HEDGE FUND PRIMER

FOR INVESTMENT ADVISERS

Charles H. Field Chapin Fitzgerald LLP June 1, 2014

© 2014 Charles H. Field

HEDGE FUND PRIMER

FOR INVESTMENT ADVISERS

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1 TYPES OF FUNDS 2 Traditional Private Fund 2 Private Equity/Venture Capital Funds 2 Hybrid Funds 2 Fund of Funds 3 STRUCTURING THE FUND 4 Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies 4 The Master-Feeder Fund Structure 5 MARKETING THE FUND TO CLAIM AN EXEMPTION FROM INVESTMENT COMPANY REGISTRATION: SECTIONS 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) 7 3(c)(1) Fund 7 Section 3(c)(7) 9 MARKETING THE FUND TO CLAIM THE EXEMPTION FROM SECURITIES REGISTRATION: REGULATION D 9 Rule 501: Accredited Investors 10 Rule 502: Limitation on the Manner of Offering 10 Rule 506(b): The Traditional Private Placement of Fund Interests 11 Rule 506(c): JOBS Act Rule Permitting General Advertising 11 Rule 506(d): The Bad Actor Disqualification 12 Form D Notices 14 Rule 508: Non-Compliance 14 BROKER-DEALER ISSUES 14 Use of Finders and Broker-Dealers 14 COMMODITY INVESTMENT: WHAT IT MEANS FOR INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND PRIVATE FUNDS 16 Commodity Interests: The Investment Portfolio 17 The Commodity Pool: The Fund 17 The Commodity Pool Operator (CPO): The Entity that Sponsors the Fund 18

The Commodity Trading Advisor (CTA): The Investment Adviser to the Fund 18 The Associated Person (AP) 18 Registration Requirements 19 EXEMPTIONS FROM REGISTRATION 19 Exemption for CPOs: Rule 4.13(a)(3) 19 Exemptions for CTAs: Section 4m 20 Exemption for CTAs: Rule 4.14 20 Registration Lite: Rule 4.7 20 Claiming the Exemptions 21

FIDUCIARY ISSUES: OPERATING THE FUND 21 Disclosure Obligations 22 Due Diligence 23 Performance Fees 24 Side Letters 24 Side-By-Side Management 26 Side Pockets 27 Side Pocket Policies to Consider 29 FUND OPERATIONAL ISSUES 29 Custody 29 Lock-Up Periods 30 Holdbacks 30 Gates 30 Unrelated Business Income Tax 31 Form PF Reporting Obligations 31 Avoiding Publicly Traded Partnership Status 32 ERISA ISSUES 33 ERISA EXEMPTIONS 34 Venture Capital Operating Company 34 Real Estate Operating Company 34 Alternative Investment Fund Manager Directive (AIFMD) 35 CONCLUSION 36 ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, and INITIALISMS 37

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HEDGE FUND PRIMER

FOR INVESTMENT ADVISERS

Charles H. Field

INTRODUCTION

There is no universally accepted definition of a “hedge fund,” either legal or industry-wide. Some funds pursue very aggressive investment practices, such as borrowing and speculating in commodities. Others resemble single-strategy mutual funds and very often do not “hedge” their portfolios against market movements or pursue leverage. The funds might be pools of illiquid assets whose gains will take years to realize, if at all. Given the different variations on the investment theme, it is much more useful to understand a hedge fund as synonymous with a private fund: a fund that is not registered as an investment company with the US Securities and Exchange Commission. The investment policies and strategies of the fund can be as constrained or as unconstrained as the portfolio manager desires. But structurally speaking, hedge funds generally have the following characteristics:

• They consist of a pool of assets from multiple investors meeting the legal requirements for

investing in an unregistered fund; • They are organized as a limited partnership or limited liability company; • They are less expensive to operate than mutual funds that are constrained by regulation; • They require a high minimum investment; • They generally impose a performance fee on investment gains; • Marketing of the fund is either prohibited or highly restricted; and • Investor access to their capital is restricted, in some cases up to two years or more.

There are a multitude of other features that are market and regulatory driven, based on the type of

investor the investment adviser seeks to attract. Investment advisers catering to the institutional market will structure their funds to appeal to a more sophisticated investor, while those catering to an individual investor market will structure something entirely different. Tax-exempt investors may require a structure that is wholly inappropriate for taxable investors.

Operating a private fund involves, at a minimum, the Securities Act of 1933, the Investment

Company Act of 1940, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the Blue Sky Laws of the states where the investment adviser attracts investors, and a host of federal tax regulations. It could also involve the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Commodity Exchange Act, not to mention the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and the European Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive. Operating a private fund is a complex business, and issues appear from all different directions.. It is our hope that this Primer will assist you in identifying the various private fund issues and formulating a plan of action that will lead to an efficiently managed fund that generates outstanding returns for investors.

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TYPES OF FUNDS Section 3(a)(1)(A) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (Investment Company Act) defines an “investment company” as any issuer that “is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities.” A private fund whose purpose is to trade in anything that is a security (e.g., stocks, bonds, notes, options, warrants, and other securities derivatives), whether publicly traded or privately held, will fit the definition of an investment company. Traditional Private Fund

Traditional private funds are designed to generate returns by trading both long and short in the securities of publicly traded operating companies across the globe, with micro, small, mid, and large capitalizations. Other private funds may focus on particular industries or sectors, while yet others are designed to produce alpha by managing market volatility though various well-defined hedging mechanisms, such as the VIX and other index futures. The funds are free to borrow money to purchase securities and, in fact, do so to leverage the gains of the portfolio.

While many of these traditional private funds are focused primarily on a narrow strategy, other

private funds have a less defined investment strategy that authorizes the portfolio manager to exercise broad investment discretion over the portfolio and invest in whatever the manager believes will generate the best return. The liquid nature of the portfolio allows traditional private funds to offer quarterly, even monthly, liquidity to its shareholders.

Private Equity/Venture Capital Funds Other private funds will trade primarily in illiquid securities, including private equity and debt. The funds even may be designed to provide venture capital to start-up entities. In either case, these types of funds pursue a much longer-term strategy and restrict shareholders’ ability to redeem their investments. The private equity or debt fund may invest in Private Investments in Public Equity (PIPEs) or distressed debt. A venture capital fund invests primarily in start-ups and may take a role in the management of the company. The venture capital fund is defined generally as one that invests in a venture capital strategy, limits its borrowings to 15% on a relative short-term basis, and does not provide shareholders with redemption rights except in extraordinary circumstances. The investment adviser to a venture capital fund is exempt from the registration requirements under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Investment Advisers Act) and the fund itself is exempt from the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), as discussed later.

Hybrid Funds

It is not uncommon to see a fund that invests in both liquid and illiquid securities. These hybrid

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funds are appealing to investment advisers and investors alike. Investment advisers can maintain a partially liquid portfolio while pursuing more attractive, lesser-known opportunities in privately held companies. Shareholders are drawn to these funds for the same reasons.

Despite their appeal, hybrid funds pose significant legal, operational, and marketing challenges

for investment advisers relative to valuing illiquid assets, calculating the performance fees on illiquid assets, and maintaining liquidity in a falling market for investors seeking to redeem. When the capital markets seized up in 2008, many hybrid funds were either not able or not willing to honor substantial redemption requests, because their portfolios had become illiquid. As a result, shareholders gained awareness of fund features such as lock-ups, gates, suspensions, and side pockets, as investment advisers took defensive measures to protect their funds from collapse.

In the cases of the traditional fund, the private equity/venture capital fund, and the hybrid fund, an

investment adviser monitors individual holdings and makes investment decisions on individual securities. Aside from the securities held in the portfolio, the major difference among these funds is the ability of the investors to liquidate their investments for cash.

Funds that invest in liquid securities tend to be open-end funds whose interests are continuously

offered, and they tend to provide monthly or quarterly redemption rights for investors. Private equity and venture capital funds, on the other hand, are generally of the closed-end variety, raising a set amount up front, making capital calls on investors as investments are made along the way, and distributing the profits as they are realized.

Fund of Funds

Another type of private fund is the fund of funds. Unlike a direct fund, where a portfolio manager makes individual investment decisions, a fund of funds is a portfolio constructed by a portfolio manager of interests issued by a number of other private funds. The fund can focus on a particular investment strategy, such as investing in publicly traded stocks or private equity, or allocate among many different strategies. Investment selections are based primarily on the skill, reputation, and expertise of the underlying investment adviser.

The advantage of a fund of funds is that an investment adviser can add value by judiciously

selecting and monitoring other investment advisers. In addition, the fund of funds allows investors with limited funds to gain access to more private fund investment advisers over which to diversify their assets. For example, an investor with $250,000 can be efficiently exposed to a number of private fund advisers instead of only one. One of the disadvantages is the layering of expenses—the expenses of the fund of funds and the expenses of the underlying funds. The doubling of fees can have a significant adverse impact on the total return an investor receives. Another disadvantage is the lack of transparency into the underlying funds.

Whether a fund is a direct fund, a fund of funds, a fund that invests in liquid securities, a fund that

invests in private equity and start-ups, or a fund that invests in a variety of investments, the investment adviser of each type of fund will look to structure the fund and attract investors based on a variety of

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factors, including the types of investors they will seek, the types of investments they will make, and the amount of resources they can commit to operating the fund. STRUCTURING THE FUND Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies

The proper construction of a fund should ensure limited liability of the investor and efficient tax treatment for both the fund and its shareholders. A fund organized as a corporation accomplishes the first goal, but it is tax inefficient. For example, investment profits earned by the corporation are subject to federal income tax when earned, and again when distributed to investors, thereby subjecting the investment profits to double taxation. To avoid this drag on performance, investment advisers to private funds organize their funds primarily as either limited partnerships or limited liability companies, which afford flow-through tax treatment to investment gains and losses, and provide limitations on the liability of investors.

Funds organized as limited partnerships and limited liability companies do not themselves pay

tax. Instead, the profits and losses attributable to a fund’s investments flow through to investors in proportion to their investment in the fund. Each investor will be required to report on its Federal income tax return its distributive share of the fund’s income or gain, whether or not it receives any actual distribution of money or property from the fund during the taxable year.

The uniform limited partnership and uniform limited liability company acts adopted in one form

or another by the various states provide that the debts, obligations, and liabilities of these funds, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, are solely the debts, obligations, and liabilities of the fund and not of the investors. In Delaware, for example, under §17-303 of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, an investor is not obligated personally for any such debt, obligation, or liability of the fund solely by reason of being an investor. Investors do share the investment losses, but only to the extent of their respective interests in the fund.

Limited partnerships and limited companies are generally organized by filing with the secretary

of state either a certificate of limited partnership or a certificate of formation. Limited partnerships and limited liability companies are governed by the limited partnership agreement on the one hand and the operating agreement on the other. Responsibility for the overall management of the fund will rest with the General Partner for limited partnerships and with the Managing Member for limited liability companies.

The agreement generally will name the investment adviser or an affiliate as the general partner or

managing member, as the case may be, and grant the investment adviser a great deal of flexibility and authority to manage the fund without interference from investors or other third parties, such as a board of directors or a trustee. These agreements will also provide the investment adviser with the strongest indemnification possible. They may provide for lock-up periods, holdbacks, redemption in-kinds, and limit the investors’ rights to transfer their interests.

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The Master-Feeder Fund Structure

Investment advisers may seek to offer an investment strategy that appeals to a wide range of investors, such as high net worth individuals, non-US investors, institutions, and tax-exempt investors. Certain restrictions, however, present a host of challenges to organizing a fund that has broad appeal. For example, a domestic fund organized as a limited partnership or limited liability company that utilizes borrowing (also known as acquisition indebtedness) as an investment strategy may be unattractive to tax-exempt investors. This is because earnings generated from borrowing would flow through to the investors and possibly subject the tax-exempt investors to unrelated business income tax. The same fund also may be unattractive to non-US investors, given that the tax rules require the fund to withhold tax at the source on the profits of investors who do not have a tax identification number. A domestic fund would also put the non-US investor under the jurisdiction of the Internal Revenue Service.

An offshore fund would likely be the more attractive option to US tax-exempt and non-US

investors because (a) the fund would be organized in a tax haven jurisdiction and not subject to local tax, and (b) the unrelated business income from an offshore company would not receive flow-through tax treatment. While the offshore fund would be attractive to tax-exempt US investors, it would be equally unattractive to taxable US investors because of the unfavorable tax rules governing “passive foreign investment companies” (PFICs).

To deal with these diversified needs, the investment adviser may consider either organizing two

separate side-by-side funds or creating a master-feeder fund structure. Under the master-feeder structure, the investment adviser establishes a master fund that holds and invests the assets. Various feeder funds are then organized in one or more jurisdictions to feed their assets into the master fund for investment in a single strategy.

Each feeder fund is designed to accept contributions from different groups of investors based on

certain criteria driven primarily by tax status and place of domicile. In the case of a fund that employs leverage, an offshore fund would be organized to accept tax-exempt and non-US investors. This is because, unlike the profits of a limited partnership and a limited liability company, the profits earned by an offshore company are recognized at the company level and do not flow through to the investor. Accordingly, margin-financed profits do not flow through to the investors, thus eliminating the issue of unrelated business income tax.

In addition, the profits of an offshore fund that invests in a non-US portfolio are not subject to US

withholding tax, and thus for non-US investors the offshore fund has a competitive advantage over domestic funds. A domestic fund would be organized to accept US taxable investors seeking to avoid PFIC issues. The assets of both feeder funds are combined into one master fund and invested according to a single investment strategy. Each feeder fund is its own separate legal entity with its own fee structure for investment advisory fees, performance fees, sales charges, and operating expenses.

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In Chart 1, the investment adviser has established two side-by-side funds, and hence two separate

investment portfolios: one domiciled in the Cayman Islands and one domiciled in Delaware. For investment advisers, side-by-side funds present some issues, with performance dispersion being at the top of the list.

Many advisers seeking the efficiencies of managing one portfolio instead of two find the master-

feeder fund structure appealing. In Chart 2, the investment adviser establishes a master fund in the Cayman Islands. Two feeder funds are also created: one in Delaware, the other in the Cayman Islands. Contributions from tax-exempt investors come into the master fund by way of the Cayman Islands feeder fund, and contributions from US taxable investors come into the master fund by way of the Delaware L.P.

While the portfolio efficiencies of the master-feeder structure may look appealing to investment advisers, it is much more complex and expensive to operate. Instead of creating and operating two funds, the investment adviser creates, operates, and pays for three. Absent sufficient assets that will generate economies of scale, the expense of the master-feeder structure could offset any portfolio efficiencies. Another consideration when evaluating the master-feeder structure is that its investment strategies may not offer advantages to all investors at all times. For example, long-term capital gains treatment may be preferred by US taxable investors, but taxes are not a concern for tax-exempt investors, so if the master fund holds a security longer to receive favorable tax treatment, it may create conflicts of interest among the different groups of investors.

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Finally, there may be integration issues that could inadvertently lead to two funds being treated as one, triggering fund registration under the Investment Company Act. While the master-feeder fund structure has its place, careful consideration must be given before plunging headlong into its complexities. MARKETING THE FUND TO CLAIM AN EXEMPTION FROM INVESTMENT COMPANY REGISTRATION: SECTIONS 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7)

Section 7(a) of the Investment Company Act prohibits an investment company from operating unless it is registered pursuant to Section 8 or is excluded from registration. Registering a fund with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is a complicated and expensive process. Operating a registered fund requires continuous compliance with a byzantine array of complex rules and regulations. This includes the fund providing pricing and liquidity daily; empaneling a board of directors and holding regular meetings; filing reports annually and semi-annually; updating prospectuses annually; and, through the board, reviewing and approving the investment advisory agreement annually.

These annual fund operating expenses could run into the hundreds of thousands of dollars and,

unless they are picked up by the fund’s investment adviser, adversely affect the performance of the fund. Because of the time, expense, and distraction associated with a registered fund, many investment advisers that lack the business interest or the distribution resources to enter the retail fund space opt for the private fund option.

Section 3(a)(1)(A) of the Investment Company Act defines an investment company as any issuer

that “is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities.” This definition would apply to anything from the billion-dollar mutual fund with tens of thousands of shareholders to the smallest weekly investment club whose members debate the merits of an odd-lot investment over coffee. Fortunately for the investment club and other start-up funds, section 3(c) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 specifically excludes certain entities from the definition of an investment company, and thus from the complicated registration process. The two most commonly used provisions are sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7).

3(c)(1) Fund

Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act excludes funds whose number of shareholders is

no more than 100 and whose capital raising does not involve a public offering. But there are certain traps for the unwary when calculating the number of investors. One trap lies

in the look-through provisions. Generally, an entity that invests in a fund will be counted as one shareholder unless that investor entity is itself an investment fund, the investor entity owns 10% or more of the outstanding voting securities of the fund, and the aggregate amount of the investor entity’s investment in the fund represents 10% or more of the investor entity’s total assets. In that instance, the investor entity’s ownership in the fund will be attributed to every owner of the investor entity.

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For example, in the case of a $10 million fund with four investors, Investor A, which is organized as a limited partnership with 99 partners and $10 million of its own in assets, and whose primary purpose is investing, invests $2 million in another fund managed by an unaffiliated investment adviser. For purposes of counting the number of shareholders in the fund, section 3(c)(1) and rule 3c-1 thereunder require the fund to look through the limited partnership and include in the count all 99 partners. 99 + 3 = 102; and accordingly, under this scenario, the fund will fail to qualify for exclusion under section 3(c)(1).

To avoid this trap, the investment adviser must be diligent in adopting and adhering to a policy of

not accepting investments from any entity whose investment would exceed 10% of the fund. Since no start-up entrepreneur desires to turn money away, another approach is to conduct due diligence on the entity, which the investment adviser can and generally does accomplish through a questionnaire and other investor representations and warranties contained in the fund’s Subscription Agreement.

The second trap lies in the concept of integration, or treating two or more like funds as one, and

counting the aggregate number of investors in the funds to determine whether they exceed 100. For example, an investment adviser launches a second global macro fund after the number of investors in the first fund reaches 100. Under certain circumstances, the SEC would treat both funds as one 3(c)(1) fund, so that at the time the number of investors in both funds combined exceeded 100, neither fund would qualify for the Section 3(c)(1) exemption.

There is no statute that addresses fund integration, and the SEC has not adopted any formal rules

that outline what may trigger integration. Guidance on integration, however, can be found in a number of no-action letters, which lay out the following tests:

• Are the different offerings a part of a single plan of financing? • Do the offerings involve issuance of the same class of security? • Are the offerings made at or about the same time? • Is the same type of consideration to be received? • Are the offerings made for the same general purpose? • Would an interest in one fund be considered materially different from an interest in a

second partnership by a reasonable investor qualified to purchase both? • Do the funds have the same investment objectives; the same types of portfolio securities;

and, particularly, similar portfolio risk return characteristics?

In Oppenheimer Arbitrage Partners LP (avail. Dec. 26, 1985), the SEC did not integrate two funds where one fund was offered to tax-exempt investors and did not engage in short sales or write uncovered calls, while the other fund was offered to taxable investors and engaged in short sales and other leveraged transactions. In Shoreline Fund (avail. Apr. 11, 1994), the SEC did not integrate an offshore fund with an onshore fund, both with almost identical investment strategies, on the grounds that the offshore fund was created for non-US and US tax-exempt investors, while the onshore fund was created for taxable investors.

Conversely, in Frontier Capital Management Company (avail. May 6, 1988), the SEC refused to

grant no-action relief to three funds where one invested in a portfolio of large cap stocks, the other in a

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portfolio of small cap stocks, and the third in a balanced portfolio of stocks and bonds. The SEC noted that the three funds were designed for one group of investors with similar investment profiles. Therefore, it appears that to avoid integration, the investment adviser should design the fund for different groups of investors: institutional, individual, taxable, or non-taxable.

Another consideration in counting the number of shareholders is Rule 3c-5, which allows the

fund to exclude from the count any person who at the time of purchase is a “knowledgeable employee” of the investment adviser and any company owned exclusively by such “knowledgeable employees.” Rule 3c-5 generally defines a “knowledgeable employee” to include certain executive officers of the fund or the investment adviser; heads of business units who perform a policy-making function; and non-executive employees who, in connection with their regular duties or functions, participate in the investment activities of a fund managed by the investment adviser. Traders, salespersons, staff lawyers, operations and information technology staff, and junior analysts who do not regularly participate in the stock selection process do not fit within the definition. In cases where a “knowledgeable employee” jointly owns the fund with his or her spouse, the joint account would not count toward the fund’s 100-owner limit (see American Bar Association Section of Business Law no-action letter [avail. April 22, 1999]).

Finally, Rule 3c-6 protects the fund from involuntary transfers accidentally triggering the 100-

beneficial-ownership test. The rule provides that beneficial ownership of a transferee who acquired the interests by way of gift, bequest, or dissolution of marriage is deemed beneficially owned by the transferor for purposes of counting the number of shareholders.

The second requirement is that the offering must be private. Provided the investment adviser

markets interests in the fund consistent with the requirements of Regulation D (as more fully explained in the next section), then the offering will be considered private. Accordingly, careful adherence to Rule 506 of Regulation D is critically important, including a set of offering materials that include all appropriate disclosure legends and restrictions on transfers required by Regulation D.

Section 3(c)(7) Section 3(c)(7) excludes funds that are owned exclusively by “qualified purchasers” and whose capital raising does not involve a public offering. A “qualified purchaser” is generally an individual or a family-owned entity that owns at least $5 million in investments, or an institution that owns and invests at least $25 million, or a knowledgeable employee. Identical to the Section 3(c)(1) prohibition on public offerings, the 3(c)(7) offering must be private and consistent with the requirements of Regulation D, as more fully explained in the next section. MARKETING THE FUND TO CLAIM THE EXEMPTION FROM SECURITIES REGISTRATION: REGULATION D

The role of raising assets is crucial to a fund’s success. The investment adviser needs adequate assets to invest and diversify so it can generate fees and cover expenses. Investment advisers know all too well the tough competitive challenges in raising assets, but there are legal challenges as well.

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Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) makes it unlawful to offer or sell a

security unless the issuer has filed its prospectus with the SEC and the SEC has deemed it effective. Registration under the Securities Act is a complicated and expensive process, requiring, in most cases, extensive negotiations with the SEC staff over disclosure issues. Because of the time, expense, and distraction associated with registering securities and updating the registration annually, investment advisers of funds tend to seek an exemption from registration.

Section 4(2) of the Securities Act exempts transactions that do not involve a public offering from

the registration process. Nowhere in the statute is “public offering” defined. To bring clarity to this matter, the SEC adopted Regulation D, and related Rules 501–508, in which it established “safe harbor” provisions. Compliance with these provisions will conclusively bring the fund within the Section 4(2) exemption. A discussion of exemptions in Rules 501–508 follows.

Rule 501: Accredited Investors

Investment advisers to private funds that seek to rely on the safe harbor provisions of Regulation D will require, with few exceptions, that all of the fund’s investors meet the definition of an “accredited investor.” This includes banks, pensions, insurance companies, and individuals whose net worth exceeds $1,000,000, or whose individual income exceeds $200,000 or joint income exceeds $300,000. In addition, all offerees who purchase must possess the requisite level of sophistication that allows them to evaluate the merits and the risk of the investment.

Although Rule 506(b) under Regulation D permits up to 35 non-accredited investors and an

unlimited number of accredited investors, most private funds will limit its investors to accredited investors, due in large part to the requirement that non-accredited investors must receive two years of additional financial and other information similar to what would be furnished in a registration statement.

Rule 502: Limitation on the Manner of Offering

Unless the investment adviser intends to sell interests in the fund solely to accredited investors pursuant to Rule 506(c) (as discussed below), Rule 502(c) prohibits the fund and the investment adviser from using any form of general solicitation or general advertising in the capital raising process. While there is no definition of “general solicitation” or “general advertising" in the statute, Regulation D broadly defines this to include advertisements, articles, notices, and other communications published in newspapers, magazines, and the internet, as well as general invitations to participate in promotional seminars and meetings. For investment advisers, the issue will most likely arise when dealing with client newsletters, client seminars, email blasts to clients, and investment adviser web sites.

By far the most difficult and pervasive questions concerning Rule 502(c) under Regulation D have concerned the determination of what will be deemed a “general solicitation." The SEC has tended to focus on whether the investment adviser has a preexisting substantive relationship with the investor.

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In H.B. Shaine & Co. (avail. May 1, 1987), a broker-dealer proposed using questionnaires to identify investors who would be “accredited” under Rule 501(a)(1). The broker-dealer would update the questionnaires annually, and the questionnaires would serve as the basis for an established list of accredited investors. The firm then intended to offer private placements to the persons on the list. In agreeing that the questionnaires provided sufficient detail to establish a substantive relationship, the SEC stated that “a satisfactory response by a prospective offeree to a questionnaire that provides a broker-dealer with sufficient information to evaluate the respondent’s sophistication and financial situation will establish a substantive relationship.” Because this relationship would be established prior to any offering, the staff also agreed that the relationship was “preexisting.”

In Lamp Technologies, Inc. No-Action Letter (avail. May 29, 1997, http://www.sec.gov/

divisions/investment/noaction/1997/lamptechnologies052997.pdf; follow-up letter, May 1998), the SEC issued guidance on how private funds could post information about themselves on a web site operated by a third party and still comply with the prohibition on general solicitation and advertising under Regulation D and the prohibition on a public offering in sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7).

Lamp proposed to establish and administer a web site that contained information concerning

privately offered, exempt funds. An interested investor could gain access to the information within the password-protected site only after (1) he or she had completed a questionnaire designed to allow Lamp to form a reasonable basis for determining that the investor was an “accredited investor,” and (2) Lamp had issued the investor a password to access the site. To prevent an investor from joining the service and immediately investing in a particular fund, Lamp set a 30-day cooling-off period before an investor could invest. By using a questionnaire that provided Lamp with sufficiently detailed information to evaluate the potential investor’s sophistication, requiring the use of a password, and imposing a 30-day cooling-off period, Lamp was able to establish a substantive relationship with a potential investor.

Rule 506(b): The Traditional Private Placement of Fund Interests

Rule 506(b) exempts the fund from registering its securities regardless of the size of the offering. To qualify for the exemption, the securities may only be offered and sold to accredited investors, as defined in Rule 501, and up to 35 non-accredited investors.

As a practical matter, however, most investment advisers to private funds will not want to accept

non-accredited investors into the fund, except under the most limited circumstances, because of Rule 505(b). This rule requires that the fund must provide non-accredited investors with the same information that it would provide in a securities registration statement. Under Rule 506(b), the issuer may not engage in general solicitation or general advertising of the offer, as defined in Rule 502, and the issuer must have a reasonable belief that the purchasers are accredited investors or sophisticated, non-accredited investors.

Rule 506(c): JOBS Act Rule Permitting General Advertising As required by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank), provisions under Rule 506(c) have given investment advisers of private funds more latitude in how they market and promote their fund. Effective September 23, 2013, the final Jumpstart Our Business

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Startups Act (JOBS Act) rules removed the 80-year-old ban under Rule 502 on general solicitation and advertising, under certain conditions. Advisers of private funds now may promote funds through public web sites and other forms of social media, provided that each investor in the fund meets the Rule 501 definition of an accredited investor and the investment adviser has taken reasonable steps to verify that the investors in fact meet the definition. Accordingly, Rule 506(c) necessitates that investment advisers adopt policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that each investor in the fund is an “accredited investor.”

Rule 506(c) requires investment advisers to take “reasonable steps” to verify that the investors in the fund are accredited investors, which is a higher standard than Rule 506(b)’s “reasonable belief” standard. In a Rule 506(b) offering, investment advisers generally rely on investor representations made in the subscription agreement, without independently verifying the financial status of the investor. But if the fund uses Rule 506(c) to promote its interests, the SEC will expect the adviser to exercise greater diligence than before in ascertaining accredited investor status.

The SEC has indicated “the more likely it appears that a purchaser qualifies as an accredited

investor, the fewer steps the issuer would have to take to verify accredited investor status, and vice versa.” In other words, the principles-based method allows the investment adviser to follow the rule of reason in determining whether an investor is or is not accredited. For example, the risk of noncompliance is very low in the case of an investor who invests $1 million or more into the fund.

The adopting release lists several nonexclusive and nonmandatory methods that it considers

reasonable steps to verify “accredited investor” status. These include: a. For income verification: Form W-2, Form 1099, Schedule K-1 to Form 1065, and Form 1040; b. For net worth verification: bank statements, brokerage statements and other statements of securities holdings, certificates of deposit, tax assessments, and appraisal reports issued by independent third parties; and for liabilities, a consumer report from at least one of the nationwide consumer reporting agencies; and c. Independent verification from (1) a registered broker-dealer, (2) an investment adviser registered with the SEC, (3) a licensed attorney who is in good standing under the laws of the Jurisdictions in which he or she is admitted to practice law, or (4) a certified public accountant who is duly registered and in good standing.

Given that investment advisers may be reluctant to assume this “reasonable step” burden,

investment advisers increasingly may look to third parties (e.g., lawyers, accountants, and established angel investor groups) to review and verify the investor information, in order to certify the accuracy and legal qualification for which the third party must bear responsibility. Rule 506(d): The Bad Actor Disqualification

As another consequence of Dodd-Frank, the SEC has adopted Rule 506(d) under the Securities Act to disqualify certain “bad actors” from relying on the exemption from registration in Rule 506. As a result, companies are now prohibited from relying on Regulation D in connection with a private offering

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pursuant to Rule 506 if certain persons related to the fund participate in “bad acts” on or after September 23, 2013.

Investment advisers will need to collect this information in the form of a questionnaire from all

persons and entities connected to the fund, to ensure compliance with these new requirements. These persons and entities will include the Issuer (the company issuing the securities); any predecessor to the Issuer; any affiliated companies; beneficial owners of 20% or more the Issuer’s outstanding voting equity, calculated on the basis of voting power; promoters under Rule 405 who are currently connected to the Issuer in any capacity; investment advisers of the funds; broker-dealers and solicitors of the fund; and, as applicable, directors, executive officers, and other officers of any of the above. Membership in any of these categories is to be determined at the time of sale; thus, additional people might need to complete the questionnaire as the offering progresses if the membership of any of the above categories changes.

Investment advisers must conclude a person will fit the definition of a “bad actor” if they

affirmatively answer any question in the questionnaire related to the following after September 23, 2013: a. Certain criminal convictions for felonies or misdemeanors and certain court injunctions in

connection with certain securities activities and making false statements to the SEC; b. Final orders of certain state and federal regulators of securities, commodities, insurance,

banking, savings associations, or credit unions constituting a bar from engaging in certain activities; or final orders based upon fraudulent, manipulative, or deceptive conduct;

c. Certain SEC disciplinary orders, cease and desist orders, and stop orders; d. Suspension or expulsion from membership in a self-regulatory organization (SRO), such as

the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), or from association with an SRO member; or

e. US Postal Service false representation orders. Even though September 23, 2013 was the trigger date, bad actor disqualifying events that existed

before that date are required to be disclosed in writing to investors. Issuers must furnish this written description to purchasers within a reasonable time before the Rule 506 sale. Even though disqualification will not arise as a result of disqualifying events that occurred before September 23, 2013, Rule 506 is unavailable to a fund that fails to provide the required disclosure, unless the issuer is able to demonstrate that it did not know, and, in the exercise of reasonable care, could not have known that a disqualifying event was required to be disclosed.

Failure to qualify for exemption under Rule 506(b), (c), and (d) can have serious consequences. Given that advisers potentially face strict liability under the Securities Act Section 12(a)(1) for selling unregistered securities that otherwise should have been registered, advisers must exercise great care in designing a program and the proper forms that demonstrate they have taken reasonable steps to comply with Rule 506(b), (c), and (d).

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Form D Notices

Form D is a form the fund files to perfect its exemption under Rule 504, 505, or 506 of Regulation D. SEC rules further require the notice to be filed online within 15 days after the first sale of securities in an offering. For this purpose, the date of first sale is the date on which the first investor is irrevocably contractually committed to invest. The SEC does not charge any filing fee for a Form D notice or amendment. If the fund is continuing to offer its interests, it will need to file an amendment annually, on or before the first anniversary of the most recent previously filed notice.

Many states also require the filing of Form D notices and amendments, and most of them charge a

filing fee. For information on state Form D filing requirements, visit http://www.nasaa.org/ to get links to the proper state web sites. State web sites contain bulletins providing details on filing requirements and a contact person for specific questions. At the present time, all states that require Form D filings accept paper filings only; none permit online filings.

Rule 508: Non-Compliance Rule 508 offers a defense to a fund that has failed to comply in all respects with Rules 506. The defense cannot be raised in an SEC enforcement action. To avail itself of the defense, the fund must show three things: (1) the provision with which it failed to comply was not intended to protect the investor who seeks rescission, (2) the failure to comply was not significant, and (3) the fund made a good faith effort to comply. So for example, a fund may raise a 508 defense if it fails to file a Form D, or if it fails to give investors an opportunity to ask questions. There are two activities that will always be significant and therefore excluded from the 508 defense: (1) general solicitation (except Rule 506[c] offerings), and (2) the numerical purchaser limit. BROKER-DEALER ISSUES Use of Finders and Broker-Dealers

Investment advisers may choose among several options to distribute interests in their private funds to investors. They can utilize external groups such as broker-dealers, finders, and internet sites. They can also utilize an internal sales force, or hope to rely on word of mouth. In 2013, the SEC began focusing its attention on this area through no-action letters, an enforcement action, and speeches. The SEC has distinguished those activities that it would consider “finder” activities and those it would consider “broker-dealer” activities that require a broker-dealer license.

In doing so, the SEC has called into question the long-standing practice of investment advisers

using internal salespersons as agents of the fund and relying on the issuer exemption from broker-dealer registration. Investment advisers who are not careful in this area are vulnerable to a regulatory enforcement action and, even worse, rescission claims by investors.

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Section 3(4) of the Securities Exchange Act defines a broker as any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others. Believing that the presence of a transaction-based success fee, or the so-called “salesman’s stake,” can lead to high-pressure tactics, the SEC places heavy emphasis on transaction-based fees when evaluating whether a person is in the broker-dealer business.

Section 15(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act makes it unlawful for any broker or dealer to

effect any transaction in the purchase or sale of any security unless the broker or dealer is registered pursuant to Section 15(b). For the person who should have been registered but isn’t, then every investor who has purchased from such unregistered person may rescind the purchase pursuant to Section 29(b) of the Act.

As the SEC enforcement action against Ranieri Partners (http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/

2013/34-69091.pdf) exemplifies, investment advisers can be subject to SEC enforcement action under Section 20(e) of the Securities Exchange Act for assisting non-registered third parties in soliciting sales of fund shares without a broker-dealer license. Ranieri Partners illustrates that the SEC will pursue investment advisers who turn a blind eye to third parties who solicit potential investors for the investment adviser’s funds. In this particular case, Ranieri Partners hired an unregistered individual to introduce investors to the investment adviser and its funds in exchange for a 1% finder’s fee. However, the business relationship evolved into something more. Ranieri furnished the individual with private placement memoranda (PPMs), subscription documents, and marketing materials. The individual then furnished them to prospective investors. Ranieri knew or should have known that the individual actively met with potential investors to discuss the fund’s investment strategy, investment performance, and asset allocation. It is not surprising that the SEC found that the individual had engaged in unregistered, and thus illegal, broker-dealer activities; however, it was surprising to see the SEC pursue Ranieri on an aiding and abetting charge, as well.

Although Ranieri involved an external third party, the same issue can arise for investment

advisers that use an internal sales force to market their fund. In the past, investment advisers tended to rely on the “issuer exemption” under Rule 3a4–1 promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act (17 CFR Part 240.3a4–1) to avoid registering as a broker-dealer, claiming that the fund was the issuer selling for its own account, and not the account of others, and their employees were associated persons carrying out that function.

Rule 3a4–1 is a non-exclusive safe harbor. Rule 3a4–1 provides that an associated person (or

employee) of an issuer who participates in the sale of the issuer’s securities would not have to register as a broker-dealer if that person, at the time of participation: (1) is not subject to a “statutory disqualification,” as defined in Section 3(a)(39) of the Act; (2) is not compensated by payment of commissions or other remuneration based directly or indirectly on securities transactions; (3) is not an associated person of a broker or dealer; and (4) limits its sales activities as set forth in the rule. However, the SEC has suggested that a narrow reading of Rule 3a4–1 raises broker-dealer compliance issues for the activities of internal sales staff paid on commission.

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Following up on the Ranieri Partners case, David Blass, the Chief Counsel of the SEC Division

of Markets and Trading, gave a speech before the American Bar Association’s Trading and Markets Subcommittee. He put investment advisers on notice that their internal sales activities may involve broker-dealer activities as a result of the methods of compensating their sales personnel and, in the case of private equity fund managers, the receipt of investment banking fees with respect to their portfolio companies (April 13, 2013, http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2013/spch040513dwg.htm).

In evaluating whether the internal sales efforts of an investment adviser give rise to broker-dealer

activity and registration as a broker-dealer, the investment adviser should analyze the following: • How does the adviser solicit and retain investors? • Do employees who solicit investors have other responsibilities? • How are personnel who solicit investors for a private fund compensated? Do those

individuals receive bonuses or other types of compensation that are linked to successful investments?

A critical element to determining whether one is required to register as a broker-dealer is the existence of transaction-based compensation. This implies that bonuses tied to capital raising success would likely give rise to a requirement for the individuals receiving such bonuses to register as broker-dealers.

In the Funders Club No-Action Letter (avail. Mar. 26, 2013, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/

marketreg/mr-noaction/2013/funders-club-032613-15a1.pdf), and Angel List LLC No-Action Letter (avail. Mar. 28, 2013, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mr-/2013/angellist-15a1.pdf) the SEC granted no-action relief to investment advisers that operated an internet-based platform exclusively for accredited investors. When the investment advisers identified prospects in which to invest, it posted investment information on the web site that could only be accessed by members who were accredited investors and who may or may not reply with an indication of interest. Once indications of interest reached certain levels, the investment adviser would close the transactions with the prospects. Investors paid administrative fees to defray actual out-of-pocket expenses; the investment manager received a performance fee based on the profits of the fund.

Key factors in the decision to grant relief were: (a) the Investment advisers received

compensation for their advisory service and not transaction-based compensation; (b) employees of the investment adviser did not receive transaction-based compensation; and (c) none of the administrative fees were paid to the investment adviser for selling activities.

COMMODITY INVESTMENT: WHAT IT MEANS FOR INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND PRIVATE FUNDS

Historically, the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) had limited application to investment advisers and sponsors of private funds because of the “sophisticated investor” exemption. Funds that traded in

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futures, options on futures, and hard commodities were exempt from the definition of a “commodity pool,” their sponsors were exempt from the definition of a “commodity pool operator” (CPO), and their advisers were exempt from the definition of a “commodity trading advisor” (CTA), as long as all of their investors were accredited investors.

Dodd-Frank, however, has changed that. Dodd-Frank eliminated the long-standing “sophisticated

investor” exemption and expanded the definition of “commodity pool,” with the overall effect of capturing “trading” in security futures products and swaps. As a result, a large number of investment advisers that were not CTAs and CPOs under prior regulations must consider whether they need to register as CTAs or CPOs, or both, and fulfill other regulatory requirements, or need to take action to claim exemption. As investment advisers to private funds continue to rely more and more on derivative instruments to hedge their portfolios (e.g., currency, interest rates, index futures, and options) knowledge of and compliance with the CEA becomes increasingly important.

Commodity Interests: The Investment Portfolio

Determining what constitutes a commodity is not always straightforward. Originally, a commodity was any item included on an enumerated list of agricultural goods, grain, sugar, and other “tangible goods.” However, in 1974 the administration of the CEA was transferred from the US Department of Agriculture to The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), which subsequently expanded the definition of a “commodity” to include “all services, rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.” Ensuing judicial cases and Congressional legislation further pushed the boundaries of what could be included as a commodity.

Today, a commodity is considered to be any homogenous good, traded in bulk, on an exchange

that is standardized, usable upon delivery, and whose price varies enough to justify the creation of a market. Thus, the expanded definition now encompasses intangible items as well—including financial products such as foreign currencies and indexes, futures contracts, options, and swaps—where contracts for a commodity do not necessarily involve settlement through delivery of a tangible underlying asset.

In July 2012, the CFTC and SEC finalized their definition of “swaps” and “security-based swaps”

to include foreign exchange forwards, foreign exchange swaps, foreign currency options (not traded on a national securities exchange), non-deliverable forward contracts involving foreign exchange, currency swaps, cross-currency swaps, forward rate agreements, contracts for differences, and certain combinations and permutations of (or options on) swaps and security-based swaps, among others. (See 17 CFR Part 1; 17 CFR Part 240)

The Commodity Pool: The Fund

CEA section 1a(10) defines a commodity pool as an enterprise in which funds contributed by a number of persons are combined for the purpose of trading futures contracts, options on futures, retail off-exchange foreign currency exchange (forex) contracts or swaps, or to invest in another commodity pool. Many investment advisers of equity funds that occasionally use derivatives to hedge their portfolios are under the false impression that their funds are not commodity pools. Many take the position that the

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purpose of their funds is to trade securities and not commodities. However, the CFTC interprets very broadly the term “for the purpose of,” so that a single commodity position within the fund’s portfolio would be enough for the fund to fall within the definition of a “commodity pool.”

The Commodity Pool Operator (CPO): The Entity that Sponsors the Fund

CEA section 1a(11) defines a CPO as “any person engaged in a business that is of the nature of an investment trust, syndicate, or similar form of enterprise, and who, in connection therewith, solicits, accepts, or receives from others, funds, securities, or property, either directly or through capital contributions, the sale of stock or other forms of securities, or otherwise, for the purpose of trading in any commodity for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any contract market or derivatives transaction execution facility.” In the private fund context, and depending how the fund is structured, this could include the general partner or managing member, or the investment adviser.

The Commodity Trading Advisor (CTA): The Investment Adviser to the Fund

Section 1a(12) defines a CTA as any person who for compensation or profit: (i) Engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through publications,

writings, or electronic media, as to the value of or the advisability of trading in: (a) Any contract of sale of a commodity for future delivery made or to be made on or

subject to the rules of a contract market or derivatives transaction execution facility; (b) Any commodity option authorized under Section 6c of the CEA; or (c) Any leverage transaction authorized under section 23 of the CEA; (ii) And as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning

any of the activities referred to above. In the private fund context, this will include the investment adviser, general partner, or managing

member, unless the general partner or managing member has elected to retain the services of an outside investment adviser to manage the portfolio.

The Associated Person (AP)

An Associated Person (AP) is an individual who solicits orders, customers, or customer funds; who supervises salespersons for any of these categories of individuals or firms; and any person in the supervisory chain of command. The CFTC has indicated that not only should immediate supervisors be registered as APs, but everyone in the “line of supervisory authority,” regardless of how senior their position—including the president of the firm—should be registered as an AP, as well. The analysis of who should register in small firms that sell interests in commodity pools appears straightforward: everyone should register. In larger organizations with layers of assistants, sales personnel, and supervisors, the analysis becomes more complex.

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Registration Requirements

In general, registration is required unless the CPO or CTA qualifies for one of the exemptions from registration outlined in CFTC Regulations 4.13 and 4.14. CTAs and CPOs are regulated by government entities and an industry-wide SRO. The CFTC is the government entity responsible for regulating commodity trading. The National Futures Association (NFA) is the SRO responsible for regulating futures markets. Membership in NFA is mandatory, and the association is financed exclusively from membership dues and assessment fees paid by the users of the futures markets. NFA has the authority to take disciplinary actions against any firm or individual that violates its rules. Full registration as a CPO and CTA is a relatively involved process and typically takes from six to eight weeks to complete. Registration involves submission of Form 7-R for the CPO and a Form 8-R for all natural person Principals and for all APs, along with fingerprints for such Principals and APs, as well as proof that each AP passed the required proficiency exams (generally the Series 3 or 31). At least one Principal will be required to be registered as an AP. Fully registered CPOs will also be subject to CFTC and NFA regulation. Such regulation includes providing disclosure documents to pool participants that are subject to review by NFA; recordkeeping; and periodic and annual reporting requirements, including delivery of audited annual financial statements. In addition, APs of a registered CPO or CTA must satisfy proficiency requirements, generally by taking and passing the Series 3 Examination.

EXEMPTIONS FROM REGISTRATION Below are some of the most notable exemptions from registration. Exemption for CPOs: Rule 4.13(a)(3)

Rule 4.13(a)(3), also referred to as the “private fund de minimis exemption,” exempts persons who are operators of funds for which: interests in the pool are exempt from registration under the Securities Act; the pool engages in a limited amount of trading in commodity interests (e.g., futures, swaps, and options); participation in the pool is limited to certain types of qualified investors; and the pool is not marketed as a vehicle for trading in commodity interests. There are two tests used to determine whether there is “limited trading.”

The first is a “five percent (5%) test,” which compares the amount of margin, premiums, and

minimum-security deposits used to establish the positions in commodity interests to the fund’s liquidation value. The second is the “alternative net notional” test, which looks at whether the net notional value of the commodity interest positions, measured at the time the most recent position is put on, is more than 100% of the fund’s liquidation value.

Accordingly, to satisfy the “limited trading” test, the private fund will have to limit the aggregate

initial margin it posts for its speculative commodities-related trading to 5% of the liquidating value of its portfolio, after taking into account unrealized profits and losses. Alternatively, a private fund may limit the aggregate net notional value of its speculative commodities-related trading positions to 100% of the

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liquidation value of its portfolio, after taking into account unrealized profits and losses (excluding the in-the-money amount of an option at the time of purchase).

In November 2012, the CFTC issued a time-limited no-action letter providing relief from CPO

registration for sponsors of funds of funds. Historically, funds of funds could rely on the de minimis exemption, along with guidance provided in Appendix A to Part 4 of the CFTC regulations used to calculate whether a fund was within the de minimis threshold. Since Appendix A was rescinded as a part of Dodd-Frank the CFTC informally indicated that Appendix A may continue to be relied upon until revised guidance is issued (see CFTC Letter to Investment Adviser Association and Managed Fund Association, No. 12-38 (November 29, 2012)) .

This no-action letter is the CFTC’s formal indication that funds of funds may continue to rely on

the guidance in the rescinded Appendix A until the later of June 30, 2013, or six months from the date the CFTC issues revised guidance on the methods for calculating the de minimis thresholds under CFTC Regulations 4.5 and 4.13(a)(3). In order to claim this relief, a fund of funds must comply with the eligibility requirements stated in the no-action letter and must file a claim of exemption.

Exemptions for CTAs: Section 4m

Section 4m(1) of the CEA provides an exemption from registration as a CTA for a person who, in the preceding 12 months, has not furnished commodity trading advice to more than 15 persons and who does not hold himself out generally to the public as a commodity trading advisor (CTA).

Section 4m(3) of the CEA provides an exemption from CTA registration for a person:

• Who is registered with the SEC as an investment adviser; • Whose business does not consist primarily of acting as a CTA; and • Who does not act as a CTA to any investment trust, syndicate, or similar form of enterprise

that is engaged primarily in trading in any commodity for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any contract market or registered derivatives transaction execution facility.

Exemption for CTAs: Rule 4.14

Rule 4.14 is the registered investment adviser exemption from registration as a CTA. In order to rely on Rule 4.14: (a) the adviser must be registered under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 or with the applicable securities regulator of any state; (b) their trading in commodity interests must be (i) solely for “qualified entities,” and (ii) solely incidental to its business of providing securities and other investment advice; and (c) the entity must not hold itself out as a CTA.

Registration Lite: Rule 4.7

CPOs of funds whose investors are qualified eligible purchasers must still register with the NFA; however, they may be able to take advantage of the scaled-back disclosure, recordkeeping, and periodic reporting requirements applicable to other registered CPOs.

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Investment advisers that qualify for the exemption described above are still generally subject to the following requirements under either CFTC or SEC rules:

• Investment advisers must file a publicly available notice disclosing the exempt status that

may be reviewed on the CFTC or NFA web site; • Investment advisers must provide investors with an offering memorandum containing

information such as fees, transferability of fund interests, conflicts of interest, and other matters; and

• Investment advisers must provide investors with quarterly account statements and an annual report.

Claiming the Exemptions

The exemptions described above are not self-executing. To claim an exemption, the adviser must electronically file a notice of eligibility with the NFA. In addition, private funds must make certain disclosures to each prospective investor regarding the fund’s exempt status. In order to retain ongoing eligibility for the exemption, advisers that are still eligible for relief must affirm the accuracy of their original notice of exemption on an annual basis.

FIDUCIARY ISSUES: OPERATING THE FUND

Nowhere does the Investment Advisers Act expressly create a fiduciary duty for investment advisers. However, the courts and the SEC have established a fiduciary standard governing the conduct of an investment adviser’s entire relationship with clients and prospective clients. Accordingly, there was never a need by Congress to codify it. As a fiduciary, the investment adviser must avoid conflicts of interest with clients, disclose all material facts to clients and prospective clients, and avoid overreaching or taking unfair advantage of a client’s trust. A fiduciary owes its clients more than mere honesty and good faith alone.

This position is well supported by the courts. In the 1963 landmark decision, the United States

Supreme Court in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963) created a federal fiduciary duty that all investment advisers, registered and unregistered, must fulfill. In its decision, the Court neither stated nor implied that the Investment Advisers Act created a fiduciary duty governing advisers, but it did hold that inherent in the Investment Advisers Act was a recognition that a fiduciary duty existed between investment advisers and their clients.

This position was later upheld by the Supreme Court in Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S.

462 (1977), in which Justice White wrote in the now-famous footnote 11 that Congress “intended the Investment Advisers Act to establish federal fiduciary standards for investment advisers.”

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Disclosure Obligations

Encouraging disclosure of information is a fundamental principle of the securities laws. Under the federal fiduciary standard, a core duty of all investment advisers of private funds is to disclose the material facts relating to the investment to the investors in the fund. The SEC has codified this duty in Rule 206(4)-8 under the Investment Advisers Act, which states:

(a) It shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act, practice, or course of business within the meaning of section 206(4) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80b-6(4)) for any investment adviser to a pooled investment vehicle to: (1) Make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, to any investor or prospective investor in the pooled investment vehicle.

On top of Rule 206(4)-8 is Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which states: It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

In addition, many state securities laws impose similar duties. For example, California

Corporations Code Section 25401 makes it unlawful: For any person to offer or sell a security in this state or buy or offer to buy a security in this state by means of any written or oral communication which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.

It is important to note that when an investor subscribes to interests in a fund, that investor is buying a security and bringing Rule 10b-5 and the various states’ Blue Sky Laws into play. Avoiding the liability imposed by these rules and Blue Sky Laws makes it imperative that the investment adviser refrain from misrepresenting or concealing facts that a prospective investor may deem important. Accordingly, even though each investor in the fund may be a sophisticated, high net worth investor, great care still must be taken when drafting PPM to include meaningful disclosure that includes at a minimum the following items:

• Investment objectives, policies, and processes;

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• Background of the investment adviser and the portfolio managers; • Terms of the offering; • Investment advisory fees, performance fees, and other expenses; • Conflicts of interest; • Risks of investing in the fund; • Redemptions; • Allocations of profit and loss; and • Tax considerations.

Due Diligence

Investment advisers to private funds have a duty to ensure they have a reasonable basis for making investment decisions for the fund. Accordingly, it is important for investment advisers to have a rigorous investment process for selecting portfolio investments. An area that has begun to attract increasing attention is the process employed by investment advisers in evaluating other third-party investment advisers selected by funds of funds.

Private fund advisers will choose to engage third-party service providers to perform a number of

critical services for the fund, such as investment management, custody, valuation, client intake and service, account reconciliations, and corporate action processing. However, when the investment adviser hires a third-party investment adviser, the investment adviser still retains its fiduciary responsibilities for formulating a reasonable basis for selecting the underlying investment adviser, just as it has when selecting an individual security. As a result, fiduciary duty dictates that investment advisers develop and implement strong due diligence process when selecting and retaining third-party investment advisers, so they can demonstrate the level of judgment and care a reasonable person would take in formulating a reasonable basis for entering into an agreement or transaction.

In 2003, then-Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE) Director Lori Richards

reminded investment advisers they have an affirmative duty to supervise under the Investment Advisers Act (Remarks at Investment Counsel Association/IA Week Investment Adviser Compliance Summit, April 28, 2003). Ms. Richards noted that the SEC believed that investment advisers had devoted “less-than-meticulous care” in the area of supervision, particularly sub-advisers. Ms. Richards made it clear that the “track record” alone was not enough; investment advisers need to satisfy themselves that the sub-adviser has on an ongoing basis all the necessary controls in place to evaluate the operational, compliance, and investment risks of third party investment advisers.

In 2011, the SEC filed a complaint against an investment adviser to a private fund of funds for,

among other things, misstating the scope and quality of their due diligence checks on certain managers and funds selected for inclusion in the fund’s portfolio (see SEC v Chetan Kapur; Lilaboc, LLC, d/b/a Think Strategy Capital Management, LLC; Civil Action No. 11-CIV-8094 [S.D.N.Y.]). Although Kapur told investors that all the funds in the portfolio would be selected using a vigorous due diligence process, he instead selected funds that later were revealed to be Ponzi schemes. In 2013, final judgments were entered against Kapur for $3,988,196 in disgorgement and $1,000,000 in civil penalties. In addition, Kapur was ordered barred from the securities industry.

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In another case, In the Matter of Hennessee Group and Charles J. Gradante (Investment Advisers

Act Release No. 2871, April 22, 2009), the SEC charged the investment adviser and its principal with a breach of their fiduciary duties for failing to perform the services they represented they would provide and failing to disclose all material departures from the representations they made to clients. The SEC alleged that the Hennessee Group failed to perform two of the five elements of the due diligence evaluation that they had represented to their clients they would undertake. The SEC also alleged that Hennessee Group had failed to verify a fund’s relationship with its independent auditor, disregarded red flags, and failed to investigate rumors relating to a conflict of interest between the fund and its independent auditor. Hennessee Group and Gradante received censures, cease and desist orders, paid disgorgement in excess of $700,000, and paid civil penalties of $100,000.

These cases illustrate that in a fund of funds context, it is critical for an investment adviser to

adopt and follow a formal due diligence process beyond that of reviewing investment performance. Necessary due diligence includes conducting a general background check into the reputation of the investment adviser and its management, checking disciplinary histories, verifying credentials, and checking the references provided by the private fund into which the fund of funds intends to invest.

It would also be beneficial for the fund of funds investment adviser to evaluate the depth of

management of the underlying investment adviser, and understand where investment responsibilities lie. This will normally entail meeting with management to become familiar with the individuals involved, their capabilities, their business judgment, and their experience in managing and constructing a portfolio. A deeper dive will include analysis of accounting and valuation principles and controls utilized by the investment adviser, a review of the underlying fund’s audited financials, the auditor’s report, and any management letters. Performance Fees

Another core duty under the federal fiduciary standard is to not be overreaching with clients, particularly in the area of fees. Many investment advisers to private funds enter into investment advisory agreements that pay the investment adviser a set advisory fee and a share of capital gains upon or capital appreciation of the fund, commonly known as a performance fee.

To prevent overreaching of clients, Section 205(a)(1) of the Investment Advisers Act generally

prohibits a registered investment adviser from entering into, extending, renewing, or performing any investment advisory agreement that has a performance fee. Under current Rule 205-3, however, an investment adviser may charge performance fees to the following types of clients, because the Rule presumes these types of investors do not need the protections provided by the Investment Advisers Act due to their wealth, financial knowledge, and experience:

• Qualified Client: A natural person or a company who has at least $1,000,000 under

management with the adviser; or who has a net worth of more than $2,000,000; • Qualified Purchasers; or • Knowledgeable Employees (see Section 3(c)(1) Fund above).

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Side Letters

A side letter is an agreement between the investment adviser and the investor that outlines different terms that will apply to the investor’s investment into the fund. Typically the letter will be used to entice early investors to invest in the fund; it can also be used to attract investors who will contribute a large amount of assets to the fund. The side letter can also be used to incentivize a current investor to contribute more assets to the fund. Although the side letter can be an important tool for raising assets, it nevertheless creates a conflict of interest in that it treats investors in the fund differently from each other.

Some of the more common terms in the side letter include: • Reduced Fees: the investment adviser will reduce or waive the management fees or

performance fees for the investor; • Lock-up and liquidity: the investment adviser may reduce or waive the lock-up for a specific

investor. The investment adviser may also allow for greater liquidity (i.e., monthly withdrawals instead of quarterly withdrawals);

• Information: the investment adviser may agree to provide an investor with greater informational rights, such as the ability to request a description of the exact positions of the fund at any given time; and

• Most favored nation’s clause: this allows an investor to get the best deal that the investment adviser gives to any other investor. This clause is usually reserved for very large or very early investors.

In testimony concerning hedge funds before the US Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs

Subcommittee on Securities and Investment, Susan Wyderko, SEC Director of Investment Education and Assistance, indicated that some side letters address matters that raise few concerns, such as the ability to make additional investments, receive treatment as favorable as other investors, or limit management fees and incentives (May 16, 2006 http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ ts051606sfw.htm).

Other side letters, however, are more troubling, because they may involve material conflicts of

interest that can harm the interests of other investors. Chief among these types of side letter agreements are those that give certain investors liquidity preferences or provide them with more access to portfolio information. It should be expected that an examination staff will review side letter agreements and evaluate whether appropriate disclosure of the side letters and relevant conflicts has been made to the other investors.

Use of side letters is not without responsibility and risk. Dodd-Frank imposes certain new specific

recordkeeping obligations on investment advisers of private funds. Specifically, Section 204-2(b)(3)(F) of the Investment Advisers Act now requires an investment adviser to maintain records relating to the “side arrangements or side letters whereby certain investors in a fund obtain more favorable rights or entitlements than other investors.”

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In SEC v Harbinger Capital Partners LLC, Civil Action 12-CV-5028 (SDNY), the SEC alleged, among other things that Harbinger Capital and two principals, Phillip Falcone and Peter Jensen, had participated in a preferential redemption scheme with certain investors in exchange for their vote to raise the gates. During the market turmoil in 2008, the fund was experiencing sizable redemptions and the principals wanted to impose a more restrictive redemption gate, but to do so required shareholder approval. To get approval, they entered into side deals that granted preferential redemption rights to the largest investors. Neither Falcone nor Jensen disclosed the existence of these side letters to the Board or to the other shareholders. They also failed to disclose the existence of side letters in response to investors’ annual questionnaires. Falcone ultimately reached a settlement with the SEC that barred him from the industry for two years.

In a case arising in the Cayman Islands, Lansdowne Limited & Silex Trust Company Limited v.

Matador Investments Limited (In Liquidation) & Ors (23 August 2012), the side letter attempted to eliminate the gating and suspension provisions in the Articles of Association on redemption requests by certain investors. The Articles of Association authorized the directors of the fund to gate and suspend redemptions, but did not empower them to treat investors in the same class differently. The Court failed to enforce the agreement on technical grounds but found that, even if it could be said that there was an ‘oral side letter’ between the Matador fund and the investors concerned, the agreement would have been inconsistent with the Articles and would not have been effective in changing the prescribed redemption and suspension process for those investors.

For side letters to be valid and enforceable, the Articles must permit the fund to relax their gating

and suspension provisions. The terms and manner of redemption from a fund must be ‘sufficiently’ set out in the company’s Articles. It is sufficient, for this purpose, for a fund’s Articles to set out the general gating and suspension powers and to specifically cross-reference another document (most commonly, the PPM) that lays out the mechanics of how the directors intend to exercise those powers.

These cases emphasize the importance of providing investors transparency in relation to key

investment terms. In particular, to the extent that investors in a fund receive preferred treatment, that position needs to be ascertainable by both new and existing investors. This does not mean that the specific details of side letters are required to be disclosed to all investors and potential investors. However, new investors must be aware, from a plain reading of the PPM, that the fund is entitled to offer different terms to different investors. Even if the specific terms are not disclosed, the new investor is nonetheless able to undertake a risk analysis and make an informed decision whether or not to invest.

Side-By-Side Management

Side-by-side management refers to the practice of having the same portfolio manager simultaneously managing accounts with substantially similar investment strategies and policies. Within an investment adviser that advises private funds, mutual funds, and separate accounts, the investment strategies and fee structures for each client will be different. The private fund may be shorting a security that another client owns. The mutual fund or separate account may charge a flat fixed fee of 1% while a private fund may charge a fixed fee of 1% plus a 20% performance fee on net profits.

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Because most investment advisers compensate their investment personnel in part on revenue, portfolio managers have an incentive to focus more attention on the fund that generates the highest revenue. In addition, the 1% and 20% fee schedule of most private funds may tempt the portfolio manager to allocate his or her best ideas to the private fund at the expense of the accounts that simply pay a flat fixed fee. Accordingly, this practice of side-by-side management has come under increased scrutiny, because of the inherent conflict of interest and actual abuse by investment advisers and portfolio managers seeking to maximize their personal returns.

In testimony concerning hedge funds before the of the US Senate Banking, Housing and Urban

Affairs Subcommittee on Securities and Investment, Susan Wyderko, SEC Director of Investment Education and Assistance, reported that almost 15% (379) of the private fund advisers registered with the SEC also advise at least one mutual fund (May 16, 2006 http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ ts051606sfw.htm). Because the adviser’s fee from the private fund is based in large measure on the fund's performance, and because the investment adviser typically invests heavily in the private fund itself, the SEC believes this “side-by-side” management presents significant conflicts of interest that could lead the investment adviser to favor the private fund over other clients. Accordingly, based on this belief,, investment advisers can anticipate the SEC staff will focus their review on whether the investment adviser has developed sufficient controls to prevent such bias and to determine whether, in fact, the adviser has favored its hedge funds over other clients.

Item 6 of Form ADV Part 2A requires investment advisers to disclose to clients that performance

fees may give the investment adviser an incentive to favor performance fee accounts over non-performance fee accounts. It also requires the investment adviser to disclose whether it has policies that guide portfolio managers to base their investment decisions on the client’s best interests and procedures to monitor compliance. These could include:

• Allocation policies that prohibit taking compensation into consideration; • A CIO approval process for shorting securities held long in other accounts; • Performance dispersion among accounts; • Analysis of allocations among accounts; and • Trading patterns.

Side Pockets

A side pocket is simply a separate account created by the fund to segregate illiquid or hard-to-value securities. The remaining liquid securities remain in the fund’s portfolio, subject to the fund’s investment advisory fee, performance fee, and liquidity needs. The side pocket, however, is typically illiquid and can remain so for lengthy periods of time until the investment adviser can liquidate the assets in an orderly fashion. Funds may continue to charge management fees but generally charge no performance fees on side pockets, though they are typically paid, if at all, once the assets are liquidated. Any investor that redeems their account in whole will still remain in the side pocket until the assets can be sold and the proceeds distributed.

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Side pockets can arise from a planned purpose of an illiquid security or the unplanned shift of status for a position from liquid to illiquid. Upon the creation of the side pocket, new investors to the fund do not share receive any allocation of profits or losses from an investment in the side pocket. Rather, their purchased interest in the fund is solely the fund’s portfolio.

Thus, in the event of a side pocket, the ongoing, realized returns to old and new investors would

differ. When a side pocket is created, the fund segregates a portion of its assets into a separate illiquid investment vehicle. These contractual restrictions ensure that, under normal market conditions, the funds can invest in illiquid assets and have the flexibility to meet redemptions without resorting to selling illiquid portfolio assets at “knocked-down” prices. The types of securities that are typical candidates for a side pocket include:

• Private Equity Investments; • Real Estate; • PIPES; and • Securities that lack a readily available market.

Given that investment advisers are paid on both realized and unrealized gains on their

investments, they may be tempted to overvalue an asset whose valuation is difficult to establish. The purpose of the side pocket is to authorize the investment adviser to erect a barrier to guard against the investment adviser collecting too much or too little on performance fees from an asset that is illiquid or hard to value.

During the financial crisis of 2007-2009, market conditions were anything but normal. As market

liquidity dried up and performance suffered, many funds found themselves subject to substantial withdrawal requests that overwhelmed ordinary redemption restrictions, creating a run on many funds. In an effort to turn the tide on outflows, some hedge fund managers enacted side pockets, which stopped investors from redeeming interest in what for many funds were illiquid portfolios. These restrictions were imposed ex-post at the discretion of fund managers and were in addition to the ordinary withdrawal restrictions (e.g., lockups and redemption notice periods) present ex-ante in the partnership agreements.

Side pockets had a negative impact on fund reputations that spilled over across the hedge fund

family. The continuing notoriety of side pockets is partly due to investor outrage over being unable to access their capital during the crisis and partly due to investment managers abusing side pockets in order to preserve fund capital and earn excess fees.

The SEC has brought two enforcement cases involving side pockets. In SEC v. Goldfarb, an investment adviser allegedly concealed more than $12 million in investment proceeds that it owed fund investors by using a side pocket to hide the profits. In SEC v. Mannion, the first side pocket case of its kind, the SEC alleged that a hedge fund manager overvalued illiquid assets in a side pocket and extracted excessive management fees, based on the asset values in the side pocket.

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Side Pocket Policies to Consider

• Establish conditions under which the investment adviser may side pocket an investment and procedures for side pocketing an asset;

• Establish criteria for the investment adviser to follow when deciding that an investment is no longer eligible for a side pocket;

• Establish limits on the amount of assets that may be side pocketed at any one time; • Establish procedures for determining fair valuation of side pocketed assets; and • Establish policies for disclosing when a fund side pockets an asset.

FUND OPERATIONAL ISSUES Custody

SEC-registered investment advisers with custody of client assets must comply with the “Custody Rule” under the Investment Advisers Act (Custody Rule). An adviser has custody if it or a related person holds, directly or indirectly, client funds or securities or has any authority to obtain possession of them. One of the more commonly overlooked examples of custody is the adviser that serves as the general partner of a private fund. The Custody Rule prescribes a number of requirements designed to enhance the safety of client assets by insulating them from any possible unlawful activities or financial reverses of the investment adviser, including insolvency. The Custody Rule’s key safeguards include:

• Rule 206(4)-2(d)(2) requires “qualified custodians” to hold client assets. An adviser with

custody generally must maintain client funds and securities at a qualified custodian (e.g., a bank or a broker-dealer), either in a separate account for the client under the client’s name or in an account under the adviser’s name as agent or trustee for the adviser’s clients but that contains only client assets (i.e., client assets may not be commingled with the adviser’s assets).

• Rule 206(4)-2(a)(2) requires notices to be sent to clients detailing how their assets are being held. An adviser that opens an account with a qualified custodian on the client’s behalf must notify the client in writing and provide the client with certain information. However, the adviser who distributes audited financial statements to investors in the private fund does not need to give notice.

• Rule 206(4)-2(a)(3) requires the qualified custodian to send account statements quarterly to clients detailing their holdings. An adviser must have a reasonable basis, after due inquiry, for believing that the qualified custodian sends account statements to clients at least quarterly. However, the adviser who distributes audited financial statements to investors in the private fund does not need to send quarterly statements.

• Rule 206(4)-2(a)(4) requires that advisers who have custody of client assets in many cases must undergo an annual surprise examination by an independent public accountant that verifies client funds and securities. The public accountant must also file a Form ADV-E to document the surprise exam. However, the adviser who distributes audited financial statements to investors in the private fund is deemed to have satisfied this requirement.

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In light of the 2008 Bernard Madoff scandal, where the former NASDAQ Chairman admitted that the wealth management arm of his business was an elaborate $50 billion Ponzi scheme, custody has moved to the forefront of the SEC’s attention. Previously, custody was considered a non-event. Despite its seemingly straightforward requirements, complying with the custody rule has proven elusive. SEC’s National Examination Program has observed widespread and varied noncompliance with elements of the Custody Rule. Of the 140 advisers examined, one-third had custody-related issues. One of the biggest issues was that many advisers weren’t even aware what custody actually meant and the how the Custody Rule applied. The SEC also found instances investment advisers commingling client money with their own. The SEC was so concerned with the deficiencies that it issued a public risk alert on March 4, 2013, alerting investment advisers that OCIE inspectors had found significant deficiencies involving advisor custody and safety of assets, and therefore investment advisers should review their practices accordingly (see http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/custody-risk-alert.pdf). Lock-Up Periods

Private funds invest in complex and illiquid assets. Because they offer redeemable claims to investors, however, their strategies and survival are constrained by their ability to retain outside financing. Private funds, therefore, typically maintain withdrawal restrictions, such as lock-ups, to slow down the flow of capital from their funds. These contractual restrictions ensure that, under normal market conditions, the funds can invest in illiquid assets and have the flexibility to meet redemptions without resorting to selling illiquid portfolio assets at “fire-sale” prices. Lock-up provisions restrict an investor's ability to withdraw capital from a hedge fund for some stated period of time.

Traditionally, it was common for hedge funds to lock-up an investor's contribution for one or two

years. In the wake of the recent financial crisis, lock-up provisions received considerable negative publicity as investors attempted to withdraw funds to meet liquidity needs, and were unable to do so. As such, many hedge funds launched since the financial crisis have determined not to include a lock-up on investor capital. These funds will generally restrict liquidity in other ways, for example, by decreasing the frequency of periodic withdrawal dates and increasing notice periods to effect a withdrawal. Despite the negative association of lock-up provisions, they are still relatively common and are often important for funds that trade illiquid assets.

Lock-up periods longer than two years are rarer in the traditional private fund space. Generally,

most investors want to have some access to their capital, particularly in times of market turmoil and downturns. However, some investors, such as pensions and endowments, are willing to lock money up with a private fund for longer than a year if the investment adviser agrees to discount the fees.

Holdbacks

In the event that an investor withdraws any portion of its interest in a hedge fund, most funds allow the general partner to withhold from the withdrawing investor a specified amount that would

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otherwise be distributable to the withdrawing investor. This is done in order to create a reserve for the investor’s share of the expenses, liabilities, management fees, and obligations with respect to the fund’s general and side pocket investments, or to accommodate any adjustments required in connection with the fund’s audit. Any holdback amounts are segregated from the investor's capital account or side pocket account, become a general liability of the fund, and typically do not participate in the profits and losses of the fund or accrue interest.

Gates

A gate is the fund’s right to limit withdrawals on any withdrawal date to a certain stated

percentage of the fund’s assets, often between 10% and 25%. If withdrawal requests exceed the gate, then redemptions will be honored on a pro rata basis until the redemption amounts reach the gate. Gates are a very common feature in many funds, particularly those with portfolios that hold thinly-traded or illiquid securities. Without gates, an investment adviser, in order to satisfy redemption requests, might be forced to sell positions in a falling market at unfavorable prices in order to gain necessary liquidity. This would adversely affect the net asset value of the fund owned by remaining investors. Unrelated Business Income Tax

Even though an investor in a private fund is recognized as tax-exempt (e.g., a pension or foundation), it still may be liable for tax on unrelated business income generated by the fund. Generally, the term “unrelated business income” means the gross income derived from any unrelated trade or business regularly conducted by the exempt organization, less the deductions directly connected with carrying on the trade or business. Incurring “acquisition indebtedness” in the purchase of securities is not inherent in the performance of an exempt purpose (Alabama Central Credit Union v. United States, 646 F. Supp. 1199 [N.D. Ala. 1986]). Accordingly, an exempt organization that purchases securities on margin with borrowed funds will generate unrelated business income subject to unrelated business income tax (UBIT).

For domestic funds organized as limited partnerships or limited liability companies and treated as

flow-through entities for tax purposes, the UBIT issue arises when the fund makes profits on securities that were purchased with borrowed funds. The income generated by the fund through borrowing will flow through and be attributed to the tax-exempt investor, subjecting the investor to UBIT. Since most tax-exempt investors will avoid any fund that has the potential of generating unrelated business income, the investment adviser must create an offshore investment company organized either side-by-side with the domestic fund or within a master-feeder fund structure.

Another thing to consider is that for there to be “acquisition indebtedness,” there must be a debt.

Acquisition indebtedness does not include the “borrowing” of stock from a broker to sell the stock short. Although a short sale creates an obligation, it does not create debt. Acquisition indebtedness does not include an obligation to return collateral security provided by the borrower of the exempt organization's securities under a securities loan agreement. This transaction is not treated as the borrowing by the exempt organization of the collateral furnished by the borrower (usually a broker) of the securities.

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Form PF Reporting Obligations

Registered investment advisers (including advisers to hedge funds, private equity funds, and liquidity funds) with at least $150 million in private fund assets under management must periodically file a reporting form, Form PF. The information reported in Form PF will be used by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to monitor risks to the US financial system and by the SEC to conduct risk assessments of private fund advisers. The type of information that is required to be disclosed on Form PF and the frequency of filing depends on whether the investment adviser is an adviser to private equity funds, hedge funds, or liquidity funds or a “large private fund adviser,” which for a hedge fund adviser is an adviser with at least $1.5 billion in hedge fund assets under management.

All investment advisers required to file a Form PF must provide basic information in Sections 1a and 1b. Section 1a requires information about the adviser and all related persons whose data is included; the large trader identification number, if any; the regulatory assets under management and net assets under management broken out by types of funds advised; and any assumptions made in responses to any question in Form PF. Section 1b requires information for each advised fund, including identifying information, gross and net asset values, investor concentration, borrowing and liquidity, and performance. There are also questions regarding a fund’s investment in other private funds and parallel managed accounts. Hedge fund advisers must disclose information about investment strategies, identification of significant credit risk, and trading and clearing practices in Section 1c.

Large private fund advisers must provide more detailed information than smaller advisers. Section 2a of Form PF requires that large hedge fund advisers disclose aggregate information regarding their hedge funds, including information regarding exposures by asset class, geographical concentration of investments held by funds, and the monthly value of portfolio turnover by asset class.

Section 2b of Form PF concerns registered advisers that are large private fund advisers and that

advise at least one “qualifying hedge fund,” a hedge fund with a net asset value of at least $500 million. Such advisers must disclose information for each qualifying hedge fund relating to fund exposures, portfolio liquidity, unencumbered cash holdings, identification of the fund’s base currency, collateral practices with significant counterparties, risk metrics, market risk, concentration of positions, and trading and financing for each such hedge fund. Avoiding Publicly Traded Partnership Status

Under certain circumstances, the fund, whether organized as a limited partnership or a limited liability company, can forfeit its flow-through tax treatment. If the fund is considered a “publicly traded partnership” (PTP) for US federal income tax purposes, and doesn’t meet a “qualifying income” test, the partnership will be treated as an association taxable as a corporation for US federal income tax purposes, with various adverse tax consequences for the fund and its investors.

This includes (a) the imposition of US corporate income tax filing and payment obligations on the

fund with respect to the partnership’s worldwide taxable income (in the case of a partnership organized under US law); (b) possible treatment of the partnership as a “passive foreign investment company”

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(PFIC), or as a “controlled foreign corporation” (CFC) (in the case of a partnership organized under non-US law), resulting in additional tax filing and payment obligations for US taxable investors; and (c) the inability of investors to benefit from the pass-through treatment of the partnership’s items of income and loss. The term “publicly traded partnership” means any partnership if:

• Interests in such partnership are traded on an established securities market; or • Interests in such partnership are readily tradable on a secondary market (or the substantial

equivalent thereof).

There are three principal safe harbors most relevant to private equity and similar partnerships: (a) “private placements”; (b) “lack of actual trading”; and (c) “qualified matching services,” all as set forth in Treasury Regulations, 26 CFR 1.7704–1:

(g) Matching service: (1) In general. For purposes of section 7704(b) and this section, the transfer of an interest in a partnership through a qualified matching service is disregarded in determining whether interests in the partnership are readily tradable on a secondary market or the substantial equivalent thereof. A matching service consists of a computerized or printed listing system that lists customers' bid and/or ask quotes in order to match partners who want to sell their interests in a partnership (the selling partner) with persons who want to buy those interests. Matching occurs either by matching the list of interested buyers with the list of interested sellers or through a bid and ask process that allows interested buyers to bid on the listed interest. (h) Private placements: (1) In general. For purposes of section 7704(b) and this section, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (h)(2) of this section, interests in a partnership are not readily tradable on a secondary market or the substantial equivalent thereof if—(i) All interests in the partnership were issued in a transaction (or transactions) that was not required to be registered under the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77a et seq.); and (ii) The partnership does not have more than 100 partners at any time during the taxable year of the partnership. (j) Lack of Actual Trading— … interests in a partnership are not readily tradable on a secondary market or the substantial equivalent thereof if the sum of the percentage interests in partnership capital or profits transferred during the taxable year of the partnership (other than in transfers described in paragraph (e), (f), or (g) of this section) does not exceed 2 percent of the total interests in partnership capital or profits.

It is because of the “Lack of Actual Trading” safe harbor that most funds impose strict limitations on the transferability of fund interests.

Funds can still avoid publicly traded partnership status for any taxable year if the fund can meet

the gross income test. The fund meets the gross income requirement for any taxable year if 90% or more of its income comes from interest, dividends, real property rents, gains from the sale of real property, gains from the sale of stock, securities, foreign currencies, and other income derived with respect to the business of investing in stocks, securities, or currencies.

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ERISA ISSUES

The volume of ERISA issues is so great that most investment advisers elect to avoid its application. Below is a summary of some of the more salient ERISA issues.

Pension plans are a vital source of capital for investment advisers that cater to institutional

investors, but at the same time they pose significant challenges. The investment adviser of a private fund that accepts an investment from pensions will need to familiarize itself with the US Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The fiduciary duties under ERISA are demanding and unforgiving.

Depending on the composition of the shareholders in a private fund, the fiduciary provisions of

ERISA may impose limitations on investment by a private fund. Once “Benefit Plan Investors” cross the 25% threshold of equity ownership in the private fund, the assets of the fund will be considered ERISA “plan assets” and the ERISA fiduciary standards will apply to the fund. The general partner and investment adviser of the fund become fiduciaries, which then brings into play the “prohibited transaction” and other restrictions under ERISA.

An ERISA fund manager must acknowledge its fiduciary responsibility under ERISA rules and must be in compliance with ERISA requirements at all times. There are prohibitions on an ERISA account entering into cross trades. Provisions in governing documents that require the fund to indemnify and hold investment managers harmless for gross negligence are unenforceable. Then there is the requirement that all ERISA fiduciaries maintain a 412 bond (named after Section 412 of ERISA).

ERISA fund managers must also consider prohibited transactions and parties in interest

transactions as defined under Section 4975 of the Internal Revenue Code. For example, performance fees may be considered self-dealing prohibited transactions. However, performance fees would be allowed if the following standards were met: (i) the fee arrangement were approved by the plan fiduciary; (ii) most investments were readily marketable; and (iii) all other investments (not readily marketable) were appraised by an independent appraiser chosen by the plan fiduciary.

Finally, ERISA requires additional disclosures at the plan level. ERISA compliance requires the

fund to file Form 5500 in addition to its income tax return. Further, Schedule C of Form 5500 requires disclosure of direct compensation paid by the plan. This includes management fees and performance fees paid by the ERISA plan to the fund manager, as well as other fees that might be paid in connection with certain investments. In addition, regulations under Section 408(2)(b) require investment advisers to make certain disclosures regarding their services and compensation prior to entering into, extending, or renewing an advisory arrangement with the plan.

Rather than deal with the significant requirements and obligations of ERISA, many investment

advisers simply limit investment in the fund by benefit plan investors, so that participation is less than 25% of the equity ownership of the fund, the so-called “25% exception.”

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ERISA EXEMPTIONS Venture Capital Operating Company

Private equity funds and venture capital funds typically fall within one of two ERISA exceptions:

(1) the so-called “25% exception,” which exempts a fund from ERISA if benefit plan investors do not hold 25% or more of any class of equity interests in a fund; or (2) the Venture Capital Operating Company (VCOC) exception, which exempts funds that make private equity investments and maintain certain management rights with respect to a majority of their portfolio company investments.

Real Estate Operating Company

Real estate funds generally fall within one of three ERISA exceptions: (1) the 25% exception, (2) the VCOC exception, or (3) the Real Estate Operating Company (REOC) exception, which exempts funds with certain real estate investments in which the fund has the right to participate in management or development decisions.

Alternative Investment Fund Manager Directive (AIFMD)

Investment advisers to private funds organized and/or marketed abroad should be aware of the regulatory framework known as the Alternative Investment Fund Manager Directive (AIFMD), which applies to alternative investment fund managers (AIF Managers) that conduct business in the European Union. US investment advisers that manage European funds, have European shareholders in their offshore funds, or market their offshore funds to European investors, will be subject to certain parts of the AIFMD effective July 22, 2014.

Included in AIFMD are detailed provisions governing delegation, the calculation of assets under management, leverage, reporting and disclosure obligations, conflicts of interest, risk and liquidity management, and the safeguarding of assets by depositaries. One of the key issues arising out of AIFMD is the ability of US investment advisers to market their funds to investors in the European Union. Generally, in such circumstances, US investment advisers may continue to make use of existing private placement regimes provided that: (i) they comply with certain disclosure and transparency requirements, (ii) appropriate information sharing agreements are in place between the relevant competent authority in each Member State and the relevant competent authority in each of the jurisdictions of establishment of the US investment adviser, and (iii) the jurisdictions of establishment of the US investment adviser are not on the Financial Action Task Force's list of high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions. The ability to make use of member state private placement regimes may be withdrawn in 2015, meaning that US investment advisers will, from 2015, have to register and be EU authorized in order to do private fund business in the European Union.

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CONCLUSION Although hedge funds are unregulated, they remain highly complex entities whose various permutations are driven principally by the bargaining power of both investment advisers and investors, alike. It is my hope that I have given readers an introduction into the issues of operating a hedge fund and explanations of how to address them. Please do not hesitate to contact me for comments and questions. Good luck and good investing. Charles H. Field Chapin Fitzgerald LLP 550 W C Street, Suite 2000 San Diego, California 92101 619.241.4810 cfield@cftriallawyers.com

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ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, and INITIALISMS Alternative investment fund managers (AIF Managers) Alternative Investment Fund Manager Directive (AIFMD) Associated Person (AP) Blue Sky Laws Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) Commodity Pool Operator (CPO) Commodity Trading Advisor (CTA) Controlled foreign corporation (CFC) “Custody Rule” under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Custody Rule). Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank) Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) Form PF Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Investment Advisers Act) Investment Company Act of 1940 (Investment Company Act) Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) National Futures Association (NFA) Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE) Passive foreign investment companies (PFICs) Private Investments in Public Equity (PIPEs) Private Placement Memoranda (PPMs) Publicly traded partnership (PTP) Real Estate Operating Company (REOC) Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO) Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Subcommittee on Securities and Investment Unrelated business income tax (UBIT) US Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) Venture Capital Operating Company (VCOC)