native maleslave-holders (HG 450ndash51) The soil was therefore ripe for other Romans to claimthat they shared in freedom too Christianity affording them terms to do so Nextdue to Roman imperialism which spread Christianity the Teutonic tribesencountered and gradually took on Christianity then after the Roman Empirefell spread Christianity through the rest of Europe (S 347ndash49) becoming thelsquobearers of the Christian principle of freedomrsquo (HG 460) Through its adoptionof Christianity Europe emerged as a distinct civilization the lsquoGermanicrsquo orlsquoChristianrsquomdashHegel tends to talk indifferently of the lsquoChristianrsquo lsquoGermanicrsquo andlsquoEuropeanrsquo states (eg 463) lsquoGermanicrsquo then means not lsquoGermanrsquo but lsquoChristianEuropeanrsquo more broadly (see also Mowad 2013 168ndash70)

Hegel and Colonialism

4

Freedomrsquos development continued with the Reformation at last restoringthe principle of the spiritual freedom of all against previously dominant Churchhierarchies The next step the Enlightenment was to grasp that freedom appliesin secular life too in freedoms to own private property choose a profession andspouse participate in public affairs etc Against the excessively abstractrealization of freedom in the French Revolution the most advanced Europeanstates treat determinate social institutionsmdashnuclear family market economyconstitutional monarchymdashas needed to secure these individual freedoms andreconcile them with social membership Overall then European history has beena centuries-long process of working out and putting into practice one definingprinciplemdashthe freedom of all (H 88)

Europe then comes to bear the Christian principle of freedom because ittakes it over from the Roman Empire where in turn Christianity had taken holdbecause the Romans were already conscious that lsquosome are freersquo building on thesame consciousness by the ancient Greeks So that lastmdashthe ancient Greekconsciousness that lsquosome are freersquomdashwas ultimately decisive lsquoThe consciousnessof freedom first awoke among the Greeks and with that they were freersquo (87 myemphases) they made the key transition from unfreedom to freedom Ultimatelythis is why the development from lsquosome are freersquo to lsquoall are freersquo has onlyspontaneously occurred on European soil

The transition that the Greeks made was equally from pre-history to historyHegel says of China and India that we lsquocannot speak here of a proper history assuchrsquo (HG 214) The Oriental civilizations are in world history only ambiguouslyThey are unhistorical insofar as they are not conscious of freedommdashor rather areconscious of it only very inadequately as belonging to one emperor (China)ruling caste (India) or empire (Persia) Consequently individuals in these culturesare not motivated to pursue or advance their own freedom for they do not knowthat they are capable of self-determination in the first place (again the lsquoOrientalsdo not know that hellip the human being as such is intrinsically free because theydo not know this they are not themselves freersquo H 87) Oriental culture containsno inner motor for progressive development to take place by way of individualsbroadening and deepening the scope of an extant yet still incomplete level offreedom Lacking that motor the Orient has no history properly speaking Evenso Hegel includes the Oriental civilizations in world history because they do havea minimal level of consciousness of freedom ie as belonging only to theemperor highest caste etc In contrast for Hegel Africans and indigenousAmericans lack any awareness of freedom their worlds are fully non-ambiguouslypre-historical whereas Oriental pre-history is on the threshold of world historyand to that extent lies partly within it

Hegelrsquos denial of full history to the Orientals sheds light on the kind ofreason he takes to be immanent in historical events which in turn illuminates

Alison Stone

5

his Eurocentrism Whereas the Orientals lack a motor for historical developmentand hence are pre-historical that motor does arise when a given level ofconsciousness of freedom being attained and embodied in social life that level ofconsciousness harbours some inner lsquocontradictionrsquo or tension which propelspeople qua rational beings to bring about change and improvement Theseconditions are first met by the ancient Greeks Another instance mentionedearlier is that the Romans conferred freedom on slave-owners while denying it toslaves giving slaves rational grounds to claim freedom as well In Section IV wewill encounter other instances of this type of historical development through therational response to contradictions

That reason is immanent in historical changes might suggest that in historylogical and temporal development coincide (whereas in say Hegelrsquos Logic thedialectical development of categories is not temporal) This is so to an extentThe pre-historical civilizations of Africa indigenous America and the Orienthave no consciousness of freedom sufficient to harbour self-contradictorylimitations that call for change hence these civilizations actually show nosignificant social change over time for Hegel They are and have ever been thesame embodying time but not history that is no instantiation over time ofthe dialectical-and-rational development of freedom Conversely in Europe thelimitations placed on a freedom that is nevertheless known power developmentsthat are at once rationally warranted and transpire through human agency overtime Yet for Hegel all that exists in space and time is subject to contingency andso realizes rational requirements under an innumerable variety of permutationsarising from the very nature of a spatio-temporal indefinitely complex causallyinterconnected world (EN sect250 and R 22ndash24) For example the Reformationultimately had to happen but it is a contingency that Luther posted his theses inWittenberg in October 15175

But not all that the PWH covers is historical In Africa indigenous Americaand the Orient time unfolds without history Consequently the advancementfrom Africa to the Orient and from China to India to Persia occurs purelyspatially in that each region in turn grasps freedom to successivemdashall highlyinadequatemdashdegrees Conversely historical development (in Europe) takes placein space as well as time not only in space (HG 156ndash57) Where advancementoccurs only spatially its motor is not human reason and agency but geographicalvariation Because we are natural spatially embodied as well as rational beings weare inescapably located in natural surroundings that divide into continentsAmerica Asia Africa and Europe The continentsrsquo features affect how theirinhabitants live and so what level of civilization and consciousness of freedomthey can reach by their own efforts America is weak and powerless yieldingimmature weak and lazy people (193) Africa is dominated by highlands andother non-cultivable areas so that African peoples form no awareness of their

Hegel and Colonialism

6

freedom something people first develop by working on nature (196) Asia isdominated by fertile plains so that its peoplesrsquo focus on agriculture inclines themtowards patriarchal family-based relationships and uncritical obedience toauthority (199ndash200) Only Europe is geographically diverse enough to fosterpeople living in diverse ways and so thinking for themselves (196)

Thus Europersquos physical environment explains why Greek civilization aroseand started the trajectory to modern liberalism Conversely for their part theOrientals advanced beyond the Africans not by thinking rationally about thelimitations of the latterrsquos grasp of freedommdashafter all allegedly they had nonemdashbut due to the Orientalsrsquo more auspicious environmental circumstancesUltimately here what guarantees the progression of stages up to the transitionto history proper is the rationality that for Hegel is embodied in the worldrsquosgeographic divisions6 Then the European natural environment made it possiblefor the Greeks to form a conception of freedom that in turn enabled historicalprogression in time and on the continuing basis of (intra-European) geographicalspace to begin7 (We might still ask though why the successive Oriental viewsthat lsquoone is freersquo were not sufficient to initiate historical progression proper I willreturn to this question later For now let us just note that for Hegel theywere not)

In sum Hegel is a Eurocentrist as defined above (p 3) As per (i) and (iii)he believes that European civilization develops purely internally towards thefuller comprehension and application of its principle of the freedom of all where(ii) this development has come to include that of all of the lsquoWestrsquo eg the USA8

(iv) He explains oppressive episodes in European history either from its not yethaving consistently worked out and applied its own principle of freedom (as withthe hierarchies of the medieval church) or as unavoidable requirements foradvancement (eg the religious wars of early modern Europe) (v) He denies thatany equivalent progression to freedom has occurred or can spontaneously occuroutside Europe Next I argue that it is Hegelrsquos Eurocentrism in particular hissharp divide between European freedom and non-European unfreedom whichgenerates a case for colonialism

II Hegelrsquos case for colonialism

In the PWH Hegel explicitly says relatively little about colonialism but what hedoes say is approving Finishing his account of the European middle ages hepraises the revival of learning the flourishing of fine art and the arrival of thelsquoherorsquo Columbus in the new world (S 411 Hei 204) Columbus he says wasmotivated by the lsquooutwardrsquo urging of spirit to know its own earth and convertnon-European natives to Christianity The reasons why Hegel regards this

Alison Stone

7

positively emerge in the passages on the lsquogeographical conditions of historyrsquo thataddress the lsquonew worldrsquo

It does not matter that Mexico and Peru did indeed havesignificant civilisations since they were of a feebler stock andare long gone The new world has shown itself to be muchfeebler than the old world hellip Some of the tribes of NorthAmerica have disappeared and some have retreated andgenerally declined hellip (HG 192ndash93)

In 183031 Hegel expanded on the new world adding that African Negroes hadto be brought to America to do the physical work of which the weak natives wereincapable (Hei 59) For lsquothe Negroes are far more receptive to European culturethan the Indianshellip [and] it will still be a long time before the Europeans succeedin producing any genuine feeling of self [Selbstgefuumlhl]rsquo in indigenous Americans(S 81) Hegel praises the Church in Latin America for beginning to instildiscipline in the natives through these and other colonial efforts the lsquoauthenticAmericans are hellip now beginning to educate themselves [sich hineinzubilden] inEuropean culturersquo (N 165) Incidentally Hegelrsquos points about indigenousAmericans apply equally to Aboriginal Australians since he includes lsquoNewHollandrsquomdashie Australiamdashin the new world

As for the old world Hegel begins with Africamdashthe lsquoauthenticrsquo sub-SaharanAfrica of the Negroes He contends that the Negroes know no morality andpractice slavery along with polygamy cannibalism and other customs thatembody total ignorance about freedom

Another characteristic fact in reference to the Negroes isSlavery Negroes are taken into slavery by Europeans and soldto America Despite this their lot is even worse in their owncountry where an equally absolute slavery is present for theoverall foundation of slavery is that man has no consciousnessof his freedom yet and so sinks down to a mere thing aworthless object hellip Slavery is in and for itself wrong [Unrecht]for the essence of humanity is freedom but for this man mustfirst become mature [reif] This is why the gradual abolition ofslavery is therefore more appropriate and more right[Richtigeres] than its sudden removal (S 96ndash99)

So European enslavement of Africans involves a degree of moral wrong insofaras Africans have intrinsic capacities for freedom Yet before enslavementAfricans did not know themselves to have that capacity accordingly theyenslaved and mistreated one another and acted merely on their natural desiresThe latter does not constitute freedom Hegel insists if I act from naturally given

Hegel and Colonialism

8

desires I am still not determining for myself how to act So slavery was relativelyan improvement because it lsquomaturedrsquo the Negroes to become aware of theirfreedom lsquoOne must educate the Negroes in their freedom by taming theirnaturalnessrsquo (Hei 70)

We can infer from Hegelrsquos comments that slavery educates in several ways(i) Those enslaved are subjected to European culture and ethical standards (fromeg N 165) (ii) Slavery imposes the discipline of work (eg Hei 59) In workingone learns to hold onersquos natural desires in check and thereby see oneself ascapable of deliberating about or even rejecting them (iii) Work also instils anawareness of onersquos capacity to mould natural objectsmdasha sense of lsquoachievingindependence through onersquos own activityrsquo (61) (iv) Ironically those enslaved thusacquire a sense of private property (61)mdashpartly by learning of Europeaninstitutions of property and partly by imposing form on objects thereby forminga sense of lsquopossessingrsquo them which fosters an appreciation of property9

In sum lsquoSlavery hellip is necessary at those stages where the state [and itspeople] has not yet arrived at rationality It is an element in the transition to ahigher stagersquo (HG 197) Because slavery still has elements of wrong though thefinal step must be for slavery to end However Hegel cautions slavery shouldnot be suddenly abolished because it must end after not before the Negroes havebeen educated through it lsquoIf slavery was altogether wrong then the Europeansshould give the slaves their freedom immediately but in that way the mostfrightening consequences arise as in the French coloniesrsquo (Hei 70)

Hegelrsquos line of thought then takes in slavery and colonization at once(understandably since enslavement of Africans was fundamental to colonialAmerica) Use of slavery in the colonies might be judged wrong because itviolates the rights equality and freedom of the slaves But through being enslavedslaves take steps forward in their consciousness of freedom which they could nototherwise make for Africa is intrinsically pre-historical and unfree so thatfreedom can come to Africans only from without Analogously one might thinkthat colonization was altogether wrong because it violated the rights equality andfreedom of indigenous peoplesmdashbut no for before colonization those peoplehad no awareness of their freedom They lsquoha[d] no sense of private property ofachieving independence through onersquos own activity or of securing onersquos propertythrough rightrsquo (61) By being forced to labour and being disciplined spiritually byagencies such as the Christian church these people will eventually learn abouttheir freedom Until then their subjection while partially wrong insofar as it issubjection is also partially right it is at least an improvement on the nativesremaining in their natural wholly unfree pre-colonial condition

Colonialism is justified on this view because it spreads freedom topeoples who otherwise both lack it and have no native means of acquiring itMoreover the colonizers are justified in extirpating the indigenous cultures of

Alison Stone

9

native peoplesmdashhence Hegelrsquos endorsement of the Christian clergy andmissionaries lsquosetting out to accustom the Indians to European culture andethics [Sitten]rsquo (N 164)mdashsince those indigenous cultures embody unfreedom Wemight wonder whether Hegel regards even the violence and slaughter thatoccurred during the colonization of America as justified He does acknowledgeEuropean especially Spanish violence towards indigenous Americans but he isonly overtly critical of this violence when the colonial project had he saysdegenerated into mere robbery (Hei 204) Moreover he disguises the extent ofEuropean violence by running together indigenous Americans having beenlsquodestroyed and slaughteredrsquo (untergegangen verdraumlngt) having disappeared(verschwunden) and having voluntarily withdrawn (haben sich zuruumlckgezogen N 163see also Parekh 2009) Hegel does not wholly denounce colonial violence becausehe thinks that Europersquos conquest of America was based on a sound goalmdashspreading freedom and the culture of freedom to all peoplemdashand that theviolence that was necessary for achieving that goal was justified But Hegel doesdisapprove of violence when it served merely an unworthy goalmdashrobbery

This is congruent with Hegelrsquos overall approach to violence in history whichhe memorably calls a lsquoslaughterbenchrsquo (Schlachtbank) On his view theconsciousness of freedom advances through each civilization in turn establishingits pre-eminence by prevailing culturally and militarily over its predecessor Tothe extent that war and violence are necessary for progress they are justified(although lsquojustifiedrsquo does not mean lsquoto be celebratedrsquo) Even in these termsthough much of the violence carried out by European colonizersmdashthedecimation of many native American tribes the Middle Passagemdashwent beyondthe minimum necessary to subject non-Europeans to colonial control along theway to their ultimate freedom But likewise in history generally violence hasregularly gone beyond the minimum necessary to propel progress Such excessesare inevitable an aspect of the inescapable contingency of human affairs Theseexcesses of violence are not justified yet we can be reconciled to them as aninevitable albeit non-ideal concomitant of progress (H 90ndash91) PresumablyHegel thinks the same about the excesses of colonial violence

Hegelrsquos overall line of thought is that colonialism is not only justified butalso necessary as part of Europersquos centuries-long process of realizing freedom Alogical step in this process is to extend freedom to non-European peoples afterall the European principle is that all are free This extension can only occurthough by passing through a stage of subjugating non-European peoples sincethey have no native means of acquiring freedom lsquoThe [Negroesrsquo] condition isincapable of any development or culture [Entwicklung und Bildung] and theircondition as we see it today is as it has always beenrsquo (N 190) And lsquothe Negroes cannot move [bewegen] to any culturersquo (Hei 67) Likewise with indigenousAmericans America is new and young because it had no history until the

Hegel and Colonialism

10

Europeans arrived These claims do not mean that Negroes and indigenousAmericans cannot be educated they can But given their native ignorance offreedom they cannot educate themselves but must be educated by Europeanswhich requires that they first be subjected to European control

Hegelrsquos case for colonization could be extended to the Orientals He admitsthat unlike Africans and indigenous Americans the Oriental peoples do have anidea of freedommdashthat lsquoone is freersquomdashbut this idea remains so inadequate as tocount as unfreedom Hence lacking belief in their own freedom Oriental peoplecannot pursue any extensions or advancements of freedom and without suchpursuits to drive historical change their societies remain ahistorical Colonizationof these peoples for educative purposes would therefore be justified As long as apeople is at a low enough level to count as unfree and pre-historical that peoplecan advance only through having the European spirit imposed on it for beingpre-historical it has no native way to attain freedom And indeed Hegel does sayof India that lsquoThe English or rather the East India Company are the lords[Herren] of the land for it is the necessary fate of Asiatic empires to be subjected[unterworfen] to Europeans and China will also some day have to submit to thisfatersquo (S 142ndash43)

We should not be misled by an apparently conflicting statement in thePhilosophy of Right lsquoThe liberation of colonies hellip [is] of the greatest advantage tothe mother state just as the emancipation of slaves is of the greatest advantage tothe masterrsquo (PR sect248A 269) Hegelrsquos paradigm here is American independenceie the independence of what he is explicit and adamant is colonial EuropeanAmerica not Native America (N 165ndash66) That is America merits independenceonce its native populace is reduced or placed securely under European tutelageThis coheres with Hegelrsquos approving reference to independent Haiti in thePhilosophy of Mind (EM sect393A 40) he says that this is a Christian state that theNegroes could only found after having undergone long spiritual servitude Oncea people has been colonized sufficiently to acquire European culture as in Haitithen and only then does that people merit freedom

Hegelrsquos argument for colonialism is of the lsquocivilizing missionrsquo familyEffectively his defence is that colonialism benefits most those who fare worstunder itmdashcolonized peoplesmdashby civilizing and bringing them freedom that theycannot access without passing through colonial subjection For Hegelcolonialism and the advancement of freedom go hand-in-hand

III Saving Hegel from himself

Hegelrsquos PWH implies that colonialism is required to further the realization ofuniversal freedom Does this show that Hegelrsquos conception of freedom is

Alison Stone

11

necessarily bound up with his pro-colonialism If so thenmdashtaking it thatcolonialism was in fact morally wrongmdashpresumably his conception of freedomand its historical development must be rejected (although not necessarily freedomas such of course)

But perhaps that would be to dismiss Hegelrsquos thought too summarily andthereby to do disservice not only to Hegel but also to anti-colonial anddecolonizing thought and activism which after all has regularly drawn on Hegelboth directlymdasheg when Frantz Fanon ([1952] 2008) and Ngugi wa Thiongrsquoo(2012) use Hegel to critique colonialismmdashand indirectly through Hegelrsquosinfluence on Marxism and critical theory Moreover Hegelrsquos thought may stilloffer further anti-colonial resources which remain to be mined We mighttherefore reasonably seek to separate Hegelrsquos basic conception of freedom and itshistoricity from his Eurocentric narrative of history so that when so separatedthat basic conception tells against colonialism Such a viewmdashone that rescuesHegel from himselfmdashis often adopted more or less explicitly by hisinterpreters10 I now want to set out my own version of this type of viewalthough I will go on to complicate it in Section IV

The view is this We can separate the essentials of Hegelrsquos account offreedom from his concrete interpretation of the actual movement of historyHegel was wrong and prejudiced when he dismissed Africans indigenousAmericans and Orientals as unfree and incapable of coming to freedom on theirown Nevertheless his basic account of what freedom is including its necessaryhistorical development remains insightful A better informed judgment ofnon-European peoples would require a very different historical narrative Butthat does not undermine Hegelrsquos basic points that freedom develops historicallyin tandem with the consciousness of it as embodied in different cultures andsocial institutions When we separate these basic points from his actualnarrative we find that these points serve a progressive purpose yielding groundsto reject colonialism

This view dovetails with Hegelrsquos claim that the human capacity for self-determination is universal not confined to Europeans (see eg H 88) Admittedlythough this starting-point is only an abstract universal Self-determination can beactualized only when one is conscious of onersquos capacity for it and thatrequires social and cultural institutions a whole way of life which foster thatconsciousness Such a way of life arose for the first time only in ancient Greecefor Hegel so that actualized freedom does not obtain universallyArguably though given his basic view of freedom and its historicity Hegelcould and should have interpreted all the worldrsquos regions as taking part in thegradual historical unfolding of social institutions that support freedom Hegeldoes not do so because he denies that non-European peoples are conscious offreedom at all Since non-European societies were not conscious of freedom

Hegel and Colonialism

12

even in the restricted ways that the Greeks and Romans were the former had nobasis for moving forward historically by further advancing an already partlyrealized freedom

Thus what underpins Hegelrsquos denial of historicity to non-European peoplesis his sharp division of European freedom from non-European unfreedom Thatin turn is underpinned by his claim that the ancient Greeks made the decisivebreak from unfreedom into freedom The Greeks Hegel says became thedistinctive people they were out of a mixing within them of heterogeneousOriental peoples and their cultures but the Greeks surmounted or overcame(uumlberwinden) this background (HG 214) By doing so the Greeks created theirlsquofree beautifulrsquo spirit (374) The Greeks overcame their Oriental preconditions tolsquomake themselvesrsquo (372 see also 393ndash94)

However this view that the Greeks lsquoovercamersquo the Oriental world ofunfreedom seems overstated by Hegelrsquos own lights For Hegel himself theGreeks mark only the latest phase in a growing consciousness of freedomrunning from China through India to Persia and culminating in EgyptPersiarsquos most advanced province Egypt is the hinge between Orient andOccident in which the human soulrsquos intrinsic capacity for freedom was almostgrasped But it was not quite grasped for the soul was still not distinguishedfrom animal nature a distinction the Greeks went on to make (HG 334 368)That lack of distinction is shown by the way the Egyptians modelled their godsand goddesses on animal species often with animal heads Yet for Hegel theGreeks too stopped short of recognizing that all people have an inherent capacityfor freedom They admitted freedom only to male native-born slave-ownersIn that way their view of freedom remained intermingled with acceptance ofnatural contingency ie accidents of birth sex and geographical location (H 88)So the difference between the Egyptian viewmdashhuman freedom is incompletelydistinguished from (animal) naturemdashand the Greek viewmdashhuman freedom isagain incompletely distinguished from naturemdashappears to be a difference ofdegree not kind11

Hegelrsquos lsquoovercomingrsquo idea therefore sits uncomfortably with his graduatedportrayal of historyrsquos stages That portrayal could be taken to show that belief infreedom is not exclusively European since the Persians and Egyptians already hadversions of that belief To be sure they were inadequate versions (for Hegel)mdashbutthen so was the Greeksrsquo And by extension the Indians and Chinese likewise hadversions of the belief in freedommdasheven more inadequate ones since theyattributed freedom only to lsquoonersquo not lsquosomersquomdashbut where that inadequacy stilldifferentiates these peoples from the Greeks only by degree and not kind (more soin the Indian case since the lsquoonersquo is a whole caste) If the Oriental peoples did haveversions however unsatisfactory of the belief in freedom then Hegel should nothave denied that these peoples are historical For if it is believed that someone is

Alison Stone

13

free be it only lsquoonersquo ruler or caste then others may claim and demand that samefreedom for themselves powering historical change

Now Hegel regards the Africans and indigenous Americans as lackingfreedom more radically than the Orientals yet contrary evidence was available tohim He might for instance have noted the Iroquois Confederacy of five (latersix) Native American tribes founded c1600 and dissolved c1800 a system ofintra- and inter-tribal governance which lsquomaximized individual freedom whileseeking to minimize excess governmental interference in peoplersquos livesrsquo (Johansen1982 9) influencing the American Constitution And Hegel embellishedexaggerated and at times outright distorted his sources on Africa so as to portraya people without any respect for human life freedom or rightsmdashmore so thanthe sources suggested and they were already unreliable (see Bernasconi 1998)12

The way was open to Hegel to recognize Africans and indigenous Americans ashaving views of freedom even if he classed them as even less adequate thanOriental ones With that those peoples would like the Orientals have had anentry to history

Nonetheless Hegel preserves his division of European freedom from non-European unfreedom by counting all the European stages as stages of freedomdown to its lowest level and all the non-European stages as stages of unfreedomright up to where unfreedom is almost freedom but not quite But the placementof this dividing line appears arbitrary Consider for example Hegelrsquos view thatHindus are not conscious of their own freedom because they fail to distinguishthemselves as human agents from nature (HG 256 273ndash81) On Hegelrsquosaccount as wersquove just seen there are ways that the ancient Greeks did not fullyextricate human agency from nature either somdashon his own termsmdashit is not clearthat the difference here is one of kind (history versus non-history freedom versusunfreedom) rather than degree (more or less freedom more or less far along thehistorical path towards full freedom)

Hegel could and it seems should have interpreted much of hismaterial as evidencing how non-European peoples have grasped and practisedfreedom albeit imperfectly We might still find this revised Hegeliannarrative objectionable assuming that it ranks non-European conceptions offreedom as less advanced than European ones Yet once it is admittedthat non-European peoples are historical in principle Hegel would alsohave to trace how historical advances unfolded in those societies so re-interpreting his material once again Each continent would have its own history ofprogression in consciousness of freedom rather than non-Europeancontinents merely paving the way for Europe The several continents wouldhave histories of freedom that run in parallel rather than corresponding tomore or less advanced phases of a single historical line that culminates in modernEurope

Hegel and Colonialism

14

Neither of these revised Hegelian narrativesmdashthe single line or parallel linesversionsmdashsupports colonialism not even the single line model on whichnon-European peoplesrsquo native levels of freedom are although real yetdeficient compared to European ones By recognizing freedom howeverunsatisfactorily non-European cultures would still have the internal potential andmotor to advance to greater freedom In that case colonization would not benecessary for non-European peoplesrsquo achieving freedom and would not bejustified as a necessary step in the realization of universal freedom Anotherplank in Hegelrsquos justification of colonization is that colonized peoples enjoyed nofreedom pre-colonizationmdashso that despite its abrogation of their freedomcolonization did not worsen their position (and ultimately would improve it) Butif these peoples did have a grasp of freedom however imperfect thencolonization stood to worsen their position That risk is especially pronouncedgiven Hegelrsquos own perspective that some violence is necessary for colonizationand given the role of contingency in human affairs that that violence may wellmushroom beyond the necessary minimum Further for Hegel colonizationrequires the extirpation of native cultures but if these are not cultures ofunfreedom then that extirpation is not justified Apparently then Hegel shouldby his own lights have opposed colonialism for his own philosophy generates acase against it

IV The Greeks history and self-liberation from nature

The view just canvassed is that despite the Eurocentrism and pro-colonialism ofHegelrsquos substantial narrative in the PWH his distinctive account of freedom asdeveloping historically through successive civilizations does not in itselfnecessitate his substantive Eurocentrism and when extricated from the latteryields a case against colonialism However we can distinguish weaker andstronger versions of this view More weakly Hegelrsquos basic account of freedomcan be separated from his actual pro-colonialism and so does not necessarilyimply pro-colonialism but contains anti-colonial possibilities as well as thepro-colonial possibilities that Hegel developed from it More strongly Hegelrsquosbasic account of freedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism andwhen so separated this account implies anti-colonialism and has an inherentlyanti-colonial direction I endorse the weaker but not the stronger claim and theweaker one only subject to a significant qualification Hegelrsquos basic account offreedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism but not as easily asSection III suggested This is because Hegelrsquos conception of freedom asself-determination has significant connections with his Eurocentrism

Alison Stone

15

In Section III I suggested that Hegelrsquos divisions Greeksnon-Greeks freeunfree look arbitrary But actually they are not For Hegel

Its [Greecersquos] principle is that self-conscious freedom stepsforth hellip [Regarding t]he unity of spirit with nature hellip thespecificity of this unity [in the Greek case] is to be graspedOne unity is the Oriental hellip consciousness immersed innature a [new kind of] harmony is now to be broughtforth [by the Greeks] in which hellip spirit dominates Spirit nowdetermines nature and this is a spiritual unity hellip (Hei 117 myemphases)

[The] fundamental characteristic [of the Greek spirit is] that thefreedom of spirit is conditioned by and in essential relation tosome natural stimulus Greek freedom is stimulated bysomething other and is free because it changes and produces thestimulus from out of itself (aus sich) (S 238 my emphasis)

Thus the Greeks were free in that they were at home with themselves in theother ie nature But this does not mean that the content of their practices andway of life was determined by natural givens such as the Greeksrsquo given impulsesRather they reshaped these givens and so became at-home-with-themselves inthem In the Greek case then spirit lsquodeterminedrsquo nature whereas previouslyspirit had been immersed or absorbed (versenkt) in nature This Greekdetermination of nature by spiritmdashspiritrsquos investment of nature with meaningof its ownmdashwas made possible by a prior moment first carried out by theGreeks through which lsquospirit is no longer immersed [versenkt] in nature hellip [but]releas[es] itself from nature [sich losmachend von der Natur]rsquo (HG 395ndash96) Thismoment in which the human spirit first releases or sets itself free from naturecorresponds to the overcoming (uumlberwinden) by the Greeks of their mixed ethnicheritage a moment of overcoming through which they became able to remakethat heritage for themselves to make themselves Hegel is explicit that none ofthe worldrsquos other peoples to that point had achieved this

Even so for Hegel the Greeks exercised freedom always with respect tonature and existing givens in the worldmdashre-shaping what they found alreadythere rather than creating a totally new world out of themselves Hence theGreeks did not regard free individuals as being capable of adjudicatingindependently on the given natural and social world through their own reason orof generating norms and principles purely through the exercise of their spiritualfreedom Or as Hegel also puts it elsewhere individual subjectivity was notdifferentiated from social substance but the individual identified fully andunquestioningly with his or her social role and there was no ground for

Hegel and Colonialism

16

independent social criticism (see Hardimon 1993) Connected with all this theGreeks restricted freedom to some people only effectively stipulating that onlythose with certain kinds of naturemdashmale free-bornmdashor natural locationmdashnativeGreekmdashhad the power of self-determination In these ways spiritrsquos freedomremained lsquoconditionedrsquo or limited (bedingt) bymdashalthough not immersed inmdashnature (and see HG 390)

However these limitations contradicted the essence of self-determination asthe Greeks understood it as including a moment of overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature such that the power to overcome nature cannotpossibly be limited by nature (or it would not be a power to overcome nature atall) Thus lsquoin the principle of Greek freedom inasmuch as it is freedom it isimplied that thought must be free for itself rsquo (HG 268)mdashalthough the Greeks fora long time did not explicitly grasp or follow through on that implicationNonetheless in the end that contradiction was what made it possible for theGreeksrsquo exclusion of some people from freedom and their other ways ofrestricting freedomrsquos scope to come in for criticism The criticism came withSocrates and the Sophists claiming that thought can adjudicate rationally on whatis and generate norms by itself (417) In that freedom of thought was therebygrasped as fully independent of nature it was also grasped as universal at least inprinciple In these two ways lsquoThought hellip introduces an opposition [Gegensatz][to the Greek mixture of freedom and nature] and asserts the validity ofessentially rational principlesrsquo (S 267)

For Hegel then Greek culture enabled rational criticism of what isincluding of limited freedom as no pre-Greek cultures did just because theGreeks had established a root opposition between freedom and nature whereaslsquoin the Oriental states in which a lack of opposition is present no moral freedomcan come aboutrsquo (267) Although the advent of rational critique brought on thedemise of Greek culture Europe was thereby also set on the path oftransformative historical change We see then why in his own terms Hegel saysthat non-European peoples could not advance critical claims for freedomrsquosextension but uncritically accepted the authority of their rulersmdashpatriarchalauthority in China caste hierarchy and caste-based restrictions and rituals inIndia and state power in Persia Non-Europeans could not question suchauthorities because their cultures did not grasp freedom as including the momentof overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature and the given Becausefreedom was not grasped as including that moment of human separation fromnature and the given no contradiction was perceived in freedom being limited bynature eg confined to people of certain castes or by given states of affairs egcustomary authority and ritual Non-Europeans lacked a critical motor to drivesocial change hence lacked history propermdashor indeed freedom as properlydistinguished from unfreedom

Alison Stone

17

So for Hegel there is a genuine difference in kind not merely degreebetween the Greek and post-Greek European world on the one hand and thenon-European world on the other the Europenon-Europe divide is notarbitrary but has a philosophical rationale For while the Greek view of freedomwas like non-European views limited and inadequate the former was moreadvanced in one key respectmdashthe inclusion in freedom of a primary moment oflsquoovercomingrsquo naturemdashwhich enabled the Greek and post-Greek European worldto become self-critical self-revising and so historical This is what motivatesHegel to identify Greek and post-Greek European views as views of freedomhowever limited whereas non-European views that might prima facie look likeviews of freedom are still actually modes of unfreedom

Once again we might object that non-Europeans have at times construedfreedom as including this moment of overcoming nature Even on Hegelrsquosaccount Hindus appreciate the human power to abstract from the world inthought He maintains though that this is merely an intellectual withdrawaland that when it comes to practical agency Hindus see human agency as immersedin not including any moment of self-freeing-from nature (see eg S 157ndash58)In response we could with Jaspal Peter Sahota (2016) agree that in classicalIndian thought there has been a tendency to locate human agency within naturebut argue against Hegel that this does not constitute a real absence offreedom but rather a different conception of freedom We might then say thatbecause thesemdashand othermdashnon-European views were still views of freedom thoseviews were still sufficient to motivate social criticism and hence place non-European peoples in history even without the element of overcoming natureHowever such a position would take us further away from Hegelrsquos own accountof the historicity of freedom according which as we have seen that moment ofovercoming nature uniquely new in ancient Greece is crucial in poweringhistorical progression

Hegelrsquos basic account of freedom and its historicity thus has more extensiveand significant connections with his Eurocentrism than I suggested inSection III In particular that account connects with Hegelrsquos denial that non-European peoples are historicalmdashie can come to freedom on their ownmdashandhence with his case for colonialism as the only route along which those peoplescan reach freedom These connections suggest that after all we cannotstraightforwardly take up Hegelrsquos account of freedom and its historicity whilesloughing off his pro-colonialism This is not to say that we cannot separate outthese parts of his thought at all But rescuing Hegel from himself is set to be acomplicated process not quick or straightforward To the extent that such arescue is possible Hegelrsquos pro-colonialism cannot rightly be counted as necessaryto his thought or system Yet his pro-colonialism does have extensive anddeep-seated connections with his other viewsmdashenough to show that it is not the

Hegel and Colonialism

18

case that Hegel should not have endorsed colonialism by his own standardsRather he did and could endorse it coherently in his own terms although otheranti-colonialist possibilities were also available within his own terms which hecould have developed

So the claim that Hegelrsquos account of freedom is inherently anti-colonial isunduly strong Through his understanding of freedom as involving spiritextricating itself from nature that account has sustained links with hisEurocentrism and so his pro-colonialism We can nonetheless envisage variousmanoeuvres by which to maintain that freedom develops historically for all theworldrsquos peoples for example by saying that they have several conceptions offreedom where freedom can but does not have to include self-liberation fromnature Then ancient Greece would initiate one historical pathway to freedombut not the only one Even so Hegelrsquos own account of freedom and its historicitydoes not inherently drive us to make these intellectual manoeuvres but onlypermits them In sum if Hegelrsquos view of freedom does not necessarily implypro-colonialism neither is it inherently anti-colonial We can make distinctionsand qualifications within his thought so as to yield anti-colonial conclusions butthis is only one of several possible lines of development of which his thoughtadmits another being its elaboration into the Eurocentric and pro-colonialsystem that Hegel in fact forged

There is a broader moral Wemdashie the heirs of the European heritage thatruns through philosophy into modern political thoughtmdashshould not let thisheritage off the hook too easily This heritage including Hegelrsquos thought hasbeen implicated in colonialism in various ways To be sure because it extols andarticulates the values of freedom and equality this heritage also furnishesconceptual resources for critiquing colonialism and giving support to anti-colonial struggles and anti-colonial thinkers and activists have drawn on modernEuropean ideas for this purpose For example the Haitian revolutionariesdeclared that they were acting in allegiance to the emancipatory goals of theFrench Revolution This might lead us to suppose that the European politicallegacy is intrinsically liberatory and that theorists in the European traditionmdashHegel includedmdashhave only ever justified colonialism due to unfortunateprejudices that led them to go back on their own principles

I believe that taking that view exculpates our predecessors too quicklyand leaves us at risk of inadvertently embracing ideas inherited from thesepredecessors which actually have deep-rooted internal connections withEurocentric and pro-colonial attitudes This is not to say that we should orcould repudiate these ideas outright Rather in view of their connections withcolonialism we need to think carefully and critically about how far to take theseinherited ideas forward and how we might do so differently My aim has been tohelp us cultivate this caution in Hegelrsquos case by acknowledging that while his

Alison Stone

19

thought harbours anti-colonial possibilities it also has real and tenacious linkswith colonialism of which we should remind mindful13

Alison StoneLancaster University UKastonelancasteracuk

Notes

1 Contributions include those by Bernasconi 1998 2007 2016 Bonetto 2006 de Laurentiis2014 McCarney and Bernasconi 2003 Mowad 2013 Parekh 2009 Purtschert 2010 andTibebu 20102 However see Buck-Morss 2000 andmdashfor highly critical accountsmdashDussel [1992] 1995 and1993 Guha 2002 Tibebu 2010 Also relevant are Bird-Pollan 2014 (on Hegel and Fanon)Brennan 2013 (on Hegelrsquos influence on post-colonialism) Buchwalter 2009 (defending Hegelagainst charges of Eurocentrism) Monahan 2017 (Creolizing Hegel) and Serequeberhan 1989(on colonialism in the Philosophy of Right)3 Ranajit Guha identifies another argument for colonialism in the Philosophy of Rightfrom the lsquorightsrsquo that Hegel claims civilized nations have with respect to less advanced ones(PR sect351 376) These rights Guha argues are lsquorights of conquestrsquo noting Hegelrsquos praise for Britishmilitary victories over India led by Robert Clive (1725ndash74) whose conquests established theEast India Companyrsquos rule over Bengal and other Indian states See Guha 2002 43ndash44PR sect372A 364 and 474 note 1)Abbreviations usedEN=Hegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller Oxford Clarendon PressEM= Hegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind Trans W Wallace and A V Miller Oxford OxfordUniversity Press Cited by paragraph and page numberN=Hegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reason in Historytrans H B Nisbet Cambridge UK Cambridge University PressS=Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NY Prometheus BooksPR=Hegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B Nisbet Cambridge UKCambridge University PressHei=Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink4 Hegel lectured on the PWH in 182223 182425 182627 182829 and 183031 Hismanuscripts of the Introduction from 1822 (rev 1828) and 183031 survive as do manytranscripts between them covering every course Some such as de Laurentiis (2014) are waryof directly attributing to Hegel views notably on race expressed only in the transcripts I agreethat we should disambiguate sources but where multiple independently written transcripts

Hegel and Colonialism

20

converge as domdashextensivelymdashseveral transcripts of the PWH we may take them to bereliable Accordingly I refer to Hegelrsquos manuscripts (abbreviated H) as in Hegel 2011 which isthe English translation of the corresponding volume of the Gesammelte Werke (Hegel 1995) andthe integrated text of the 182223 course composed primarily from Hothorsquos and Griesheimrsquostranscripts (abb HG) included in Hegel 2011 (the German is Hegel 1996) Since the Germancritical edition of the transcripts remains incomplete for materials on Hegelrsquos later coursesI have used Heimannrsquos transcript of 183031 whenever possible (Hegel 2005 abb Hei)otherwise the composite texts produced by Karl Hegel (Hegel 1986) and translated by Sibree(Hegel 1991 abb S) and by Georg LassonJohannes Hoffmeister (Hegel 1988) translated byNisbet (Hegel 1975 abb N) I quote English translations whenever available sometimesadjusted in view of the German5 For more on contingency in Hegel see inter alia Burbidge 2007 esp ch 1 Burbidge stressesthe extent to which Hegel lsquotakes the contingencies of history seriouslyrsquo (2007 9)6 For Hegel lsquonaturehellip is indeed a rational system operating in its own distinct elementrsquo (N 44)The division into continents is rational in that different natural features and their varietiesmdashmountains and plains lands and seas and their fusion and differentiationmdasheach find fullembodiment in different continents (EM sect393 and R 40ndash41) In a sense then non-Europeansare subject to reason and rational progression insofar as nature imposes it on them fromthe outside rather than by exercising rational thought for themselves This coheres withHegelrsquos view that these peoples are immersed in nature out of which only Europeans can liftthem see below7 This recalls Hegelrsquos derivation of time from space in the Philosophy of Nature a derivation thatpositions time as more advanced than space (EN sectsect256ndash57 31ndash36)8 This is evident from eg Hegelrsquos discussion of the colonization of America see Section II9 Hegel connects formation with possession (PR sect56 85ndash86) albeit in the very differentcontext of modern European societies in which private property is institutionalized I leaveunexplored here how far his ideas about slaveryrsquos educative power may be informed by hislordbondsman dialectic10 For instance some interpreters defend Hegel against charges of Eurocentrism and racism(eg Buchwalter 2009 Houlgate [1991] 2015 35ndash37 McCarney in McCarney and Bernasconi2003 Mowad 2013) others stress Hegelrsquos founding importance for anti-colonial thought(Brennan 2013) and numerous readers of Hegel as a thinker of freedom (eg Patten 1999)see no need to discuss his position on colonialism presumably on the grounds that the latteris a merely accidental avoidable part of his thought from which his essential views on freedomcan be extracted11 For Hegel the Greeks were greatly influenced by the Egyptians whose influence theynonetheless overcame Here he is close to accepting what Martin Bernal calls the lsquoancientmodelrsquo of the Greeksrsquo origins a model to which the Greeks themselves adhered later-nineteenth-century Europeans instead espoused an lsquoAryan modelrsquo on which Greek cultureproper arose from northern invaders driving out earlier Egyptian and Phoenician influences([1987] 1991) Bernal argues that the Aryan model had Eurocentric motivations if the Greeks

Alison Stone

21

the supposed originators of Europersquos distinctive culture were actually the Egyptiansrsquo heirsthen given that Egypt is within Africa the EuropeAfrica divide would crumble A furthercomplicating factor is whether the Egyptians were seen as black Africans Bernasconi (2007)argues that Hegel thought so as did most other Europeans of his time Later the Egyptiansrsquoracial status was changedmdashto Mediterranean (ie Caucasian)mdashto hold up the divide betweenEurope-as-white and Africa-as-black Bernasconi suggests that Hegel himself dealt with thepotential anomalymdashof highly cultured black Africans giving much to the Greeksmdashby makingthe EgyptGreece transition the site of the key conceptual transition from unfreedom tofreedom nature to spirit (2007 212ndash13) This ties in with my argument in Section IV thatHegel actually did have grounds on his own terms to construe the apparently gradual EgyptGreece transition as actually being a sharp divide12 Bernasconi (2016) has recently shown how Hegel likewise distorted his sources on China tothe detriment of the Chinese13 I thank Bob Stern and the referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions

Bibliography

Bernal M [1987] (1991) Black Athena The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical CivilisationVol 1 London VintageBernasconi R (1998) lsquoHegel at the Court of the Ashantirsquo in S Barnett (ed)Hegel After Derrida Albany NY SUNYBernasconi R (2007) lsquoThe Return of Africa Hegel and the Question of theRacial Identity of the Egyptiansrsquo in P T Grier (ed) Identity and Difference AlbanyNY SUNYBernasconi R (2016) lsquoChina on Parade Hegelrsquos Manipulation of his Sources andhis Change of Mindrsquo in B Brandt and D L Purdy (eds) China in the GermanEnlightenment Toronto University of Toronto PressBird-Pollan S (2014) Hegel Freud and Fanon The Dialectic of Emancipation LondonRowman and Littlefield InternationalBonetto S (2006) lsquoRace and Racism in HegelmdashAn AnalysisrsquoMinerva An InternetJournal of Philosophy 10Brennan T (2013) lsquoHegel Empire and Anti-Colonial Thoughtrsquo in G Huggan(ed) The Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies Oxford Oxford University PressBuchwalter A (2009) lsquoIs Hegelrsquos Philosophy of History Eurocentricrsquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYBuck-Morss S (2000) lsquoHegel and Haitirsquo Critical Inquiry 264 821ndash65Burbidge J (2007) Hegelrsquos Systematic Contingency Basingstoke Palgrave MacmillanDe Laurentiis A (2014) lsquoRace in Hegel Text and Contextrsquo in M Egger (ed)Philosophie Nach Kant Neue Wege zum Verstaumlndnis von Kants Transzendental- undMoralphilosophie Berlin De Gruyter

Hegel and Colonialism

22

Dussel E [1992] (1995) The Invention of the Americas trans M D Barber NewYork ContinuumDussel E (1993) lsquoEurocentrism and Modernityrsquo Boundary 2 203 65ndash76Fanon F [1952] (2008) Black Skin White Masks trans R Philcox New YorkGroveGuha R (2002) History at the Limit of World-History New York ColumbiaUniversity PressHardimon M (1993) Hegelrsquos Social Philosophy Cambridge Cambridge UniversityPressHegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller OxfordClarendonHegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind trans W Wallace and A V MillerOxford Oxford University PressHegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reasonin History trans H B Nisbet Cambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1986) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Geschichte Werke Vol 12ed E Moldenhauer and K M Michel Frankfurt Suhrkamp [Englishtranslation Sibree]Hegel G W F (1988) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Vols 1-3 edG Lasson Vols 1-4 Hamburg Meiner [English translation of volume 1 Nisbet]Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NYPrometheus BooksHegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B NisbetCambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1995) lsquoVorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der WeltgeschichteEinleitungrsquo in W Jaeschke (ed) Vorlesungsmanuskripte II (1916ndash1831)Gesammelte Werke Vol 18 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown andHodgson]Hegel G W F (1996) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Berlin 182223 Nachschriften von Griesheim Hotho und Kehler ed Karl Brehmer K-H Iltingund Hoo Nam Seelmann Hegel Vorlesungen Ausgew Nachschriften und ManuskripteVol 12 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown and Hodgson]Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink Abb HeiHegel G W F (2011) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Volume 1Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822ndash3 ed and trans R F Brownand P C Hodgson with assistance of W G Geuss Oxford Clarendon PressHoulgate S [1991] 2015 An Introduction to Hegel Freedom Truth and HistoryOxford BlackwellJohansen B E (1982) Forgotten Founders How the American Indians Helped ShapeDemocracy Boston Harvard Common Press

Alison Stone

23

McCarney J and Bernasconi R (2003) lsquoExchange Hegelrsquos Racismrsquo RadicalPhilosophy 119(MayJune) 32ndash37Monahan M (ed) (2017) Creolizing Hegel London Rowman and LittlefieldInternationalMowad N (2013) lsquoThe Place of Nationality in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of Politicsand Religion A Defense of Hegel on the Charges of National Chauvinism andRacismrsquo in A Nuzzo (ed) Hegel on Religion and Politics Albany NY SUNYParekh S (2009) lsquoHegelrsquos New World History Freedom and Racersquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYPatten A (1999) Hegelrsquos Idea of Freedom Oxford Oxford University PressPurtschert P (2010) lsquoOn the Limit of Spirit Hegelrsquos Racism Revisitedrsquo Philosophyand Social Criticism 369 1039ndash51Quijano A (2000) lsquoColoniality of Power Eurocentrism and Latin AmericarsquoNepantla Views from South 13 533ndash80Sahota J P (2016) lsquoHegelrsquos Critique of Hinduism A Responsersquo Hegel Bulletin372 305ndash17Serequeberhan T (1989) lsquoThe Idea of Colonialism in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of RightrsquoInternational Philosophical Quarterly 293 301ndash18Shohat E and Stam R [1994] (2014) Unthinking Eurocentrism New YorkRoutledgeTibebu T (2010) Hegel and the Third World The Making of Eurocentrism in WorldHistory Syracuse NY Syracuse University PressWa Thiongrsquoo N (2012) Globalectics Theory and the Politics of Knowing New YorkColumbia University Press

Hegel and Colonialism

24

  • Hegel and Colonialism
Page 3: Hegel and Colonialism - Lancaster University · 2017-06-30 · Hegel and Colonialism Alison Stone Abstract This article explores the implications of Hegel’s Philosophy of World

I World history and Eurocentrism

Hegelrsquos best-known argument regarding colonialism in his Philosophy of Right isthat migration of the European poor to colonies overseas can alleviate moderncivil societyrsquos endemic problems of poverty and over-production (PR sectsect246ndash48267ndash69)3 In this article though I concentrate on the scattered statements oncolonialism in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of World History (PWH) along with thePWHrsquos broader implications4 I focus on the PWH because this is where Hegelargues that history runs from East to West that history proper only unfolds inthe West and that Christian European civilization especially in its latest phase asmodern liberal Europe is the most advanced world civilization (so far at least)That is in the PWH Hegel overtly upholds Eurocentrism or so I will argue inthis section

I understand Eurocentrism informed by Shohat and Stam (2014 esp 2ndash3)as the position that (i) history follows a linear path from Greece through Rome tomedieval then modern Europe all change powered internally to this line(ii) lsquomodern Europersquo includes European-derived cultures in the US Australia andbroadly lsquothe Westrsquo (iii) inherent progress unfolds along this intra-European linetowards freedom equality and other liberal values (iv) where unfreedom hasexisted or still exists in Europersquos past or present this is only because Europe hasnot yet fully worked through and applied its own governing principles of freedomand equality (v) no equivalent progression to freedom and equality has occurredoutside the West This kind of position focusing on freedom is expressed inHegelrsquos PWHmdashhis distinctive mode of approaching history notwithstandingmdashand his Eurocentrism brings pro-colonialism in its wake Irsquoll argue Thus it isfrom the PWH that we can best ascertain how Hegelrsquos thought tells forcolonialism

Regarding Hegelrsquos distinctive approach to history suffice it here to say thatHegelrsquos deceptively simple claim is to apply thought to history (H 78) where lsquothesole conception [or thought] that [philosophy] brings hellip is the simple conceptionof reasonmdashthe conception that reason governs the world and that thereforeworld history is a rational processrsquo (79) That is we aim to discern the immanentreason why real historical events took place to see why it made sense for theseevents to happen why they had to happen to advance historyrsquos overarching goalthe lsquoconsciousness of freedomrsquo (Bewuszligtsein der Freiheit) This goes even for dismalepisodes of decline destruction and suffering we ask how they too played a partin historyrsquos broader advancement This is not a matter of imposing an externallogic or categorial scheme on historical events (81) but rather of discerning theirlogic through interpretation of the recorded facts That said we the philosophicalhistorians bring forward the idea of reason and with it freedommdashthe idea thatthis single goal must regulate all world eventsmdashand we find that the historical

Alison Stone

3

record confirms this lsquoWhoever looks at the world rationally sees it as rationaltoo the two exist in a reciprocal relationshiprsquo (81)

As is well known Hegel holds concretely that world historyrsquos progression inthe lsquoconsciousness of freedomrsquo unfolds over three main stages lsquoone is freersquolsquosome are freersquo lsquoall are freersquo (all containing sub-divisions) corresponding toOriental Classical and Germanic civilizations On lsquoconsciousness of freedomrsquoHegelrsquos views are these Freedom consists in self-determination rationaldecision-making about what ends to follow which impulses to satisfy orwhether to act purely from universal principle instead (HG 148ndash49) All humanindividuals have this capacity for self-determinationmdashlsquoall human beings areintrinsically freersquo (an sich hellip frei H 88) but individuals are not always aware ofthis If they are not then they will fail to exercise develop and actualize theircapacity remaining practically unfree (although ontologically free)mdashfree lsquointhemselvesrsquo (an sich) but not for themselves (88) For instance lsquothe Orientals donot know that spirit or the human being as such is intrinsically free because theydo not know this they are not themselves freersquo (87 my emphasis) As thisimplies if the civilization to which I belong does not treat me as being freemdashsayif my place in it is to be a slave or serfmdashthen I will be unaware of my capacity forfreedom for what I can know depends on what is known in the social worldaround me This is why individual freedom advances in tandem with the sharedconsciousness of that freedom on the part of members of societies and as thisconsciousness is embodied in their practices and institutions As thisconsciousness advances the nature of freedom is grasped more adequately itsdomain is expanded eg from religious to secular affairs and crucially its scopeis expanded ever more people and categories of people are known to be free

As to Eurocentrism Hegel famously states that history moves West like thesun for historyrsquos most advanced stage is the lsquoGermanicrsquo civilization whose spirit isthat lsquoall are freersquo Admittedly for Hegel the insight that lsquoall are freersquo was first wonalbeit only in spiritual form (eg that we may all be saved) by Jesus Christmdashthusin Judaea not Europe (88) But Christrsquos message took hold in ancient Rome notthe Middle East because the Romans already held that some are free native maleslave-holders (HG 450ndash51) The soil was therefore ripe for other Romans to claimthat they shared in freedom too Christianity affording them terms to do so Nextdue to Roman imperialism which spread Christianity the Teutonic tribesencountered and gradually took on Christianity then after the Roman Empirefell spread Christianity through the rest of Europe (S 347ndash49) becoming thelsquobearers of the Christian principle of freedomrsquo (HG 460) Through its adoptionof Christianity Europe emerged as a distinct civilization the lsquoGermanicrsquo orlsquoChristianrsquomdashHegel tends to talk indifferently of the lsquoChristianrsquo lsquoGermanicrsquo andlsquoEuropeanrsquo states (eg 463) lsquoGermanicrsquo then means not lsquoGermanrsquo but lsquoChristianEuropeanrsquo more broadly (see also Mowad 2013 168ndash70)

Hegel and Colonialism

4

Freedomrsquos development continued with the Reformation at last restoringthe principle of the spiritual freedom of all against previously dominant Churchhierarchies The next step the Enlightenment was to grasp that freedom appliesin secular life too in freedoms to own private property choose a profession andspouse participate in public affairs etc Against the excessively abstractrealization of freedom in the French Revolution the most advanced Europeanstates treat determinate social institutionsmdashnuclear family market economyconstitutional monarchymdashas needed to secure these individual freedoms andreconcile them with social membership Overall then European history has beena centuries-long process of working out and putting into practice one definingprinciplemdashthe freedom of all (H 88)

Europe then comes to bear the Christian principle of freedom because ittakes it over from the Roman Empire where in turn Christianity had taken holdbecause the Romans were already conscious that lsquosome are freersquo building on thesame consciousness by the ancient Greeks So that lastmdashthe ancient Greekconsciousness that lsquosome are freersquomdashwas ultimately decisive lsquoThe consciousnessof freedom first awoke among the Greeks and with that they were freersquo (87 myemphases) they made the key transition from unfreedom to freedom Ultimatelythis is why the development from lsquosome are freersquo to lsquoall are freersquo has onlyspontaneously occurred on European soil

The transition that the Greeks made was equally from pre-history to historyHegel says of China and India that we lsquocannot speak here of a proper history assuchrsquo (HG 214) The Oriental civilizations are in world history only ambiguouslyThey are unhistorical insofar as they are not conscious of freedommdashor rather areconscious of it only very inadequately as belonging to one emperor (China)ruling caste (India) or empire (Persia) Consequently individuals in these culturesare not motivated to pursue or advance their own freedom for they do not knowthat they are capable of self-determination in the first place (again the lsquoOrientalsdo not know that hellip the human being as such is intrinsically free because theydo not know this they are not themselves freersquo H 87) Oriental culture containsno inner motor for progressive development to take place by way of individualsbroadening and deepening the scope of an extant yet still incomplete level offreedom Lacking that motor the Orient has no history properly speaking Evenso Hegel includes the Oriental civilizations in world history because they do havea minimal level of consciousness of freedom ie as belonging only to theemperor highest caste etc In contrast for Hegel Africans and indigenousAmericans lack any awareness of freedom their worlds are fully non-ambiguouslypre-historical whereas Oriental pre-history is on the threshold of world historyand to that extent lies partly within it

Hegelrsquos denial of full history to the Orientals sheds light on the kind ofreason he takes to be immanent in historical events which in turn illuminates

Alison Stone

5

his Eurocentrism Whereas the Orientals lack a motor for historical developmentand hence are pre-historical that motor does arise when a given level ofconsciousness of freedom being attained and embodied in social life that level ofconsciousness harbours some inner lsquocontradictionrsquo or tension which propelspeople qua rational beings to bring about change and improvement Theseconditions are first met by the ancient Greeks Another instance mentionedearlier is that the Romans conferred freedom on slave-owners while denying it toslaves giving slaves rational grounds to claim freedom as well In Section IV wewill encounter other instances of this type of historical development through therational response to contradictions

That reason is immanent in historical changes might suggest that in historylogical and temporal development coincide (whereas in say Hegelrsquos Logic thedialectical development of categories is not temporal) This is so to an extentThe pre-historical civilizations of Africa indigenous America and the Orienthave no consciousness of freedom sufficient to harbour self-contradictorylimitations that call for change hence these civilizations actually show nosignificant social change over time for Hegel They are and have ever been thesame embodying time but not history that is no instantiation over time ofthe dialectical-and-rational development of freedom Conversely in Europe thelimitations placed on a freedom that is nevertheless known power developmentsthat are at once rationally warranted and transpire through human agency overtime Yet for Hegel all that exists in space and time is subject to contingency andso realizes rational requirements under an innumerable variety of permutationsarising from the very nature of a spatio-temporal indefinitely complex causallyinterconnected world (EN sect250 and R 22ndash24) For example the Reformationultimately had to happen but it is a contingency that Luther posted his theses inWittenberg in October 15175

But not all that the PWH covers is historical In Africa indigenous Americaand the Orient time unfolds without history Consequently the advancementfrom Africa to the Orient and from China to India to Persia occurs purelyspatially in that each region in turn grasps freedom to successivemdashall highlyinadequatemdashdegrees Conversely historical development (in Europe) takes placein space as well as time not only in space (HG 156ndash57) Where advancementoccurs only spatially its motor is not human reason and agency but geographicalvariation Because we are natural spatially embodied as well as rational beings weare inescapably located in natural surroundings that divide into continentsAmerica Asia Africa and Europe The continentsrsquo features affect how theirinhabitants live and so what level of civilization and consciousness of freedomthey can reach by their own efforts America is weak and powerless yieldingimmature weak and lazy people (193) Africa is dominated by highlands andother non-cultivable areas so that African peoples form no awareness of their

Hegel and Colonialism

6

freedom something people first develop by working on nature (196) Asia isdominated by fertile plains so that its peoplesrsquo focus on agriculture inclines themtowards patriarchal family-based relationships and uncritical obedience toauthority (199ndash200) Only Europe is geographically diverse enough to fosterpeople living in diverse ways and so thinking for themselves (196)

Thus Europersquos physical environment explains why Greek civilization aroseand started the trajectory to modern liberalism Conversely for their part theOrientals advanced beyond the Africans not by thinking rationally about thelimitations of the latterrsquos grasp of freedommdashafter all allegedly they had nonemdashbut due to the Orientalsrsquo more auspicious environmental circumstancesUltimately here what guarantees the progression of stages up to the transitionto history proper is the rationality that for Hegel is embodied in the worldrsquosgeographic divisions6 Then the European natural environment made it possiblefor the Greeks to form a conception of freedom that in turn enabled historicalprogression in time and on the continuing basis of (intra-European) geographicalspace to begin7 (We might still ask though why the successive Oriental viewsthat lsquoone is freersquo were not sufficient to initiate historical progression proper I willreturn to this question later For now let us just note that for Hegel theywere not)

In sum Hegel is a Eurocentrist as defined above (p 3) As per (i) and (iii)he believes that European civilization develops purely internally towards thefuller comprehension and application of its principle of the freedom of all where(ii) this development has come to include that of all of the lsquoWestrsquo eg the USA8

(iv) He explains oppressive episodes in European history either from its not yethaving consistently worked out and applied its own principle of freedom (as withthe hierarchies of the medieval church) or as unavoidable requirements foradvancement (eg the religious wars of early modern Europe) (v) He denies thatany equivalent progression to freedom has occurred or can spontaneously occuroutside Europe Next I argue that it is Hegelrsquos Eurocentrism in particular hissharp divide between European freedom and non-European unfreedom whichgenerates a case for colonialism

II Hegelrsquos case for colonialism

In the PWH Hegel explicitly says relatively little about colonialism but what hedoes say is approving Finishing his account of the European middle ages hepraises the revival of learning the flourishing of fine art and the arrival of thelsquoherorsquo Columbus in the new world (S 411 Hei 204) Columbus he says wasmotivated by the lsquooutwardrsquo urging of spirit to know its own earth and convertnon-European natives to Christianity The reasons why Hegel regards this

Alison Stone

7

positively emerge in the passages on the lsquogeographical conditions of historyrsquo thataddress the lsquonew worldrsquo

It does not matter that Mexico and Peru did indeed havesignificant civilisations since they were of a feebler stock andare long gone The new world has shown itself to be muchfeebler than the old world hellip Some of the tribes of NorthAmerica have disappeared and some have retreated andgenerally declined hellip (HG 192ndash93)

In 183031 Hegel expanded on the new world adding that African Negroes hadto be brought to America to do the physical work of which the weak natives wereincapable (Hei 59) For lsquothe Negroes are far more receptive to European culturethan the Indianshellip [and] it will still be a long time before the Europeans succeedin producing any genuine feeling of self [Selbstgefuumlhl]rsquo in indigenous Americans(S 81) Hegel praises the Church in Latin America for beginning to instildiscipline in the natives through these and other colonial efforts the lsquoauthenticAmericans are hellip now beginning to educate themselves [sich hineinzubilden] inEuropean culturersquo (N 165) Incidentally Hegelrsquos points about indigenousAmericans apply equally to Aboriginal Australians since he includes lsquoNewHollandrsquomdashie Australiamdashin the new world

As for the old world Hegel begins with Africamdashthe lsquoauthenticrsquo sub-SaharanAfrica of the Negroes He contends that the Negroes know no morality andpractice slavery along with polygamy cannibalism and other customs thatembody total ignorance about freedom

Another characteristic fact in reference to the Negroes isSlavery Negroes are taken into slavery by Europeans and soldto America Despite this their lot is even worse in their owncountry where an equally absolute slavery is present for theoverall foundation of slavery is that man has no consciousnessof his freedom yet and so sinks down to a mere thing aworthless object hellip Slavery is in and for itself wrong [Unrecht]for the essence of humanity is freedom but for this man mustfirst become mature [reif] This is why the gradual abolition ofslavery is therefore more appropriate and more right[Richtigeres] than its sudden removal (S 96ndash99)

So European enslavement of Africans involves a degree of moral wrong insofaras Africans have intrinsic capacities for freedom Yet before enslavementAfricans did not know themselves to have that capacity accordingly theyenslaved and mistreated one another and acted merely on their natural desiresThe latter does not constitute freedom Hegel insists if I act from naturally given

Hegel and Colonialism

8

desires I am still not determining for myself how to act So slavery was relativelyan improvement because it lsquomaturedrsquo the Negroes to become aware of theirfreedom lsquoOne must educate the Negroes in their freedom by taming theirnaturalnessrsquo (Hei 70)

We can infer from Hegelrsquos comments that slavery educates in several ways(i) Those enslaved are subjected to European culture and ethical standards (fromeg N 165) (ii) Slavery imposes the discipline of work (eg Hei 59) In workingone learns to hold onersquos natural desires in check and thereby see oneself ascapable of deliberating about or even rejecting them (iii) Work also instils anawareness of onersquos capacity to mould natural objectsmdasha sense of lsquoachievingindependence through onersquos own activityrsquo (61) (iv) Ironically those enslaved thusacquire a sense of private property (61)mdashpartly by learning of Europeaninstitutions of property and partly by imposing form on objects thereby forminga sense of lsquopossessingrsquo them which fosters an appreciation of property9

In sum lsquoSlavery hellip is necessary at those stages where the state [and itspeople] has not yet arrived at rationality It is an element in the transition to ahigher stagersquo (HG 197) Because slavery still has elements of wrong though thefinal step must be for slavery to end However Hegel cautions slavery shouldnot be suddenly abolished because it must end after not before the Negroes havebeen educated through it lsquoIf slavery was altogether wrong then the Europeansshould give the slaves their freedom immediately but in that way the mostfrightening consequences arise as in the French coloniesrsquo (Hei 70)

Hegelrsquos line of thought then takes in slavery and colonization at once(understandably since enslavement of Africans was fundamental to colonialAmerica) Use of slavery in the colonies might be judged wrong because itviolates the rights equality and freedom of the slaves But through being enslavedslaves take steps forward in their consciousness of freedom which they could nototherwise make for Africa is intrinsically pre-historical and unfree so thatfreedom can come to Africans only from without Analogously one might thinkthat colonization was altogether wrong because it violated the rights equality andfreedom of indigenous peoplesmdashbut no for before colonization those peoplehad no awareness of their freedom They lsquoha[d] no sense of private property ofachieving independence through onersquos own activity or of securing onersquos propertythrough rightrsquo (61) By being forced to labour and being disciplined spiritually byagencies such as the Christian church these people will eventually learn abouttheir freedom Until then their subjection while partially wrong insofar as it issubjection is also partially right it is at least an improvement on the nativesremaining in their natural wholly unfree pre-colonial condition

Colonialism is justified on this view because it spreads freedom topeoples who otherwise both lack it and have no native means of acquiring itMoreover the colonizers are justified in extirpating the indigenous cultures of

Alison Stone

9

native peoplesmdashhence Hegelrsquos endorsement of the Christian clergy andmissionaries lsquosetting out to accustom the Indians to European culture andethics [Sitten]rsquo (N 164)mdashsince those indigenous cultures embody unfreedom Wemight wonder whether Hegel regards even the violence and slaughter thatoccurred during the colonization of America as justified He does acknowledgeEuropean especially Spanish violence towards indigenous Americans but he isonly overtly critical of this violence when the colonial project had he saysdegenerated into mere robbery (Hei 204) Moreover he disguises the extent ofEuropean violence by running together indigenous Americans having beenlsquodestroyed and slaughteredrsquo (untergegangen verdraumlngt) having disappeared(verschwunden) and having voluntarily withdrawn (haben sich zuruumlckgezogen N 163see also Parekh 2009) Hegel does not wholly denounce colonial violence becausehe thinks that Europersquos conquest of America was based on a sound goalmdashspreading freedom and the culture of freedom to all peoplemdashand that theviolence that was necessary for achieving that goal was justified But Hegel doesdisapprove of violence when it served merely an unworthy goalmdashrobbery

This is congruent with Hegelrsquos overall approach to violence in history whichhe memorably calls a lsquoslaughterbenchrsquo (Schlachtbank) On his view theconsciousness of freedom advances through each civilization in turn establishingits pre-eminence by prevailing culturally and militarily over its predecessor Tothe extent that war and violence are necessary for progress they are justified(although lsquojustifiedrsquo does not mean lsquoto be celebratedrsquo) Even in these termsthough much of the violence carried out by European colonizersmdashthedecimation of many native American tribes the Middle Passagemdashwent beyondthe minimum necessary to subject non-Europeans to colonial control along theway to their ultimate freedom But likewise in history generally violence hasregularly gone beyond the minimum necessary to propel progress Such excessesare inevitable an aspect of the inescapable contingency of human affairs Theseexcesses of violence are not justified yet we can be reconciled to them as aninevitable albeit non-ideal concomitant of progress (H 90ndash91) PresumablyHegel thinks the same about the excesses of colonial violence

Hegelrsquos overall line of thought is that colonialism is not only justified butalso necessary as part of Europersquos centuries-long process of realizing freedom Alogical step in this process is to extend freedom to non-European peoples afterall the European principle is that all are free This extension can only occurthough by passing through a stage of subjugating non-European peoples sincethey have no native means of acquiring freedom lsquoThe [Negroesrsquo] condition isincapable of any development or culture [Entwicklung und Bildung] and theircondition as we see it today is as it has always beenrsquo (N 190) And lsquothe Negroes cannot move [bewegen] to any culturersquo (Hei 67) Likewise with indigenousAmericans America is new and young because it had no history until the

Hegel and Colonialism

10

Europeans arrived These claims do not mean that Negroes and indigenousAmericans cannot be educated they can But given their native ignorance offreedom they cannot educate themselves but must be educated by Europeanswhich requires that they first be subjected to European control

Hegelrsquos case for colonization could be extended to the Orientals He admitsthat unlike Africans and indigenous Americans the Oriental peoples do have anidea of freedommdashthat lsquoone is freersquomdashbut this idea remains so inadequate as tocount as unfreedom Hence lacking belief in their own freedom Oriental peoplecannot pursue any extensions or advancements of freedom and without suchpursuits to drive historical change their societies remain ahistorical Colonizationof these peoples for educative purposes would therefore be justified As long as apeople is at a low enough level to count as unfree and pre-historical that peoplecan advance only through having the European spirit imposed on it for beingpre-historical it has no native way to attain freedom And indeed Hegel does sayof India that lsquoThe English or rather the East India Company are the lords[Herren] of the land for it is the necessary fate of Asiatic empires to be subjected[unterworfen] to Europeans and China will also some day have to submit to thisfatersquo (S 142ndash43)

We should not be misled by an apparently conflicting statement in thePhilosophy of Right lsquoThe liberation of colonies hellip [is] of the greatest advantage tothe mother state just as the emancipation of slaves is of the greatest advantage tothe masterrsquo (PR sect248A 269) Hegelrsquos paradigm here is American independenceie the independence of what he is explicit and adamant is colonial EuropeanAmerica not Native America (N 165ndash66) That is America merits independenceonce its native populace is reduced or placed securely under European tutelageThis coheres with Hegelrsquos approving reference to independent Haiti in thePhilosophy of Mind (EM sect393A 40) he says that this is a Christian state that theNegroes could only found after having undergone long spiritual servitude Oncea people has been colonized sufficiently to acquire European culture as in Haitithen and only then does that people merit freedom

Hegelrsquos argument for colonialism is of the lsquocivilizing missionrsquo familyEffectively his defence is that colonialism benefits most those who fare worstunder itmdashcolonized peoplesmdashby civilizing and bringing them freedom that theycannot access without passing through colonial subjection For Hegelcolonialism and the advancement of freedom go hand-in-hand

III Saving Hegel from himself

Hegelrsquos PWH implies that colonialism is required to further the realization ofuniversal freedom Does this show that Hegelrsquos conception of freedom is

Alison Stone

11

necessarily bound up with his pro-colonialism If so thenmdashtaking it thatcolonialism was in fact morally wrongmdashpresumably his conception of freedomand its historical development must be rejected (although not necessarily freedomas such of course)

But perhaps that would be to dismiss Hegelrsquos thought too summarily andthereby to do disservice not only to Hegel but also to anti-colonial anddecolonizing thought and activism which after all has regularly drawn on Hegelboth directlymdasheg when Frantz Fanon ([1952] 2008) and Ngugi wa Thiongrsquoo(2012) use Hegel to critique colonialismmdashand indirectly through Hegelrsquosinfluence on Marxism and critical theory Moreover Hegelrsquos thought may stilloffer further anti-colonial resources which remain to be mined We mighttherefore reasonably seek to separate Hegelrsquos basic conception of freedom and itshistoricity from his Eurocentric narrative of history so that when so separatedthat basic conception tells against colonialism Such a viewmdashone that rescuesHegel from himselfmdashis often adopted more or less explicitly by hisinterpreters10 I now want to set out my own version of this type of viewalthough I will go on to complicate it in Section IV

The view is this We can separate the essentials of Hegelrsquos account offreedom from his concrete interpretation of the actual movement of historyHegel was wrong and prejudiced when he dismissed Africans indigenousAmericans and Orientals as unfree and incapable of coming to freedom on theirown Nevertheless his basic account of what freedom is including its necessaryhistorical development remains insightful A better informed judgment ofnon-European peoples would require a very different historical narrative Butthat does not undermine Hegelrsquos basic points that freedom develops historicallyin tandem with the consciousness of it as embodied in different cultures andsocial institutions When we separate these basic points from his actualnarrative we find that these points serve a progressive purpose yielding groundsto reject colonialism

This view dovetails with Hegelrsquos claim that the human capacity for self-determination is universal not confined to Europeans (see eg H 88) Admittedlythough this starting-point is only an abstract universal Self-determination can beactualized only when one is conscious of onersquos capacity for it and thatrequires social and cultural institutions a whole way of life which foster thatconsciousness Such a way of life arose for the first time only in ancient Greecefor Hegel so that actualized freedom does not obtain universallyArguably though given his basic view of freedom and its historicity Hegelcould and should have interpreted all the worldrsquos regions as taking part in thegradual historical unfolding of social institutions that support freedom Hegeldoes not do so because he denies that non-European peoples are conscious offreedom at all Since non-European societies were not conscious of freedom

Hegel and Colonialism

12

even in the restricted ways that the Greeks and Romans were the former had nobasis for moving forward historically by further advancing an already partlyrealized freedom

Thus what underpins Hegelrsquos denial of historicity to non-European peoplesis his sharp division of European freedom from non-European unfreedom Thatin turn is underpinned by his claim that the ancient Greeks made the decisivebreak from unfreedom into freedom The Greeks Hegel says became thedistinctive people they were out of a mixing within them of heterogeneousOriental peoples and their cultures but the Greeks surmounted or overcame(uumlberwinden) this background (HG 214) By doing so the Greeks created theirlsquofree beautifulrsquo spirit (374) The Greeks overcame their Oriental preconditions tolsquomake themselvesrsquo (372 see also 393ndash94)

However this view that the Greeks lsquoovercamersquo the Oriental world ofunfreedom seems overstated by Hegelrsquos own lights For Hegel himself theGreeks mark only the latest phase in a growing consciousness of freedomrunning from China through India to Persia and culminating in EgyptPersiarsquos most advanced province Egypt is the hinge between Orient andOccident in which the human soulrsquos intrinsic capacity for freedom was almostgrasped But it was not quite grasped for the soul was still not distinguishedfrom animal nature a distinction the Greeks went on to make (HG 334 368)That lack of distinction is shown by the way the Egyptians modelled their godsand goddesses on animal species often with animal heads Yet for Hegel theGreeks too stopped short of recognizing that all people have an inherent capacityfor freedom They admitted freedom only to male native-born slave-ownersIn that way their view of freedom remained intermingled with acceptance ofnatural contingency ie accidents of birth sex and geographical location (H 88)So the difference between the Egyptian viewmdashhuman freedom is incompletelydistinguished from (animal) naturemdashand the Greek viewmdashhuman freedom isagain incompletely distinguished from naturemdashappears to be a difference ofdegree not kind11

Hegelrsquos lsquoovercomingrsquo idea therefore sits uncomfortably with his graduatedportrayal of historyrsquos stages That portrayal could be taken to show that belief infreedom is not exclusively European since the Persians and Egyptians already hadversions of that belief To be sure they were inadequate versions (for Hegel)mdashbutthen so was the Greeksrsquo And by extension the Indians and Chinese likewise hadversions of the belief in freedommdasheven more inadequate ones since theyattributed freedom only to lsquoonersquo not lsquosomersquomdashbut where that inadequacy stilldifferentiates these peoples from the Greeks only by degree and not kind (more soin the Indian case since the lsquoonersquo is a whole caste) If the Oriental peoples did haveversions however unsatisfactory of the belief in freedom then Hegel should nothave denied that these peoples are historical For if it is believed that someone is

Alison Stone

13

free be it only lsquoonersquo ruler or caste then others may claim and demand that samefreedom for themselves powering historical change

Now Hegel regards the Africans and indigenous Americans as lackingfreedom more radically than the Orientals yet contrary evidence was available tohim He might for instance have noted the Iroquois Confederacy of five (latersix) Native American tribes founded c1600 and dissolved c1800 a system ofintra- and inter-tribal governance which lsquomaximized individual freedom whileseeking to minimize excess governmental interference in peoplersquos livesrsquo (Johansen1982 9) influencing the American Constitution And Hegel embellishedexaggerated and at times outright distorted his sources on Africa so as to portraya people without any respect for human life freedom or rightsmdashmore so thanthe sources suggested and they were already unreliable (see Bernasconi 1998)12

The way was open to Hegel to recognize Africans and indigenous Americans ashaving views of freedom even if he classed them as even less adequate thanOriental ones With that those peoples would like the Orientals have had anentry to history

Nonetheless Hegel preserves his division of European freedom from non-European unfreedom by counting all the European stages as stages of freedomdown to its lowest level and all the non-European stages as stages of unfreedomright up to where unfreedom is almost freedom but not quite But the placementof this dividing line appears arbitrary Consider for example Hegelrsquos view thatHindus are not conscious of their own freedom because they fail to distinguishthemselves as human agents from nature (HG 256 273ndash81) On Hegelrsquosaccount as wersquove just seen there are ways that the ancient Greeks did not fullyextricate human agency from nature either somdashon his own termsmdashit is not clearthat the difference here is one of kind (history versus non-history freedom versusunfreedom) rather than degree (more or less freedom more or less far along thehistorical path towards full freedom)

Hegel could and it seems should have interpreted much of hismaterial as evidencing how non-European peoples have grasped and practisedfreedom albeit imperfectly We might still find this revised Hegeliannarrative objectionable assuming that it ranks non-European conceptions offreedom as less advanced than European ones Yet once it is admittedthat non-European peoples are historical in principle Hegel would alsohave to trace how historical advances unfolded in those societies so re-interpreting his material once again Each continent would have its own history ofprogression in consciousness of freedom rather than non-Europeancontinents merely paving the way for Europe The several continents wouldhave histories of freedom that run in parallel rather than corresponding tomore or less advanced phases of a single historical line that culminates in modernEurope

Hegel and Colonialism

14

Neither of these revised Hegelian narrativesmdashthe single line or parallel linesversionsmdashsupports colonialism not even the single line model on whichnon-European peoplesrsquo native levels of freedom are although real yetdeficient compared to European ones By recognizing freedom howeverunsatisfactorily non-European cultures would still have the internal potential andmotor to advance to greater freedom In that case colonization would not benecessary for non-European peoplesrsquo achieving freedom and would not bejustified as a necessary step in the realization of universal freedom Anotherplank in Hegelrsquos justification of colonization is that colonized peoples enjoyed nofreedom pre-colonizationmdashso that despite its abrogation of their freedomcolonization did not worsen their position (and ultimately would improve it) Butif these peoples did have a grasp of freedom however imperfect thencolonization stood to worsen their position That risk is especially pronouncedgiven Hegelrsquos own perspective that some violence is necessary for colonizationand given the role of contingency in human affairs that that violence may wellmushroom beyond the necessary minimum Further for Hegel colonizationrequires the extirpation of native cultures but if these are not cultures ofunfreedom then that extirpation is not justified Apparently then Hegel shouldby his own lights have opposed colonialism for his own philosophy generates acase against it

IV The Greeks history and self-liberation from nature

The view just canvassed is that despite the Eurocentrism and pro-colonialism ofHegelrsquos substantial narrative in the PWH his distinctive account of freedom asdeveloping historically through successive civilizations does not in itselfnecessitate his substantive Eurocentrism and when extricated from the latteryields a case against colonialism However we can distinguish weaker andstronger versions of this view More weakly Hegelrsquos basic account of freedomcan be separated from his actual pro-colonialism and so does not necessarilyimply pro-colonialism but contains anti-colonial possibilities as well as thepro-colonial possibilities that Hegel developed from it More strongly Hegelrsquosbasic account of freedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism andwhen so separated this account implies anti-colonialism and has an inherentlyanti-colonial direction I endorse the weaker but not the stronger claim and theweaker one only subject to a significant qualification Hegelrsquos basic account offreedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism but not as easily asSection III suggested This is because Hegelrsquos conception of freedom asself-determination has significant connections with his Eurocentrism

Alison Stone

15

In Section III I suggested that Hegelrsquos divisions Greeksnon-Greeks freeunfree look arbitrary But actually they are not For Hegel

Its [Greecersquos] principle is that self-conscious freedom stepsforth hellip [Regarding t]he unity of spirit with nature hellip thespecificity of this unity [in the Greek case] is to be graspedOne unity is the Oriental hellip consciousness immersed innature a [new kind of] harmony is now to be broughtforth [by the Greeks] in which hellip spirit dominates Spirit nowdetermines nature and this is a spiritual unity hellip (Hei 117 myemphases)

[The] fundamental characteristic [of the Greek spirit is] that thefreedom of spirit is conditioned by and in essential relation tosome natural stimulus Greek freedom is stimulated bysomething other and is free because it changes and produces thestimulus from out of itself (aus sich) (S 238 my emphasis)

Thus the Greeks were free in that they were at home with themselves in theother ie nature But this does not mean that the content of their practices andway of life was determined by natural givens such as the Greeksrsquo given impulsesRather they reshaped these givens and so became at-home-with-themselves inthem In the Greek case then spirit lsquodeterminedrsquo nature whereas previouslyspirit had been immersed or absorbed (versenkt) in nature This Greekdetermination of nature by spiritmdashspiritrsquos investment of nature with meaningof its ownmdashwas made possible by a prior moment first carried out by theGreeks through which lsquospirit is no longer immersed [versenkt] in nature hellip [but]releas[es] itself from nature [sich losmachend von der Natur]rsquo (HG 395ndash96) Thismoment in which the human spirit first releases or sets itself free from naturecorresponds to the overcoming (uumlberwinden) by the Greeks of their mixed ethnicheritage a moment of overcoming through which they became able to remakethat heritage for themselves to make themselves Hegel is explicit that none ofthe worldrsquos other peoples to that point had achieved this

Even so for Hegel the Greeks exercised freedom always with respect tonature and existing givens in the worldmdashre-shaping what they found alreadythere rather than creating a totally new world out of themselves Hence theGreeks did not regard free individuals as being capable of adjudicatingindependently on the given natural and social world through their own reason orof generating norms and principles purely through the exercise of their spiritualfreedom Or as Hegel also puts it elsewhere individual subjectivity was notdifferentiated from social substance but the individual identified fully andunquestioningly with his or her social role and there was no ground for

Hegel and Colonialism

16

independent social criticism (see Hardimon 1993) Connected with all this theGreeks restricted freedom to some people only effectively stipulating that onlythose with certain kinds of naturemdashmale free-bornmdashor natural locationmdashnativeGreekmdashhad the power of self-determination In these ways spiritrsquos freedomremained lsquoconditionedrsquo or limited (bedingt) bymdashalthough not immersed inmdashnature (and see HG 390)

However these limitations contradicted the essence of self-determination asthe Greeks understood it as including a moment of overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature such that the power to overcome nature cannotpossibly be limited by nature (or it would not be a power to overcome nature atall) Thus lsquoin the principle of Greek freedom inasmuch as it is freedom it isimplied that thought must be free for itself rsquo (HG 268)mdashalthough the Greeks fora long time did not explicitly grasp or follow through on that implicationNonetheless in the end that contradiction was what made it possible for theGreeksrsquo exclusion of some people from freedom and their other ways ofrestricting freedomrsquos scope to come in for criticism The criticism came withSocrates and the Sophists claiming that thought can adjudicate rationally on whatis and generate norms by itself (417) In that freedom of thought was therebygrasped as fully independent of nature it was also grasped as universal at least inprinciple In these two ways lsquoThought hellip introduces an opposition [Gegensatz][to the Greek mixture of freedom and nature] and asserts the validity ofessentially rational principlesrsquo (S 267)

For Hegel then Greek culture enabled rational criticism of what isincluding of limited freedom as no pre-Greek cultures did just because theGreeks had established a root opposition between freedom and nature whereaslsquoin the Oriental states in which a lack of opposition is present no moral freedomcan come aboutrsquo (267) Although the advent of rational critique brought on thedemise of Greek culture Europe was thereby also set on the path oftransformative historical change We see then why in his own terms Hegel saysthat non-European peoples could not advance critical claims for freedomrsquosextension but uncritically accepted the authority of their rulersmdashpatriarchalauthority in China caste hierarchy and caste-based restrictions and rituals inIndia and state power in Persia Non-Europeans could not question suchauthorities because their cultures did not grasp freedom as including the momentof overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature and the given Becausefreedom was not grasped as including that moment of human separation fromnature and the given no contradiction was perceived in freedom being limited bynature eg confined to people of certain castes or by given states of affairs egcustomary authority and ritual Non-Europeans lacked a critical motor to drivesocial change hence lacked history propermdashor indeed freedom as properlydistinguished from unfreedom

Alison Stone

17

So for Hegel there is a genuine difference in kind not merely degreebetween the Greek and post-Greek European world on the one hand and thenon-European world on the other the Europenon-Europe divide is notarbitrary but has a philosophical rationale For while the Greek view of freedomwas like non-European views limited and inadequate the former was moreadvanced in one key respectmdashthe inclusion in freedom of a primary moment oflsquoovercomingrsquo naturemdashwhich enabled the Greek and post-Greek European worldto become self-critical self-revising and so historical This is what motivatesHegel to identify Greek and post-Greek European views as views of freedomhowever limited whereas non-European views that might prima facie look likeviews of freedom are still actually modes of unfreedom

Once again we might object that non-Europeans have at times construedfreedom as including this moment of overcoming nature Even on Hegelrsquosaccount Hindus appreciate the human power to abstract from the world inthought He maintains though that this is merely an intellectual withdrawaland that when it comes to practical agency Hindus see human agency as immersedin not including any moment of self-freeing-from nature (see eg S 157ndash58)In response we could with Jaspal Peter Sahota (2016) agree that in classicalIndian thought there has been a tendency to locate human agency within naturebut argue against Hegel that this does not constitute a real absence offreedom but rather a different conception of freedom We might then say thatbecause thesemdashand othermdashnon-European views were still views of freedom thoseviews were still sufficient to motivate social criticism and hence place non-European peoples in history even without the element of overcoming natureHowever such a position would take us further away from Hegelrsquos own accountof the historicity of freedom according which as we have seen that moment ofovercoming nature uniquely new in ancient Greece is crucial in poweringhistorical progression

Hegelrsquos basic account of freedom and its historicity thus has more extensiveand significant connections with his Eurocentrism than I suggested inSection III In particular that account connects with Hegelrsquos denial that non-European peoples are historicalmdashie can come to freedom on their ownmdashandhence with his case for colonialism as the only route along which those peoplescan reach freedom These connections suggest that after all we cannotstraightforwardly take up Hegelrsquos account of freedom and its historicity whilesloughing off his pro-colonialism This is not to say that we cannot separate outthese parts of his thought at all But rescuing Hegel from himself is set to be acomplicated process not quick or straightforward To the extent that such arescue is possible Hegelrsquos pro-colonialism cannot rightly be counted as necessaryto his thought or system Yet his pro-colonialism does have extensive anddeep-seated connections with his other viewsmdashenough to show that it is not the

Hegel and Colonialism

18

case that Hegel should not have endorsed colonialism by his own standardsRather he did and could endorse it coherently in his own terms although otheranti-colonialist possibilities were also available within his own terms which hecould have developed

So the claim that Hegelrsquos account of freedom is inherently anti-colonial isunduly strong Through his understanding of freedom as involving spiritextricating itself from nature that account has sustained links with hisEurocentrism and so his pro-colonialism We can nonetheless envisage variousmanoeuvres by which to maintain that freedom develops historically for all theworldrsquos peoples for example by saying that they have several conceptions offreedom where freedom can but does not have to include self-liberation fromnature Then ancient Greece would initiate one historical pathway to freedombut not the only one Even so Hegelrsquos own account of freedom and its historicitydoes not inherently drive us to make these intellectual manoeuvres but onlypermits them In sum if Hegelrsquos view of freedom does not necessarily implypro-colonialism neither is it inherently anti-colonial We can make distinctionsand qualifications within his thought so as to yield anti-colonial conclusions butthis is only one of several possible lines of development of which his thoughtadmits another being its elaboration into the Eurocentric and pro-colonialsystem that Hegel in fact forged

There is a broader moral Wemdashie the heirs of the European heritage thatruns through philosophy into modern political thoughtmdashshould not let thisheritage off the hook too easily This heritage including Hegelrsquos thought hasbeen implicated in colonialism in various ways To be sure because it extols andarticulates the values of freedom and equality this heritage also furnishesconceptual resources for critiquing colonialism and giving support to anti-colonial struggles and anti-colonial thinkers and activists have drawn on modernEuropean ideas for this purpose For example the Haitian revolutionariesdeclared that they were acting in allegiance to the emancipatory goals of theFrench Revolution This might lead us to suppose that the European politicallegacy is intrinsically liberatory and that theorists in the European traditionmdashHegel includedmdashhave only ever justified colonialism due to unfortunateprejudices that led them to go back on their own principles

I believe that taking that view exculpates our predecessors too quicklyand leaves us at risk of inadvertently embracing ideas inherited from thesepredecessors which actually have deep-rooted internal connections withEurocentric and pro-colonial attitudes This is not to say that we should orcould repudiate these ideas outright Rather in view of their connections withcolonialism we need to think carefully and critically about how far to take theseinherited ideas forward and how we might do so differently My aim has been tohelp us cultivate this caution in Hegelrsquos case by acknowledging that while his

Alison Stone

19

thought harbours anti-colonial possibilities it also has real and tenacious linkswith colonialism of which we should remind mindful13

Alison StoneLancaster University UKastonelancasteracuk

Notes

1 Contributions include those by Bernasconi 1998 2007 2016 Bonetto 2006 de Laurentiis2014 McCarney and Bernasconi 2003 Mowad 2013 Parekh 2009 Purtschert 2010 andTibebu 20102 However see Buck-Morss 2000 andmdashfor highly critical accountsmdashDussel [1992] 1995 and1993 Guha 2002 Tibebu 2010 Also relevant are Bird-Pollan 2014 (on Hegel and Fanon)Brennan 2013 (on Hegelrsquos influence on post-colonialism) Buchwalter 2009 (defending Hegelagainst charges of Eurocentrism) Monahan 2017 (Creolizing Hegel) and Serequeberhan 1989(on colonialism in the Philosophy of Right)3 Ranajit Guha identifies another argument for colonialism in the Philosophy of Rightfrom the lsquorightsrsquo that Hegel claims civilized nations have with respect to less advanced ones(PR sect351 376) These rights Guha argues are lsquorights of conquestrsquo noting Hegelrsquos praise for Britishmilitary victories over India led by Robert Clive (1725ndash74) whose conquests established theEast India Companyrsquos rule over Bengal and other Indian states See Guha 2002 43ndash44PR sect372A 364 and 474 note 1)Abbreviations usedEN=Hegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller Oxford Clarendon PressEM= Hegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind Trans W Wallace and A V Miller Oxford OxfordUniversity Press Cited by paragraph and page numberN=Hegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reason in Historytrans H B Nisbet Cambridge UK Cambridge University PressS=Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NY Prometheus BooksPR=Hegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B Nisbet Cambridge UKCambridge University PressHei=Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink4 Hegel lectured on the PWH in 182223 182425 182627 182829 and 183031 Hismanuscripts of the Introduction from 1822 (rev 1828) and 183031 survive as do manytranscripts between them covering every course Some such as de Laurentiis (2014) are waryof directly attributing to Hegel views notably on race expressed only in the transcripts I agreethat we should disambiguate sources but where multiple independently written transcripts

Hegel and Colonialism

20

converge as domdashextensivelymdashseveral transcripts of the PWH we may take them to bereliable Accordingly I refer to Hegelrsquos manuscripts (abbreviated H) as in Hegel 2011 which isthe English translation of the corresponding volume of the Gesammelte Werke (Hegel 1995) andthe integrated text of the 182223 course composed primarily from Hothorsquos and Griesheimrsquostranscripts (abb HG) included in Hegel 2011 (the German is Hegel 1996) Since the Germancritical edition of the transcripts remains incomplete for materials on Hegelrsquos later coursesI have used Heimannrsquos transcript of 183031 whenever possible (Hegel 2005 abb Hei)otherwise the composite texts produced by Karl Hegel (Hegel 1986) and translated by Sibree(Hegel 1991 abb S) and by Georg LassonJohannes Hoffmeister (Hegel 1988) translated byNisbet (Hegel 1975 abb N) I quote English translations whenever available sometimesadjusted in view of the German5 For more on contingency in Hegel see inter alia Burbidge 2007 esp ch 1 Burbidge stressesthe extent to which Hegel lsquotakes the contingencies of history seriouslyrsquo (2007 9)6 For Hegel lsquonaturehellip is indeed a rational system operating in its own distinct elementrsquo (N 44)The division into continents is rational in that different natural features and their varietiesmdashmountains and plains lands and seas and their fusion and differentiationmdasheach find fullembodiment in different continents (EM sect393 and R 40ndash41) In a sense then non-Europeansare subject to reason and rational progression insofar as nature imposes it on them fromthe outside rather than by exercising rational thought for themselves This coheres withHegelrsquos view that these peoples are immersed in nature out of which only Europeans can liftthem see below7 This recalls Hegelrsquos derivation of time from space in the Philosophy of Nature a derivation thatpositions time as more advanced than space (EN sectsect256ndash57 31ndash36)8 This is evident from eg Hegelrsquos discussion of the colonization of America see Section II9 Hegel connects formation with possession (PR sect56 85ndash86) albeit in the very differentcontext of modern European societies in which private property is institutionalized I leaveunexplored here how far his ideas about slaveryrsquos educative power may be informed by hislordbondsman dialectic10 For instance some interpreters defend Hegel against charges of Eurocentrism and racism(eg Buchwalter 2009 Houlgate [1991] 2015 35ndash37 McCarney in McCarney and Bernasconi2003 Mowad 2013) others stress Hegelrsquos founding importance for anti-colonial thought(Brennan 2013) and numerous readers of Hegel as a thinker of freedom (eg Patten 1999)see no need to discuss his position on colonialism presumably on the grounds that the latteris a merely accidental avoidable part of his thought from which his essential views on freedomcan be extracted11 For Hegel the Greeks were greatly influenced by the Egyptians whose influence theynonetheless overcame Here he is close to accepting what Martin Bernal calls the lsquoancientmodelrsquo of the Greeksrsquo origins a model to which the Greeks themselves adhered later-nineteenth-century Europeans instead espoused an lsquoAryan modelrsquo on which Greek cultureproper arose from northern invaders driving out earlier Egyptian and Phoenician influences([1987] 1991) Bernal argues that the Aryan model had Eurocentric motivations if the Greeks

Alison Stone

21

the supposed originators of Europersquos distinctive culture were actually the Egyptiansrsquo heirsthen given that Egypt is within Africa the EuropeAfrica divide would crumble A furthercomplicating factor is whether the Egyptians were seen as black Africans Bernasconi (2007)argues that Hegel thought so as did most other Europeans of his time Later the Egyptiansrsquoracial status was changedmdashto Mediterranean (ie Caucasian)mdashto hold up the divide betweenEurope-as-white and Africa-as-black Bernasconi suggests that Hegel himself dealt with thepotential anomalymdashof highly cultured black Africans giving much to the Greeksmdashby makingthe EgyptGreece transition the site of the key conceptual transition from unfreedom tofreedom nature to spirit (2007 212ndash13) This ties in with my argument in Section IV thatHegel actually did have grounds on his own terms to construe the apparently gradual EgyptGreece transition as actually being a sharp divide12 Bernasconi (2016) has recently shown how Hegel likewise distorted his sources on China tothe detriment of the Chinese13 I thank Bob Stern and the referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions

Bibliography

Bernal M [1987] (1991) Black Athena The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical CivilisationVol 1 London VintageBernasconi R (1998) lsquoHegel at the Court of the Ashantirsquo in S Barnett (ed)Hegel After Derrida Albany NY SUNYBernasconi R (2007) lsquoThe Return of Africa Hegel and the Question of theRacial Identity of the Egyptiansrsquo in P T Grier (ed) Identity and Difference AlbanyNY SUNYBernasconi R (2016) lsquoChina on Parade Hegelrsquos Manipulation of his Sources andhis Change of Mindrsquo in B Brandt and D L Purdy (eds) China in the GermanEnlightenment Toronto University of Toronto PressBird-Pollan S (2014) Hegel Freud and Fanon The Dialectic of Emancipation LondonRowman and Littlefield InternationalBonetto S (2006) lsquoRace and Racism in HegelmdashAn AnalysisrsquoMinerva An InternetJournal of Philosophy 10Brennan T (2013) lsquoHegel Empire and Anti-Colonial Thoughtrsquo in G Huggan(ed) The Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies Oxford Oxford University PressBuchwalter A (2009) lsquoIs Hegelrsquos Philosophy of History Eurocentricrsquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYBuck-Morss S (2000) lsquoHegel and Haitirsquo Critical Inquiry 264 821ndash65Burbidge J (2007) Hegelrsquos Systematic Contingency Basingstoke Palgrave MacmillanDe Laurentiis A (2014) lsquoRace in Hegel Text and Contextrsquo in M Egger (ed)Philosophie Nach Kant Neue Wege zum Verstaumlndnis von Kants Transzendental- undMoralphilosophie Berlin De Gruyter

Hegel and Colonialism

22

Dussel E [1992] (1995) The Invention of the Americas trans M D Barber NewYork ContinuumDussel E (1993) lsquoEurocentrism and Modernityrsquo Boundary 2 203 65ndash76Fanon F [1952] (2008) Black Skin White Masks trans R Philcox New YorkGroveGuha R (2002) History at the Limit of World-History New York ColumbiaUniversity PressHardimon M (1993) Hegelrsquos Social Philosophy Cambridge Cambridge UniversityPressHegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller OxfordClarendonHegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind trans W Wallace and A V MillerOxford Oxford University PressHegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reasonin History trans H B Nisbet Cambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1986) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Geschichte Werke Vol 12ed E Moldenhauer and K M Michel Frankfurt Suhrkamp [Englishtranslation Sibree]Hegel G W F (1988) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Vols 1-3 edG Lasson Vols 1-4 Hamburg Meiner [English translation of volume 1 Nisbet]Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NYPrometheus BooksHegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B NisbetCambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1995) lsquoVorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der WeltgeschichteEinleitungrsquo in W Jaeschke (ed) Vorlesungsmanuskripte II (1916ndash1831)Gesammelte Werke Vol 18 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown andHodgson]Hegel G W F (1996) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Berlin 182223 Nachschriften von Griesheim Hotho und Kehler ed Karl Brehmer K-H Iltingund Hoo Nam Seelmann Hegel Vorlesungen Ausgew Nachschriften und ManuskripteVol 12 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown and Hodgson]Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink Abb HeiHegel G W F (2011) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Volume 1Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822ndash3 ed and trans R F Brownand P C Hodgson with assistance of W G Geuss Oxford Clarendon PressHoulgate S [1991] 2015 An Introduction to Hegel Freedom Truth and HistoryOxford BlackwellJohansen B E (1982) Forgotten Founders How the American Indians Helped ShapeDemocracy Boston Harvard Common Press

Alison Stone

23

McCarney J and Bernasconi R (2003) lsquoExchange Hegelrsquos Racismrsquo RadicalPhilosophy 119(MayJune) 32ndash37Monahan M (ed) (2017) Creolizing Hegel London Rowman and LittlefieldInternationalMowad N (2013) lsquoThe Place of Nationality in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of Politicsand Religion A Defense of Hegel on the Charges of National Chauvinism andRacismrsquo in A Nuzzo (ed) Hegel on Religion and Politics Albany NY SUNYParekh S (2009) lsquoHegelrsquos New World History Freedom and Racersquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYPatten A (1999) Hegelrsquos Idea of Freedom Oxford Oxford University PressPurtschert P (2010) lsquoOn the Limit of Spirit Hegelrsquos Racism Revisitedrsquo Philosophyand Social Criticism 369 1039ndash51Quijano A (2000) lsquoColoniality of Power Eurocentrism and Latin AmericarsquoNepantla Views from South 13 533ndash80Sahota J P (2016) lsquoHegelrsquos Critique of Hinduism A Responsersquo Hegel Bulletin372 305ndash17Serequeberhan T (1989) lsquoThe Idea of Colonialism in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of RightrsquoInternational Philosophical Quarterly 293 301ndash18Shohat E and Stam R [1994] (2014) Unthinking Eurocentrism New YorkRoutledgeTibebu T (2010) Hegel and the Third World The Making of Eurocentrism in WorldHistory Syracuse NY Syracuse University PressWa Thiongrsquoo N (2012) Globalectics Theory and the Politics of Knowing New YorkColumbia University Press

Hegel and Colonialism

24

  • Hegel and Colonialism
Page 4: Hegel and Colonialism - Lancaster University · 2017-06-30 · Hegel and Colonialism Alison Stone Abstract This article explores the implications of Hegel’s Philosophy of World

record confirms this lsquoWhoever looks at the world rationally sees it as rationaltoo the two exist in a reciprocal relationshiprsquo (81)

As is well known Hegel holds concretely that world historyrsquos progression inthe lsquoconsciousness of freedomrsquo unfolds over three main stages lsquoone is freersquolsquosome are freersquo lsquoall are freersquo (all containing sub-divisions) corresponding toOriental Classical and Germanic civilizations On lsquoconsciousness of freedomrsquoHegelrsquos views are these Freedom consists in self-determination rationaldecision-making about what ends to follow which impulses to satisfy orwhether to act purely from universal principle instead (HG 148ndash49) All humanindividuals have this capacity for self-determinationmdashlsquoall human beings areintrinsically freersquo (an sich hellip frei H 88) but individuals are not always aware ofthis If they are not then they will fail to exercise develop and actualize theircapacity remaining practically unfree (although ontologically free)mdashfree lsquointhemselvesrsquo (an sich) but not for themselves (88) For instance lsquothe Orientals donot know that spirit or the human being as such is intrinsically free because theydo not know this they are not themselves freersquo (87 my emphasis) As thisimplies if the civilization to which I belong does not treat me as being freemdashsayif my place in it is to be a slave or serfmdashthen I will be unaware of my capacity forfreedom for what I can know depends on what is known in the social worldaround me This is why individual freedom advances in tandem with the sharedconsciousness of that freedom on the part of members of societies and as thisconsciousness is embodied in their practices and institutions As thisconsciousness advances the nature of freedom is grasped more adequately itsdomain is expanded eg from religious to secular affairs and crucially its scopeis expanded ever more people and categories of people are known to be free

As to Eurocentrism Hegel famously states that history moves West like thesun for historyrsquos most advanced stage is the lsquoGermanicrsquo civilization whose spirit isthat lsquoall are freersquo Admittedly for Hegel the insight that lsquoall are freersquo was first wonalbeit only in spiritual form (eg that we may all be saved) by Jesus Christmdashthusin Judaea not Europe (88) But Christrsquos message took hold in ancient Rome notthe Middle East because the Romans already held that some are free native maleslave-holders (HG 450ndash51) The soil was therefore ripe for other Romans to claimthat they shared in freedom too Christianity affording them terms to do so Nextdue to Roman imperialism which spread Christianity the Teutonic tribesencountered and gradually took on Christianity then after the Roman Empirefell spread Christianity through the rest of Europe (S 347ndash49) becoming thelsquobearers of the Christian principle of freedomrsquo (HG 460) Through its adoptionof Christianity Europe emerged as a distinct civilization the lsquoGermanicrsquo orlsquoChristianrsquomdashHegel tends to talk indifferently of the lsquoChristianrsquo lsquoGermanicrsquo andlsquoEuropeanrsquo states (eg 463) lsquoGermanicrsquo then means not lsquoGermanrsquo but lsquoChristianEuropeanrsquo more broadly (see also Mowad 2013 168ndash70)

Hegel and Colonialism

4

Freedomrsquos development continued with the Reformation at last restoringthe principle of the spiritual freedom of all against previously dominant Churchhierarchies The next step the Enlightenment was to grasp that freedom appliesin secular life too in freedoms to own private property choose a profession andspouse participate in public affairs etc Against the excessively abstractrealization of freedom in the French Revolution the most advanced Europeanstates treat determinate social institutionsmdashnuclear family market economyconstitutional monarchymdashas needed to secure these individual freedoms andreconcile them with social membership Overall then European history has beena centuries-long process of working out and putting into practice one definingprinciplemdashthe freedom of all (H 88)

Europe then comes to bear the Christian principle of freedom because ittakes it over from the Roman Empire where in turn Christianity had taken holdbecause the Romans were already conscious that lsquosome are freersquo building on thesame consciousness by the ancient Greeks So that lastmdashthe ancient Greekconsciousness that lsquosome are freersquomdashwas ultimately decisive lsquoThe consciousnessof freedom first awoke among the Greeks and with that they were freersquo (87 myemphases) they made the key transition from unfreedom to freedom Ultimatelythis is why the development from lsquosome are freersquo to lsquoall are freersquo has onlyspontaneously occurred on European soil

The transition that the Greeks made was equally from pre-history to historyHegel says of China and India that we lsquocannot speak here of a proper history assuchrsquo (HG 214) The Oriental civilizations are in world history only ambiguouslyThey are unhistorical insofar as they are not conscious of freedommdashor rather areconscious of it only very inadequately as belonging to one emperor (China)ruling caste (India) or empire (Persia) Consequently individuals in these culturesare not motivated to pursue or advance their own freedom for they do not knowthat they are capable of self-determination in the first place (again the lsquoOrientalsdo not know that hellip the human being as such is intrinsically free because theydo not know this they are not themselves freersquo H 87) Oriental culture containsno inner motor for progressive development to take place by way of individualsbroadening and deepening the scope of an extant yet still incomplete level offreedom Lacking that motor the Orient has no history properly speaking Evenso Hegel includes the Oriental civilizations in world history because they do havea minimal level of consciousness of freedom ie as belonging only to theemperor highest caste etc In contrast for Hegel Africans and indigenousAmericans lack any awareness of freedom their worlds are fully non-ambiguouslypre-historical whereas Oriental pre-history is on the threshold of world historyand to that extent lies partly within it

Hegelrsquos denial of full history to the Orientals sheds light on the kind ofreason he takes to be immanent in historical events which in turn illuminates

Alison Stone

5

his Eurocentrism Whereas the Orientals lack a motor for historical developmentand hence are pre-historical that motor does arise when a given level ofconsciousness of freedom being attained and embodied in social life that level ofconsciousness harbours some inner lsquocontradictionrsquo or tension which propelspeople qua rational beings to bring about change and improvement Theseconditions are first met by the ancient Greeks Another instance mentionedearlier is that the Romans conferred freedom on slave-owners while denying it toslaves giving slaves rational grounds to claim freedom as well In Section IV wewill encounter other instances of this type of historical development through therational response to contradictions

That reason is immanent in historical changes might suggest that in historylogical and temporal development coincide (whereas in say Hegelrsquos Logic thedialectical development of categories is not temporal) This is so to an extentThe pre-historical civilizations of Africa indigenous America and the Orienthave no consciousness of freedom sufficient to harbour self-contradictorylimitations that call for change hence these civilizations actually show nosignificant social change over time for Hegel They are and have ever been thesame embodying time but not history that is no instantiation over time ofthe dialectical-and-rational development of freedom Conversely in Europe thelimitations placed on a freedom that is nevertheless known power developmentsthat are at once rationally warranted and transpire through human agency overtime Yet for Hegel all that exists in space and time is subject to contingency andso realizes rational requirements under an innumerable variety of permutationsarising from the very nature of a spatio-temporal indefinitely complex causallyinterconnected world (EN sect250 and R 22ndash24) For example the Reformationultimately had to happen but it is a contingency that Luther posted his theses inWittenberg in October 15175

But not all that the PWH covers is historical In Africa indigenous Americaand the Orient time unfolds without history Consequently the advancementfrom Africa to the Orient and from China to India to Persia occurs purelyspatially in that each region in turn grasps freedom to successivemdashall highlyinadequatemdashdegrees Conversely historical development (in Europe) takes placein space as well as time not only in space (HG 156ndash57) Where advancementoccurs only spatially its motor is not human reason and agency but geographicalvariation Because we are natural spatially embodied as well as rational beings weare inescapably located in natural surroundings that divide into continentsAmerica Asia Africa and Europe The continentsrsquo features affect how theirinhabitants live and so what level of civilization and consciousness of freedomthey can reach by their own efforts America is weak and powerless yieldingimmature weak and lazy people (193) Africa is dominated by highlands andother non-cultivable areas so that African peoples form no awareness of their

Hegel and Colonialism

6

freedom something people first develop by working on nature (196) Asia isdominated by fertile plains so that its peoplesrsquo focus on agriculture inclines themtowards patriarchal family-based relationships and uncritical obedience toauthority (199ndash200) Only Europe is geographically diverse enough to fosterpeople living in diverse ways and so thinking for themselves (196)

Thus Europersquos physical environment explains why Greek civilization aroseand started the trajectory to modern liberalism Conversely for their part theOrientals advanced beyond the Africans not by thinking rationally about thelimitations of the latterrsquos grasp of freedommdashafter all allegedly they had nonemdashbut due to the Orientalsrsquo more auspicious environmental circumstancesUltimately here what guarantees the progression of stages up to the transitionto history proper is the rationality that for Hegel is embodied in the worldrsquosgeographic divisions6 Then the European natural environment made it possiblefor the Greeks to form a conception of freedom that in turn enabled historicalprogression in time and on the continuing basis of (intra-European) geographicalspace to begin7 (We might still ask though why the successive Oriental viewsthat lsquoone is freersquo were not sufficient to initiate historical progression proper I willreturn to this question later For now let us just note that for Hegel theywere not)

In sum Hegel is a Eurocentrist as defined above (p 3) As per (i) and (iii)he believes that European civilization develops purely internally towards thefuller comprehension and application of its principle of the freedom of all where(ii) this development has come to include that of all of the lsquoWestrsquo eg the USA8

(iv) He explains oppressive episodes in European history either from its not yethaving consistently worked out and applied its own principle of freedom (as withthe hierarchies of the medieval church) or as unavoidable requirements foradvancement (eg the religious wars of early modern Europe) (v) He denies thatany equivalent progression to freedom has occurred or can spontaneously occuroutside Europe Next I argue that it is Hegelrsquos Eurocentrism in particular hissharp divide between European freedom and non-European unfreedom whichgenerates a case for colonialism

II Hegelrsquos case for colonialism

In the PWH Hegel explicitly says relatively little about colonialism but what hedoes say is approving Finishing his account of the European middle ages hepraises the revival of learning the flourishing of fine art and the arrival of thelsquoherorsquo Columbus in the new world (S 411 Hei 204) Columbus he says wasmotivated by the lsquooutwardrsquo urging of spirit to know its own earth and convertnon-European natives to Christianity The reasons why Hegel regards this

Alison Stone

7

positively emerge in the passages on the lsquogeographical conditions of historyrsquo thataddress the lsquonew worldrsquo

It does not matter that Mexico and Peru did indeed havesignificant civilisations since they were of a feebler stock andare long gone The new world has shown itself to be muchfeebler than the old world hellip Some of the tribes of NorthAmerica have disappeared and some have retreated andgenerally declined hellip (HG 192ndash93)

In 183031 Hegel expanded on the new world adding that African Negroes hadto be brought to America to do the physical work of which the weak natives wereincapable (Hei 59) For lsquothe Negroes are far more receptive to European culturethan the Indianshellip [and] it will still be a long time before the Europeans succeedin producing any genuine feeling of self [Selbstgefuumlhl]rsquo in indigenous Americans(S 81) Hegel praises the Church in Latin America for beginning to instildiscipline in the natives through these and other colonial efforts the lsquoauthenticAmericans are hellip now beginning to educate themselves [sich hineinzubilden] inEuropean culturersquo (N 165) Incidentally Hegelrsquos points about indigenousAmericans apply equally to Aboriginal Australians since he includes lsquoNewHollandrsquomdashie Australiamdashin the new world

As for the old world Hegel begins with Africamdashthe lsquoauthenticrsquo sub-SaharanAfrica of the Negroes He contends that the Negroes know no morality andpractice slavery along with polygamy cannibalism and other customs thatembody total ignorance about freedom

Another characteristic fact in reference to the Negroes isSlavery Negroes are taken into slavery by Europeans and soldto America Despite this their lot is even worse in their owncountry where an equally absolute slavery is present for theoverall foundation of slavery is that man has no consciousnessof his freedom yet and so sinks down to a mere thing aworthless object hellip Slavery is in and for itself wrong [Unrecht]for the essence of humanity is freedom but for this man mustfirst become mature [reif] This is why the gradual abolition ofslavery is therefore more appropriate and more right[Richtigeres] than its sudden removal (S 96ndash99)

So European enslavement of Africans involves a degree of moral wrong insofaras Africans have intrinsic capacities for freedom Yet before enslavementAfricans did not know themselves to have that capacity accordingly theyenslaved and mistreated one another and acted merely on their natural desiresThe latter does not constitute freedom Hegel insists if I act from naturally given

Hegel and Colonialism

8

desires I am still not determining for myself how to act So slavery was relativelyan improvement because it lsquomaturedrsquo the Negroes to become aware of theirfreedom lsquoOne must educate the Negroes in their freedom by taming theirnaturalnessrsquo (Hei 70)

We can infer from Hegelrsquos comments that slavery educates in several ways(i) Those enslaved are subjected to European culture and ethical standards (fromeg N 165) (ii) Slavery imposes the discipline of work (eg Hei 59) In workingone learns to hold onersquos natural desires in check and thereby see oneself ascapable of deliberating about or even rejecting them (iii) Work also instils anawareness of onersquos capacity to mould natural objectsmdasha sense of lsquoachievingindependence through onersquos own activityrsquo (61) (iv) Ironically those enslaved thusacquire a sense of private property (61)mdashpartly by learning of Europeaninstitutions of property and partly by imposing form on objects thereby forminga sense of lsquopossessingrsquo them which fosters an appreciation of property9

In sum lsquoSlavery hellip is necessary at those stages where the state [and itspeople] has not yet arrived at rationality It is an element in the transition to ahigher stagersquo (HG 197) Because slavery still has elements of wrong though thefinal step must be for slavery to end However Hegel cautions slavery shouldnot be suddenly abolished because it must end after not before the Negroes havebeen educated through it lsquoIf slavery was altogether wrong then the Europeansshould give the slaves their freedom immediately but in that way the mostfrightening consequences arise as in the French coloniesrsquo (Hei 70)

Hegelrsquos line of thought then takes in slavery and colonization at once(understandably since enslavement of Africans was fundamental to colonialAmerica) Use of slavery in the colonies might be judged wrong because itviolates the rights equality and freedom of the slaves But through being enslavedslaves take steps forward in their consciousness of freedom which they could nototherwise make for Africa is intrinsically pre-historical and unfree so thatfreedom can come to Africans only from without Analogously one might thinkthat colonization was altogether wrong because it violated the rights equality andfreedom of indigenous peoplesmdashbut no for before colonization those peoplehad no awareness of their freedom They lsquoha[d] no sense of private property ofachieving independence through onersquos own activity or of securing onersquos propertythrough rightrsquo (61) By being forced to labour and being disciplined spiritually byagencies such as the Christian church these people will eventually learn abouttheir freedom Until then their subjection while partially wrong insofar as it issubjection is also partially right it is at least an improvement on the nativesremaining in their natural wholly unfree pre-colonial condition

Colonialism is justified on this view because it spreads freedom topeoples who otherwise both lack it and have no native means of acquiring itMoreover the colonizers are justified in extirpating the indigenous cultures of

Alison Stone

9

native peoplesmdashhence Hegelrsquos endorsement of the Christian clergy andmissionaries lsquosetting out to accustom the Indians to European culture andethics [Sitten]rsquo (N 164)mdashsince those indigenous cultures embody unfreedom Wemight wonder whether Hegel regards even the violence and slaughter thatoccurred during the colonization of America as justified He does acknowledgeEuropean especially Spanish violence towards indigenous Americans but he isonly overtly critical of this violence when the colonial project had he saysdegenerated into mere robbery (Hei 204) Moreover he disguises the extent ofEuropean violence by running together indigenous Americans having beenlsquodestroyed and slaughteredrsquo (untergegangen verdraumlngt) having disappeared(verschwunden) and having voluntarily withdrawn (haben sich zuruumlckgezogen N 163see also Parekh 2009) Hegel does not wholly denounce colonial violence becausehe thinks that Europersquos conquest of America was based on a sound goalmdashspreading freedom and the culture of freedom to all peoplemdashand that theviolence that was necessary for achieving that goal was justified But Hegel doesdisapprove of violence when it served merely an unworthy goalmdashrobbery

This is congruent with Hegelrsquos overall approach to violence in history whichhe memorably calls a lsquoslaughterbenchrsquo (Schlachtbank) On his view theconsciousness of freedom advances through each civilization in turn establishingits pre-eminence by prevailing culturally and militarily over its predecessor Tothe extent that war and violence are necessary for progress they are justified(although lsquojustifiedrsquo does not mean lsquoto be celebratedrsquo) Even in these termsthough much of the violence carried out by European colonizersmdashthedecimation of many native American tribes the Middle Passagemdashwent beyondthe minimum necessary to subject non-Europeans to colonial control along theway to their ultimate freedom But likewise in history generally violence hasregularly gone beyond the minimum necessary to propel progress Such excessesare inevitable an aspect of the inescapable contingency of human affairs Theseexcesses of violence are not justified yet we can be reconciled to them as aninevitable albeit non-ideal concomitant of progress (H 90ndash91) PresumablyHegel thinks the same about the excesses of colonial violence

Hegelrsquos overall line of thought is that colonialism is not only justified butalso necessary as part of Europersquos centuries-long process of realizing freedom Alogical step in this process is to extend freedom to non-European peoples afterall the European principle is that all are free This extension can only occurthough by passing through a stage of subjugating non-European peoples sincethey have no native means of acquiring freedom lsquoThe [Negroesrsquo] condition isincapable of any development or culture [Entwicklung und Bildung] and theircondition as we see it today is as it has always beenrsquo (N 190) And lsquothe Negroes cannot move [bewegen] to any culturersquo (Hei 67) Likewise with indigenousAmericans America is new and young because it had no history until the

Hegel and Colonialism

10

Europeans arrived These claims do not mean that Negroes and indigenousAmericans cannot be educated they can But given their native ignorance offreedom they cannot educate themselves but must be educated by Europeanswhich requires that they first be subjected to European control

Hegelrsquos case for colonization could be extended to the Orientals He admitsthat unlike Africans and indigenous Americans the Oriental peoples do have anidea of freedommdashthat lsquoone is freersquomdashbut this idea remains so inadequate as tocount as unfreedom Hence lacking belief in their own freedom Oriental peoplecannot pursue any extensions or advancements of freedom and without suchpursuits to drive historical change their societies remain ahistorical Colonizationof these peoples for educative purposes would therefore be justified As long as apeople is at a low enough level to count as unfree and pre-historical that peoplecan advance only through having the European spirit imposed on it for beingpre-historical it has no native way to attain freedom And indeed Hegel does sayof India that lsquoThe English or rather the East India Company are the lords[Herren] of the land for it is the necessary fate of Asiatic empires to be subjected[unterworfen] to Europeans and China will also some day have to submit to thisfatersquo (S 142ndash43)

We should not be misled by an apparently conflicting statement in thePhilosophy of Right lsquoThe liberation of colonies hellip [is] of the greatest advantage tothe mother state just as the emancipation of slaves is of the greatest advantage tothe masterrsquo (PR sect248A 269) Hegelrsquos paradigm here is American independenceie the independence of what he is explicit and adamant is colonial EuropeanAmerica not Native America (N 165ndash66) That is America merits independenceonce its native populace is reduced or placed securely under European tutelageThis coheres with Hegelrsquos approving reference to independent Haiti in thePhilosophy of Mind (EM sect393A 40) he says that this is a Christian state that theNegroes could only found after having undergone long spiritual servitude Oncea people has been colonized sufficiently to acquire European culture as in Haitithen and only then does that people merit freedom

Hegelrsquos argument for colonialism is of the lsquocivilizing missionrsquo familyEffectively his defence is that colonialism benefits most those who fare worstunder itmdashcolonized peoplesmdashby civilizing and bringing them freedom that theycannot access without passing through colonial subjection For Hegelcolonialism and the advancement of freedom go hand-in-hand

III Saving Hegel from himself

Hegelrsquos PWH implies that colonialism is required to further the realization ofuniversal freedom Does this show that Hegelrsquos conception of freedom is

Alison Stone

11

necessarily bound up with his pro-colonialism If so thenmdashtaking it thatcolonialism was in fact morally wrongmdashpresumably his conception of freedomand its historical development must be rejected (although not necessarily freedomas such of course)

But perhaps that would be to dismiss Hegelrsquos thought too summarily andthereby to do disservice not only to Hegel but also to anti-colonial anddecolonizing thought and activism which after all has regularly drawn on Hegelboth directlymdasheg when Frantz Fanon ([1952] 2008) and Ngugi wa Thiongrsquoo(2012) use Hegel to critique colonialismmdashand indirectly through Hegelrsquosinfluence on Marxism and critical theory Moreover Hegelrsquos thought may stilloffer further anti-colonial resources which remain to be mined We mighttherefore reasonably seek to separate Hegelrsquos basic conception of freedom and itshistoricity from his Eurocentric narrative of history so that when so separatedthat basic conception tells against colonialism Such a viewmdashone that rescuesHegel from himselfmdashis often adopted more or less explicitly by hisinterpreters10 I now want to set out my own version of this type of viewalthough I will go on to complicate it in Section IV

The view is this We can separate the essentials of Hegelrsquos account offreedom from his concrete interpretation of the actual movement of historyHegel was wrong and prejudiced when he dismissed Africans indigenousAmericans and Orientals as unfree and incapable of coming to freedom on theirown Nevertheless his basic account of what freedom is including its necessaryhistorical development remains insightful A better informed judgment ofnon-European peoples would require a very different historical narrative Butthat does not undermine Hegelrsquos basic points that freedom develops historicallyin tandem with the consciousness of it as embodied in different cultures andsocial institutions When we separate these basic points from his actualnarrative we find that these points serve a progressive purpose yielding groundsto reject colonialism

This view dovetails with Hegelrsquos claim that the human capacity for self-determination is universal not confined to Europeans (see eg H 88) Admittedlythough this starting-point is only an abstract universal Self-determination can beactualized only when one is conscious of onersquos capacity for it and thatrequires social and cultural institutions a whole way of life which foster thatconsciousness Such a way of life arose for the first time only in ancient Greecefor Hegel so that actualized freedom does not obtain universallyArguably though given his basic view of freedom and its historicity Hegelcould and should have interpreted all the worldrsquos regions as taking part in thegradual historical unfolding of social institutions that support freedom Hegeldoes not do so because he denies that non-European peoples are conscious offreedom at all Since non-European societies were not conscious of freedom

Hegel and Colonialism

12

even in the restricted ways that the Greeks and Romans were the former had nobasis for moving forward historically by further advancing an already partlyrealized freedom

Thus what underpins Hegelrsquos denial of historicity to non-European peoplesis his sharp division of European freedom from non-European unfreedom Thatin turn is underpinned by his claim that the ancient Greeks made the decisivebreak from unfreedom into freedom The Greeks Hegel says became thedistinctive people they were out of a mixing within them of heterogeneousOriental peoples and their cultures but the Greeks surmounted or overcame(uumlberwinden) this background (HG 214) By doing so the Greeks created theirlsquofree beautifulrsquo spirit (374) The Greeks overcame their Oriental preconditions tolsquomake themselvesrsquo (372 see also 393ndash94)

However this view that the Greeks lsquoovercamersquo the Oriental world ofunfreedom seems overstated by Hegelrsquos own lights For Hegel himself theGreeks mark only the latest phase in a growing consciousness of freedomrunning from China through India to Persia and culminating in EgyptPersiarsquos most advanced province Egypt is the hinge between Orient andOccident in which the human soulrsquos intrinsic capacity for freedom was almostgrasped But it was not quite grasped for the soul was still not distinguishedfrom animal nature a distinction the Greeks went on to make (HG 334 368)That lack of distinction is shown by the way the Egyptians modelled their godsand goddesses on animal species often with animal heads Yet for Hegel theGreeks too stopped short of recognizing that all people have an inherent capacityfor freedom They admitted freedom only to male native-born slave-ownersIn that way their view of freedom remained intermingled with acceptance ofnatural contingency ie accidents of birth sex and geographical location (H 88)So the difference between the Egyptian viewmdashhuman freedom is incompletelydistinguished from (animal) naturemdashand the Greek viewmdashhuman freedom isagain incompletely distinguished from naturemdashappears to be a difference ofdegree not kind11

Hegelrsquos lsquoovercomingrsquo idea therefore sits uncomfortably with his graduatedportrayal of historyrsquos stages That portrayal could be taken to show that belief infreedom is not exclusively European since the Persians and Egyptians already hadversions of that belief To be sure they were inadequate versions (for Hegel)mdashbutthen so was the Greeksrsquo And by extension the Indians and Chinese likewise hadversions of the belief in freedommdasheven more inadequate ones since theyattributed freedom only to lsquoonersquo not lsquosomersquomdashbut where that inadequacy stilldifferentiates these peoples from the Greeks only by degree and not kind (more soin the Indian case since the lsquoonersquo is a whole caste) If the Oriental peoples did haveversions however unsatisfactory of the belief in freedom then Hegel should nothave denied that these peoples are historical For if it is believed that someone is

Alison Stone

13

free be it only lsquoonersquo ruler or caste then others may claim and demand that samefreedom for themselves powering historical change

Now Hegel regards the Africans and indigenous Americans as lackingfreedom more radically than the Orientals yet contrary evidence was available tohim He might for instance have noted the Iroquois Confederacy of five (latersix) Native American tribes founded c1600 and dissolved c1800 a system ofintra- and inter-tribal governance which lsquomaximized individual freedom whileseeking to minimize excess governmental interference in peoplersquos livesrsquo (Johansen1982 9) influencing the American Constitution And Hegel embellishedexaggerated and at times outright distorted his sources on Africa so as to portraya people without any respect for human life freedom or rightsmdashmore so thanthe sources suggested and they were already unreliable (see Bernasconi 1998)12

The way was open to Hegel to recognize Africans and indigenous Americans ashaving views of freedom even if he classed them as even less adequate thanOriental ones With that those peoples would like the Orientals have had anentry to history

Nonetheless Hegel preserves his division of European freedom from non-European unfreedom by counting all the European stages as stages of freedomdown to its lowest level and all the non-European stages as stages of unfreedomright up to where unfreedom is almost freedom but not quite But the placementof this dividing line appears arbitrary Consider for example Hegelrsquos view thatHindus are not conscious of their own freedom because they fail to distinguishthemselves as human agents from nature (HG 256 273ndash81) On Hegelrsquosaccount as wersquove just seen there are ways that the ancient Greeks did not fullyextricate human agency from nature either somdashon his own termsmdashit is not clearthat the difference here is one of kind (history versus non-history freedom versusunfreedom) rather than degree (more or less freedom more or less far along thehistorical path towards full freedom)

Hegel could and it seems should have interpreted much of hismaterial as evidencing how non-European peoples have grasped and practisedfreedom albeit imperfectly We might still find this revised Hegeliannarrative objectionable assuming that it ranks non-European conceptions offreedom as less advanced than European ones Yet once it is admittedthat non-European peoples are historical in principle Hegel would alsohave to trace how historical advances unfolded in those societies so re-interpreting his material once again Each continent would have its own history ofprogression in consciousness of freedom rather than non-Europeancontinents merely paving the way for Europe The several continents wouldhave histories of freedom that run in parallel rather than corresponding tomore or less advanced phases of a single historical line that culminates in modernEurope

Hegel and Colonialism

14

Neither of these revised Hegelian narrativesmdashthe single line or parallel linesversionsmdashsupports colonialism not even the single line model on whichnon-European peoplesrsquo native levels of freedom are although real yetdeficient compared to European ones By recognizing freedom howeverunsatisfactorily non-European cultures would still have the internal potential andmotor to advance to greater freedom In that case colonization would not benecessary for non-European peoplesrsquo achieving freedom and would not bejustified as a necessary step in the realization of universal freedom Anotherplank in Hegelrsquos justification of colonization is that colonized peoples enjoyed nofreedom pre-colonizationmdashso that despite its abrogation of their freedomcolonization did not worsen their position (and ultimately would improve it) Butif these peoples did have a grasp of freedom however imperfect thencolonization stood to worsen their position That risk is especially pronouncedgiven Hegelrsquos own perspective that some violence is necessary for colonizationand given the role of contingency in human affairs that that violence may wellmushroom beyond the necessary minimum Further for Hegel colonizationrequires the extirpation of native cultures but if these are not cultures ofunfreedom then that extirpation is not justified Apparently then Hegel shouldby his own lights have opposed colonialism for his own philosophy generates acase against it

IV The Greeks history and self-liberation from nature

The view just canvassed is that despite the Eurocentrism and pro-colonialism ofHegelrsquos substantial narrative in the PWH his distinctive account of freedom asdeveloping historically through successive civilizations does not in itselfnecessitate his substantive Eurocentrism and when extricated from the latteryields a case against colonialism However we can distinguish weaker andstronger versions of this view More weakly Hegelrsquos basic account of freedomcan be separated from his actual pro-colonialism and so does not necessarilyimply pro-colonialism but contains anti-colonial possibilities as well as thepro-colonial possibilities that Hegel developed from it More strongly Hegelrsquosbasic account of freedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism andwhen so separated this account implies anti-colonialism and has an inherentlyanti-colonial direction I endorse the weaker but not the stronger claim and theweaker one only subject to a significant qualification Hegelrsquos basic account offreedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism but not as easily asSection III suggested This is because Hegelrsquos conception of freedom asself-determination has significant connections with his Eurocentrism

Alison Stone

15

In Section III I suggested that Hegelrsquos divisions Greeksnon-Greeks freeunfree look arbitrary But actually they are not For Hegel

Its [Greecersquos] principle is that self-conscious freedom stepsforth hellip [Regarding t]he unity of spirit with nature hellip thespecificity of this unity [in the Greek case] is to be graspedOne unity is the Oriental hellip consciousness immersed innature a [new kind of] harmony is now to be broughtforth [by the Greeks] in which hellip spirit dominates Spirit nowdetermines nature and this is a spiritual unity hellip (Hei 117 myemphases)

[The] fundamental characteristic [of the Greek spirit is] that thefreedom of spirit is conditioned by and in essential relation tosome natural stimulus Greek freedom is stimulated bysomething other and is free because it changes and produces thestimulus from out of itself (aus sich) (S 238 my emphasis)

Thus the Greeks were free in that they were at home with themselves in theother ie nature But this does not mean that the content of their practices andway of life was determined by natural givens such as the Greeksrsquo given impulsesRather they reshaped these givens and so became at-home-with-themselves inthem In the Greek case then spirit lsquodeterminedrsquo nature whereas previouslyspirit had been immersed or absorbed (versenkt) in nature This Greekdetermination of nature by spiritmdashspiritrsquos investment of nature with meaningof its ownmdashwas made possible by a prior moment first carried out by theGreeks through which lsquospirit is no longer immersed [versenkt] in nature hellip [but]releas[es] itself from nature [sich losmachend von der Natur]rsquo (HG 395ndash96) Thismoment in which the human spirit first releases or sets itself free from naturecorresponds to the overcoming (uumlberwinden) by the Greeks of their mixed ethnicheritage a moment of overcoming through which they became able to remakethat heritage for themselves to make themselves Hegel is explicit that none ofthe worldrsquos other peoples to that point had achieved this

Even so for Hegel the Greeks exercised freedom always with respect tonature and existing givens in the worldmdashre-shaping what they found alreadythere rather than creating a totally new world out of themselves Hence theGreeks did not regard free individuals as being capable of adjudicatingindependently on the given natural and social world through their own reason orof generating norms and principles purely through the exercise of their spiritualfreedom Or as Hegel also puts it elsewhere individual subjectivity was notdifferentiated from social substance but the individual identified fully andunquestioningly with his or her social role and there was no ground for

Hegel and Colonialism

16

independent social criticism (see Hardimon 1993) Connected with all this theGreeks restricted freedom to some people only effectively stipulating that onlythose with certain kinds of naturemdashmale free-bornmdashor natural locationmdashnativeGreekmdashhad the power of self-determination In these ways spiritrsquos freedomremained lsquoconditionedrsquo or limited (bedingt) bymdashalthough not immersed inmdashnature (and see HG 390)

However these limitations contradicted the essence of self-determination asthe Greeks understood it as including a moment of overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature such that the power to overcome nature cannotpossibly be limited by nature (or it would not be a power to overcome nature atall) Thus lsquoin the principle of Greek freedom inasmuch as it is freedom it isimplied that thought must be free for itself rsquo (HG 268)mdashalthough the Greeks fora long time did not explicitly grasp or follow through on that implicationNonetheless in the end that contradiction was what made it possible for theGreeksrsquo exclusion of some people from freedom and their other ways ofrestricting freedomrsquos scope to come in for criticism The criticism came withSocrates and the Sophists claiming that thought can adjudicate rationally on whatis and generate norms by itself (417) In that freedom of thought was therebygrasped as fully independent of nature it was also grasped as universal at least inprinciple In these two ways lsquoThought hellip introduces an opposition [Gegensatz][to the Greek mixture of freedom and nature] and asserts the validity ofessentially rational principlesrsquo (S 267)

For Hegel then Greek culture enabled rational criticism of what isincluding of limited freedom as no pre-Greek cultures did just because theGreeks had established a root opposition between freedom and nature whereaslsquoin the Oriental states in which a lack of opposition is present no moral freedomcan come aboutrsquo (267) Although the advent of rational critique brought on thedemise of Greek culture Europe was thereby also set on the path oftransformative historical change We see then why in his own terms Hegel saysthat non-European peoples could not advance critical claims for freedomrsquosextension but uncritically accepted the authority of their rulersmdashpatriarchalauthority in China caste hierarchy and caste-based restrictions and rituals inIndia and state power in Persia Non-Europeans could not question suchauthorities because their cultures did not grasp freedom as including the momentof overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature and the given Becausefreedom was not grasped as including that moment of human separation fromnature and the given no contradiction was perceived in freedom being limited bynature eg confined to people of certain castes or by given states of affairs egcustomary authority and ritual Non-Europeans lacked a critical motor to drivesocial change hence lacked history propermdashor indeed freedom as properlydistinguished from unfreedom

Alison Stone

17

So for Hegel there is a genuine difference in kind not merely degreebetween the Greek and post-Greek European world on the one hand and thenon-European world on the other the Europenon-Europe divide is notarbitrary but has a philosophical rationale For while the Greek view of freedomwas like non-European views limited and inadequate the former was moreadvanced in one key respectmdashthe inclusion in freedom of a primary moment oflsquoovercomingrsquo naturemdashwhich enabled the Greek and post-Greek European worldto become self-critical self-revising and so historical This is what motivatesHegel to identify Greek and post-Greek European views as views of freedomhowever limited whereas non-European views that might prima facie look likeviews of freedom are still actually modes of unfreedom

Once again we might object that non-Europeans have at times construedfreedom as including this moment of overcoming nature Even on Hegelrsquosaccount Hindus appreciate the human power to abstract from the world inthought He maintains though that this is merely an intellectual withdrawaland that when it comes to practical agency Hindus see human agency as immersedin not including any moment of self-freeing-from nature (see eg S 157ndash58)In response we could with Jaspal Peter Sahota (2016) agree that in classicalIndian thought there has been a tendency to locate human agency within naturebut argue against Hegel that this does not constitute a real absence offreedom but rather a different conception of freedom We might then say thatbecause thesemdashand othermdashnon-European views were still views of freedom thoseviews were still sufficient to motivate social criticism and hence place non-European peoples in history even without the element of overcoming natureHowever such a position would take us further away from Hegelrsquos own accountof the historicity of freedom according which as we have seen that moment ofovercoming nature uniquely new in ancient Greece is crucial in poweringhistorical progression

Hegelrsquos basic account of freedom and its historicity thus has more extensiveand significant connections with his Eurocentrism than I suggested inSection III In particular that account connects with Hegelrsquos denial that non-European peoples are historicalmdashie can come to freedom on their ownmdashandhence with his case for colonialism as the only route along which those peoplescan reach freedom These connections suggest that after all we cannotstraightforwardly take up Hegelrsquos account of freedom and its historicity whilesloughing off his pro-colonialism This is not to say that we cannot separate outthese parts of his thought at all But rescuing Hegel from himself is set to be acomplicated process not quick or straightforward To the extent that such arescue is possible Hegelrsquos pro-colonialism cannot rightly be counted as necessaryto his thought or system Yet his pro-colonialism does have extensive anddeep-seated connections with his other viewsmdashenough to show that it is not the

Hegel and Colonialism

18

case that Hegel should not have endorsed colonialism by his own standardsRather he did and could endorse it coherently in his own terms although otheranti-colonialist possibilities were also available within his own terms which hecould have developed

So the claim that Hegelrsquos account of freedom is inherently anti-colonial isunduly strong Through his understanding of freedom as involving spiritextricating itself from nature that account has sustained links with hisEurocentrism and so his pro-colonialism We can nonetheless envisage variousmanoeuvres by which to maintain that freedom develops historically for all theworldrsquos peoples for example by saying that they have several conceptions offreedom where freedom can but does not have to include self-liberation fromnature Then ancient Greece would initiate one historical pathway to freedombut not the only one Even so Hegelrsquos own account of freedom and its historicitydoes not inherently drive us to make these intellectual manoeuvres but onlypermits them In sum if Hegelrsquos view of freedom does not necessarily implypro-colonialism neither is it inherently anti-colonial We can make distinctionsand qualifications within his thought so as to yield anti-colonial conclusions butthis is only one of several possible lines of development of which his thoughtadmits another being its elaboration into the Eurocentric and pro-colonialsystem that Hegel in fact forged

There is a broader moral Wemdashie the heirs of the European heritage thatruns through philosophy into modern political thoughtmdashshould not let thisheritage off the hook too easily This heritage including Hegelrsquos thought hasbeen implicated in colonialism in various ways To be sure because it extols andarticulates the values of freedom and equality this heritage also furnishesconceptual resources for critiquing colonialism and giving support to anti-colonial struggles and anti-colonial thinkers and activists have drawn on modernEuropean ideas for this purpose For example the Haitian revolutionariesdeclared that they were acting in allegiance to the emancipatory goals of theFrench Revolution This might lead us to suppose that the European politicallegacy is intrinsically liberatory and that theorists in the European traditionmdashHegel includedmdashhave only ever justified colonialism due to unfortunateprejudices that led them to go back on their own principles

I believe that taking that view exculpates our predecessors too quicklyand leaves us at risk of inadvertently embracing ideas inherited from thesepredecessors which actually have deep-rooted internal connections withEurocentric and pro-colonial attitudes This is not to say that we should orcould repudiate these ideas outright Rather in view of their connections withcolonialism we need to think carefully and critically about how far to take theseinherited ideas forward and how we might do so differently My aim has been tohelp us cultivate this caution in Hegelrsquos case by acknowledging that while his

Alison Stone

19

thought harbours anti-colonial possibilities it also has real and tenacious linkswith colonialism of which we should remind mindful13

Alison StoneLancaster University UKastonelancasteracuk

Notes

1 Contributions include those by Bernasconi 1998 2007 2016 Bonetto 2006 de Laurentiis2014 McCarney and Bernasconi 2003 Mowad 2013 Parekh 2009 Purtschert 2010 andTibebu 20102 However see Buck-Morss 2000 andmdashfor highly critical accountsmdashDussel [1992] 1995 and1993 Guha 2002 Tibebu 2010 Also relevant are Bird-Pollan 2014 (on Hegel and Fanon)Brennan 2013 (on Hegelrsquos influence on post-colonialism) Buchwalter 2009 (defending Hegelagainst charges of Eurocentrism) Monahan 2017 (Creolizing Hegel) and Serequeberhan 1989(on colonialism in the Philosophy of Right)3 Ranajit Guha identifies another argument for colonialism in the Philosophy of Rightfrom the lsquorightsrsquo that Hegel claims civilized nations have with respect to less advanced ones(PR sect351 376) These rights Guha argues are lsquorights of conquestrsquo noting Hegelrsquos praise for Britishmilitary victories over India led by Robert Clive (1725ndash74) whose conquests established theEast India Companyrsquos rule over Bengal and other Indian states See Guha 2002 43ndash44PR sect372A 364 and 474 note 1)Abbreviations usedEN=Hegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller Oxford Clarendon PressEM= Hegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind Trans W Wallace and A V Miller Oxford OxfordUniversity Press Cited by paragraph and page numberN=Hegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reason in Historytrans H B Nisbet Cambridge UK Cambridge University PressS=Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NY Prometheus BooksPR=Hegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B Nisbet Cambridge UKCambridge University PressHei=Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink4 Hegel lectured on the PWH in 182223 182425 182627 182829 and 183031 Hismanuscripts of the Introduction from 1822 (rev 1828) and 183031 survive as do manytranscripts between them covering every course Some such as de Laurentiis (2014) are waryof directly attributing to Hegel views notably on race expressed only in the transcripts I agreethat we should disambiguate sources but where multiple independently written transcripts

Hegel and Colonialism

20

converge as domdashextensivelymdashseveral transcripts of the PWH we may take them to bereliable Accordingly I refer to Hegelrsquos manuscripts (abbreviated H) as in Hegel 2011 which isthe English translation of the corresponding volume of the Gesammelte Werke (Hegel 1995) andthe integrated text of the 182223 course composed primarily from Hothorsquos and Griesheimrsquostranscripts (abb HG) included in Hegel 2011 (the German is Hegel 1996) Since the Germancritical edition of the transcripts remains incomplete for materials on Hegelrsquos later coursesI have used Heimannrsquos transcript of 183031 whenever possible (Hegel 2005 abb Hei)otherwise the composite texts produced by Karl Hegel (Hegel 1986) and translated by Sibree(Hegel 1991 abb S) and by Georg LassonJohannes Hoffmeister (Hegel 1988) translated byNisbet (Hegel 1975 abb N) I quote English translations whenever available sometimesadjusted in view of the German5 For more on contingency in Hegel see inter alia Burbidge 2007 esp ch 1 Burbidge stressesthe extent to which Hegel lsquotakes the contingencies of history seriouslyrsquo (2007 9)6 For Hegel lsquonaturehellip is indeed a rational system operating in its own distinct elementrsquo (N 44)The division into continents is rational in that different natural features and their varietiesmdashmountains and plains lands and seas and their fusion and differentiationmdasheach find fullembodiment in different continents (EM sect393 and R 40ndash41) In a sense then non-Europeansare subject to reason and rational progression insofar as nature imposes it on them fromthe outside rather than by exercising rational thought for themselves This coheres withHegelrsquos view that these peoples are immersed in nature out of which only Europeans can liftthem see below7 This recalls Hegelrsquos derivation of time from space in the Philosophy of Nature a derivation thatpositions time as more advanced than space (EN sectsect256ndash57 31ndash36)8 This is evident from eg Hegelrsquos discussion of the colonization of America see Section II9 Hegel connects formation with possession (PR sect56 85ndash86) albeit in the very differentcontext of modern European societies in which private property is institutionalized I leaveunexplored here how far his ideas about slaveryrsquos educative power may be informed by hislordbondsman dialectic10 For instance some interpreters defend Hegel against charges of Eurocentrism and racism(eg Buchwalter 2009 Houlgate [1991] 2015 35ndash37 McCarney in McCarney and Bernasconi2003 Mowad 2013) others stress Hegelrsquos founding importance for anti-colonial thought(Brennan 2013) and numerous readers of Hegel as a thinker of freedom (eg Patten 1999)see no need to discuss his position on colonialism presumably on the grounds that the latteris a merely accidental avoidable part of his thought from which his essential views on freedomcan be extracted11 For Hegel the Greeks were greatly influenced by the Egyptians whose influence theynonetheless overcame Here he is close to accepting what Martin Bernal calls the lsquoancientmodelrsquo of the Greeksrsquo origins a model to which the Greeks themselves adhered later-nineteenth-century Europeans instead espoused an lsquoAryan modelrsquo on which Greek cultureproper arose from northern invaders driving out earlier Egyptian and Phoenician influences([1987] 1991) Bernal argues that the Aryan model had Eurocentric motivations if the Greeks

Alison Stone

21

the supposed originators of Europersquos distinctive culture were actually the Egyptiansrsquo heirsthen given that Egypt is within Africa the EuropeAfrica divide would crumble A furthercomplicating factor is whether the Egyptians were seen as black Africans Bernasconi (2007)argues that Hegel thought so as did most other Europeans of his time Later the Egyptiansrsquoracial status was changedmdashto Mediterranean (ie Caucasian)mdashto hold up the divide betweenEurope-as-white and Africa-as-black Bernasconi suggests that Hegel himself dealt with thepotential anomalymdashof highly cultured black Africans giving much to the Greeksmdashby makingthe EgyptGreece transition the site of the key conceptual transition from unfreedom tofreedom nature to spirit (2007 212ndash13) This ties in with my argument in Section IV thatHegel actually did have grounds on his own terms to construe the apparently gradual EgyptGreece transition as actually being a sharp divide12 Bernasconi (2016) has recently shown how Hegel likewise distorted his sources on China tothe detriment of the Chinese13 I thank Bob Stern and the referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions

Bibliography

Bernal M [1987] (1991) Black Athena The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical CivilisationVol 1 London VintageBernasconi R (1998) lsquoHegel at the Court of the Ashantirsquo in S Barnett (ed)Hegel After Derrida Albany NY SUNYBernasconi R (2007) lsquoThe Return of Africa Hegel and the Question of theRacial Identity of the Egyptiansrsquo in P T Grier (ed) Identity and Difference AlbanyNY SUNYBernasconi R (2016) lsquoChina on Parade Hegelrsquos Manipulation of his Sources andhis Change of Mindrsquo in B Brandt and D L Purdy (eds) China in the GermanEnlightenment Toronto University of Toronto PressBird-Pollan S (2014) Hegel Freud and Fanon The Dialectic of Emancipation LondonRowman and Littlefield InternationalBonetto S (2006) lsquoRace and Racism in HegelmdashAn AnalysisrsquoMinerva An InternetJournal of Philosophy 10Brennan T (2013) lsquoHegel Empire and Anti-Colonial Thoughtrsquo in G Huggan(ed) The Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies Oxford Oxford University PressBuchwalter A (2009) lsquoIs Hegelrsquos Philosophy of History Eurocentricrsquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYBuck-Morss S (2000) lsquoHegel and Haitirsquo Critical Inquiry 264 821ndash65Burbidge J (2007) Hegelrsquos Systematic Contingency Basingstoke Palgrave MacmillanDe Laurentiis A (2014) lsquoRace in Hegel Text and Contextrsquo in M Egger (ed)Philosophie Nach Kant Neue Wege zum Verstaumlndnis von Kants Transzendental- undMoralphilosophie Berlin De Gruyter

Hegel and Colonialism

22

Dussel E [1992] (1995) The Invention of the Americas trans M D Barber NewYork ContinuumDussel E (1993) lsquoEurocentrism and Modernityrsquo Boundary 2 203 65ndash76Fanon F [1952] (2008) Black Skin White Masks trans R Philcox New YorkGroveGuha R (2002) History at the Limit of World-History New York ColumbiaUniversity PressHardimon M (1993) Hegelrsquos Social Philosophy Cambridge Cambridge UniversityPressHegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller OxfordClarendonHegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind trans W Wallace and A V MillerOxford Oxford University PressHegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reasonin History trans H B Nisbet Cambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1986) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Geschichte Werke Vol 12ed E Moldenhauer and K M Michel Frankfurt Suhrkamp [Englishtranslation Sibree]Hegel G W F (1988) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Vols 1-3 edG Lasson Vols 1-4 Hamburg Meiner [English translation of volume 1 Nisbet]Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NYPrometheus BooksHegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B NisbetCambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1995) lsquoVorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der WeltgeschichteEinleitungrsquo in W Jaeschke (ed) Vorlesungsmanuskripte II (1916ndash1831)Gesammelte Werke Vol 18 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown andHodgson]Hegel G W F (1996) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Berlin 182223 Nachschriften von Griesheim Hotho und Kehler ed Karl Brehmer K-H Iltingund Hoo Nam Seelmann Hegel Vorlesungen Ausgew Nachschriften und ManuskripteVol 12 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown and Hodgson]Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink Abb HeiHegel G W F (2011) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Volume 1Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822ndash3 ed and trans R F Brownand P C Hodgson with assistance of W G Geuss Oxford Clarendon PressHoulgate S [1991] 2015 An Introduction to Hegel Freedom Truth and HistoryOxford BlackwellJohansen B E (1982) Forgotten Founders How the American Indians Helped ShapeDemocracy Boston Harvard Common Press

Alison Stone

23

McCarney J and Bernasconi R (2003) lsquoExchange Hegelrsquos Racismrsquo RadicalPhilosophy 119(MayJune) 32ndash37Monahan M (ed) (2017) Creolizing Hegel London Rowman and LittlefieldInternationalMowad N (2013) lsquoThe Place of Nationality in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of Politicsand Religion A Defense of Hegel on the Charges of National Chauvinism andRacismrsquo in A Nuzzo (ed) Hegel on Religion and Politics Albany NY SUNYParekh S (2009) lsquoHegelrsquos New World History Freedom and Racersquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYPatten A (1999) Hegelrsquos Idea of Freedom Oxford Oxford University PressPurtschert P (2010) lsquoOn the Limit of Spirit Hegelrsquos Racism Revisitedrsquo Philosophyand Social Criticism 369 1039ndash51Quijano A (2000) lsquoColoniality of Power Eurocentrism and Latin AmericarsquoNepantla Views from South 13 533ndash80Sahota J P (2016) lsquoHegelrsquos Critique of Hinduism A Responsersquo Hegel Bulletin372 305ndash17Serequeberhan T (1989) lsquoThe Idea of Colonialism in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of RightrsquoInternational Philosophical Quarterly 293 301ndash18Shohat E and Stam R [1994] (2014) Unthinking Eurocentrism New YorkRoutledgeTibebu T (2010) Hegel and the Third World The Making of Eurocentrism in WorldHistory Syracuse NY Syracuse University PressWa Thiongrsquoo N (2012) Globalectics Theory and the Politics of Knowing New YorkColumbia University Press

Hegel and Colonialism

24

  • Hegel and Colonialism
Page 5: Hegel and Colonialism - Lancaster University · 2017-06-30 · Hegel and Colonialism Alison Stone Abstract This article explores the implications of Hegel’s Philosophy of World

Freedomrsquos development continued with the Reformation at last restoringthe principle of the spiritual freedom of all against previously dominant Churchhierarchies The next step the Enlightenment was to grasp that freedom appliesin secular life too in freedoms to own private property choose a profession andspouse participate in public affairs etc Against the excessively abstractrealization of freedom in the French Revolution the most advanced Europeanstates treat determinate social institutionsmdashnuclear family market economyconstitutional monarchymdashas needed to secure these individual freedoms andreconcile them with social membership Overall then European history has beena centuries-long process of working out and putting into practice one definingprinciplemdashthe freedom of all (H 88)

Europe then comes to bear the Christian principle of freedom because ittakes it over from the Roman Empire where in turn Christianity had taken holdbecause the Romans were already conscious that lsquosome are freersquo building on thesame consciousness by the ancient Greeks So that lastmdashthe ancient Greekconsciousness that lsquosome are freersquomdashwas ultimately decisive lsquoThe consciousnessof freedom first awoke among the Greeks and with that they were freersquo (87 myemphases) they made the key transition from unfreedom to freedom Ultimatelythis is why the development from lsquosome are freersquo to lsquoall are freersquo has onlyspontaneously occurred on European soil

The transition that the Greeks made was equally from pre-history to historyHegel says of China and India that we lsquocannot speak here of a proper history assuchrsquo (HG 214) The Oriental civilizations are in world history only ambiguouslyThey are unhistorical insofar as they are not conscious of freedommdashor rather areconscious of it only very inadequately as belonging to one emperor (China)ruling caste (India) or empire (Persia) Consequently individuals in these culturesare not motivated to pursue or advance their own freedom for they do not knowthat they are capable of self-determination in the first place (again the lsquoOrientalsdo not know that hellip the human being as such is intrinsically free because theydo not know this they are not themselves freersquo H 87) Oriental culture containsno inner motor for progressive development to take place by way of individualsbroadening and deepening the scope of an extant yet still incomplete level offreedom Lacking that motor the Orient has no history properly speaking Evenso Hegel includes the Oriental civilizations in world history because they do havea minimal level of consciousness of freedom ie as belonging only to theemperor highest caste etc In contrast for Hegel Africans and indigenousAmericans lack any awareness of freedom their worlds are fully non-ambiguouslypre-historical whereas Oriental pre-history is on the threshold of world historyand to that extent lies partly within it

Hegelrsquos denial of full history to the Orientals sheds light on the kind ofreason he takes to be immanent in historical events which in turn illuminates

Alison Stone

5

his Eurocentrism Whereas the Orientals lack a motor for historical developmentand hence are pre-historical that motor does arise when a given level ofconsciousness of freedom being attained and embodied in social life that level ofconsciousness harbours some inner lsquocontradictionrsquo or tension which propelspeople qua rational beings to bring about change and improvement Theseconditions are first met by the ancient Greeks Another instance mentionedearlier is that the Romans conferred freedom on slave-owners while denying it toslaves giving slaves rational grounds to claim freedom as well In Section IV wewill encounter other instances of this type of historical development through therational response to contradictions

That reason is immanent in historical changes might suggest that in historylogical and temporal development coincide (whereas in say Hegelrsquos Logic thedialectical development of categories is not temporal) This is so to an extentThe pre-historical civilizations of Africa indigenous America and the Orienthave no consciousness of freedom sufficient to harbour self-contradictorylimitations that call for change hence these civilizations actually show nosignificant social change over time for Hegel They are and have ever been thesame embodying time but not history that is no instantiation over time ofthe dialectical-and-rational development of freedom Conversely in Europe thelimitations placed on a freedom that is nevertheless known power developmentsthat are at once rationally warranted and transpire through human agency overtime Yet for Hegel all that exists in space and time is subject to contingency andso realizes rational requirements under an innumerable variety of permutationsarising from the very nature of a spatio-temporal indefinitely complex causallyinterconnected world (EN sect250 and R 22ndash24) For example the Reformationultimately had to happen but it is a contingency that Luther posted his theses inWittenberg in October 15175

But not all that the PWH covers is historical In Africa indigenous Americaand the Orient time unfolds without history Consequently the advancementfrom Africa to the Orient and from China to India to Persia occurs purelyspatially in that each region in turn grasps freedom to successivemdashall highlyinadequatemdashdegrees Conversely historical development (in Europe) takes placein space as well as time not only in space (HG 156ndash57) Where advancementoccurs only spatially its motor is not human reason and agency but geographicalvariation Because we are natural spatially embodied as well as rational beings weare inescapably located in natural surroundings that divide into continentsAmerica Asia Africa and Europe The continentsrsquo features affect how theirinhabitants live and so what level of civilization and consciousness of freedomthey can reach by their own efforts America is weak and powerless yieldingimmature weak and lazy people (193) Africa is dominated by highlands andother non-cultivable areas so that African peoples form no awareness of their

Hegel and Colonialism

6

freedom something people first develop by working on nature (196) Asia isdominated by fertile plains so that its peoplesrsquo focus on agriculture inclines themtowards patriarchal family-based relationships and uncritical obedience toauthority (199ndash200) Only Europe is geographically diverse enough to fosterpeople living in diverse ways and so thinking for themselves (196)

Thus Europersquos physical environment explains why Greek civilization aroseand started the trajectory to modern liberalism Conversely for their part theOrientals advanced beyond the Africans not by thinking rationally about thelimitations of the latterrsquos grasp of freedommdashafter all allegedly they had nonemdashbut due to the Orientalsrsquo more auspicious environmental circumstancesUltimately here what guarantees the progression of stages up to the transitionto history proper is the rationality that for Hegel is embodied in the worldrsquosgeographic divisions6 Then the European natural environment made it possiblefor the Greeks to form a conception of freedom that in turn enabled historicalprogression in time and on the continuing basis of (intra-European) geographicalspace to begin7 (We might still ask though why the successive Oriental viewsthat lsquoone is freersquo were not sufficient to initiate historical progression proper I willreturn to this question later For now let us just note that for Hegel theywere not)

In sum Hegel is a Eurocentrist as defined above (p 3) As per (i) and (iii)he believes that European civilization develops purely internally towards thefuller comprehension and application of its principle of the freedom of all where(ii) this development has come to include that of all of the lsquoWestrsquo eg the USA8

(iv) He explains oppressive episodes in European history either from its not yethaving consistently worked out and applied its own principle of freedom (as withthe hierarchies of the medieval church) or as unavoidable requirements foradvancement (eg the religious wars of early modern Europe) (v) He denies thatany equivalent progression to freedom has occurred or can spontaneously occuroutside Europe Next I argue that it is Hegelrsquos Eurocentrism in particular hissharp divide between European freedom and non-European unfreedom whichgenerates a case for colonialism

II Hegelrsquos case for colonialism

In the PWH Hegel explicitly says relatively little about colonialism but what hedoes say is approving Finishing his account of the European middle ages hepraises the revival of learning the flourishing of fine art and the arrival of thelsquoherorsquo Columbus in the new world (S 411 Hei 204) Columbus he says wasmotivated by the lsquooutwardrsquo urging of spirit to know its own earth and convertnon-European natives to Christianity The reasons why Hegel regards this

Alison Stone

7

positively emerge in the passages on the lsquogeographical conditions of historyrsquo thataddress the lsquonew worldrsquo

It does not matter that Mexico and Peru did indeed havesignificant civilisations since they were of a feebler stock andare long gone The new world has shown itself to be muchfeebler than the old world hellip Some of the tribes of NorthAmerica have disappeared and some have retreated andgenerally declined hellip (HG 192ndash93)

In 183031 Hegel expanded on the new world adding that African Negroes hadto be brought to America to do the physical work of which the weak natives wereincapable (Hei 59) For lsquothe Negroes are far more receptive to European culturethan the Indianshellip [and] it will still be a long time before the Europeans succeedin producing any genuine feeling of self [Selbstgefuumlhl]rsquo in indigenous Americans(S 81) Hegel praises the Church in Latin America for beginning to instildiscipline in the natives through these and other colonial efforts the lsquoauthenticAmericans are hellip now beginning to educate themselves [sich hineinzubilden] inEuropean culturersquo (N 165) Incidentally Hegelrsquos points about indigenousAmericans apply equally to Aboriginal Australians since he includes lsquoNewHollandrsquomdashie Australiamdashin the new world

As for the old world Hegel begins with Africamdashthe lsquoauthenticrsquo sub-SaharanAfrica of the Negroes He contends that the Negroes know no morality andpractice slavery along with polygamy cannibalism and other customs thatembody total ignorance about freedom

Another characteristic fact in reference to the Negroes isSlavery Negroes are taken into slavery by Europeans and soldto America Despite this their lot is even worse in their owncountry where an equally absolute slavery is present for theoverall foundation of slavery is that man has no consciousnessof his freedom yet and so sinks down to a mere thing aworthless object hellip Slavery is in and for itself wrong [Unrecht]for the essence of humanity is freedom but for this man mustfirst become mature [reif] This is why the gradual abolition ofslavery is therefore more appropriate and more right[Richtigeres] than its sudden removal (S 96ndash99)

So European enslavement of Africans involves a degree of moral wrong insofaras Africans have intrinsic capacities for freedom Yet before enslavementAfricans did not know themselves to have that capacity accordingly theyenslaved and mistreated one another and acted merely on their natural desiresThe latter does not constitute freedom Hegel insists if I act from naturally given

Hegel and Colonialism

8

desires I am still not determining for myself how to act So slavery was relativelyan improvement because it lsquomaturedrsquo the Negroes to become aware of theirfreedom lsquoOne must educate the Negroes in their freedom by taming theirnaturalnessrsquo (Hei 70)

We can infer from Hegelrsquos comments that slavery educates in several ways(i) Those enslaved are subjected to European culture and ethical standards (fromeg N 165) (ii) Slavery imposes the discipline of work (eg Hei 59) In workingone learns to hold onersquos natural desires in check and thereby see oneself ascapable of deliberating about or even rejecting them (iii) Work also instils anawareness of onersquos capacity to mould natural objectsmdasha sense of lsquoachievingindependence through onersquos own activityrsquo (61) (iv) Ironically those enslaved thusacquire a sense of private property (61)mdashpartly by learning of Europeaninstitutions of property and partly by imposing form on objects thereby forminga sense of lsquopossessingrsquo them which fosters an appreciation of property9

In sum lsquoSlavery hellip is necessary at those stages where the state [and itspeople] has not yet arrived at rationality It is an element in the transition to ahigher stagersquo (HG 197) Because slavery still has elements of wrong though thefinal step must be for slavery to end However Hegel cautions slavery shouldnot be suddenly abolished because it must end after not before the Negroes havebeen educated through it lsquoIf slavery was altogether wrong then the Europeansshould give the slaves their freedom immediately but in that way the mostfrightening consequences arise as in the French coloniesrsquo (Hei 70)

Hegelrsquos line of thought then takes in slavery and colonization at once(understandably since enslavement of Africans was fundamental to colonialAmerica) Use of slavery in the colonies might be judged wrong because itviolates the rights equality and freedom of the slaves But through being enslavedslaves take steps forward in their consciousness of freedom which they could nototherwise make for Africa is intrinsically pre-historical and unfree so thatfreedom can come to Africans only from without Analogously one might thinkthat colonization was altogether wrong because it violated the rights equality andfreedom of indigenous peoplesmdashbut no for before colonization those peoplehad no awareness of their freedom They lsquoha[d] no sense of private property ofachieving independence through onersquos own activity or of securing onersquos propertythrough rightrsquo (61) By being forced to labour and being disciplined spiritually byagencies such as the Christian church these people will eventually learn abouttheir freedom Until then their subjection while partially wrong insofar as it issubjection is also partially right it is at least an improvement on the nativesremaining in their natural wholly unfree pre-colonial condition

Colonialism is justified on this view because it spreads freedom topeoples who otherwise both lack it and have no native means of acquiring itMoreover the colonizers are justified in extirpating the indigenous cultures of

Alison Stone

9

native peoplesmdashhence Hegelrsquos endorsement of the Christian clergy andmissionaries lsquosetting out to accustom the Indians to European culture andethics [Sitten]rsquo (N 164)mdashsince those indigenous cultures embody unfreedom Wemight wonder whether Hegel regards even the violence and slaughter thatoccurred during the colonization of America as justified He does acknowledgeEuropean especially Spanish violence towards indigenous Americans but he isonly overtly critical of this violence when the colonial project had he saysdegenerated into mere robbery (Hei 204) Moreover he disguises the extent ofEuropean violence by running together indigenous Americans having beenlsquodestroyed and slaughteredrsquo (untergegangen verdraumlngt) having disappeared(verschwunden) and having voluntarily withdrawn (haben sich zuruumlckgezogen N 163see also Parekh 2009) Hegel does not wholly denounce colonial violence becausehe thinks that Europersquos conquest of America was based on a sound goalmdashspreading freedom and the culture of freedom to all peoplemdashand that theviolence that was necessary for achieving that goal was justified But Hegel doesdisapprove of violence when it served merely an unworthy goalmdashrobbery

This is congruent with Hegelrsquos overall approach to violence in history whichhe memorably calls a lsquoslaughterbenchrsquo (Schlachtbank) On his view theconsciousness of freedom advances through each civilization in turn establishingits pre-eminence by prevailing culturally and militarily over its predecessor Tothe extent that war and violence are necessary for progress they are justified(although lsquojustifiedrsquo does not mean lsquoto be celebratedrsquo) Even in these termsthough much of the violence carried out by European colonizersmdashthedecimation of many native American tribes the Middle Passagemdashwent beyondthe minimum necessary to subject non-Europeans to colonial control along theway to their ultimate freedom But likewise in history generally violence hasregularly gone beyond the minimum necessary to propel progress Such excessesare inevitable an aspect of the inescapable contingency of human affairs Theseexcesses of violence are not justified yet we can be reconciled to them as aninevitable albeit non-ideal concomitant of progress (H 90ndash91) PresumablyHegel thinks the same about the excesses of colonial violence

Hegelrsquos overall line of thought is that colonialism is not only justified butalso necessary as part of Europersquos centuries-long process of realizing freedom Alogical step in this process is to extend freedom to non-European peoples afterall the European principle is that all are free This extension can only occurthough by passing through a stage of subjugating non-European peoples sincethey have no native means of acquiring freedom lsquoThe [Negroesrsquo] condition isincapable of any development or culture [Entwicklung und Bildung] and theircondition as we see it today is as it has always beenrsquo (N 190) And lsquothe Negroes cannot move [bewegen] to any culturersquo (Hei 67) Likewise with indigenousAmericans America is new and young because it had no history until the

Hegel and Colonialism

10

Europeans arrived These claims do not mean that Negroes and indigenousAmericans cannot be educated they can But given their native ignorance offreedom they cannot educate themselves but must be educated by Europeanswhich requires that they first be subjected to European control

Hegelrsquos case for colonization could be extended to the Orientals He admitsthat unlike Africans and indigenous Americans the Oriental peoples do have anidea of freedommdashthat lsquoone is freersquomdashbut this idea remains so inadequate as tocount as unfreedom Hence lacking belief in their own freedom Oriental peoplecannot pursue any extensions or advancements of freedom and without suchpursuits to drive historical change their societies remain ahistorical Colonizationof these peoples for educative purposes would therefore be justified As long as apeople is at a low enough level to count as unfree and pre-historical that peoplecan advance only through having the European spirit imposed on it for beingpre-historical it has no native way to attain freedom And indeed Hegel does sayof India that lsquoThe English or rather the East India Company are the lords[Herren] of the land for it is the necessary fate of Asiatic empires to be subjected[unterworfen] to Europeans and China will also some day have to submit to thisfatersquo (S 142ndash43)

We should not be misled by an apparently conflicting statement in thePhilosophy of Right lsquoThe liberation of colonies hellip [is] of the greatest advantage tothe mother state just as the emancipation of slaves is of the greatest advantage tothe masterrsquo (PR sect248A 269) Hegelrsquos paradigm here is American independenceie the independence of what he is explicit and adamant is colonial EuropeanAmerica not Native America (N 165ndash66) That is America merits independenceonce its native populace is reduced or placed securely under European tutelageThis coheres with Hegelrsquos approving reference to independent Haiti in thePhilosophy of Mind (EM sect393A 40) he says that this is a Christian state that theNegroes could only found after having undergone long spiritual servitude Oncea people has been colonized sufficiently to acquire European culture as in Haitithen and only then does that people merit freedom

Hegelrsquos argument for colonialism is of the lsquocivilizing missionrsquo familyEffectively his defence is that colonialism benefits most those who fare worstunder itmdashcolonized peoplesmdashby civilizing and bringing them freedom that theycannot access without passing through colonial subjection For Hegelcolonialism and the advancement of freedom go hand-in-hand

III Saving Hegel from himself

Hegelrsquos PWH implies that colonialism is required to further the realization ofuniversal freedom Does this show that Hegelrsquos conception of freedom is

Alison Stone

11

necessarily bound up with his pro-colonialism If so thenmdashtaking it thatcolonialism was in fact morally wrongmdashpresumably his conception of freedomand its historical development must be rejected (although not necessarily freedomas such of course)

But perhaps that would be to dismiss Hegelrsquos thought too summarily andthereby to do disservice not only to Hegel but also to anti-colonial anddecolonizing thought and activism which after all has regularly drawn on Hegelboth directlymdasheg when Frantz Fanon ([1952] 2008) and Ngugi wa Thiongrsquoo(2012) use Hegel to critique colonialismmdashand indirectly through Hegelrsquosinfluence on Marxism and critical theory Moreover Hegelrsquos thought may stilloffer further anti-colonial resources which remain to be mined We mighttherefore reasonably seek to separate Hegelrsquos basic conception of freedom and itshistoricity from his Eurocentric narrative of history so that when so separatedthat basic conception tells against colonialism Such a viewmdashone that rescuesHegel from himselfmdashis often adopted more or less explicitly by hisinterpreters10 I now want to set out my own version of this type of viewalthough I will go on to complicate it in Section IV

The view is this We can separate the essentials of Hegelrsquos account offreedom from his concrete interpretation of the actual movement of historyHegel was wrong and prejudiced when he dismissed Africans indigenousAmericans and Orientals as unfree and incapable of coming to freedom on theirown Nevertheless his basic account of what freedom is including its necessaryhistorical development remains insightful A better informed judgment ofnon-European peoples would require a very different historical narrative Butthat does not undermine Hegelrsquos basic points that freedom develops historicallyin tandem with the consciousness of it as embodied in different cultures andsocial institutions When we separate these basic points from his actualnarrative we find that these points serve a progressive purpose yielding groundsto reject colonialism

This view dovetails with Hegelrsquos claim that the human capacity for self-determination is universal not confined to Europeans (see eg H 88) Admittedlythough this starting-point is only an abstract universal Self-determination can beactualized only when one is conscious of onersquos capacity for it and thatrequires social and cultural institutions a whole way of life which foster thatconsciousness Such a way of life arose for the first time only in ancient Greecefor Hegel so that actualized freedom does not obtain universallyArguably though given his basic view of freedom and its historicity Hegelcould and should have interpreted all the worldrsquos regions as taking part in thegradual historical unfolding of social institutions that support freedom Hegeldoes not do so because he denies that non-European peoples are conscious offreedom at all Since non-European societies were not conscious of freedom

Hegel and Colonialism

12

even in the restricted ways that the Greeks and Romans were the former had nobasis for moving forward historically by further advancing an already partlyrealized freedom

Thus what underpins Hegelrsquos denial of historicity to non-European peoplesis his sharp division of European freedom from non-European unfreedom Thatin turn is underpinned by his claim that the ancient Greeks made the decisivebreak from unfreedom into freedom The Greeks Hegel says became thedistinctive people they were out of a mixing within them of heterogeneousOriental peoples and their cultures but the Greeks surmounted or overcame(uumlberwinden) this background (HG 214) By doing so the Greeks created theirlsquofree beautifulrsquo spirit (374) The Greeks overcame their Oriental preconditions tolsquomake themselvesrsquo (372 see also 393ndash94)

However this view that the Greeks lsquoovercamersquo the Oriental world ofunfreedom seems overstated by Hegelrsquos own lights For Hegel himself theGreeks mark only the latest phase in a growing consciousness of freedomrunning from China through India to Persia and culminating in EgyptPersiarsquos most advanced province Egypt is the hinge between Orient andOccident in which the human soulrsquos intrinsic capacity for freedom was almostgrasped But it was not quite grasped for the soul was still not distinguishedfrom animal nature a distinction the Greeks went on to make (HG 334 368)That lack of distinction is shown by the way the Egyptians modelled their godsand goddesses on animal species often with animal heads Yet for Hegel theGreeks too stopped short of recognizing that all people have an inherent capacityfor freedom They admitted freedom only to male native-born slave-ownersIn that way their view of freedom remained intermingled with acceptance ofnatural contingency ie accidents of birth sex and geographical location (H 88)So the difference between the Egyptian viewmdashhuman freedom is incompletelydistinguished from (animal) naturemdashand the Greek viewmdashhuman freedom isagain incompletely distinguished from naturemdashappears to be a difference ofdegree not kind11

Hegelrsquos lsquoovercomingrsquo idea therefore sits uncomfortably with his graduatedportrayal of historyrsquos stages That portrayal could be taken to show that belief infreedom is not exclusively European since the Persians and Egyptians already hadversions of that belief To be sure they were inadequate versions (for Hegel)mdashbutthen so was the Greeksrsquo And by extension the Indians and Chinese likewise hadversions of the belief in freedommdasheven more inadequate ones since theyattributed freedom only to lsquoonersquo not lsquosomersquomdashbut where that inadequacy stilldifferentiates these peoples from the Greeks only by degree and not kind (more soin the Indian case since the lsquoonersquo is a whole caste) If the Oriental peoples did haveversions however unsatisfactory of the belief in freedom then Hegel should nothave denied that these peoples are historical For if it is believed that someone is

Alison Stone

13

free be it only lsquoonersquo ruler or caste then others may claim and demand that samefreedom for themselves powering historical change

Now Hegel regards the Africans and indigenous Americans as lackingfreedom more radically than the Orientals yet contrary evidence was available tohim He might for instance have noted the Iroquois Confederacy of five (latersix) Native American tribes founded c1600 and dissolved c1800 a system ofintra- and inter-tribal governance which lsquomaximized individual freedom whileseeking to minimize excess governmental interference in peoplersquos livesrsquo (Johansen1982 9) influencing the American Constitution And Hegel embellishedexaggerated and at times outright distorted his sources on Africa so as to portraya people without any respect for human life freedom or rightsmdashmore so thanthe sources suggested and they were already unreliable (see Bernasconi 1998)12

The way was open to Hegel to recognize Africans and indigenous Americans ashaving views of freedom even if he classed them as even less adequate thanOriental ones With that those peoples would like the Orientals have had anentry to history

Nonetheless Hegel preserves his division of European freedom from non-European unfreedom by counting all the European stages as stages of freedomdown to its lowest level and all the non-European stages as stages of unfreedomright up to where unfreedom is almost freedom but not quite But the placementof this dividing line appears arbitrary Consider for example Hegelrsquos view thatHindus are not conscious of their own freedom because they fail to distinguishthemselves as human agents from nature (HG 256 273ndash81) On Hegelrsquosaccount as wersquove just seen there are ways that the ancient Greeks did not fullyextricate human agency from nature either somdashon his own termsmdashit is not clearthat the difference here is one of kind (history versus non-history freedom versusunfreedom) rather than degree (more or less freedom more or less far along thehistorical path towards full freedom)

Hegel could and it seems should have interpreted much of hismaterial as evidencing how non-European peoples have grasped and practisedfreedom albeit imperfectly We might still find this revised Hegeliannarrative objectionable assuming that it ranks non-European conceptions offreedom as less advanced than European ones Yet once it is admittedthat non-European peoples are historical in principle Hegel would alsohave to trace how historical advances unfolded in those societies so re-interpreting his material once again Each continent would have its own history ofprogression in consciousness of freedom rather than non-Europeancontinents merely paving the way for Europe The several continents wouldhave histories of freedom that run in parallel rather than corresponding tomore or less advanced phases of a single historical line that culminates in modernEurope

Hegel and Colonialism

14

Neither of these revised Hegelian narrativesmdashthe single line or parallel linesversionsmdashsupports colonialism not even the single line model on whichnon-European peoplesrsquo native levels of freedom are although real yetdeficient compared to European ones By recognizing freedom howeverunsatisfactorily non-European cultures would still have the internal potential andmotor to advance to greater freedom In that case colonization would not benecessary for non-European peoplesrsquo achieving freedom and would not bejustified as a necessary step in the realization of universal freedom Anotherplank in Hegelrsquos justification of colonization is that colonized peoples enjoyed nofreedom pre-colonizationmdashso that despite its abrogation of their freedomcolonization did not worsen their position (and ultimately would improve it) Butif these peoples did have a grasp of freedom however imperfect thencolonization stood to worsen their position That risk is especially pronouncedgiven Hegelrsquos own perspective that some violence is necessary for colonizationand given the role of contingency in human affairs that that violence may wellmushroom beyond the necessary minimum Further for Hegel colonizationrequires the extirpation of native cultures but if these are not cultures ofunfreedom then that extirpation is not justified Apparently then Hegel shouldby his own lights have opposed colonialism for his own philosophy generates acase against it

IV The Greeks history and self-liberation from nature

The view just canvassed is that despite the Eurocentrism and pro-colonialism ofHegelrsquos substantial narrative in the PWH his distinctive account of freedom asdeveloping historically through successive civilizations does not in itselfnecessitate his substantive Eurocentrism and when extricated from the latteryields a case against colonialism However we can distinguish weaker andstronger versions of this view More weakly Hegelrsquos basic account of freedomcan be separated from his actual pro-colonialism and so does not necessarilyimply pro-colonialism but contains anti-colonial possibilities as well as thepro-colonial possibilities that Hegel developed from it More strongly Hegelrsquosbasic account of freedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism andwhen so separated this account implies anti-colonialism and has an inherentlyanti-colonial direction I endorse the weaker but not the stronger claim and theweaker one only subject to a significant qualification Hegelrsquos basic account offreedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism but not as easily asSection III suggested This is because Hegelrsquos conception of freedom asself-determination has significant connections with his Eurocentrism

Alison Stone

15

In Section III I suggested that Hegelrsquos divisions Greeksnon-Greeks freeunfree look arbitrary But actually they are not For Hegel

Its [Greecersquos] principle is that self-conscious freedom stepsforth hellip [Regarding t]he unity of spirit with nature hellip thespecificity of this unity [in the Greek case] is to be graspedOne unity is the Oriental hellip consciousness immersed innature a [new kind of] harmony is now to be broughtforth [by the Greeks] in which hellip spirit dominates Spirit nowdetermines nature and this is a spiritual unity hellip (Hei 117 myemphases)

[The] fundamental characteristic [of the Greek spirit is] that thefreedom of spirit is conditioned by and in essential relation tosome natural stimulus Greek freedom is stimulated bysomething other and is free because it changes and produces thestimulus from out of itself (aus sich) (S 238 my emphasis)

Thus the Greeks were free in that they were at home with themselves in theother ie nature But this does not mean that the content of their practices andway of life was determined by natural givens such as the Greeksrsquo given impulsesRather they reshaped these givens and so became at-home-with-themselves inthem In the Greek case then spirit lsquodeterminedrsquo nature whereas previouslyspirit had been immersed or absorbed (versenkt) in nature This Greekdetermination of nature by spiritmdashspiritrsquos investment of nature with meaningof its ownmdashwas made possible by a prior moment first carried out by theGreeks through which lsquospirit is no longer immersed [versenkt] in nature hellip [but]releas[es] itself from nature [sich losmachend von der Natur]rsquo (HG 395ndash96) Thismoment in which the human spirit first releases or sets itself free from naturecorresponds to the overcoming (uumlberwinden) by the Greeks of their mixed ethnicheritage a moment of overcoming through which they became able to remakethat heritage for themselves to make themselves Hegel is explicit that none ofthe worldrsquos other peoples to that point had achieved this

Even so for Hegel the Greeks exercised freedom always with respect tonature and existing givens in the worldmdashre-shaping what they found alreadythere rather than creating a totally new world out of themselves Hence theGreeks did not regard free individuals as being capable of adjudicatingindependently on the given natural and social world through their own reason orof generating norms and principles purely through the exercise of their spiritualfreedom Or as Hegel also puts it elsewhere individual subjectivity was notdifferentiated from social substance but the individual identified fully andunquestioningly with his or her social role and there was no ground for

Hegel and Colonialism

16

independent social criticism (see Hardimon 1993) Connected with all this theGreeks restricted freedom to some people only effectively stipulating that onlythose with certain kinds of naturemdashmale free-bornmdashor natural locationmdashnativeGreekmdashhad the power of self-determination In these ways spiritrsquos freedomremained lsquoconditionedrsquo or limited (bedingt) bymdashalthough not immersed inmdashnature (and see HG 390)

However these limitations contradicted the essence of self-determination asthe Greeks understood it as including a moment of overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature such that the power to overcome nature cannotpossibly be limited by nature (or it would not be a power to overcome nature atall) Thus lsquoin the principle of Greek freedom inasmuch as it is freedom it isimplied that thought must be free for itself rsquo (HG 268)mdashalthough the Greeks fora long time did not explicitly grasp or follow through on that implicationNonetheless in the end that contradiction was what made it possible for theGreeksrsquo exclusion of some people from freedom and their other ways ofrestricting freedomrsquos scope to come in for criticism The criticism came withSocrates and the Sophists claiming that thought can adjudicate rationally on whatis and generate norms by itself (417) In that freedom of thought was therebygrasped as fully independent of nature it was also grasped as universal at least inprinciple In these two ways lsquoThought hellip introduces an opposition [Gegensatz][to the Greek mixture of freedom and nature] and asserts the validity ofessentially rational principlesrsquo (S 267)

For Hegel then Greek culture enabled rational criticism of what isincluding of limited freedom as no pre-Greek cultures did just because theGreeks had established a root opposition between freedom and nature whereaslsquoin the Oriental states in which a lack of opposition is present no moral freedomcan come aboutrsquo (267) Although the advent of rational critique brought on thedemise of Greek culture Europe was thereby also set on the path oftransformative historical change We see then why in his own terms Hegel saysthat non-European peoples could not advance critical claims for freedomrsquosextension but uncritically accepted the authority of their rulersmdashpatriarchalauthority in China caste hierarchy and caste-based restrictions and rituals inIndia and state power in Persia Non-Europeans could not question suchauthorities because their cultures did not grasp freedom as including the momentof overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature and the given Becausefreedom was not grasped as including that moment of human separation fromnature and the given no contradiction was perceived in freedom being limited bynature eg confined to people of certain castes or by given states of affairs egcustomary authority and ritual Non-Europeans lacked a critical motor to drivesocial change hence lacked history propermdashor indeed freedom as properlydistinguished from unfreedom

Alison Stone

17

So for Hegel there is a genuine difference in kind not merely degreebetween the Greek and post-Greek European world on the one hand and thenon-European world on the other the Europenon-Europe divide is notarbitrary but has a philosophical rationale For while the Greek view of freedomwas like non-European views limited and inadequate the former was moreadvanced in one key respectmdashthe inclusion in freedom of a primary moment oflsquoovercomingrsquo naturemdashwhich enabled the Greek and post-Greek European worldto become self-critical self-revising and so historical This is what motivatesHegel to identify Greek and post-Greek European views as views of freedomhowever limited whereas non-European views that might prima facie look likeviews of freedom are still actually modes of unfreedom

Once again we might object that non-Europeans have at times construedfreedom as including this moment of overcoming nature Even on Hegelrsquosaccount Hindus appreciate the human power to abstract from the world inthought He maintains though that this is merely an intellectual withdrawaland that when it comes to practical agency Hindus see human agency as immersedin not including any moment of self-freeing-from nature (see eg S 157ndash58)In response we could with Jaspal Peter Sahota (2016) agree that in classicalIndian thought there has been a tendency to locate human agency within naturebut argue against Hegel that this does not constitute a real absence offreedom but rather a different conception of freedom We might then say thatbecause thesemdashand othermdashnon-European views were still views of freedom thoseviews were still sufficient to motivate social criticism and hence place non-European peoples in history even without the element of overcoming natureHowever such a position would take us further away from Hegelrsquos own accountof the historicity of freedom according which as we have seen that moment ofovercoming nature uniquely new in ancient Greece is crucial in poweringhistorical progression

Hegelrsquos basic account of freedom and its historicity thus has more extensiveand significant connections with his Eurocentrism than I suggested inSection III In particular that account connects with Hegelrsquos denial that non-European peoples are historicalmdashie can come to freedom on their ownmdashandhence with his case for colonialism as the only route along which those peoplescan reach freedom These connections suggest that after all we cannotstraightforwardly take up Hegelrsquos account of freedom and its historicity whilesloughing off his pro-colonialism This is not to say that we cannot separate outthese parts of his thought at all But rescuing Hegel from himself is set to be acomplicated process not quick or straightforward To the extent that such arescue is possible Hegelrsquos pro-colonialism cannot rightly be counted as necessaryto his thought or system Yet his pro-colonialism does have extensive anddeep-seated connections with his other viewsmdashenough to show that it is not the

Hegel and Colonialism

18

case that Hegel should not have endorsed colonialism by his own standardsRather he did and could endorse it coherently in his own terms although otheranti-colonialist possibilities were also available within his own terms which hecould have developed

So the claim that Hegelrsquos account of freedom is inherently anti-colonial isunduly strong Through his understanding of freedom as involving spiritextricating itself from nature that account has sustained links with hisEurocentrism and so his pro-colonialism We can nonetheless envisage variousmanoeuvres by which to maintain that freedom develops historically for all theworldrsquos peoples for example by saying that they have several conceptions offreedom where freedom can but does not have to include self-liberation fromnature Then ancient Greece would initiate one historical pathway to freedombut not the only one Even so Hegelrsquos own account of freedom and its historicitydoes not inherently drive us to make these intellectual manoeuvres but onlypermits them In sum if Hegelrsquos view of freedom does not necessarily implypro-colonialism neither is it inherently anti-colonial We can make distinctionsand qualifications within his thought so as to yield anti-colonial conclusions butthis is only one of several possible lines of development of which his thoughtadmits another being its elaboration into the Eurocentric and pro-colonialsystem that Hegel in fact forged

There is a broader moral Wemdashie the heirs of the European heritage thatruns through philosophy into modern political thoughtmdashshould not let thisheritage off the hook too easily This heritage including Hegelrsquos thought hasbeen implicated in colonialism in various ways To be sure because it extols andarticulates the values of freedom and equality this heritage also furnishesconceptual resources for critiquing colonialism and giving support to anti-colonial struggles and anti-colonial thinkers and activists have drawn on modernEuropean ideas for this purpose For example the Haitian revolutionariesdeclared that they were acting in allegiance to the emancipatory goals of theFrench Revolution This might lead us to suppose that the European politicallegacy is intrinsically liberatory and that theorists in the European traditionmdashHegel includedmdashhave only ever justified colonialism due to unfortunateprejudices that led them to go back on their own principles

I believe that taking that view exculpates our predecessors too quicklyand leaves us at risk of inadvertently embracing ideas inherited from thesepredecessors which actually have deep-rooted internal connections withEurocentric and pro-colonial attitudes This is not to say that we should orcould repudiate these ideas outright Rather in view of their connections withcolonialism we need to think carefully and critically about how far to take theseinherited ideas forward and how we might do so differently My aim has been tohelp us cultivate this caution in Hegelrsquos case by acknowledging that while his

Alison Stone

19

thought harbours anti-colonial possibilities it also has real and tenacious linkswith colonialism of which we should remind mindful13

Alison StoneLancaster University UKastonelancasteracuk

Notes

1 Contributions include those by Bernasconi 1998 2007 2016 Bonetto 2006 de Laurentiis2014 McCarney and Bernasconi 2003 Mowad 2013 Parekh 2009 Purtschert 2010 andTibebu 20102 However see Buck-Morss 2000 andmdashfor highly critical accountsmdashDussel [1992] 1995 and1993 Guha 2002 Tibebu 2010 Also relevant are Bird-Pollan 2014 (on Hegel and Fanon)Brennan 2013 (on Hegelrsquos influence on post-colonialism) Buchwalter 2009 (defending Hegelagainst charges of Eurocentrism) Monahan 2017 (Creolizing Hegel) and Serequeberhan 1989(on colonialism in the Philosophy of Right)3 Ranajit Guha identifies another argument for colonialism in the Philosophy of Rightfrom the lsquorightsrsquo that Hegel claims civilized nations have with respect to less advanced ones(PR sect351 376) These rights Guha argues are lsquorights of conquestrsquo noting Hegelrsquos praise for Britishmilitary victories over India led by Robert Clive (1725ndash74) whose conquests established theEast India Companyrsquos rule over Bengal and other Indian states See Guha 2002 43ndash44PR sect372A 364 and 474 note 1)Abbreviations usedEN=Hegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller Oxford Clarendon PressEM= Hegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind Trans W Wallace and A V Miller Oxford OxfordUniversity Press Cited by paragraph and page numberN=Hegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reason in Historytrans H B Nisbet Cambridge UK Cambridge University PressS=Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NY Prometheus BooksPR=Hegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B Nisbet Cambridge UKCambridge University PressHei=Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink4 Hegel lectured on the PWH in 182223 182425 182627 182829 and 183031 Hismanuscripts of the Introduction from 1822 (rev 1828) and 183031 survive as do manytranscripts between them covering every course Some such as de Laurentiis (2014) are waryof directly attributing to Hegel views notably on race expressed only in the transcripts I agreethat we should disambiguate sources but where multiple independently written transcripts

Hegel and Colonialism

20

converge as domdashextensivelymdashseveral transcripts of the PWH we may take them to bereliable Accordingly I refer to Hegelrsquos manuscripts (abbreviated H) as in Hegel 2011 which isthe English translation of the corresponding volume of the Gesammelte Werke (Hegel 1995) andthe integrated text of the 182223 course composed primarily from Hothorsquos and Griesheimrsquostranscripts (abb HG) included in Hegel 2011 (the German is Hegel 1996) Since the Germancritical edition of the transcripts remains incomplete for materials on Hegelrsquos later coursesI have used Heimannrsquos transcript of 183031 whenever possible (Hegel 2005 abb Hei)otherwise the composite texts produced by Karl Hegel (Hegel 1986) and translated by Sibree(Hegel 1991 abb S) and by Georg LassonJohannes Hoffmeister (Hegel 1988) translated byNisbet (Hegel 1975 abb N) I quote English translations whenever available sometimesadjusted in view of the German5 For more on contingency in Hegel see inter alia Burbidge 2007 esp ch 1 Burbidge stressesthe extent to which Hegel lsquotakes the contingencies of history seriouslyrsquo (2007 9)6 For Hegel lsquonaturehellip is indeed a rational system operating in its own distinct elementrsquo (N 44)The division into continents is rational in that different natural features and their varietiesmdashmountains and plains lands and seas and their fusion and differentiationmdasheach find fullembodiment in different continents (EM sect393 and R 40ndash41) In a sense then non-Europeansare subject to reason and rational progression insofar as nature imposes it on them fromthe outside rather than by exercising rational thought for themselves This coheres withHegelrsquos view that these peoples are immersed in nature out of which only Europeans can liftthem see below7 This recalls Hegelrsquos derivation of time from space in the Philosophy of Nature a derivation thatpositions time as more advanced than space (EN sectsect256ndash57 31ndash36)8 This is evident from eg Hegelrsquos discussion of the colonization of America see Section II9 Hegel connects formation with possession (PR sect56 85ndash86) albeit in the very differentcontext of modern European societies in which private property is institutionalized I leaveunexplored here how far his ideas about slaveryrsquos educative power may be informed by hislordbondsman dialectic10 For instance some interpreters defend Hegel against charges of Eurocentrism and racism(eg Buchwalter 2009 Houlgate [1991] 2015 35ndash37 McCarney in McCarney and Bernasconi2003 Mowad 2013) others stress Hegelrsquos founding importance for anti-colonial thought(Brennan 2013) and numerous readers of Hegel as a thinker of freedom (eg Patten 1999)see no need to discuss his position on colonialism presumably on the grounds that the latteris a merely accidental avoidable part of his thought from which his essential views on freedomcan be extracted11 For Hegel the Greeks were greatly influenced by the Egyptians whose influence theynonetheless overcame Here he is close to accepting what Martin Bernal calls the lsquoancientmodelrsquo of the Greeksrsquo origins a model to which the Greeks themselves adhered later-nineteenth-century Europeans instead espoused an lsquoAryan modelrsquo on which Greek cultureproper arose from northern invaders driving out earlier Egyptian and Phoenician influences([1987] 1991) Bernal argues that the Aryan model had Eurocentric motivations if the Greeks

Alison Stone

21

the supposed originators of Europersquos distinctive culture were actually the Egyptiansrsquo heirsthen given that Egypt is within Africa the EuropeAfrica divide would crumble A furthercomplicating factor is whether the Egyptians were seen as black Africans Bernasconi (2007)argues that Hegel thought so as did most other Europeans of his time Later the Egyptiansrsquoracial status was changedmdashto Mediterranean (ie Caucasian)mdashto hold up the divide betweenEurope-as-white and Africa-as-black Bernasconi suggests that Hegel himself dealt with thepotential anomalymdashof highly cultured black Africans giving much to the Greeksmdashby makingthe EgyptGreece transition the site of the key conceptual transition from unfreedom tofreedom nature to spirit (2007 212ndash13) This ties in with my argument in Section IV thatHegel actually did have grounds on his own terms to construe the apparently gradual EgyptGreece transition as actually being a sharp divide12 Bernasconi (2016) has recently shown how Hegel likewise distorted his sources on China tothe detriment of the Chinese13 I thank Bob Stern and the referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions

Bibliography

Bernal M [1987] (1991) Black Athena The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical CivilisationVol 1 London VintageBernasconi R (1998) lsquoHegel at the Court of the Ashantirsquo in S Barnett (ed)Hegel After Derrida Albany NY SUNYBernasconi R (2007) lsquoThe Return of Africa Hegel and the Question of theRacial Identity of the Egyptiansrsquo in P T Grier (ed) Identity and Difference AlbanyNY SUNYBernasconi R (2016) lsquoChina on Parade Hegelrsquos Manipulation of his Sources andhis Change of Mindrsquo in B Brandt and D L Purdy (eds) China in the GermanEnlightenment Toronto University of Toronto PressBird-Pollan S (2014) Hegel Freud and Fanon The Dialectic of Emancipation LondonRowman and Littlefield InternationalBonetto S (2006) lsquoRace and Racism in HegelmdashAn AnalysisrsquoMinerva An InternetJournal of Philosophy 10Brennan T (2013) lsquoHegel Empire and Anti-Colonial Thoughtrsquo in G Huggan(ed) The Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies Oxford Oxford University PressBuchwalter A (2009) lsquoIs Hegelrsquos Philosophy of History Eurocentricrsquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYBuck-Morss S (2000) lsquoHegel and Haitirsquo Critical Inquiry 264 821ndash65Burbidge J (2007) Hegelrsquos Systematic Contingency Basingstoke Palgrave MacmillanDe Laurentiis A (2014) lsquoRace in Hegel Text and Contextrsquo in M Egger (ed)Philosophie Nach Kant Neue Wege zum Verstaumlndnis von Kants Transzendental- undMoralphilosophie Berlin De Gruyter

Hegel and Colonialism

22

Dussel E [1992] (1995) The Invention of the Americas trans M D Barber NewYork ContinuumDussel E (1993) lsquoEurocentrism and Modernityrsquo Boundary 2 203 65ndash76Fanon F [1952] (2008) Black Skin White Masks trans R Philcox New YorkGroveGuha R (2002) History at the Limit of World-History New York ColumbiaUniversity PressHardimon M (1993) Hegelrsquos Social Philosophy Cambridge Cambridge UniversityPressHegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller OxfordClarendonHegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind trans W Wallace and A V MillerOxford Oxford University PressHegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reasonin History trans H B Nisbet Cambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1986) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Geschichte Werke Vol 12ed E Moldenhauer and K M Michel Frankfurt Suhrkamp [Englishtranslation Sibree]Hegel G W F (1988) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Vols 1-3 edG Lasson Vols 1-4 Hamburg Meiner [English translation of volume 1 Nisbet]Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NYPrometheus BooksHegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B NisbetCambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1995) lsquoVorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der WeltgeschichteEinleitungrsquo in W Jaeschke (ed) Vorlesungsmanuskripte II (1916ndash1831)Gesammelte Werke Vol 18 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown andHodgson]Hegel G W F (1996) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Berlin 182223 Nachschriften von Griesheim Hotho und Kehler ed Karl Brehmer K-H Iltingund Hoo Nam Seelmann Hegel Vorlesungen Ausgew Nachschriften und ManuskripteVol 12 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown and Hodgson]Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink Abb HeiHegel G W F (2011) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Volume 1Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822ndash3 ed and trans R F Brownand P C Hodgson with assistance of W G Geuss Oxford Clarendon PressHoulgate S [1991] 2015 An Introduction to Hegel Freedom Truth and HistoryOxford BlackwellJohansen B E (1982) Forgotten Founders How the American Indians Helped ShapeDemocracy Boston Harvard Common Press

Alison Stone

23

McCarney J and Bernasconi R (2003) lsquoExchange Hegelrsquos Racismrsquo RadicalPhilosophy 119(MayJune) 32ndash37Monahan M (ed) (2017) Creolizing Hegel London Rowman and LittlefieldInternationalMowad N (2013) lsquoThe Place of Nationality in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of Politicsand Religion A Defense of Hegel on the Charges of National Chauvinism andRacismrsquo in A Nuzzo (ed) Hegel on Religion and Politics Albany NY SUNYParekh S (2009) lsquoHegelrsquos New World History Freedom and Racersquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYPatten A (1999) Hegelrsquos Idea of Freedom Oxford Oxford University PressPurtschert P (2010) lsquoOn the Limit of Spirit Hegelrsquos Racism Revisitedrsquo Philosophyand Social Criticism 369 1039ndash51Quijano A (2000) lsquoColoniality of Power Eurocentrism and Latin AmericarsquoNepantla Views from South 13 533ndash80Sahota J P (2016) lsquoHegelrsquos Critique of Hinduism A Responsersquo Hegel Bulletin372 305ndash17Serequeberhan T (1989) lsquoThe Idea of Colonialism in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of RightrsquoInternational Philosophical Quarterly 293 301ndash18Shohat E and Stam R [1994] (2014) Unthinking Eurocentrism New YorkRoutledgeTibebu T (2010) Hegel and the Third World The Making of Eurocentrism in WorldHistory Syracuse NY Syracuse University PressWa Thiongrsquoo N (2012) Globalectics Theory and the Politics of Knowing New YorkColumbia University Press

Hegel and Colonialism

24

  • Hegel and Colonialism
Page 6: Hegel and Colonialism - Lancaster University · 2017-06-30 · Hegel and Colonialism Alison Stone Abstract This article explores the implications of Hegel’s Philosophy of World

his Eurocentrism Whereas the Orientals lack a motor for historical developmentand hence are pre-historical that motor does arise when a given level ofconsciousness of freedom being attained and embodied in social life that level ofconsciousness harbours some inner lsquocontradictionrsquo or tension which propelspeople qua rational beings to bring about change and improvement Theseconditions are first met by the ancient Greeks Another instance mentionedearlier is that the Romans conferred freedom on slave-owners while denying it toslaves giving slaves rational grounds to claim freedom as well In Section IV wewill encounter other instances of this type of historical development through therational response to contradictions

That reason is immanent in historical changes might suggest that in historylogical and temporal development coincide (whereas in say Hegelrsquos Logic thedialectical development of categories is not temporal) This is so to an extentThe pre-historical civilizations of Africa indigenous America and the Orienthave no consciousness of freedom sufficient to harbour self-contradictorylimitations that call for change hence these civilizations actually show nosignificant social change over time for Hegel They are and have ever been thesame embodying time but not history that is no instantiation over time ofthe dialectical-and-rational development of freedom Conversely in Europe thelimitations placed on a freedom that is nevertheless known power developmentsthat are at once rationally warranted and transpire through human agency overtime Yet for Hegel all that exists in space and time is subject to contingency andso realizes rational requirements under an innumerable variety of permutationsarising from the very nature of a spatio-temporal indefinitely complex causallyinterconnected world (EN sect250 and R 22ndash24) For example the Reformationultimately had to happen but it is a contingency that Luther posted his theses inWittenberg in October 15175

But not all that the PWH covers is historical In Africa indigenous Americaand the Orient time unfolds without history Consequently the advancementfrom Africa to the Orient and from China to India to Persia occurs purelyspatially in that each region in turn grasps freedom to successivemdashall highlyinadequatemdashdegrees Conversely historical development (in Europe) takes placein space as well as time not only in space (HG 156ndash57) Where advancementoccurs only spatially its motor is not human reason and agency but geographicalvariation Because we are natural spatially embodied as well as rational beings weare inescapably located in natural surroundings that divide into continentsAmerica Asia Africa and Europe The continentsrsquo features affect how theirinhabitants live and so what level of civilization and consciousness of freedomthey can reach by their own efforts America is weak and powerless yieldingimmature weak and lazy people (193) Africa is dominated by highlands andother non-cultivable areas so that African peoples form no awareness of their

Hegel and Colonialism

6

freedom something people first develop by working on nature (196) Asia isdominated by fertile plains so that its peoplesrsquo focus on agriculture inclines themtowards patriarchal family-based relationships and uncritical obedience toauthority (199ndash200) Only Europe is geographically diverse enough to fosterpeople living in diverse ways and so thinking for themselves (196)

Thus Europersquos physical environment explains why Greek civilization aroseand started the trajectory to modern liberalism Conversely for their part theOrientals advanced beyond the Africans not by thinking rationally about thelimitations of the latterrsquos grasp of freedommdashafter all allegedly they had nonemdashbut due to the Orientalsrsquo more auspicious environmental circumstancesUltimately here what guarantees the progression of stages up to the transitionto history proper is the rationality that for Hegel is embodied in the worldrsquosgeographic divisions6 Then the European natural environment made it possiblefor the Greeks to form a conception of freedom that in turn enabled historicalprogression in time and on the continuing basis of (intra-European) geographicalspace to begin7 (We might still ask though why the successive Oriental viewsthat lsquoone is freersquo were not sufficient to initiate historical progression proper I willreturn to this question later For now let us just note that for Hegel theywere not)

In sum Hegel is a Eurocentrist as defined above (p 3) As per (i) and (iii)he believes that European civilization develops purely internally towards thefuller comprehension and application of its principle of the freedom of all where(ii) this development has come to include that of all of the lsquoWestrsquo eg the USA8

(iv) He explains oppressive episodes in European history either from its not yethaving consistently worked out and applied its own principle of freedom (as withthe hierarchies of the medieval church) or as unavoidable requirements foradvancement (eg the religious wars of early modern Europe) (v) He denies thatany equivalent progression to freedom has occurred or can spontaneously occuroutside Europe Next I argue that it is Hegelrsquos Eurocentrism in particular hissharp divide between European freedom and non-European unfreedom whichgenerates a case for colonialism

II Hegelrsquos case for colonialism

In the PWH Hegel explicitly says relatively little about colonialism but what hedoes say is approving Finishing his account of the European middle ages hepraises the revival of learning the flourishing of fine art and the arrival of thelsquoherorsquo Columbus in the new world (S 411 Hei 204) Columbus he says wasmotivated by the lsquooutwardrsquo urging of spirit to know its own earth and convertnon-European natives to Christianity The reasons why Hegel regards this

Alison Stone

7

positively emerge in the passages on the lsquogeographical conditions of historyrsquo thataddress the lsquonew worldrsquo

It does not matter that Mexico and Peru did indeed havesignificant civilisations since they were of a feebler stock andare long gone The new world has shown itself to be muchfeebler than the old world hellip Some of the tribes of NorthAmerica have disappeared and some have retreated andgenerally declined hellip (HG 192ndash93)

In 183031 Hegel expanded on the new world adding that African Negroes hadto be brought to America to do the physical work of which the weak natives wereincapable (Hei 59) For lsquothe Negroes are far more receptive to European culturethan the Indianshellip [and] it will still be a long time before the Europeans succeedin producing any genuine feeling of self [Selbstgefuumlhl]rsquo in indigenous Americans(S 81) Hegel praises the Church in Latin America for beginning to instildiscipline in the natives through these and other colonial efforts the lsquoauthenticAmericans are hellip now beginning to educate themselves [sich hineinzubilden] inEuropean culturersquo (N 165) Incidentally Hegelrsquos points about indigenousAmericans apply equally to Aboriginal Australians since he includes lsquoNewHollandrsquomdashie Australiamdashin the new world

As for the old world Hegel begins with Africamdashthe lsquoauthenticrsquo sub-SaharanAfrica of the Negroes He contends that the Negroes know no morality andpractice slavery along with polygamy cannibalism and other customs thatembody total ignorance about freedom

Another characteristic fact in reference to the Negroes isSlavery Negroes are taken into slavery by Europeans and soldto America Despite this their lot is even worse in their owncountry where an equally absolute slavery is present for theoverall foundation of slavery is that man has no consciousnessof his freedom yet and so sinks down to a mere thing aworthless object hellip Slavery is in and for itself wrong [Unrecht]for the essence of humanity is freedom but for this man mustfirst become mature [reif] This is why the gradual abolition ofslavery is therefore more appropriate and more right[Richtigeres] than its sudden removal (S 96ndash99)

So European enslavement of Africans involves a degree of moral wrong insofaras Africans have intrinsic capacities for freedom Yet before enslavementAfricans did not know themselves to have that capacity accordingly theyenslaved and mistreated one another and acted merely on their natural desiresThe latter does not constitute freedom Hegel insists if I act from naturally given

Hegel and Colonialism

8

desires I am still not determining for myself how to act So slavery was relativelyan improvement because it lsquomaturedrsquo the Negroes to become aware of theirfreedom lsquoOne must educate the Negroes in their freedom by taming theirnaturalnessrsquo (Hei 70)

We can infer from Hegelrsquos comments that slavery educates in several ways(i) Those enslaved are subjected to European culture and ethical standards (fromeg N 165) (ii) Slavery imposes the discipline of work (eg Hei 59) In workingone learns to hold onersquos natural desires in check and thereby see oneself ascapable of deliberating about or even rejecting them (iii) Work also instils anawareness of onersquos capacity to mould natural objectsmdasha sense of lsquoachievingindependence through onersquos own activityrsquo (61) (iv) Ironically those enslaved thusacquire a sense of private property (61)mdashpartly by learning of Europeaninstitutions of property and partly by imposing form on objects thereby forminga sense of lsquopossessingrsquo them which fosters an appreciation of property9

In sum lsquoSlavery hellip is necessary at those stages where the state [and itspeople] has not yet arrived at rationality It is an element in the transition to ahigher stagersquo (HG 197) Because slavery still has elements of wrong though thefinal step must be for slavery to end However Hegel cautions slavery shouldnot be suddenly abolished because it must end after not before the Negroes havebeen educated through it lsquoIf slavery was altogether wrong then the Europeansshould give the slaves their freedom immediately but in that way the mostfrightening consequences arise as in the French coloniesrsquo (Hei 70)

Hegelrsquos line of thought then takes in slavery and colonization at once(understandably since enslavement of Africans was fundamental to colonialAmerica) Use of slavery in the colonies might be judged wrong because itviolates the rights equality and freedom of the slaves But through being enslavedslaves take steps forward in their consciousness of freedom which they could nototherwise make for Africa is intrinsically pre-historical and unfree so thatfreedom can come to Africans only from without Analogously one might thinkthat colonization was altogether wrong because it violated the rights equality andfreedom of indigenous peoplesmdashbut no for before colonization those peoplehad no awareness of their freedom They lsquoha[d] no sense of private property ofachieving independence through onersquos own activity or of securing onersquos propertythrough rightrsquo (61) By being forced to labour and being disciplined spiritually byagencies such as the Christian church these people will eventually learn abouttheir freedom Until then their subjection while partially wrong insofar as it issubjection is also partially right it is at least an improvement on the nativesremaining in their natural wholly unfree pre-colonial condition

Colonialism is justified on this view because it spreads freedom topeoples who otherwise both lack it and have no native means of acquiring itMoreover the colonizers are justified in extirpating the indigenous cultures of

Alison Stone

9

native peoplesmdashhence Hegelrsquos endorsement of the Christian clergy andmissionaries lsquosetting out to accustom the Indians to European culture andethics [Sitten]rsquo (N 164)mdashsince those indigenous cultures embody unfreedom Wemight wonder whether Hegel regards even the violence and slaughter thatoccurred during the colonization of America as justified He does acknowledgeEuropean especially Spanish violence towards indigenous Americans but he isonly overtly critical of this violence when the colonial project had he saysdegenerated into mere robbery (Hei 204) Moreover he disguises the extent ofEuropean violence by running together indigenous Americans having beenlsquodestroyed and slaughteredrsquo (untergegangen verdraumlngt) having disappeared(verschwunden) and having voluntarily withdrawn (haben sich zuruumlckgezogen N 163see also Parekh 2009) Hegel does not wholly denounce colonial violence becausehe thinks that Europersquos conquest of America was based on a sound goalmdashspreading freedom and the culture of freedom to all peoplemdashand that theviolence that was necessary for achieving that goal was justified But Hegel doesdisapprove of violence when it served merely an unworthy goalmdashrobbery

This is congruent with Hegelrsquos overall approach to violence in history whichhe memorably calls a lsquoslaughterbenchrsquo (Schlachtbank) On his view theconsciousness of freedom advances through each civilization in turn establishingits pre-eminence by prevailing culturally and militarily over its predecessor Tothe extent that war and violence are necessary for progress they are justified(although lsquojustifiedrsquo does not mean lsquoto be celebratedrsquo) Even in these termsthough much of the violence carried out by European colonizersmdashthedecimation of many native American tribes the Middle Passagemdashwent beyondthe minimum necessary to subject non-Europeans to colonial control along theway to their ultimate freedom But likewise in history generally violence hasregularly gone beyond the minimum necessary to propel progress Such excessesare inevitable an aspect of the inescapable contingency of human affairs Theseexcesses of violence are not justified yet we can be reconciled to them as aninevitable albeit non-ideal concomitant of progress (H 90ndash91) PresumablyHegel thinks the same about the excesses of colonial violence

Hegelrsquos overall line of thought is that colonialism is not only justified butalso necessary as part of Europersquos centuries-long process of realizing freedom Alogical step in this process is to extend freedom to non-European peoples afterall the European principle is that all are free This extension can only occurthough by passing through a stage of subjugating non-European peoples sincethey have no native means of acquiring freedom lsquoThe [Negroesrsquo] condition isincapable of any development or culture [Entwicklung und Bildung] and theircondition as we see it today is as it has always beenrsquo (N 190) And lsquothe Negroes cannot move [bewegen] to any culturersquo (Hei 67) Likewise with indigenousAmericans America is new and young because it had no history until the

Hegel and Colonialism

10

Europeans arrived These claims do not mean that Negroes and indigenousAmericans cannot be educated they can But given their native ignorance offreedom they cannot educate themselves but must be educated by Europeanswhich requires that they first be subjected to European control

Hegelrsquos case for colonization could be extended to the Orientals He admitsthat unlike Africans and indigenous Americans the Oriental peoples do have anidea of freedommdashthat lsquoone is freersquomdashbut this idea remains so inadequate as tocount as unfreedom Hence lacking belief in their own freedom Oriental peoplecannot pursue any extensions or advancements of freedom and without suchpursuits to drive historical change their societies remain ahistorical Colonizationof these peoples for educative purposes would therefore be justified As long as apeople is at a low enough level to count as unfree and pre-historical that peoplecan advance only through having the European spirit imposed on it for beingpre-historical it has no native way to attain freedom And indeed Hegel does sayof India that lsquoThe English or rather the East India Company are the lords[Herren] of the land for it is the necessary fate of Asiatic empires to be subjected[unterworfen] to Europeans and China will also some day have to submit to thisfatersquo (S 142ndash43)

We should not be misled by an apparently conflicting statement in thePhilosophy of Right lsquoThe liberation of colonies hellip [is] of the greatest advantage tothe mother state just as the emancipation of slaves is of the greatest advantage tothe masterrsquo (PR sect248A 269) Hegelrsquos paradigm here is American independenceie the independence of what he is explicit and adamant is colonial EuropeanAmerica not Native America (N 165ndash66) That is America merits independenceonce its native populace is reduced or placed securely under European tutelageThis coheres with Hegelrsquos approving reference to independent Haiti in thePhilosophy of Mind (EM sect393A 40) he says that this is a Christian state that theNegroes could only found after having undergone long spiritual servitude Oncea people has been colonized sufficiently to acquire European culture as in Haitithen and only then does that people merit freedom

Hegelrsquos argument for colonialism is of the lsquocivilizing missionrsquo familyEffectively his defence is that colonialism benefits most those who fare worstunder itmdashcolonized peoplesmdashby civilizing and bringing them freedom that theycannot access without passing through colonial subjection For Hegelcolonialism and the advancement of freedom go hand-in-hand

III Saving Hegel from himself

Hegelrsquos PWH implies that colonialism is required to further the realization ofuniversal freedom Does this show that Hegelrsquos conception of freedom is

Alison Stone

11

necessarily bound up with his pro-colonialism If so thenmdashtaking it thatcolonialism was in fact morally wrongmdashpresumably his conception of freedomand its historical development must be rejected (although not necessarily freedomas such of course)

But perhaps that would be to dismiss Hegelrsquos thought too summarily andthereby to do disservice not only to Hegel but also to anti-colonial anddecolonizing thought and activism which after all has regularly drawn on Hegelboth directlymdasheg when Frantz Fanon ([1952] 2008) and Ngugi wa Thiongrsquoo(2012) use Hegel to critique colonialismmdashand indirectly through Hegelrsquosinfluence on Marxism and critical theory Moreover Hegelrsquos thought may stilloffer further anti-colonial resources which remain to be mined We mighttherefore reasonably seek to separate Hegelrsquos basic conception of freedom and itshistoricity from his Eurocentric narrative of history so that when so separatedthat basic conception tells against colonialism Such a viewmdashone that rescuesHegel from himselfmdashis often adopted more or less explicitly by hisinterpreters10 I now want to set out my own version of this type of viewalthough I will go on to complicate it in Section IV

The view is this We can separate the essentials of Hegelrsquos account offreedom from his concrete interpretation of the actual movement of historyHegel was wrong and prejudiced when he dismissed Africans indigenousAmericans and Orientals as unfree and incapable of coming to freedom on theirown Nevertheless his basic account of what freedom is including its necessaryhistorical development remains insightful A better informed judgment ofnon-European peoples would require a very different historical narrative Butthat does not undermine Hegelrsquos basic points that freedom develops historicallyin tandem with the consciousness of it as embodied in different cultures andsocial institutions When we separate these basic points from his actualnarrative we find that these points serve a progressive purpose yielding groundsto reject colonialism

This view dovetails with Hegelrsquos claim that the human capacity for self-determination is universal not confined to Europeans (see eg H 88) Admittedlythough this starting-point is only an abstract universal Self-determination can beactualized only when one is conscious of onersquos capacity for it and thatrequires social and cultural institutions a whole way of life which foster thatconsciousness Such a way of life arose for the first time only in ancient Greecefor Hegel so that actualized freedom does not obtain universallyArguably though given his basic view of freedom and its historicity Hegelcould and should have interpreted all the worldrsquos regions as taking part in thegradual historical unfolding of social institutions that support freedom Hegeldoes not do so because he denies that non-European peoples are conscious offreedom at all Since non-European societies were not conscious of freedom

Hegel and Colonialism

12

even in the restricted ways that the Greeks and Romans were the former had nobasis for moving forward historically by further advancing an already partlyrealized freedom

Thus what underpins Hegelrsquos denial of historicity to non-European peoplesis his sharp division of European freedom from non-European unfreedom Thatin turn is underpinned by his claim that the ancient Greeks made the decisivebreak from unfreedom into freedom The Greeks Hegel says became thedistinctive people they were out of a mixing within them of heterogeneousOriental peoples and their cultures but the Greeks surmounted or overcame(uumlberwinden) this background (HG 214) By doing so the Greeks created theirlsquofree beautifulrsquo spirit (374) The Greeks overcame their Oriental preconditions tolsquomake themselvesrsquo (372 see also 393ndash94)

However this view that the Greeks lsquoovercamersquo the Oriental world ofunfreedom seems overstated by Hegelrsquos own lights For Hegel himself theGreeks mark only the latest phase in a growing consciousness of freedomrunning from China through India to Persia and culminating in EgyptPersiarsquos most advanced province Egypt is the hinge between Orient andOccident in which the human soulrsquos intrinsic capacity for freedom was almostgrasped But it was not quite grasped for the soul was still not distinguishedfrom animal nature a distinction the Greeks went on to make (HG 334 368)That lack of distinction is shown by the way the Egyptians modelled their godsand goddesses on animal species often with animal heads Yet for Hegel theGreeks too stopped short of recognizing that all people have an inherent capacityfor freedom They admitted freedom only to male native-born slave-ownersIn that way their view of freedom remained intermingled with acceptance ofnatural contingency ie accidents of birth sex and geographical location (H 88)So the difference between the Egyptian viewmdashhuman freedom is incompletelydistinguished from (animal) naturemdashand the Greek viewmdashhuman freedom isagain incompletely distinguished from naturemdashappears to be a difference ofdegree not kind11

Hegelrsquos lsquoovercomingrsquo idea therefore sits uncomfortably with his graduatedportrayal of historyrsquos stages That portrayal could be taken to show that belief infreedom is not exclusively European since the Persians and Egyptians already hadversions of that belief To be sure they were inadequate versions (for Hegel)mdashbutthen so was the Greeksrsquo And by extension the Indians and Chinese likewise hadversions of the belief in freedommdasheven more inadequate ones since theyattributed freedom only to lsquoonersquo not lsquosomersquomdashbut where that inadequacy stilldifferentiates these peoples from the Greeks only by degree and not kind (more soin the Indian case since the lsquoonersquo is a whole caste) If the Oriental peoples did haveversions however unsatisfactory of the belief in freedom then Hegel should nothave denied that these peoples are historical For if it is believed that someone is

Alison Stone

13

free be it only lsquoonersquo ruler or caste then others may claim and demand that samefreedom for themselves powering historical change

Now Hegel regards the Africans and indigenous Americans as lackingfreedom more radically than the Orientals yet contrary evidence was available tohim He might for instance have noted the Iroquois Confederacy of five (latersix) Native American tribes founded c1600 and dissolved c1800 a system ofintra- and inter-tribal governance which lsquomaximized individual freedom whileseeking to minimize excess governmental interference in peoplersquos livesrsquo (Johansen1982 9) influencing the American Constitution And Hegel embellishedexaggerated and at times outright distorted his sources on Africa so as to portraya people without any respect for human life freedom or rightsmdashmore so thanthe sources suggested and they were already unreliable (see Bernasconi 1998)12

The way was open to Hegel to recognize Africans and indigenous Americans ashaving views of freedom even if he classed them as even less adequate thanOriental ones With that those peoples would like the Orientals have had anentry to history

Nonetheless Hegel preserves his division of European freedom from non-European unfreedom by counting all the European stages as stages of freedomdown to its lowest level and all the non-European stages as stages of unfreedomright up to where unfreedom is almost freedom but not quite But the placementof this dividing line appears arbitrary Consider for example Hegelrsquos view thatHindus are not conscious of their own freedom because they fail to distinguishthemselves as human agents from nature (HG 256 273ndash81) On Hegelrsquosaccount as wersquove just seen there are ways that the ancient Greeks did not fullyextricate human agency from nature either somdashon his own termsmdashit is not clearthat the difference here is one of kind (history versus non-history freedom versusunfreedom) rather than degree (more or less freedom more or less far along thehistorical path towards full freedom)

Hegel could and it seems should have interpreted much of hismaterial as evidencing how non-European peoples have grasped and practisedfreedom albeit imperfectly We might still find this revised Hegeliannarrative objectionable assuming that it ranks non-European conceptions offreedom as less advanced than European ones Yet once it is admittedthat non-European peoples are historical in principle Hegel would alsohave to trace how historical advances unfolded in those societies so re-interpreting his material once again Each continent would have its own history ofprogression in consciousness of freedom rather than non-Europeancontinents merely paving the way for Europe The several continents wouldhave histories of freedom that run in parallel rather than corresponding tomore or less advanced phases of a single historical line that culminates in modernEurope

Hegel and Colonialism

14

Neither of these revised Hegelian narrativesmdashthe single line or parallel linesversionsmdashsupports colonialism not even the single line model on whichnon-European peoplesrsquo native levels of freedom are although real yetdeficient compared to European ones By recognizing freedom howeverunsatisfactorily non-European cultures would still have the internal potential andmotor to advance to greater freedom In that case colonization would not benecessary for non-European peoplesrsquo achieving freedom and would not bejustified as a necessary step in the realization of universal freedom Anotherplank in Hegelrsquos justification of colonization is that colonized peoples enjoyed nofreedom pre-colonizationmdashso that despite its abrogation of their freedomcolonization did not worsen their position (and ultimately would improve it) Butif these peoples did have a grasp of freedom however imperfect thencolonization stood to worsen their position That risk is especially pronouncedgiven Hegelrsquos own perspective that some violence is necessary for colonizationand given the role of contingency in human affairs that that violence may wellmushroom beyond the necessary minimum Further for Hegel colonizationrequires the extirpation of native cultures but if these are not cultures ofunfreedom then that extirpation is not justified Apparently then Hegel shouldby his own lights have opposed colonialism for his own philosophy generates acase against it

IV The Greeks history and self-liberation from nature

The view just canvassed is that despite the Eurocentrism and pro-colonialism ofHegelrsquos substantial narrative in the PWH his distinctive account of freedom asdeveloping historically through successive civilizations does not in itselfnecessitate his substantive Eurocentrism and when extricated from the latteryields a case against colonialism However we can distinguish weaker andstronger versions of this view More weakly Hegelrsquos basic account of freedomcan be separated from his actual pro-colonialism and so does not necessarilyimply pro-colonialism but contains anti-colonial possibilities as well as thepro-colonial possibilities that Hegel developed from it More strongly Hegelrsquosbasic account of freedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism andwhen so separated this account implies anti-colonialism and has an inherentlyanti-colonial direction I endorse the weaker but not the stronger claim and theweaker one only subject to a significant qualification Hegelrsquos basic account offreedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism but not as easily asSection III suggested This is because Hegelrsquos conception of freedom asself-determination has significant connections with his Eurocentrism

Alison Stone

15

In Section III I suggested that Hegelrsquos divisions Greeksnon-Greeks freeunfree look arbitrary But actually they are not For Hegel

Its [Greecersquos] principle is that self-conscious freedom stepsforth hellip [Regarding t]he unity of spirit with nature hellip thespecificity of this unity [in the Greek case] is to be graspedOne unity is the Oriental hellip consciousness immersed innature a [new kind of] harmony is now to be broughtforth [by the Greeks] in which hellip spirit dominates Spirit nowdetermines nature and this is a spiritual unity hellip (Hei 117 myemphases)

[The] fundamental characteristic [of the Greek spirit is] that thefreedom of spirit is conditioned by and in essential relation tosome natural stimulus Greek freedom is stimulated bysomething other and is free because it changes and produces thestimulus from out of itself (aus sich) (S 238 my emphasis)

Thus the Greeks were free in that they were at home with themselves in theother ie nature But this does not mean that the content of their practices andway of life was determined by natural givens such as the Greeksrsquo given impulsesRather they reshaped these givens and so became at-home-with-themselves inthem In the Greek case then spirit lsquodeterminedrsquo nature whereas previouslyspirit had been immersed or absorbed (versenkt) in nature This Greekdetermination of nature by spiritmdashspiritrsquos investment of nature with meaningof its ownmdashwas made possible by a prior moment first carried out by theGreeks through which lsquospirit is no longer immersed [versenkt] in nature hellip [but]releas[es] itself from nature [sich losmachend von der Natur]rsquo (HG 395ndash96) Thismoment in which the human spirit first releases or sets itself free from naturecorresponds to the overcoming (uumlberwinden) by the Greeks of their mixed ethnicheritage a moment of overcoming through which they became able to remakethat heritage for themselves to make themselves Hegel is explicit that none ofthe worldrsquos other peoples to that point had achieved this

Even so for Hegel the Greeks exercised freedom always with respect tonature and existing givens in the worldmdashre-shaping what they found alreadythere rather than creating a totally new world out of themselves Hence theGreeks did not regard free individuals as being capable of adjudicatingindependently on the given natural and social world through their own reason orof generating norms and principles purely through the exercise of their spiritualfreedom Or as Hegel also puts it elsewhere individual subjectivity was notdifferentiated from social substance but the individual identified fully andunquestioningly with his or her social role and there was no ground for

Hegel and Colonialism

16

independent social criticism (see Hardimon 1993) Connected with all this theGreeks restricted freedom to some people only effectively stipulating that onlythose with certain kinds of naturemdashmale free-bornmdashor natural locationmdashnativeGreekmdashhad the power of self-determination In these ways spiritrsquos freedomremained lsquoconditionedrsquo or limited (bedingt) bymdashalthough not immersed inmdashnature (and see HG 390)

However these limitations contradicted the essence of self-determination asthe Greeks understood it as including a moment of overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature such that the power to overcome nature cannotpossibly be limited by nature (or it would not be a power to overcome nature atall) Thus lsquoin the principle of Greek freedom inasmuch as it is freedom it isimplied that thought must be free for itself rsquo (HG 268)mdashalthough the Greeks fora long time did not explicitly grasp or follow through on that implicationNonetheless in the end that contradiction was what made it possible for theGreeksrsquo exclusion of some people from freedom and their other ways ofrestricting freedomrsquos scope to come in for criticism The criticism came withSocrates and the Sophists claiming that thought can adjudicate rationally on whatis and generate norms by itself (417) In that freedom of thought was therebygrasped as fully independent of nature it was also grasped as universal at least inprinciple In these two ways lsquoThought hellip introduces an opposition [Gegensatz][to the Greek mixture of freedom and nature] and asserts the validity ofessentially rational principlesrsquo (S 267)

For Hegel then Greek culture enabled rational criticism of what isincluding of limited freedom as no pre-Greek cultures did just because theGreeks had established a root opposition between freedom and nature whereaslsquoin the Oriental states in which a lack of opposition is present no moral freedomcan come aboutrsquo (267) Although the advent of rational critique brought on thedemise of Greek culture Europe was thereby also set on the path oftransformative historical change We see then why in his own terms Hegel saysthat non-European peoples could not advance critical claims for freedomrsquosextension but uncritically accepted the authority of their rulersmdashpatriarchalauthority in China caste hierarchy and caste-based restrictions and rituals inIndia and state power in Persia Non-Europeans could not question suchauthorities because their cultures did not grasp freedom as including the momentof overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature and the given Becausefreedom was not grasped as including that moment of human separation fromnature and the given no contradiction was perceived in freedom being limited bynature eg confined to people of certain castes or by given states of affairs egcustomary authority and ritual Non-Europeans lacked a critical motor to drivesocial change hence lacked history propermdashor indeed freedom as properlydistinguished from unfreedom

Alison Stone

17

So for Hegel there is a genuine difference in kind not merely degreebetween the Greek and post-Greek European world on the one hand and thenon-European world on the other the Europenon-Europe divide is notarbitrary but has a philosophical rationale For while the Greek view of freedomwas like non-European views limited and inadequate the former was moreadvanced in one key respectmdashthe inclusion in freedom of a primary moment oflsquoovercomingrsquo naturemdashwhich enabled the Greek and post-Greek European worldto become self-critical self-revising and so historical This is what motivatesHegel to identify Greek and post-Greek European views as views of freedomhowever limited whereas non-European views that might prima facie look likeviews of freedom are still actually modes of unfreedom

Once again we might object that non-Europeans have at times construedfreedom as including this moment of overcoming nature Even on Hegelrsquosaccount Hindus appreciate the human power to abstract from the world inthought He maintains though that this is merely an intellectual withdrawaland that when it comes to practical agency Hindus see human agency as immersedin not including any moment of self-freeing-from nature (see eg S 157ndash58)In response we could with Jaspal Peter Sahota (2016) agree that in classicalIndian thought there has been a tendency to locate human agency within naturebut argue against Hegel that this does not constitute a real absence offreedom but rather a different conception of freedom We might then say thatbecause thesemdashand othermdashnon-European views were still views of freedom thoseviews were still sufficient to motivate social criticism and hence place non-European peoples in history even without the element of overcoming natureHowever such a position would take us further away from Hegelrsquos own accountof the historicity of freedom according which as we have seen that moment ofovercoming nature uniquely new in ancient Greece is crucial in poweringhistorical progression

Hegelrsquos basic account of freedom and its historicity thus has more extensiveand significant connections with his Eurocentrism than I suggested inSection III In particular that account connects with Hegelrsquos denial that non-European peoples are historicalmdashie can come to freedom on their ownmdashandhence with his case for colonialism as the only route along which those peoplescan reach freedom These connections suggest that after all we cannotstraightforwardly take up Hegelrsquos account of freedom and its historicity whilesloughing off his pro-colonialism This is not to say that we cannot separate outthese parts of his thought at all But rescuing Hegel from himself is set to be acomplicated process not quick or straightforward To the extent that such arescue is possible Hegelrsquos pro-colonialism cannot rightly be counted as necessaryto his thought or system Yet his pro-colonialism does have extensive anddeep-seated connections with his other viewsmdashenough to show that it is not the

Hegel and Colonialism

18

case that Hegel should not have endorsed colonialism by his own standardsRather he did and could endorse it coherently in his own terms although otheranti-colonialist possibilities were also available within his own terms which hecould have developed

So the claim that Hegelrsquos account of freedom is inherently anti-colonial isunduly strong Through his understanding of freedom as involving spiritextricating itself from nature that account has sustained links with hisEurocentrism and so his pro-colonialism We can nonetheless envisage variousmanoeuvres by which to maintain that freedom develops historically for all theworldrsquos peoples for example by saying that they have several conceptions offreedom where freedom can but does not have to include self-liberation fromnature Then ancient Greece would initiate one historical pathway to freedombut not the only one Even so Hegelrsquos own account of freedom and its historicitydoes not inherently drive us to make these intellectual manoeuvres but onlypermits them In sum if Hegelrsquos view of freedom does not necessarily implypro-colonialism neither is it inherently anti-colonial We can make distinctionsand qualifications within his thought so as to yield anti-colonial conclusions butthis is only one of several possible lines of development of which his thoughtadmits another being its elaboration into the Eurocentric and pro-colonialsystem that Hegel in fact forged

There is a broader moral Wemdashie the heirs of the European heritage thatruns through philosophy into modern political thoughtmdashshould not let thisheritage off the hook too easily This heritage including Hegelrsquos thought hasbeen implicated in colonialism in various ways To be sure because it extols andarticulates the values of freedom and equality this heritage also furnishesconceptual resources for critiquing colonialism and giving support to anti-colonial struggles and anti-colonial thinkers and activists have drawn on modernEuropean ideas for this purpose For example the Haitian revolutionariesdeclared that they were acting in allegiance to the emancipatory goals of theFrench Revolution This might lead us to suppose that the European politicallegacy is intrinsically liberatory and that theorists in the European traditionmdashHegel includedmdashhave only ever justified colonialism due to unfortunateprejudices that led them to go back on their own principles

I believe that taking that view exculpates our predecessors too quicklyand leaves us at risk of inadvertently embracing ideas inherited from thesepredecessors which actually have deep-rooted internal connections withEurocentric and pro-colonial attitudes This is not to say that we should orcould repudiate these ideas outright Rather in view of their connections withcolonialism we need to think carefully and critically about how far to take theseinherited ideas forward and how we might do so differently My aim has been tohelp us cultivate this caution in Hegelrsquos case by acknowledging that while his

Alison Stone

19

thought harbours anti-colonial possibilities it also has real and tenacious linkswith colonialism of which we should remind mindful13

Alison StoneLancaster University UKastonelancasteracuk

Notes

1 Contributions include those by Bernasconi 1998 2007 2016 Bonetto 2006 de Laurentiis2014 McCarney and Bernasconi 2003 Mowad 2013 Parekh 2009 Purtschert 2010 andTibebu 20102 However see Buck-Morss 2000 andmdashfor highly critical accountsmdashDussel [1992] 1995 and1993 Guha 2002 Tibebu 2010 Also relevant are Bird-Pollan 2014 (on Hegel and Fanon)Brennan 2013 (on Hegelrsquos influence on post-colonialism) Buchwalter 2009 (defending Hegelagainst charges of Eurocentrism) Monahan 2017 (Creolizing Hegel) and Serequeberhan 1989(on colonialism in the Philosophy of Right)3 Ranajit Guha identifies another argument for colonialism in the Philosophy of Rightfrom the lsquorightsrsquo that Hegel claims civilized nations have with respect to less advanced ones(PR sect351 376) These rights Guha argues are lsquorights of conquestrsquo noting Hegelrsquos praise for Britishmilitary victories over India led by Robert Clive (1725ndash74) whose conquests established theEast India Companyrsquos rule over Bengal and other Indian states See Guha 2002 43ndash44PR sect372A 364 and 474 note 1)Abbreviations usedEN=Hegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller Oxford Clarendon PressEM= Hegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind Trans W Wallace and A V Miller Oxford OxfordUniversity Press Cited by paragraph and page numberN=Hegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reason in Historytrans H B Nisbet Cambridge UK Cambridge University PressS=Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NY Prometheus BooksPR=Hegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B Nisbet Cambridge UKCambridge University PressHei=Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink4 Hegel lectured on the PWH in 182223 182425 182627 182829 and 183031 Hismanuscripts of the Introduction from 1822 (rev 1828) and 183031 survive as do manytranscripts between them covering every course Some such as de Laurentiis (2014) are waryof directly attributing to Hegel views notably on race expressed only in the transcripts I agreethat we should disambiguate sources but where multiple independently written transcripts

Hegel and Colonialism

20

converge as domdashextensivelymdashseveral transcripts of the PWH we may take them to bereliable Accordingly I refer to Hegelrsquos manuscripts (abbreviated H) as in Hegel 2011 which isthe English translation of the corresponding volume of the Gesammelte Werke (Hegel 1995) andthe integrated text of the 182223 course composed primarily from Hothorsquos and Griesheimrsquostranscripts (abb HG) included in Hegel 2011 (the German is Hegel 1996) Since the Germancritical edition of the transcripts remains incomplete for materials on Hegelrsquos later coursesI have used Heimannrsquos transcript of 183031 whenever possible (Hegel 2005 abb Hei)otherwise the composite texts produced by Karl Hegel (Hegel 1986) and translated by Sibree(Hegel 1991 abb S) and by Georg LassonJohannes Hoffmeister (Hegel 1988) translated byNisbet (Hegel 1975 abb N) I quote English translations whenever available sometimesadjusted in view of the German5 For more on contingency in Hegel see inter alia Burbidge 2007 esp ch 1 Burbidge stressesthe extent to which Hegel lsquotakes the contingencies of history seriouslyrsquo (2007 9)6 For Hegel lsquonaturehellip is indeed a rational system operating in its own distinct elementrsquo (N 44)The division into continents is rational in that different natural features and their varietiesmdashmountains and plains lands and seas and their fusion and differentiationmdasheach find fullembodiment in different continents (EM sect393 and R 40ndash41) In a sense then non-Europeansare subject to reason and rational progression insofar as nature imposes it on them fromthe outside rather than by exercising rational thought for themselves This coheres withHegelrsquos view that these peoples are immersed in nature out of which only Europeans can liftthem see below7 This recalls Hegelrsquos derivation of time from space in the Philosophy of Nature a derivation thatpositions time as more advanced than space (EN sectsect256ndash57 31ndash36)8 This is evident from eg Hegelrsquos discussion of the colonization of America see Section II9 Hegel connects formation with possession (PR sect56 85ndash86) albeit in the very differentcontext of modern European societies in which private property is institutionalized I leaveunexplored here how far his ideas about slaveryrsquos educative power may be informed by hislordbondsman dialectic10 For instance some interpreters defend Hegel against charges of Eurocentrism and racism(eg Buchwalter 2009 Houlgate [1991] 2015 35ndash37 McCarney in McCarney and Bernasconi2003 Mowad 2013) others stress Hegelrsquos founding importance for anti-colonial thought(Brennan 2013) and numerous readers of Hegel as a thinker of freedom (eg Patten 1999)see no need to discuss his position on colonialism presumably on the grounds that the latteris a merely accidental avoidable part of his thought from which his essential views on freedomcan be extracted11 For Hegel the Greeks were greatly influenced by the Egyptians whose influence theynonetheless overcame Here he is close to accepting what Martin Bernal calls the lsquoancientmodelrsquo of the Greeksrsquo origins a model to which the Greeks themselves adhered later-nineteenth-century Europeans instead espoused an lsquoAryan modelrsquo on which Greek cultureproper arose from northern invaders driving out earlier Egyptian and Phoenician influences([1987] 1991) Bernal argues that the Aryan model had Eurocentric motivations if the Greeks

Alison Stone

21

the supposed originators of Europersquos distinctive culture were actually the Egyptiansrsquo heirsthen given that Egypt is within Africa the EuropeAfrica divide would crumble A furthercomplicating factor is whether the Egyptians were seen as black Africans Bernasconi (2007)argues that Hegel thought so as did most other Europeans of his time Later the Egyptiansrsquoracial status was changedmdashto Mediterranean (ie Caucasian)mdashto hold up the divide betweenEurope-as-white and Africa-as-black Bernasconi suggests that Hegel himself dealt with thepotential anomalymdashof highly cultured black Africans giving much to the Greeksmdashby makingthe EgyptGreece transition the site of the key conceptual transition from unfreedom tofreedom nature to spirit (2007 212ndash13) This ties in with my argument in Section IV thatHegel actually did have grounds on his own terms to construe the apparently gradual EgyptGreece transition as actually being a sharp divide12 Bernasconi (2016) has recently shown how Hegel likewise distorted his sources on China tothe detriment of the Chinese13 I thank Bob Stern and the referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions

Bibliography

Bernal M [1987] (1991) Black Athena The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical CivilisationVol 1 London VintageBernasconi R (1998) lsquoHegel at the Court of the Ashantirsquo in S Barnett (ed)Hegel After Derrida Albany NY SUNYBernasconi R (2007) lsquoThe Return of Africa Hegel and the Question of theRacial Identity of the Egyptiansrsquo in P T Grier (ed) Identity and Difference AlbanyNY SUNYBernasconi R (2016) lsquoChina on Parade Hegelrsquos Manipulation of his Sources andhis Change of Mindrsquo in B Brandt and D L Purdy (eds) China in the GermanEnlightenment Toronto University of Toronto PressBird-Pollan S (2014) Hegel Freud and Fanon The Dialectic of Emancipation LondonRowman and Littlefield InternationalBonetto S (2006) lsquoRace and Racism in HegelmdashAn AnalysisrsquoMinerva An InternetJournal of Philosophy 10Brennan T (2013) lsquoHegel Empire and Anti-Colonial Thoughtrsquo in G Huggan(ed) The Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies Oxford Oxford University PressBuchwalter A (2009) lsquoIs Hegelrsquos Philosophy of History Eurocentricrsquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYBuck-Morss S (2000) lsquoHegel and Haitirsquo Critical Inquiry 264 821ndash65Burbidge J (2007) Hegelrsquos Systematic Contingency Basingstoke Palgrave MacmillanDe Laurentiis A (2014) lsquoRace in Hegel Text and Contextrsquo in M Egger (ed)Philosophie Nach Kant Neue Wege zum Verstaumlndnis von Kants Transzendental- undMoralphilosophie Berlin De Gruyter

Hegel and Colonialism

22

Dussel E [1992] (1995) The Invention of the Americas trans M D Barber NewYork ContinuumDussel E (1993) lsquoEurocentrism and Modernityrsquo Boundary 2 203 65ndash76Fanon F [1952] (2008) Black Skin White Masks trans R Philcox New YorkGroveGuha R (2002) History at the Limit of World-History New York ColumbiaUniversity PressHardimon M (1993) Hegelrsquos Social Philosophy Cambridge Cambridge UniversityPressHegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller OxfordClarendonHegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind trans W Wallace and A V MillerOxford Oxford University PressHegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reasonin History trans H B Nisbet Cambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1986) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Geschichte Werke Vol 12ed E Moldenhauer and K M Michel Frankfurt Suhrkamp [Englishtranslation Sibree]Hegel G W F (1988) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Vols 1-3 edG Lasson Vols 1-4 Hamburg Meiner [English translation of volume 1 Nisbet]Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NYPrometheus BooksHegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B NisbetCambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1995) lsquoVorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der WeltgeschichteEinleitungrsquo in W Jaeschke (ed) Vorlesungsmanuskripte II (1916ndash1831)Gesammelte Werke Vol 18 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown andHodgson]Hegel G W F (1996) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Berlin 182223 Nachschriften von Griesheim Hotho und Kehler ed Karl Brehmer K-H Iltingund Hoo Nam Seelmann Hegel Vorlesungen Ausgew Nachschriften und ManuskripteVol 12 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown and Hodgson]Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink Abb HeiHegel G W F (2011) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Volume 1Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822ndash3 ed and trans R F Brownand P C Hodgson with assistance of W G Geuss Oxford Clarendon PressHoulgate S [1991] 2015 An Introduction to Hegel Freedom Truth and HistoryOxford BlackwellJohansen B E (1982) Forgotten Founders How the American Indians Helped ShapeDemocracy Boston Harvard Common Press

Alison Stone

23

McCarney J and Bernasconi R (2003) lsquoExchange Hegelrsquos Racismrsquo RadicalPhilosophy 119(MayJune) 32ndash37Monahan M (ed) (2017) Creolizing Hegel London Rowman and LittlefieldInternationalMowad N (2013) lsquoThe Place of Nationality in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of Politicsand Religion A Defense of Hegel on the Charges of National Chauvinism andRacismrsquo in A Nuzzo (ed) Hegel on Religion and Politics Albany NY SUNYParekh S (2009) lsquoHegelrsquos New World History Freedom and Racersquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYPatten A (1999) Hegelrsquos Idea of Freedom Oxford Oxford University PressPurtschert P (2010) lsquoOn the Limit of Spirit Hegelrsquos Racism Revisitedrsquo Philosophyand Social Criticism 369 1039ndash51Quijano A (2000) lsquoColoniality of Power Eurocentrism and Latin AmericarsquoNepantla Views from South 13 533ndash80Sahota J P (2016) lsquoHegelrsquos Critique of Hinduism A Responsersquo Hegel Bulletin372 305ndash17Serequeberhan T (1989) lsquoThe Idea of Colonialism in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of RightrsquoInternational Philosophical Quarterly 293 301ndash18Shohat E and Stam R [1994] (2014) Unthinking Eurocentrism New YorkRoutledgeTibebu T (2010) Hegel and the Third World The Making of Eurocentrism in WorldHistory Syracuse NY Syracuse University PressWa Thiongrsquoo N (2012) Globalectics Theory and the Politics of Knowing New YorkColumbia University Press

Hegel and Colonialism

24

  • Hegel and Colonialism
Page 7: Hegel and Colonialism - Lancaster University · 2017-06-30 · Hegel and Colonialism Alison Stone Abstract This article explores the implications of Hegel’s Philosophy of World

freedom something people first develop by working on nature (196) Asia isdominated by fertile plains so that its peoplesrsquo focus on agriculture inclines themtowards patriarchal family-based relationships and uncritical obedience toauthority (199ndash200) Only Europe is geographically diverse enough to fosterpeople living in diverse ways and so thinking for themselves (196)

Thus Europersquos physical environment explains why Greek civilization aroseand started the trajectory to modern liberalism Conversely for their part theOrientals advanced beyond the Africans not by thinking rationally about thelimitations of the latterrsquos grasp of freedommdashafter all allegedly they had nonemdashbut due to the Orientalsrsquo more auspicious environmental circumstancesUltimately here what guarantees the progression of stages up to the transitionto history proper is the rationality that for Hegel is embodied in the worldrsquosgeographic divisions6 Then the European natural environment made it possiblefor the Greeks to form a conception of freedom that in turn enabled historicalprogression in time and on the continuing basis of (intra-European) geographicalspace to begin7 (We might still ask though why the successive Oriental viewsthat lsquoone is freersquo were not sufficient to initiate historical progression proper I willreturn to this question later For now let us just note that for Hegel theywere not)

In sum Hegel is a Eurocentrist as defined above (p 3) As per (i) and (iii)he believes that European civilization develops purely internally towards thefuller comprehension and application of its principle of the freedom of all where(ii) this development has come to include that of all of the lsquoWestrsquo eg the USA8

(iv) He explains oppressive episodes in European history either from its not yethaving consistently worked out and applied its own principle of freedom (as withthe hierarchies of the medieval church) or as unavoidable requirements foradvancement (eg the religious wars of early modern Europe) (v) He denies thatany equivalent progression to freedom has occurred or can spontaneously occuroutside Europe Next I argue that it is Hegelrsquos Eurocentrism in particular hissharp divide between European freedom and non-European unfreedom whichgenerates a case for colonialism

II Hegelrsquos case for colonialism

In the PWH Hegel explicitly says relatively little about colonialism but what hedoes say is approving Finishing his account of the European middle ages hepraises the revival of learning the flourishing of fine art and the arrival of thelsquoherorsquo Columbus in the new world (S 411 Hei 204) Columbus he says wasmotivated by the lsquooutwardrsquo urging of spirit to know its own earth and convertnon-European natives to Christianity The reasons why Hegel regards this

Alison Stone

7

positively emerge in the passages on the lsquogeographical conditions of historyrsquo thataddress the lsquonew worldrsquo

It does not matter that Mexico and Peru did indeed havesignificant civilisations since they were of a feebler stock andare long gone The new world has shown itself to be muchfeebler than the old world hellip Some of the tribes of NorthAmerica have disappeared and some have retreated andgenerally declined hellip (HG 192ndash93)

In 183031 Hegel expanded on the new world adding that African Negroes hadto be brought to America to do the physical work of which the weak natives wereincapable (Hei 59) For lsquothe Negroes are far more receptive to European culturethan the Indianshellip [and] it will still be a long time before the Europeans succeedin producing any genuine feeling of self [Selbstgefuumlhl]rsquo in indigenous Americans(S 81) Hegel praises the Church in Latin America for beginning to instildiscipline in the natives through these and other colonial efforts the lsquoauthenticAmericans are hellip now beginning to educate themselves [sich hineinzubilden] inEuropean culturersquo (N 165) Incidentally Hegelrsquos points about indigenousAmericans apply equally to Aboriginal Australians since he includes lsquoNewHollandrsquomdashie Australiamdashin the new world

As for the old world Hegel begins with Africamdashthe lsquoauthenticrsquo sub-SaharanAfrica of the Negroes He contends that the Negroes know no morality andpractice slavery along with polygamy cannibalism and other customs thatembody total ignorance about freedom

Another characteristic fact in reference to the Negroes isSlavery Negroes are taken into slavery by Europeans and soldto America Despite this their lot is even worse in their owncountry where an equally absolute slavery is present for theoverall foundation of slavery is that man has no consciousnessof his freedom yet and so sinks down to a mere thing aworthless object hellip Slavery is in and for itself wrong [Unrecht]for the essence of humanity is freedom but for this man mustfirst become mature [reif] This is why the gradual abolition ofslavery is therefore more appropriate and more right[Richtigeres] than its sudden removal (S 96ndash99)

So European enslavement of Africans involves a degree of moral wrong insofaras Africans have intrinsic capacities for freedom Yet before enslavementAfricans did not know themselves to have that capacity accordingly theyenslaved and mistreated one another and acted merely on their natural desiresThe latter does not constitute freedom Hegel insists if I act from naturally given

Hegel and Colonialism

8

desires I am still not determining for myself how to act So slavery was relativelyan improvement because it lsquomaturedrsquo the Negroes to become aware of theirfreedom lsquoOne must educate the Negroes in their freedom by taming theirnaturalnessrsquo (Hei 70)

We can infer from Hegelrsquos comments that slavery educates in several ways(i) Those enslaved are subjected to European culture and ethical standards (fromeg N 165) (ii) Slavery imposes the discipline of work (eg Hei 59) In workingone learns to hold onersquos natural desires in check and thereby see oneself ascapable of deliberating about or even rejecting them (iii) Work also instils anawareness of onersquos capacity to mould natural objectsmdasha sense of lsquoachievingindependence through onersquos own activityrsquo (61) (iv) Ironically those enslaved thusacquire a sense of private property (61)mdashpartly by learning of Europeaninstitutions of property and partly by imposing form on objects thereby forminga sense of lsquopossessingrsquo them which fosters an appreciation of property9

In sum lsquoSlavery hellip is necessary at those stages where the state [and itspeople] has not yet arrived at rationality It is an element in the transition to ahigher stagersquo (HG 197) Because slavery still has elements of wrong though thefinal step must be for slavery to end However Hegel cautions slavery shouldnot be suddenly abolished because it must end after not before the Negroes havebeen educated through it lsquoIf slavery was altogether wrong then the Europeansshould give the slaves their freedom immediately but in that way the mostfrightening consequences arise as in the French coloniesrsquo (Hei 70)

Hegelrsquos line of thought then takes in slavery and colonization at once(understandably since enslavement of Africans was fundamental to colonialAmerica) Use of slavery in the colonies might be judged wrong because itviolates the rights equality and freedom of the slaves But through being enslavedslaves take steps forward in their consciousness of freedom which they could nototherwise make for Africa is intrinsically pre-historical and unfree so thatfreedom can come to Africans only from without Analogously one might thinkthat colonization was altogether wrong because it violated the rights equality andfreedom of indigenous peoplesmdashbut no for before colonization those peoplehad no awareness of their freedom They lsquoha[d] no sense of private property ofachieving independence through onersquos own activity or of securing onersquos propertythrough rightrsquo (61) By being forced to labour and being disciplined spiritually byagencies such as the Christian church these people will eventually learn abouttheir freedom Until then their subjection while partially wrong insofar as it issubjection is also partially right it is at least an improvement on the nativesremaining in their natural wholly unfree pre-colonial condition

Colonialism is justified on this view because it spreads freedom topeoples who otherwise both lack it and have no native means of acquiring itMoreover the colonizers are justified in extirpating the indigenous cultures of

Alison Stone

9

native peoplesmdashhence Hegelrsquos endorsement of the Christian clergy andmissionaries lsquosetting out to accustom the Indians to European culture andethics [Sitten]rsquo (N 164)mdashsince those indigenous cultures embody unfreedom Wemight wonder whether Hegel regards even the violence and slaughter thatoccurred during the colonization of America as justified He does acknowledgeEuropean especially Spanish violence towards indigenous Americans but he isonly overtly critical of this violence when the colonial project had he saysdegenerated into mere robbery (Hei 204) Moreover he disguises the extent ofEuropean violence by running together indigenous Americans having beenlsquodestroyed and slaughteredrsquo (untergegangen verdraumlngt) having disappeared(verschwunden) and having voluntarily withdrawn (haben sich zuruumlckgezogen N 163see also Parekh 2009) Hegel does not wholly denounce colonial violence becausehe thinks that Europersquos conquest of America was based on a sound goalmdashspreading freedom and the culture of freedom to all peoplemdashand that theviolence that was necessary for achieving that goal was justified But Hegel doesdisapprove of violence when it served merely an unworthy goalmdashrobbery

This is congruent with Hegelrsquos overall approach to violence in history whichhe memorably calls a lsquoslaughterbenchrsquo (Schlachtbank) On his view theconsciousness of freedom advances through each civilization in turn establishingits pre-eminence by prevailing culturally and militarily over its predecessor Tothe extent that war and violence are necessary for progress they are justified(although lsquojustifiedrsquo does not mean lsquoto be celebratedrsquo) Even in these termsthough much of the violence carried out by European colonizersmdashthedecimation of many native American tribes the Middle Passagemdashwent beyondthe minimum necessary to subject non-Europeans to colonial control along theway to their ultimate freedom But likewise in history generally violence hasregularly gone beyond the minimum necessary to propel progress Such excessesare inevitable an aspect of the inescapable contingency of human affairs Theseexcesses of violence are not justified yet we can be reconciled to them as aninevitable albeit non-ideal concomitant of progress (H 90ndash91) PresumablyHegel thinks the same about the excesses of colonial violence

Hegelrsquos overall line of thought is that colonialism is not only justified butalso necessary as part of Europersquos centuries-long process of realizing freedom Alogical step in this process is to extend freedom to non-European peoples afterall the European principle is that all are free This extension can only occurthough by passing through a stage of subjugating non-European peoples sincethey have no native means of acquiring freedom lsquoThe [Negroesrsquo] condition isincapable of any development or culture [Entwicklung und Bildung] and theircondition as we see it today is as it has always beenrsquo (N 190) And lsquothe Negroes cannot move [bewegen] to any culturersquo (Hei 67) Likewise with indigenousAmericans America is new and young because it had no history until the

Hegel and Colonialism

10

Europeans arrived These claims do not mean that Negroes and indigenousAmericans cannot be educated they can But given their native ignorance offreedom they cannot educate themselves but must be educated by Europeanswhich requires that they first be subjected to European control

Hegelrsquos case for colonization could be extended to the Orientals He admitsthat unlike Africans and indigenous Americans the Oriental peoples do have anidea of freedommdashthat lsquoone is freersquomdashbut this idea remains so inadequate as tocount as unfreedom Hence lacking belief in their own freedom Oriental peoplecannot pursue any extensions or advancements of freedom and without suchpursuits to drive historical change their societies remain ahistorical Colonizationof these peoples for educative purposes would therefore be justified As long as apeople is at a low enough level to count as unfree and pre-historical that peoplecan advance only through having the European spirit imposed on it for beingpre-historical it has no native way to attain freedom And indeed Hegel does sayof India that lsquoThe English or rather the East India Company are the lords[Herren] of the land for it is the necessary fate of Asiatic empires to be subjected[unterworfen] to Europeans and China will also some day have to submit to thisfatersquo (S 142ndash43)

We should not be misled by an apparently conflicting statement in thePhilosophy of Right lsquoThe liberation of colonies hellip [is] of the greatest advantage tothe mother state just as the emancipation of slaves is of the greatest advantage tothe masterrsquo (PR sect248A 269) Hegelrsquos paradigm here is American independenceie the independence of what he is explicit and adamant is colonial EuropeanAmerica not Native America (N 165ndash66) That is America merits independenceonce its native populace is reduced or placed securely under European tutelageThis coheres with Hegelrsquos approving reference to independent Haiti in thePhilosophy of Mind (EM sect393A 40) he says that this is a Christian state that theNegroes could only found after having undergone long spiritual servitude Oncea people has been colonized sufficiently to acquire European culture as in Haitithen and only then does that people merit freedom

Hegelrsquos argument for colonialism is of the lsquocivilizing missionrsquo familyEffectively his defence is that colonialism benefits most those who fare worstunder itmdashcolonized peoplesmdashby civilizing and bringing them freedom that theycannot access without passing through colonial subjection For Hegelcolonialism and the advancement of freedom go hand-in-hand

III Saving Hegel from himself

Hegelrsquos PWH implies that colonialism is required to further the realization ofuniversal freedom Does this show that Hegelrsquos conception of freedom is

Alison Stone

11

necessarily bound up with his pro-colonialism If so thenmdashtaking it thatcolonialism was in fact morally wrongmdashpresumably his conception of freedomand its historical development must be rejected (although not necessarily freedomas such of course)

But perhaps that would be to dismiss Hegelrsquos thought too summarily andthereby to do disservice not only to Hegel but also to anti-colonial anddecolonizing thought and activism which after all has regularly drawn on Hegelboth directlymdasheg when Frantz Fanon ([1952] 2008) and Ngugi wa Thiongrsquoo(2012) use Hegel to critique colonialismmdashand indirectly through Hegelrsquosinfluence on Marxism and critical theory Moreover Hegelrsquos thought may stilloffer further anti-colonial resources which remain to be mined We mighttherefore reasonably seek to separate Hegelrsquos basic conception of freedom and itshistoricity from his Eurocentric narrative of history so that when so separatedthat basic conception tells against colonialism Such a viewmdashone that rescuesHegel from himselfmdashis often adopted more or less explicitly by hisinterpreters10 I now want to set out my own version of this type of viewalthough I will go on to complicate it in Section IV

The view is this We can separate the essentials of Hegelrsquos account offreedom from his concrete interpretation of the actual movement of historyHegel was wrong and prejudiced when he dismissed Africans indigenousAmericans and Orientals as unfree and incapable of coming to freedom on theirown Nevertheless his basic account of what freedom is including its necessaryhistorical development remains insightful A better informed judgment ofnon-European peoples would require a very different historical narrative Butthat does not undermine Hegelrsquos basic points that freedom develops historicallyin tandem with the consciousness of it as embodied in different cultures andsocial institutions When we separate these basic points from his actualnarrative we find that these points serve a progressive purpose yielding groundsto reject colonialism

This view dovetails with Hegelrsquos claim that the human capacity for self-determination is universal not confined to Europeans (see eg H 88) Admittedlythough this starting-point is only an abstract universal Self-determination can beactualized only when one is conscious of onersquos capacity for it and thatrequires social and cultural institutions a whole way of life which foster thatconsciousness Such a way of life arose for the first time only in ancient Greecefor Hegel so that actualized freedom does not obtain universallyArguably though given his basic view of freedom and its historicity Hegelcould and should have interpreted all the worldrsquos regions as taking part in thegradual historical unfolding of social institutions that support freedom Hegeldoes not do so because he denies that non-European peoples are conscious offreedom at all Since non-European societies were not conscious of freedom

Hegel and Colonialism

12

even in the restricted ways that the Greeks and Romans were the former had nobasis for moving forward historically by further advancing an already partlyrealized freedom

Thus what underpins Hegelrsquos denial of historicity to non-European peoplesis his sharp division of European freedom from non-European unfreedom Thatin turn is underpinned by his claim that the ancient Greeks made the decisivebreak from unfreedom into freedom The Greeks Hegel says became thedistinctive people they were out of a mixing within them of heterogeneousOriental peoples and their cultures but the Greeks surmounted or overcame(uumlberwinden) this background (HG 214) By doing so the Greeks created theirlsquofree beautifulrsquo spirit (374) The Greeks overcame their Oriental preconditions tolsquomake themselvesrsquo (372 see also 393ndash94)

However this view that the Greeks lsquoovercamersquo the Oriental world ofunfreedom seems overstated by Hegelrsquos own lights For Hegel himself theGreeks mark only the latest phase in a growing consciousness of freedomrunning from China through India to Persia and culminating in EgyptPersiarsquos most advanced province Egypt is the hinge between Orient andOccident in which the human soulrsquos intrinsic capacity for freedom was almostgrasped But it was not quite grasped for the soul was still not distinguishedfrom animal nature a distinction the Greeks went on to make (HG 334 368)That lack of distinction is shown by the way the Egyptians modelled their godsand goddesses on animal species often with animal heads Yet for Hegel theGreeks too stopped short of recognizing that all people have an inherent capacityfor freedom They admitted freedom only to male native-born slave-ownersIn that way their view of freedom remained intermingled with acceptance ofnatural contingency ie accidents of birth sex and geographical location (H 88)So the difference between the Egyptian viewmdashhuman freedom is incompletelydistinguished from (animal) naturemdashand the Greek viewmdashhuman freedom isagain incompletely distinguished from naturemdashappears to be a difference ofdegree not kind11

Hegelrsquos lsquoovercomingrsquo idea therefore sits uncomfortably with his graduatedportrayal of historyrsquos stages That portrayal could be taken to show that belief infreedom is not exclusively European since the Persians and Egyptians already hadversions of that belief To be sure they were inadequate versions (for Hegel)mdashbutthen so was the Greeksrsquo And by extension the Indians and Chinese likewise hadversions of the belief in freedommdasheven more inadequate ones since theyattributed freedom only to lsquoonersquo not lsquosomersquomdashbut where that inadequacy stilldifferentiates these peoples from the Greeks only by degree and not kind (more soin the Indian case since the lsquoonersquo is a whole caste) If the Oriental peoples did haveversions however unsatisfactory of the belief in freedom then Hegel should nothave denied that these peoples are historical For if it is believed that someone is

Alison Stone

13

free be it only lsquoonersquo ruler or caste then others may claim and demand that samefreedom for themselves powering historical change

Now Hegel regards the Africans and indigenous Americans as lackingfreedom more radically than the Orientals yet contrary evidence was available tohim He might for instance have noted the Iroquois Confederacy of five (latersix) Native American tribes founded c1600 and dissolved c1800 a system ofintra- and inter-tribal governance which lsquomaximized individual freedom whileseeking to minimize excess governmental interference in peoplersquos livesrsquo (Johansen1982 9) influencing the American Constitution And Hegel embellishedexaggerated and at times outright distorted his sources on Africa so as to portraya people without any respect for human life freedom or rightsmdashmore so thanthe sources suggested and they were already unreliable (see Bernasconi 1998)12

The way was open to Hegel to recognize Africans and indigenous Americans ashaving views of freedom even if he classed them as even less adequate thanOriental ones With that those peoples would like the Orientals have had anentry to history

Nonetheless Hegel preserves his division of European freedom from non-European unfreedom by counting all the European stages as stages of freedomdown to its lowest level and all the non-European stages as stages of unfreedomright up to where unfreedom is almost freedom but not quite But the placementof this dividing line appears arbitrary Consider for example Hegelrsquos view thatHindus are not conscious of their own freedom because they fail to distinguishthemselves as human agents from nature (HG 256 273ndash81) On Hegelrsquosaccount as wersquove just seen there are ways that the ancient Greeks did not fullyextricate human agency from nature either somdashon his own termsmdashit is not clearthat the difference here is one of kind (history versus non-history freedom versusunfreedom) rather than degree (more or less freedom more or less far along thehistorical path towards full freedom)

Hegel could and it seems should have interpreted much of hismaterial as evidencing how non-European peoples have grasped and practisedfreedom albeit imperfectly We might still find this revised Hegeliannarrative objectionable assuming that it ranks non-European conceptions offreedom as less advanced than European ones Yet once it is admittedthat non-European peoples are historical in principle Hegel would alsohave to trace how historical advances unfolded in those societies so re-interpreting his material once again Each continent would have its own history ofprogression in consciousness of freedom rather than non-Europeancontinents merely paving the way for Europe The several continents wouldhave histories of freedom that run in parallel rather than corresponding tomore or less advanced phases of a single historical line that culminates in modernEurope

Hegel and Colonialism

14

Neither of these revised Hegelian narrativesmdashthe single line or parallel linesversionsmdashsupports colonialism not even the single line model on whichnon-European peoplesrsquo native levels of freedom are although real yetdeficient compared to European ones By recognizing freedom howeverunsatisfactorily non-European cultures would still have the internal potential andmotor to advance to greater freedom In that case colonization would not benecessary for non-European peoplesrsquo achieving freedom and would not bejustified as a necessary step in the realization of universal freedom Anotherplank in Hegelrsquos justification of colonization is that colonized peoples enjoyed nofreedom pre-colonizationmdashso that despite its abrogation of their freedomcolonization did not worsen their position (and ultimately would improve it) Butif these peoples did have a grasp of freedom however imperfect thencolonization stood to worsen their position That risk is especially pronouncedgiven Hegelrsquos own perspective that some violence is necessary for colonizationand given the role of contingency in human affairs that that violence may wellmushroom beyond the necessary minimum Further for Hegel colonizationrequires the extirpation of native cultures but if these are not cultures ofunfreedom then that extirpation is not justified Apparently then Hegel shouldby his own lights have opposed colonialism for his own philosophy generates acase against it

IV The Greeks history and self-liberation from nature

The view just canvassed is that despite the Eurocentrism and pro-colonialism ofHegelrsquos substantial narrative in the PWH his distinctive account of freedom asdeveloping historically through successive civilizations does not in itselfnecessitate his substantive Eurocentrism and when extricated from the latteryields a case against colonialism However we can distinguish weaker andstronger versions of this view More weakly Hegelrsquos basic account of freedomcan be separated from his actual pro-colonialism and so does not necessarilyimply pro-colonialism but contains anti-colonial possibilities as well as thepro-colonial possibilities that Hegel developed from it More strongly Hegelrsquosbasic account of freedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism andwhen so separated this account implies anti-colonialism and has an inherentlyanti-colonial direction I endorse the weaker but not the stronger claim and theweaker one only subject to a significant qualification Hegelrsquos basic account offreedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism but not as easily asSection III suggested This is because Hegelrsquos conception of freedom asself-determination has significant connections with his Eurocentrism

Alison Stone

15

In Section III I suggested that Hegelrsquos divisions Greeksnon-Greeks freeunfree look arbitrary But actually they are not For Hegel

Its [Greecersquos] principle is that self-conscious freedom stepsforth hellip [Regarding t]he unity of spirit with nature hellip thespecificity of this unity [in the Greek case] is to be graspedOne unity is the Oriental hellip consciousness immersed innature a [new kind of] harmony is now to be broughtforth [by the Greeks] in which hellip spirit dominates Spirit nowdetermines nature and this is a spiritual unity hellip (Hei 117 myemphases)

[The] fundamental characteristic [of the Greek spirit is] that thefreedom of spirit is conditioned by and in essential relation tosome natural stimulus Greek freedom is stimulated bysomething other and is free because it changes and produces thestimulus from out of itself (aus sich) (S 238 my emphasis)

Thus the Greeks were free in that they were at home with themselves in theother ie nature But this does not mean that the content of their practices andway of life was determined by natural givens such as the Greeksrsquo given impulsesRather they reshaped these givens and so became at-home-with-themselves inthem In the Greek case then spirit lsquodeterminedrsquo nature whereas previouslyspirit had been immersed or absorbed (versenkt) in nature This Greekdetermination of nature by spiritmdashspiritrsquos investment of nature with meaningof its ownmdashwas made possible by a prior moment first carried out by theGreeks through which lsquospirit is no longer immersed [versenkt] in nature hellip [but]releas[es] itself from nature [sich losmachend von der Natur]rsquo (HG 395ndash96) Thismoment in which the human spirit first releases or sets itself free from naturecorresponds to the overcoming (uumlberwinden) by the Greeks of their mixed ethnicheritage a moment of overcoming through which they became able to remakethat heritage for themselves to make themselves Hegel is explicit that none ofthe worldrsquos other peoples to that point had achieved this

Even so for Hegel the Greeks exercised freedom always with respect tonature and existing givens in the worldmdashre-shaping what they found alreadythere rather than creating a totally new world out of themselves Hence theGreeks did not regard free individuals as being capable of adjudicatingindependently on the given natural and social world through their own reason orof generating norms and principles purely through the exercise of their spiritualfreedom Or as Hegel also puts it elsewhere individual subjectivity was notdifferentiated from social substance but the individual identified fully andunquestioningly with his or her social role and there was no ground for

Hegel and Colonialism

16

independent social criticism (see Hardimon 1993) Connected with all this theGreeks restricted freedom to some people only effectively stipulating that onlythose with certain kinds of naturemdashmale free-bornmdashor natural locationmdashnativeGreekmdashhad the power of self-determination In these ways spiritrsquos freedomremained lsquoconditionedrsquo or limited (bedingt) bymdashalthough not immersed inmdashnature (and see HG 390)

However these limitations contradicted the essence of self-determination asthe Greeks understood it as including a moment of overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature such that the power to overcome nature cannotpossibly be limited by nature (or it would not be a power to overcome nature atall) Thus lsquoin the principle of Greek freedom inasmuch as it is freedom it isimplied that thought must be free for itself rsquo (HG 268)mdashalthough the Greeks fora long time did not explicitly grasp or follow through on that implicationNonetheless in the end that contradiction was what made it possible for theGreeksrsquo exclusion of some people from freedom and their other ways ofrestricting freedomrsquos scope to come in for criticism The criticism came withSocrates and the Sophists claiming that thought can adjudicate rationally on whatis and generate norms by itself (417) In that freedom of thought was therebygrasped as fully independent of nature it was also grasped as universal at least inprinciple In these two ways lsquoThought hellip introduces an opposition [Gegensatz][to the Greek mixture of freedom and nature] and asserts the validity ofessentially rational principlesrsquo (S 267)

For Hegel then Greek culture enabled rational criticism of what isincluding of limited freedom as no pre-Greek cultures did just because theGreeks had established a root opposition between freedom and nature whereaslsquoin the Oriental states in which a lack of opposition is present no moral freedomcan come aboutrsquo (267) Although the advent of rational critique brought on thedemise of Greek culture Europe was thereby also set on the path oftransformative historical change We see then why in his own terms Hegel saysthat non-European peoples could not advance critical claims for freedomrsquosextension but uncritically accepted the authority of their rulersmdashpatriarchalauthority in China caste hierarchy and caste-based restrictions and rituals inIndia and state power in Persia Non-Europeans could not question suchauthorities because their cultures did not grasp freedom as including the momentof overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature and the given Becausefreedom was not grasped as including that moment of human separation fromnature and the given no contradiction was perceived in freedom being limited bynature eg confined to people of certain castes or by given states of affairs egcustomary authority and ritual Non-Europeans lacked a critical motor to drivesocial change hence lacked history propermdashor indeed freedom as properlydistinguished from unfreedom

Alison Stone

17

So for Hegel there is a genuine difference in kind not merely degreebetween the Greek and post-Greek European world on the one hand and thenon-European world on the other the Europenon-Europe divide is notarbitrary but has a philosophical rationale For while the Greek view of freedomwas like non-European views limited and inadequate the former was moreadvanced in one key respectmdashthe inclusion in freedom of a primary moment oflsquoovercomingrsquo naturemdashwhich enabled the Greek and post-Greek European worldto become self-critical self-revising and so historical This is what motivatesHegel to identify Greek and post-Greek European views as views of freedomhowever limited whereas non-European views that might prima facie look likeviews of freedom are still actually modes of unfreedom

Once again we might object that non-Europeans have at times construedfreedom as including this moment of overcoming nature Even on Hegelrsquosaccount Hindus appreciate the human power to abstract from the world inthought He maintains though that this is merely an intellectual withdrawaland that when it comes to practical agency Hindus see human agency as immersedin not including any moment of self-freeing-from nature (see eg S 157ndash58)In response we could with Jaspal Peter Sahota (2016) agree that in classicalIndian thought there has been a tendency to locate human agency within naturebut argue against Hegel that this does not constitute a real absence offreedom but rather a different conception of freedom We might then say thatbecause thesemdashand othermdashnon-European views were still views of freedom thoseviews were still sufficient to motivate social criticism and hence place non-European peoples in history even without the element of overcoming natureHowever such a position would take us further away from Hegelrsquos own accountof the historicity of freedom according which as we have seen that moment ofovercoming nature uniquely new in ancient Greece is crucial in poweringhistorical progression

Hegelrsquos basic account of freedom and its historicity thus has more extensiveand significant connections with his Eurocentrism than I suggested inSection III In particular that account connects with Hegelrsquos denial that non-European peoples are historicalmdashie can come to freedom on their ownmdashandhence with his case for colonialism as the only route along which those peoplescan reach freedom These connections suggest that after all we cannotstraightforwardly take up Hegelrsquos account of freedom and its historicity whilesloughing off his pro-colonialism This is not to say that we cannot separate outthese parts of his thought at all But rescuing Hegel from himself is set to be acomplicated process not quick or straightforward To the extent that such arescue is possible Hegelrsquos pro-colonialism cannot rightly be counted as necessaryto his thought or system Yet his pro-colonialism does have extensive anddeep-seated connections with his other viewsmdashenough to show that it is not the

Hegel and Colonialism

18

case that Hegel should not have endorsed colonialism by his own standardsRather he did and could endorse it coherently in his own terms although otheranti-colonialist possibilities were also available within his own terms which hecould have developed

So the claim that Hegelrsquos account of freedom is inherently anti-colonial isunduly strong Through his understanding of freedom as involving spiritextricating itself from nature that account has sustained links with hisEurocentrism and so his pro-colonialism We can nonetheless envisage variousmanoeuvres by which to maintain that freedom develops historically for all theworldrsquos peoples for example by saying that they have several conceptions offreedom where freedom can but does not have to include self-liberation fromnature Then ancient Greece would initiate one historical pathway to freedombut not the only one Even so Hegelrsquos own account of freedom and its historicitydoes not inherently drive us to make these intellectual manoeuvres but onlypermits them In sum if Hegelrsquos view of freedom does not necessarily implypro-colonialism neither is it inherently anti-colonial We can make distinctionsand qualifications within his thought so as to yield anti-colonial conclusions butthis is only one of several possible lines of development of which his thoughtadmits another being its elaboration into the Eurocentric and pro-colonialsystem that Hegel in fact forged

There is a broader moral Wemdashie the heirs of the European heritage thatruns through philosophy into modern political thoughtmdashshould not let thisheritage off the hook too easily This heritage including Hegelrsquos thought hasbeen implicated in colonialism in various ways To be sure because it extols andarticulates the values of freedom and equality this heritage also furnishesconceptual resources for critiquing colonialism and giving support to anti-colonial struggles and anti-colonial thinkers and activists have drawn on modernEuropean ideas for this purpose For example the Haitian revolutionariesdeclared that they were acting in allegiance to the emancipatory goals of theFrench Revolution This might lead us to suppose that the European politicallegacy is intrinsically liberatory and that theorists in the European traditionmdashHegel includedmdashhave only ever justified colonialism due to unfortunateprejudices that led them to go back on their own principles

I believe that taking that view exculpates our predecessors too quicklyand leaves us at risk of inadvertently embracing ideas inherited from thesepredecessors which actually have deep-rooted internal connections withEurocentric and pro-colonial attitudes This is not to say that we should orcould repudiate these ideas outright Rather in view of their connections withcolonialism we need to think carefully and critically about how far to take theseinherited ideas forward and how we might do so differently My aim has been tohelp us cultivate this caution in Hegelrsquos case by acknowledging that while his

Alison Stone

19

thought harbours anti-colonial possibilities it also has real and tenacious linkswith colonialism of which we should remind mindful13

Alison StoneLancaster University UKastonelancasteracuk

Notes

1 Contributions include those by Bernasconi 1998 2007 2016 Bonetto 2006 de Laurentiis2014 McCarney and Bernasconi 2003 Mowad 2013 Parekh 2009 Purtschert 2010 andTibebu 20102 However see Buck-Morss 2000 andmdashfor highly critical accountsmdashDussel [1992] 1995 and1993 Guha 2002 Tibebu 2010 Also relevant are Bird-Pollan 2014 (on Hegel and Fanon)Brennan 2013 (on Hegelrsquos influence on post-colonialism) Buchwalter 2009 (defending Hegelagainst charges of Eurocentrism) Monahan 2017 (Creolizing Hegel) and Serequeberhan 1989(on colonialism in the Philosophy of Right)3 Ranajit Guha identifies another argument for colonialism in the Philosophy of Rightfrom the lsquorightsrsquo that Hegel claims civilized nations have with respect to less advanced ones(PR sect351 376) These rights Guha argues are lsquorights of conquestrsquo noting Hegelrsquos praise for Britishmilitary victories over India led by Robert Clive (1725ndash74) whose conquests established theEast India Companyrsquos rule over Bengal and other Indian states See Guha 2002 43ndash44PR sect372A 364 and 474 note 1)Abbreviations usedEN=Hegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller Oxford Clarendon PressEM= Hegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind Trans W Wallace and A V Miller Oxford OxfordUniversity Press Cited by paragraph and page numberN=Hegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reason in Historytrans H B Nisbet Cambridge UK Cambridge University PressS=Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NY Prometheus BooksPR=Hegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B Nisbet Cambridge UKCambridge University PressHei=Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink4 Hegel lectured on the PWH in 182223 182425 182627 182829 and 183031 Hismanuscripts of the Introduction from 1822 (rev 1828) and 183031 survive as do manytranscripts between them covering every course Some such as de Laurentiis (2014) are waryof directly attributing to Hegel views notably on race expressed only in the transcripts I agreethat we should disambiguate sources but where multiple independently written transcripts

Hegel and Colonialism

20

converge as domdashextensivelymdashseveral transcripts of the PWH we may take them to bereliable Accordingly I refer to Hegelrsquos manuscripts (abbreviated H) as in Hegel 2011 which isthe English translation of the corresponding volume of the Gesammelte Werke (Hegel 1995) andthe integrated text of the 182223 course composed primarily from Hothorsquos and Griesheimrsquostranscripts (abb HG) included in Hegel 2011 (the German is Hegel 1996) Since the Germancritical edition of the transcripts remains incomplete for materials on Hegelrsquos later coursesI have used Heimannrsquos transcript of 183031 whenever possible (Hegel 2005 abb Hei)otherwise the composite texts produced by Karl Hegel (Hegel 1986) and translated by Sibree(Hegel 1991 abb S) and by Georg LassonJohannes Hoffmeister (Hegel 1988) translated byNisbet (Hegel 1975 abb N) I quote English translations whenever available sometimesadjusted in view of the German5 For more on contingency in Hegel see inter alia Burbidge 2007 esp ch 1 Burbidge stressesthe extent to which Hegel lsquotakes the contingencies of history seriouslyrsquo (2007 9)6 For Hegel lsquonaturehellip is indeed a rational system operating in its own distinct elementrsquo (N 44)The division into continents is rational in that different natural features and their varietiesmdashmountains and plains lands and seas and their fusion and differentiationmdasheach find fullembodiment in different continents (EM sect393 and R 40ndash41) In a sense then non-Europeansare subject to reason and rational progression insofar as nature imposes it on them fromthe outside rather than by exercising rational thought for themselves This coheres withHegelrsquos view that these peoples are immersed in nature out of which only Europeans can liftthem see below7 This recalls Hegelrsquos derivation of time from space in the Philosophy of Nature a derivation thatpositions time as more advanced than space (EN sectsect256ndash57 31ndash36)8 This is evident from eg Hegelrsquos discussion of the colonization of America see Section II9 Hegel connects formation with possession (PR sect56 85ndash86) albeit in the very differentcontext of modern European societies in which private property is institutionalized I leaveunexplored here how far his ideas about slaveryrsquos educative power may be informed by hislordbondsman dialectic10 For instance some interpreters defend Hegel against charges of Eurocentrism and racism(eg Buchwalter 2009 Houlgate [1991] 2015 35ndash37 McCarney in McCarney and Bernasconi2003 Mowad 2013) others stress Hegelrsquos founding importance for anti-colonial thought(Brennan 2013) and numerous readers of Hegel as a thinker of freedom (eg Patten 1999)see no need to discuss his position on colonialism presumably on the grounds that the latteris a merely accidental avoidable part of his thought from which his essential views on freedomcan be extracted11 For Hegel the Greeks were greatly influenced by the Egyptians whose influence theynonetheless overcame Here he is close to accepting what Martin Bernal calls the lsquoancientmodelrsquo of the Greeksrsquo origins a model to which the Greeks themselves adhered later-nineteenth-century Europeans instead espoused an lsquoAryan modelrsquo on which Greek cultureproper arose from northern invaders driving out earlier Egyptian and Phoenician influences([1987] 1991) Bernal argues that the Aryan model had Eurocentric motivations if the Greeks

Alison Stone

21

the supposed originators of Europersquos distinctive culture were actually the Egyptiansrsquo heirsthen given that Egypt is within Africa the EuropeAfrica divide would crumble A furthercomplicating factor is whether the Egyptians were seen as black Africans Bernasconi (2007)argues that Hegel thought so as did most other Europeans of his time Later the Egyptiansrsquoracial status was changedmdashto Mediterranean (ie Caucasian)mdashto hold up the divide betweenEurope-as-white and Africa-as-black Bernasconi suggests that Hegel himself dealt with thepotential anomalymdashof highly cultured black Africans giving much to the Greeksmdashby makingthe EgyptGreece transition the site of the key conceptual transition from unfreedom tofreedom nature to spirit (2007 212ndash13) This ties in with my argument in Section IV thatHegel actually did have grounds on his own terms to construe the apparently gradual EgyptGreece transition as actually being a sharp divide12 Bernasconi (2016) has recently shown how Hegel likewise distorted his sources on China tothe detriment of the Chinese13 I thank Bob Stern and the referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions

Bibliography

Bernal M [1987] (1991) Black Athena The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical CivilisationVol 1 London VintageBernasconi R (1998) lsquoHegel at the Court of the Ashantirsquo in S Barnett (ed)Hegel After Derrida Albany NY SUNYBernasconi R (2007) lsquoThe Return of Africa Hegel and the Question of theRacial Identity of the Egyptiansrsquo in P T Grier (ed) Identity and Difference AlbanyNY SUNYBernasconi R (2016) lsquoChina on Parade Hegelrsquos Manipulation of his Sources andhis Change of Mindrsquo in B Brandt and D L Purdy (eds) China in the GermanEnlightenment Toronto University of Toronto PressBird-Pollan S (2014) Hegel Freud and Fanon The Dialectic of Emancipation LondonRowman and Littlefield InternationalBonetto S (2006) lsquoRace and Racism in HegelmdashAn AnalysisrsquoMinerva An InternetJournal of Philosophy 10Brennan T (2013) lsquoHegel Empire and Anti-Colonial Thoughtrsquo in G Huggan(ed) The Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies Oxford Oxford University PressBuchwalter A (2009) lsquoIs Hegelrsquos Philosophy of History Eurocentricrsquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYBuck-Morss S (2000) lsquoHegel and Haitirsquo Critical Inquiry 264 821ndash65Burbidge J (2007) Hegelrsquos Systematic Contingency Basingstoke Palgrave MacmillanDe Laurentiis A (2014) lsquoRace in Hegel Text and Contextrsquo in M Egger (ed)Philosophie Nach Kant Neue Wege zum Verstaumlndnis von Kants Transzendental- undMoralphilosophie Berlin De Gruyter

Hegel and Colonialism

22

Dussel E [1992] (1995) The Invention of the Americas trans M D Barber NewYork ContinuumDussel E (1993) lsquoEurocentrism and Modernityrsquo Boundary 2 203 65ndash76Fanon F [1952] (2008) Black Skin White Masks trans R Philcox New YorkGroveGuha R (2002) History at the Limit of World-History New York ColumbiaUniversity PressHardimon M (1993) Hegelrsquos Social Philosophy Cambridge Cambridge UniversityPressHegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller OxfordClarendonHegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind trans W Wallace and A V MillerOxford Oxford University PressHegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reasonin History trans H B Nisbet Cambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1986) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Geschichte Werke Vol 12ed E Moldenhauer and K M Michel Frankfurt Suhrkamp [Englishtranslation Sibree]Hegel G W F (1988) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Vols 1-3 edG Lasson Vols 1-4 Hamburg Meiner [English translation of volume 1 Nisbet]Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NYPrometheus BooksHegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B NisbetCambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1995) lsquoVorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der WeltgeschichteEinleitungrsquo in W Jaeschke (ed) Vorlesungsmanuskripte II (1916ndash1831)Gesammelte Werke Vol 18 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown andHodgson]Hegel G W F (1996) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Berlin 182223 Nachschriften von Griesheim Hotho und Kehler ed Karl Brehmer K-H Iltingund Hoo Nam Seelmann Hegel Vorlesungen Ausgew Nachschriften und ManuskripteVol 12 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown and Hodgson]Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink Abb HeiHegel G W F (2011) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Volume 1Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822ndash3 ed and trans R F Brownand P C Hodgson with assistance of W G Geuss Oxford Clarendon PressHoulgate S [1991] 2015 An Introduction to Hegel Freedom Truth and HistoryOxford BlackwellJohansen B E (1982) Forgotten Founders How the American Indians Helped ShapeDemocracy Boston Harvard Common Press

Alison Stone

23

McCarney J and Bernasconi R (2003) lsquoExchange Hegelrsquos Racismrsquo RadicalPhilosophy 119(MayJune) 32ndash37Monahan M (ed) (2017) Creolizing Hegel London Rowman and LittlefieldInternationalMowad N (2013) lsquoThe Place of Nationality in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of Politicsand Religion A Defense of Hegel on the Charges of National Chauvinism andRacismrsquo in A Nuzzo (ed) Hegel on Religion and Politics Albany NY SUNYParekh S (2009) lsquoHegelrsquos New World History Freedom and Racersquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYPatten A (1999) Hegelrsquos Idea of Freedom Oxford Oxford University PressPurtschert P (2010) lsquoOn the Limit of Spirit Hegelrsquos Racism Revisitedrsquo Philosophyand Social Criticism 369 1039ndash51Quijano A (2000) lsquoColoniality of Power Eurocentrism and Latin AmericarsquoNepantla Views from South 13 533ndash80Sahota J P (2016) lsquoHegelrsquos Critique of Hinduism A Responsersquo Hegel Bulletin372 305ndash17Serequeberhan T (1989) lsquoThe Idea of Colonialism in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of RightrsquoInternational Philosophical Quarterly 293 301ndash18Shohat E and Stam R [1994] (2014) Unthinking Eurocentrism New YorkRoutledgeTibebu T (2010) Hegel and the Third World The Making of Eurocentrism in WorldHistory Syracuse NY Syracuse University PressWa Thiongrsquoo N (2012) Globalectics Theory and the Politics of Knowing New YorkColumbia University Press

Hegel and Colonialism

24

  • Hegel and Colonialism
Page 8: Hegel and Colonialism - Lancaster University · 2017-06-30 · Hegel and Colonialism Alison Stone Abstract This article explores the implications of Hegel’s Philosophy of World

positively emerge in the passages on the lsquogeographical conditions of historyrsquo thataddress the lsquonew worldrsquo

It does not matter that Mexico and Peru did indeed havesignificant civilisations since they were of a feebler stock andare long gone The new world has shown itself to be muchfeebler than the old world hellip Some of the tribes of NorthAmerica have disappeared and some have retreated andgenerally declined hellip (HG 192ndash93)

In 183031 Hegel expanded on the new world adding that African Negroes hadto be brought to America to do the physical work of which the weak natives wereincapable (Hei 59) For lsquothe Negroes are far more receptive to European culturethan the Indianshellip [and] it will still be a long time before the Europeans succeedin producing any genuine feeling of self [Selbstgefuumlhl]rsquo in indigenous Americans(S 81) Hegel praises the Church in Latin America for beginning to instildiscipline in the natives through these and other colonial efforts the lsquoauthenticAmericans are hellip now beginning to educate themselves [sich hineinzubilden] inEuropean culturersquo (N 165) Incidentally Hegelrsquos points about indigenousAmericans apply equally to Aboriginal Australians since he includes lsquoNewHollandrsquomdashie Australiamdashin the new world

As for the old world Hegel begins with Africamdashthe lsquoauthenticrsquo sub-SaharanAfrica of the Negroes He contends that the Negroes know no morality andpractice slavery along with polygamy cannibalism and other customs thatembody total ignorance about freedom

Another characteristic fact in reference to the Negroes isSlavery Negroes are taken into slavery by Europeans and soldto America Despite this their lot is even worse in their owncountry where an equally absolute slavery is present for theoverall foundation of slavery is that man has no consciousnessof his freedom yet and so sinks down to a mere thing aworthless object hellip Slavery is in and for itself wrong [Unrecht]for the essence of humanity is freedom but for this man mustfirst become mature [reif] This is why the gradual abolition ofslavery is therefore more appropriate and more right[Richtigeres] than its sudden removal (S 96ndash99)

So European enslavement of Africans involves a degree of moral wrong insofaras Africans have intrinsic capacities for freedom Yet before enslavementAfricans did not know themselves to have that capacity accordingly theyenslaved and mistreated one another and acted merely on their natural desiresThe latter does not constitute freedom Hegel insists if I act from naturally given

Hegel and Colonialism

8

desires I am still not determining for myself how to act So slavery was relativelyan improvement because it lsquomaturedrsquo the Negroes to become aware of theirfreedom lsquoOne must educate the Negroes in their freedom by taming theirnaturalnessrsquo (Hei 70)

We can infer from Hegelrsquos comments that slavery educates in several ways(i) Those enslaved are subjected to European culture and ethical standards (fromeg N 165) (ii) Slavery imposes the discipline of work (eg Hei 59) In workingone learns to hold onersquos natural desires in check and thereby see oneself ascapable of deliberating about or even rejecting them (iii) Work also instils anawareness of onersquos capacity to mould natural objectsmdasha sense of lsquoachievingindependence through onersquos own activityrsquo (61) (iv) Ironically those enslaved thusacquire a sense of private property (61)mdashpartly by learning of Europeaninstitutions of property and partly by imposing form on objects thereby forminga sense of lsquopossessingrsquo them which fosters an appreciation of property9

In sum lsquoSlavery hellip is necessary at those stages where the state [and itspeople] has not yet arrived at rationality It is an element in the transition to ahigher stagersquo (HG 197) Because slavery still has elements of wrong though thefinal step must be for slavery to end However Hegel cautions slavery shouldnot be suddenly abolished because it must end after not before the Negroes havebeen educated through it lsquoIf slavery was altogether wrong then the Europeansshould give the slaves their freedom immediately but in that way the mostfrightening consequences arise as in the French coloniesrsquo (Hei 70)

Hegelrsquos line of thought then takes in slavery and colonization at once(understandably since enslavement of Africans was fundamental to colonialAmerica) Use of slavery in the colonies might be judged wrong because itviolates the rights equality and freedom of the slaves But through being enslavedslaves take steps forward in their consciousness of freedom which they could nototherwise make for Africa is intrinsically pre-historical and unfree so thatfreedom can come to Africans only from without Analogously one might thinkthat colonization was altogether wrong because it violated the rights equality andfreedom of indigenous peoplesmdashbut no for before colonization those peoplehad no awareness of their freedom They lsquoha[d] no sense of private property ofachieving independence through onersquos own activity or of securing onersquos propertythrough rightrsquo (61) By being forced to labour and being disciplined spiritually byagencies such as the Christian church these people will eventually learn abouttheir freedom Until then their subjection while partially wrong insofar as it issubjection is also partially right it is at least an improvement on the nativesremaining in their natural wholly unfree pre-colonial condition

Colonialism is justified on this view because it spreads freedom topeoples who otherwise both lack it and have no native means of acquiring itMoreover the colonizers are justified in extirpating the indigenous cultures of

Alison Stone

9

native peoplesmdashhence Hegelrsquos endorsement of the Christian clergy andmissionaries lsquosetting out to accustom the Indians to European culture andethics [Sitten]rsquo (N 164)mdashsince those indigenous cultures embody unfreedom Wemight wonder whether Hegel regards even the violence and slaughter thatoccurred during the colonization of America as justified He does acknowledgeEuropean especially Spanish violence towards indigenous Americans but he isonly overtly critical of this violence when the colonial project had he saysdegenerated into mere robbery (Hei 204) Moreover he disguises the extent ofEuropean violence by running together indigenous Americans having beenlsquodestroyed and slaughteredrsquo (untergegangen verdraumlngt) having disappeared(verschwunden) and having voluntarily withdrawn (haben sich zuruumlckgezogen N 163see also Parekh 2009) Hegel does not wholly denounce colonial violence becausehe thinks that Europersquos conquest of America was based on a sound goalmdashspreading freedom and the culture of freedom to all peoplemdashand that theviolence that was necessary for achieving that goal was justified But Hegel doesdisapprove of violence when it served merely an unworthy goalmdashrobbery

This is congruent with Hegelrsquos overall approach to violence in history whichhe memorably calls a lsquoslaughterbenchrsquo (Schlachtbank) On his view theconsciousness of freedom advances through each civilization in turn establishingits pre-eminence by prevailing culturally and militarily over its predecessor Tothe extent that war and violence are necessary for progress they are justified(although lsquojustifiedrsquo does not mean lsquoto be celebratedrsquo) Even in these termsthough much of the violence carried out by European colonizersmdashthedecimation of many native American tribes the Middle Passagemdashwent beyondthe minimum necessary to subject non-Europeans to colonial control along theway to their ultimate freedom But likewise in history generally violence hasregularly gone beyond the minimum necessary to propel progress Such excessesare inevitable an aspect of the inescapable contingency of human affairs Theseexcesses of violence are not justified yet we can be reconciled to them as aninevitable albeit non-ideal concomitant of progress (H 90ndash91) PresumablyHegel thinks the same about the excesses of colonial violence

Hegelrsquos overall line of thought is that colonialism is not only justified butalso necessary as part of Europersquos centuries-long process of realizing freedom Alogical step in this process is to extend freedom to non-European peoples afterall the European principle is that all are free This extension can only occurthough by passing through a stage of subjugating non-European peoples sincethey have no native means of acquiring freedom lsquoThe [Negroesrsquo] condition isincapable of any development or culture [Entwicklung und Bildung] and theircondition as we see it today is as it has always beenrsquo (N 190) And lsquothe Negroes cannot move [bewegen] to any culturersquo (Hei 67) Likewise with indigenousAmericans America is new and young because it had no history until the

Hegel and Colonialism

10

Europeans arrived These claims do not mean that Negroes and indigenousAmericans cannot be educated they can But given their native ignorance offreedom they cannot educate themselves but must be educated by Europeanswhich requires that they first be subjected to European control

Hegelrsquos case for colonization could be extended to the Orientals He admitsthat unlike Africans and indigenous Americans the Oriental peoples do have anidea of freedommdashthat lsquoone is freersquomdashbut this idea remains so inadequate as tocount as unfreedom Hence lacking belief in their own freedom Oriental peoplecannot pursue any extensions or advancements of freedom and without suchpursuits to drive historical change their societies remain ahistorical Colonizationof these peoples for educative purposes would therefore be justified As long as apeople is at a low enough level to count as unfree and pre-historical that peoplecan advance only through having the European spirit imposed on it for beingpre-historical it has no native way to attain freedom And indeed Hegel does sayof India that lsquoThe English or rather the East India Company are the lords[Herren] of the land for it is the necessary fate of Asiatic empires to be subjected[unterworfen] to Europeans and China will also some day have to submit to thisfatersquo (S 142ndash43)

We should not be misled by an apparently conflicting statement in thePhilosophy of Right lsquoThe liberation of colonies hellip [is] of the greatest advantage tothe mother state just as the emancipation of slaves is of the greatest advantage tothe masterrsquo (PR sect248A 269) Hegelrsquos paradigm here is American independenceie the independence of what he is explicit and adamant is colonial EuropeanAmerica not Native America (N 165ndash66) That is America merits independenceonce its native populace is reduced or placed securely under European tutelageThis coheres with Hegelrsquos approving reference to independent Haiti in thePhilosophy of Mind (EM sect393A 40) he says that this is a Christian state that theNegroes could only found after having undergone long spiritual servitude Oncea people has been colonized sufficiently to acquire European culture as in Haitithen and only then does that people merit freedom

Hegelrsquos argument for colonialism is of the lsquocivilizing missionrsquo familyEffectively his defence is that colonialism benefits most those who fare worstunder itmdashcolonized peoplesmdashby civilizing and bringing them freedom that theycannot access without passing through colonial subjection For Hegelcolonialism and the advancement of freedom go hand-in-hand

III Saving Hegel from himself

Hegelrsquos PWH implies that colonialism is required to further the realization ofuniversal freedom Does this show that Hegelrsquos conception of freedom is

Alison Stone

11

necessarily bound up with his pro-colonialism If so thenmdashtaking it thatcolonialism was in fact morally wrongmdashpresumably his conception of freedomand its historical development must be rejected (although not necessarily freedomas such of course)

But perhaps that would be to dismiss Hegelrsquos thought too summarily andthereby to do disservice not only to Hegel but also to anti-colonial anddecolonizing thought and activism which after all has regularly drawn on Hegelboth directlymdasheg when Frantz Fanon ([1952] 2008) and Ngugi wa Thiongrsquoo(2012) use Hegel to critique colonialismmdashand indirectly through Hegelrsquosinfluence on Marxism and critical theory Moreover Hegelrsquos thought may stilloffer further anti-colonial resources which remain to be mined We mighttherefore reasonably seek to separate Hegelrsquos basic conception of freedom and itshistoricity from his Eurocentric narrative of history so that when so separatedthat basic conception tells against colonialism Such a viewmdashone that rescuesHegel from himselfmdashis often adopted more or less explicitly by hisinterpreters10 I now want to set out my own version of this type of viewalthough I will go on to complicate it in Section IV

The view is this We can separate the essentials of Hegelrsquos account offreedom from his concrete interpretation of the actual movement of historyHegel was wrong and prejudiced when he dismissed Africans indigenousAmericans and Orientals as unfree and incapable of coming to freedom on theirown Nevertheless his basic account of what freedom is including its necessaryhistorical development remains insightful A better informed judgment ofnon-European peoples would require a very different historical narrative Butthat does not undermine Hegelrsquos basic points that freedom develops historicallyin tandem with the consciousness of it as embodied in different cultures andsocial institutions When we separate these basic points from his actualnarrative we find that these points serve a progressive purpose yielding groundsto reject colonialism

This view dovetails with Hegelrsquos claim that the human capacity for self-determination is universal not confined to Europeans (see eg H 88) Admittedlythough this starting-point is only an abstract universal Self-determination can beactualized only when one is conscious of onersquos capacity for it and thatrequires social and cultural institutions a whole way of life which foster thatconsciousness Such a way of life arose for the first time only in ancient Greecefor Hegel so that actualized freedom does not obtain universallyArguably though given his basic view of freedom and its historicity Hegelcould and should have interpreted all the worldrsquos regions as taking part in thegradual historical unfolding of social institutions that support freedom Hegeldoes not do so because he denies that non-European peoples are conscious offreedom at all Since non-European societies were not conscious of freedom

Hegel and Colonialism

12

even in the restricted ways that the Greeks and Romans were the former had nobasis for moving forward historically by further advancing an already partlyrealized freedom

Thus what underpins Hegelrsquos denial of historicity to non-European peoplesis his sharp division of European freedom from non-European unfreedom Thatin turn is underpinned by his claim that the ancient Greeks made the decisivebreak from unfreedom into freedom The Greeks Hegel says became thedistinctive people they were out of a mixing within them of heterogeneousOriental peoples and their cultures but the Greeks surmounted or overcame(uumlberwinden) this background (HG 214) By doing so the Greeks created theirlsquofree beautifulrsquo spirit (374) The Greeks overcame their Oriental preconditions tolsquomake themselvesrsquo (372 see also 393ndash94)

However this view that the Greeks lsquoovercamersquo the Oriental world ofunfreedom seems overstated by Hegelrsquos own lights For Hegel himself theGreeks mark only the latest phase in a growing consciousness of freedomrunning from China through India to Persia and culminating in EgyptPersiarsquos most advanced province Egypt is the hinge between Orient andOccident in which the human soulrsquos intrinsic capacity for freedom was almostgrasped But it was not quite grasped for the soul was still not distinguishedfrom animal nature a distinction the Greeks went on to make (HG 334 368)That lack of distinction is shown by the way the Egyptians modelled their godsand goddesses on animal species often with animal heads Yet for Hegel theGreeks too stopped short of recognizing that all people have an inherent capacityfor freedom They admitted freedom only to male native-born slave-ownersIn that way their view of freedom remained intermingled with acceptance ofnatural contingency ie accidents of birth sex and geographical location (H 88)So the difference between the Egyptian viewmdashhuman freedom is incompletelydistinguished from (animal) naturemdashand the Greek viewmdashhuman freedom isagain incompletely distinguished from naturemdashappears to be a difference ofdegree not kind11

Hegelrsquos lsquoovercomingrsquo idea therefore sits uncomfortably with his graduatedportrayal of historyrsquos stages That portrayal could be taken to show that belief infreedom is not exclusively European since the Persians and Egyptians already hadversions of that belief To be sure they were inadequate versions (for Hegel)mdashbutthen so was the Greeksrsquo And by extension the Indians and Chinese likewise hadversions of the belief in freedommdasheven more inadequate ones since theyattributed freedom only to lsquoonersquo not lsquosomersquomdashbut where that inadequacy stilldifferentiates these peoples from the Greeks only by degree and not kind (more soin the Indian case since the lsquoonersquo is a whole caste) If the Oriental peoples did haveversions however unsatisfactory of the belief in freedom then Hegel should nothave denied that these peoples are historical For if it is believed that someone is

Alison Stone

13

free be it only lsquoonersquo ruler or caste then others may claim and demand that samefreedom for themselves powering historical change

Now Hegel regards the Africans and indigenous Americans as lackingfreedom more radically than the Orientals yet contrary evidence was available tohim He might for instance have noted the Iroquois Confederacy of five (latersix) Native American tribes founded c1600 and dissolved c1800 a system ofintra- and inter-tribal governance which lsquomaximized individual freedom whileseeking to minimize excess governmental interference in peoplersquos livesrsquo (Johansen1982 9) influencing the American Constitution And Hegel embellishedexaggerated and at times outright distorted his sources on Africa so as to portraya people without any respect for human life freedom or rightsmdashmore so thanthe sources suggested and they were already unreliable (see Bernasconi 1998)12

The way was open to Hegel to recognize Africans and indigenous Americans ashaving views of freedom even if he classed them as even less adequate thanOriental ones With that those peoples would like the Orientals have had anentry to history

Nonetheless Hegel preserves his division of European freedom from non-European unfreedom by counting all the European stages as stages of freedomdown to its lowest level and all the non-European stages as stages of unfreedomright up to where unfreedom is almost freedom but not quite But the placementof this dividing line appears arbitrary Consider for example Hegelrsquos view thatHindus are not conscious of their own freedom because they fail to distinguishthemselves as human agents from nature (HG 256 273ndash81) On Hegelrsquosaccount as wersquove just seen there are ways that the ancient Greeks did not fullyextricate human agency from nature either somdashon his own termsmdashit is not clearthat the difference here is one of kind (history versus non-history freedom versusunfreedom) rather than degree (more or less freedom more or less far along thehistorical path towards full freedom)

Hegel could and it seems should have interpreted much of hismaterial as evidencing how non-European peoples have grasped and practisedfreedom albeit imperfectly We might still find this revised Hegeliannarrative objectionable assuming that it ranks non-European conceptions offreedom as less advanced than European ones Yet once it is admittedthat non-European peoples are historical in principle Hegel would alsohave to trace how historical advances unfolded in those societies so re-interpreting his material once again Each continent would have its own history ofprogression in consciousness of freedom rather than non-Europeancontinents merely paving the way for Europe The several continents wouldhave histories of freedom that run in parallel rather than corresponding tomore or less advanced phases of a single historical line that culminates in modernEurope

Hegel and Colonialism

14

Neither of these revised Hegelian narrativesmdashthe single line or parallel linesversionsmdashsupports colonialism not even the single line model on whichnon-European peoplesrsquo native levels of freedom are although real yetdeficient compared to European ones By recognizing freedom howeverunsatisfactorily non-European cultures would still have the internal potential andmotor to advance to greater freedom In that case colonization would not benecessary for non-European peoplesrsquo achieving freedom and would not bejustified as a necessary step in the realization of universal freedom Anotherplank in Hegelrsquos justification of colonization is that colonized peoples enjoyed nofreedom pre-colonizationmdashso that despite its abrogation of their freedomcolonization did not worsen their position (and ultimately would improve it) Butif these peoples did have a grasp of freedom however imperfect thencolonization stood to worsen their position That risk is especially pronouncedgiven Hegelrsquos own perspective that some violence is necessary for colonizationand given the role of contingency in human affairs that that violence may wellmushroom beyond the necessary minimum Further for Hegel colonizationrequires the extirpation of native cultures but if these are not cultures ofunfreedom then that extirpation is not justified Apparently then Hegel shouldby his own lights have opposed colonialism for his own philosophy generates acase against it

IV The Greeks history and self-liberation from nature

The view just canvassed is that despite the Eurocentrism and pro-colonialism ofHegelrsquos substantial narrative in the PWH his distinctive account of freedom asdeveloping historically through successive civilizations does not in itselfnecessitate his substantive Eurocentrism and when extricated from the latteryields a case against colonialism However we can distinguish weaker andstronger versions of this view More weakly Hegelrsquos basic account of freedomcan be separated from his actual pro-colonialism and so does not necessarilyimply pro-colonialism but contains anti-colonial possibilities as well as thepro-colonial possibilities that Hegel developed from it More strongly Hegelrsquosbasic account of freedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism andwhen so separated this account implies anti-colonialism and has an inherentlyanti-colonial direction I endorse the weaker but not the stronger claim and theweaker one only subject to a significant qualification Hegelrsquos basic account offreedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism but not as easily asSection III suggested This is because Hegelrsquos conception of freedom asself-determination has significant connections with his Eurocentrism

Alison Stone

15

In Section III I suggested that Hegelrsquos divisions Greeksnon-Greeks freeunfree look arbitrary But actually they are not For Hegel

Its [Greecersquos] principle is that self-conscious freedom stepsforth hellip [Regarding t]he unity of spirit with nature hellip thespecificity of this unity [in the Greek case] is to be graspedOne unity is the Oriental hellip consciousness immersed innature a [new kind of] harmony is now to be broughtforth [by the Greeks] in which hellip spirit dominates Spirit nowdetermines nature and this is a spiritual unity hellip (Hei 117 myemphases)

[The] fundamental characteristic [of the Greek spirit is] that thefreedom of spirit is conditioned by and in essential relation tosome natural stimulus Greek freedom is stimulated bysomething other and is free because it changes and produces thestimulus from out of itself (aus sich) (S 238 my emphasis)

Thus the Greeks were free in that they were at home with themselves in theother ie nature But this does not mean that the content of their practices andway of life was determined by natural givens such as the Greeksrsquo given impulsesRather they reshaped these givens and so became at-home-with-themselves inthem In the Greek case then spirit lsquodeterminedrsquo nature whereas previouslyspirit had been immersed or absorbed (versenkt) in nature This Greekdetermination of nature by spiritmdashspiritrsquos investment of nature with meaningof its ownmdashwas made possible by a prior moment first carried out by theGreeks through which lsquospirit is no longer immersed [versenkt] in nature hellip [but]releas[es] itself from nature [sich losmachend von der Natur]rsquo (HG 395ndash96) Thismoment in which the human spirit first releases or sets itself free from naturecorresponds to the overcoming (uumlberwinden) by the Greeks of their mixed ethnicheritage a moment of overcoming through which they became able to remakethat heritage for themselves to make themselves Hegel is explicit that none ofthe worldrsquos other peoples to that point had achieved this

Even so for Hegel the Greeks exercised freedom always with respect tonature and existing givens in the worldmdashre-shaping what they found alreadythere rather than creating a totally new world out of themselves Hence theGreeks did not regard free individuals as being capable of adjudicatingindependently on the given natural and social world through their own reason orof generating norms and principles purely through the exercise of their spiritualfreedom Or as Hegel also puts it elsewhere individual subjectivity was notdifferentiated from social substance but the individual identified fully andunquestioningly with his or her social role and there was no ground for

Hegel and Colonialism

16

independent social criticism (see Hardimon 1993) Connected with all this theGreeks restricted freedom to some people only effectively stipulating that onlythose with certain kinds of naturemdashmale free-bornmdashor natural locationmdashnativeGreekmdashhad the power of self-determination In these ways spiritrsquos freedomremained lsquoconditionedrsquo or limited (bedingt) bymdashalthough not immersed inmdashnature (and see HG 390)

However these limitations contradicted the essence of self-determination asthe Greeks understood it as including a moment of overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature such that the power to overcome nature cannotpossibly be limited by nature (or it would not be a power to overcome nature atall) Thus lsquoin the principle of Greek freedom inasmuch as it is freedom it isimplied that thought must be free for itself rsquo (HG 268)mdashalthough the Greeks fora long time did not explicitly grasp or follow through on that implicationNonetheless in the end that contradiction was what made it possible for theGreeksrsquo exclusion of some people from freedom and their other ways ofrestricting freedomrsquos scope to come in for criticism The criticism came withSocrates and the Sophists claiming that thought can adjudicate rationally on whatis and generate norms by itself (417) In that freedom of thought was therebygrasped as fully independent of nature it was also grasped as universal at least inprinciple In these two ways lsquoThought hellip introduces an opposition [Gegensatz][to the Greek mixture of freedom and nature] and asserts the validity ofessentially rational principlesrsquo (S 267)

For Hegel then Greek culture enabled rational criticism of what isincluding of limited freedom as no pre-Greek cultures did just because theGreeks had established a root opposition between freedom and nature whereaslsquoin the Oriental states in which a lack of opposition is present no moral freedomcan come aboutrsquo (267) Although the advent of rational critique brought on thedemise of Greek culture Europe was thereby also set on the path oftransformative historical change We see then why in his own terms Hegel saysthat non-European peoples could not advance critical claims for freedomrsquosextension but uncritically accepted the authority of their rulersmdashpatriarchalauthority in China caste hierarchy and caste-based restrictions and rituals inIndia and state power in Persia Non-Europeans could not question suchauthorities because their cultures did not grasp freedom as including the momentof overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature and the given Becausefreedom was not grasped as including that moment of human separation fromnature and the given no contradiction was perceived in freedom being limited bynature eg confined to people of certain castes or by given states of affairs egcustomary authority and ritual Non-Europeans lacked a critical motor to drivesocial change hence lacked history propermdashor indeed freedom as properlydistinguished from unfreedom

Alison Stone

17

So for Hegel there is a genuine difference in kind not merely degreebetween the Greek and post-Greek European world on the one hand and thenon-European world on the other the Europenon-Europe divide is notarbitrary but has a philosophical rationale For while the Greek view of freedomwas like non-European views limited and inadequate the former was moreadvanced in one key respectmdashthe inclusion in freedom of a primary moment oflsquoovercomingrsquo naturemdashwhich enabled the Greek and post-Greek European worldto become self-critical self-revising and so historical This is what motivatesHegel to identify Greek and post-Greek European views as views of freedomhowever limited whereas non-European views that might prima facie look likeviews of freedom are still actually modes of unfreedom

Once again we might object that non-Europeans have at times construedfreedom as including this moment of overcoming nature Even on Hegelrsquosaccount Hindus appreciate the human power to abstract from the world inthought He maintains though that this is merely an intellectual withdrawaland that when it comes to practical agency Hindus see human agency as immersedin not including any moment of self-freeing-from nature (see eg S 157ndash58)In response we could with Jaspal Peter Sahota (2016) agree that in classicalIndian thought there has been a tendency to locate human agency within naturebut argue against Hegel that this does not constitute a real absence offreedom but rather a different conception of freedom We might then say thatbecause thesemdashand othermdashnon-European views were still views of freedom thoseviews were still sufficient to motivate social criticism and hence place non-European peoples in history even without the element of overcoming natureHowever such a position would take us further away from Hegelrsquos own accountof the historicity of freedom according which as we have seen that moment ofovercoming nature uniquely new in ancient Greece is crucial in poweringhistorical progression

Hegelrsquos basic account of freedom and its historicity thus has more extensiveand significant connections with his Eurocentrism than I suggested inSection III In particular that account connects with Hegelrsquos denial that non-European peoples are historicalmdashie can come to freedom on their ownmdashandhence with his case for colonialism as the only route along which those peoplescan reach freedom These connections suggest that after all we cannotstraightforwardly take up Hegelrsquos account of freedom and its historicity whilesloughing off his pro-colonialism This is not to say that we cannot separate outthese parts of his thought at all But rescuing Hegel from himself is set to be acomplicated process not quick or straightforward To the extent that such arescue is possible Hegelrsquos pro-colonialism cannot rightly be counted as necessaryto his thought or system Yet his pro-colonialism does have extensive anddeep-seated connections with his other viewsmdashenough to show that it is not the

Hegel and Colonialism

18

case that Hegel should not have endorsed colonialism by his own standardsRather he did and could endorse it coherently in his own terms although otheranti-colonialist possibilities were also available within his own terms which hecould have developed

So the claim that Hegelrsquos account of freedom is inherently anti-colonial isunduly strong Through his understanding of freedom as involving spiritextricating itself from nature that account has sustained links with hisEurocentrism and so his pro-colonialism We can nonetheless envisage variousmanoeuvres by which to maintain that freedom develops historically for all theworldrsquos peoples for example by saying that they have several conceptions offreedom where freedom can but does not have to include self-liberation fromnature Then ancient Greece would initiate one historical pathway to freedombut not the only one Even so Hegelrsquos own account of freedom and its historicitydoes not inherently drive us to make these intellectual manoeuvres but onlypermits them In sum if Hegelrsquos view of freedom does not necessarily implypro-colonialism neither is it inherently anti-colonial We can make distinctionsand qualifications within his thought so as to yield anti-colonial conclusions butthis is only one of several possible lines of development of which his thoughtadmits another being its elaboration into the Eurocentric and pro-colonialsystem that Hegel in fact forged

There is a broader moral Wemdashie the heirs of the European heritage thatruns through philosophy into modern political thoughtmdashshould not let thisheritage off the hook too easily This heritage including Hegelrsquos thought hasbeen implicated in colonialism in various ways To be sure because it extols andarticulates the values of freedom and equality this heritage also furnishesconceptual resources for critiquing colonialism and giving support to anti-colonial struggles and anti-colonial thinkers and activists have drawn on modernEuropean ideas for this purpose For example the Haitian revolutionariesdeclared that they were acting in allegiance to the emancipatory goals of theFrench Revolution This might lead us to suppose that the European politicallegacy is intrinsically liberatory and that theorists in the European traditionmdashHegel includedmdashhave only ever justified colonialism due to unfortunateprejudices that led them to go back on their own principles

I believe that taking that view exculpates our predecessors too quicklyand leaves us at risk of inadvertently embracing ideas inherited from thesepredecessors which actually have deep-rooted internal connections withEurocentric and pro-colonial attitudes This is not to say that we should orcould repudiate these ideas outright Rather in view of their connections withcolonialism we need to think carefully and critically about how far to take theseinherited ideas forward and how we might do so differently My aim has been tohelp us cultivate this caution in Hegelrsquos case by acknowledging that while his

Alison Stone

19

thought harbours anti-colonial possibilities it also has real and tenacious linkswith colonialism of which we should remind mindful13

Alison StoneLancaster University UKastonelancasteracuk

Notes

1 Contributions include those by Bernasconi 1998 2007 2016 Bonetto 2006 de Laurentiis2014 McCarney and Bernasconi 2003 Mowad 2013 Parekh 2009 Purtschert 2010 andTibebu 20102 However see Buck-Morss 2000 andmdashfor highly critical accountsmdashDussel [1992] 1995 and1993 Guha 2002 Tibebu 2010 Also relevant are Bird-Pollan 2014 (on Hegel and Fanon)Brennan 2013 (on Hegelrsquos influence on post-colonialism) Buchwalter 2009 (defending Hegelagainst charges of Eurocentrism) Monahan 2017 (Creolizing Hegel) and Serequeberhan 1989(on colonialism in the Philosophy of Right)3 Ranajit Guha identifies another argument for colonialism in the Philosophy of Rightfrom the lsquorightsrsquo that Hegel claims civilized nations have with respect to less advanced ones(PR sect351 376) These rights Guha argues are lsquorights of conquestrsquo noting Hegelrsquos praise for Britishmilitary victories over India led by Robert Clive (1725ndash74) whose conquests established theEast India Companyrsquos rule over Bengal and other Indian states See Guha 2002 43ndash44PR sect372A 364 and 474 note 1)Abbreviations usedEN=Hegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller Oxford Clarendon PressEM= Hegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind Trans W Wallace and A V Miller Oxford OxfordUniversity Press Cited by paragraph and page numberN=Hegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reason in Historytrans H B Nisbet Cambridge UK Cambridge University PressS=Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NY Prometheus BooksPR=Hegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B Nisbet Cambridge UKCambridge University PressHei=Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink4 Hegel lectured on the PWH in 182223 182425 182627 182829 and 183031 Hismanuscripts of the Introduction from 1822 (rev 1828) and 183031 survive as do manytranscripts between them covering every course Some such as de Laurentiis (2014) are waryof directly attributing to Hegel views notably on race expressed only in the transcripts I agreethat we should disambiguate sources but where multiple independently written transcripts

Hegel and Colonialism

20

converge as domdashextensivelymdashseveral transcripts of the PWH we may take them to bereliable Accordingly I refer to Hegelrsquos manuscripts (abbreviated H) as in Hegel 2011 which isthe English translation of the corresponding volume of the Gesammelte Werke (Hegel 1995) andthe integrated text of the 182223 course composed primarily from Hothorsquos and Griesheimrsquostranscripts (abb HG) included in Hegel 2011 (the German is Hegel 1996) Since the Germancritical edition of the transcripts remains incomplete for materials on Hegelrsquos later coursesI have used Heimannrsquos transcript of 183031 whenever possible (Hegel 2005 abb Hei)otherwise the composite texts produced by Karl Hegel (Hegel 1986) and translated by Sibree(Hegel 1991 abb S) and by Georg LassonJohannes Hoffmeister (Hegel 1988) translated byNisbet (Hegel 1975 abb N) I quote English translations whenever available sometimesadjusted in view of the German5 For more on contingency in Hegel see inter alia Burbidge 2007 esp ch 1 Burbidge stressesthe extent to which Hegel lsquotakes the contingencies of history seriouslyrsquo (2007 9)6 For Hegel lsquonaturehellip is indeed a rational system operating in its own distinct elementrsquo (N 44)The division into continents is rational in that different natural features and their varietiesmdashmountains and plains lands and seas and their fusion and differentiationmdasheach find fullembodiment in different continents (EM sect393 and R 40ndash41) In a sense then non-Europeansare subject to reason and rational progression insofar as nature imposes it on them fromthe outside rather than by exercising rational thought for themselves This coheres withHegelrsquos view that these peoples are immersed in nature out of which only Europeans can liftthem see below7 This recalls Hegelrsquos derivation of time from space in the Philosophy of Nature a derivation thatpositions time as more advanced than space (EN sectsect256ndash57 31ndash36)8 This is evident from eg Hegelrsquos discussion of the colonization of America see Section II9 Hegel connects formation with possession (PR sect56 85ndash86) albeit in the very differentcontext of modern European societies in which private property is institutionalized I leaveunexplored here how far his ideas about slaveryrsquos educative power may be informed by hislordbondsman dialectic10 For instance some interpreters defend Hegel against charges of Eurocentrism and racism(eg Buchwalter 2009 Houlgate [1991] 2015 35ndash37 McCarney in McCarney and Bernasconi2003 Mowad 2013) others stress Hegelrsquos founding importance for anti-colonial thought(Brennan 2013) and numerous readers of Hegel as a thinker of freedom (eg Patten 1999)see no need to discuss his position on colonialism presumably on the grounds that the latteris a merely accidental avoidable part of his thought from which his essential views on freedomcan be extracted11 For Hegel the Greeks were greatly influenced by the Egyptians whose influence theynonetheless overcame Here he is close to accepting what Martin Bernal calls the lsquoancientmodelrsquo of the Greeksrsquo origins a model to which the Greeks themselves adhered later-nineteenth-century Europeans instead espoused an lsquoAryan modelrsquo on which Greek cultureproper arose from northern invaders driving out earlier Egyptian and Phoenician influences([1987] 1991) Bernal argues that the Aryan model had Eurocentric motivations if the Greeks

Alison Stone

21

the supposed originators of Europersquos distinctive culture were actually the Egyptiansrsquo heirsthen given that Egypt is within Africa the EuropeAfrica divide would crumble A furthercomplicating factor is whether the Egyptians were seen as black Africans Bernasconi (2007)argues that Hegel thought so as did most other Europeans of his time Later the Egyptiansrsquoracial status was changedmdashto Mediterranean (ie Caucasian)mdashto hold up the divide betweenEurope-as-white and Africa-as-black Bernasconi suggests that Hegel himself dealt with thepotential anomalymdashof highly cultured black Africans giving much to the Greeksmdashby makingthe EgyptGreece transition the site of the key conceptual transition from unfreedom tofreedom nature to spirit (2007 212ndash13) This ties in with my argument in Section IV thatHegel actually did have grounds on his own terms to construe the apparently gradual EgyptGreece transition as actually being a sharp divide12 Bernasconi (2016) has recently shown how Hegel likewise distorted his sources on China tothe detriment of the Chinese13 I thank Bob Stern and the referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions

Bibliography

Bernal M [1987] (1991) Black Athena The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical CivilisationVol 1 London VintageBernasconi R (1998) lsquoHegel at the Court of the Ashantirsquo in S Barnett (ed)Hegel After Derrida Albany NY SUNYBernasconi R (2007) lsquoThe Return of Africa Hegel and the Question of theRacial Identity of the Egyptiansrsquo in P T Grier (ed) Identity and Difference AlbanyNY SUNYBernasconi R (2016) lsquoChina on Parade Hegelrsquos Manipulation of his Sources andhis Change of Mindrsquo in B Brandt and D L Purdy (eds) China in the GermanEnlightenment Toronto University of Toronto PressBird-Pollan S (2014) Hegel Freud and Fanon The Dialectic of Emancipation LondonRowman and Littlefield InternationalBonetto S (2006) lsquoRace and Racism in HegelmdashAn AnalysisrsquoMinerva An InternetJournal of Philosophy 10Brennan T (2013) lsquoHegel Empire and Anti-Colonial Thoughtrsquo in G Huggan(ed) The Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies Oxford Oxford University PressBuchwalter A (2009) lsquoIs Hegelrsquos Philosophy of History Eurocentricrsquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYBuck-Morss S (2000) lsquoHegel and Haitirsquo Critical Inquiry 264 821ndash65Burbidge J (2007) Hegelrsquos Systematic Contingency Basingstoke Palgrave MacmillanDe Laurentiis A (2014) lsquoRace in Hegel Text and Contextrsquo in M Egger (ed)Philosophie Nach Kant Neue Wege zum Verstaumlndnis von Kants Transzendental- undMoralphilosophie Berlin De Gruyter

Hegel and Colonialism

22

Dussel E [1992] (1995) The Invention of the Americas trans M D Barber NewYork ContinuumDussel E (1993) lsquoEurocentrism and Modernityrsquo Boundary 2 203 65ndash76Fanon F [1952] (2008) Black Skin White Masks trans R Philcox New YorkGroveGuha R (2002) History at the Limit of World-History New York ColumbiaUniversity PressHardimon M (1993) Hegelrsquos Social Philosophy Cambridge Cambridge UniversityPressHegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller OxfordClarendonHegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind trans W Wallace and A V MillerOxford Oxford University PressHegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reasonin History trans H B Nisbet Cambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1986) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Geschichte Werke Vol 12ed E Moldenhauer and K M Michel Frankfurt Suhrkamp [Englishtranslation Sibree]Hegel G W F (1988) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Vols 1-3 edG Lasson Vols 1-4 Hamburg Meiner [English translation of volume 1 Nisbet]Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NYPrometheus BooksHegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B NisbetCambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1995) lsquoVorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der WeltgeschichteEinleitungrsquo in W Jaeschke (ed) Vorlesungsmanuskripte II (1916ndash1831)Gesammelte Werke Vol 18 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown andHodgson]Hegel G W F (1996) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Berlin 182223 Nachschriften von Griesheim Hotho und Kehler ed Karl Brehmer K-H Iltingund Hoo Nam Seelmann Hegel Vorlesungen Ausgew Nachschriften und ManuskripteVol 12 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown and Hodgson]Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink Abb HeiHegel G W F (2011) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Volume 1Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822ndash3 ed and trans R F Brownand P C Hodgson with assistance of W G Geuss Oxford Clarendon PressHoulgate S [1991] 2015 An Introduction to Hegel Freedom Truth and HistoryOxford BlackwellJohansen B E (1982) Forgotten Founders How the American Indians Helped ShapeDemocracy Boston Harvard Common Press

Alison Stone

23

McCarney J and Bernasconi R (2003) lsquoExchange Hegelrsquos Racismrsquo RadicalPhilosophy 119(MayJune) 32ndash37Monahan M (ed) (2017) Creolizing Hegel London Rowman and LittlefieldInternationalMowad N (2013) lsquoThe Place of Nationality in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of Politicsand Religion A Defense of Hegel on the Charges of National Chauvinism andRacismrsquo in A Nuzzo (ed) Hegel on Religion and Politics Albany NY SUNYParekh S (2009) lsquoHegelrsquos New World History Freedom and Racersquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYPatten A (1999) Hegelrsquos Idea of Freedom Oxford Oxford University PressPurtschert P (2010) lsquoOn the Limit of Spirit Hegelrsquos Racism Revisitedrsquo Philosophyand Social Criticism 369 1039ndash51Quijano A (2000) lsquoColoniality of Power Eurocentrism and Latin AmericarsquoNepantla Views from South 13 533ndash80Sahota J P (2016) lsquoHegelrsquos Critique of Hinduism A Responsersquo Hegel Bulletin372 305ndash17Serequeberhan T (1989) lsquoThe Idea of Colonialism in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of RightrsquoInternational Philosophical Quarterly 293 301ndash18Shohat E and Stam R [1994] (2014) Unthinking Eurocentrism New YorkRoutledgeTibebu T (2010) Hegel and the Third World The Making of Eurocentrism in WorldHistory Syracuse NY Syracuse University PressWa Thiongrsquoo N (2012) Globalectics Theory and the Politics of Knowing New YorkColumbia University Press

Hegel and Colonialism

24

  • Hegel and Colonialism
Page 9: Hegel and Colonialism - Lancaster University · 2017-06-30 · Hegel and Colonialism Alison Stone Abstract This article explores the implications of Hegel’s Philosophy of World

desires I am still not determining for myself how to act So slavery was relativelyan improvement because it lsquomaturedrsquo the Negroes to become aware of theirfreedom lsquoOne must educate the Negroes in their freedom by taming theirnaturalnessrsquo (Hei 70)

We can infer from Hegelrsquos comments that slavery educates in several ways(i) Those enslaved are subjected to European culture and ethical standards (fromeg N 165) (ii) Slavery imposes the discipline of work (eg Hei 59) In workingone learns to hold onersquos natural desires in check and thereby see oneself ascapable of deliberating about or even rejecting them (iii) Work also instils anawareness of onersquos capacity to mould natural objectsmdasha sense of lsquoachievingindependence through onersquos own activityrsquo (61) (iv) Ironically those enslaved thusacquire a sense of private property (61)mdashpartly by learning of Europeaninstitutions of property and partly by imposing form on objects thereby forminga sense of lsquopossessingrsquo them which fosters an appreciation of property9

In sum lsquoSlavery hellip is necessary at those stages where the state [and itspeople] has not yet arrived at rationality It is an element in the transition to ahigher stagersquo (HG 197) Because slavery still has elements of wrong though thefinal step must be for slavery to end However Hegel cautions slavery shouldnot be suddenly abolished because it must end after not before the Negroes havebeen educated through it lsquoIf slavery was altogether wrong then the Europeansshould give the slaves their freedom immediately but in that way the mostfrightening consequences arise as in the French coloniesrsquo (Hei 70)

Hegelrsquos line of thought then takes in slavery and colonization at once(understandably since enslavement of Africans was fundamental to colonialAmerica) Use of slavery in the colonies might be judged wrong because itviolates the rights equality and freedom of the slaves But through being enslavedslaves take steps forward in their consciousness of freedom which they could nototherwise make for Africa is intrinsically pre-historical and unfree so thatfreedom can come to Africans only from without Analogously one might thinkthat colonization was altogether wrong because it violated the rights equality andfreedom of indigenous peoplesmdashbut no for before colonization those peoplehad no awareness of their freedom They lsquoha[d] no sense of private property ofachieving independence through onersquos own activity or of securing onersquos propertythrough rightrsquo (61) By being forced to labour and being disciplined spiritually byagencies such as the Christian church these people will eventually learn abouttheir freedom Until then their subjection while partially wrong insofar as it issubjection is also partially right it is at least an improvement on the nativesremaining in their natural wholly unfree pre-colonial condition

Colonialism is justified on this view because it spreads freedom topeoples who otherwise both lack it and have no native means of acquiring itMoreover the colonizers are justified in extirpating the indigenous cultures of

Alison Stone

9

native peoplesmdashhence Hegelrsquos endorsement of the Christian clergy andmissionaries lsquosetting out to accustom the Indians to European culture andethics [Sitten]rsquo (N 164)mdashsince those indigenous cultures embody unfreedom Wemight wonder whether Hegel regards even the violence and slaughter thatoccurred during the colonization of America as justified He does acknowledgeEuropean especially Spanish violence towards indigenous Americans but he isonly overtly critical of this violence when the colonial project had he saysdegenerated into mere robbery (Hei 204) Moreover he disguises the extent ofEuropean violence by running together indigenous Americans having beenlsquodestroyed and slaughteredrsquo (untergegangen verdraumlngt) having disappeared(verschwunden) and having voluntarily withdrawn (haben sich zuruumlckgezogen N 163see also Parekh 2009) Hegel does not wholly denounce colonial violence becausehe thinks that Europersquos conquest of America was based on a sound goalmdashspreading freedom and the culture of freedom to all peoplemdashand that theviolence that was necessary for achieving that goal was justified But Hegel doesdisapprove of violence when it served merely an unworthy goalmdashrobbery

This is congruent with Hegelrsquos overall approach to violence in history whichhe memorably calls a lsquoslaughterbenchrsquo (Schlachtbank) On his view theconsciousness of freedom advances through each civilization in turn establishingits pre-eminence by prevailing culturally and militarily over its predecessor Tothe extent that war and violence are necessary for progress they are justified(although lsquojustifiedrsquo does not mean lsquoto be celebratedrsquo) Even in these termsthough much of the violence carried out by European colonizersmdashthedecimation of many native American tribes the Middle Passagemdashwent beyondthe minimum necessary to subject non-Europeans to colonial control along theway to their ultimate freedom But likewise in history generally violence hasregularly gone beyond the minimum necessary to propel progress Such excessesare inevitable an aspect of the inescapable contingency of human affairs Theseexcesses of violence are not justified yet we can be reconciled to them as aninevitable albeit non-ideal concomitant of progress (H 90ndash91) PresumablyHegel thinks the same about the excesses of colonial violence

Hegelrsquos overall line of thought is that colonialism is not only justified butalso necessary as part of Europersquos centuries-long process of realizing freedom Alogical step in this process is to extend freedom to non-European peoples afterall the European principle is that all are free This extension can only occurthough by passing through a stage of subjugating non-European peoples sincethey have no native means of acquiring freedom lsquoThe [Negroesrsquo] condition isincapable of any development or culture [Entwicklung und Bildung] and theircondition as we see it today is as it has always beenrsquo (N 190) And lsquothe Negroes cannot move [bewegen] to any culturersquo (Hei 67) Likewise with indigenousAmericans America is new and young because it had no history until the

Hegel and Colonialism

10

Europeans arrived These claims do not mean that Negroes and indigenousAmericans cannot be educated they can But given their native ignorance offreedom they cannot educate themselves but must be educated by Europeanswhich requires that they first be subjected to European control

Hegelrsquos case for colonization could be extended to the Orientals He admitsthat unlike Africans and indigenous Americans the Oriental peoples do have anidea of freedommdashthat lsquoone is freersquomdashbut this idea remains so inadequate as tocount as unfreedom Hence lacking belief in their own freedom Oriental peoplecannot pursue any extensions or advancements of freedom and without suchpursuits to drive historical change their societies remain ahistorical Colonizationof these peoples for educative purposes would therefore be justified As long as apeople is at a low enough level to count as unfree and pre-historical that peoplecan advance only through having the European spirit imposed on it for beingpre-historical it has no native way to attain freedom And indeed Hegel does sayof India that lsquoThe English or rather the East India Company are the lords[Herren] of the land for it is the necessary fate of Asiatic empires to be subjected[unterworfen] to Europeans and China will also some day have to submit to thisfatersquo (S 142ndash43)

We should not be misled by an apparently conflicting statement in thePhilosophy of Right lsquoThe liberation of colonies hellip [is] of the greatest advantage tothe mother state just as the emancipation of slaves is of the greatest advantage tothe masterrsquo (PR sect248A 269) Hegelrsquos paradigm here is American independenceie the independence of what he is explicit and adamant is colonial EuropeanAmerica not Native America (N 165ndash66) That is America merits independenceonce its native populace is reduced or placed securely under European tutelageThis coheres with Hegelrsquos approving reference to independent Haiti in thePhilosophy of Mind (EM sect393A 40) he says that this is a Christian state that theNegroes could only found after having undergone long spiritual servitude Oncea people has been colonized sufficiently to acquire European culture as in Haitithen and only then does that people merit freedom

Hegelrsquos argument for colonialism is of the lsquocivilizing missionrsquo familyEffectively his defence is that colonialism benefits most those who fare worstunder itmdashcolonized peoplesmdashby civilizing and bringing them freedom that theycannot access without passing through colonial subjection For Hegelcolonialism and the advancement of freedom go hand-in-hand

III Saving Hegel from himself

Hegelrsquos PWH implies that colonialism is required to further the realization ofuniversal freedom Does this show that Hegelrsquos conception of freedom is

Alison Stone

11

necessarily bound up with his pro-colonialism If so thenmdashtaking it thatcolonialism was in fact morally wrongmdashpresumably his conception of freedomand its historical development must be rejected (although not necessarily freedomas such of course)

But perhaps that would be to dismiss Hegelrsquos thought too summarily andthereby to do disservice not only to Hegel but also to anti-colonial anddecolonizing thought and activism which after all has regularly drawn on Hegelboth directlymdasheg when Frantz Fanon ([1952] 2008) and Ngugi wa Thiongrsquoo(2012) use Hegel to critique colonialismmdashand indirectly through Hegelrsquosinfluence on Marxism and critical theory Moreover Hegelrsquos thought may stilloffer further anti-colonial resources which remain to be mined We mighttherefore reasonably seek to separate Hegelrsquos basic conception of freedom and itshistoricity from his Eurocentric narrative of history so that when so separatedthat basic conception tells against colonialism Such a viewmdashone that rescuesHegel from himselfmdashis often adopted more or less explicitly by hisinterpreters10 I now want to set out my own version of this type of viewalthough I will go on to complicate it in Section IV

The view is this We can separate the essentials of Hegelrsquos account offreedom from his concrete interpretation of the actual movement of historyHegel was wrong and prejudiced when he dismissed Africans indigenousAmericans and Orientals as unfree and incapable of coming to freedom on theirown Nevertheless his basic account of what freedom is including its necessaryhistorical development remains insightful A better informed judgment ofnon-European peoples would require a very different historical narrative Butthat does not undermine Hegelrsquos basic points that freedom develops historicallyin tandem with the consciousness of it as embodied in different cultures andsocial institutions When we separate these basic points from his actualnarrative we find that these points serve a progressive purpose yielding groundsto reject colonialism

This view dovetails with Hegelrsquos claim that the human capacity for self-determination is universal not confined to Europeans (see eg H 88) Admittedlythough this starting-point is only an abstract universal Self-determination can beactualized only when one is conscious of onersquos capacity for it and thatrequires social and cultural institutions a whole way of life which foster thatconsciousness Such a way of life arose for the first time only in ancient Greecefor Hegel so that actualized freedom does not obtain universallyArguably though given his basic view of freedom and its historicity Hegelcould and should have interpreted all the worldrsquos regions as taking part in thegradual historical unfolding of social institutions that support freedom Hegeldoes not do so because he denies that non-European peoples are conscious offreedom at all Since non-European societies were not conscious of freedom

Hegel and Colonialism

12

even in the restricted ways that the Greeks and Romans were the former had nobasis for moving forward historically by further advancing an already partlyrealized freedom

Thus what underpins Hegelrsquos denial of historicity to non-European peoplesis his sharp division of European freedom from non-European unfreedom Thatin turn is underpinned by his claim that the ancient Greeks made the decisivebreak from unfreedom into freedom The Greeks Hegel says became thedistinctive people they were out of a mixing within them of heterogeneousOriental peoples and their cultures but the Greeks surmounted or overcame(uumlberwinden) this background (HG 214) By doing so the Greeks created theirlsquofree beautifulrsquo spirit (374) The Greeks overcame their Oriental preconditions tolsquomake themselvesrsquo (372 see also 393ndash94)

However this view that the Greeks lsquoovercamersquo the Oriental world ofunfreedom seems overstated by Hegelrsquos own lights For Hegel himself theGreeks mark only the latest phase in a growing consciousness of freedomrunning from China through India to Persia and culminating in EgyptPersiarsquos most advanced province Egypt is the hinge between Orient andOccident in which the human soulrsquos intrinsic capacity for freedom was almostgrasped But it was not quite grasped for the soul was still not distinguishedfrom animal nature a distinction the Greeks went on to make (HG 334 368)That lack of distinction is shown by the way the Egyptians modelled their godsand goddesses on animal species often with animal heads Yet for Hegel theGreeks too stopped short of recognizing that all people have an inherent capacityfor freedom They admitted freedom only to male native-born slave-ownersIn that way their view of freedom remained intermingled with acceptance ofnatural contingency ie accidents of birth sex and geographical location (H 88)So the difference between the Egyptian viewmdashhuman freedom is incompletelydistinguished from (animal) naturemdashand the Greek viewmdashhuman freedom isagain incompletely distinguished from naturemdashappears to be a difference ofdegree not kind11

Hegelrsquos lsquoovercomingrsquo idea therefore sits uncomfortably with his graduatedportrayal of historyrsquos stages That portrayal could be taken to show that belief infreedom is not exclusively European since the Persians and Egyptians already hadversions of that belief To be sure they were inadequate versions (for Hegel)mdashbutthen so was the Greeksrsquo And by extension the Indians and Chinese likewise hadversions of the belief in freedommdasheven more inadequate ones since theyattributed freedom only to lsquoonersquo not lsquosomersquomdashbut where that inadequacy stilldifferentiates these peoples from the Greeks only by degree and not kind (more soin the Indian case since the lsquoonersquo is a whole caste) If the Oriental peoples did haveversions however unsatisfactory of the belief in freedom then Hegel should nothave denied that these peoples are historical For if it is believed that someone is

Alison Stone

13

free be it only lsquoonersquo ruler or caste then others may claim and demand that samefreedom for themselves powering historical change

Now Hegel regards the Africans and indigenous Americans as lackingfreedom more radically than the Orientals yet contrary evidence was available tohim He might for instance have noted the Iroquois Confederacy of five (latersix) Native American tribes founded c1600 and dissolved c1800 a system ofintra- and inter-tribal governance which lsquomaximized individual freedom whileseeking to minimize excess governmental interference in peoplersquos livesrsquo (Johansen1982 9) influencing the American Constitution And Hegel embellishedexaggerated and at times outright distorted his sources on Africa so as to portraya people without any respect for human life freedom or rightsmdashmore so thanthe sources suggested and they were already unreliable (see Bernasconi 1998)12

The way was open to Hegel to recognize Africans and indigenous Americans ashaving views of freedom even if he classed them as even less adequate thanOriental ones With that those peoples would like the Orientals have had anentry to history

Nonetheless Hegel preserves his division of European freedom from non-European unfreedom by counting all the European stages as stages of freedomdown to its lowest level and all the non-European stages as stages of unfreedomright up to where unfreedom is almost freedom but not quite But the placementof this dividing line appears arbitrary Consider for example Hegelrsquos view thatHindus are not conscious of their own freedom because they fail to distinguishthemselves as human agents from nature (HG 256 273ndash81) On Hegelrsquosaccount as wersquove just seen there are ways that the ancient Greeks did not fullyextricate human agency from nature either somdashon his own termsmdashit is not clearthat the difference here is one of kind (history versus non-history freedom versusunfreedom) rather than degree (more or less freedom more or less far along thehistorical path towards full freedom)

Hegel could and it seems should have interpreted much of hismaterial as evidencing how non-European peoples have grasped and practisedfreedom albeit imperfectly We might still find this revised Hegeliannarrative objectionable assuming that it ranks non-European conceptions offreedom as less advanced than European ones Yet once it is admittedthat non-European peoples are historical in principle Hegel would alsohave to trace how historical advances unfolded in those societies so re-interpreting his material once again Each continent would have its own history ofprogression in consciousness of freedom rather than non-Europeancontinents merely paving the way for Europe The several continents wouldhave histories of freedom that run in parallel rather than corresponding tomore or less advanced phases of a single historical line that culminates in modernEurope

Hegel and Colonialism

14

Neither of these revised Hegelian narrativesmdashthe single line or parallel linesversionsmdashsupports colonialism not even the single line model on whichnon-European peoplesrsquo native levels of freedom are although real yetdeficient compared to European ones By recognizing freedom howeverunsatisfactorily non-European cultures would still have the internal potential andmotor to advance to greater freedom In that case colonization would not benecessary for non-European peoplesrsquo achieving freedom and would not bejustified as a necessary step in the realization of universal freedom Anotherplank in Hegelrsquos justification of colonization is that colonized peoples enjoyed nofreedom pre-colonizationmdashso that despite its abrogation of their freedomcolonization did not worsen their position (and ultimately would improve it) Butif these peoples did have a grasp of freedom however imperfect thencolonization stood to worsen their position That risk is especially pronouncedgiven Hegelrsquos own perspective that some violence is necessary for colonizationand given the role of contingency in human affairs that that violence may wellmushroom beyond the necessary minimum Further for Hegel colonizationrequires the extirpation of native cultures but if these are not cultures ofunfreedom then that extirpation is not justified Apparently then Hegel shouldby his own lights have opposed colonialism for his own philosophy generates acase against it

IV The Greeks history and self-liberation from nature

The view just canvassed is that despite the Eurocentrism and pro-colonialism ofHegelrsquos substantial narrative in the PWH his distinctive account of freedom asdeveloping historically through successive civilizations does not in itselfnecessitate his substantive Eurocentrism and when extricated from the latteryields a case against colonialism However we can distinguish weaker andstronger versions of this view More weakly Hegelrsquos basic account of freedomcan be separated from his actual pro-colonialism and so does not necessarilyimply pro-colonialism but contains anti-colonial possibilities as well as thepro-colonial possibilities that Hegel developed from it More strongly Hegelrsquosbasic account of freedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism andwhen so separated this account implies anti-colonialism and has an inherentlyanti-colonial direction I endorse the weaker but not the stronger claim and theweaker one only subject to a significant qualification Hegelrsquos basic account offreedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism but not as easily asSection III suggested This is because Hegelrsquos conception of freedom asself-determination has significant connections with his Eurocentrism

Alison Stone

15

In Section III I suggested that Hegelrsquos divisions Greeksnon-Greeks freeunfree look arbitrary But actually they are not For Hegel

Its [Greecersquos] principle is that self-conscious freedom stepsforth hellip [Regarding t]he unity of spirit with nature hellip thespecificity of this unity [in the Greek case] is to be graspedOne unity is the Oriental hellip consciousness immersed innature a [new kind of] harmony is now to be broughtforth [by the Greeks] in which hellip spirit dominates Spirit nowdetermines nature and this is a spiritual unity hellip (Hei 117 myemphases)

[The] fundamental characteristic [of the Greek spirit is] that thefreedom of spirit is conditioned by and in essential relation tosome natural stimulus Greek freedom is stimulated bysomething other and is free because it changes and produces thestimulus from out of itself (aus sich) (S 238 my emphasis)

Thus the Greeks were free in that they were at home with themselves in theother ie nature But this does not mean that the content of their practices andway of life was determined by natural givens such as the Greeksrsquo given impulsesRather they reshaped these givens and so became at-home-with-themselves inthem In the Greek case then spirit lsquodeterminedrsquo nature whereas previouslyspirit had been immersed or absorbed (versenkt) in nature This Greekdetermination of nature by spiritmdashspiritrsquos investment of nature with meaningof its ownmdashwas made possible by a prior moment first carried out by theGreeks through which lsquospirit is no longer immersed [versenkt] in nature hellip [but]releas[es] itself from nature [sich losmachend von der Natur]rsquo (HG 395ndash96) Thismoment in which the human spirit first releases or sets itself free from naturecorresponds to the overcoming (uumlberwinden) by the Greeks of their mixed ethnicheritage a moment of overcoming through which they became able to remakethat heritage for themselves to make themselves Hegel is explicit that none ofthe worldrsquos other peoples to that point had achieved this

Even so for Hegel the Greeks exercised freedom always with respect tonature and existing givens in the worldmdashre-shaping what they found alreadythere rather than creating a totally new world out of themselves Hence theGreeks did not regard free individuals as being capable of adjudicatingindependently on the given natural and social world through their own reason orof generating norms and principles purely through the exercise of their spiritualfreedom Or as Hegel also puts it elsewhere individual subjectivity was notdifferentiated from social substance but the individual identified fully andunquestioningly with his or her social role and there was no ground for

Hegel and Colonialism

16

independent social criticism (see Hardimon 1993) Connected with all this theGreeks restricted freedom to some people only effectively stipulating that onlythose with certain kinds of naturemdashmale free-bornmdashor natural locationmdashnativeGreekmdashhad the power of self-determination In these ways spiritrsquos freedomremained lsquoconditionedrsquo or limited (bedingt) bymdashalthough not immersed inmdashnature (and see HG 390)

However these limitations contradicted the essence of self-determination asthe Greeks understood it as including a moment of overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature such that the power to overcome nature cannotpossibly be limited by nature (or it would not be a power to overcome nature atall) Thus lsquoin the principle of Greek freedom inasmuch as it is freedom it isimplied that thought must be free for itself rsquo (HG 268)mdashalthough the Greeks fora long time did not explicitly grasp or follow through on that implicationNonetheless in the end that contradiction was what made it possible for theGreeksrsquo exclusion of some people from freedom and their other ways ofrestricting freedomrsquos scope to come in for criticism The criticism came withSocrates and the Sophists claiming that thought can adjudicate rationally on whatis and generate norms by itself (417) In that freedom of thought was therebygrasped as fully independent of nature it was also grasped as universal at least inprinciple In these two ways lsquoThought hellip introduces an opposition [Gegensatz][to the Greek mixture of freedom and nature] and asserts the validity ofessentially rational principlesrsquo (S 267)

For Hegel then Greek culture enabled rational criticism of what isincluding of limited freedom as no pre-Greek cultures did just because theGreeks had established a root opposition between freedom and nature whereaslsquoin the Oriental states in which a lack of opposition is present no moral freedomcan come aboutrsquo (267) Although the advent of rational critique brought on thedemise of Greek culture Europe was thereby also set on the path oftransformative historical change We see then why in his own terms Hegel saysthat non-European peoples could not advance critical claims for freedomrsquosextension but uncritically accepted the authority of their rulersmdashpatriarchalauthority in China caste hierarchy and caste-based restrictions and rituals inIndia and state power in Persia Non-Europeans could not question suchauthorities because their cultures did not grasp freedom as including the momentof overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature and the given Becausefreedom was not grasped as including that moment of human separation fromnature and the given no contradiction was perceived in freedom being limited bynature eg confined to people of certain castes or by given states of affairs egcustomary authority and ritual Non-Europeans lacked a critical motor to drivesocial change hence lacked history propermdashor indeed freedom as properlydistinguished from unfreedom

Alison Stone

17

So for Hegel there is a genuine difference in kind not merely degreebetween the Greek and post-Greek European world on the one hand and thenon-European world on the other the Europenon-Europe divide is notarbitrary but has a philosophical rationale For while the Greek view of freedomwas like non-European views limited and inadequate the former was moreadvanced in one key respectmdashthe inclusion in freedom of a primary moment oflsquoovercomingrsquo naturemdashwhich enabled the Greek and post-Greek European worldto become self-critical self-revising and so historical This is what motivatesHegel to identify Greek and post-Greek European views as views of freedomhowever limited whereas non-European views that might prima facie look likeviews of freedom are still actually modes of unfreedom

Once again we might object that non-Europeans have at times construedfreedom as including this moment of overcoming nature Even on Hegelrsquosaccount Hindus appreciate the human power to abstract from the world inthought He maintains though that this is merely an intellectual withdrawaland that when it comes to practical agency Hindus see human agency as immersedin not including any moment of self-freeing-from nature (see eg S 157ndash58)In response we could with Jaspal Peter Sahota (2016) agree that in classicalIndian thought there has been a tendency to locate human agency within naturebut argue against Hegel that this does not constitute a real absence offreedom but rather a different conception of freedom We might then say thatbecause thesemdashand othermdashnon-European views were still views of freedom thoseviews were still sufficient to motivate social criticism and hence place non-European peoples in history even without the element of overcoming natureHowever such a position would take us further away from Hegelrsquos own accountof the historicity of freedom according which as we have seen that moment ofovercoming nature uniquely new in ancient Greece is crucial in poweringhistorical progression

Hegelrsquos basic account of freedom and its historicity thus has more extensiveand significant connections with his Eurocentrism than I suggested inSection III In particular that account connects with Hegelrsquos denial that non-European peoples are historicalmdashie can come to freedom on their ownmdashandhence with his case for colonialism as the only route along which those peoplescan reach freedom These connections suggest that after all we cannotstraightforwardly take up Hegelrsquos account of freedom and its historicity whilesloughing off his pro-colonialism This is not to say that we cannot separate outthese parts of his thought at all But rescuing Hegel from himself is set to be acomplicated process not quick or straightforward To the extent that such arescue is possible Hegelrsquos pro-colonialism cannot rightly be counted as necessaryto his thought or system Yet his pro-colonialism does have extensive anddeep-seated connections with his other viewsmdashenough to show that it is not the

Hegel and Colonialism

18

case that Hegel should not have endorsed colonialism by his own standardsRather he did and could endorse it coherently in his own terms although otheranti-colonialist possibilities were also available within his own terms which hecould have developed

So the claim that Hegelrsquos account of freedom is inherently anti-colonial isunduly strong Through his understanding of freedom as involving spiritextricating itself from nature that account has sustained links with hisEurocentrism and so his pro-colonialism We can nonetheless envisage variousmanoeuvres by which to maintain that freedom develops historically for all theworldrsquos peoples for example by saying that they have several conceptions offreedom where freedom can but does not have to include self-liberation fromnature Then ancient Greece would initiate one historical pathway to freedombut not the only one Even so Hegelrsquos own account of freedom and its historicitydoes not inherently drive us to make these intellectual manoeuvres but onlypermits them In sum if Hegelrsquos view of freedom does not necessarily implypro-colonialism neither is it inherently anti-colonial We can make distinctionsand qualifications within his thought so as to yield anti-colonial conclusions butthis is only one of several possible lines of development of which his thoughtadmits another being its elaboration into the Eurocentric and pro-colonialsystem that Hegel in fact forged

There is a broader moral Wemdashie the heirs of the European heritage thatruns through philosophy into modern political thoughtmdashshould not let thisheritage off the hook too easily This heritage including Hegelrsquos thought hasbeen implicated in colonialism in various ways To be sure because it extols andarticulates the values of freedom and equality this heritage also furnishesconceptual resources for critiquing colonialism and giving support to anti-colonial struggles and anti-colonial thinkers and activists have drawn on modernEuropean ideas for this purpose For example the Haitian revolutionariesdeclared that they were acting in allegiance to the emancipatory goals of theFrench Revolution This might lead us to suppose that the European politicallegacy is intrinsically liberatory and that theorists in the European traditionmdashHegel includedmdashhave only ever justified colonialism due to unfortunateprejudices that led them to go back on their own principles

I believe that taking that view exculpates our predecessors too quicklyand leaves us at risk of inadvertently embracing ideas inherited from thesepredecessors which actually have deep-rooted internal connections withEurocentric and pro-colonial attitudes This is not to say that we should orcould repudiate these ideas outright Rather in view of their connections withcolonialism we need to think carefully and critically about how far to take theseinherited ideas forward and how we might do so differently My aim has been tohelp us cultivate this caution in Hegelrsquos case by acknowledging that while his

Alison Stone

19

thought harbours anti-colonial possibilities it also has real and tenacious linkswith colonialism of which we should remind mindful13

Alison StoneLancaster University UKastonelancasteracuk

Notes

1 Contributions include those by Bernasconi 1998 2007 2016 Bonetto 2006 de Laurentiis2014 McCarney and Bernasconi 2003 Mowad 2013 Parekh 2009 Purtschert 2010 andTibebu 20102 However see Buck-Morss 2000 andmdashfor highly critical accountsmdashDussel [1992] 1995 and1993 Guha 2002 Tibebu 2010 Also relevant are Bird-Pollan 2014 (on Hegel and Fanon)Brennan 2013 (on Hegelrsquos influence on post-colonialism) Buchwalter 2009 (defending Hegelagainst charges of Eurocentrism) Monahan 2017 (Creolizing Hegel) and Serequeberhan 1989(on colonialism in the Philosophy of Right)3 Ranajit Guha identifies another argument for colonialism in the Philosophy of Rightfrom the lsquorightsrsquo that Hegel claims civilized nations have with respect to less advanced ones(PR sect351 376) These rights Guha argues are lsquorights of conquestrsquo noting Hegelrsquos praise for Britishmilitary victories over India led by Robert Clive (1725ndash74) whose conquests established theEast India Companyrsquos rule over Bengal and other Indian states See Guha 2002 43ndash44PR sect372A 364 and 474 note 1)Abbreviations usedEN=Hegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller Oxford Clarendon PressEM= Hegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind Trans W Wallace and A V Miller Oxford OxfordUniversity Press Cited by paragraph and page numberN=Hegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reason in Historytrans H B Nisbet Cambridge UK Cambridge University PressS=Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NY Prometheus BooksPR=Hegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B Nisbet Cambridge UKCambridge University PressHei=Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink4 Hegel lectured on the PWH in 182223 182425 182627 182829 and 183031 Hismanuscripts of the Introduction from 1822 (rev 1828) and 183031 survive as do manytranscripts between them covering every course Some such as de Laurentiis (2014) are waryof directly attributing to Hegel views notably on race expressed only in the transcripts I agreethat we should disambiguate sources but where multiple independently written transcripts

Hegel and Colonialism

20

converge as domdashextensivelymdashseveral transcripts of the PWH we may take them to bereliable Accordingly I refer to Hegelrsquos manuscripts (abbreviated H) as in Hegel 2011 which isthe English translation of the corresponding volume of the Gesammelte Werke (Hegel 1995) andthe integrated text of the 182223 course composed primarily from Hothorsquos and Griesheimrsquostranscripts (abb HG) included in Hegel 2011 (the German is Hegel 1996) Since the Germancritical edition of the transcripts remains incomplete for materials on Hegelrsquos later coursesI have used Heimannrsquos transcript of 183031 whenever possible (Hegel 2005 abb Hei)otherwise the composite texts produced by Karl Hegel (Hegel 1986) and translated by Sibree(Hegel 1991 abb S) and by Georg LassonJohannes Hoffmeister (Hegel 1988) translated byNisbet (Hegel 1975 abb N) I quote English translations whenever available sometimesadjusted in view of the German5 For more on contingency in Hegel see inter alia Burbidge 2007 esp ch 1 Burbidge stressesthe extent to which Hegel lsquotakes the contingencies of history seriouslyrsquo (2007 9)6 For Hegel lsquonaturehellip is indeed a rational system operating in its own distinct elementrsquo (N 44)The division into continents is rational in that different natural features and their varietiesmdashmountains and plains lands and seas and their fusion and differentiationmdasheach find fullembodiment in different continents (EM sect393 and R 40ndash41) In a sense then non-Europeansare subject to reason and rational progression insofar as nature imposes it on them fromthe outside rather than by exercising rational thought for themselves This coheres withHegelrsquos view that these peoples are immersed in nature out of which only Europeans can liftthem see below7 This recalls Hegelrsquos derivation of time from space in the Philosophy of Nature a derivation thatpositions time as more advanced than space (EN sectsect256ndash57 31ndash36)8 This is evident from eg Hegelrsquos discussion of the colonization of America see Section II9 Hegel connects formation with possession (PR sect56 85ndash86) albeit in the very differentcontext of modern European societies in which private property is institutionalized I leaveunexplored here how far his ideas about slaveryrsquos educative power may be informed by hislordbondsman dialectic10 For instance some interpreters defend Hegel against charges of Eurocentrism and racism(eg Buchwalter 2009 Houlgate [1991] 2015 35ndash37 McCarney in McCarney and Bernasconi2003 Mowad 2013) others stress Hegelrsquos founding importance for anti-colonial thought(Brennan 2013) and numerous readers of Hegel as a thinker of freedom (eg Patten 1999)see no need to discuss his position on colonialism presumably on the grounds that the latteris a merely accidental avoidable part of his thought from which his essential views on freedomcan be extracted11 For Hegel the Greeks were greatly influenced by the Egyptians whose influence theynonetheless overcame Here he is close to accepting what Martin Bernal calls the lsquoancientmodelrsquo of the Greeksrsquo origins a model to which the Greeks themselves adhered later-nineteenth-century Europeans instead espoused an lsquoAryan modelrsquo on which Greek cultureproper arose from northern invaders driving out earlier Egyptian and Phoenician influences([1987] 1991) Bernal argues that the Aryan model had Eurocentric motivations if the Greeks

Alison Stone

21

the supposed originators of Europersquos distinctive culture were actually the Egyptiansrsquo heirsthen given that Egypt is within Africa the EuropeAfrica divide would crumble A furthercomplicating factor is whether the Egyptians were seen as black Africans Bernasconi (2007)argues that Hegel thought so as did most other Europeans of his time Later the Egyptiansrsquoracial status was changedmdashto Mediterranean (ie Caucasian)mdashto hold up the divide betweenEurope-as-white and Africa-as-black Bernasconi suggests that Hegel himself dealt with thepotential anomalymdashof highly cultured black Africans giving much to the Greeksmdashby makingthe EgyptGreece transition the site of the key conceptual transition from unfreedom tofreedom nature to spirit (2007 212ndash13) This ties in with my argument in Section IV thatHegel actually did have grounds on his own terms to construe the apparently gradual EgyptGreece transition as actually being a sharp divide12 Bernasconi (2016) has recently shown how Hegel likewise distorted his sources on China tothe detriment of the Chinese13 I thank Bob Stern and the referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions

Bibliography

Bernal M [1987] (1991) Black Athena The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical CivilisationVol 1 London VintageBernasconi R (1998) lsquoHegel at the Court of the Ashantirsquo in S Barnett (ed)Hegel After Derrida Albany NY SUNYBernasconi R (2007) lsquoThe Return of Africa Hegel and the Question of theRacial Identity of the Egyptiansrsquo in P T Grier (ed) Identity and Difference AlbanyNY SUNYBernasconi R (2016) lsquoChina on Parade Hegelrsquos Manipulation of his Sources andhis Change of Mindrsquo in B Brandt and D L Purdy (eds) China in the GermanEnlightenment Toronto University of Toronto PressBird-Pollan S (2014) Hegel Freud and Fanon The Dialectic of Emancipation LondonRowman and Littlefield InternationalBonetto S (2006) lsquoRace and Racism in HegelmdashAn AnalysisrsquoMinerva An InternetJournal of Philosophy 10Brennan T (2013) lsquoHegel Empire and Anti-Colonial Thoughtrsquo in G Huggan(ed) The Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies Oxford Oxford University PressBuchwalter A (2009) lsquoIs Hegelrsquos Philosophy of History Eurocentricrsquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYBuck-Morss S (2000) lsquoHegel and Haitirsquo Critical Inquiry 264 821ndash65Burbidge J (2007) Hegelrsquos Systematic Contingency Basingstoke Palgrave MacmillanDe Laurentiis A (2014) lsquoRace in Hegel Text and Contextrsquo in M Egger (ed)Philosophie Nach Kant Neue Wege zum Verstaumlndnis von Kants Transzendental- undMoralphilosophie Berlin De Gruyter

Hegel and Colonialism

22

Dussel E [1992] (1995) The Invention of the Americas trans M D Barber NewYork ContinuumDussel E (1993) lsquoEurocentrism and Modernityrsquo Boundary 2 203 65ndash76Fanon F [1952] (2008) Black Skin White Masks trans R Philcox New YorkGroveGuha R (2002) History at the Limit of World-History New York ColumbiaUniversity PressHardimon M (1993) Hegelrsquos Social Philosophy Cambridge Cambridge UniversityPressHegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller OxfordClarendonHegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind trans W Wallace and A V MillerOxford Oxford University PressHegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reasonin History trans H B Nisbet Cambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1986) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Geschichte Werke Vol 12ed E Moldenhauer and K M Michel Frankfurt Suhrkamp [Englishtranslation Sibree]Hegel G W F (1988) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Vols 1-3 edG Lasson Vols 1-4 Hamburg Meiner [English translation of volume 1 Nisbet]Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NYPrometheus BooksHegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B NisbetCambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1995) lsquoVorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der WeltgeschichteEinleitungrsquo in W Jaeschke (ed) Vorlesungsmanuskripte II (1916ndash1831)Gesammelte Werke Vol 18 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown andHodgson]Hegel G W F (1996) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Berlin 182223 Nachschriften von Griesheim Hotho und Kehler ed Karl Brehmer K-H Iltingund Hoo Nam Seelmann Hegel Vorlesungen Ausgew Nachschriften und ManuskripteVol 12 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown and Hodgson]Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink Abb HeiHegel G W F (2011) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Volume 1Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822ndash3 ed and trans R F Brownand P C Hodgson with assistance of W G Geuss Oxford Clarendon PressHoulgate S [1991] 2015 An Introduction to Hegel Freedom Truth and HistoryOxford BlackwellJohansen B E (1982) Forgotten Founders How the American Indians Helped ShapeDemocracy Boston Harvard Common Press

Alison Stone

23

McCarney J and Bernasconi R (2003) lsquoExchange Hegelrsquos Racismrsquo RadicalPhilosophy 119(MayJune) 32ndash37Monahan M (ed) (2017) Creolizing Hegel London Rowman and LittlefieldInternationalMowad N (2013) lsquoThe Place of Nationality in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of Politicsand Religion A Defense of Hegel on the Charges of National Chauvinism andRacismrsquo in A Nuzzo (ed) Hegel on Religion and Politics Albany NY SUNYParekh S (2009) lsquoHegelrsquos New World History Freedom and Racersquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYPatten A (1999) Hegelrsquos Idea of Freedom Oxford Oxford University PressPurtschert P (2010) lsquoOn the Limit of Spirit Hegelrsquos Racism Revisitedrsquo Philosophyand Social Criticism 369 1039ndash51Quijano A (2000) lsquoColoniality of Power Eurocentrism and Latin AmericarsquoNepantla Views from South 13 533ndash80Sahota J P (2016) lsquoHegelrsquos Critique of Hinduism A Responsersquo Hegel Bulletin372 305ndash17Serequeberhan T (1989) lsquoThe Idea of Colonialism in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of RightrsquoInternational Philosophical Quarterly 293 301ndash18Shohat E and Stam R [1994] (2014) Unthinking Eurocentrism New YorkRoutledgeTibebu T (2010) Hegel and the Third World The Making of Eurocentrism in WorldHistory Syracuse NY Syracuse University PressWa Thiongrsquoo N (2012) Globalectics Theory and the Politics of Knowing New YorkColumbia University Press

Hegel and Colonialism

24

  • Hegel and Colonialism
Page 10: Hegel and Colonialism - Lancaster University · 2017-06-30 · Hegel and Colonialism Alison Stone Abstract This article explores the implications of Hegel’s Philosophy of World

native peoplesmdashhence Hegelrsquos endorsement of the Christian clergy andmissionaries lsquosetting out to accustom the Indians to European culture andethics [Sitten]rsquo (N 164)mdashsince those indigenous cultures embody unfreedom Wemight wonder whether Hegel regards even the violence and slaughter thatoccurred during the colonization of America as justified He does acknowledgeEuropean especially Spanish violence towards indigenous Americans but he isonly overtly critical of this violence when the colonial project had he saysdegenerated into mere robbery (Hei 204) Moreover he disguises the extent ofEuropean violence by running together indigenous Americans having beenlsquodestroyed and slaughteredrsquo (untergegangen verdraumlngt) having disappeared(verschwunden) and having voluntarily withdrawn (haben sich zuruumlckgezogen N 163see also Parekh 2009) Hegel does not wholly denounce colonial violence becausehe thinks that Europersquos conquest of America was based on a sound goalmdashspreading freedom and the culture of freedom to all peoplemdashand that theviolence that was necessary for achieving that goal was justified But Hegel doesdisapprove of violence when it served merely an unworthy goalmdashrobbery

This is congruent with Hegelrsquos overall approach to violence in history whichhe memorably calls a lsquoslaughterbenchrsquo (Schlachtbank) On his view theconsciousness of freedom advances through each civilization in turn establishingits pre-eminence by prevailing culturally and militarily over its predecessor Tothe extent that war and violence are necessary for progress they are justified(although lsquojustifiedrsquo does not mean lsquoto be celebratedrsquo) Even in these termsthough much of the violence carried out by European colonizersmdashthedecimation of many native American tribes the Middle Passagemdashwent beyondthe minimum necessary to subject non-Europeans to colonial control along theway to their ultimate freedom But likewise in history generally violence hasregularly gone beyond the minimum necessary to propel progress Such excessesare inevitable an aspect of the inescapable contingency of human affairs Theseexcesses of violence are not justified yet we can be reconciled to them as aninevitable albeit non-ideal concomitant of progress (H 90ndash91) PresumablyHegel thinks the same about the excesses of colonial violence

Hegelrsquos overall line of thought is that colonialism is not only justified butalso necessary as part of Europersquos centuries-long process of realizing freedom Alogical step in this process is to extend freedom to non-European peoples afterall the European principle is that all are free This extension can only occurthough by passing through a stage of subjugating non-European peoples sincethey have no native means of acquiring freedom lsquoThe [Negroesrsquo] condition isincapable of any development or culture [Entwicklung und Bildung] and theircondition as we see it today is as it has always beenrsquo (N 190) And lsquothe Negroes cannot move [bewegen] to any culturersquo (Hei 67) Likewise with indigenousAmericans America is new and young because it had no history until the

Hegel and Colonialism

10

Europeans arrived These claims do not mean that Negroes and indigenousAmericans cannot be educated they can But given their native ignorance offreedom they cannot educate themselves but must be educated by Europeanswhich requires that they first be subjected to European control

Hegelrsquos case for colonization could be extended to the Orientals He admitsthat unlike Africans and indigenous Americans the Oriental peoples do have anidea of freedommdashthat lsquoone is freersquomdashbut this idea remains so inadequate as tocount as unfreedom Hence lacking belief in their own freedom Oriental peoplecannot pursue any extensions or advancements of freedom and without suchpursuits to drive historical change their societies remain ahistorical Colonizationof these peoples for educative purposes would therefore be justified As long as apeople is at a low enough level to count as unfree and pre-historical that peoplecan advance only through having the European spirit imposed on it for beingpre-historical it has no native way to attain freedom And indeed Hegel does sayof India that lsquoThe English or rather the East India Company are the lords[Herren] of the land for it is the necessary fate of Asiatic empires to be subjected[unterworfen] to Europeans and China will also some day have to submit to thisfatersquo (S 142ndash43)

We should not be misled by an apparently conflicting statement in thePhilosophy of Right lsquoThe liberation of colonies hellip [is] of the greatest advantage tothe mother state just as the emancipation of slaves is of the greatest advantage tothe masterrsquo (PR sect248A 269) Hegelrsquos paradigm here is American independenceie the independence of what he is explicit and adamant is colonial EuropeanAmerica not Native America (N 165ndash66) That is America merits independenceonce its native populace is reduced or placed securely under European tutelageThis coheres with Hegelrsquos approving reference to independent Haiti in thePhilosophy of Mind (EM sect393A 40) he says that this is a Christian state that theNegroes could only found after having undergone long spiritual servitude Oncea people has been colonized sufficiently to acquire European culture as in Haitithen and only then does that people merit freedom

Hegelrsquos argument for colonialism is of the lsquocivilizing missionrsquo familyEffectively his defence is that colonialism benefits most those who fare worstunder itmdashcolonized peoplesmdashby civilizing and bringing them freedom that theycannot access without passing through colonial subjection For Hegelcolonialism and the advancement of freedom go hand-in-hand

III Saving Hegel from himself

Hegelrsquos PWH implies that colonialism is required to further the realization ofuniversal freedom Does this show that Hegelrsquos conception of freedom is

Alison Stone

11

necessarily bound up with his pro-colonialism If so thenmdashtaking it thatcolonialism was in fact morally wrongmdashpresumably his conception of freedomand its historical development must be rejected (although not necessarily freedomas such of course)

But perhaps that would be to dismiss Hegelrsquos thought too summarily andthereby to do disservice not only to Hegel but also to anti-colonial anddecolonizing thought and activism which after all has regularly drawn on Hegelboth directlymdasheg when Frantz Fanon ([1952] 2008) and Ngugi wa Thiongrsquoo(2012) use Hegel to critique colonialismmdashand indirectly through Hegelrsquosinfluence on Marxism and critical theory Moreover Hegelrsquos thought may stilloffer further anti-colonial resources which remain to be mined We mighttherefore reasonably seek to separate Hegelrsquos basic conception of freedom and itshistoricity from his Eurocentric narrative of history so that when so separatedthat basic conception tells against colonialism Such a viewmdashone that rescuesHegel from himselfmdashis often adopted more or less explicitly by hisinterpreters10 I now want to set out my own version of this type of viewalthough I will go on to complicate it in Section IV

The view is this We can separate the essentials of Hegelrsquos account offreedom from his concrete interpretation of the actual movement of historyHegel was wrong and prejudiced when he dismissed Africans indigenousAmericans and Orientals as unfree and incapable of coming to freedom on theirown Nevertheless his basic account of what freedom is including its necessaryhistorical development remains insightful A better informed judgment ofnon-European peoples would require a very different historical narrative Butthat does not undermine Hegelrsquos basic points that freedom develops historicallyin tandem with the consciousness of it as embodied in different cultures andsocial institutions When we separate these basic points from his actualnarrative we find that these points serve a progressive purpose yielding groundsto reject colonialism

This view dovetails with Hegelrsquos claim that the human capacity for self-determination is universal not confined to Europeans (see eg H 88) Admittedlythough this starting-point is only an abstract universal Self-determination can beactualized only when one is conscious of onersquos capacity for it and thatrequires social and cultural institutions a whole way of life which foster thatconsciousness Such a way of life arose for the first time only in ancient Greecefor Hegel so that actualized freedom does not obtain universallyArguably though given his basic view of freedom and its historicity Hegelcould and should have interpreted all the worldrsquos regions as taking part in thegradual historical unfolding of social institutions that support freedom Hegeldoes not do so because he denies that non-European peoples are conscious offreedom at all Since non-European societies were not conscious of freedom

Hegel and Colonialism

12

even in the restricted ways that the Greeks and Romans were the former had nobasis for moving forward historically by further advancing an already partlyrealized freedom

Thus what underpins Hegelrsquos denial of historicity to non-European peoplesis his sharp division of European freedom from non-European unfreedom Thatin turn is underpinned by his claim that the ancient Greeks made the decisivebreak from unfreedom into freedom The Greeks Hegel says became thedistinctive people they were out of a mixing within them of heterogeneousOriental peoples and their cultures but the Greeks surmounted or overcame(uumlberwinden) this background (HG 214) By doing so the Greeks created theirlsquofree beautifulrsquo spirit (374) The Greeks overcame their Oriental preconditions tolsquomake themselvesrsquo (372 see also 393ndash94)

However this view that the Greeks lsquoovercamersquo the Oriental world ofunfreedom seems overstated by Hegelrsquos own lights For Hegel himself theGreeks mark only the latest phase in a growing consciousness of freedomrunning from China through India to Persia and culminating in EgyptPersiarsquos most advanced province Egypt is the hinge between Orient andOccident in which the human soulrsquos intrinsic capacity for freedom was almostgrasped But it was not quite grasped for the soul was still not distinguishedfrom animal nature a distinction the Greeks went on to make (HG 334 368)That lack of distinction is shown by the way the Egyptians modelled their godsand goddesses on animal species often with animal heads Yet for Hegel theGreeks too stopped short of recognizing that all people have an inherent capacityfor freedom They admitted freedom only to male native-born slave-ownersIn that way their view of freedom remained intermingled with acceptance ofnatural contingency ie accidents of birth sex and geographical location (H 88)So the difference between the Egyptian viewmdashhuman freedom is incompletelydistinguished from (animal) naturemdashand the Greek viewmdashhuman freedom isagain incompletely distinguished from naturemdashappears to be a difference ofdegree not kind11

Hegelrsquos lsquoovercomingrsquo idea therefore sits uncomfortably with his graduatedportrayal of historyrsquos stages That portrayal could be taken to show that belief infreedom is not exclusively European since the Persians and Egyptians already hadversions of that belief To be sure they were inadequate versions (for Hegel)mdashbutthen so was the Greeksrsquo And by extension the Indians and Chinese likewise hadversions of the belief in freedommdasheven more inadequate ones since theyattributed freedom only to lsquoonersquo not lsquosomersquomdashbut where that inadequacy stilldifferentiates these peoples from the Greeks only by degree and not kind (more soin the Indian case since the lsquoonersquo is a whole caste) If the Oriental peoples did haveversions however unsatisfactory of the belief in freedom then Hegel should nothave denied that these peoples are historical For if it is believed that someone is

Alison Stone

13

free be it only lsquoonersquo ruler or caste then others may claim and demand that samefreedom for themselves powering historical change

Now Hegel regards the Africans and indigenous Americans as lackingfreedom more radically than the Orientals yet contrary evidence was available tohim He might for instance have noted the Iroquois Confederacy of five (latersix) Native American tribes founded c1600 and dissolved c1800 a system ofintra- and inter-tribal governance which lsquomaximized individual freedom whileseeking to minimize excess governmental interference in peoplersquos livesrsquo (Johansen1982 9) influencing the American Constitution And Hegel embellishedexaggerated and at times outright distorted his sources on Africa so as to portraya people without any respect for human life freedom or rightsmdashmore so thanthe sources suggested and they were already unreliable (see Bernasconi 1998)12

The way was open to Hegel to recognize Africans and indigenous Americans ashaving views of freedom even if he classed them as even less adequate thanOriental ones With that those peoples would like the Orientals have had anentry to history

Nonetheless Hegel preserves his division of European freedom from non-European unfreedom by counting all the European stages as stages of freedomdown to its lowest level and all the non-European stages as stages of unfreedomright up to where unfreedom is almost freedom but not quite But the placementof this dividing line appears arbitrary Consider for example Hegelrsquos view thatHindus are not conscious of their own freedom because they fail to distinguishthemselves as human agents from nature (HG 256 273ndash81) On Hegelrsquosaccount as wersquove just seen there are ways that the ancient Greeks did not fullyextricate human agency from nature either somdashon his own termsmdashit is not clearthat the difference here is one of kind (history versus non-history freedom versusunfreedom) rather than degree (more or less freedom more or less far along thehistorical path towards full freedom)

Hegel could and it seems should have interpreted much of hismaterial as evidencing how non-European peoples have grasped and practisedfreedom albeit imperfectly We might still find this revised Hegeliannarrative objectionable assuming that it ranks non-European conceptions offreedom as less advanced than European ones Yet once it is admittedthat non-European peoples are historical in principle Hegel would alsohave to trace how historical advances unfolded in those societies so re-interpreting his material once again Each continent would have its own history ofprogression in consciousness of freedom rather than non-Europeancontinents merely paving the way for Europe The several continents wouldhave histories of freedom that run in parallel rather than corresponding tomore or less advanced phases of a single historical line that culminates in modernEurope

Hegel and Colonialism

14

Neither of these revised Hegelian narrativesmdashthe single line or parallel linesversionsmdashsupports colonialism not even the single line model on whichnon-European peoplesrsquo native levels of freedom are although real yetdeficient compared to European ones By recognizing freedom howeverunsatisfactorily non-European cultures would still have the internal potential andmotor to advance to greater freedom In that case colonization would not benecessary for non-European peoplesrsquo achieving freedom and would not bejustified as a necessary step in the realization of universal freedom Anotherplank in Hegelrsquos justification of colonization is that colonized peoples enjoyed nofreedom pre-colonizationmdashso that despite its abrogation of their freedomcolonization did not worsen their position (and ultimately would improve it) Butif these peoples did have a grasp of freedom however imperfect thencolonization stood to worsen their position That risk is especially pronouncedgiven Hegelrsquos own perspective that some violence is necessary for colonizationand given the role of contingency in human affairs that that violence may wellmushroom beyond the necessary minimum Further for Hegel colonizationrequires the extirpation of native cultures but if these are not cultures ofunfreedom then that extirpation is not justified Apparently then Hegel shouldby his own lights have opposed colonialism for his own philosophy generates acase against it

IV The Greeks history and self-liberation from nature

The view just canvassed is that despite the Eurocentrism and pro-colonialism ofHegelrsquos substantial narrative in the PWH his distinctive account of freedom asdeveloping historically through successive civilizations does not in itselfnecessitate his substantive Eurocentrism and when extricated from the latteryields a case against colonialism However we can distinguish weaker andstronger versions of this view More weakly Hegelrsquos basic account of freedomcan be separated from his actual pro-colonialism and so does not necessarilyimply pro-colonialism but contains anti-colonial possibilities as well as thepro-colonial possibilities that Hegel developed from it More strongly Hegelrsquosbasic account of freedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism andwhen so separated this account implies anti-colonialism and has an inherentlyanti-colonial direction I endorse the weaker but not the stronger claim and theweaker one only subject to a significant qualification Hegelrsquos basic account offreedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism but not as easily asSection III suggested This is because Hegelrsquos conception of freedom asself-determination has significant connections with his Eurocentrism

Alison Stone

15

In Section III I suggested that Hegelrsquos divisions Greeksnon-Greeks freeunfree look arbitrary But actually they are not For Hegel

Its [Greecersquos] principle is that self-conscious freedom stepsforth hellip [Regarding t]he unity of spirit with nature hellip thespecificity of this unity [in the Greek case] is to be graspedOne unity is the Oriental hellip consciousness immersed innature a [new kind of] harmony is now to be broughtforth [by the Greeks] in which hellip spirit dominates Spirit nowdetermines nature and this is a spiritual unity hellip (Hei 117 myemphases)

[The] fundamental characteristic [of the Greek spirit is] that thefreedom of spirit is conditioned by and in essential relation tosome natural stimulus Greek freedom is stimulated bysomething other and is free because it changes and produces thestimulus from out of itself (aus sich) (S 238 my emphasis)

Thus the Greeks were free in that they were at home with themselves in theother ie nature But this does not mean that the content of their practices andway of life was determined by natural givens such as the Greeksrsquo given impulsesRather they reshaped these givens and so became at-home-with-themselves inthem In the Greek case then spirit lsquodeterminedrsquo nature whereas previouslyspirit had been immersed or absorbed (versenkt) in nature This Greekdetermination of nature by spiritmdashspiritrsquos investment of nature with meaningof its ownmdashwas made possible by a prior moment first carried out by theGreeks through which lsquospirit is no longer immersed [versenkt] in nature hellip [but]releas[es] itself from nature [sich losmachend von der Natur]rsquo (HG 395ndash96) Thismoment in which the human spirit first releases or sets itself free from naturecorresponds to the overcoming (uumlberwinden) by the Greeks of their mixed ethnicheritage a moment of overcoming through which they became able to remakethat heritage for themselves to make themselves Hegel is explicit that none ofthe worldrsquos other peoples to that point had achieved this

Even so for Hegel the Greeks exercised freedom always with respect tonature and existing givens in the worldmdashre-shaping what they found alreadythere rather than creating a totally new world out of themselves Hence theGreeks did not regard free individuals as being capable of adjudicatingindependently on the given natural and social world through their own reason orof generating norms and principles purely through the exercise of their spiritualfreedom Or as Hegel also puts it elsewhere individual subjectivity was notdifferentiated from social substance but the individual identified fully andunquestioningly with his or her social role and there was no ground for

Hegel and Colonialism

16

independent social criticism (see Hardimon 1993) Connected with all this theGreeks restricted freedom to some people only effectively stipulating that onlythose with certain kinds of naturemdashmale free-bornmdashor natural locationmdashnativeGreekmdashhad the power of self-determination In these ways spiritrsquos freedomremained lsquoconditionedrsquo or limited (bedingt) bymdashalthough not immersed inmdashnature (and see HG 390)

However these limitations contradicted the essence of self-determination asthe Greeks understood it as including a moment of overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature such that the power to overcome nature cannotpossibly be limited by nature (or it would not be a power to overcome nature atall) Thus lsquoin the principle of Greek freedom inasmuch as it is freedom it isimplied that thought must be free for itself rsquo (HG 268)mdashalthough the Greeks fora long time did not explicitly grasp or follow through on that implicationNonetheless in the end that contradiction was what made it possible for theGreeksrsquo exclusion of some people from freedom and their other ways ofrestricting freedomrsquos scope to come in for criticism The criticism came withSocrates and the Sophists claiming that thought can adjudicate rationally on whatis and generate norms by itself (417) In that freedom of thought was therebygrasped as fully independent of nature it was also grasped as universal at least inprinciple In these two ways lsquoThought hellip introduces an opposition [Gegensatz][to the Greek mixture of freedom and nature] and asserts the validity ofessentially rational principlesrsquo (S 267)

For Hegel then Greek culture enabled rational criticism of what isincluding of limited freedom as no pre-Greek cultures did just because theGreeks had established a root opposition between freedom and nature whereaslsquoin the Oriental states in which a lack of opposition is present no moral freedomcan come aboutrsquo (267) Although the advent of rational critique brought on thedemise of Greek culture Europe was thereby also set on the path oftransformative historical change We see then why in his own terms Hegel saysthat non-European peoples could not advance critical claims for freedomrsquosextension but uncritically accepted the authority of their rulersmdashpatriarchalauthority in China caste hierarchy and caste-based restrictions and rituals inIndia and state power in Persia Non-Europeans could not question suchauthorities because their cultures did not grasp freedom as including the momentof overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature and the given Becausefreedom was not grasped as including that moment of human separation fromnature and the given no contradiction was perceived in freedom being limited bynature eg confined to people of certain castes or by given states of affairs egcustomary authority and ritual Non-Europeans lacked a critical motor to drivesocial change hence lacked history propermdashor indeed freedom as properlydistinguished from unfreedom

Alison Stone

17

So for Hegel there is a genuine difference in kind not merely degreebetween the Greek and post-Greek European world on the one hand and thenon-European world on the other the Europenon-Europe divide is notarbitrary but has a philosophical rationale For while the Greek view of freedomwas like non-European views limited and inadequate the former was moreadvanced in one key respectmdashthe inclusion in freedom of a primary moment oflsquoovercomingrsquo naturemdashwhich enabled the Greek and post-Greek European worldto become self-critical self-revising and so historical This is what motivatesHegel to identify Greek and post-Greek European views as views of freedomhowever limited whereas non-European views that might prima facie look likeviews of freedom are still actually modes of unfreedom

Once again we might object that non-Europeans have at times construedfreedom as including this moment of overcoming nature Even on Hegelrsquosaccount Hindus appreciate the human power to abstract from the world inthought He maintains though that this is merely an intellectual withdrawaland that when it comes to practical agency Hindus see human agency as immersedin not including any moment of self-freeing-from nature (see eg S 157ndash58)In response we could with Jaspal Peter Sahota (2016) agree that in classicalIndian thought there has been a tendency to locate human agency within naturebut argue against Hegel that this does not constitute a real absence offreedom but rather a different conception of freedom We might then say thatbecause thesemdashand othermdashnon-European views were still views of freedom thoseviews were still sufficient to motivate social criticism and hence place non-European peoples in history even without the element of overcoming natureHowever such a position would take us further away from Hegelrsquos own accountof the historicity of freedom according which as we have seen that moment ofovercoming nature uniquely new in ancient Greece is crucial in poweringhistorical progression

Hegelrsquos basic account of freedom and its historicity thus has more extensiveand significant connections with his Eurocentrism than I suggested inSection III In particular that account connects with Hegelrsquos denial that non-European peoples are historicalmdashie can come to freedom on their ownmdashandhence with his case for colonialism as the only route along which those peoplescan reach freedom These connections suggest that after all we cannotstraightforwardly take up Hegelrsquos account of freedom and its historicity whilesloughing off his pro-colonialism This is not to say that we cannot separate outthese parts of his thought at all But rescuing Hegel from himself is set to be acomplicated process not quick or straightforward To the extent that such arescue is possible Hegelrsquos pro-colonialism cannot rightly be counted as necessaryto his thought or system Yet his pro-colonialism does have extensive anddeep-seated connections with his other viewsmdashenough to show that it is not the

Hegel and Colonialism

18

case that Hegel should not have endorsed colonialism by his own standardsRather he did and could endorse it coherently in his own terms although otheranti-colonialist possibilities were also available within his own terms which hecould have developed

So the claim that Hegelrsquos account of freedom is inherently anti-colonial isunduly strong Through his understanding of freedom as involving spiritextricating itself from nature that account has sustained links with hisEurocentrism and so his pro-colonialism We can nonetheless envisage variousmanoeuvres by which to maintain that freedom develops historically for all theworldrsquos peoples for example by saying that they have several conceptions offreedom where freedom can but does not have to include self-liberation fromnature Then ancient Greece would initiate one historical pathway to freedombut not the only one Even so Hegelrsquos own account of freedom and its historicitydoes not inherently drive us to make these intellectual manoeuvres but onlypermits them In sum if Hegelrsquos view of freedom does not necessarily implypro-colonialism neither is it inherently anti-colonial We can make distinctionsand qualifications within his thought so as to yield anti-colonial conclusions butthis is only one of several possible lines of development of which his thoughtadmits another being its elaboration into the Eurocentric and pro-colonialsystem that Hegel in fact forged

There is a broader moral Wemdashie the heirs of the European heritage thatruns through philosophy into modern political thoughtmdashshould not let thisheritage off the hook too easily This heritage including Hegelrsquos thought hasbeen implicated in colonialism in various ways To be sure because it extols andarticulates the values of freedom and equality this heritage also furnishesconceptual resources for critiquing colonialism and giving support to anti-colonial struggles and anti-colonial thinkers and activists have drawn on modernEuropean ideas for this purpose For example the Haitian revolutionariesdeclared that they were acting in allegiance to the emancipatory goals of theFrench Revolution This might lead us to suppose that the European politicallegacy is intrinsically liberatory and that theorists in the European traditionmdashHegel includedmdashhave only ever justified colonialism due to unfortunateprejudices that led them to go back on their own principles

I believe that taking that view exculpates our predecessors too quicklyand leaves us at risk of inadvertently embracing ideas inherited from thesepredecessors which actually have deep-rooted internal connections withEurocentric and pro-colonial attitudes This is not to say that we should orcould repudiate these ideas outright Rather in view of their connections withcolonialism we need to think carefully and critically about how far to take theseinherited ideas forward and how we might do so differently My aim has been tohelp us cultivate this caution in Hegelrsquos case by acknowledging that while his

Alison Stone

19

thought harbours anti-colonial possibilities it also has real and tenacious linkswith colonialism of which we should remind mindful13

Alison StoneLancaster University UKastonelancasteracuk

Notes

1 Contributions include those by Bernasconi 1998 2007 2016 Bonetto 2006 de Laurentiis2014 McCarney and Bernasconi 2003 Mowad 2013 Parekh 2009 Purtschert 2010 andTibebu 20102 However see Buck-Morss 2000 andmdashfor highly critical accountsmdashDussel [1992] 1995 and1993 Guha 2002 Tibebu 2010 Also relevant are Bird-Pollan 2014 (on Hegel and Fanon)Brennan 2013 (on Hegelrsquos influence on post-colonialism) Buchwalter 2009 (defending Hegelagainst charges of Eurocentrism) Monahan 2017 (Creolizing Hegel) and Serequeberhan 1989(on colonialism in the Philosophy of Right)3 Ranajit Guha identifies another argument for colonialism in the Philosophy of Rightfrom the lsquorightsrsquo that Hegel claims civilized nations have with respect to less advanced ones(PR sect351 376) These rights Guha argues are lsquorights of conquestrsquo noting Hegelrsquos praise for Britishmilitary victories over India led by Robert Clive (1725ndash74) whose conquests established theEast India Companyrsquos rule over Bengal and other Indian states See Guha 2002 43ndash44PR sect372A 364 and 474 note 1)Abbreviations usedEN=Hegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller Oxford Clarendon PressEM= Hegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind Trans W Wallace and A V Miller Oxford OxfordUniversity Press Cited by paragraph and page numberN=Hegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reason in Historytrans H B Nisbet Cambridge UK Cambridge University PressS=Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NY Prometheus BooksPR=Hegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B Nisbet Cambridge UKCambridge University PressHei=Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink4 Hegel lectured on the PWH in 182223 182425 182627 182829 and 183031 Hismanuscripts of the Introduction from 1822 (rev 1828) and 183031 survive as do manytranscripts between them covering every course Some such as de Laurentiis (2014) are waryof directly attributing to Hegel views notably on race expressed only in the transcripts I agreethat we should disambiguate sources but where multiple independently written transcripts

Hegel and Colonialism

20

converge as domdashextensivelymdashseveral transcripts of the PWH we may take them to bereliable Accordingly I refer to Hegelrsquos manuscripts (abbreviated H) as in Hegel 2011 which isthe English translation of the corresponding volume of the Gesammelte Werke (Hegel 1995) andthe integrated text of the 182223 course composed primarily from Hothorsquos and Griesheimrsquostranscripts (abb HG) included in Hegel 2011 (the German is Hegel 1996) Since the Germancritical edition of the transcripts remains incomplete for materials on Hegelrsquos later coursesI have used Heimannrsquos transcript of 183031 whenever possible (Hegel 2005 abb Hei)otherwise the composite texts produced by Karl Hegel (Hegel 1986) and translated by Sibree(Hegel 1991 abb S) and by Georg LassonJohannes Hoffmeister (Hegel 1988) translated byNisbet (Hegel 1975 abb N) I quote English translations whenever available sometimesadjusted in view of the German5 For more on contingency in Hegel see inter alia Burbidge 2007 esp ch 1 Burbidge stressesthe extent to which Hegel lsquotakes the contingencies of history seriouslyrsquo (2007 9)6 For Hegel lsquonaturehellip is indeed a rational system operating in its own distinct elementrsquo (N 44)The division into continents is rational in that different natural features and their varietiesmdashmountains and plains lands and seas and their fusion and differentiationmdasheach find fullembodiment in different continents (EM sect393 and R 40ndash41) In a sense then non-Europeansare subject to reason and rational progression insofar as nature imposes it on them fromthe outside rather than by exercising rational thought for themselves This coheres withHegelrsquos view that these peoples are immersed in nature out of which only Europeans can liftthem see below7 This recalls Hegelrsquos derivation of time from space in the Philosophy of Nature a derivation thatpositions time as more advanced than space (EN sectsect256ndash57 31ndash36)8 This is evident from eg Hegelrsquos discussion of the colonization of America see Section II9 Hegel connects formation with possession (PR sect56 85ndash86) albeit in the very differentcontext of modern European societies in which private property is institutionalized I leaveunexplored here how far his ideas about slaveryrsquos educative power may be informed by hislordbondsman dialectic10 For instance some interpreters defend Hegel against charges of Eurocentrism and racism(eg Buchwalter 2009 Houlgate [1991] 2015 35ndash37 McCarney in McCarney and Bernasconi2003 Mowad 2013) others stress Hegelrsquos founding importance for anti-colonial thought(Brennan 2013) and numerous readers of Hegel as a thinker of freedom (eg Patten 1999)see no need to discuss his position on colonialism presumably on the grounds that the latteris a merely accidental avoidable part of his thought from which his essential views on freedomcan be extracted11 For Hegel the Greeks were greatly influenced by the Egyptians whose influence theynonetheless overcame Here he is close to accepting what Martin Bernal calls the lsquoancientmodelrsquo of the Greeksrsquo origins a model to which the Greeks themselves adhered later-nineteenth-century Europeans instead espoused an lsquoAryan modelrsquo on which Greek cultureproper arose from northern invaders driving out earlier Egyptian and Phoenician influences([1987] 1991) Bernal argues that the Aryan model had Eurocentric motivations if the Greeks

Alison Stone

21

the supposed originators of Europersquos distinctive culture were actually the Egyptiansrsquo heirsthen given that Egypt is within Africa the EuropeAfrica divide would crumble A furthercomplicating factor is whether the Egyptians were seen as black Africans Bernasconi (2007)argues that Hegel thought so as did most other Europeans of his time Later the Egyptiansrsquoracial status was changedmdashto Mediterranean (ie Caucasian)mdashto hold up the divide betweenEurope-as-white and Africa-as-black Bernasconi suggests that Hegel himself dealt with thepotential anomalymdashof highly cultured black Africans giving much to the Greeksmdashby makingthe EgyptGreece transition the site of the key conceptual transition from unfreedom tofreedom nature to spirit (2007 212ndash13) This ties in with my argument in Section IV thatHegel actually did have grounds on his own terms to construe the apparently gradual EgyptGreece transition as actually being a sharp divide12 Bernasconi (2016) has recently shown how Hegel likewise distorted his sources on China tothe detriment of the Chinese13 I thank Bob Stern and the referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions

Bibliography

Bernal M [1987] (1991) Black Athena The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical CivilisationVol 1 London VintageBernasconi R (1998) lsquoHegel at the Court of the Ashantirsquo in S Barnett (ed)Hegel After Derrida Albany NY SUNYBernasconi R (2007) lsquoThe Return of Africa Hegel and the Question of theRacial Identity of the Egyptiansrsquo in P T Grier (ed) Identity and Difference AlbanyNY SUNYBernasconi R (2016) lsquoChina on Parade Hegelrsquos Manipulation of his Sources andhis Change of Mindrsquo in B Brandt and D L Purdy (eds) China in the GermanEnlightenment Toronto University of Toronto PressBird-Pollan S (2014) Hegel Freud and Fanon The Dialectic of Emancipation LondonRowman and Littlefield InternationalBonetto S (2006) lsquoRace and Racism in HegelmdashAn AnalysisrsquoMinerva An InternetJournal of Philosophy 10Brennan T (2013) lsquoHegel Empire and Anti-Colonial Thoughtrsquo in G Huggan(ed) The Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies Oxford Oxford University PressBuchwalter A (2009) lsquoIs Hegelrsquos Philosophy of History Eurocentricrsquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYBuck-Morss S (2000) lsquoHegel and Haitirsquo Critical Inquiry 264 821ndash65Burbidge J (2007) Hegelrsquos Systematic Contingency Basingstoke Palgrave MacmillanDe Laurentiis A (2014) lsquoRace in Hegel Text and Contextrsquo in M Egger (ed)Philosophie Nach Kant Neue Wege zum Verstaumlndnis von Kants Transzendental- undMoralphilosophie Berlin De Gruyter

Hegel and Colonialism

22

Dussel E [1992] (1995) The Invention of the Americas trans M D Barber NewYork ContinuumDussel E (1993) lsquoEurocentrism and Modernityrsquo Boundary 2 203 65ndash76Fanon F [1952] (2008) Black Skin White Masks trans R Philcox New YorkGroveGuha R (2002) History at the Limit of World-History New York ColumbiaUniversity PressHardimon M (1993) Hegelrsquos Social Philosophy Cambridge Cambridge UniversityPressHegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller OxfordClarendonHegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind trans W Wallace and A V MillerOxford Oxford University PressHegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reasonin History trans H B Nisbet Cambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1986) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Geschichte Werke Vol 12ed E Moldenhauer and K M Michel Frankfurt Suhrkamp [Englishtranslation Sibree]Hegel G W F (1988) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Vols 1-3 edG Lasson Vols 1-4 Hamburg Meiner [English translation of volume 1 Nisbet]Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NYPrometheus BooksHegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B NisbetCambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1995) lsquoVorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der WeltgeschichteEinleitungrsquo in W Jaeschke (ed) Vorlesungsmanuskripte II (1916ndash1831)Gesammelte Werke Vol 18 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown andHodgson]Hegel G W F (1996) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Berlin 182223 Nachschriften von Griesheim Hotho und Kehler ed Karl Brehmer K-H Iltingund Hoo Nam Seelmann Hegel Vorlesungen Ausgew Nachschriften und ManuskripteVol 12 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown and Hodgson]Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink Abb HeiHegel G W F (2011) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Volume 1Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822ndash3 ed and trans R F Brownand P C Hodgson with assistance of W G Geuss Oxford Clarendon PressHoulgate S [1991] 2015 An Introduction to Hegel Freedom Truth and HistoryOxford BlackwellJohansen B E (1982) Forgotten Founders How the American Indians Helped ShapeDemocracy Boston Harvard Common Press

Alison Stone

23

McCarney J and Bernasconi R (2003) lsquoExchange Hegelrsquos Racismrsquo RadicalPhilosophy 119(MayJune) 32ndash37Monahan M (ed) (2017) Creolizing Hegel London Rowman and LittlefieldInternationalMowad N (2013) lsquoThe Place of Nationality in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of Politicsand Religion A Defense of Hegel on the Charges of National Chauvinism andRacismrsquo in A Nuzzo (ed) Hegel on Religion and Politics Albany NY SUNYParekh S (2009) lsquoHegelrsquos New World History Freedom and Racersquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYPatten A (1999) Hegelrsquos Idea of Freedom Oxford Oxford University PressPurtschert P (2010) lsquoOn the Limit of Spirit Hegelrsquos Racism Revisitedrsquo Philosophyand Social Criticism 369 1039ndash51Quijano A (2000) lsquoColoniality of Power Eurocentrism and Latin AmericarsquoNepantla Views from South 13 533ndash80Sahota J P (2016) lsquoHegelrsquos Critique of Hinduism A Responsersquo Hegel Bulletin372 305ndash17Serequeberhan T (1989) lsquoThe Idea of Colonialism in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of RightrsquoInternational Philosophical Quarterly 293 301ndash18Shohat E and Stam R [1994] (2014) Unthinking Eurocentrism New YorkRoutledgeTibebu T (2010) Hegel and the Third World The Making of Eurocentrism in WorldHistory Syracuse NY Syracuse University PressWa Thiongrsquoo N (2012) Globalectics Theory and the Politics of Knowing New YorkColumbia University Press

Hegel and Colonialism

24

  • Hegel and Colonialism
Page 11: Hegel and Colonialism - Lancaster University · 2017-06-30 · Hegel and Colonialism Alison Stone Abstract This article explores the implications of Hegel’s Philosophy of World

Europeans arrived These claims do not mean that Negroes and indigenousAmericans cannot be educated they can But given their native ignorance offreedom they cannot educate themselves but must be educated by Europeanswhich requires that they first be subjected to European control

Hegelrsquos case for colonization could be extended to the Orientals He admitsthat unlike Africans and indigenous Americans the Oriental peoples do have anidea of freedommdashthat lsquoone is freersquomdashbut this idea remains so inadequate as tocount as unfreedom Hence lacking belief in their own freedom Oriental peoplecannot pursue any extensions or advancements of freedom and without suchpursuits to drive historical change their societies remain ahistorical Colonizationof these peoples for educative purposes would therefore be justified As long as apeople is at a low enough level to count as unfree and pre-historical that peoplecan advance only through having the European spirit imposed on it for beingpre-historical it has no native way to attain freedom And indeed Hegel does sayof India that lsquoThe English or rather the East India Company are the lords[Herren] of the land for it is the necessary fate of Asiatic empires to be subjected[unterworfen] to Europeans and China will also some day have to submit to thisfatersquo (S 142ndash43)

We should not be misled by an apparently conflicting statement in thePhilosophy of Right lsquoThe liberation of colonies hellip [is] of the greatest advantage tothe mother state just as the emancipation of slaves is of the greatest advantage tothe masterrsquo (PR sect248A 269) Hegelrsquos paradigm here is American independenceie the independence of what he is explicit and adamant is colonial EuropeanAmerica not Native America (N 165ndash66) That is America merits independenceonce its native populace is reduced or placed securely under European tutelageThis coheres with Hegelrsquos approving reference to independent Haiti in thePhilosophy of Mind (EM sect393A 40) he says that this is a Christian state that theNegroes could only found after having undergone long spiritual servitude Oncea people has been colonized sufficiently to acquire European culture as in Haitithen and only then does that people merit freedom

Hegelrsquos argument for colonialism is of the lsquocivilizing missionrsquo familyEffectively his defence is that colonialism benefits most those who fare worstunder itmdashcolonized peoplesmdashby civilizing and bringing them freedom that theycannot access without passing through colonial subjection For Hegelcolonialism and the advancement of freedom go hand-in-hand

III Saving Hegel from himself

Hegelrsquos PWH implies that colonialism is required to further the realization ofuniversal freedom Does this show that Hegelrsquos conception of freedom is

Alison Stone

11

necessarily bound up with his pro-colonialism If so thenmdashtaking it thatcolonialism was in fact morally wrongmdashpresumably his conception of freedomand its historical development must be rejected (although not necessarily freedomas such of course)

But perhaps that would be to dismiss Hegelrsquos thought too summarily andthereby to do disservice not only to Hegel but also to anti-colonial anddecolonizing thought and activism which after all has regularly drawn on Hegelboth directlymdasheg when Frantz Fanon ([1952] 2008) and Ngugi wa Thiongrsquoo(2012) use Hegel to critique colonialismmdashand indirectly through Hegelrsquosinfluence on Marxism and critical theory Moreover Hegelrsquos thought may stilloffer further anti-colonial resources which remain to be mined We mighttherefore reasonably seek to separate Hegelrsquos basic conception of freedom and itshistoricity from his Eurocentric narrative of history so that when so separatedthat basic conception tells against colonialism Such a viewmdashone that rescuesHegel from himselfmdashis often adopted more or less explicitly by hisinterpreters10 I now want to set out my own version of this type of viewalthough I will go on to complicate it in Section IV

The view is this We can separate the essentials of Hegelrsquos account offreedom from his concrete interpretation of the actual movement of historyHegel was wrong and prejudiced when he dismissed Africans indigenousAmericans and Orientals as unfree and incapable of coming to freedom on theirown Nevertheless his basic account of what freedom is including its necessaryhistorical development remains insightful A better informed judgment ofnon-European peoples would require a very different historical narrative Butthat does not undermine Hegelrsquos basic points that freedom develops historicallyin tandem with the consciousness of it as embodied in different cultures andsocial institutions When we separate these basic points from his actualnarrative we find that these points serve a progressive purpose yielding groundsto reject colonialism

This view dovetails with Hegelrsquos claim that the human capacity for self-determination is universal not confined to Europeans (see eg H 88) Admittedlythough this starting-point is only an abstract universal Self-determination can beactualized only when one is conscious of onersquos capacity for it and thatrequires social and cultural institutions a whole way of life which foster thatconsciousness Such a way of life arose for the first time only in ancient Greecefor Hegel so that actualized freedom does not obtain universallyArguably though given his basic view of freedom and its historicity Hegelcould and should have interpreted all the worldrsquos regions as taking part in thegradual historical unfolding of social institutions that support freedom Hegeldoes not do so because he denies that non-European peoples are conscious offreedom at all Since non-European societies were not conscious of freedom

Hegel and Colonialism

12

even in the restricted ways that the Greeks and Romans were the former had nobasis for moving forward historically by further advancing an already partlyrealized freedom

Thus what underpins Hegelrsquos denial of historicity to non-European peoplesis his sharp division of European freedom from non-European unfreedom Thatin turn is underpinned by his claim that the ancient Greeks made the decisivebreak from unfreedom into freedom The Greeks Hegel says became thedistinctive people they were out of a mixing within them of heterogeneousOriental peoples and their cultures but the Greeks surmounted or overcame(uumlberwinden) this background (HG 214) By doing so the Greeks created theirlsquofree beautifulrsquo spirit (374) The Greeks overcame their Oriental preconditions tolsquomake themselvesrsquo (372 see also 393ndash94)

However this view that the Greeks lsquoovercamersquo the Oriental world ofunfreedom seems overstated by Hegelrsquos own lights For Hegel himself theGreeks mark only the latest phase in a growing consciousness of freedomrunning from China through India to Persia and culminating in EgyptPersiarsquos most advanced province Egypt is the hinge between Orient andOccident in which the human soulrsquos intrinsic capacity for freedom was almostgrasped But it was not quite grasped for the soul was still not distinguishedfrom animal nature a distinction the Greeks went on to make (HG 334 368)That lack of distinction is shown by the way the Egyptians modelled their godsand goddesses on animal species often with animal heads Yet for Hegel theGreeks too stopped short of recognizing that all people have an inherent capacityfor freedom They admitted freedom only to male native-born slave-ownersIn that way their view of freedom remained intermingled with acceptance ofnatural contingency ie accidents of birth sex and geographical location (H 88)So the difference between the Egyptian viewmdashhuman freedom is incompletelydistinguished from (animal) naturemdashand the Greek viewmdashhuman freedom isagain incompletely distinguished from naturemdashappears to be a difference ofdegree not kind11

Hegelrsquos lsquoovercomingrsquo idea therefore sits uncomfortably with his graduatedportrayal of historyrsquos stages That portrayal could be taken to show that belief infreedom is not exclusively European since the Persians and Egyptians already hadversions of that belief To be sure they were inadequate versions (for Hegel)mdashbutthen so was the Greeksrsquo And by extension the Indians and Chinese likewise hadversions of the belief in freedommdasheven more inadequate ones since theyattributed freedom only to lsquoonersquo not lsquosomersquomdashbut where that inadequacy stilldifferentiates these peoples from the Greeks only by degree and not kind (more soin the Indian case since the lsquoonersquo is a whole caste) If the Oriental peoples did haveversions however unsatisfactory of the belief in freedom then Hegel should nothave denied that these peoples are historical For if it is believed that someone is

Alison Stone

13

free be it only lsquoonersquo ruler or caste then others may claim and demand that samefreedom for themselves powering historical change

Now Hegel regards the Africans and indigenous Americans as lackingfreedom more radically than the Orientals yet contrary evidence was available tohim He might for instance have noted the Iroquois Confederacy of five (latersix) Native American tribes founded c1600 and dissolved c1800 a system ofintra- and inter-tribal governance which lsquomaximized individual freedom whileseeking to minimize excess governmental interference in peoplersquos livesrsquo (Johansen1982 9) influencing the American Constitution And Hegel embellishedexaggerated and at times outright distorted his sources on Africa so as to portraya people without any respect for human life freedom or rightsmdashmore so thanthe sources suggested and they were already unreliable (see Bernasconi 1998)12

The way was open to Hegel to recognize Africans and indigenous Americans ashaving views of freedom even if he classed them as even less adequate thanOriental ones With that those peoples would like the Orientals have had anentry to history

Nonetheless Hegel preserves his division of European freedom from non-European unfreedom by counting all the European stages as stages of freedomdown to its lowest level and all the non-European stages as stages of unfreedomright up to where unfreedom is almost freedom but not quite But the placementof this dividing line appears arbitrary Consider for example Hegelrsquos view thatHindus are not conscious of their own freedom because they fail to distinguishthemselves as human agents from nature (HG 256 273ndash81) On Hegelrsquosaccount as wersquove just seen there are ways that the ancient Greeks did not fullyextricate human agency from nature either somdashon his own termsmdashit is not clearthat the difference here is one of kind (history versus non-history freedom versusunfreedom) rather than degree (more or less freedom more or less far along thehistorical path towards full freedom)

Hegel could and it seems should have interpreted much of hismaterial as evidencing how non-European peoples have grasped and practisedfreedom albeit imperfectly We might still find this revised Hegeliannarrative objectionable assuming that it ranks non-European conceptions offreedom as less advanced than European ones Yet once it is admittedthat non-European peoples are historical in principle Hegel would alsohave to trace how historical advances unfolded in those societies so re-interpreting his material once again Each continent would have its own history ofprogression in consciousness of freedom rather than non-Europeancontinents merely paving the way for Europe The several continents wouldhave histories of freedom that run in parallel rather than corresponding tomore or less advanced phases of a single historical line that culminates in modernEurope

Hegel and Colonialism

14

Neither of these revised Hegelian narrativesmdashthe single line or parallel linesversionsmdashsupports colonialism not even the single line model on whichnon-European peoplesrsquo native levels of freedom are although real yetdeficient compared to European ones By recognizing freedom howeverunsatisfactorily non-European cultures would still have the internal potential andmotor to advance to greater freedom In that case colonization would not benecessary for non-European peoplesrsquo achieving freedom and would not bejustified as a necessary step in the realization of universal freedom Anotherplank in Hegelrsquos justification of colonization is that colonized peoples enjoyed nofreedom pre-colonizationmdashso that despite its abrogation of their freedomcolonization did not worsen their position (and ultimately would improve it) Butif these peoples did have a grasp of freedom however imperfect thencolonization stood to worsen their position That risk is especially pronouncedgiven Hegelrsquos own perspective that some violence is necessary for colonizationand given the role of contingency in human affairs that that violence may wellmushroom beyond the necessary minimum Further for Hegel colonizationrequires the extirpation of native cultures but if these are not cultures ofunfreedom then that extirpation is not justified Apparently then Hegel shouldby his own lights have opposed colonialism for his own philosophy generates acase against it

IV The Greeks history and self-liberation from nature

The view just canvassed is that despite the Eurocentrism and pro-colonialism ofHegelrsquos substantial narrative in the PWH his distinctive account of freedom asdeveloping historically through successive civilizations does not in itselfnecessitate his substantive Eurocentrism and when extricated from the latteryields a case against colonialism However we can distinguish weaker andstronger versions of this view More weakly Hegelrsquos basic account of freedomcan be separated from his actual pro-colonialism and so does not necessarilyimply pro-colonialism but contains anti-colonial possibilities as well as thepro-colonial possibilities that Hegel developed from it More strongly Hegelrsquosbasic account of freedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism andwhen so separated this account implies anti-colonialism and has an inherentlyanti-colonial direction I endorse the weaker but not the stronger claim and theweaker one only subject to a significant qualification Hegelrsquos basic account offreedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism but not as easily asSection III suggested This is because Hegelrsquos conception of freedom asself-determination has significant connections with his Eurocentrism

Alison Stone

15

In Section III I suggested that Hegelrsquos divisions Greeksnon-Greeks freeunfree look arbitrary But actually they are not For Hegel

Its [Greecersquos] principle is that self-conscious freedom stepsforth hellip [Regarding t]he unity of spirit with nature hellip thespecificity of this unity [in the Greek case] is to be graspedOne unity is the Oriental hellip consciousness immersed innature a [new kind of] harmony is now to be broughtforth [by the Greeks] in which hellip spirit dominates Spirit nowdetermines nature and this is a spiritual unity hellip (Hei 117 myemphases)

[The] fundamental characteristic [of the Greek spirit is] that thefreedom of spirit is conditioned by and in essential relation tosome natural stimulus Greek freedom is stimulated bysomething other and is free because it changes and produces thestimulus from out of itself (aus sich) (S 238 my emphasis)

Thus the Greeks were free in that they were at home with themselves in theother ie nature But this does not mean that the content of their practices andway of life was determined by natural givens such as the Greeksrsquo given impulsesRather they reshaped these givens and so became at-home-with-themselves inthem In the Greek case then spirit lsquodeterminedrsquo nature whereas previouslyspirit had been immersed or absorbed (versenkt) in nature This Greekdetermination of nature by spiritmdashspiritrsquos investment of nature with meaningof its ownmdashwas made possible by a prior moment first carried out by theGreeks through which lsquospirit is no longer immersed [versenkt] in nature hellip [but]releas[es] itself from nature [sich losmachend von der Natur]rsquo (HG 395ndash96) Thismoment in which the human spirit first releases or sets itself free from naturecorresponds to the overcoming (uumlberwinden) by the Greeks of their mixed ethnicheritage a moment of overcoming through which they became able to remakethat heritage for themselves to make themselves Hegel is explicit that none ofthe worldrsquos other peoples to that point had achieved this

Even so for Hegel the Greeks exercised freedom always with respect tonature and existing givens in the worldmdashre-shaping what they found alreadythere rather than creating a totally new world out of themselves Hence theGreeks did not regard free individuals as being capable of adjudicatingindependently on the given natural and social world through their own reason orof generating norms and principles purely through the exercise of their spiritualfreedom Or as Hegel also puts it elsewhere individual subjectivity was notdifferentiated from social substance but the individual identified fully andunquestioningly with his or her social role and there was no ground for

Hegel and Colonialism

16

independent social criticism (see Hardimon 1993) Connected with all this theGreeks restricted freedom to some people only effectively stipulating that onlythose with certain kinds of naturemdashmale free-bornmdashor natural locationmdashnativeGreekmdashhad the power of self-determination In these ways spiritrsquos freedomremained lsquoconditionedrsquo or limited (bedingt) bymdashalthough not immersed inmdashnature (and see HG 390)

However these limitations contradicted the essence of self-determination asthe Greeks understood it as including a moment of overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature such that the power to overcome nature cannotpossibly be limited by nature (or it would not be a power to overcome nature atall) Thus lsquoin the principle of Greek freedom inasmuch as it is freedom it isimplied that thought must be free for itself rsquo (HG 268)mdashalthough the Greeks fora long time did not explicitly grasp or follow through on that implicationNonetheless in the end that contradiction was what made it possible for theGreeksrsquo exclusion of some people from freedom and their other ways ofrestricting freedomrsquos scope to come in for criticism The criticism came withSocrates and the Sophists claiming that thought can adjudicate rationally on whatis and generate norms by itself (417) In that freedom of thought was therebygrasped as fully independent of nature it was also grasped as universal at least inprinciple In these two ways lsquoThought hellip introduces an opposition [Gegensatz][to the Greek mixture of freedom and nature] and asserts the validity ofessentially rational principlesrsquo (S 267)

For Hegel then Greek culture enabled rational criticism of what isincluding of limited freedom as no pre-Greek cultures did just because theGreeks had established a root opposition between freedom and nature whereaslsquoin the Oriental states in which a lack of opposition is present no moral freedomcan come aboutrsquo (267) Although the advent of rational critique brought on thedemise of Greek culture Europe was thereby also set on the path oftransformative historical change We see then why in his own terms Hegel saysthat non-European peoples could not advance critical claims for freedomrsquosextension but uncritically accepted the authority of their rulersmdashpatriarchalauthority in China caste hierarchy and caste-based restrictions and rituals inIndia and state power in Persia Non-Europeans could not question suchauthorities because their cultures did not grasp freedom as including the momentof overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature and the given Becausefreedom was not grasped as including that moment of human separation fromnature and the given no contradiction was perceived in freedom being limited bynature eg confined to people of certain castes or by given states of affairs egcustomary authority and ritual Non-Europeans lacked a critical motor to drivesocial change hence lacked history propermdashor indeed freedom as properlydistinguished from unfreedom

Alison Stone

17

So for Hegel there is a genuine difference in kind not merely degreebetween the Greek and post-Greek European world on the one hand and thenon-European world on the other the Europenon-Europe divide is notarbitrary but has a philosophical rationale For while the Greek view of freedomwas like non-European views limited and inadequate the former was moreadvanced in one key respectmdashthe inclusion in freedom of a primary moment oflsquoovercomingrsquo naturemdashwhich enabled the Greek and post-Greek European worldto become self-critical self-revising and so historical This is what motivatesHegel to identify Greek and post-Greek European views as views of freedomhowever limited whereas non-European views that might prima facie look likeviews of freedom are still actually modes of unfreedom

Once again we might object that non-Europeans have at times construedfreedom as including this moment of overcoming nature Even on Hegelrsquosaccount Hindus appreciate the human power to abstract from the world inthought He maintains though that this is merely an intellectual withdrawaland that when it comes to practical agency Hindus see human agency as immersedin not including any moment of self-freeing-from nature (see eg S 157ndash58)In response we could with Jaspal Peter Sahota (2016) agree that in classicalIndian thought there has been a tendency to locate human agency within naturebut argue against Hegel that this does not constitute a real absence offreedom but rather a different conception of freedom We might then say thatbecause thesemdashand othermdashnon-European views were still views of freedom thoseviews were still sufficient to motivate social criticism and hence place non-European peoples in history even without the element of overcoming natureHowever such a position would take us further away from Hegelrsquos own accountof the historicity of freedom according which as we have seen that moment ofovercoming nature uniquely new in ancient Greece is crucial in poweringhistorical progression

Hegelrsquos basic account of freedom and its historicity thus has more extensiveand significant connections with his Eurocentrism than I suggested inSection III In particular that account connects with Hegelrsquos denial that non-European peoples are historicalmdashie can come to freedom on their ownmdashandhence with his case for colonialism as the only route along which those peoplescan reach freedom These connections suggest that after all we cannotstraightforwardly take up Hegelrsquos account of freedom and its historicity whilesloughing off his pro-colonialism This is not to say that we cannot separate outthese parts of his thought at all But rescuing Hegel from himself is set to be acomplicated process not quick or straightforward To the extent that such arescue is possible Hegelrsquos pro-colonialism cannot rightly be counted as necessaryto his thought or system Yet his pro-colonialism does have extensive anddeep-seated connections with his other viewsmdashenough to show that it is not the

Hegel and Colonialism

18

case that Hegel should not have endorsed colonialism by his own standardsRather he did and could endorse it coherently in his own terms although otheranti-colonialist possibilities were also available within his own terms which hecould have developed

So the claim that Hegelrsquos account of freedom is inherently anti-colonial isunduly strong Through his understanding of freedom as involving spiritextricating itself from nature that account has sustained links with hisEurocentrism and so his pro-colonialism We can nonetheless envisage variousmanoeuvres by which to maintain that freedom develops historically for all theworldrsquos peoples for example by saying that they have several conceptions offreedom where freedom can but does not have to include self-liberation fromnature Then ancient Greece would initiate one historical pathway to freedombut not the only one Even so Hegelrsquos own account of freedom and its historicitydoes not inherently drive us to make these intellectual manoeuvres but onlypermits them In sum if Hegelrsquos view of freedom does not necessarily implypro-colonialism neither is it inherently anti-colonial We can make distinctionsand qualifications within his thought so as to yield anti-colonial conclusions butthis is only one of several possible lines of development of which his thoughtadmits another being its elaboration into the Eurocentric and pro-colonialsystem that Hegel in fact forged

There is a broader moral Wemdashie the heirs of the European heritage thatruns through philosophy into modern political thoughtmdashshould not let thisheritage off the hook too easily This heritage including Hegelrsquos thought hasbeen implicated in colonialism in various ways To be sure because it extols andarticulates the values of freedom and equality this heritage also furnishesconceptual resources for critiquing colonialism and giving support to anti-colonial struggles and anti-colonial thinkers and activists have drawn on modernEuropean ideas for this purpose For example the Haitian revolutionariesdeclared that they were acting in allegiance to the emancipatory goals of theFrench Revolution This might lead us to suppose that the European politicallegacy is intrinsically liberatory and that theorists in the European traditionmdashHegel includedmdashhave only ever justified colonialism due to unfortunateprejudices that led them to go back on their own principles

I believe that taking that view exculpates our predecessors too quicklyand leaves us at risk of inadvertently embracing ideas inherited from thesepredecessors which actually have deep-rooted internal connections withEurocentric and pro-colonial attitudes This is not to say that we should orcould repudiate these ideas outright Rather in view of their connections withcolonialism we need to think carefully and critically about how far to take theseinherited ideas forward and how we might do so differently My aim has been tohelp us cultivate this caution in Hegelrsquos case by acknowledging that while his

Alison Stone

19

thought harbours anti-colonial possibilities it also has real and tenacious linkswith colonialism of which we should remind mindful13

Alison StoneLancaster University UKastonelancasteracuk

Notes

1 Contributions include those by Bernasconi 1998 2007 2016 Bonetto 2006 de Laurentiis2014 McCarney and Bernasconi 2003 Mowad 2013 Parekh 2009 Purtschert 2010 andTibebu 20102 However see Buck-Morss 2000 andmdashfor highly critical accountsmdashDussel [1992] 1995 and1993 Guha 2002 Tibebu 2010 Also relevant are Bird-Pollan 2014 (on Hegel and Fanon)Brennan 2013 (on Hegelrsquos influence on post-colonialism) Buchwalter 2009 (defending Hegelagainst charges of Eurocentrism) Monahan 2017 (Creolizing Hegel) and Serequeberhan 1989(on colonialism in the Philosophy of Right)3 Ranajit Guha identifies another argument for colonialism in the Philosophy of Rightfrom the lsquorightsrsquo that Hegel claims civilized nations have with respect to less advanced ones(PR sect351 376) These rights Guha argues are lsquorights of conquestrsquo noting Hegelrsquos praise for Britishmilitary victories over India led by Robert Clive (1725ndash74) whose conquests established theEast India Companyrsquos rule over Bengal and other Indian states See Guha 2002 43ndash44PR sect372A 364 and 474 note 1)Abbreviations usedEN=Hegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller Oxford Clarendon PressEM= Hegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind Trans W Wallace and A V Miller Oxford OxfordUniversity Press Cited by paragraph and page numberN=Hegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reason in Historytrans H B Nisbet Cambridge UK Cambridge University PressS=Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NY Prometheus BooksPR=Hegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B Nisbet Cambridge UKCambridge University PressHei=Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink4 Hegel lectured on the PWH in 182223 182425 182627 182829 and 183031 Hismanuscripts of the Introduction from 1822 (rev 1828) and 183031 survive as do manytranscripts between them covering every course Some such as de Laurentiis (2014) are waryof directly attributing to Hegel views notably on race expressed only in the transcripts I agreethat we should disambiguate sources but where multiple independently written transcripts

Hegel and Colonialism

20

converge as domdashextensivelymdashseveral transcripts of the PWH we may take them to bereliable Accordingly I refer to Hegelrsquos manuscripts (abbreviated H) as in Hegel 2011 which isthe English translation of the corresponding volume of the Gesammelte Werke (Hegel 1995) andthe integrated text of the 182223 course composed primarily from Hothorsquos and Griesheimrsquostranscripts (abb HG) included in Hegel 2011 (the German is Hegel 1996) Since the Germancritical edition of the transcripts remains incomplete for materials on Hegelrsquos later coursesI have used Heimannrsquos transcript of 183031 whenever possible (Hegel 2005 abb Hei)otherwise the composite texts produced by Karl Hegel (Hegel 1986) and translated by Sibree(Hegel 1991 abb S) and by Georg LassonJohannes Hoffmeister (Hegel 1988) translated byNisbet (Hegel 1975 abb N) I quote English translations whenever available sometimesadjusted in view of the German5 For more on contingency in Hegel see inter alia Burbidge 2007 esp ch 1 Burbidge stressesthe extent to which Hegel lsquotakes the contingencies of history seriouslyrsquo (2007 9)6 For Hegel lsquonaturehellip is indeed a rational system operating in its own distinct elementrsquo (N 44)The division into continents is rational in that different natural features and their varietiesmdashmountains and plains lands and seas and their fusion and differentiationmdasheach find fullembodiment in different continents (EM sect393 and R 40ndash41) In a sense then non-Europeansare subject to reason and rational progression insofar as nature imposes it on them fromthe outside rather than by exercising rational thought for themselves This coheres withHegelrsquos view that these peoples are immersed in nature out of which only Europeans can liftthem see below7 This recalls Hegelrsquos derivation of time from space in the Philosophy of Nature a derivation thatpositions time as more advanced than space (EN sectsect256ndash57 31ndash36)8 This is evident from eg Hegelrsquos discussion of the colonization of America see Section II9 Hegel connects formation with possession (PR sect56 85ndash86) albeit in the very differentcontext of modern European societies in which private property is institutionalized I leaveunexplored here how far his ideas about slaveryrsquos educative power may be informed by hislordbondsman dialectic10 For instance some interpreters defend Hegel against charges of Eurocentrism and racism(eg Buchwalter 2009 Houlgate [1991] 2015 35ndash37 McCarney in McCarney and Bernasconi2003 Mowad 2013) others stress Hegelrsquos founding importance for anti-colonial thought(Brennan 2013) and numerous readers of Hegel as a thinker of freedom (eg Patten 1999)see no need to discuss his position on colonialism presumably on the grounds that the latteris a merely accidental avoidable part of his thought from which his essential views on freedomcan be extracted11 For Hegel the Greeks were greatly influenced by the Egyptians whose influence theynonetheless overcame Here he is close to accepting what Martin Bernal calls the lsquoancientmodelrsquo of the Greeksrsquo origins a model to which the Greeks themselves adhered later-nineteenth-century Europeans instead espoused an lsquoAryan modelrsquo on which Greek cultureproper arose from northern invaders driving out earlier Egyptian and Phoenician influences([1987] 1991) Bernal argues that the Aryan model had Eurocentric motivations if the Greeks

Alison Stone

21

the supposed originators of Europersquos distinctive culture were actually the Egyptiansrsquo heirsthen given that Egypt is within Africa the EuropeAfrica divide would crumble A furthercomplicating factor is whether the Egyptians were seen as black Africans Bernasconi (2007)argues that Hegel thought so as did most other Europeans of his time Later the Egyptiansrsquoracial status was changedmdashto Mediterranean (ie Caucasian)mdashto hold up the divide betweenEurope-as-white and Africa-as-black Bernasconi suggests that Hegel himself dealt with thepotential anomalymdashof highly cultured black Africans giving much to the Greeksmdashby makingthe EgyptGreece transition the site of the key conceptual transition from unfreedom tofreedom nature to spirit (2007 212ndash13) This ties in with my argument in Section IV thatHegel actually did have grounds on his own terms to construe the apparently gradual EgyptGreece transition as actually being a sharp divide12 Bernasconi (2016) has recently shown how Hegel likewise distorted his sources on China tothe detriment of the Chinese13 I thank Bob Stern and the referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions

Bibliography

Bernal M [1987] (1991) Black Athena The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical CivilisationVol 1 London VintageBernasconi R (1998) lsquoHegel at the Court of the Ashantirsquo in S Barnett (ed)Hegel After Derrida Albany NY SUNYBernasconi R (2007) lsquoThe Return of Africa Hegel and the Question of theRacial Identity of the Egyptiansrsquo in P T Grier (ed) Identity and Difference AlbanyNY SUNYBernasconi R (2016) lsquoChina on Parade Hegelrsquos Manipulation of his Sources andhis Change of Mindrsquo in B Brandt and D L Purdy (eds) China in the GermanEnlightenment Toronto University of Toronto PressBird-Pollan S (2014) Hegel Freud and Fanon The Dialectic of Emancipation LondonRowman and Littlefield InternationalBonetto S (2006) lsquoRace and Racism in HegelmdashAn AnalysisrsquoMinerva An InternetJournal of Philosophy 10Brennan T (2013) lsquoHegel Empire and Anti-Colonial Thoughtrsquo in G Huggan(ed) The Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies Oxford Oxford University PressBuchwalter A (2009) lsquoIs Hegelrsquos Philosophy of History Eurocentricrsquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYBuck-Morss S (2000) lsquoHegel and Haitirsquo Critical Inquiry 264 821ndash65Burbidge J (2007) Hegelrsquos Systematic Contingency Basingstoke Palgrave MacmillanDe Laurentiis A (2014) lsquoRace in Hegel Text and Contextrsquo in M Egger (ed)Philosophie Nach Kant Neue Wege zum Verstaumlndnis von Kants Transzendental- undMoralphilosophie Berlin De Gruyter

Hegel and Colonialism

22

Dussel E [1992] (1995) The Invention of the Americas trans M D Barber NewYork ContinuumDussel E (1993) lsquoEurocentrism and Modernityrsquo Boundary 2 203 65ndash76Fanon F [1952] (2008) Black Skin White Masks trans R Philcox New YorkGroveGuha R (2002) History at the Limit of World-History New York ColumbiaUniversity PressHardimon M (1993) Hegelrsquos Social Philosophy Cambridge Cambridge UniversityPressHegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller OxfordClarendonHegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind trans W Wallace and A V MillerOxford Oxford University PressHegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reasonin History trans H B Nisbet Cambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1986) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Geschichte Werke Vol 12ed E Moldenhauer and K M Michel Frankfurt Suhrkamp [Englishtranslation Sibree]Hegel G W F (1988) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Vols 1-3 edG Lasson Vols 1-4 Hamburg Meiner [English translation of volume 1 Nisbet]Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NYPrometheus BooksHegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B NisbetCambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1995) lsquoVorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der WeltgeschichteEinleitungrsquo in W Jaeschke (ed) Vorlesungsmanuskripte II (1916ndash1831)Gesammelte Werke Vol 18 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown andHodgson]Hegel G W F (1996) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Berlin 182223 Nachschriften von Griesheim Hotho und Kehler ed Karl Brehmer K-H Iltingund Hoo Nam Seelmann Hegel Vorlesungen Ausgew Nachschriften und ManuskripteVol 12 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown and Hodgson]Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink Abb HeiHegel G W F (2011) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Volume 1Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822ndash3 ed and trans R F Brownand P C Hodgson with assistance of W G Geuss Oxford Clarendon PressHoulgate S [1991] 2015 An Introduction to Hegel Freedom Truth and HistoryOxford BlackwellJohansen B E (1982) Forgotten Founders How the American Indians Helped ShapeDemocracy Boston Harvard Common Press

Alison Stone

23

McCarney J and Bernasconi R (2003) lsquoExchange Hegelrsquos Racismrsquo RadicalPhilosophy 119(MayJune) 32ndash37Monahan M (ed) (2017) Creolizing Hegel London Rowman and LittlefieldInternationalMowad N (2013) lsquoThe Place of Nationality in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of Politicsand Religion A Defense of Hegel on the Charges of National Chauvinism andRacismrsquo in A Nuzzo (ed) Hegel on Religion and Politics Albany NY SUNYParekh S (2009) lsquoHegelrsquos New World History Freedom and Racersquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYPatten A (1999) Hegelrsquos Idea of Freedom Oxford Oxford University PressPurtschert P (2010) lsquoOn the Limit of Spirit Hegelrsquos Racism Revisitedrsquo Philosophyand Social Criticism 369 1039ndash51Quijano A (2000) lsquoColoniality of Power Eurocentrism and Latin AmericarsquoNepantla Views from South 13 533ndash80Sahota J P (2016) lsquoHegelrsquos Critique of Hinduism A Responsersquo Hegel Bulletin372 305ndash17Serequeberhan T (1989) lsquoThe Idea of Colonialism in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of RightrsquoInternational Philosophical Quarterly 293 301ndash18Shohat E and Stam R [1994] (2014) Unthinking Eurocentrism New YorkRoutledgeTibebu T (2010) Hegel and the Third World The Making of Eurocentrism in WorldHistory Syracuse NY Syracuse University PressWa Thiongrsquoo N (2012) Globalectics Theory and the Politics of Knowing New YorkColumbia University Press

Hegel and Colonialism

24

  • Hegel and Colonialism
Page 12: Hegel and Colonialism - Lancaster University · 2017-06-30 · Hegel and Colonialism Alison Stone Abstract This article explores the implications of Hegel’s Philosophy of World

necessarily bound up with his pro-colonialism If so thenmdashtaking it thatcolonialism was in fact morally wrongmdashpresumably his conception of freedomand its historical development must be rejected (although not necessarily freedomas such of course)

But perhaps that would be to dismiss Hegelrsquos thought too summarily andthereby to do disservice not only to Hegel but also to anti-colonial anddecolonizing thought and activism which after all has regularly drawn on Hegelboth directlymdasheg when Frantz Fanon ([1952] 2008) and Ngugi wa Thiongrsquoo(2012) use Hegel to critique colonialismmdashand indirectly through Hegelrsquosinfluence on Marxism and critical theory Moreover Hegelrsquos thought may stilloffer further anti-colonial resources which remain to be mined We mighttherefore reasonably seek to separate Hegelrsquos basic conception of freedom and itshistoricity from his Eurocentric narrative of history so that when so separatedthat basic conception tells against colonialism Such a viewmdashone that rescuesHegel from himselfmdashis often adopted more or less explicitly by hisinterpreters10 I now want to set out my own version of this type of viewalthough I will go on to complicate it in Section IV

The view is this We can separate the essentials of Hegelrsquos account offreedom from his concrete interpretation of the actual movement of historyHegel was wrong and prejudiced when he dismissed Africans indigenousAmericans and Orientals as unfree and incapable of coming to freedom on theirown Nevertheless his basic account of what freedom is including its necessaryhistorical development remains insightful A better informed judgment ofnon-European peoples would require a very different historical narrative Butthat does not undermine Hegelrsquos basic points that freedom develops historicallyin tandem with the consciousness of it as embodied in different cultures andsocial institutions When we separate these basic points from his actualnarrative we find that these points serve a progressive purpose yielding groundsto reject colonialism

This view dovetails with Hegelrsquos claim that the human capacity for self-determination is universal not confined to Europeans (see eg H 88) Admittedlythough this starting-point is only an abstract universal Self-determination can beactualized only when one is conscious of onersquos capacity for it and thatrequires social and cultural institutions a whole way of life which foster thatconsciousness Such a way of life arose for the first time only in ancient Greecefor Hegel so that actualized freedom does not obtain universallyArguably though given his basic view of freedom and its historicity Hegelcould and should have interpreted all the worldrsquos regions as taking part in thegradual historical unfolding of social institutions that support freedom Hegeldoes not do so because he denies that non-European peoples are conscious offreedom at all Since non-European societies were not conscious of freedom

Hegel and Colonialism

12

even in the restricted ways that the Greeks and Romans were the former had nobasis for moving forward historically by further advancing an already partlyrealized freedom

Thus what underpins Hegelrsquos denial of historicity to non-European peoplesis his sharp division of European freedom from non-European unfreedom Thatin turn is underpinned by his claim that the ancient Greeks made the decisivebreak from unfreedom into freedom The Greeks Hegel says became thedistinctive people they were out of a mixing within them of heterogeneousOriental peoples and their cultures but the Greeks surmounted or overcame(uumlberwinden) this background (HG 214) By doing so the Greeks created theirlsquofree beautifulrsquo spirit (374) The Greeks overcame their Oriental preconditions tolsquomake themselvesrsquo (372 see also 393ndash94)

However this view that the Greeks lsquoovercamersquo the Oriental world ofunfreedom seems overstated by Hegelrsquos own lights For Hegel himself theGreeks mark only the latest phase in a growing consciousness of freedomrunning from China through India to Persia and culminating in EgyptPersiarsquos most advanced province Egypt is the hinge between Orient andOccident in which the human soulrsquos intrinsic capacity for freedom was almostgrasped But it was not quite grasped for the soul was still not distinguishedfrom animal nature a distinction the Greeks went on to make (HG 334 368)That lack of distinction is shown by the way the Egyptians modelled their godsand goddesses on animal species often with animal heads Yet for Hegel theGreeks too stopped short of recognizing that all people have an inherent capacityfor freedom They admitted freedom only to male native-born slave-ownersIn that way their view of freedom remained intermingled with acceptance ofnatural contingency ie accidents of birth sex and geographical location (H 88)So the difference between the Egyptian viewmdashhuman freedom is incompletelydistinguished from (animal) naturemdashand the Greek viewmdashhuman freedom isagain incompletely distinguished from naturemdashappears to be a difference ofdegree not kind11

Hegelrsquos lsquoovercomingrsquo idea therefore sits uncomfortably with his graduatedportrayal of historyrsquos stages That portrayal could be taken to show that belief infreedom is not exclusively European since the Persians and Egyptians already hadversions of that belief To be sure they were inadequate versions (for Hegel)mdashbutthen so was the Greeksrsquo And by extension the Indians and Chinese likewise hadversions of the belief in freedommdasheven more inadequate ones since theyattributed freedom only to lsquoonersquo not lsquosomersquomdashbut where that inadequacy stilldifferentiates these peoples from the Greeks only by degree and not kind (more soin the Indian case since the lsquoonersquo is a whole caste) If the Oriental peoples did haveversions however unsatisfactory of the belief in freedom then Hegel should nothave denied that these peoples are historical For if it is believed that someone is

Alison Stone

13

free be it only lsquoonersquo ruler or caste then others may claim and demand that samefreedom for themselves powering historical change

Now Hegel regards the Africans and indigenous Americans as lackingfreedom more radically than the Orientals yet contrary evidence was available tohim He might for instance have noted the Iroquois Confederacy of five (latersix) Native American tribes founded c1600 and dissolved c1800 a system ofintra- and inter-tribal governance which lsquomaximized individual freedom whileseeking to minimize excess governmental interference in peoplersquos livesrsquo (Johansen1982 9) influencing the American Constitution And Hegel embellishedexaggerated and at times outright distorted his sources on Africa so as to portraya people without any respect for human life freedom or rightsmdashmore so thanthe sources suggested and they were already unreliable (see Bernasconi 1998)12

The way was open to Hegel to recognize Africans and indigenous Americans ashaving views of freedom even if he classed them as even less adequate thanOriental ones With that those peoples would like the Orientals have had anentry to history

Nonetheless Hegel preserves his division of European freedom from non-European unfreedom by counting all the European stages as stages of freedomdown to its lowest level and all the non-European stages as stages of unfreedomright up to where unfreedom is almost freedom but not quite But the placementof this dividing line appears arbitrary Consider for example Hegelrsquos view thatHindus are not conscious of their own freedom because they fail to distinguishthemselves as human agents from nature (HG 256 273ndash81) On Hegelrsquosaccount as wersquove just seen there are ways that the ancient Greeks did not fullyextricate human agency from nature either somdashon his own termsmdashit is not clearthat the difference here is one of kind (history versus non-history freedom versusunfreedom) rather than degree (more or less freedom more or less far along thehistorical path towards full freedom)

Hegel could and it seems should have interpreted much of hismaterial as evidencing how non-European peoples have grasped and practisedfreedom albeit imperfectly We might still find this revised Hegeliannarrative objectionable assuming that it ranks non-European conceptions offreedom as less advanced than European ones Yet once it is admittedthat non-European peoples are historical in principle Hegel would alsohave to trace how historical advances unfolded in those societies so re-interpreting his material once again Each continent would have its own history ofprogression in consciousness of freedom rather than non-Europeancontinents merely paving the way for Europe The several continents wouldhave histories of freedom that run in parallel rather than corresponding tomore or less advanced phases of a single historical line that culminates in modernEurope

Hegel and Colonialism

14

Neither of these revised Hegelian narrativesmdashthe single line or parallel linesversionsmdashsupports colonialism not even the single line model on whichnon-European peoplesrsquo native levels of freedom are although real yetdeficient compared to European ones By recognizing freedom howeverunsatisfactorily non-European cultures would still have the internal potential andmotor to advance to greater freedom In that case colonization would not benecessary for non-European peoplesrsquo achieving freedom and would not bejustified as a necessary step in the realization of universal freedom Anotherplank in Hegelrsquos justification of colonization is that colonized peoples enjoyed nofreedom pre-colonizationmdashso that despite its abrogation of their freedomcolonization did not worsen their position (and ultimately would improve it) Butif these peoples did have a grasp of freedom however imperfect thencolonization stood to worsen their position That risk is especially pronouncedgiven Hegelrsquos own perspective that some violence is necessary for colonizationand given the role of contingency in human affairs that that violence may wellmushroom beyond the necessary minimum Further for Hegel colonizationrequires the extirpation of native cultures but if these are not cultures ofunfreedom then that extirpation is not justified Apparently then Hegel shouldby his own lights have opposed colonialism for his own philosophy generates acase against it

IV The Greeks history and self-liberation from nature

The view just canvassed is that despite the Eurocentrism and pro-colonialism ofHegelrsquos substantial narrative in the PWH his distinctive account of freedom asdeveloping historically through successive civilizations does not in itselfnecessitate his substantive Eurocentrism and when extricated from the latteryields a case against colonialism However we can distinguish weaker andstronger versions of this view More weakly Hegelrsquos basic account of freedomcan be separated from his actual pro-colonialism and so does not necessarilyimply pro-colonialism but contains anti-colonial possibilities as well as thepro-colonial possibilities that Hegel developed from it More strongly Hegelrsquosbasic account of freedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism andwhen so separated this account implies anti-colonialism and has an inherentlyanti-colonial direction I endorse the weaker but not the stronger claim and theweaker one only subject to a significant qualification Hegelrsquos basic account offreedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism but not as easily asSection III suggested This is because Hegelrsquos conception of freedom asself-determination has significant connections with his Eurocentrism

Alison Stone

15

In Section III I suggested that Hegelrsquos divisions Greeksnon-Greeks freeunfree look arbitrary But actually they are not For Hegel

Its [Greecersquos] principle is that self-conscious freedom stepsforth hellip [Regarding t]he unity of spirit with nature hellip thespecificity of this unity [in the Greek case] is to be graspedOne unity is the Oriental hellip consciousness immersed innature a [new kind of] harmony is now to be broughtforth [by the Greeks] in which hellip spirit dominates Spirit nowdetermines nature and this is a spiritual unity hellip (Hei 117 myemphases)

[The] fundamental characteristic [of the Greek spirit is] that thefreedom of spirit is conditioned by and in essential relation tosome natural stimulus Greek freedom is stimulated bysomething other and is free because it changes and produces thestimulus from out of itself (aus sich) (S 238 my emphasis)

Thus the Greeks were free in that they were at home with themselves in theother ie nature But this does not mean that the content of their practices andway of life was determined by natural givens such as the Greeksrsquo given impulsesRather they reshaped these givens and so became at-home-with-themselves inthem In the Greek case then spirit lsquodeterminedrsquo nature whereas previouslyspirit had been immersed or absorbed (versenkt) in nature This Greekdetermination of nature by spiritmdashspiritrsquos investment of nature with meaningof its ownmdashwas made possible by a prior moment first carried out by theGreeks through which lsquospirit is no longer immersed [versenkt] in nature hellip [but]releas[es] itself from nature [sich losmachend von der Natur]rsquo (HG 395ndash96) Thismoment in which the human spirit first releases or sets itself free from naturecorresponds to the overcoming (uumlberwinden) by the Greeks of their mixed ethnicheritage a moment of overcoming through which they became able to remakethat heritage for themselves to make themselves Hegel is explicit that none ofthe worldrsquos other peoples to that point had achieved this

Even so for Hegel the Greeks exercised freedom always with respect tonature and existing givens in the worldmdashre-shaping what they found alreadythere rather than creating a totally new world out of themselves Hence theGreeks did not regard free individuals as being capable of adjudicatingindependently on the given natural and social world through their own reason orof generating norms and principles purely through the exercise of their spiritualfreedom Or as Hegel also puts it elsewhere individual subjectivity was notdifferentiated from social substance but the individual identified fully andunquestioningly with his or her social role and there was no ground for

Hegel and Colonialism

16

independent social criticism (see Hardimon 1993) Connected with all this theGreeks restricted freedom to some people only effectively stipulating that onlythose with certain kinds of naturemdashmale free-bornmdashor natural locationmdashnativeGreekmdashhad the power of self-determination In these ways spiritrsquos freedomremained lsquoconditionedrsquo or limited (bedingt) bymdashalthough not immersed inmdashnature (and see HG 390)

However these limitations contradicted the essence of self-determination asthe Greeks understood it as including a moment of overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature such that the power to overcome nature cannotpossibly be limited by nature (or it would not be a power to overcome nature atall) Thus lsquoin the principle of Greek freedom inasmuch as it is freedom it isimplied that thought must be free for itself rsquo (HG 268)mdashalthough the Greeks fora long time did not explicitly grasp or follow through on that implicationNonetheless in the end that contradiction was what made it possible for theGreeksrsquo exclusion of some people from freedom and their other ways ofrestricting freedomrsquos scope to come in for criticism The criticism came withSocrates and the Sophists claiming that thought can adjudicate rationally on whatis and generate norms by itself (417) In that freedom of thought was therebygrasped as fully independent of nature it was also grasped as universal at least inprinciple In these two ways lsquoThought hellip introduces an opposition [Gegensatz][to the Greek mixture of freedom and nature] and asserts the validity ofessentially rational principlesrsquo (S 267)

For Hegel then Greek culture enabled rational criticism of what isincluding of limited freedom as no pre-Greek cultures did just because theGreeks had established a root opposition between freedom and nature whereaslsquoin the Oriental states in which a lack of opposition is present no moral freedomcan come aboutrsquo (267) Although the advent of rational critique brought on thedemise of Greek culture Europe was thereby also set on the path oftransformative historical change We see then why in his own terms Hegel saysthat non-European peoples could not advance critical claims for freedomrsquosextension but uncritically accepted the authority of their rulersmdashpatriarchalauthority in China caste hierarchy and caste-based restrictions and rituals inIndia and state power in Persia Non-Europeans could not question suchauthorities because their cultures did not grasp freedom as including the momentof overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature and the given Becausefreedom was not grasped as including that moment of human separation fromnature and the given no contradiction was perceived in freedom being limited bynature eg confined to people of certain castes or by given states of affairs egcustomary authority and ritual Non-Europeans lacked a critical motor to drivesocial change hence lacked history propermdashor indeed freedom as properlydistinguished from unfreedom

Alison Stone

17

So for Hegel there is a genuine difference in kind not merely degreebetween the Greek and post-Greek European world on the one hand and thenon-European world on the other the Europenon-Europe divide is notarbitrary but has a philosophical rationale For while the Greek view of freedomwas like non-European views limited and inadequate the former was moreadvanced in one key respectmdashthe inclusion in freedom of a primary moment oflsquoovercomingrsquo naturemdashwhich enabled the Greek and post-Greek European worldto become self-critical self-revising and so historical This is what motivatesHegel to identify Greek and post-Greek European views as views of freedomhowever limited whereas non-European views that might prima facie look likeviews of freedom are still actually modes of unfreedom

Once again we might object that non-Europeans have at times construedfreedom as including this moment of overcoming nature Even on Hegelrsquosaccount Hindus appreciate the human power to abstract from the world inthought He maintains though that this is merely an intellectual withdrawaland that when it comes to practical agency Hindus see human agency as immersedin not including any moment of self-freeing-from nature (see eg S 157ndash58)In response we could with Jaspal Peter Sahota (2016) agree that in classicalIndian thought there has been a tendency to locate human agency within naturebut argue against Hegel that this does not constitute a real absence offreedom but rather a different conception of freedom We might then say thatbecause thesemdashand othermdashnon-European views were still views of freedom thoseviews were still sufficient to motivate social criticism and hence place non-European peoples in history even without the element of overcoming natureHowever such a position would take us further away from Hegelrsquos own accountof the historicity of freedom according which as we have seen that moment ofovercoming nature uniquely new in ancient Greece is crucial in poweringhistorical progression

Hegelrsquos basic account of freedom and its historicity thus has more extensiveand significant connections with his Eurocentrism than I suggested inSection III In particular that account connects with Hegelrsquos denial that non-European peoples are historicalmdashie can come to freedom on their ownmdashandhence with his case for colonialism as the only route along which those peoplescan reach freedom These connections suggest that after all we cannotstraightforwardly take up Hegelrsquos account of freedom and its historicity whilesloughing off his pro-colonialism This is not to say that we cannot separate outthese parts of his thought at all But rescuing Hegel from himself is set to be acomplicated process not quick or straightforward To the extent that such arescue is possible Hegelrsquos pro-colonialism cannot rightly be counted as necessaryto his thought or system Yet his pro-colonialism does have extensive anddeep-seated connections with his other viewsmdashenough to show that it is not the

Hegel and Colonialism

18

case that Hegel should not have endorsed colonialism by his own standardsRather he did and could endorse it coherently in his own terms although otheranti-colonialist possibilities were also available within his own terms which hecould have developed

So the claim that Hegelrsquos account of freedom is inherently anti-colonial isunduly strong Through his understanding of freedom as involving spiritextricating itself from nature that account has sustained links with hisEurocentrism and so his pro-colonialism We can nonetheless envisage variousmanoeuvres by which to maintain that freedom develops historically for all theworldrsquos peoples for example by saying that they have several conceptions offreedom where freedom can but does not have to include self-liberation fromnature Then ancient Greece would initiate one historical pathway to freedombut not the only one Even so Hegelrsquos own account of freedom and its historicitydoes not inherently drive us to make these intellectual manoeuvres but onlypermits them In sum if Hegelrsquos view of freedom does not necessarily implypro-colonialism neither is it inherently anti-colonial We can make distinctionsand qualifications within his thought so as to yield anti-colonial conclusions butthis is only one of several possible lines of development of which his thoughtadmits another being its elaboration into the Eurocentric and pro-colonialsystem that Hegel in fact forged

There is a broader moral Wemdashie the heirs of the European heritage thatruns through philosophy into modern political thoughtmdashshould not let thisheritage off the hook too easily This heritage including Hegelrsquos thought hasbeen implicated in colonialism in various ways To be sure because it extols andarticulates the values of freedom and equality this heritage also furnishesconceptual resources for critiquing colonialism and giving support to anti-colonial struggles and anti-colonial thinkers and activists have drawn on modernEuropean ideas for this purpose For example the Haitian revolutionariesdeclared that they were acting in allegiance to the emancipatory goals of theFrench Revolution This might lead us to suppose that the European politicallegacy is intrinsically liberatory and that theorists in the European traditionmdashHegel includedmdashhave only ever justified colonialism due to unfortunateprejudices that led them to go back on their own principles

I believe that taking that view exculpates our predecessors too quicklyand leaves us at risk of inadvertently embracing ideas inherited from thesepredecessors which actually have deep-rooted internal connections withEurocentric and pro-colonial attitudes This is not to say that we should orcould repudiate these ideas outright Rather in view of their connections withcolonialism we need to think carefully and critically about how far to take theseinherited ideas forward and how we might do so differently My aim has been tohelp us cultivate this caution in Hegelrsquos case by acknowledging that while his

Alison Stone

19

thought harbours anti-colonial possibilities it also has real and tenacious linkswith colonialism of which we should remind mindful13

Alison StoneLancaster University UKastonelancasteracuk

Notes

1 Contributions include those by Bernasconi 1998 2007 2016 Bonetto 2006 de Laurentiis2014 McCarney and Bernasconi 2003 Mowad 2013 Parekh 2009 Purtschert 2010 andTibebu 20102 However see Buck-Morss 2000 andmdashfor highly critical accountsmdashDussel [1992] 1995 and1993 Guha 2002 Tibebu 2010 Also relevant are Bird-Pollan 2014 (on Hegel and Fanon)Brennan 2013 (on Hegelrsquos influence on post-colonialism) Buchwalter 2009 (defending Hegelagainst charges of Eurocentrism) Monahan 2017 (Creolizing Hegel) and Serequeberhan 1989(on colonialism in the Philosophy of Right)3 Ranajit Guha identifies another argument for colonialism in the Philosophy of Rightfrom the lsquorightsrsquo that Hegel claims civilized nations have with respect to less advanced ones(PR sect351 376) These rights Guha argues are lsquorights of conquestrsquo noting Hegelrsquos praise for Britishmilitary victories over India led by Robert Clive (1725ndash74) whose conquests established theEast India Companyrsquos rule over Bengal and other Indian states See Guha 2002 43ndash44PR sect372A 364 and 474 note 1)Abbreviations usedEN=Hegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller Oxford Clarendon PressEM= Hegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind Trans W Wallace and A V Miller Oxford OxfordUniversity Press Cited by paragraph and page numberN=Hegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reason in Historytrans H B Nisbet Cambridge UK Cambridge University PressS=Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NY Prometheus BooksPR=Hegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B Nisbet Cambridge UKCambridge University PressHei=Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink4 Hegel lectured on the PWH in 182223 182425 182627 182829 and 183031 Hismanuscripts of the Introduction from 1822 (rev 1828) and 183031 survive as do manytranscripts between them covering every course Some such as de Laurentiis (2014) are waryof directly attributing to Hegel views notably on race expressed only in the transcripts I agreethat we should disambiguate sources but where multiple independently written transcripts

Hegel and Colonialism

20

converge as domdashextensivelymdashseveral transcripts of the PWH we may take them to bereliable Accordingly I refer to Hegelrsquos manuscripts (abbreviated H) as in Hegel 2011 which isthe English translation of the corresponding volume of the Gesammelte Werke (Hegel 1995) andthe integrated text of the 182223 course composed primarily from Hothorsquos and Griesheimrsquostranscripts (abb HG) included in Hegel 2011 (the German is Hegel 1996) Since the Germancritical edition of the transcripts remains incomplete for materials on Hegelrsquos later coursesI have used Heimannrsquos transcript of 183031 whenever possible (Hegel 2005 abb Hei)otherwise the composite texts produced by Karl Hegel (Hegel 1986) and translated by Sibree(Hegel 1991 abb S) and by Georg LassonJohannes Hoffmeister (Hegel 1988) translated byNisbet (Hegel 1975 abb N) I quote English translations whenever available sometimesadjusted in view of the German5 For more on contingency in Hegel see inter alia Burbidge 2007 esp ch 1 Burbidge stressesthe extent to which Hegel lsquotakes the contingencies of history seriouslyrsquo (2007 9)6 For Hegel lsquonaturehellip is indeed a rational system operating in its own distinct elementrsquo (N 44)The division into continents is rational in that different natural features and their varietiesmdashmountains and plains lands and seas and their fusion and differentiationmdasheach find fullembodiment in different continents (EM sect393 and R 40ndash41) In a sense then non-Europeansare subject to reason and rational progression insofar as nature imposes it on them fromthe outside rather than by exercising rational thought for themselves This coheres withHegelrsquos view that these peoples are immersed in nature out of which only Europeans can liftthem see below7 This recalls Hegelrsquos derivation of time from space in the Philosophy of Nature a derivation thatpositions time as more advanced than space (EN sectsect256ndash57 31ndash36)8 This is evident from eg Hegelrsquos discussion of the colonization of America see Section II9 Hegel connects formation with possession (PR sect56 85ndash86) albeit in the very differentcontext of modern European societies in which private property is institutionalized I leaveunexplored here how far his ideas about slaveryrsquos educative power may be informed by hislordbondsman dialectic10 For instance some interpreters defend Hegel against charges of Eurocentrism and racism(eg Buchwalter 2009 Houlgate [1991] 2015 35ndash37 McCarney in McCarney and Bernasconi2003 Mowad 2013) others stress Hegelrsquos founding importance for anti-colonial thought(Brennan 2013) and numerous readers of Hegel as a thinker of freedom (eg Patten 1999)see no need to discuss his position on colonialism presumably on the grounds that the latteris a merely accidental avoidable part of his thought from which his essential views on freedomcan be extracted11 For Hegel the Greeks were greatly influenced by the Egyptians whose influence theynonetheless overcame Here he is close to accepting what Martin Bernal calls the lsquoancientmodelrsquo of the Greeksrsquo origins a model to which the Greeks themselves adhered later-nineteenth-century Europeans instead espoused an lsquoAryan modelrsquo on which Greek cultureproper arose from northern invaders driving out earlier Egyptian and Phoenician influences([1987] 1991) Bernal argues that the Aryan model had Eurocentric motivations if the Greeks

Alison Stone

21

the supposed originators of Europersquos distinctive culture were actually the Egyptiansrsquo heirsthen given that Egypt is within Africa the EuropeAfrica divide would crumble A furthercomplicating factor is whether the Egyptians were seen as black Africans Bernasconi (2007)argues that Hegel thought so as did most other Europeans of his time Later the Egyptiansrsquoracial status was changedmdashto Mediterranean (ie Caucasian)mdashto hold up the divide betweenEurope-as-white and Africa-as-black Bernasconi suggests that Hegel himself dealt with thepotential anomalymdashof highly cultured black Africans giving much to the Greeksmdashby makingthe EgyptGreece transition the site of the key conceptual transition from unfreedom tofreedom nature to spirit (2007 212ndash13) This ties in with my argument in Section IV thatHegel actually did have grounds on his own terms to construe the apparently gradual EgyptGreece transition as actually being a sharp divide12 Bernasconi (2016) has recently shown how Hegel likewise distorted his sources on China tothe detriment of the Chinese13 I thank Bob Stern and the referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions

Bibliography

Bernal M [1987] (1991) Black Athena The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical CivilisationVol 1 London VintageBernasconi R (1998) lsquoHegel at the Court of the Ashantirsquo in S Barnett (ed)Hegel After Derrida Albany NY SUNYBernasconi R (2007) lsquoThe Return of Africa Hegel and the Question of theRacial Identity of the Egyptiansrsquo in P T Grier (ed) Identity and Difference AlbanyNY SUNYBernasconi R (2016) lsquoChina on Parade Hegelrsquos Manipulation of his Sources andhis Change of Mindrsquo in B Brandt and D L Purdy (eds) China in the GermanEnlightenment Toronto University of Toronto PressBird-Pollan S (2014) Hegel Freud and Fanon The Dialectic of Emancipation LondonRowman and Littlefield InternationalBonetto S (2006) lsquoRace and Racism in HegelmdashAn AnalysisrsquoMinerva An InternetJournal of Philosophy 10Brennan T (2013) lsquoHegel Empire and Anti-Colonial Thoughtrsquo in G Huggan(ed) The Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies Oxford Oxford University PressBuchwalter A (2009) lsquoIs Hegelrsquos Philosophy of History Eurocentricrsquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYBuck-Morss S (2000) lsquoHegel and Haitirsquo Critical Inquiry 264 821ndash65Burbidge J (2007) Hegelrsquos Systematic Contingency Basingstoke Palgrave MacmillanDe Laurentiis A (2014) lsquoRace in Hegel Text and Contextrsquo in M Egger (ed)Philosophie Nach Kant Neue Wege zum Verstaumlndnis von Kants Transzendental- undMoralphilosophie Berlin De Gruyter

Hegel and Colonialism

22

Dussel E [1992] (1995) The Invention of the Americas trans M D Barber NewYork ContinuumDussel E (1993) lsquoEurocentrism and Modernityrsquo Boundary 2 203 65ndash76Fanon F [1952] (2008) Black Skin White Masks trans R Philcox New YorkGroveGuha R (2002) History at the Limit of World-History New York ColumbiaUniversity PressHardimon M (1993) Hegelrsquos Social Philosophy Cambridge Cambridge UniversityPressHegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller OxfordClarendonHegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind trans W Wallace and A V MillerOxford Oxford University PressHegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reasonin History trans H B Nisbet Cambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1986) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Geschichte Werke Vol 12ed E Moldenhauer and K M Michel Frankfurt Suhrkamp [Englishtranslation Sibree]Hegel G W F (1988) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Vols 1-3 edG Lasson Vols 1-4 Hamburg Meiner [English translation of volume 1 Nisbet]Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NYPrometheus BooksHegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B NisbetCambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1995) lsquoVorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der WeltgeschichteEinleitungrsquo in W Jaeschke (ed) Vorlesungsmanuskripte II (1916ndash1831)Gesammelte Werke Vol 18 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown andHodgson]Hegel G W F (1996) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Berlin 182223 Nachschriften von Griesheim Hotho und Kehler ed Karl Brehmer K-H Iltingund Hoo Nam Seelmann Hegel Vorlesungen Ausgew Nachschriften und ManuskripteVol 12 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown and Hodgson]Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink Abb HeiHegel G W F (2011) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Volume 1Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822ndash3 ed and trans R F Brownand P C Hodgson with assistance of W G Geuss Oxford Clarendon PressHoulgate S [1991] 2015 An Introduction to Hegel Freedom Truth and HistoryOxford BlackwellJohansen B E (1982) Forgotten Founders How the American Indians Helped ShapeDemocracy Boston Harvard Common Press

Alison Stone

23

McCarney J and Bernasconi R (2003) lsquoExchange Hegelrsquos Racismrsquo RadicalPhilosophy 119(MayJune) 32ndash37Monahan M (ed) (2017) Creolizing Hegel London Rowman and LittlefieldInternationalMowad N (2013) lsquoThe Place of Nationality in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of Politicsand Religion A Defense of Hegel on the Charges of National Chauvinism andRacismrsquo in A Nuzzo (ed) Hegel on Religion and Politics Albany NY SUNYParekh S (2009) lsquoHegelrsquos New World History Freedom and Racersquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYPatten A (1999) Hegelrsquos Idea of Freedom Oxford Oxford University PressPurtschert P (2010) lsquoOn the Limit of Spirit Hegelrsquos Racism Revisitedrsquo Philosophyand Social Criticism 369 1039ndash51Quijano A (2000) lsquoColoniality of Power Eurocentrism and Latin AmericarsquoNepantla Views from South 13 533ndash80Sahota J P (2016) lsquoHegelrsquos Critique of Hinduism A Responsersquo Hegel Bulletin372 305ndash17Serequeberhan T (1989) lsquoThe Idea of Colonialism in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of RightrsquoInternational Philosophical Quarterly 293 301ndash18Shohat E and Stam R [1994] (2014) Unthinking Eurocentrism New YorkRoutledgeTibebu T (2010) Hegel and the Third World The Making of Eurocentrism in WorldHistory Syracuse NY Syracuse University PressWa Thiongrsquoo N (2012) Globalectics Theory and the Politics of Knowing New YorkColumbia University Press

Hegel and Colonialism

24

  • Hegel and Colonialism
Page 13: Hegel and Colonialism - Lancaster University · 2017-06-30 · Hegel and Colonialism Alison Stone Abstract This article explores the implications of Hegel’s Philosophy of World

even in the restricted ways that the Greeks and Romans were the former had nobasis for moving forward historically by further advancing an already partlyrealized freedom

Thus what underpins Hegelrsquos denial of historicity to non-European peoplesis his sharp division of European freedom from non-European unfreedom Thatin turn is underpinned by his claim that the ancient Greeks made the decisivebreak from unfreedom into freedom The Greeks Hegel says became thedistinctive people they were out of a mixing within them of heterogeneousOriental peoples and their cultures but the Greeks surmounted or overcame(uumlberwinden) this background (HG 214) By doing so the Greeks created theirlsquofree beautifulrsquo spirit (374) The Greeks overcame their Oriental preconditions tolsquomake themselvesrsquo (372 see also 393ndash94)

However this view that the Greeks lsquoovercamersquo the Oriental world ofunfreedom seems overstated by Hegelrsquos own lights For Hegel himself theGreeks mark only the latest phase in a growing consciousness of freedomrunning from China through India to Persia and culminating in EgyptPersiarsquos most advanced province Egypt is the hinge between Orient andOccident in which the human soulrsquos intrinsic capacity for freedom was almostgrasped But it was not quite grasped for the soul was still not distinguishedfrom animal nature a distinction the Greeks went on to make (HG 334 368)That lack of distinction is shown by the way the Egyptians modelled their godsand goddesses on animal species often with animal heads Yet for Hegel theGreeks too stopped short of recognizing that all people have an inherent capacityfor freedom They admitted freedom only to male native-born slave-ownersIn that way their view of freedom remained intermingled with acceptance ofnatural contingency ie accidents of birth sex and geographical location (H 88)So the difference between the Egyptian viewmdashhuman freedom is incompletelydistinguished from (animal) naturemdashand the Greek viewmdashhuman freedom isagain incompletely distinguished from naturemdashappears to be a difference ofdegree not kind11

Hegelrsquos lsquoovercomingrsquo idea therefore sits uncomfortably with his graduatedportrayal of historyrsquos stages That portrayal could be taken to show that belief infreedom is not exclusively European since the Persians and Egyptians already hadversions of that belief To be sure they were inadequate versions (for Hegel)mdashbutthen so was the Greeksrsquo And by extension the Indians and Chinese likewise hadversions of the belief in freedommdasheven more inadequate ones since theyattributed freedom only to lsquoonersquo not lsquosomersquomdashbut where that inadequacy stilldifferentiates these peoples from the Greeks only by degree and not kind (more soin the Indian case since the lsquoonersquo is a whole caste) If the Oriental peoples did haveversions however unsatisfactory of the belief in freedom then Hegel should nothave denied that these peoples are historical For if it is believed that someone is

Alison Stone

13

free be it only lsquoonersquo ruler or caste then others may claim and demand that samefreedom for themselves powering historical change

Now Hegel regards the Africans and indigenous Americans as lackingfreedom more radically than the Orientals yet contrary evidence was available tohim He might for instance have noted the Iroquois Confederacy of five (latersix) Native American tribes founded c1600 and dissolved c1800 a system ofintra- and inter-tribal governance which lsquomaximized individual freedom whileseeking to minimize excess governmental interference in peoplersquos livesrsquo (Johansen1982 9) influencing the American Constitution And Hegel embellishedexaggerated and at times outright distorted his sources on Africa so as to portraya people without any respect for human life freedom or rightsmdashmore so thanthe sources suggested and they were already unreliable (see Bernasconi 1998)12

The way was open to Hegel to recognize Africans and indigenous Americans ashaving views of freedom even if he classed them as even less adequate thanOriental ones With that those peoples would like the Orientals have had anentry to history

Nonetheless Hegel preserves his division of European freedom from non-European unfreedom by counting all the European stages as stages of freedomdown to its lowest level and all the non-European stages as stages of unfreedomright up to where unfreedom is almost freedom but not quite But the placementof this dividing line appears arbitrary Consider for example Hegelrsquos view thatHindus are not conscious of their own freedom because they fail to distinguishthemselves as human agents from nature (HG 256 273ndash81) On Hegelrsquosaccount as wersquove just seen there are ways that the ancient Greeks did not fullyextricate human agency from nature either somdashon his own termsmdashit is not clearthat the difference here is one of kind (history versus non-history freedom versusunfreedom) rather than degree (more or less freedom more or less far along thehistorical path towards full freedom)

Hegel could and it seems should have interpreted much of hismaterial as evidencing how non-European peoples have grasped and practisedfreedom albeit imperfectly We might still find this revised Hegeliannarrative objectionable assuming that it ranks non-European conceptions offreedom as less advanced than European ones Yet once it is admittedthat non-European peoples are historical in principle Hegel would alsohave to trace how historical advances unfolded in those societies so re-interpreting his material once again Each continent would have its own history ofprogression in consciousness of freedom rather than non-Europeancontinents merely paving the way for Europe The several continents wouldhave histories of freedom that run in parallel rather than corresponding tomore or less advanced phases of a single historical line that culminates in modernEurope

Hegel and Colonialism

14

Neither of these revised Hegelian narrativesmdashthe single line or parallel linesversionsmdashsupports colonialism not even the single line model on whichnon-European peoplesrsquo native levels of freedom are although real yetdeficient compared to European ones By recognizing freedom howeverunsatisfactorily non-European cultures would still have the internal potential andmotor to advance to greater freedom In that case colonization would not benecessary for non-European peoplesrsquo achieving freedom and would not bejustified as a necessary step in the realization of universal freedom Anotherplank in Hegelrsquos justification of colonization is that colonized peoples enjoyed nofreedom pre-colonizationmdashso that despite its abrogation of their freedomcolonization did not worsen their position (and ultimately would improve it) Butif these peoples did have a grasp of freedom however imperfect thencolonization stood to worsen their position That risk is especially pronouncedgiven Hegelrsquos own perspective that some violence is necessary for colonizationand given the role of contingency in human affairs that that violence may wellmushroom beyond the necessary minimum Further for Hegel colonizationrequires the extirpation of native cultures but if these are not cultures ofunfreedom then that extirpation is not justified Apparently then Hegel shouldby his own lights have opposed colonialism for his own philosophy generates acase against it

IV The Greeks history and self-liberation from nature

The view just canvassed is that despite the Eurocentrism and pro-colonialism ofHegelrsquos substantial narrative in the PWH his distinctive account of freedom asdeveloping historically through successive civilizations does not in itselfnecessitate his substantive Eurocentrism and when extricated from the latteryields a case against colonialism However we can distinguish weaker andstronger versions of this view More weakly Hegelrsquos basic account of freedomcan be separated from his actual pro-colonialism and so does not necessarilyimply pro-colonialism but contains anti-colonial possibilities as well as thepro-colonial possibilities that Hegel developed from it More strongly Hegelrsquosbasic account of freedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism andwhen so separated this account implies anti-colonialism and has an inherentlyanti-colonial direction I endorse the weaker but not the stronger claim and theweaker one only subject to a significant qualification Hegelrsquos basic account offreedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism but not as easily asSection III suggested This is because Hegelrsquos conception of freedom asself-determination has significant connections with his Eurocentrism

Alison Stone

15

In Section III I suggested that Hegelrsquos divisions Greeksnon-Greeks freeunfree look arbitrary But actually they are not For Hegel

Its [Greecersquos] principle is that self-conscious freedom stepsforth hellip [Regarding t]he unity of spirit with nature hellip thespecificity of this unity [in the Greek case] is to be graspedOne unity is the Oriental hellip consciousness immersed innature a [new kind of] harmony is now to be broughtforth [by the Greeks] in which hellip spirit dominates Spirit nowdetermines nature and this is a spiritual unity hellip (Hei 117 myemphases)

[The] fundamental characteristic [of the Greek spirit is] that thefreedom of spirit is conditioned by and in essential relation tosome natural stimulus Greek freedom is stimulated bysomething other and is free because it changes and produces thestimulus from out of itself (aus sich) (S 238 my emphasis)

Thus the Greeks were free in that they were at home with themselves in theother ie nature But this does not mean that the content of their practices andway of life was determined by natural givens such as the Greeksrsquo given impulsesRather they reshaped these givens and so became at-home-with-themselves inthem In the Greek case then spirit lsquodeterminedrsquo nature whereas previouslyspirit had been immersed or absorbed (versenkt) in nature This Greekdetermination of nature by spiritmdashspiritrsquos investment of nature with meaningof its ownmdashwas made possible by a prior moment first carried out by theGreeks through which lsquospirit is no longer immersed [versenkt] in nature hellip [but]releas[es] itself from nature [sich losmachend von der Natur]rsquo (HG 395ndash96) Thismoment in which the human spirit first releases or sets itself free from naturecorresponds to the overcoming (uumlberwinden) by the Greeks of their mixed ethnicheritage a moment of overcoming through which they became able to remakethat heritage for themselves to make themselves Hegel is explicit that none ofthe worldrsquos other peoples to that point had achieved this

Even so for Hegel the Greeks exercised freedom always with respect tonature and existing givens in the worldmdashre-shaping what they found alreadythere rather than creating a totally new world out of themselves Hence theGreeks did not regard free individuals as being capable of adjudicatingindependently on the given natural and social world through their own reason orof generating norms and principles purely through the exercise of their spiritualfreedom Or as Hegel also puts it elsewhere individual subjectivity was notdifferentiated from social substance but the individual identified fully andunquestioningly with his or her social role and there was no ground for

Hegel and Colonialism

16

independent social criticism (see Hardimon 1993) Connected with all this theGreeks restricted freedom to some people only effectively stipulating that onlythose with certain kinds of naturemdashmale free-bornmdashor natural locationmdashnativeGreekmdashhad the power of self-determination In these ways spiritrsquos freedomremained lsquoconditionedrsquo or limited (bedingt) bymdashalthough not immersed inmdashnature (and see HG 390)

However these limitations contradicted the essence of self-determination asthe Greeks understood it as including a moment of overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature such that the power to overcome nature cannotpossibly be limited by nature (or it would not be a power to overcome nature atall) Thus lsquoin the principle of Greek freedom inasmuch as it is freedom it isimplied that thought must be free for itself rsquo (HG 268)mdashalthough the Greeks fora long time did not explicitly grasp or follow through on that implicationNonetheless in the end that contradiction was what made it possible for theGreeksrsquo exclusion of some people from freedom and their other ways ofrestricting freedomrsquos scope to come in for criticism The criticism came withSocrates and the Sophists claiming that thought can adjudicate rationally on whatis and generate norms by itself (417) In that freedom of thought was therebygrasped as fully independent of nature it was also grasped as universal at least inprinciple In these two ways lsquoThought hellip introduces an opposition [Gegensatz][to the Greek mixture of freedom and nature] and asserts the validity ofessentially rational principlesrsquo (S 267)

For Hegel then Greek culture enabled rational criticism of what isincluding of limited freedom as no pre-Greek cultures did just because theGreeks had established a root opposition between freedom and nature whereaslsquoin the Oriental states in which a lack of opposition is present no moral freedomcan come aboutrsquo (267) Although the advent of rational critique brought on thedemise of Greek culture Europe was thereby also set on the path oftransformative historical change We see then why in his own terms Hegel saysthat non-European peoples could not advance critical claims for freedomrsquosextension but uncritically accepted the authority of their rulersmdashpatriarchalauthority in China caste hierarchy and caste-based restrictions and rituals inIndia and state power in Persia Non-Europeans could not question suchauthorities because their cultures did not grasp freedom as including the momentof overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature and the given Becausefreedom was not grasped as including that moment of human separation fromnature and the given no contradiction was perceived in freedom being limited bynature eg confined to people of certain castes or by given states of affairs egcustomary authority and ritual Non-Europeans lacked a critical motor to drivesocial change hence lacked history propermdashor indeed freedom as properlydistinguished from unfreedom

Alison Stone

17

So for Hegel there is a genuine difference in kind not merely degreebetween the Greek and post-Greek European world on the one hand and thenon-European world on the other the Europenon-Europe divide is notarbitrary but has a philosophical rationale For while the Greek view of freedomwas like non-European views limited and inadequate the former was moreadvanced in one key respectmdashthe inclusion in freedom of a primary moment oflsquoovercomingrsquo naturemdashwhich enabled the Greek and post-Greek European worldto become self-critical self-revising and so historical This is what motivatesHegel to identify Greek and post-Greek European views as views of freedomhowever limited whereas non-European views that might prima facie look likeviews of freedom are still actually modes of unfreedom

Once again we might object that non-Europeans have at times construedfreedom as including this moment of overcoming nature Even on Hegelrsquosaccount Hindus appreciate the human power to abstract from the world inthought He maintains though that this is merely an intellectual withdrawaland that when it comes to practical agency Hindus see human agency as immersedin not including any moment of self-freeing-from nature (see eg S 157ndash58)In response we could with Jaspal Peter Sahota (2016) agree that in classicalIndian thought there has been a tendency to locate human agency within naturebut argue against Hegel that this does not constitute a real absence offreedom but rather a different conception of freedom We might then say thatbecause thesemdashand othermdashnon-European views were still views of freedom thoseviews were still sufficient to motivate social criticism and hence place non-European peoples in history even without the element of overcoming natureHowever such a position would take us further away from Hegelrsquos own accountof the historicity of freedom according which as we have seen that moment ofovercoming nature uniquely new in ancient Greece is crucial in poweringhistorical progression

Hegelrsquos basic account of freedom and its historicity thus has more extensiveand significant connections with his Eurocentrism than I suggested inSection III In particular that account connects with Hegelrsquos denial that non-European peoples are historicalmdashie can come to freedom on their ownmdashandhence with his case for colonialism as the only route along which those peoplescan reach freedom These connections suggest that after all we cannotstraightforwardly take up Hegelrsquos account of freedom and its historicity whilesloughing off his pro-colonialism This is not to say that we cannot separate outthese parts of his thought at all But rescuing Hegel from himself is set to be acomplicated process not quick or straightforward To the extent that such arescue is possible Hegelrsquos pro-colonialism cannot rightly be counted as necessaryto his thought or system Yet his pro-colonialism does have extensive anddeep-seated connections with his other viewsmdashenough to show that it is not the

Hegel and Colonialism

18

case that Hegel should not have endorsed colonialism by his own standardsRather he did and could endorse it coherently in his own terms although otheranti-colonialist possibilities were also available within his own terms which hecould have developed

So the claim that Hegelrsquos account of freedom is inherently anti-colonial isunduly strong Through his understanding of freedom as involving spiritextricating itself from nature that account has sustained links with hisEurocentrism and so his pro-colonialism We can nonetheless envisage variousmanoeuvres by which to maintain that freedom develops historically for all theworldrsquos peoples for example by saying that they have several conceptions offreedom where freedom can but does not have to include self-liberation fromnature Then ancient Greece would initiate one historical pathway to freedombut not the only one Even so Hegelrsquos own account of freedom and its historicitydoes not inherently drive us to make these intellectual manoeuvres but onlypermits them In sum if Hegelrsquos view of freedom does not necessarily implypro-colonialism neither is it inherently anti-colonial We can make distinctionsand qualifications within his thought so as to yield anti-colonial conclusions butthis is only one of several possible lines of development of which his thoughtadmits another being its elaboration into the Eurocentric and pro-colonialsystem that Hegel in fact forged

There is a broader moral Wemdashie the heirs of the European heritage thatruns through philosophy into modern political thoughtmdashshould not let thisheritage off the hook too easily This heritage including Hegelrsquos thought hasbeen implicated in colonialism in various ways To be sure because it extols andarticulates the values of freedom and equality this heritage also furnishesconceptual resources for critiquing colonialism and giving support to anti-colonial struggles and anti-colonial thinkers and activists have drawn on modernEuropean ideas for this purpose For example the Haitian revolutionariesdeclared that they were acting in allegiance to the emancipatory goals of theFrench Revolution This might lead us to suppose that the European politicallegacy is intrinsically liberatory and that theorists in the European traditionmdashHegel includedmdashhave only ever justified colonialism due to unfortunateprejudices that led them to go back on their own principles

I believe that taking that view exculpates our predecessors too quicklyand leaves us at risk of inadvertently embracing ideas inherited from thesepredecessors which actually have deep-rooted internal connections withEurocentric and pro-colonial attitudes This is not to say that we should orcould repudiate these ideas outright Rather in view of their connections withcolonialism we need to think carefully and critically about how far to take theseinherited ideas forward and how we might do so differently My aim has been tohelp us cultivate this caution in Hegelrsquos case by acknowledging that while his

Alison Stone

19

thought harbours anti-colonial possibilities it also has real and tenacious linkswith colonialism of which we should remind mindful13

Alison StoneLancaster University UKastonelancasteracuk

Notes

1 Contributions include those by Bernasconi 1998 2007 2016 Bonetto 2006 de Laurentiis2014 McCarney and Bernasconi 2003 Mowad 2013 Parekh 2009 Purtschert 2010 andTibebu 20102 However see Buck-Morss 2000 andmdashfor highly critical accountsmdashDussel [1992] 1995 and1993 Guha 2002 Tibebu 2010 Also relevant are Bird-Pollan 2014 (on Hegel and Fanon)Brennan 2013 (on Hegelrsquos influence on post-colonialism) Buchwalter 2009 (defending Hegelagainst charges of Eurocentrism) Monahan 2017 (Creolizing Hegel) and Serequeberhan 1989(on colonialism in the Philosophy of Right)3 Ranajit Guha identifies another argument for colonialism in the Philosophy of Rightfrom the lsquorightsrsquo that Hegel claims civilized nations have with respect to less advanced ones(PR sect351 376) These rights Guha argues are lsquorights of conquestrsquo noting Hegelrsquos praise for Britishmilitary victories over India led by Robert Clive (1725ndash74) whose conquests established theEast India Companyrsquos rule over Bengal and other Indian states See Guha 2002 43ndash44PR sect372A 364 and 474 note 1)Abbreviations usedEN=Hegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller Oxford Clarendon PressEM= Hegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind Trans W Wallace and A V Miller Oxford OxfordUniversity Press Cited by paragraph and page numberN=Hegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reason in Historytrans H B Nisbet Cambridge UK Cambridge University PressS=Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NY Prometheus BooksPR=Hegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B Nisbet Cambridge UKCambridge University PressHei=Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink4 Hegel lectured on the PWH in 182223 182425 182627 182829 and 183031 Hismanuscripts of the Introduction from 1822 (rev 1828) and 183031 survive as do manytranscripts between them covering every course Some such as de Laurentiis (2014) are waryof directly attributing to Hegel views notably on race expressed only in the transcripts I agreethat we should disambiguate sources but where multiple independently written transcripts

Hegel and Colonialism

20

converge as domdashextensivelymdashseveral transcripts of the PWH we may take them to bereliable Accordingly I refer to Hegelrsquos manuscripts (abbreviated H) as in Hegel 2011 which isthe English translation of the corresponding volume of the Gesammelte Werke (Hegel 1995) andthe integrated text of the 182223 course composed primarily from Hothorsquos and Griesheimrsquostranscripts (abb HG) included in Hegel 2011 (the German is Hegel 1996) Since the Germancritical edition of the transcripts remains incomplete for materials on Hegelrsquos later coursesI have used Heimannrsquos transcript of 183031 whenever possible (Hegel 2005 abb Hei)otherwise the composite texts produced by Karl Hegel (Hegel 1986) and translated by Sibree(Hegel 1991 abb S) and by Georg LassonJohannes Hoffmeister (Hegel 1988) translated byNisbet (Hegel 1975 abb N) I quote English translations whenever available sometimesadjusted in view of the German5 For more on contingency in Hegel see inter alia Burbidge 2007 esp ch 1 Burbidge stressesthe extent to which Hegel lsquotakes the contingencies of history seriouslyrsquo (2007 9)6 For Hegel lsquonaturehellip is indeed a rational system operating in its own distinct elementrsquo (N 44)The division into continents is rational in that different natural features and their varietiesmdashmountains and plains lands and seas and their fusion and differentiationmdasheach find fullembodiment in different continents (EM sect393 and R 40ndash41) In a sense then non-Europeansare subject to reason and rational progression insofar as nature imposes it on them fromthe outside rather than by exercising rational thought for themselves This coheres withHegelrsquos view that these peoples are immersed in nature out of which only Europeans can liftthem see below7 This recalls Hegelrsquos derivation of time from space in the Philosophy of Nature a derivation thatpositions time as more advanced than space (EN sectsect256ndash57 31ndash36)8 This is evident from eg Hegelrsquos discussion of the colonization of America see Section II9 Hegel connects formation with possession (PR sect56 85ndash86) albeit in the very differentcontext of modern European societies in which private property is institutionalized I leaveunexplored here how far his ideas about slaveryrsquos educative power may be informed by hislordbondsman dialectic10 For instance some interpreters defend Hegel against charges of Eurocentrism and racism(eg Buchwalter 2009 Houlgate [1991] 2015 35ndash37 McCarney in McCarney and Bernasconi2003 Mowad 2013) others stress Hegelrsquos founding importance for anti-colonial thought(Brennan 2013) and numerous readers of Hegel as a thinker of freedom (eg Patten 1999)see no need to discuss his position on colonialism presumably on the grounds that the latteris a merely accidental avoidable part of his thought from which his essential views on freedomcan be extracted11 For Hegel the Greeks were greatly influenced by the Egyptians whose influence theynonetheless overcame Here he is close to accepting what Martin Bernal calls the lsquoancientmodelrsquo of the Greeksrsquo origins a model to which the Greeks themselves adhered later-nineteenth-century Europeans instead espoused an lsquoAryan modelrsquo on which Greek cultureproper arose from northern invaders driving out earlier Egyptian and Phoenician influences([1987] 1991) Bernal argues that the Aryan model had Eurocentric motivations if the Greeks

Alison Stone

21

the supposed originators of Europersquos distinctive culture were actually the Egyptiansrsquo heirsthen given that Egypt is within Africa the EuropeAfrica divide would crumble A furthercomplicating factor is whether the Egyptians were seen as black Africans Bernasconi (2007)argues that Hegel thought so as did most other Europeans of his time Later the Egyptiansrsquoracial status was changedmdashto Mediterranean (ie Caucasian)mdashto hold up the divide betweenEurope-as-white and Africa-as-black Bernasconi suggests that Hegel himself dealt with thepotential anomalymdashof highly cultured black Africans giving much to the Greeksmdashby makingthe EgyptGreece transition the site of the key conceptual transition from unfreedom tofreedom nature to spirit (2007 212ndash13) This ties in with my argument in Section IV thatHegel actually did have grounds on his own terms to construe the apparently gradual EgyptGreece transition as actually being a sharp divide12 Bernasconi (2016) has recently shown how Hegel likewise distorted his sources on China tothe detriment of the Chinese13 I thank Bob Stern and the referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions

Bibliography

Bernal M [1987] (1991) Black Athena The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical CivilisationVol 1 London VintageBernasconi R (1998) lsquoHegel at the Court of the Ashantirsquo in S Barnett (ed)Hegel After Derrida Albany NY SUNYBernasconi R (2007) lsquoThe Return of Africa Hegel and the Question of theRacial Identity of the Egyptiansrsquo in P T Grier (ed) Identity and Difference AlbanyNY SUNYBernasconi R (2016) lsquoChina on Parade Hegelrsquos Manipulation of his Sources andhis Change of Mindrsquo in B Brandt and D L Purdy (eds) China in the GermanEnlightenment Toronto University of Toronto PressBird-Pollan S (2014) Hegel Freud and Fanon The Dialectic of Emancipation LondonRowman and Littlefield InternationalBonetto S (2006) lsquoRace and Racism in HegelmdashAn AnalysisrsquoMinerva An InternetJournal of Philosophy 10Brennan T (2013) lsquoHegel Empire and Anti-Colonial Thoughtrsquo in G Huggan(ed) The Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies Oxford Oxford University PressBuchwalter A (2009) lsquoIs Hegelrsquos Philosophy of History Eurocentricrsquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYBuck-Morss S (2000) lsquoHegel and Haitirsquo Critical Inquiry 264 821ndash65Burbidge J (2007) Hegelrsquos Systematic Contingency Basingstoke Palgrave MacmillanDe Laurentiis A (2014) lsquoRace in Hegel Text and Contextrsquo in M Egger (ed)Philosophie Nach Kant Neue Wege zum Verstaumlndnis von Kants Transzendental- undMoralphilosophie Berlin De Gruyter

Hegel and Colonialism

22

Dussel E [1992] (1995) The Invention of the Americas trans M D Barber NewYork ContinuumDussel E (1993) lsquoEurocentrism and Modernityrsquo Boundary 2 203 65ndash76Fanon F [1952] (2008) Black Skin White Masks trans R Philcox New YorkGroveGuha R (2002) History at the Limit of World-History New York ColumbiaUniversity PressHardimon M (1993) Hegelrsquos Social Philosophy Cambridge Cambridge UniversityPressHegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller OxfordClarendonHegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind trans W Wallace and A V MillerOxford Oxford University PressHegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reasonin History trans H B Nisbet Cambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1986) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Geschichte Werke Vol 12ed E Moldenhauer and K M Michel Frankfurt Suhrkamp [Englishtranslation Sibree]Hegel G W F (1988) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Vols 1-3 edG Lasson Vols 1-4 Hamburg Meiner [English translation of volume 1 Nisbet]Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NYPrometheus BooksHegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B NisbetCambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1995) lsquoVorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der WeltgeschichteEinleitungrsquo in W Jaeschke (ed) Vorlesungsmanuskripte II (1916ndash1831)Gesammelte Werke Vol 18 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown andHodgson]Hegel G W F (1996) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Berlin 182223 Nachschriften von Griesheim Hotho und Kehler ed Karl Brehmer K-H Iltingund Hoo Nam Seelmann Hegel Vorlesungen Ausgew Nachschriften und ManuskripteVol 12 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown and Hodgson]Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink Abb HeiHegel G W F (2011) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Volume 1Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822ndash3 ed and trans R F Brownand P C Hodgson with assistance of W G Geuss Oxford Clarendon PressHoulgate S [1991] 2015 An Introduction to Hegel Freedom Truth and HistoryOxford BlackwellJohansen B E (1982) Forgotten Founders How the American Indians Helped ShapeDemocracy Boston Harvard Common Press

Alison Stone

23

McCarney J and Bernasconi R (2003) lsquoExchange Hegelrsquos Racismrsquo RadicalPhilosophy 119(MayJune) 32ndash37Monahan M (ed) (2017) Creolizing Hegel London Rowman and LittlefieldInternationalMowad N (2013) lsquoThe Place of Nationality in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of Politicsand Religion A Defense of Hegel on the Charges of National Chauvinism andRacismrsquo in A Nuzzo (ed) Hegel on Religion and Politics Albany NY SUNYParekh S (2009) lsquoHegelrsquos New World History Freedom and Racersquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYPatten A (1999) Hegelrsquos Idea of Freedom Oxford Oxford University PressPurtschert P (2010) lsquoOn the Limit of Spirit Hegelrsquos Racism Revisitedrsquo Philosophyand Social Criticism 369 1039ndash51Quijano A (2000) lsquoColoniality of Power Eurocentrism and Latin AmericarsquoNepantla Views from South 13 533ndash80Sahota J P (2016) lsquoHegelrsquos Critique of Hinduism A Responsersquo Hegel Bulletin372 305ndash17Serequeberhan T (1989) lsquoThe Idea of Colonialism in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of RightrsquoInternational Philosophical Quarterly 293 301ndash18Shohat E and Stam R [1994] (2014) Unthinking Eurocentrism New YorkRoutledgeTibebu T (2010) Hegel and the Third World The Making of Eurocentrism in WorldHistory Syracuse NY Syracuse University PressWa Thiongrsquoo N (2012) Globalectics Theory and the Politics of Knowing New YorkColumbia University Press

Hegel and Colonialism

24

  • Hegel and Colonialism
Page 14: Hegel and Colonialism - Lancaster University · 2017-06-30 · Hegel and Colonialism Alison Stone Abstract This article explores the implications of Hegel’s Philosophy of World

free be it only lsquoonersquo ruler or caste then others may claim and demand that samefreedom for themselves powering historical change

Now Hegel regards the Africans and indigenous Americans as lackingfreedom more radically than the Orientals yet contrary evidence was available tohim He might for instance have noted the Iroquois Confederacy of five (latersix) Native American tribes founded c1600 and dissolved c1800 a system ofintra- and inter-tribal governance which lsquomaximized individual freedom whileseeking to minimize excess governmental interference in peoplersquos livesrsquo (Johansen1982 9) influencing the American Constitution And Hegel embellishedexaggerated and at times outright distorted his sources on Africa so as to portraya people without any respect for human life freedom or rightsmdashmore so thanthe sources suggested and they were already unreliable (see Bernasconi 1998)12

The way was open to Hegel to recognize Africans and indigenous Americans ashaving views of freedom even if he classed them as even less adequate thanOriental ones With that those peoples would like the Orientals have had anentry to history

Nonetheless Hegel preserves his division of European freedom from non-European unfreedom by counting all the European stages as stages of freedomdown to its lowest level and all the non-European stages as stages of unfreedomright up to where unfreedom is almost freedom but not quite But the placementof this dividing line appears arbitrary Consider for example Hegelrsquos view thatHindus are not conscious of their own freedom because they fail to distinguishthemselves as human agents from nature (HG 256 273ndash81) On Hegelrsquosaccount as wersquove just seen there are ways that the ancient Greeks did not fullyextricate human agency from nature either somdashon his own termsmdashit is not clearthat the difference here is one of kind (history versus non-history freedom versusunfreedom) rather than degree (more or less freedom more or less far along thehistorical path towards full freedom)

Hegel could and it seems should have interpreted much of hismaterial as evidencing how non-European peoples have grasped and practisedfreedom albeit imperfectly We might still find this revised Hegeliannarrative objectionable assuming that it ranks non-European conceptions offreedom as less advanced than European ones Yet once it is admittedthat non-European peoples are historical in principle Hegel would alsohave to trace how historical advances unfolded in those societies so re-interpreting his material once again Each continent would have its own history ofprogression in consciousness of freedom rather than non-Europeancontinents merely paving the way for Europe The several continents wouldhave histories of freedom that run in parallel rather than corresponding tomore or less advanced phases of a single historical line that culminates in modernEurope

Hegel and Colonialism

14

Neither of these revised Hegelian narrativesmdashthe single line or parallel linesversionsmdashsupports colonialism not even the single line model on whichnon-European peoplesrsquo native levels of freedom are although real yetdeficient compared to European ones By recognizing freedom howeverunsatisfactorily non-European cultures would still have the internal potential andmotor to advance to greater freedom In that case colonization would not benecessary for non-European peoplesrsquo achieving freedom and would not bejustified as a necessary step in the realization of universal freedom Anotherplank in Hegelrsquos justification of colonization is that colonized peoples enjoyed nofreedom pre-colonizationmdashso that despite its abrogation of their freedomcolonization did not worsen their position (and ultimately would improve it) Butif these peoples did have a grasp of freedom however imperfect thencolonization stood to worsen their position That risk is especially pronouncedgiven Hegelrsquos own perspective that some violence is necessary for colonizationand given the role of contingency in human affairs that that violence may wellmushroom beyond the necessary minimum Further for Hegel colonizationrequires the extirpation of native cultures but if these are not cultures ofunfreedom then that extirpation is not justified Apparently then Hegel shouldby his own lights have opposed colonialism for his own philosophy generates acase against it

IV The Greeks history and self-liberation from nature

The view just canvassed is that despite the Eurocentrism and pro-colonialism ofHegelrsquos substantial narrative in the PWH his distinctive account of freedom asdeveloping historically through successive civilizations does not in itselfnecessitate his substantive Eurocentrism and when extricated from the latteryields a case against colonialism However we can distinguish weaker andstronger versions of this view More weakly Hegelrsquos basic account of freedomcan be separated from his actual pro-colonialism and so does not necessarilyimply pro-colonialism but contains anti-colonial possibilities as well as thepro-colonial possibilities that Hegel developed from it More strongly Hegelrsquosbasic account of freedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism andwhen so separated this account implies anti-colonialism and has an inherentlyanti-colonial direction I endorse the weaker but not the stronger claim and theweaker one only subject to a significant qualification Hegelrsquos basic account offreedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism but not as easily asSection III suggested This is because Hegelrsquos conception of freedom asself-determination has significant connections with his Eurocentrism

Alison Stone

15

In Section III I suggested that Hegelrsquos divisions Greeksnon-Greeks freeunfree look arbitrary But actually they are not For Hegel

Its [Greecersquos] principle is that self-conscious freedom stepsforth hellip [Regarding t]he unity of spirit with nature hellip thespecificity of this unity [in the Greek case] is to be graspedOne unity is the Oriental hellip consciousness immersed innature a [new kind of] harmony is now to be broughtforth [by the Greeks] in which hellip spirit dominates Spirit nowdetermines nature and this is a spiritual unity hellip (Hei 117 myemphases)

[The] fundamental characteristic [of the Greek spirit is] that thefreedom of spirit is conditioned by and in essential relation tosome natural stimulus Greek freedom is stimulated bysomething other and is free because it changes and produces thestimulus from out of itself (aus sich) (S 238 my emphasis)

Thus the Greeks were free in that they were at home with themselves in theother ie nature But this does not mean that the content of their practices andway of life was determined by natural givens such as the Greeksrsquo given impulsesRather they reshaped these givens and so became at-home-with-themselves inthem In the Greek case then spirit lsquodeterminedrsquo nature whereas previouslyspirit had been immersed or absorbed (versenkt) in nature This Greekdetermination of nature by spiritmdashspiritrsquos investment of nature with meaningof its ownmdashwas made possible by a prior moment first carried out by theGreeks through which lsquospirit is no longer immersed [versenkt] in nature hellip [but]releas[es] itself from nature [sich losmachend von der Natur]rsquo (HG 395ndash96) Thismoment in which the human spirit first releases or sets itself free from naturecorresponds to the overcoming (uumlberwinden) by the Greeks of their mixed ethnicheritage a moment of overcoming through which they became able to remakethat heritage for themselves to make themselves Hegel is explicit that none ofthe worldrsquos other peoples to that point had achieved this

Even so for Hegel the Greeks exercised freedom always with respect tonature and existing givens in the worldmdashre-shaping what they found alreadythere rather than creating a totally new world out of themselves Hence theGreeks did not regard free individuals as being capable of adjudicatingindependently on the given natural and social world through their own reason orof generating norms and principles purely through the exercise of their spiritualfreedom Or as Hegel also puts it elsewhere individual subjectivity was notdifferentiated from social substance but the individual identified fully andunquestioningly with his or her social role and there was no ground for

Hegel and Colonialism

16

independent social criticism (see Hardimon 1993) Connected with all this theGreeks restricted freedom to some people only effectively stipulating that onlythose with certain kinds of naturemdashmale free-bornmdashor natural locationmdashnativeGreekmdashhad the power of self-determination In these ways spiritrsquos freedomremained lsquoconditionedrsquo or limited (bedingt) bymdashalthough not immersed inmdashnature (and see HG 390)

However these limitations contradicted the essence of self-determination asthe Greeks understood it as including a moment of overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature such that the power to overcome nature cannotpossibly be limited by nature (or it would not be a power to overcome nature atall) Thus lsquoin the principle of Greek freedom inasmuch as it is freedom it isimplied that thought must be free for itself rsquo (HG 268)mdashalthough the Greeks fora long time did not explicitly grasp or follow through on that implicationNonetheless in the end that contradiction was what made it possible for theGreeksrsquo exclusion of some people from freedom and their other ways ofrestricting freedomrsquos scope to come in for criticism The criticism came withSocrates and the Sophists claiming that thought can adjudicate rationally on whatis and generate norms by itself (417) In that freedom of thought was therebygrasped as fully independent of nature it was also grasped as universal at least inprinciple In these two ways lsquoThought hellip introduces an opposition [Gegensatz][to the Greek mixture of freedom and nature] and asserts the validity ofessentially rational principlesrsquo (S 267)

For Hegel then Greek culture enabled rational criticism of what isincluding of limited freedom as no pre-Greek cultures did just because theGreeks had established a root opposition between freedom and nature whereaslsquoin the Oriental states in which a lack of opposition is present no moral freedomcan come aboutrsquo (267) Although the advent of rational critique brought on thedemise of Greek culture Europe was thereby also set on the path oftransformative historical change We see then why in his own terms Hegel saysthat non-European peoples could not advance critical claims for freedomrsquosextension but uncritically accepted the authority of their rulersmdashpatriarchalauthority in China caste hierarchy and caste-based restrictions and rituals inIndia and state power in Persia Non-Europeans could not question suchauthorities because their cultures did not grasp freedom as including the momentof overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature and the given Becausefreedom was not grasped as including that moment of human separation fromnature and the given no contradiction was perceived in freedom being limited bynature eg confined to people of certain castes or by given states of affairs egcustomary authority and ritual Non-Europeans lacked a critical motor to drivesocial change hence lacked history propermdashor indeed freedom as properlydistinguished from unfreedom

Alison Stone

17

So for Hegel there is a genuine difference in kind not merely degreebetween the Greek and post-Greek European world on the one hand and thenon-European world on the other the Europenon-Europe divide is notarbitrary but has a philosophical rationale For while the Greek view of freedomwas like non-European views limited and inadequate the former was moreadvanced in one key respectmdashthe inclusion in freedom of a primary moment oflsquoovercomingrsquo naturemdashwhich enabled the Greek and post-Greek European worldto become self-critical self-revising and so historical This is what motivatesHegel to identify Greek and post-Greek European views as views of freedomhowever limited whereas non-European views that might prima facie look likeviews of freedom are still actually modes of unfreedom

Once again we might object that non-Europeans have at times construedfreedom as including this moment of overcoming nature Even on Hegelrsquosaccount Hindus appreciate the human power to abstract from the world inthought He maintains though that this is merely an intellectual withdrawaland that when it comes to practical agency Hindus see human agency as immersedin not including any moment of self-freeing-from nature (see eg S 157ndash58)In response we could with Jaspal Peter Sahota (2016) agree that in classicalIndian thought there has been a tendency to locate human agency within naturebut argue against Hegel that this does not constitute a real absence offreedom but rather a different conception of freedom We might then say thatbecause thesemdashand othermdashnon-European views were still views of freedom thoseviews were still sufficient to motivate social criticism and hence place non-European peoples in history even without the element of overcoming natureHowever such a position would take us further away from Hegelrsquos own accountof the historicity of freedom according which as we have seen that moment ofovercoming nature uniquely new in ancient Greece is crucial in poweringhistorical progression

Hegelrsquos basic account of freedom and its historicity thus has more extensiveand significant connections with his Eurocentrism than I suggested inSection III In particular that account connects with Hegelrsquos denial that non-European peoples are historicalmdashie can come to freedom on their ownmdashandhence with his case for colonialism as the only route along which those peoplescan reach freedom These connections suggest that after all we cannotstraightforwardly take up Hegelrsquos account of freedom and its historicity whilesloughing off his pro-colonialism This is not to say that we cannot separate outthese parts of his thought at all But rescuing Hegel from himself is set to be acomplicated process not quick or straightforward To the extent that such arescue is possible Hegelrsquos pro-colonialism cannot rightly be counted as necessaryto his thought or system Yet his pro-colonialism does have extensive anddeep-seated connections with his other viewsmdashenough to show that it is not the

Hegel and Colonialism

18

case that Hegel should not have endorsed colonialism by his own standardsRather he did and could endorse it coherently in his own terms although otheranti-colonialist possibilities were also available within his own terms which hecould have developed

So the claim that Hegelrsquos account of freedom is inherently anti-colonial isunduly strong Through his understanding of freedom as involving spiritextricating itself from nature that account has sustained links with hisEurocentrism and so his pro-colonialism We can nonetheless envisage variousmanoeuvres by which to maintain that freedom develops historically for all theworldrsquos peoples for example by saying that they have several conceptions offreedom where freedom can but does not have to include self-liberation fromnature Then ancient Greece would initiate one historical pathway to freedombut not the only one Even so Hegelrsquos own account of freedom and its historicitydoes not inherently drive us to make these intellectual manoeuvres but onlypermits them In sum if Hegelrsquos view of freedom does not necessarily implypro-colonialism neither is it inherently anti-colonial We can make distinctionsand qualifications within his thought so as to yield anti-colonial conclusions butthis is only one of several possible lines of development of which his thoughtadmits another being its elaboration into the Eurocentric and pro-colonialsystem that Hegel in fact forged

There is a broader moral Wemdashie the heirs of the European heritage thatruns through philosophy into modern political thoughtmdashshould not let thisheritage off the hook too easily This heritage including Hegelrsquos thought hasbeen implicated in colonialism in various ways To be sure because it extols andarticulates the values of freedom and equality this heritage also furnishesconceptual resources for critiquing colonialism and giving support to anti-colonial struggles and anti-colonial thinkers and activists have drawn on modernEuropean ideas for this purpose For example the Haitian revolutionariesdeclared that they were acting in allegiance to the emancipatory goals of theFrench Revolution This might lead us to suppose that the European politicallegacy is intrinsically liberatory and that theorists in the European traditionmdashHegel includedmdashhave only ever justified colonialism due to unfortunateprejudices that led them to go back on their own principles

I believe that taking that view exculpates our predecessors too quicklyand leaves us at risk of inadvertently embracing ideas inherited from thesepredecessors which actually have deep-rooted internal connections withEurocentric and pro-colonial attitudes This is not to say that we should orcould repudiate these ideas outright Rather in view of their connections withcolonialism we need to think carefully and critically about how far to take theseinherited ideas forward and how we might do so differently My aim has been tohelp us cultivate this caution in Hegelrsquos case by acknowledging that while his

Alison Stone

19

thought harbours anti-colonial possibilities it also has real and tenacious linkswith colonialism of which we should remind mindful13

Alison StoneLancaster University UKastonelancasteracuk

Notes

1 Contributions include those by Bernasconi 1998 2007 2016 Bonetto 2006 de Laurentiis2014 McCarney and Bernasconi 2003 Mowad 2013 Parekh 2009 Purtschert 2010 andTibebu 20102 However see Buck-Morss 2000 andmdashfor highly critical accountsmdashDussel [1992] 1995 and1993 Guha 2002 Tibebu 2010 Also relevant are Bird-Pollan 2014 (on Hegel and Fanon)Brennan 2013 (on Hegelrsquos influence on post-colonialism) Buchwalter 2009 (defending Hegelagainst charges of Eurocentrism) Monahan 2017 (Creolizing Hegel) and Serequeberhan 1989(on colonialism in the Philosophy of Right)3 Ranajit Guha identifies another argument for colonialism in the Philosophy of Rightfrom the lsquorightsrsquo that Hegel claims civilized nations have with respect to less advanced ones(PR sect351 376) These rights Guha argues are lsquorights of conquestrsquo noting Hegelrsquos praise for Britishmilitary victories over India led by Robert Clive (1725ndash74) whose conquests established theEast India Companyrsquos rule over Bengal and other Indian states See Guha 2002 43ndash44PR sect372A 364 and 474 note 1)Abbreviations usedEN=Hegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller Oxford Clarendon PressEM= Hegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind Trans W Wallace and A V Miller Oxford OxfordUniversity Press Cited by paragraph and page numberN=Hegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reason in Historytrans H B Nisbet Cambridge UK Cambridge University PressS=Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NY Prometheus BooksPR=Hegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B Nisbet Cambridge UKCambridge University PressHei=Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink4 Hegel lectured on the PWH in 182223 182425 182627 182829 and 183031 Hismanuscripts of the Introduction from 1822 (rev 1828) and 183031 survive as do manytranscripts between them covering every course Some such as de Laurentiis (2014) are waryof directly attributing to Hegel views notably on race expressed only in the transcripts I agreethat we should disambiguate sources but where multiple independently written transcripts

Hegel and Colonialism

20

converge as domdashextensivelymdashseveral transcripts of the PWH we may take them to bereliable Accordingly I refer to Hegelrsquos manuscripts (abbreviated H) as in Hegel 2011 which isthe English translation of the corresponding volume of the Gesammelte Werke (Hegel 1995) andthe integrated text of the 182223 course composed primarily from Hothorsquos and Griesheimrsquostranscripts (abb HG) included in Hegel 2011 (the German is Hegel 1996) Since the Germancritical edition of the transcripts remains incomplete for materials on Hegelrsquos later coursesI have used Heimannrsquos transcript of 183031 whenever possible (Hegel 2005 abb Hei)otherwise the composite texts produced by Karl Hegel (Hegel 1986) and translated by Sibree(Hegel 1991 abb S) and by Georg LassonJohannes Hoffmeister (Hegel 1988) translated byNisbet (Hegel 1975 abb N) I quote English translations whenever available sometimesadjusted in view of the German5 For more on contingency in Hegel see inter alia Burbidge 2007 esp ch 1 Burbidge stressesthe extent to which Hegel lsquotakes the contingencies of history seriouslyrsquo (2007 9)6 For Hegel lsquonaturehellip is indeed a rational system operating in its own distinct elementrsquo (N 44)The division into continents is rational in that different natural features and their varietiesmdashmountains and plains lands and seas and their fusion and differentiationmdasheach find fullembodiment in different continents (EM sect393 and R 40ndash41) In a sense then non-Europeansare subject to reason and rational progression insofar as nature imposes it on them fromthe outside rather than by exercising rational thought for themselves This coheres withHegelrsquos view that these peoples are immersed in nature out of which only Europeans can liftthem see below7 This recalls Hegelrsquos derivation of time from space in the Philosophy of Nature a derivation thatpositions time as more advanced than space (EN sectsect256ndash57 31ndash36)8 This is evident from eg Hegelrsquos discussion of the colonization of America see Section II9 Hegel connects formation with possession (PR sect56 85ndash86) albeit in the very differentcontext of modern European societies in which private property is institutionalized I leaveunexplored here how far his ideas about slaveryrsquos educative power may be informed by hislordbondsman dialectic10 For instance some interpreters defend Hegel against charges of Eurocentrism and racism(eg Buchwalter 2009 Houlgate [1991] 2015 35ndash37 McCarney in McCarney and Bernasconi2003 Mowad 2013) others stress Hegelrsquos founding importance for anti-colonial thought(Brennan 2013) and numerous readers of Hegel as a thinker of freedom (eg Patten 1999)see no need to discuss his position on colonialism presumably on the grounds that the latteris a merely accidental avoidable part of his thought from which his essential views on freedomcan be extracted11 For Hegel the Greeks were greatly influenced by the Egyptians whose influence theynonetheless overcame Here he is close to accepting what Martin Bernal calls the lsquoancientmodelrsquo of the Greeksrsquo origins a model to which the Greeks themselves adhered later-nineteenth-century Europeans instead espoused an lsquoAryan modelrsquo on which Greek cultureproper arose from northern invaders driving out earlier Egyptian and Phoenician influences([1987] 1991) Bernal argues that the Aryan model had Eurocentric motivations if the Greeks

Alison Stone

21

the supposed originators of Europersquos distinctive culture were actually the Egyptiansrsquo heirsthen given that Egypt is within Africa the EuropeAfrica divide would crumble A furthercomplicating factor is whether the Egyptians were seen as black Africans Bernasconi (2007)argues that Hegel thought so as did most other Europeans of his time Later the Egyptiansrsquoracial status was changedmdashto Mediterranean (ie Caucasian)mdashto hold up the divide betweenEurope-as-white and Africa-as-black Bernasconi suggests that Hegel himself dealt with thepotential anomalymdashof highly cultured black Africans giving much to the Greeksmdashby makingthe EgyptGreece transition the site of the key conceptual transition from unfreedom tofreedom nature to spirit (2007 212ndash13) This ties in with my argument in Section IV thatHegel actually did have grounds on his own terms to construe the apparently gradual EgyptGreece transition as actually being a sharp divide12 Bernasconi (2016) has recently shown how Hegel likewise distorted his sources on China tothe detriment of the Chinese13 I thank Bob Stern and the referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions

Bibliography

Bernal M [1987] (1991) Black Athena The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical CivilisationVol 1 London VintageBernasconi R (1998) lsquoHegel at the Court of the Ashantirsquo in S Barnett (ed)Hegel After Derrida Albany NY SUNYBernasconi R (2007) lsquoThe Return of Africa Hegel and the Question of theRacial Identity of the Egyptiansrsquo in P T Grier (ed) Identity and Difference AlbanyNY SUNYBernasconi R (2016) lsquoChina on Parade Hegelrsquos Manipulation of his Sources andhis Change of Mindrsquo in B Brandt and D L Purdy (eds) China in the GermanEnlightenment Toronto University of Toronto PressBird-Pollan S (2014) Hegel Freud and Fanon The Dialectic of Emancipation LondonRowman and Littlefield InternationalBonetto S (2006) lsquoRace and Racism in HegelmdashAn AnalysisrsquoMinerva An InternetJournal of Philosophy 10Brennan T (2013) lsquoHegel Empire and Anti-Colonial Thoughtrsquo in G Huggan(ed) The Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies Oxford Oxford University PressBuchwalter A (2009) lsquoIs Hegelrsquos Philosophy of History Eurocentricrsquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYBuck-Morss S (2000) lsquoHegel and Haitirsquo Critical Inquiry 264 821ndash65Burbidge J (2007) Hegelrsquos Systematic Contingency Basingstoke Palgrave MacmillanDe Laurentiis A (2014) lsquoRace in Hegel Text and Contextrsquo in M Egger (ed)Philosophie Nach Kant Neue Wege zum Verstaumlndnis von Kants Transzendental- undMoralphilosophie Berlin De Gruyter

Hegel and Colonialism

22

Dussel E [1992] (1995) The Invention of the Americas trans M D Barber NewYork ContinuumDussel E (1993) lsquoEurocentrism and Modernityrsquo Boundary 2 203 65ndash76Fanon F [1952] (2008) Black Skin White Masks trans R Philcox New YorkGroveGuha R (2002) History at the Limit of World-History New York ColumbiaUniversity PressHardimon M (1993) Hegelrsquos Social Philosophy Cambridge Cambridge UniversityPressHegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller OxfordClarendonHegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind trans W Wallace and A V MillerOxford Oxford University PressHegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reasonin History trans H B Nisbet Cambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1986) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Geschichte Werke Vol 12ed E Moldenhauer and K M Michel Frankfurt Suhrkamp [Englishtranslation Sibree]Hegel G W F (1988) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Vols 1-3 edG Lasson Vols 1-4 Hamburg Meiner [English translation of volume 1 Nisbet]Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NYPrometheus BooksHegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B NisbetCambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1995) lsquoVorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der WeltgeschichteEinleitungrsquo in W Jaeschke (ed) Vorlesungsmanuskripte II (1916ndash1831)Gesammelte Werke Vol 18 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown andHodgson]Hegel G W F (1996) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Berlin 182223 Nachschriften von Griesheim Hotho und Kehler ed Karl Brehmer K-H Iltingund Hoo Nam Seelmann Hegel Vorlesungen Ausgew Nachschriften und ManuskripteVol 12 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown and Hodgson]Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink Abb HeiHegel G W F (2011) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Volume 1Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822ndash3 ed and trans R F Brownand P C Hodgson with assistance of W G Geuss Oxford Clarendon PressHoulgate S [1991] 2015 An Introduction to Hegel Freedom Truth and HistoryOxford BlackwellJohansen B E (1982) Forgotten Founders How the American Indians Helped ShapeDemocracy Boston Harvard Common Press

Alison Stone

23

McCarney J and Bernasconi R (2003) lsquoExchange Hegelrsquos Racismrsquo RadicalPhilosophy 119(MayJune) 32ndash37Monahan M (ed) (2017) Creolizing Hegel London Rowman and LittlefieldInternationalMowad N (2013) lsquoThe Place of Nationality in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of Politicsand Religion A Defense of Hegel on the Charges of National Chauvinism andRacismrsquo in A Nuzzo (ed) Hegel on Religion and Politics Albany NY SUNYParekh S (2009) lsquoHegelrsquos New World History Freedom and Racersquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYPatten A (1999) Hegelrsquos Idea of Freedom Oxford Oxford University PressPurtschert P (2010) lsquoOn the Limit of Spirit Hegelrsquos Racism Revisitedrsquo Philosophyand Social Criticism 369 1039ndash51Quijano A (2000) lsquoColoniality of Power Eurocentrism and Latin AmericarsquoNepantla Views from South 13 533ndash80Sahota J P (2016) lsquoHegelrsquos Critique of Hinduism A Responsersquo Hegel Bulletin372 305ndash17Serequeberhan T (1989) lsquoThe Idea of Colonialism in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of RightrsquoInternational Philosophical Quarterly 293 301ndash18Shohat E and Stam R [1994] (2014) Unthinking Eurocentrism New YorkRoutledgeTibebu T (2010) Hegel and the Third World The Making of Eurocentrism in WorldHistory Syracuse NY Syracuse University PressWa Thiongrsquoo N (2012) Globalectics Theory and the Politics of Knowing New YorkColumbia University Press

Hegel and Colonialism

24

  • Hegel and Colonialism
Page 15: Hegel and Colonialism - Lancaster University · 2017-06-30 · Hegel and Colonialism Alison Stone Abstract This article explores the implications of Hegel’s Philosophy of World

Neither of these revised Hegelian narrativesmdashthe single line or parallel linesversionsmdashsupports colonialism not even the single line model on whichnon-European peoplesrsquo native levels of freedom are although real yetdeficient compared to European ones By recognizing freedom howeverunsatisfactorily non-European cultures would still have the internal potential andmotor to advance to greater freedom In that case colonization would not benecessary for non-European peoplesrsquo achieving freedom and would not bejustified as a necessary step in the realization of universal freedom Anotherplank in Hegelrsquos justification of colonization is that colonized peoples enjoyed nofreedom pre-colonizationmdashso that despite its abrogation of their freedomcolonization did not worsen their position (and ultimately would improve it) Butif these peoples did have a grasp of freedom however imperfect thencolonization stood to worsen their position That risk is especially pronouncedgiven Hegelrsquos own perspective that some violence is necessary for colonizationand given the role of contingency in human affairs that that violence may wellmushroom beyond the necessary minimum Further for Hegel colonizationrequires the extirpation of native cultures but if these are not cultures ofunfreedom then that extirpation is not justified Apparently then Hegel shouldby his own lights have opposed colonialism for his own philosophy generates acase against it

IV The Greeks history and self-liberation from nature

The view just canvassed is that despite the Eurocentrism and pro-colonialism ofHegelrsquos substantial narrative in the PWH his distinctive account of freedom asdeveloping historically through successive civilizations does not in itselfnecessitate his substantive Eurocentrism and when extricated from the latteryields a case against colonialism However we can distinguish weaker andstronger versions of this view More weakly Hegelrsquos basic account of freedomcan be separated from his actual pro-colonialism and so does not necessarilyimply pro-colonialism but contains anti-colonial possibilities as well as thepro-colonial possibilities that Hegel developed from it More strongly Hegelrsquosbasic account of freedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism andwhen so separated this account implies anti-colonialism and has an inherentlyanti-colonial direction I endorse the weaker but not the stronger claim and theweaker one only subject to a significant qualification Hegelrsquos basic account offreedom can be separated from his actual pro-colonialism but not as easily asSection III suggested This is because Hegelrsquos conception of freedom asself-determination has significant connections with his Eurocentrism

Alison Stone

15

In Section III I suggested that Hegelrsquos divisions Greeksnon-Greeks freeunfree look arbitrary But actually they are not For Hegel

Its [Greecersquos] principle is that self-conscious freedom stepsforth hellip [Regarding t]he unity of spirit with nature hellip thespecificity of this unity [in the Greek case] is to be graspedOne unity is the Oriental hellip consciousness immersed innature a [new kind of] harmony is now to be broughtforth [by the Greeks] in which hellip spirit dominates Spirit nowdetermines nature and this is a spiritual unity hellip (Hei 117 myemphases)

[The] fundamental characteristic [of the Greek spirit is] that thefreedom of spirit is conditioned by and in essential relation tosome natural stimulus Greek freedom is stimulated bysomething other and is free because it changes and produces thestimulus from out of itself (aus sich) (S 238 my emphasis)

Thus the Greeks were free in that they were at home with themselves in theother ie nature But this does not mean that the content of their practices andway of life was determined by natural givens such as the Greeksrsquo given impulsesRather they reshaped these givens and so became at-home-with-themselves inthem In the Greek case then spirit lsquodeterminedrsquo nature whereas previouslyspirit had been immersed or absorbed (versenkt) in nature This Greekdetermination of nature by spiritmdashspiritrsquos investment of nature with meaningof its ownmdashwas made possible by a prior moment first carried out by theGreeks through which lsquospirit is no longer immersed [versenkt] in nature hellip [but]releas[es] itself from nature [sich losmachend von der Natur]rsquo (HG 395ndash96) Thismoment in which the human spirit first releases or sets itself free from naturecorresponds to the overcoming (uumlberwinden) by the Greeks of their mixed ethnicheritage a moment of overcoming through which they became able to remakethat heritage for themselves to make themselves Hegel is explicit that none ofthe worldrsquos other peoples to that point had achieved this

Even so for Hegel the Greeks exercised freedom always with respect tonature and existing givens in the worldmdashre-shaping what they found alreadythere rather than creating a totally new world out of themselves Hence theGreeks did not regard free individuals as being capable of adjudicatingindependently on the given natural and social world through their own reason orof generating norms and principles purely through the exercise of their spiritualfreedom Or as Hegel also puts it elsewhere individual subjectivity was notdifferentiated from social substance but the individual identified fully andunquestioningly with his or her social role and there was no ground for

Hegel and Colonialism

16

independent social criticism (see Hardimon 1993) Connected with all this theGreeks restricted freedom to some people only effectively stipulating that onlythose with certain kinds of naturemdashmale free-bornmdashor natural locationmdashnativeGreekmdashhad the power of self-determination In these ways spiritrsquos freedomremained lsquoconditionedrsquo or limited (bedingt) bymdashalthough not immersed inmdashnature (and see HG 390)

However these limitations contradicted the essence of self-determination asthe Greeks understood it as including a moment of overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature such that the power to overcome nature cannotpossibly be limited by nature (or it would not be a power to overcome nature atall) Thus lsquoin the principle of Greek freedom inasmuch as it is freedom it isimplied that thought must be free for itself rsquo (HG 268)mdashalthough the Greeks fora long time did not explicitly grasp or follow through on that implicationNonetheless in the end that contradiction was what made it possible for theGreeksrsquo exclusion of some people from freedom and their other ways ofrestricting freedomrsquos scope to come in for criticism The criticism came withSocrates and the Sophists claiming that thought can adjudicate rationally on whatis and generate norms by itself (417) In that freedom of thought was therebygrasped as fully independent of nature it was also grasped as universal at least inprinciple In these two ways lsquoThought hellip introduces an opposition [Gegensatz][to the Greek mixture of freedom and nature] and asserts the validity ofessentially rational principlesrsquo (S 267)

For Hegel then Greek culture enabled rational criticism of what isincluding of limited freedom as no pre-Greek cultures did just because theGreeks had established a root opposition between freedom and nature whereaslsquoin the Oriental states in which a lack of opposition is present no moral freedomcan come aboutrsquo (267) Although the advent of rational critique brought on thedemise of Greek culture Europe was thereby also set on the path oftransformative historical change We see then why in his own terms Hegel saysthat non-European peoples could not advance critical claims for freedomrsquosextension but uncritically accepted the authority of their rulersmdashpatriarchalauthority in China caste hierarchy and caste-based restrictions and rituals inIndia and state power in Persia Non-Europeans could not question suchauthorities because their cultures did not grasp freedom as including the momentof overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature and the given Becausefreedom was not grasped as including that moment of human separation fromnature and the given no contradiction was perceived in freedom being limited bynature eg confined to people of certain castes or by given states of affairs egcustomary authority and ritual Non-Europeans lacked a critical motor to drivesocial change hence lacked history propermdashor indeed freedom as properlydistinguished from unfreedom

Alison Stone

17

So for Hegel there is a genuine difference in kind not merely degreebetween the Greek and post-Greek European world on the one hand and thenon-European world on the other the Europenon-Europe divide is notarbitrary but has a philosophical rationale For while the Greek view of freedomwas like non-European views limited and inadequate the former was moreadvanced in one key respectmdashthe inclusion in freedom of a primary moment oflsquoovercomingrsquo naturemdashwhich enabled the Greek and post-Greek European worldto become self-critical self-revising and so historical This is what motivatesHegel to identify Greek and post-Greek European views as views of freedomhowever limited whereas non-European views that might prima facie look likeviews of freedom are still actually modes of unfreedom

Once again we might object that non-Europeans have at times construedfreedom as including this moment of overcoming nature Even on Hegelrsquosaccount Hindus appreciate the human power to abstract from the world inthought He maintains though that this is merely an intellectual withdrawaland that when it comes to practical agency Hindus see human agency as immersedin not including any moment of self-freeing-from nature (see eg S 157ndash58)In response we could with Jaspal Peter Sahota (2016) agree that in classicalIndian thought there has been a tendency to locate human agency within naturebut argue against Hegel that this does not constitute a real absence offreedom but rather a different conception of freedom We might then say thatbecause thesemdashand othermdashnon-European views were still views of freedom thoseviews were still sufficient to motivate social criticism and hence place non-European peoples in history even without the element of overcoming natureHowever such a position would take us further away from Hegelrsquos own accountof the historicity of freedom according which as we have seen that moment ofovercoming nature uniquely new in ancient Greece is crucial in poweringhistorical progression

Hegelrsquos basic account of freedom and its historicity thus has more extensiveand significant connections with his Eurocentrism than I suggested inSection III In particular that account connects with Hegelrsquos denial that non-European peoples are historicalmdashie can come to freedom on their ownmdashandhence with his case for colonialism as the only route along which those peoplescan reach freedom These connections suggest that after all we cannotstraightforwardly take up Hegelrsquos account of freedom and its historicity whilesloughing off his pro-colonialism This is not to say that we cannot separate outthese parts of his thought at all But rescuing Hegel from himself is set to be acomplicated process not quick or straightforward To the extent that such arescue is possible Hegelrsquos pro-colonialism cannot rightly be counted as necessaryto his thought or system Yet his pro-colonialism does have extensive anddeep-seated connections with his other viewsmdashenough to show that it is not the

Hegel and Colonialism

18

case that Hegel should not have endorsed colonialism by his own standardsRather he did and could endorse it coherently in his own terms although otheranti-colonialist possibilities were also available within his own terms which hecould have developed

So the claim that Hegelrsquos account of freedom is inherently anti-colonial isunduly strong Through his understanding of freedom as involving spiritextricating itself from nature that account has sustained links with hisEurocentrism and so his pro-colonialism We can nonetheless envisage variousmanoeuvres by which to maintain that freedom develops historically for all theworldrsquos peoples for example by saying that they have several conceptions offreedom where freedom can but does not have to include self-liberation fromnature Then ancient Greece would initiate one historical pathway to freedombut not the only one Even so Hegelrsquos own account of freedom and its historicitydoes not inherently drive us to make these intellectual manoeuvres but onlypermits them In sum if Hegelrsquos view of freedom does not necessarily implypro-colonialism neither is it inherently anti-colonial We can make distinctionsand qualifications within his thought so as to yield anti-colonial conclusions butthis is only one of several possible lines of development of which his thoughtadmits another being its elaboration into the Eurocentric and pro-colonialsystem that Hegel in fact forged

There is a broader moral Wemdashie the heirs of the European heritage thatruns through philosophy into modern political thoughtmdashshould not let thisheritage off the hook too easily This heritage including Hegelrsquos thought hasbeen implicated in colonialism in various ways To be sure because it extols andarticulates the values of freedom and equality this heritage also furnishesconceptual resources for critiquing colonialism and giving support to anti-colonial struggles and anti-colonial thinkers and activists have drawn on modernEuropean ideas for this purpose For example the Haitian revolutionariesdeclared that they were acting in allegiance to the emancipatory goals of theFrench Revolution This might lead us to suppose that the European politicallegacy is intrinsically liberatory and that theorists in the European traditionmdashHegel includedmdashhave only ever justified colonialism due to unfortunateprejudices that led them to go back on their own principles

I believe that taking that view exculpates our predecessors too quicklyand leaves us at risk of inadvertently embracing ideas inherited from thesepredecessors which actually have deep-rooted internal connections withEurocentric and pro-colonial attitudes This is not to say that we should orcould repudiate these ideas outright Rather in view of their connections withcolonialism we need to think carefully and critically about how far to take theseinherited ideas forward and how we might do so differently My aim has been tohelp us cultivate this caution in Hegelrsquos case by acknowledging that while his

Alison Stone

19

thought harbours anti-colonial possibilities it also has real and tenacious linkswith colonialism of which we should remind mindful13

Alison StoneLancaster University UKastonelancasteracuk

Notes

1 Contributions include those by Bernasconi 1998 2007 2016 Bonetto 2006 de Laurentiis2014 McCarney and Bernasconi 2003 Mowad 2013 Parekh 2009 Purtschert 2010 andTibebu 20102 However see Buck-Morss 2000 andmdashfor highly critical accountsmdashDussel [1992] 1995 and1993 Guha 2002 Tibebu 2010 Also relevant are Bird-Pollan 2014 (on Hegel and Fanon)Brennan 2013 (on Hegelrsquos influence on post-colonialism) Buchwalter 2009 (defending Hegelagainst charges of Eurocentrism) Monahan 2017 (Creolizing Hegel) and Serequeberhan 1989(on colonialism in the Philosophy of Right)3 Ranajit Guha identifies another argument for colonialism in the Philosophy of Rightfrom the lsquorightsrsquo that Hegel claims civilized nations have with respect to less advanced ones(PR sect351 376) These rights Guha argues are lsquorights of conquestrsquo noting Hegelrsquos praise for Britishmilitary victories over India led by Robert Clive (1725ndash74) whose conquests established theEast India Companyrsquos rule over Bengal and other Indian states See Guha 2002 43ndash44PR sect372A 364 and 474 note 1)Abbreviations usedEN=Hegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller Oxford Clarendon PressEM= Hegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind Trans W Wallace and A V Miller Oxford OxfordUniversity Press Cited by paragraph and page numberN=Hegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reason in Historytrans H B Nisbet Cambridge UK Cambridge University PressS=Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NY Prometheus BooksPR=Hegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B Nisbet Cambridge UKCambridge University PressHei=Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink4 Hegel lectured on the PWH in 182223 182425 182627 182829 and 183031 Hismanuscripts of the Introduction from 1822 (rev 1828) and 183031 survive as do manytranscripts between them covering every course Some such as de Laurentiis (2014) are waryof directly attributing to Hegel views notably on race expressed only in the transcripts I agreethat we should disambiguate sources but where multiple independently written transcripts

Hegel and Colonialism

20

converge as domdashextensivelymdashseveral transcripts of the PWH we may take them to bereliable Accordingly I refer to Hegelrsquos manuscripts (abbreviated H) as in Hegel 2011 which isthe English translation of the corresponding volume of the Gesammelte Werke (Hegel 1995) andthe integrated text of the 182223 course composed primarily from Hothorsquos and Griesheimrsquostranscripts (abb HG) included in Hegel 2011 (the German is Hegel 1996) Since the Germancritical edition of the transcripts remains incomplete for materials on Hegelrsquos later coursesI have used Heimannrsquos transcript of 183031 whenever possible (Hegel 2005 abb Hei)otherwise the composite texts produced by Karl Hegel (Hegel 1986) and translated by Sibree(Hegel 1991 abb S) and by Georg LassonJohannes Hoffmeister (Hegel 1988) translated byNisbet (Hegel 1975 abb N) I quote English translations whenever available sometimesadjusted in view of the German5 For more on contingency in Hegel see inter alia Burbidge 2007 esp ch 1 Burbidge stressesthe extent to which Hegel lsquotakes the contingencies of history seriouslyrsquo (2007 9)6 For Hegel lsquonaturehellip is indeed a rational system operating in its own distinct elementrsquo (N 44)The division into continents is rational in that different natural features and their varietiesmdashmountains and plains lands and seas and their fusion and differentiationmdasheach find fullembodiment in different continents (EM sect393 and R 40ndash41) In a sense then non-Europeansare subject to reason and rational progression insofar as nature imposes it on them fromthe outside rather than by exercising rational thought for themselves This coheres withHegelrsquos view that these peoples are immersed in nature out of which only Europeans can liftthem see below7 This recalls Hegelrsquos derivation of time from space in the Philosophy of Nature a derivation thatpositions time as more advanced than space (EN sectsect256ndash57 31ndash36)8 This is evident from eg Hegelrsquos discussion of the colonization of America see Section II9 Hegel connects formation with possession (PR sect56 85ndash86) albeit in the very differentcontext of modern European societies in which private property is institutionalized I leaveunexplored here how far his ideas about slaveryrsquos educative power may be informed by hislordbondsman dialectic10 For instance some interpreters defend Hegel against charges of Eurocentrism and racism(eg Buchwalter 2009 Houlgate [1991] 2015 35ndash37 McCarney in McCarney and Bernasconi2003 Mowad 2013) others stress Hegelrsquos founding importance for anti-colonial thought(Brennan 2013) and numerous readers of Hegel as a thinker of freedom (eg Patten 1999)see no need to discuss his position on colonialism presumably on the grounds that the latteris a merely accidental avoidable part of his thought from which his essential views on freedomcan be extracted11 For Hegel the Greeks were greatly influenced by the Egyptians whose influence theynonetheless overcame Here he is close to accepting what Martin Bernal calls the lsquoancientmodelrsquo of the Greeksrsquo origins a model to which the Greeks themselves adhered later-nineteenth-century Europeans instead espoused an lsquoAryan modelrsquo on which Greek cultureproper arose from northern invaders driving out earlier Egyptian and Phoenician influences([1987] 1991) Bernal argues that the Aryan model had Eurocentric motivations if the Greeks

Alison Stone

21

the supposed originators of Europersquos distinctive culture were actually the Egyptiansrsquo heirsthen given that Egypt is within Africa the EuropeAfrica divide would crumble A furthercomplicating factor is whether the Egyptians were seen as black Africans Bernasconi (2007)argues that Hegel thought so as did most other Europeans of his time Later the Egyptiansrsquoracial status was changedmdashto Mediterranean (ie Caucasian)mdashto hold up the divide betweenEurope-as-white and Africa-as-black Bernasconi suggests that Hegel himself dealt with thepotential anomalymdashof highly cultured black Africans giving much to the Greeksmdashby makingthe EgyptGreece transition the site of the key conceptual transition from unfreedom tofreedom nature to spirit (2007 212ndash13) This ties in with my argument in Section IV thatHegel actually did have grounds on his own terms to construe the apparently gradual EgyptGreece transition as actually being a sharp divide12 Bernasconi (2016) has recently shown how Hegel likewise distorted his sources on China tothe detriment of the Chinese13 I thank Bob Stern and the referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions

Bibliography

Bernal M [1987] (1991) Black Athena The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical CivilisationVol 1 London VintageBernasconi R (1998) lsquoHegel at the Court of the Ashantirsquo in S Barnett (ed)Hegel After Derrida Albany NY SUNYBernasconi R (2007) lsquoThe Return of Africa Hegel and the Question of theRacial Identity of the Egyptiansrsquo in P T Grier (ed) Identity and Difference AlbanyNY SUNYBernasconi R (2016) lsquoChina on Parade Hegelrsquos Manipulation of his Sources andhis Change of Mindrsquo in B Brandt and D L Purdy (eds) China in the GermanEnlightenment Toronto University of Toronto PressBird-Pollan S (2014) Hegel Freud and Fanon The Dialectic of Emancipation LondonRowman and Littlefield InternationalBonetto S (2006) lsquoRace and Racism in HegelmdashAn AnalysisrsquoMinerva An InternetJournal of Philosophy 10Brennan T (2013) lsquoHegel Empire and Anti-Colonial Thoughtrsquo in G Huggan(ed) The Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies Oxford Oxford University PressBuchwalter A (2009) lsquoIs Hegelrsquos Philosophy of History Eurocentricrsquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYBuck-Morss S (2000) lsquoHegel and Haitirsquo Critical Inquiry 264 821ndash65Burbidge J (2007) Hegelrsquos Systematic Contingency Basingstoke Palgrave MacmillanDe Laurentiis A (2014) lsquoRace in Hegel Text and Contextrsquo in M Egger (ed)Philosophie Nach Kant Neue Wege zum Verstaumlndnis von Kants Transzendental- undMoralphilosophie Berlin De Gruyter

Hegel and Colonialism

22

Dussel E [1992] (1995) The Invention of the Americas trans M D Barber NewYork ContinuumDussel E (1993) lsquoEurocentrism and Modernityrsquo Boundary 2 203 65ndash76Fanon F [1952] (2008) Black Skin White Masks trans R Philcox New YorkGroveGuha R (2002) History at the Limit of World-History New York ColumbiaUniversity PressHardimon M (1993) Hegelrsquos Social Philosophy Cambridge Cambridge UniversityPressHegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller OxfordClarendonHegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind trans W Wallace and A V MillerOxford Oxford University PressHegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reasonin History trans H B Nisbet Cambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1986) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Geschichte Werke Vol 12ed E Moldenhauer and K M Michel Frankfurt Suhrkamp [Englishtranslation Sibree]Hegel G W F (1988) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Vols 1-3 edG Lasson Vols 1-4 Hamburg Meiner [English translation of volume 1 Nisbet]Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NYPrometheus BooksHegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B NisbetCambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1995) lsquoVorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der WeltgeschichteEinleitungrsquo in W Jaeschke (ed) Vorlesungsmanuskripte II (1916ndash1831)Gesammelte Werke Vol 18 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown andHodgson]Hegel G W F (1996) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Berlin 182223 Nachschriften von Griesheim Hotho und Kehler ed Karl Brehmer K-H Iltingund Hoo Nam Seelmann Hegel Vorlesungen Ausgew Nachschriften und ManuskripteVol 12 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown and Hodgson]Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink Abb HeiHegel G W F (2011) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Volume 1Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822ndash3 ed and trans R F Brownand P C Hodgson with assistance of W G Geuss Oxford Clarendon PressHoulgate S [1991] 2015 An Introduction to Hegel Freedom Truth and HistoryOxford BlackwellJohansen B E (1982) Forgotten Founders How the American Indians Helped ShapeDemocracy Boston Harvard Common Press

Alison Stone

23

McCarney J and Bernasconi R (2003) lsquoExchange Hegelrsquos Racismrsquo RadicalPhilosophy 119(MayJune) 32ndash37Monahan M (ed) (2017) Creolizing Hegel London Rowman and LittlefieldInternationalMowad N (2013) lsquoThe Place of Nationality in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of Politicsand Religion A Defense of Hegel on the Charges of National Chauvinism andRacismrsquo in A Nuzzo (ed) Hegel on Religion and Politics Albany NY SUNYParekh S (2009) lsquoHegelrsquos New World History Freedom and Racersquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYPatten A (1999) Hegelrsquos Idea of Freedom Oxford Oxford University PressPurtschert P (2010) lsquoOn the Limit of Spirit Hegelrsquos Racism Revisitedrsquo Philosophyand Social Criticism 369 1039ndash51Quijano A (2000) lsquoColoniality of Power Eurocentrism and Latin AmericarsquoNepantla Views from South 13 533ndash80Sahota J P (2016) lsquoHegelrsquos Critique of Hinduism A Responsersquo Hegel Bulletin372 305ndash17Serequeberhan T (1989) lsquoThe Idea of Colonialism in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of RightrsquoInternational Philosophical Quarterly 293 301ndash18Shohat E and Stam R [1994] (2014) Unthinking Eurocentrism New YorkRoutledgeTibebu T (2010) Hegel and the Third World The Making of Eurocentrism in WorldHistory Syracuse NY Syracuse University PressWa Thiongrsquoo N (2012) Globalectics Theory and the Politics of Knowing New YorkColumbia University Press

Hegel and Colonialism

24

  • Hegel and Colonialism
Page 16: Hegel and Colonialism - Lancaster University · 2017-06-30 · Hegel and Colonialism Alison Stone Abstract This article explores the implications of Hegel’s Philosophy of World

In Section III I suggested that Hegelrsquos divisions Greeksnon-Greeks freeunfree look arbitrary But actually they are not For Hegel

Its [Greecersquos] principle is that self-conscious freedom stepsforth hellip [Regarding t]he unity of spirit with nature hellip thespecificity of this unity [in the Greek case] is to be graspedOne unity is the Oriental hellip consciousness immersed innature a [new kind of] harmony is now to be broughtforth [by the Greeks] in which hellip spirit dominates Spirit nowdetermines nature and this is a spiritual unity hellip (Hei 117 myemphases)

[The] fundamental characteristic [of the Greek spirit is] that thefreedom of spirit is conditioned by and in essential relation tosome natural stimulus Greek freedom is stimulated bysomething other and is free because it changes and produces thestimulus from out of itself (aus sich) (S 238 my emphasis)

Thus the Greeks were free in that they were at home with themselves in theother ie nature But this does not mean that the content of their practices andway of life was determined by natural givens such as the Greeksrsquo given impulsesRather they reshaped these givens and so became at-home-with-themselves inthem In the Greek case then spirit lsquodeterminedrsquo nature whereas previouslyspirit had been immersed or absorbed (versenkt) in nature This Greekdetermination of nature by spiritmdashspiritrsquos investment of nature with meaningof its ownmdashwas made possible by a prior moment first carried out by theGreeks through which lsquospirit is no longer immersed [versenkt] in nature hellip [but]releas[es] itself from nature [sich losmachend von der Natur]rsquo (HG 395ndash96) Thismoment in which the human spirit first releases or sets itself free from naturecorresponds to the overcoming (uumlberwinden) by the Greeks of their mixed ethnicheritage a moment of overcoming through which they became able to remakethat heritage for themselves to make themselves Hegel is explicit that none ofthe worldrsquos other peoples to that point had achieved this

Even so for Hegel the Greeks exercised freedom always with respect tonature and existing givens in the worldmdashre-shaping what they found alreadythere rather than creating a totally new world out of themselves Hence theGreeks did not regard free individuals as being capable of adjudicatingindependently on the given natural and social world through their own reason orof generating norms and principles purely through the exercise of their spiritualfreedom Or as Hegel also puts it elsewhere individual subjectivity was notdifferentiated from social substance but the individual identified fully andunquestioningly with his or her social role and there was no ground for

Hegel and Colonialism

16

independent social criticism (see Hardimon 1993) Connected with all this theGreeks restricted freedom to some people only effectively stipulating that onlythose with certain kinds of naturemdashmale free-bornmdashor natural locationmdashnativeGreekmdashhad the power of self-determination In these ways spiritrsquos freedomremained lsquoconditionedrsquo or limited (bedingt) bymdashalthough not immersed inmdashnature (and see HG 390)

However these limitations contradicted the essence of self-determination asthe Greeks understood it as including a moment of overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature such that the power to overcome nature cannotpossibly be limited by nature (or it would not be a power to overcome nature atall) Thus lsquoin the principle of Greek freedom inasmuch as it is freedom it isimplied that thought must be free for itself rsquo (HG 268)mdashalthough the Greeks fora long time did not explicitly grasp or follow through on that implicationNonetheless in the end that contradiction was what made it possible for theGreeksrsquo exclusion of some people from freedom and their other ways ofrestricting freedomrsquos scope to come in for criticism The criticism came withSocrates and the Sophists claiming that thought can adjudicate rationally on whatis and generate norms by itself (417) In that freedom of thought was therebygrasped as fully independent of nature it was also grasped as universal at least inprinciple In these two ways lsquoThought hellip introduces an opposition [Gegensatz][to the Greek mixture of freedom and nature] and asserts the validity ofessentially rational principlesrsquo (S 267)

For Hegel then Greek culture enabled rational criticism of what isincluding of limited freedom as no pre-Greek cultures did just because theGreeks had established a root opposition between freedom and nature whereaslsquoin the Oriental states in which a lack of opposition is present no moral freedomcan come aboutrsquo (267) Although the advent of rational critique brought on thedemise of Greek culture Europe was thereby also set on the path oftransformative historical change We see then why in his own terms Hegel saysthat non-European peoples could not advance critical claims for freedomrsquosextension but uncritically accepted the authority of their rulersmdashpatriarchalauthority in China caste hierarchy and caste-based restrictions and rituals inIndia and state power in Persia Non-Europeans could not question suchauthorities because their cultures did not grasp freedom as including the momentof overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature and the given Becausefreedom was not grasped as including that moment of human separation fromnature and the given no contradiction was perceived in freedom being limited bynature eg confined to people of certain castes or by given states of affairs egcustomary authority and ritual Non-Europeans lacked a critical motor to drivesocial change hence lacked history propermdashor indeed freedom as properlydistinguished from unfreedom

Alison Stone

17

So for Hegel there is a genuine difference in kind not merely degreebetween the Greek and post-Greek European world on the one hand and thenon-European world on the other the Europenon-Europe divide is notarbitrary but has a philosophical rationale For while the Greek view of freedomwas like non-European views limited and inadequate the former was moreadvanced in one key respectmdashthe inclusion in freedom of a primary moment oflsquoovercomingrsquo naturemdashwhich enabled the Greek and post-Greek European worldto become self-critical self-revising and so historical This is what motivatesHegel to identify Greek and post-Greek European views as views of freedomhowever limited whereas non-European views that might prima facie look likeviews of freedom are still actually modes of unfreedom

Once again we might object that non-Europeans have at times construedfreedom as including this moment of overcoming nature Even on Hegelrsquosaccount Hindus appreciate the human power to abstract from the world inthought He maintains though that this is merely an intellectual withdrawaland that when it comes to practical agency Hindus see human agency as immersedin not including any moment of self-freeing-from nature (see eg S 157ndash58)In response we could with Jaspal Peter Sahota (2016) agree that in classicalIndian thought there has been a tendency to locate human agency within naturebut argue against Hegel that this does not constitute a real absence offreedom but rather a different conception of freedom We might then say thatbecause thesemdashand othermdashnon-European views were still views of freedom thoseviews were still sufficient to motivate social criticism and hence place non-European peoples in history even without the element of overcoming natureHowever such a position would take us further away from Hegelrsquos own accountof the historicity of freedom according which as we have seen that moment ofovercoming nature uniquely new in ancient Greece is crucial in poweringhistorical progression

Hegelrsquos basic account of freedom and its historicity thus has more extensiveand significant connections with his Eurocentrism than I suggested inSection III In particular that account connects with Hegelrsquos denial that non-European peoples are historicalmdashie can come to freedom on their ownmdashandhence with his case for colonialism as the only route along which those peoplescan reach freedom These connections suggest that after all we cannotstraightforwardly take up Hegelrsquos account of freedom and its historicity whilesloughing off his pro-colonialism This is not to say that we cannot separate outthese parts of his thought at all But rescuing Hegel from himself is set to be acomplicated process not quick or straightforward To the extent that such arescue is possible Hegelrsquos pro-colonialism cannot rightly be counted as necessaryto his thought or system Yet his pro-colonialism does have extensive anddeep-seated connections with his other viewsmdashenough to show that it is not the

Hegel and Colonialism

18

case that Hegel should not have endorsed colonialism by his own standardsRather he did and could endorse it coherently in his own terms although otheranti-colonialist possibilities were also available within his own terms which hecould have developed

So the claim that Hegelrsquos account of freedom is inherently anti-colonial isunduly strong Through his understanding of freedom as involving spiritextricating itself from nature that account has sustained links with hisEurocentrism and so his pro-colonialism We can nonetheless envisage variousmanoeuvres by which to maintain that freedom develops historically for all theworldrsquos peoples for example by saying that they have several conceptions offreedom where freedom can but does not have to include self-liberation fromnature Then ancient Greece would initiate one historical pathway to freedombut not the only one Even so Hegelrsquos own account of freedom and its historicitydoes not inherently drive us to make these intellectual manoeuvres but onlypermits them In sum if Hegelrsquos view of freedom does not necessarily implypro-colonialism neither is it inherently anti-colonial We can make distinctionsand qualifications within his thought so as to yield anti-colonial conclusions butthis is only one of several possible lines of development of which his thoughtadmits another being its elaboration into the Eurocentric and pro-colonialsystem that Hegel in fact forged

There is a broader moral Wemdashie the heirs of the European heritage thatruns through philosophy into modern political thoughtmdashshould not let thisheritage off the hook too easily This heritage including Hegelrsquos thought hasbeen implicated in colonialism in various ways To be sure because it extols andarticulates the values of freedom and equality this heritage also furnishesconceptual resources for critiquing colonialism and giving support to anti-colonial struggles and anti-colonial thinkers and activists have drawn on modernEuropean ideas for this purpose For example the Haitian revolutionariesdeclared that they were acting in allegiance to the emancipatory goals of theFrench Revolution This might lead us to suppose that the European politicallegacy is intrinsically liberatory and that theorists in the European traditionmdashHegel includedmdashhave only ever justified colonialism due to unfortunateprejudices that led them to go back on their own principles

I believe that taking that view exculpates our predecessors too quicklyand leaves us at risk of inadvertently embracing ideas inherited from thesepredecessors which actually have deep-rooted internal connections withEurocentric and pro-colonial attitudes This is not to say that we should orcould repudiate these ideas outright Rather in view of their connections withcolonialism we need to think carefully and critically about how far to take theseinherited ideas forward and how we might do so differently My aim has been tohelp us cultivate this caution in Hegelrsquos case by acknowledging that while his

Alison Stone

19

thought harbours anti-colonial possibilities it also has real and tenacious linkswith colonialism of which we should remind mindful13

Alison StoneLancaster University UKastonelancasteracuk

Notes

1 Contributions include those by Bernasconi 1998 2007 2016 Bonetto 2006 de Laurentiis2014 McCarney and Bernasconi 2003 Mowad 2013 Parekh 2009 Purtschert 2010 andTibebu 20102 However see Buck-Morss 2000 andmdashfor highly critical accountsmdashDussel [1992] 1995 and1993 Guha 2002 Tibebu 2010 Also relevant are Bird-Pollan 2014 (on Hegel and Fanon)Brennan 2013 (on Hegelrsquos influence on post-colonialism) Buchwalter 2009 (defending Hegelagainst charges of Eurocentrism) Monahan 2017 (Creolizing Hegel) and Serequeberhan 1989(on colonialism in the Philosophy of Right)3 Ranajit Guha identifies another argument for colonialism in the Philosophy of Rightfrom the lsquorightsrsquo that Hegel claims civilized nations have with respect to less advanced ones(PR sect351 376) These rights Guha argues are lsquorights of conquestrsquo noting Hegelrsquos praise for Britishmilitary victories over India led by Robert Clive (1725ndash74) whose conquests established theEast India Companyrsquos rule over Bengal and other Indian states See Guha 2002 43ndash44PR sect372A 364 and 474 note 1)Abbreviations usedEN=Hegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller Oxford Clarendon PressEM= Hegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind Trans W Wallace and A V Miller Oxford OxfordUniversity Press Cited by paragraph and page numberN=Hegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reason in Historytrans H B Nisbet Cambridge UK Cambridge University PressS=Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NY Prometheus BooksPR=Hegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B Nisbet Cambridge UKCambridge University PressHei=Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink4 Hegel lectured on the PWH in 182223 182425 182627 182829 and 183031 Hismanuscripts of the Introduction from 1822 (rev 1828) and 183031 survive as do manytranscripts between them covering every course Some such as de Laurentiis (2014) are waryof directly attributing to Hegel views notably on race expressed only in the transcripts I agreethat we should disambiguate sources but where multiple independently written transcripts

Hegel and Colonialism

20

converge as domdashextensivelymdashseveral transcripts of the PWH we may take them to bereliable Accordingly I refer to Hegelrsquos manuscripts (abbreviated H) as in Hegel 2011 which isthe English translation of the corresponding volume of the Gesammelte Werke (Hegel 1995) andthe integrated text of the 182223 course composed primarily from Hothorsquos and Griesheimrsquostranscripts (abb HG) included in Hegel 2011 (the German is Hegel 1996) Since the Germancritical edition of the transcripts remains incomplete for materials on Hegelrsquos later coursesI have used Heimannrsquos transcript of 183031 whenever possible (Hegel 2005 abb Hei)otherwise the composite texts produced by Karl Hegel (Hegel 1986) and translated by Sibree(Hegel 1991 abb S) and by Georg LassonJohannes Hoffmeister (Hegel 1988) translated byNisbet (Hegel 1975 abb N) I quote English translations whenever available sometimesadjusted in view of the German5 For more on contingency in Hegel see inter alia Burbidge 2007 esp ch 1 Burbidge stressesthe extent to which Hegel lsquotakes the contingencies of history seriouslyrsquo (2007 9)6 For Hegel lsquonaturehellip is indeed a rational system operating in its own distinct elementrsquo (N 44)The division into continents is rational in that different natural features and their varietiesmdashmountains and plains lands and seas and their fusion and differentiationmdasheach find fullembodiment in different continents (EM sect393 and R 40ndash41) In a sense then non-Europeansare subject to reason and rational progression insofar as nature imposes it on them fromthe outside rather than by exercising rational thought for themselves This coheres withHegelrsquos view that these peoples are immersed in nature out of which only Europeans can liftthem see below7 This recalls Hegelrsquos derivation of time from space in the Philosophy of Nature a derivation thatpositions time as more advanced than space (EN sectsect256ndash57 31ndash36)8 This is evident from eg Hegelrsquos discussion of the colonization of America see Section II9 Hegel connects formation with possession (PR sect56 85ndash86) albeit in the very differentcontext of modern European societies in which private property is institutionalized I leaveunexplored here how far his ideas about slaveryrsquos educative power may be informed by hislordbondsman dialectic10 For instance some interpreters defend Hegel against charges of Eurocentrism and racism(eg Buchwalter 2009 Houlgate [1991] 2015 35ndash37 McCarney in McCarney and Bernasconi2003 Mowad 2013) others stress Hegelrsquos founding importance for anti-colonial thought(Brennan 2013) and numerous readers of Hegel as a thinker of freedom (eg Patten 1999)see no need to discuss his position on colonialism presumably on the grounds that the latteris a merely accidental avoidable part of his thought from which his essential views on freedomcan be extracted11 For Hegel the Greeks were greatly influenced by the Egyptians whose influence theynonetheless overcame Here he is close to accepting what Martin Bernal calls the lsquoancientmodelrsquo of the Greeksrsquo origins a model to which the Greeks themselves adhered later-nineteenth-century Europeans instead espoused an lsquoAryan modelrsquo on which Greek cultureproper arose from northern invaders driving out earlier Egyptian and Phoenician influences([1987] 1991) Bernal argues that the Aryan model had Eurocentric motivations if the Greeks

Alison Stone

21

the supposed originators of Europersquos distinctive culture were actually the Egyptiansrsquo heirsthen given that Egypt is within Africa the EuropeAfrica divide would crumble A furthercomplicating factor is whether the Egyptians were seen as black Africans Bernasconi (2007)argues that Hegel thought so as did most other Europeans of his time Later the Egyptiansrsquoracial status was changedmdashto Mediterranean (ie Caucasian)mdashto hold up the divide betweenEurope-as-white and Africa-as-black Bernasconi suggests that Hegel himself dealt with thepotential anomalymdashof highly cultured black Africans giving much to the Greeksmdashby makingthe EgyptGreece transition the site of the key conceptual transition from unfreedom tofreedom nature to spirit (2007 212ndash13) This ties in with my argument in Section IV thatHegel actually did have grounds on his own terms to construe the apparently gradual EgyptGreece transition as actually being a sharp divide12 Bernasconi (2016) has recently shown how Hegel likewise distorted his sources on China tothe detriment of the Chinese13 I thank Bob Stern and the referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions

Bibliography

Bernal M [1987] (1991) Black Athena The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical CivilisationVol 1 London VintageBernasconi R (1998) lsquoHegel at the Court of the Ashantirsquo in S Barnett (ed)Hegel After Derrida Albany NY SUNYBernasconi R (2007) lsquoThe Return of Africa Hegel and the Question of theRacial Identity of the Egyptiansrsquo in P T Grier (ed) Identity and Difference AlbanyNY SUNYBernasconi R (2016) lsquoChina on Parade Hegelrsquos Manipulation of his Sources andhis Change of Mindrsquo in B Brandt and D L Purdy (eds) China in the GermanEnlightenment Toronto University of Toronto PressBird-Pollan S (2014) Hegel Freud and Fanon The Dialectic of Emancipation LondonRowman and Littlefield InternationalBonetto S (2006) lsquoRace and Racism in HegelmdashAn AnalysisrsquoMinerva An InternetJournal of Philosophy 10Brennan T (2013) lsquoHegel Empire and Anti-Colonial Thoughtrsquo in G Huggan(ed) The Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies Oxford Oxford University PressBuchwalter A (2009) lsquoIs Hegelrsquos Philosophy of History Eurocentricrsquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYBuck-Morss S (2000) lsquoHegel and Haitirsquo Critical Inquiry 264 821ndash65Burbidge J (2007) Hegelrsquos Systematic Contingency Basingstoke Palgrave MacmillanDe Laurentiis A (2014) lsquoRace in Hegel Text and Contextrsquo in M Egger (ed)Philosophie Nach Kant Neue Wege zum Verstaumlndnis von Kants Transzendental- undMoralphilosophie Berlin De Gruyter

Hegel and Colonialism

22

Dussel E [1992] (1995) The Invention of the Americas trans M D Barber NewYork ContinuumDussel E (1993) lsquoEurocentrism and Modernityrsquo Boundary 2 203 65ndash76Fanon F [1952] (2008) Black Skin White Masks trans R Philcox New YorkGroveGuha R (2002) History at the Limit of World-History New York ColumbiaUniversity PressHardimon M (1993) Hegelrsquos Social Philosophy Cambridge Cambridge UniversityPressHegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller OxfordClarendonHegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind trans W Wallace and A V MillerOxford Oxford University PressHegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reasonin History trans H B Nisbet Cambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1986) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Geschichte Werke Vol 12ed E Moldenhauer and K M Michel Frankfurt Suhrkamp [Englishtranslation Sibree]Hegel G W F (1988) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Vols 1-3 edG Lasson Vols 1-4 Hamburg Meiner [English translation of volume 1 Nisbet]Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NYPrometheus BooksHegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B NisbetCambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1995) lsquoVorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der WeltgeschichteEinleitungrsquo in W Jaeschke (ed) Vorlesungsmanuskripte II (1916ndash1831)Gesammelte Werke Vol 18 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown andHodgson]Hegel G W F (1996) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Berlin 182223 Nachschriften von Griesheim Hotho und Kehler ed Karl Brehmer K-H Iltingund Hoo Nam Seelmann Hegel Vorlesungen Ausgew Nachschriften und ManuskripteVol 12 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown and Hodgson]Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink Abb HeiHegel G W F (2011) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Volume 1Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822ndash3 ed and trans R F Brownand P C Hodgson with assistance of W G Geuss Oxford Clarendon PressHoulgate S [1991] 2015 An Introduction to Hegel Freedom Truth and HistoryOxford BlackwellJohansen B E (1982) Forgotten Founders How the American Indians Helped ShapeDemocracy Boston Harvard Common Press

Alison Stone

23

McCarney J and Bernasconi R (2003) lsquoExchange Hegelrsquos Racismrsquo RadicalPhilosophy 119(MayJune) 32ndash37Monahan M (ed) (2017) Creolizing Hegel London Rowman and LittlefieldInternationalMowad N (2013) lsquoThe Place of Nationality in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of Politicsand Religion A Defense of Hegel on the Charges of National Chauvinism andRacismrsquo in A Nuzzo (ed) Hegel on Religion and Politics Albany NY SUNYParekh S (2009) lsquoHegelrsquos New World History Freedom and Racersquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYPatten A (1999) Hegelrsquos Idea of Freedom Oxford Oxford University PressPurtschert P (2010) lsquoOn the Limit of Spirit Hegelrsquos Racism Revisitedrsquo Philosophyand Social Criticism 369 1039ndash51Quijano A (2000) lsquoColoniality of Power Eurocentrism and Latin AmericarsquoNepantla Views from South 13 533ndash80Sahota J P (2016) lsquoHegelrsquos Critique of Hinduism A Responsersquo Hegel Bulletin372 305ndash17Serequeberhan T (1989) lsquoThe Idea of Colonialism in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of RightrsquoInternational Philosophical Quarterly 293 301ndash18Shohat E and Stam R [1994] (2014) Unthinking Eurocentrism New YorkRoutledgeTibebu T (2010) Hegel and the Third World The Making of Eurocentrism in WorldHistory Syracuse NY Syracuse University PressWa Thiongrsquoo N (2012) Globalectics Theory and the Politics of Knowing New YorkColumbia University Press

Hegel and Colonialism

24

  • Hegel and Colonialism
Page 17: Hegel and Colonialism - Lancaster University · 2017-06-30 · Hegel and Colonialism Alison Stone Abstract This article explores the implications of Hegel’s Philosophy of World

independent social criticism (see Hardimon 1993) Connected with all this theGreeks restricted freedom to some people only effectively stipulating that onlythose with certain kinds of naturemdashmale free-bornmdashor natural locationmdashnativeGreekmdashhad the power of self-determination In these ways spiritrsquos freedomremained lsquoconditionedrsquo or limited (bedingt) bymdashalthough not immersed inmdashnature (and see HG 390)

However these limitations contradicted the essence of self-determination asthe Greeks understood it as including a moment of overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature such that the power to overcome nature cannotpossibly be limited by nature (or it would not be a power to overcome nature atall) Thus lsquoin the principle of Greek freedom inasmuch as it is freedom it isimplied that thought must be free for itself rsquo (HG 268)mdashalthough the Greeks fora long time did not explicitly grasp or follow through on that implicationNonetheless in the end that contradiction was what made it possible for theGreeksrsquo exclusion of some people from freedom and their other ways ofrestricting freedomrsquos scope to come in for criticism The criticism came withSocrates and the Sophists claiming that thought can adjudicate rationally on whatis and generate norms by itself (417) In that freedom of thought was therebygrasped as fully independent of nature it was also grasped as universal at least inprinciple In these two ways lsquoThought hellip introduces an opposition [Gegensatz][to the Greek mixture of freedom and nature] and asserts the validity ofessentially rational principlesrsquo (S 267)

For Hegel then Greek culture enabled rational criticism of what isincluding of limited freedom as no pre-Greek cultures did just because theGreeks had established a root opposition between freedom and nature whereaslsquoin the Oriental states in which a lack of opposition is present no moral freedomcan come aboutrsquo (267) Although the advent of rational critique brought on thedemise of Greek culture Europe was thereby also set on the path oftransformative historical change We see then why in his own terms Hegel saysthat non-European peoples could not advance critical claims for freedomrsquosextension but uncritically accepted the authority of their rulersmdashpatriarchalauthority in China caste hierarchy and caste-based restrictions and rituals inIndia and state power in Persia Non-Europeans could not question suchauthorities because their cultures did not grasp freedom as including the momentof overcoming or setting-oneself-free from nature and the given Becausefreedom was not grasped as including that moment of human separation fromnature and the given no contradiction was perceived in freedom being limited bynature eg confined to people of certain castes or by given states of affairs egcustomary authority and ritual Non-Europeans lacked a critical motor to drivesocial change hence lacked history propermdashor indeed freedom as properlydistinguished from unfreedom

Alison Stone

17

So for Hegel there is a genuine difference in kind not merely degreebetween the Greek and post-Greek European world on the one hand and thenon-European world on the other the Europenon-Europe divide is notarbitrary but has a philosophical rationale For while the Greek view of freedomwas like non-European views limited and inadequate the former was moreadvanced in one key respectmdashthe inclusion in freedom of a primary moment oflsquoovercomingrsquo naturemdashwhich enabled the Greek and post-Greek European worldto become self-critical self-revising and so historical This is what motivatesHegel to identify Greek and post-Greek European views as views of freedomhowever limited whereas non-European views that might prima facie look likeviews of freedom are still actually modes of unfreedom

Once again we might object that non-Europeans have at times construedfreedom as including this moment of overcoming nature Even on Hegelrsquosaccount Hindus appreciate the human power to abstract from the world inthought He maintains though that this is merely an intellectual withdrawaland that when it comes to practical agency Hindus see human agency as immersedin not including any moment of self-freeing-from nature (see eg S 157ndash58)In response we could with Jaspal Peter Sahota (2016) agree that in classicalIndian thought there has been a tendency to locate human agency within naturebut argue against Hegel that this does not constitute a real absence offreedom but rather a different conception of freedom We might then say thatbecause thesemdashand othermdashnon-European views were still views of freedom thoseviews were still sufficient to motivate social criticism and hence place non-European peoples in history even without the element of overcoming natureHowever such a position would take us further away from Hegelrsquos own accountof the historicity of freedom according which as we have seen that moment ofovercoming nature uniquely new in ancient Greece is crucial in poweringhistorical progression

Hegelrsquos basic account of freedom and its historicity thus has more extensiveand significant connections with his Eurocentrism than I suggested inSection III In particular that account connects with Hegelrsquos denial that non-European peoples are historicalmdashie can come to freedom on their ownmdashandhence with his case for colonialism as the only route along which those peoplescan reach freedom These connections suggest that after all we cannotstraightforwardly take up Hegelrsquos account of freedom and its historicity whilesloughing off his pro-colonialism This is not to say that we cannot separate outthese parts of his thought at all But rescuing Hegel from himself is set to be acomplicated process not quick or straightforward To the extent that such arescue is possible Hegelrsquos pro-colonialism cannot rightly be counted as necessaryto his thought or system Yet his pro-colonialism does have extensive anddeep-seated connections with his other viewsmdashenough to show that it is not the

Hegel and Colonialism

18

case that Hegel should not have endorsed colonialism by his own standardsRather he did and could endorse it coherently in his own terms although otheranti-colonialist possibilities were also available within his own terms which hecould have developed

So the claim that Hegelrsquos account of freedom is inherently anti-colonial isunduly strong Through his understanding of freedom as involving spiritextricating itself from nature that account has sustained links with hisEurocentrism and so his pro-colonialism We can nonetheless envisage variousmanoeuvres by which to maintain that freedom develops historically for all theworldrsquos peoples for example by saying that they have several conceptions offreedom where freedom can but does not have to include self-liberation fromnature Then ancient Greece would initiate one historical pathway to freedombut not the only one Even so Hegelrsquos own account of freedom and its historicitydoes not inherently drive us to make these intellectual manoeuvres but onlypermits them In sum if Hegelrsquos view of freedom does not necessarily implypro-colonialism neither is it inherently anti-colonial We can make distinctionsand qualifications within his thought so as to yield anti-colonial conclusions butthis is only one of several possible lines of development of which his thoughtadmits another being its elaboration into the Eurocentric and pro-colonialsystem that Hegel in fact forged

There is a broader moral Wemdashie the heirs of the European heritage thatruns through philosophy into modern political thoughtmdashshould not let thisheritage off the hook too easily This heritage including Hegelrsquos thought hasbeen implicated in colonialism in various ways To be sure because it extols andarticulates the values of freedom and equality this heritage also furnishesconceptual resources for critiquing colonialism and giving support to anti-colonial struggles and anti-colonial thinkers and activists have drawn on modernEuropean ideas for this purpose For example the Haitian revolutionariesdeclared that they were acting in allegiance to the emancipatory goals of theFrench Revolution This might lead us to suppose that the European politicallegacy is intrinsically liberatory and that theorists in the European traditionmdashHegel includedmdashhave only ever justified colonialism due to unfortunateprejudices that led them to go back on their own principles

I believe that taking that view exculpates our predecessors too quicklyand leaves us at risk of inadvertently embracing ideas inherited from thesepredecessors which actually have deep-rooted internal connections withEurocentric and pro-colonial attitudes This is not to say that we should orcould repudiate these ideas outright Rather in view of their connections withcolonialism we need to think carefully and critically about how far to take theseinherited ideas forward and how we might do so differently My aim has been tohelp us cultivate this caution in Hegelrsquos case by acknowledging that while his

Alison Stone

19

thought harbours anti-colonial possibilities it also has real and tenacious linkswith colonialism of which we should remind mindful13

Alison StoneLancaster University UKastonelancasteracuk

Notes

1 Contributions include those by Bernasconi 1998 2007 2016 Bonetto 2006 de Laurentiis2014 McCarney and Bernasconi 2003 Mowad 2013 Parekh 2009 Purtschert 2010 andTibebu 20102 However see Buck-Morss 2000 andmdashfor highly critical accountsmdashDussel [1992] 1995 and1993 Guha 2002 Tibebu 2010 Also relevant are Bird-Pollan 2014 (on Hegel and Fanon)Brennan 2013 (on Hegelrsquos influence on post-colonialism) Buchwalter 2009 (defending Hegelagainst charges of Eurocentrism) Monahan 2017 (Creolizing Hegel) and Serequeberhan 1989(on colonialism in the Philosophy of Right)3 Ranajit Guha identifies another argument for colonialism in the Philosophy of Rightfrom the lsquorightsrsquo that Hegel claims civilized nations have with respect to less advanced ones(PR sect351 376) These rights Guha argues are lsquorights of conquestrsquo noting Hegelrsquos praise for Britishmilitary victories over India led by Robert Clive (1725ndash74) whose conquests established theEast India Companyrsquos rule over Bengal and other Indian states See Guha 2002 43ndash44PR sect372A 364 and 474 note 1)Abbreviations usedEN=Hegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller Oxford Clarendon PressEM= Hegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind Trans W Wallace and A V Miller Oxford OxfordUniversity Press Cited by paragraph and page numberN=Hegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reason in Historytrans H B Nisbet Cambridge UK Cambridge University PressS=Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NY Prometheus BooksPR=Hegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B Nisbet Cambridge UKCambridge University PressHei=Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink4 Hegel lectured on the PWH in 182223 182425 182627 182829 and 183031 Hismanuscripts of the Introduction from 1822 (rev 1828) and 183031 survive as do manytranscripts between them covering every course Some such as de Laurentiis (2014) are waryof directly attributing to Hegel views notably on race expressed only in the transcripts I agreethat we should disambiguate sources but where multiple independently written transcripts

Hegel and Colonialism

20

converge as domdashextensivelymdashseveral transcripts of the PWH we may take them to bereliable Accordingly I refer to Hegelrsquos manuscripts (abbreviated H) as in Hegel 2011 which isthe English translation of the corresponding volume of the Gesammelte Werke (Hegel 1995) andthe integrated text of the 182223 course composed primarily from Hothorsquos and Griesheimrsquostranscripts (abb HG) included in Hegel 2011 (the German is Hegel 1996) Since the Germancritical edition of the transcripts remains incomplete for materials on Hegelrsquos later coursesI have used Heimannrsquos transcript of 183031 whenever possible (Hegel 2005 abb Hei)otherwise the composite texts produced by Karl Hegel (Hegel 1986) and translated by Sibree(Hegel 1991 abb S) and by Georg LassonJohannes Hoffmeister (Hegel 1988) translated byNisbet (Hegel 1975 abb N) I quote English translations whenever available sometimesadjusted in view of the German5 For more on contingency in Hegel see inter alia Burbidge 2007 esp ch 1 Burbidge stressesthe extent to which Hegel lsquotakes the contingencies of history seriouslyrsquo (2007 9)6 For Hegel lsquonaturehellip is indeed a rational system operating in its own distinct elementrsquo (N 44)The division into continents is rational in that different natural features and their varietiesmdashmountains and plains lands and seas and their fusion and differentiationmdasheach find fullembodiment in different continents (EM sect393 and R 40ndash41) In a sense then non-Europeansare subject to reason and rational progression insofar as nature imposes it on them fromthe outside rather than by exercising rational thought for themselves This coheres withHegelrsquos view that these peoples are immersed in nature out of which only Europeans can liftthem see below7 This recalls Hegelrsquos derivation of time from space in the Philosophy of Nature a derivation thatpositions time as more advanced than space (EN sectsect256ndash57 31ndash36)8 This is evident from eg Hegelrsquos discussion of the colonization of America see Section II9 Hegel connects formation with possession (PR sect56 85ndash86) albeit in the very differentcontext of modern European societies in which private property is institutionalized I leaveunexplored here how far his ideas about slaveryrsquos educative power may be informed by hislordbondsman dialectic10 For instance some interpreters defend Hegel against charges of Eurocentrism and racism(eg Buchwalter 2009 Houlgate [1991] 2015 35ndash37 McCarney in McCarney and Bernasconi2003 Mowad 2013) others stress Hegelrsquos founding importance for anti-colonial thought(Brennan 2013) and numerous readers of Hegel as a thinker of freedom (eg Patten 1999)see no need to discuss his position on colonialism presumably on the grounds that the latteris a merely accidental avoidable part of his thought from which his essential views on freedomcan be extracted11 For Hegel the Greeks were greatly influenced by the Egyptians whose influence theynonetheless overcame Here he is close to accepting what Martin Bernal calls the lsquoancientmodelrsquo of the Greeksrsquo origins a model to which the Greeks themselves adhered later-nineteenth-century Europeans instead espoused an lsquoAryan modelrsquo on which Greek cultureproper arose from northern invaders driving out earlier Egyptian and Phoenician influences([1987] 1991) Bernal argues that the Aryan model had Eurocentric motivations if the Greeks

Alison Stone

21

the supposed originators of Europersquos distinctive culture were actually the Egyptiansrsquo heirsthen given that Egypt is within Africa the EuropeAfrica divide would crumble A furthercomplicating factor is whether the Egyptians were seen as black Africans Bernasconi (2007)argues that Hegel thought so as did most other Europeans of his time Later the Egyptiansrsquoracial status was changedmdashto Mediterranean (ie Caucasian)mdashto hold up the divide betweenEurope-as-white and Africa-as-black Bernasconi suggests that Hegel himself dealt with thepotential anomalymdashof highly cultured black Africans giving much to the Greeksmdashby makingthe EgyptGreece transition the site of the key conceptual transition from unfreedom tofreedom nature to spirit (2007 212ndash13) This ties in with my argument in Section IV thatHegel actually did have grounds on his own terms to construe the apparently gradual EgyptGreece transition as actually being a sharp divide12 Bernasconi (2016) has recently shown how Hegel likewise distorted his sources on China tothe detriment of the Chinese13 I thank Bob Stern and the referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions

Bibliography

Bernal M [1987] (1991) Black Athena The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical CivilisationVol 1 London VintageBernasconi R (1998) lsquoHegel at the Court of the Ashantirsquo in S Barnett (ed)Hegel After Derrida Albany NY SUNYBernasconi R (2007) lsquoThe Return of Africa Hegel and the Question of theRacial Identity of the Egyptiansrsquo in P T Grier (ed) Identity and Difference AlbanyNY SUNYBernasconi R (2016) lsquoChina on Parade Hegelrsquos Manipulation of his Sources andhis Change of Mindrsquo in B Brandt and D L Purdy (eds) China in the GermanEnlightenment Toronto University of Toronto PressBird-Pollan S (2014) Hegel Freud and Fanon The Dialectic of Emancipation LondonRowman and Littlefield InternationalBonetto S (2006) lsquoRace and Racism in HegelmdashAn AnalysisrsquoMinerva An InternetJournal of Philosophy 10Brennan T (2013) lsquoHegel Empire and Anti-Colonial Thoughtrsquo in G Huggan(ed) The Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies Oxford Oxford University PressBuchwalter A (2009) lsquoIs Hegelrsquos Philosophy of History Eurocentricrsquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYBuck-Morss S (2000) lsquoHegel and Haitirsquo Critical Inquiry 264 821ndash65Burbidge J (2007) Hegelrsquos Systematic Contingency Basingstoke Palgrave MacmillanDe Laurentiis A (2014) lsquoRace in Hegel Text and Contextrsquo in M Egger (ed)Philosophie Nach Kant Neue Wege zum Verstaumlndnis von Kants Transzendental- undMoralphilosophie Berlin De Gruyter

Hegel and Colonialism

22

Dussel E [1992] (1995) The Invention of the Americas trans M D Barber NewYork ContinuumDussel E (1993) lsquoEurocentrism and Modernityrsquo Boundary 2 203 65ndash76Fanon F [1952] (2008) Black Skin White Masks trans R Philcox New YorkGroveGuha R (2002) History at the Limit of World-History New York ColumbiaUniversity PressHardimon M (1993) Hegelrsquos Social Philosophy Cambridge Cambridge UniversityPressHegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller OxfordClarendonHegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind trans W Wallace and A V MillerOxford Oxford University PressHegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reasonin History trans H B Nisbet Cambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1986) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Geschichte Werke Vol 12ed E Moldenhauer and K M Michel Frankfurt Suhrkamp [Englishtranslation Sibree]Hegel G W F (1988) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Vols 1-3 edG Lasson Vols 1-4 Hamburg Meiner [English translation of volume 1 Nisbet]Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NYPrometheus BooksHegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B NisbetCambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1995) lsquoVorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der WeltgeschichteEinleitungrsquo in W Jaeschke (ed) Vorlesungsmanuskripte II (1916ndash1831)Gesammelte Werke Vol 18 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown andHodgson]Hegel G W F (1996) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Berlin 182223 Nachschriften von Griesheim Hotho und Kehler ed Karl Brehmer K-H Iltingund Hoo Nam Seelmann Hegel Vorlesungen Ausgew Nachschriften und ManuskripteVol 12 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown and Hodgson]Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink Abb HeiHegel G W F (2011) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Volume 1Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822ndash3 ed and trans R F Brownand P C Hodgson with assistance of W G Geuss Oxford Clarendon PressHoulgate S [1991] 2015 An Introduction to Hegel Freedom Truth and HistoryOxford BlackwellJohansen B E (1982) Forgotten Founders How the American Indians Helped ShapeDemocracy Boston Harvard Common Press

Alison Stone

23

McCarney J and Bernasconi R (2003) lsquoExchange Hegelrsquos Racismrsquo RadicalPhilosophy 119(MayJune) 32ndash37Monahan M (ed) (2017) Creolizing Hegel London Rowman and LittlefieldInternationalMowad N (2013) lsquoThe Place of Nationality in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of Politicsand Religion A Defense of Hegel on the Charges of National Chauvinism andRacismrsquo in A Nuzzo (ed) Hegel on Religion and Politics Albany NY SUNYParekh S (2009) lsquoHegelrsquos New World History Freedom and Racersquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYPatten A (1999) Hegelrsquos Idea of Freedom Oxford Oxford University PressPurtschert P (2010) lsquoOn the Limit of Spirit Hegelrsquos Racism Revisitedrsquo Philosophyand Social Criticism 369 1039ndash51Quijano A (2000) lsquoColoniality of Power Eurocentrism and Latin AmericarsquoNepantla Views from South 13 533ndash80Sahota J P (2016) lsquoHegelrsquos Critique of Hinduism A Responsersquo Hegel Bulletin372 305ndash17Serequeberhan T (1989) lsquoThe Idea of Colonialism in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of RightrsquoInternational Philosophical Quarterly 293 301ndash18Shohat E and Stam R [1994] (2014) Unthinking Eurocentrism New YorkRoutledgeTibebu T (2010) Hegel and the Third World The Making of Eurocentrism in WorldHistory Syracuse NY Syracuse University PressWa Thiongrsquoo N (2012) Globalectics Theory and the Politics of Knowing New YorkColumbia University Press

Hegel and Colonialism

24

  • Hegel and Colonialism
Page 18: Hegel and Colonialism - Lancaster University · 2017-06-30 · Hegel and Colonialism Alison Stone Abstract This article explores the implications of Hegel’s Philosophy of World

So for Hegel there is a genuine difference in kind not merely degreebetween the Greek and post-Greek European world on the one hand and thenon-European world on the other the Europenon-Europe divide is notarbitrary but has a philosophical rationale For while the Greek view of freedomwas like non-European views limited and inadequate the former was moreadvanced in one key respectmdashthe inclusion in freedom of a primary moment oflsquoovercomingrsquo naturemdashwhich enabled the Greek and post-Greek European worldto become self-critical self-revising and so historical This is what motivatesHegel to identify Greek and post-Greek European views as views of freedomhowever limited whereas non-European views that might prima facie look likeviews of freedom are still actually modes of unfreedom

Once again we might object that non-Europeans have at times construedfreedom as including this moment of overcoming nature Even on Hegelrsquosaccount Hindus appreciate the human power to abstract from the world inthought He maintains though that this is merely an intellectual withdrawaland that when it comes to practical agency Hindus see human agency as immersedin not including any moment of self-freeing-from nature (see eg S 157ndash58)In response we could with Jaspal Peter Sahota (2016) agree that in classicalIndian thought there has been a tendency to locate human agency within naturebut argue against Hegel that this does not constitute a real absence offreedom but rather a different conception of freedom We might then say thatbecause thesemdashand othermdashnon-European views were still views of freedom thoseviews were still sufficient to motivate social criticism and hence place non-European peoples in history even without the element of overcoming natureHowever such a position would take us further away from Hegelrsquos own accountof the historicity of freedom according which as we have seen that moment ofovercoming nature uniquely new in ancient Greece is crucial in poweringhistorical progression

Hegelrsquos basic account of freedom and its historicity thus has more extensiveand significant connections with his Eurocentrism than I suggested inSection III In particular that account connects with Hegelrsquos denial that non-European peoples are historicalmdashie can come to freedom on their ownmdashandhence with his case for colonialism as the only route along which those peoplescan reach freedom These connections suggest that after all we cannotstraightforwardly take up Hegelrsquos account of freedom and its historicity whilesloughing off his pro-colonialism This is not to say that we cannot separate outthese parts of his thought at all But rescuing Hegel from himself is set to be acomplicated process not quick or straightforward To the extent that such arescue is possible Hegelrsquos pro-colonialism cannot rightly be counted as necessaryto his thought or system Yet his pro-colonialism does have extensive anddeep-seated connections with his other viewsmdashenough to show that it is not the

Hegel and Colonialism

18

case that Hegel should not have endorsed colonialism by his own standardsRather he did and could endorse it coherently in his own terms although otheranti-colonialist possibilities were also available within his own terms which hecould have developed

So the claim that Hegelrsquos account of freedom is inherently anti-colonial isunduly strong Through his understanding of freedom as involving spiritextricating itself from nature that account has sustained links with hisEurocentrism and so his pro-colonialism We can nonetheless envisage variousmanoeuvres by which to maintain that freedom develops historically for all theworldrsquos peoples for example by saying that they have several conceptions offreedom where freedom can but does not have to include self-liberation fromnature Then ancient Greece would initiate one historical pathway to freedombut not the only one Even so Hegelrsquos own account of freedom and its historicitydoes not inherently drive us to make these intellectual manoeuvres but onlypermits them In sum if Hegelrsquos view of freedom does not necessarily implypro-colonialism neither is it inherently anti-colonial We can make distinctionsand qualifications within his thought so as to yield anti-colonial conclusions butthis is only one of several possible lines of development of which his thoughtadmits another being its elaboration into the Eurocentric and pro-colonialsystem that Hegel in fact forged

There is a broader moral Wemdashie the heirs of the European heritage thatruns through philosophy into modern political thoughtmdashshould not let thisheritage off the hook too easily This heritage including Hegelrsquos thought hasbeen implicated in colonialism in various ways To be sure because it extols andarticulates the values of freedom and equality this heritage also furnishesconceptual resources for critiquing colonialism and giving support to anti-colonial struggles and anti-colonial thinkers and activists have drawn on modernEuropean ideas for this purpose For example the Haitian revolutionariesdeclared that they were acting in allegiance to the emancipatory goals of theFrench Revolution This might lead us to suppose that the European politicallegacy is intrinsically liberatory and that theorists in the European traditionmdashHegel includedmdashhave only ever justified colonialism due to unfortunateprejudices that led them to go back on their own principles

I believe that taking that view exculpates our predecessors too quicklyand leaves us at risk of inadvertently embracing ideas inherited from thesepredecessors which actually have deep-rooted internal connections withEurocentric and pro-colonial attitudes This is not to say that we should orcould repudiate these ideas outright Rather in view of their connections withcolonialism we need to think carefully and critically about how far to take theseinherited ideas forward and how we might do so differently My aim has been tohelp us cultivate this caution in Hegelrsquos case by acknowledging that while his

Alison Stone

19

thought harbours anti-colonial possibilities it also has real and tenacious linkswith colonialism of which we should remind mindful13

Alison StoneLancaster University UKastonelancasteracuk

Notes

1 Contributions include those by Bernasconi 1998 2007 2016 Bonetto 2006 de Laurentiis2014 McCarney and Bernasconi 2003 Mowad 2013 Parekh 2009 Purtschert 2010 andTibebu 20102 However see Buck-Morss 2000 andmdashfor highly critical accountsmdashDussel [1992] 1995 and1993 Guha 2002 Tibebu 2010 Also relevant are Bird-Pollan 2014 (on Hegel and Fanon)Brennan 2013 (on Hegelrsquos influence on post-colonialism) Buchwalter 2009 (defending Hegelagainst charges of Eurocentrism) Monahan 2017 (Creolizing Hegel) and Serequeberhan 1989(on colonialism in the Philosophy of Right)3 Ranajit Guha identifies another argument for colonialism in the Philosophy of Rightfrom the lsquorightsrsquo that Hegel claims civilized nations have with respect to less advanced ones(PR sect351 376) These rights Guha argues are lsquorights of conquestrsquo noting Hegelrsquos praise for Britishmilitary victories over India led by Robert Clive (1725ndash74) whose conquests established theEast India Companyrsquos rule over Bengal and other Indian states See Guha 2002 43ndash44PR sect372A 364 and 474 note 1)Abbreviations usedEN=Hegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller Oxford Clarendon PressEM= Hegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind Trans W Wallace and A V Miller Oxford OxfordUniversity Press Cited by paragraph and page numberN=Hegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reason in Historytrans H B Nisbet Cambridge UK Cambridge University PressS=Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NY Prometheus BooksPR=Hegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B Nisbet Cambridge UKCambridge University PressHei=Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink4 Hegel lectured on the PWH in 182223 182425 182627 182829 and 183031 Hismanuscripts of the Introduction from 1822 (rev 1828) and 183031 survive as do manytranscripts between them covering every course Some such as de Laurentiis (2014) are waryof directly attributing to Hegel views notably on race expressed only in the transcripts I agreethat we should disambiguate sources but where multiple independently written transcripts

Hegel and Colonialism

20

converge as domdashextensivelymdashseveral transcripts of the PWH we may take them to bereliable Accordingly I refer to Hegelrsquos manuscripts (abbreviated H) as in Hegel 2011 which isthe English translation of the corresponding volume of the Gesammelte Werke (Hegel 1995) andthe integrated text of the 182223 course composed primarily from Hothorsquos and Griesheimrsquostranscripts (abb HG) included in Hegel 2011 (the German is Hegel 1996) Since the Germancritical edition of the transcripts remains incomplete for materials on Hegelrsquos later coursesI have used Heimannrsquos transcript of 183031 whenever possible (Hegel 2005 abb Hei)otherwise the composite texts produced by Karl Hegel (Hegel 1986) and translated by Sibree(Hegel 1991 abb S) and by Georg LassonJohannes Hoffmeister (Hegel 1988) translated byNisbet (Hegel 1975 abb N) I quote English translations whenever available sometimesadjusted in view of the German5 For more on contingency in Hegel see inter alia Burbidge 2007 esp ch 1 Burbidge stressesthe extent to which Hegel lsquotakes the contingencies of history seriouslyrsquo (2007 9)6 For Hegel lsquonaturehellip is indeed a rational system operating in its own distinct elementrsquo (N 44)The division into continents is rational in that different natural features and their varietiesmdashmountains and plains lands and seas and their fusion and differentiationmdasheach find fullembodiment in different continents (EM sect393 and R 40ndash41) In a sense then non-Europeansare subject to reason and rational progression insofar as nature imposes it on them fromthe outside rather than by exercising rational thought for themselves This coheres withHegelrsquos view that these peoples are immersed in nature out of which only Europeans can liftthem see below7 This recalls Hegelrsquos derivation of time from space in the Philosophy of Nature a derivation thatpositions time as more advanced than space (EN sectsect256ndash57 31ndash36)8 This is evident from eg Hegelrsquos discussion of the colonization of America see Section II9 Hegel connects formation with possession (PR sect56 85ndash86) albeit in the very differentcontext of modern European societies in which private property is institutionalized I leaveunexplored here how far his ideas about slaveryrsquos educative power may be informed by hislordbondsman dialectic10 For instance some interpreters defend Hegel against charges of Eurocentrism and racism(eg Buchwalter 2009 Houlgate [1991] 2015 35ndash37 McCarney in McCarney and Bernasconi2003 Mowad 2013) others stress Hegelrsquos founding importance for anti-colonial thought(Brennan 2013) and numerous readers of Hegel as a thinker of freedom (eg Patten 1999)see no need to discuss his position on colonialism presumably on the grounds that the latteris a merely accidental avoidable part of his thought from which his essential views on freedomcan be extracted11 For Hegel the Greeks were greatly influenced by the Egyptians whose influence theynonetheless overcame Here he is close to accepting what Martin Bernal calls the lsquoancientmodelrsquo of the Greeksrsquo origins a model to which the Greeks themselves adhered later-nineteenth-century Europeans instead espoused an lsquoAryan modelrsquo on which Greek cultureproper arose from northern invaders driving out earlier Egyptian and Phoenician influences([1987] 1991) Bernal argues that the Aryan model had Eurocentric motivations if the Greeks

Alison Stone

21

the supposed originators of Europersquos distinctive culture were actually the Egyptiansrsquo heirsthen given that Egypt is within Africa the EuropeAfrica divide would crumble A furthercomplicating factor is whether the Egyptians were seen as black Africans Bernasconi (2007)argues that Hegel thought so as did most other Europeans of his time Later the Egyptiansrsquoracial status was changedmdashto Mediterranean (ie Caucasian)mdashto hold up the divide betweenEurope-as-white and Africa-as-black Bernasconi suggests that Hegel himself dealt with thepotential anomalymdashof highly cultured black Africans giving much to the Greeksmdashby makingthe EgyptGreece transition the site of the key conceptual transition from unfreedom tofreedom nature to spirit (2007 212ndash13) This ties in with my argument in Section IV thatHegel actually did have grounds on his own terms to construe the apparently gradual EgyptGreece transition as actually being a sharp divide12 Bernasconi (2016) has recently shown how Hegel likewise distorted his sources on China tothe detriment of the Chinese13 I thank Bob Stern and the referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions

Bibliography

Bernal M [1987] (1991) Black Athena The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical CivilisationVol 1 London VintageBernasconi R (1998) lsquoHegel at the Court of the Ashantirsquo in S Barnett (ed)Hegel After Derrida Albany NY SUNYBernasconi R (2007) lsquoThe Return of Africa Hegel and the Question of theRacial Identity of the Egyptiansrsquo in P T Grier (ed) Identity and Difference AlbanyNY SUNYBernasconi R (2016) lsquoChina on Parade Hegelrsquos Manipulation of his Sources andhis Change of Mindrsquo in B Brandt and D L Purdy (eds) China in the GermanEnlightenment Toronto University of Toronto PressBird-Pollan S (2014) Hegel Freud and Fanon The Dialectic of Emancipation LondonRowman and Littlefield InternationalBonetto S (2006) lsquoRace and Racism in HegelmdashAn AnalysisrsquoMinerva An InternetJournal of Philosophy 10Brennan T (2013) lsquoHegel Empire and Anti-Colonial Thoughtrsquo in G Huggan(ed) The Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies Oxford Oxford University PressBuchwalter A (2009) lsquoIs Hegelrsquos Philosophy of History Eurocentricrsquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYBuck-Morss S (2000) lsquoHegel and Haitirsquo Critical Inquiry 264 821ndash65Burbidge J (2007) Hegelrsquos Systematic Contingency Basingstoke Palgrave MacmillanDe Laurentiis A (2014) lsquoRace in Hegel Text and Contextrsquo in M Egger (ed)Philosophie Nach Kant Neue Wege zum Verstaumlndnis von Kants Transzendental- undMoralphilosophie Berlin De Gruyter

Hegel and Colonialism

22

Dussel E [1992] (1995) The Invention of the Americas trans M D Barber NewYork ContinuumDussel E (1993) lsquoEurocentrism and Modernityrsquo Boundary 2 203 65ndash76Fanon F [1952] (2008) Black Skin White Masks trans R Philcox New YorkGroveGuha R (2002) History at the Limit of World-History New York ColumbiaUniversity PressHardimon M (1993) Hegelrsquos Social Philosophy Cambridge Cambridge UniversityPressHegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller OxfordClarendonHegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind trans W Wallace and A V MillerOxford Oxford University PressHegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reasonin History trans H B Nisbet Cambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1986) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Geschichte Werke Vol 12ed E Moldenhauer and K M Michel Frankfurt Suhrkamp [Englishtranslation Sibree]Hegel G W F (1988) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Vols 1-3 edG Lasson Vols 1-4 Hamburg Meiner [English translation of volume 1 Nisbet]Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NYPrometheus BooksHegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B NisbetCambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1995) lsquoVorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der WeltgeschichteEinleitungrsquo in W Jaeschke (ed) Vorlesungsmanuskripte II (1916ndash1831)Gesammelte Werke Vol 18 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown andHodgson]Hegel G W F (1996) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Berlin 182223 Nachschriften von Griesheim Hotho und Kehler ed Karl Brehmer K-H Iltingund Hoo Nam Seelmann Hegel Vorlesungen Ausgew Nachschriften und ManuskripteVol 12 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown and Hodgson]Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink Abb HeiHegel G W F (2011) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Volume 1Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822ndash3 ed and trans R F Brownand P C Hodgson with assistance of W G Geuss Oxford Clarendon PressHoulgate S [1991] 2015 An Introduction to Hegel Freedom Truth and HistoryOxford BlackwellJohansen B E (1982) Forgotten Founders How the American Indians Helped ShapeDemocracy Boston Harvard Common Press

Alison Stone

23

McCarney J and Bernasconi R (2003) lsquoExchange Hegelrsquos Racismrsquo RadicalPhilosophy 119(MayJune) 32ndash37Monahan M (ed) (2017) Creolizing Hegel London Rowman and LittlefieldInternationalMowad N (2013) lsquoThe Place of Nationality in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of Politicsand Religion A Defense of Hegel on the Charges of National Chauvinism andRacismrsquo in A Nuzzo (ed) Hegel on Religion and Politics Albany NY SUNYParekh S (2009) lsquoHegelrsquos New World History Freedom and Racersquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYPatten A (1999) Hegelrsquos Idea of Freedom Oxford Oxford University PressPurtschert P (2010) lsquoOn the Limit of Spirit Hegelrsquos Racism Revisitedrsquo Philosophyand Social Criticism 369 1039ndash51Quijano A (2000) lsquoColoniality of Power Eurocentrism and Latin AmericarsquoNepantla Views from South 13 533ndash80Sahota J P (2016) lsquoHegelrsquos Critique of Hinduism A Responsersquo Hegel Bulletin372 305ndash17Serequeberhan T (1989) lsquoThe Idea of Colonialism in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of RightrsquoInternational Philosophical Quarterly 293 301ndash18Shohat E and Stam R [1994] (2014) Unthinking Eurocentrism New YorkRoutledgeTibebu T (2010) Hegel and the Third World The Making of Eurocentrism in WorldHistory Syracuse NY Syracuse University PressWa Thiongrsquoo N (2012) Globalectics Theory and the Politics of Knowing New YorkColumbia University Press

Hegel and Colonialism

24

  • Hegel and Colonialism
Page 19: Hegel and Colonialism - Lancaster University · 2017-06-30 · Hegel and Colonialism Alison Stone Abstract This article explores the implications of Hegel’s Philosophy of World

case that Hegel should not have endorsed colonialism by his own standardsRather he did and could endorse it coherently in his own terms although otheranti-colonialist possibilities were also available within his own terms which hecould have developed

So the claim that Hegelrsquos account of freedom is inherently anti-colonial isunduly strong Through his understanding of freedom as involving spiritextricating itself from nature that account has sustained links with hisEurocentrism and so his pro-colonialism We can nonetheless envisage variousmanoeuvres by which to maintain that freedom develops historically for all theworldrsquos peoples for example by saying that they have several conceptions offreedom where freedom can but does not have to include self-liberation fromnature Then ancient Greece would initiate one historical pathway to freedombut not the only one Even so Hegelrsquos own account of freedom and its historicitydoes not inherently drive us to make these intellectual manoeuvres but onlypermits them In sum if Hegelrsquos view of freedom does not necessarily implypro-colonialism neither is it inherently anti-colonial We can make distinctionsand qualifications within his thought so as to yield anti-colonial conclusions butthis is only one of several possible lines of development of which his thoughtadmits another being its elaboration into the Eurocentric and pro-colonialsystem that Hegel in fact forged

There is a broader moral Wemdashie the heirs of the European heritage thatruns through philosophy into modern political thoughtmdashshould not let thisheritage off the hook too easily This heritage including Hegelrsquos thought hasbeen implicated in colonialism in various ways To be sure because it extols andarticulates the values of freedom and equality this heritage also furnishesconceptual resources for critiquing colonialism and giving support to anti-colonial struggles and anti-colonial thinkers and activists have drawn on modernEuropean ideas for this purpose For example the Haitian revolutionariesdeclared that they were acting in allegiance to the emancipatory goals of theFrench Revolution This might lead us to suppose that the European politicallegacy is intrinsically liberatory and that theorists in the European traditionmdashHegel includedmdashhave only ever justified colonialism due to unfortunateprejudices that led them to go back on their own principles

I believe that taking that view exculpates our predecessors too quicklyand leaves us at risk of inadvertently embracing ideas inherited from thesepredecessors which actually have deep-rooted internal connections withEurocentric and pro-colonial attitudes This is not to say that we should orcould repudiate these ideas outright Rather in view of their connections withcolonialism we need to think carefully and critically about how far to take theseinherited ideas forward and how we might do so differently My aim has been tohelp us cultivate this caution in Hegelrsquos case by acknowledging that while his

Alison Stone

19

thought harbours anti-colonial possibilities it also has real and tenacious linkswith colonialism of which we should remind mindful13

Alison StoneLancaster University UKastonelancasteracuk

Notes

1 Contributions include those by Bernasconi 1998 2007 2016 Bonetto 2006 de Laurentiis2014 McCarney and Bernasconi 2003 Mowad 2013 Parekh 2009 Purtschert 2010 andTibebu 20102 However see Buck-Morss 2000 andmdashfor highly critical accountsmdashDussel [1992] 1995 and1993 Guha 2002 Tibebu 2010 Also relevant are Bird-Pollan 2014 (on Hegel and Fanon)Brennan 2013 (on Hegelrsquos influence on post-colonialism) Buchwalter 2009 (defending Hegelagainst charges of Eurocentrism) Monahan 2017 (Creolizing Hegel) and Serequeberhan 1989(on colonialism in the Philosophy of Right)3 Ranajit Guha identifies another argument for colonialism in the Philosophy of Rightfrom the lsquorightsrsquo that Hegel claims civilized nations have with respect to less advanced ones(PR sect351 376) These rights Guha argues are lsquorights of conquestrsquo noting Hegelrsquos praise for Britishmilitary victories over India led by Robert Clive (1725ndash74) whose conquests established theEast India Companyrsquos rule over Bengal and other Indian states See Guha 2002 43ndash44PR sect372A 364 and 474 note 1)Abbreviations usedEN=Hegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller Oxford Clarendon PressEM= Hegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind Trans W Wallace and A V Miller Oxford OxfordUniversity Press Cited by paragraph and page numberN=Hegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reason in Historytrans H B Nisbet Cambridge UK Cambridge University PressS=Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NY Prometheus BooksPR=Hegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B Nisbet Cambridge UKCambridge University PressHei=Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink4 Hegel lectured on the PWH in 182223 182425 182627 182829 and 183031 Hismanuscripts of the Introduction from 1822 (rev 1828) and 183031 survive as do manytranscripts between them covering every course Some such as de Laurentiis (2014) are waryof directly attributing to Hegel views notably on race expressed only in the transcripts I agreethat we should disambiguate sources but where multiple independently written transcripts

Hegel and Colonialism

20

converge as domdashextensivelymdashseveral transcripts of the PWH we may take them to bereliable Accordingly I refer to Hegelrsquos manuscripts (abbreviated H) as in Hegel 2011 which isthe English translation of the corresponding volume of the Gesammelte Werke (Hegel 1995) andthe integrated text of the 182223 course composed primarily from Hothorsquos and Griesheimrsquostranscripts (abb HG) included in Hegel 2011 (the German is Hegel 1996) Since the Germancritical edition of the transcripts remains incomplete for materials on Hegelrsquos later coursesI have used Heimannrsquos transcript of 183031 whenever possible (Hegel 2005 abb Hei)otherwise the composite texts produced by Karl Hegel (Hegel 1986) and translated by Sibree(Hegel 1991 abb S) and by Georg LassonJohannes Hoffmeister (Hegel 1988) translated byNisbet (Hegel 1975 abb N) I quote English translations whenever available sometimesadjusted in view of the German5 For more on contingency in Hegel see inter alia Burbidge 2007 esp ch 1 Burbidge stressesthe extent to which Hegel lsquotakes the contingencies of history seriouslyrsquo (2007 9)6 For Hegel lsquonaturehellip is indeed a rational system operating in its own distinct elementrsquo (N 44)The division into continents is rational in that different natural features and their varietiesmdashmountains and plains lands and seas and their fusion and differentiationmdasheach find fullembodiment in different continents (EM sect393 and R 40ndash41) In a sense then non-Europeansare subject to reason and rational progression insofar as nature imposes it on them fromthe outside rather than by exercising rational thought for themselves This coheres withHegelrsquos view that these peoples are immersed in nature out of which only Europeans can liftthem see below7 This recalls Hegelrsquos derivation of time from space in the Philosophy of Nature a derivation thatpositions time as more advanced than space (EN sectsect256ndash57 31ndash36)8 This is evident from eg Hegelrsquos discussion of the colonization of America see Section II9 Hegel connects formation with possession (PR sect56 85ndash86) albeit in the very differentcontext of modern European societies in which private property is institutionalized I leaveunexplored here how far his ideas about slaveryrsquos educative power may be informed by hislordbondsman dialectic10 For instance some interpreters defend Hegel against charges of Eurocentrism and racism(eg Buchwalter 2009 Houlgate [1991] 2015 35ndash37 McCarney in McCarney and Bernasconi2003 Mowad 2013) others stress Hegelrsquos founding importance for anti-colonial thought(Brennan 2013) and numerous readers of Hegel as a thinker of freedom (eg Patten 1999)see no need to discuss his position on colonialism presumably on the grounds that the latteris a merely accidental avoidable part of his thought from which his essential views on freedomcan be extracted11 For Hegel the Greeks were greatly influenced by the Egyptians whose influence theynonetheless overcame Here he is close to accepting what Martin Bernal calls the lsquoancientmodelrsquo of the Greeksrsquo origins a model to which the Greeks themselves adhered later-nineteenth-century Europeans instead espoused an lsquoAryan modelrsquo on which Greek cultureproper arose from northern invaders driving out earlier Egyptian and Phoenician influences([1987] 1991) Bernal argues that the Aryan model had Eurocentric motivations if the Greeks

Alison Stone

21

the supposed originators of Europersquos distinctive culture were actually the Egyptiansrsquo heirsthen given that Egypt is within Africa the EuropeAfrica divide would crumble A furthercomplicating factor is whether the Egyptians were seen as black Africans Bernasconi (2007)argues that Hegel thought so as did most other Europeans of his time Later the Egyptiansrsquoracial status was changedmdashto Mediterranean (ie Caucasian)mdashto hold up the divide betweenEurope-as-white and Africa-as-black Bernasconi suggests that Hegel himself dealt with thepotential anomalymdashof highly cultured black Africans giving much to the Greeksmdashby makingthe EgyptGreece transition the site of the key conceptual transition from unfreedom tofreedom nature to spirit (2007 212ndash13) This ties in with my argument in Section IV thatHegel actually did have grounds on his own terms to construe the apparently gradual EgyptGreece transition as actually being a sharp divide12 Bernasconi (2016) has recently shown how Hegel likewise distorted his sources on China tothe detriment of the Chinese13 I thank Bob Stern and the referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions

Bibliography

Bernal M [1987] (1991) Black Athena The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical CivilisationVol 1 London VintageBernasconi R (1998) lsquoHegel at the Court of the Ashantirsquo in S Barnett (ed)Hegel After Derrida Albany NY SUNYBernasconi R (2007) lsquoThe Return of Africa Hegel and the Question of theRacial Identity of the Egyptiansrsquo in P T Grier (ed) Identity and Difference AlbanyNY SUNYBernasconi R (2016) lsquoChina on Parade Hegelrsquos Manipulation of his Sources andhis Change of Mindrsquo in B Brandt and D L Purdy (eds) China in the GermanEnlightenment Toronto University of Toronto PressBird-Pollan S (2014) Hegel Freud and Fanon The Dialectic of Emancipation LondonRowman and Littlefield InternationalBonetto S (2006) lsquoRace and Racism in HegelmdashAn AnalysisrsquoMinerva An InternetJournal of Philosophy 10Brennan T (2013) lsquoHegel Empire and Anti-Colonial Thoughtrsquo in G Huggan(ed) The Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies Oxford Oxford University PressBuchwalter A (2009) lsquoIs Hegelrsquos Philosophy of History Eurocentricrsquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYBuck-Morss S (2000) lsquoHegel and Haitirsquo Critical Inquiry 264 821ndash65Burbidge J (2007) Hegelrsquos Systematic Contingency Basingstoke Palgrave MacmillanDe Laurentiis A (2014) lsquoRace in Hegel Text and Contextrsquo in M Egger (ed)Philosophie Nach Kant Neue Wege zum Verstaumlndnis von Kants Transzendental- undMoralphilosophie Berlin De Gruyter

Hegel and Colonialism

22

Dussel E [1992] (1995) The Invention of the Americas trans M D Barber NewYork ContinuumDussel E (1993) lsquoEurocentrism and Modernityrsquo Boundary 2 203 65ndash76Fanon F [1952] (2008) Black Skin White Masks trans R Philcox New YorkGroveGuha R (2002) History at the Limit of World-History New York ColumbiaUniversity PressHardimon M (1993) Hegelrsquos Social Philosophy Cambridge Cambridge UniversityPressHegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller OxfordClarendonHegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind trans W Wallace and A V MillerOxford Oxford University PressHegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reasonin History trans H B Nisbet Cambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1986) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Geschichte Werke Vol 12ed E Moldenhauer and K M Michel Frankfurt Suhrkamp [Englishtranslation Sibree]Hegel G W F (1988) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Vols 1-3 edG Lasson Vols 1-4 Hamburg Meiner [English translation of volume 1 Nisbet]Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NYPrometheus BooksHegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B NisbetCambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1995) lsquoVorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der WeltgeschichteEinleitungrsquo in W Jaeschke (ed) Vorlesungsmanuskripte II (1916ndash1831)Gesammelte Werke Vol 18 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown andHodgson]Hegel G W F (1996) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Berlin 182223 Nachschriften von Griesheim Hotho und Kehler ed Karl Brehmer K-H Iltingund Hoo Nam Seelmann Hegel Vorlesungen Ausgew Nachschriften und ManuskripteVol 12 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown and Hodgson]Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink Abb HeiHegel G W F (2011) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Volume 1Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822ndash3 ed and trans R F Brownand P C Hodgson with assistance of W G Geuss Oxford Clarendon PressHoulgate S [1991] 2015 An Introduction to Hegel Freedom Truth and HistoryOxford BlackwellJohansen B E (1982) Forgotten Founders How the American Indians Helped ShapeDemocracy Boston Harvard Common Press

Alison Stone

23

McCarney J and Bernasconi R (2003) lsquoExchange Hegelrsquos Racismrsquo RadicalPhilosophy 119(MayJune) 32ndash37Monahan M (ed) (2017) Creolizing Hegel London Rowman and LittlefieldInternationalMowad N (2013) lsquoThe Place of Nationality in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of Politicsand Religion A Defense of Hegel on the Charges of National Chauvinism andRacismrsquo in A Nuzzo (ed) Hegel on Religion and Politics Albany NY SUNYParekh S (2009) lsquoHegelrsquos New World History Freedom and Racersquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYPatten A (1999) Hegelrsquos Idea of Freedom Oxford Oxford University PressPurtschert P (2010) lsquoOn the Limit of Spirit Hegelrsquos Racism Revisitedrsquo Philosophyand Social Criticism 369 1039ndash51Quijano A (2000) lsquoColoniality of Power Eurocentrism and Latin AmericarsquoNepantla Views from South 13 533ndash80Sahota J P (2016) lsquoHegelrsquos Critique of Hinduism A Responsersquo Hegel Bulletin372 305ndash17Serequeberhan T (1989) lsquoThe Idea of Colonialism in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of RightrsquoInternational Philosophical Quarterly 293 301ndash18Shohat E and Stam R [1994] (2014) Unthinking Eurocentrism New YorkRoutledgeTibebu T (2010) Hegel and the Third World The Making of Eurocentrism in WorldHistory Syracuse NY Syracuse University PressWa Thiongrsquoo N (2012) Globalectics Theory and the Politics of Knowing New YorkColumbia University Press

Hegel and Colonialism

24

  • Hegel and Colonialism
Page 20: Hegel and Colonialism - Lancaster University · 2017-06-30 · Hegel and Colonialism Alison Stone Abstract This article explores the implications of Hegel’s Philosophy of World

thought harbours anti-colonial possibilities it also has real and tenacious linkswith colonialism of which we should remind mindful13

Alison StoneLancaster University UKastonelancasteracuk

Notes

1 Contributions include those by Bernasconi 1998 2007 2016 Bonetto 2006 de Laurentiis2014 McCarney and Bernasconi 2003 Mowad 2013 Parekh 2009 Purtschert 2010 andTibebu 20102 However see Buck-Morss 2000 andmdashfor highly critical accountsmdashDussel [1992] 1995 and1993 Guha 2002 Tibebu 2010 Also relevant are Bird-Pollan 2014 (on Hegel and Fanon)Brennan 2013 (on Hegelrsquos influence on post-colonialism) Buchwalter 2009 (defending Hegelagainst charges of Eurocentrism) Monahan 2017 (Creolizing Hegel) and Serequeberhan 1989(on colonialism in the Philosophy of Right)3 Ranajit Guha identifies another argument for colonialism in the Philosophy of Rightfrom the lsquorightsrsquo that Hegel claims civilized nations have with respect to less advanced ones(PR sect351 376) These rights Guha argues are lsquorights of conquestrsquo noting Hegelrsquos praise for Britishmilitary victories over India led by Robert Clive (1725ndash74) whose conquests established theEast India Companyrsquos rule over Bengal and other Indian states See Guha 2002 43ndash44PR sect372A 364 and 474 note 1)Abbreviations usedEN=Hegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller Oxford Clarendon PressEM= Hegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind Trans W Wallace and A V Miller Oxford OxfordUniversity Press Cited by paragraph and page numberN=Hegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reason in Historytrans H B Nisbet Cambridge UK Cambridge University PressS=Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NY Prometheus BooksPR=Hegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B Nisbet Cambridge UKCambridge University PressHei=Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink4 Hegel lectured on the PWH in 182223 182425 182627 182829 and 183031 Hismanuscripts of the Introduction from 1822 (rev 1828) and 183031 survive as do manytranscripts between them covering every course Some such as de Laurentiis (2014) are waryof directly attributing to Hegel views notably on race expressed only in the transcripts I agreethat we should disambiguate sources but where multiple independently written transcripts

Hegel and Colonialism

20

converge as domdashextensivelymdashseveral transcripts of the PWH we may take them to bereliable Accordingly I refer to Hegelrsquos manuscripts (abbreviated H) as in Hegel 2011 which isthe English translation of the corresponding volume of the Gesammelte Werke (Hegel 1995) andthe integrated text of the 182223 course composed primarily from Hothorsquos and Griesheimrsquostranscripts (abb HG) included in Hegel 2011 (the German is Hegel 1996) Since the Germancritical edition of the transcripts remains incomplete for materials on Hegelrsquos later coursesI have used Heimannrsquos transcript of 183031 whenever possible (Hegel 2005 abb Hei)otherwise the composite texts produced by Karl Hegel (Hegel 1986) and translated by Sibree(Hegel 1991 abb S) and by Georg LassonJohannes Hoffmeister (Hegel 1988) translated byNisbet (Hegel 1975 abb N) I quote English translations whenever available sometimesadjusted in view of the German5 For more on contingency in Hegel see inter alia Burbidge 2007 esp ch 1 Burbidge stressesthe extent to which Hegel lsquotakes the contingencies of history seriouslyrsquo (2007 9)6 For Hegel lsquonaturehellip is indeed a rational system operating in its own distinct elementrsquo (N 44)The division into continents is rational in that different natural features and their varietiesmdashmountains and plains lands and seas and their fusion and differentiationmdasheach find fullembodiment in different continents (EM sect393 and R 40ndash41) In a sense then non-Europeansare subject to reason and rational progression insofar as nature imposes it on them fromthe outside rather than by exercising rational thought for themselves This coheres withHegelrsquos view that these peoples are immersed in nature out of which only Europeans can liftthem see below7 This recalls Hegelrsquos derivation of time from space in the Philosophy of Nature a derivation thatpositions time as more advanced than space (EN sectsect256ndash57 31ndash36)8 This is evident from eg Hegelrsquos discussion of the colonization of America see Section II9 Hegel connects formation with possession (PR sect56 85ndash86) albeit in the very differentcontext of modern European societies in which private property is institutionalized I leaveunexplored here how far his ideas about slaveryrsquos educative power may be informed by hislordbondsman dialectic10 For instance some interpreters defend Hegel against charges of Eurocentrism and racism(eg Buchwalter 2009 Houlgate [1991] 2015 35ndash37 McCarney in McCarney and Bernasconi2003 Mowad 2013) others stress Hegelrsquos founding importance for anti-colonial thought(Brennan 2013) and numerous readers of Hegel as a thinker of freedom (eg Patten 1999)see no need to discuss his position on colonialism presumably on the grounds that the latteris a merely accidental avoidable part of his thought from which his essential views on freedomcan be extracted11 For Hegel the Greeks were greatly influenced by the Egyptians whose influence theynonetheless overcame Here he is close to accepting what Martin Bernal calls the lsquoancientmodelrsquo of the Greeksrsquo origins a model to which the Greeks themselves adhered later-nineteenth-century Europeans instead espoused an lsquoAryan modelrsquo on which Greek cultureproper arose from northern invaders driving out earlier Egyptian and Phoenician influences([1987] 1991) Bernal argues that the Aryan model had Eurocentric motivations if the Greeks

Alison Stone

21

the supposed originators of Europersquos distinctive culture were actually the Egyptiansrsquo heirsthen given that Egypt is within Africa the EuropeAfrica divide would crumble A furthercomplicating factor is whether the Egyptians were seen as black Africans Bernasconi (2007)argues that Hegel thought so as did most other Europeans of his time Later the Egyptiansrsquoracial status was changedmdashto Mediterranean (ie Caucasian)mdashto hold up the divide betweenEurope-as-white and Africa-as-black Bernasconi suggests that Hegel himself dealt with thepotential anomalymdashof highly cultured black Africans giving much to the Greeksmdashby makingthe EgyptGreece transition the site of the key conceptual transition from unfreedom tofreedom nature to spirit (2007 212ndash13) This ties in with my argument in Section IV thatHegel actually did have grounds on his own terms to construe the apparently gradual EgyptGreece transition as actually being a sharp divide12 Bernasconi (2016) has recently shown how Hegel likewise distorted his sources on China tothe detriment of the Chinese13 I thank Bob Stern and the referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions

Bibliography

Bernal M [1987] (1991) Black Athena The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical CivilisationVol 1 London VintageBernasconi R (1998) lsquoHegel at the Court of the Ashantirsquo in S Barnett (ed)Hegel After Derrida Albany NY SUNYBernasconi R (2007) lsquoThe Return of Africa Hegel and the Question of theRacial Identity of the Egyptiansrsquo in P T Grier (ed) Identity and Difference AlbanyNY SUNYBernasconi R (2016) lsquoChina on Parade Hegelrsquos Manipulation of his Sources andhis Change of Mindrsquo in B Brandt and D L Purdy (eds) China in the GermanEnlightenment Toronto University of Toronto PressBird-Pollan S (2014) Hegel Freud and Fanon The Dialectic of Emancipation LondonRowman and Littlefield InternationalBonetto S (2006) lsquoRace and Racism in HegelmdashAn AnalysisrsquoMinerva An InternetJournal of Philosophy 10Brennan T (2013) lsquoHegel Empire and Anti-Colonial Thoughtrsquo in G Huggan(ed) The Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies Oxford Oxford University PressBuchwalter A (2009) lsquoIs Hegelrsquos Philosophy of History Eurocentricrsquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYBuck-Morss S (2000) lsquoHegel and Haitirsquo Critical Inquiry 264 821ndash65Burbidge J (2007) Hegelrsquos Systematic Contingency Basingstoke Palgrave MacmillanDe Laurentiis A (2014) lsquoRace in Hegel Text and Contextrsquo in M Egger (ed)Philosophie Nach Kant Neue Wege zum Verstaumlndnis von Kants Transzendental- undMoralphilosophie Berlin De Gruyter

Hegel and Colonialism

22

Dussel E [1992] (1995) The Invention of the Americas trans M D Barber NewYork ContinuumDussel E (1993) lsquoEurocentrism and Modernityrsquo Boundary 2 203 65ndash76Fanon F [1952] (2008) Black Skin White Masks trans R Philcox New YorkGroveGuha R (2002) History at the Limit of World-History New York ColumbiaUniversity PressHardimon M (1993) Hegelrsquos Social Philosophy Cambridge Cambridge UniversityPressHegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller OxfordClarendonHegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind trans W Wallace and A V MillerOxford Oxford University PressHegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reasonin History trans H B Nisbet Cambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1986) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Geschichte Werke Vol 12ed E Moldenhauer and K M Michel Frankfurt Suhrkamp [Englishtranslation Sibree]Hegel G W F (1988) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Vols 1-3 edG Lasson Vols 1-4 Hamburg Meiner [English translation of volume 1 Nisbet]Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NYPrometheus BooksHegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B NisbetCambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1995) lsquoVorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der WeltgeschichteEinleitungrsquo in W Jaeschke (ed) Vorlesungsmanuskripte II (1916ndash1831)Gesammelte Werke Vol 18 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown andHodgson]Hegel G W F (1996) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Berlin 182223 Nachschriften von Griesheim Hotho und Kehler ed Karl Brehmer K-H Iltingund Hoo Nam Seelmann Hegel Vorlesungen Ausgew Nachschriften und ManuskripteVol 12 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown and Hodgson]Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink Abb HeiHegel G W F (2011) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Volume 1Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822ndash3 ed and trans R F Brownand P C Hodgson with assistance of W G Geuss Oxford Clarendon PressHoulgate S [1991] 2015 An Introduction to Hegel Freedom Truth and HistoryOxford BlackwellJohansen B E (1982) Forgotten Founders How the American Indians Helped ShapeDemocracy Boston Harvard Common Press

Alison Stone

23

McCarney J and Bernasconi R (2003) lsquoExchange Hegelrsquos Racismrsquo RadicalPhilosophy 119(MayJune) 32ndash37Monahan M (ed) (2017) Creolizing Hegel London Rowman and LittlefieldInternationalMowad N (2013) lsquoThe Place of Nationality in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of Politicsand Religion A Defense of Hegel on the Charges of National Chauvinism andRacismrsquo in A Nuzzo (ed) Hegel on Religion and Politics Albany NY SUNYParekh S (2009) lsquoHegelrsquos New World History Freedom and Racersquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYPatten A (1999) Hegelrsquos Idea of Freedom Oxford Oxford University PressPurtschert P (2010) lsquoOn the Limit of Spirit Hegelrsquos Racism Revisitedrsquo Philosophyand Social Criticism 369 1039ndash51Quijano A (2000) lsquoColoniality of Power Eurocentrism and Latin AmericarsquoNepantla Views from South 13 533ndash80Sahota J P (2016) lsquoHegelrsquos Critique of Hinduism A Responsersquo Hegel Bulletin372 305ndash17Serequeberhan T (1989) lsquoThe Idea of Colonialism in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of RightrsquoInternational Philosophical Quarterly 293 301ndash18Shohat E and Stam R [1994] (2014) Unthinking Eurocentrism New YorkRoutledgeTibebu T (2010) Hegel and the Third World The Making of Eurocentrism in WorldHistory Syracuse NY Syracuse University PressWa Thiongrsquoo N (2012) Globalectics Theory and the Politics of Knowing New YorkColumbia University Press

Hegel and Colonialism

24

  • Hegel and Colonialism
Page 21: Hegel and Colonialism - Lancaster University · 2017-06-30 · Hegel and Colonialism Alison Stone Abstract This article explores the implications of Hegel’s Philosophy of World

converge as domdashextensivelymdashseveral transcripts of the PWH we may take them to bereliable Accordingly I refer to Hegelrsquos manuscripts (abbreviated H) as in Hegel 2011 which isthe English translation of the corresponding volume of the Gesammelte Werke (Hegel 1995) andthe integrated text of the 182223 course composed primarily from Hothorsquos and Griesheimrsquostranscripts (abb HG) included in Hegel 2011 (the German is Hegel 1996) Since the Germancritical edition of the transcripts remains incomplete for materials on Hegelrsquos later coursesI have used Heimannrsquos transcript of 183031 whenever possible (Hegel 2005 abb Hei)otherwise the composite texts produced by Karl Hegel (Hegel 1986) and translated by Sibree(Hegel 1991 abb S) and by Georg LassonJohannes Hoffmeister (Hegel 1988) translated byNisbet (Hegel 1975 abb N) I quote English translations whenever available sometimesadjusted in view of the German5 For more on contingency in Hegel see inter alia Burbidge 2007 esp ch 1 Burbidge stressesthe extent to which Hegel lsquotakes the contingencies of history seriouslyrsquo (2007 9)6 For Hegel lsquonaturehellip is indeed a rational system operating in its own distinct elementrsquo (N 44)The division into continents is rational in that different natural features and their varietiesmdashmountains and plains lands and seas and their fusion and differentiationmdasheach find fullembodiment in different continents (EM sect393 and R 40ndash41) In a sense then non-Europeansare subject to reason and rational progression insofar as nature imposes it on them fromthe outside rather than by exercising rational thought for themselves This coheres withHegelrsquos view that these peoples are immersed in nature out of which only Europeans can liftthem see below7 This recalls Hegelrsquos derivation of time from space in the Philosophy of Nature a derivation thatpositions time as more advanced than space (EN sectsect256ndash57 31ndash36)8 This is evident from eg Hegelrsquos discussion of the colonization of America see Section II9 Hegel connects formation with possession (PR sect56 85ndash86) albeit in the very differentcontext of modern European societies in which private property is institutionalized I leaveunexplored here how far his ideas about slaveryrsquos educative power may be informed by hislordbondsman dialectic10 For instance some interpreters defend Hegel against charges of Eurocentrism and racism(eg Buchwalter 2009 Houlgate [1991] 2015 35ndash37 McCarney in McCarney and Bernasconi2003 Mowad 2013) others stress Hegelrsquos founding importance for anti-colonial thought(Brennan 2013) and numerous readers of Hegel as a thinker of freedom (eg Patten 1999)see no need to discuss his position on colonialism presumably on the grounds that the latteris a merely accidental avoidable part of his thought from which his essential views on freedomcan be extracted11 For Hegel the Greeks were greatly influenced by the Egyptians whose influence theynonetheless overcame Here he is close to accepting what Martin Bernal calls the lsquoancientmodelrsquo of the Greeksrsquo origins a model to which the Greeks themselves adhered later-nineteenth-century Europeans instead espoused an lsquoAryan modelrsquo on which Greek cultureproper arose from northern invaders driving out earlier Egyptian and Phoenician influences([1987] 1991) Bernal argues that the Aryan model had Eurocentric motivations if the Greeks

Alison Stone

21

the supposed originators of Europersquos distinctive culture were actually the Egyptiansrsquo heirsthen given that Egypt is within Africa the EuropeAfrica divide would crumble A furthercomplicating factor is whether the Egyptians were seen as black Africans Bernasconi (2007)argues that Hegel thought so as did most other Europeans of his time Later the Egyptiansrsquoracial status was changedmdashto Mediterranean (ie Caucasian)mdashto hold up the divide betweenEurope-as-white and Africa-as-black Bernasconi suggests that Hegel himself dealt with thepotential anomalymdashof highly cultured black Africans giving much to the Greeksmdashby makingthe EgyptGreece transition the site of the key conceptual transition from unfreedom tofreedom nature to spirit (2007 212ndash13) This ties in with my argument in Section IV thatHegel actually did have grounds on his own terms to construe the apparently gradual EgyptGreece transition as actually being a sharp divide12 Bernasconi (2016) has recently shown how Hegel likewise distorted his sources on China tothe detriment of the Chinese13 I thank Bob Stern and the referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions

Bibliography

Bernal M [1987] (1991) Black Athena The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical CivilisationVol 1 London VintageBernasconi R (1998) lsquoHegel at the Court of the Ashantirsquo in S Barnett (ed)Hegel After Derrida Albany NY SUNYBernasconi R (2007) lsquoThe Return of Africa Hegel and the Question of theRacial Identity of the Egyptiansrsquo in P T Grier (ed) Identity and Difference AlbanyNY SUNYBernasconi R (2016) lsquoChina on Parade Hegelrsquos Manipulation of his Sources andhis Change of Mindrsquo in B Brandt and D L Purdy (eds) China in the GermanEnlightenment Toronto University of Toronto PressBird-Pollan S (2014) Hegel Freud and Fanon The Dialectic of Emancipation LondonRowman and Littlefield InternationalBonetto S (2006) lsquoRace and Racism in HegelmdashAn AnalysisrsquoMinerva An InternetJournal of Philosophy 10Brennan T (2013) lsquoHegel Empire and Anti-Colonial Thoughtrsquo in G Huggan(ed) The Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies Oxford Oxford University PressBuchwalter A (2009) lsquoIs Hegelrsquos Philosophy of History Eurocentricrsquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYBuck-Morss S (2000) lsquoHegel and Haitirsquo Critical Inquiry 264 821ndash65Burbidge J (2007) Hegelrsquos Systematic Contingency Basingstoke Palgrave MacmillanDe Laurentiis A (2014) lsquoRace in Hegel Text and Contextrsquo in M Egger (ed)Philosophie Nach Kant Neue Wege zum Verstaumlndnis von Kants Transzendental- undMoralphilosophie Berlin De Gruyter

Hegel and Colonialism

22

Dussel E [1992] (1995) The Invention of the Americas trans M D Barber NewYork ContinuumDussel E (1993) lsquoEurocentrism and Modernityrsquo Boundary 2 203 65ndash76Fanon F [1952] (2008) Black Skin White Masks trans R Philcox New YorkGroveGuha R (2002) History at the Limit of World-History New York ColumbiaUniversity PressHardimon M (1993) Hegelrsquos Social Philosophy Cambridge Cambridge UniversityPressHegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller OxfordClarendonHegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind trans W Wallace and A V MillerOxford Oxford University PressHegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reasonin History trans H B Nisbet Cambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1986) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Geschichte Werke Vol 12ed E Moldenhauer and K M Michel Frankfurt Suhrkamp [Englishtranslation Sibree]Hegel G W F (1988) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Vols 1-3 edG Lasson Vols 1-4 Hamburg Meiner [English translation of volume 1 Nisbet]Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NYPrometheus BooksHegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B NisbetCambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1995) lsquoVorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der WeltgeschichteEinleitungrsquo in W Jaeschke (ed) Vorlesungsmanuskripte II (1916ndash1831)Gesammelte Werke Vol 18 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown andHodgson]Hegel G W F (1996) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Berlin 182223 Nachschriften von Griesheim Hotho und Kehler ed Karl Brehmer K-H Iltingund Hoo Nam Seelmann Hegel Vorlesungen Ausgew Nachschriften und ManuskripteVol 12 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown and Hodgson]Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink Abb HeiHegel G W F (2011) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Volume 1Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822ndash3 ed and trans R F Brownand P C Hodgson with assistance of W G Geuss Oxford Clarendon PressHoulgate S [1991] 2015 An Introduction to Hegel Freedom Truth and HistoryOxford BlackwellJohansen B E (1982) Forgotten Founders How the American Indians Helped ShapeDemocracy Boston Harvard Common Press

Alison Stone

23

McCarney J and Bernasconi R (2003) lsquoExchange Hegelrsquos Racismrsquo RadicalPhilosophy 119(MayJune) 32ndash37Monahan M (ed) (2017) Creolizing Hegel London Rowman and LittlefieldInternationalMowad N (2013) lsquoThe Place of Nationality in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of Politicsand Religion A Defense of Hegel on the Charges of National Chauvinism andRacismrsquo in A Nuzzo (ed) Hegel on Religion and Politics Albany NY SUNYParekh S (2009) lsquoHegelrsquos New World History Freedom and Racersquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYPatten A (1999) Hegelrsquos Idea of Freedom Oxford Oxford University PressPurtschert P (2010) lsquoOn the Limit of Spirit Hegelrsquos Racism Revisitedrsquo Philosophyand Social Criticism 369 1039ndash51Quijano A (2000) lsquoColoniality of Power Eurocentrism and Latin AmericarsquoNepantla Views from South 13 533ndash80Sahota J P (2016) lsquoHegelrsquos Critique of Hinduism A Responsersquo Hegel Bulletin372 305ndash17Serequeberhan T (1989) lsquoThe Idea of Colonialism in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of RightrsquoInternational Philosophical Quarterly 293 301ndash18Shohat E and Stam R [1994] (2014) Unthinking Eurocentrism New YorkRoutledgeTibebu T (2010) Hegel and the Third World The Making of Eurocentrism in WorldHistory Syracuse NY Syracuse University PressWa Thiongrsquoo N (2012) Globalectics Theory and the Politics of Knowing New YorkColumbia University Press

Hegel and Colonialism

24

  • Hegel and Colonialism
Page 22: Hegel and Colonialism - Lancaster University · 2017-06-30 · Hegel and Colonialism Alison Stone Abstract This article explores the implications of Hegel’s Philosophy of World

the supposed originators of Europersquos distinctive culture were actually the Egyptiansrsquo heirsthen given that Egypt is within Africa the EuropeAfrica divide would crumble A furthercomplicating factor is whether the Egyptians were seen as black Africans Bernasconi (2007)argues that Hegel thought so as did most other Europeans of his time Later the Egyptiansrsquoracial status was changedmdashto Mediterranean (ie Caucasian)mdashto hold up the divide betweenEurope-as-white and Africa-as-black Bernasconi suggests that Hegel himself dealt with thepotential anomalymdashof highly cultured black Africans giving much to the Greeksmdashby makingthe EgyptGreece transition the site of the key conceptual transition from unfreedom tofreedom nature to spirit (2007 212ndash13) This ties in with my argument in Section IV thatHegel actually did have grounds on his own terms to construe the apparently gradual EgyptGreece transition as actually being a sharp divide12 Bernasconi (2016) has recently shown how Hegel likewise distorted his sources on China tothe detriment of the Chinese13 I thank Bob Stern and the referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions

Bibliography

Bernal M [1987] (1991) Black Athena The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical CivilisationVol 1 London VintageBernasconi R (1998) lsquoHegel at the Court of the Ashantirsquo in S Barnett (ed)Hegel After Derrida Albany NY SUNYBernasconi R (2007) lsquoThe Return of Africa Hegel and the Question of theRacial Identity of the Egyptiansrsquo in P T Grier (ed) Identity and Difference AlbanyNY SUNYBernasconi R (2016) lsquoChina on Parade Hegelrsquos Manipulation of his Sources andhis Change of Mindrsquo in B Brandt and D L Purdy (eds) China in the GermanEnlightenment Toronto University of Toronto PressBird-Pollan S (2014) Hegel Freud and Fanon The Dialectic of Emancipation LondonRowman and Littlefield InternationalBonetto S (2006) lsquoRace and Racism in HegelmdashAn AnalysisrsquoMinerva An InternetJournal of Philosophy 10Brennan T (2013) lsquoHegel Empire and Anti-Colonial Thoughtrsquo in G Huggan(ed) The Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies Oxford Oxford University PressBuchwalter A (2009) lsquoIs Hegelrsquos Philosophy of History Eurocentricrsquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYBuck-Morss S (2000) lsquoHegel and Haitirsquo Critical Inquiry 264 821ndash65Burbidge J (2007) Hegelrsquos Systematic Contingency Basingstoke Palgrave MacmillanDe Laurentiis A (2014) lsquoRace in Hegel Text and Contextrsquo in M Egger (ed)Philosophie Nach Kant Neue Wege zum Verstaumlndnis von Kants Transzendental- undMoralphilosophie Berlin De Gruyter

Hegel and Colonialism

22

Dussel E [1992] (1995) The Invention of the Americas trans M D Barber NewYork ContinuumDussel E (1993) lsquoEurocentrism and Modernityrsquo Boundary 2 203 65ndash76Fanon F [1952] (2008) Black Skin White Masks trans R Philcox New YorkGroveGuha R (2002) History at the Limit of World-History New York ColumbiaUniversity PressHardimon M (1993) Hegelrsquos Social Philosophy Cambridge Cambridge UniversityPressHegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller OxfordClarendonHegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind trans W Wallace and A V MillerOxford Oxford University PressHegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reasonin History trans H B Nisbet Cambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1986) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Geschichte Werke Vol 12ed E Moldenhauer and K M Michel Frankfurt Suhrkamp [Englishtranslation Sibree]Hegel G W F (1988) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Vols 1-3 edG Lasson Vols 1-4 Hamburg Meiner [English translation of volume 1 Nisbet]Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NYPrometheus BooksHegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B NisbetCambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1995) lsquoVorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der WeltgeschichteEinleitungrsquo in W Jaeschke (ed) Vorlesungsmanuskripte II (1916ndash1831)Gesammelte Werke Vol 18 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown andHodgson]Hegel G W F (1996) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Berlin 182223 Nachschriften von Griesheim Hotho und Kehler ed Karl Brehmer K-H Iltingund Hoo Nam Seelmann Hegel Vorlesungen Ausgew Nachschriften und ManuskripteVol 12 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown and Hodgson]Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink Abb HeiHegel G W F (2011) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Volume 1Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822ndash3 ed and trans R F Brownand P C Hodgson with assistance of W G Geuss Oxford Clarendon PressHoulgate S [1991] 2015 An Introduction to Hegel Freedom Truth and HistoryOxford BlackwellJohansen B E (1982) Forgotten Founders How the American Indians Helped ShapeDemocracy Boston Harvard Common Press

Alison Stone

23

McCarney J and Bernasconi R (2003) lsquoExchange Hegelrsquos Racismrsquo RadicalPhilosophy 119(MayJune) 32ndash37Monahan M (ed) (2017) Creolizing Hegel London Rowman and LittlefieldInternationalMowad N (2013) lsquoThe Place of Nationality in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of Politicsand Religion A Defense of Hegel on the Charges of National Chauvinism andRacismrsquo in A Nuzzo (ed) Hegel on Religion and Politics Albany NY SUNYParekh S (2009) lsquoHegelrsquos New World History Freedom and Racersquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYPatten A (1999) Hegelrsquos Idea of Freedom Oxford Oxford University PressPurtschert P (2010) lsquoOn the Limit of Spirit Hegelrsquos Racism Revisitedrsquo Philosophyand Social Criticism 369 1039ndash51Quijano A (2000) lsquoColoniality of Power Eurocentrism and Latin AmericarsquoNepantla Views from South 13 533ndash80Sahota J P (2016) lsquoHegelrsquos Critique of Hinduism A Responsersquo Hegel Bulletin372 305ndash17Serequeberhan T (1989) lsquoThe Idea of Colonialism in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of RightrsquoInternational Philosophical Quarterly 293 301ndash18Shohat E and Stam R [1994] (2014) Unthinking Eurocentrism New YorkRoutledgeTibebu T (2010) Hegel and the Third World The Making of Eurocentrism in WorldHistory Syracuse NY Syracuse University PressWa Thiongrsquoo N (2012) Globalectics Theory and the Politics of Knowing New YorkColumbia University Press

Hegel and Colonialism

24

  • Hegel and Colonialism
Page 23: Hegel and Colonialism - Lancaster University · 2017-06-30 · Hegel and Colonialism Alison Stone Abstract This article explores the implications of Hegel’s Philosophy of World

Dussel E [1992] (1995) The Invention of the Americas trans M D Barber NewYork ContinuumDussel E (1993) lsquoEurocentrism and Modernityrsquo Boundary 2 203 65ndash76Fanon F [1952] (2008) Black Skin White Masks trans R Philcox New YorkGroveGuha R (2002) History at the Limit of World-History New York ColumbiaUniversity PressHardimon M (1993) Hegelrsquos Social Philosophy Cambridge Cambridge UniversityPressHegel G W F (1970) Philosophy of Nature trans A V Miller OxfordClarendonHegel G W F (1971) Philosophy of Mind trans W Wallace and A V MillerOxford Oxford University PressHegel G W F (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction Reasonin History trans H B Nisbet Cambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1986) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Geschichte Werke Vol 12ed E Moldenhauer and K M Michel Frankfurt Suhrkamp [Englishtranslation Sibree]Hegel G W F (1988) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Vols 1-3 edG Lasson Vols 1-4 Hamburg Meiner [English translation of volume 1 Nisbet]Hegel G W F (1991) The Philosophy of History trans J Sibree Buffalo NYPrometheus BooksHegel G W F (1992) Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans H B NisbetCambridge Cambridge University PressHegel G W F (1995) lsquoVorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der WeltgeschichteEinleitungrsquo in W Jaeschke (ed) Vorlesungsmanuskripte II (1916ndash1831)Gesammelte Werke Vol 18 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown andHodgson]Hegel G W F (1996) Vorlesungen uumlber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Berlin 182223 Nachschriften von Griesheim Hotho und Kehler ed Karl Brehmer K-H Iltingund Hoo Nam Seelmann Hegel Vorlesungen Ausgew Nachschriften und ManuskripteVol 12 Hamburg Meiner [English translation Brown and Hodgson]Hegel G W F (2005) Die Philosophie der Geschichte Vorlesungsmitschrift Heimann(Winter 18301831) ed K Vieweg Berlin Wilhelm Fink Abb HeiHegel G W F (2011) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Volume 1Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822ndash3 ed and trans R F Brownand P C Hodgson with assistance of W G Geuss Oxford Clarendon PressHoulgate S [1991] 2015 An Introduction to Hegel Freedom Truth and HistoryOxford BlackwellJohansen B E (1982) Forgotten Founders How the American Indians Helped ShapeDemocracy Boston Harvard Common Press

Alison Stone

23

McCarney J and Bernasconi R (2003) lsquoExchange Hegelrsquos Racismrsquo RadicalPhilosophy 119(MayJune) 32ndash37Monahan M (ed) (2017) Creolizing Hegel London Rowman and LittlefieldInternationalMowad N (2013) lsquoThe Place of Nationality in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of Politicsand Religion A Defense of Hegel on the Charges of National Chauvinism andRacismrsquo in A Nuzzo (ed) Hegel on Religion and Politics Albany NY SUNYParekh S (2009) lsquoHegelrsquos New World History Freedom and Racersquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYPatten A (1999) Hegelrsquos Idea of Freedom Oxford Oxford University PressPurtschert P (2010) lsquoOn the Limit of Spirit Hegelrsquos Racism Revisitedrsquo Philosophyand Social Criticism 369 1039ndash51Quijano A (2000) lsquoColoniality of Power Eurocentrism and Latin AmericarsquoNepantla Views from South 13 533ndash80Sahota J P (2016) lsquoHegelrsquos Critique of Hinduism A Responsersquo Hegel Bulletin372 305ndash17Serequeberhan T (1989) lsquoThe Idea of Colonialism in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of RightrsquoInternational Philosophical Quarterly 293 301ndash18Shohat E and Stam R [1994] (2014) Unthinking Eurocentrism New YorkRoutledgeTibebu T (2010) Hegel and the Third World The Making of Eurocentrism in WorldHistory Syracuse NY Syracuse University PressWa Thiongrsquoo N (2012) Globalectics Theory and the Politics of Knowing New YorkColumbia University Press

Hegel and Colonialism

24

  • Hegel and Colonialism
Page 24: Hegel and Colonialism - Lancaster University · 2017-06-30 · Hegel and Colonialism Alison Stone Abstract This article explores the implications of Hegel’s Philosophy of World

McCarney J and Bernasconi R (2003) lsquoExchange Hegelrsquos Racismrsquo RadicalPhilosophy 119(MayJune) 32ndash37Monahan M (ed) (2017) Creolizing Hegel London Rowman and LittlefieldInternationalMowad N (2013) lsquoThe Place of Nationality in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of Politicsand Religion A Defense of Hegel on the Charges of National Chauvinism andRacismrsquo in A Nuzzo (ed) Hegel on Religion and Politics Albany NY SUNYParekh S (2009) lsquoHegelrsquos New World History Freedom and Racersquo inW Dudley (ed) Hegel and History Albany NY SUNYPatten A (1999) Hegelrsquos Idea of Freedom Oxford Oxford University PressPurtschert P (2010) lsquoOn the Limit of Spirit Hegelrsquos Racism Revisitedrsquo Philosophyand Social Criticism 369 1039ndash51Quijano A (2000) lsquoColoniality of Power Eurocentrism and Latin AmericarsquoNepantla Views from South 13 533ndash80Sahota J P (2016) lsquoHegelrsquos Critique of Hinduism A Responsersquo Hegel Bulletin372 305ndash17Serequeberhan T (1989) lsquoThe Idea of Colonialism in Hegelrsquos Philosophy of RightrsquoInternational Philosophical Quarterly 293 301ndash18Shohat E and Stam R [1994] (2014) Unthinking Eurocentrism New YorkRoutledgeTibebu T (2010) Hegel and the Third World The Making of Eurocentrism in WorldHistory Syracuse NY Syracuse University PressWa Thiongrsquoo N (2012) Globalectics Theory and the Politics of Knowing New YorkColumbia University Press

Hegel and Colonialism

24

  • Hegel and Colonialism