Saturday, January 31 - Tuesday, February 3, 2009Final Program

La Quinta Inn & Suites, and Henry B. Gonzalez Convention CenterSan Antonio, Texas

Health Physics SocietyMidyear Meeting

Recent Advances in Planning andResponse to Radiation Emergencies

2009 Topical MeetingHealth Physics Society

(The Forty-Second Midyear Topical Meeting of the Health Physics Society)American Academy of Health Physics

Friday, January 30, 2009

Fin a n c e c o mmit t e e8:00 - 11:00 am Fiesta Aa bh p pa r t i i pa n e l w o r k s h o p8:00 am - 5:00 pm Bowie Westh ps e Xe c u t iVe c o mmit t e eNoon - 5:00 pm President’s Suite (Founders)

Saturday, January 31, 2009

a a h p e Xe c u t iVe c o mmit t e e8:00 am - 5:00 pm 101B (CC)a bh p pa r t i i pa n e l w o r k s h o p8:00 am - 5:00 pm Bowie Westh ps bo a r d o F d ir e c t o r s8:00 am - 5:00 pm Crockett East/Westpr o g r a m c o mmit t e e t a s k Fo r c e 11:00 am - 1:00 pm 101A (CC)c o n t in u in g e d u c a t io n c o mmit t e e12:45 - 1:45 pm Bowie East

Sunday, February 1, 2009

h is t o r y c o mmit t e eNoon - 1:30 pm Bowie West2010 pd s  Fa c u l t y me e t in g 1:30 - 2:00 pm Bowie Wests c ie n t iFic & pu bl ic i s s u e s c o mmit t e e4:00 - 5:30 pm Fiesta A

Health Physics Society Committee Meetingsa ll meetings take place in the l a Quinta h otel

unless noted by c c (h enry b . g onzalez c onvention c enter)

Monday, February 2, 2009

s c ie n c e s u ppo r t c o mmit t e e9:00 - 11:00 am Bowie Westn 12.22 w o r k in g g r o u p9:00 am - 4:00 pm 102B (CC)l a b a c c r e d i t a t io n po l ic y c o mmit t e e10:00 am - 12:30 pm Bowie Eastin t e r n a t io n a l c o l l a bo r a t io n c o m-mit t e e11:30 am - 2:00 pm Bowie Westl a b a c c r e d i t a t io n a s s e s s me n t c o m-mit t e eNoon - 2:00 pm Bowie Easta d h o c c o mmu n ic a t io n a n d o u t -r e a c h c o mmit t e e12:15 - 2:00 pm 102A (CC)h o me l a n d s e c u r i t y c o mmit t e e5:30 - 6:30 pm Bowie West

Tuesday, February 3, 2009

a n s i n 42.320 c o mmit t e e9:00 am - Noon 102A (CC)

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Table of ContentsCommittee Meetings . . . . . . . . . .Inside Front CoverTours/Social Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2Exhibitors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6Technical Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13Abstracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21Author Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53Floor Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Inside Back Cover

La Quinta Inn & Suites - San Antonio Convention Center303 Blum

San Antonio, TX 78205 USA 210-222-9181

h ps board of d irectorsRichard E. Toohey, President

Howard Dickson, President-ElectKevin L. Nelson, Past-President

Kathryn H. Pryor, SecretaryRobert Cherry, Jr, Secretary-Elect

Darrell R. Fisher, TreasurerRichard J. Burk, Jr., Executive Secretary

boardLiz Brackett Eric Goldin

Barbara L. Hamrick Nolan E. Hertel

Michael LewandowskiMathew P. Moeller

Ali A. Simpkins Dan Strom

Terry Yoshizumil ocal a rrangements c ommittee

Michael A. Charlton (Co-Chair)John Salsman (Co-Chair)

Ed BaileyStan BravenecRobert EmeryDavid Fogle

Susan JablonskiJohn HagemanKen KriegerJim Lewis

Linda MorrisCarmine Plott

Jay PostonJennifer Watson

John Whiteprogram c ommittee t ask Force

Tara Medich, Task Force ChairNick BatesRobin Hill

Bryan LemieuxChris MartelMatt McFeeLaura PringJeff VollmerHeidi Walton

Speaker Ready RoomSaturday 1:00-5:00 pmSunday & Monday 8:00 am-Noon;

1:15-5:00 pmTuesday 8:00-11:00 am

Registration HoursBallroom A, Foyer (CC)

Saturday, January 31 .......................3:30-6:30 PMSunday, February 1..................7:30 AM-3:00 PMMonday, February 2.................8:00 AM-3:00 PMTuesday, February 3......................8:00 AM-Noon

Exhibit HoursBallroom A (CC)

s unday 4:45-6:15 PM Opening Reception

monday 9:45 AM-4:30 PM Exhibits Open10:00-10:45 AM Refreshment BreaksNoon-1:00 PM Lunch in Exhibit Hall3:15-4:00 PM Refreshment Breaks

t uesday 9:30 AM-Noon Exhibits Open9:35-10:30 AM Refreshment Breaks

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TECHNICAL TOURSmo n d a y , Fe br u a r y 2n d

s outhwest r esearch institute12:30-5:00 pm o n s ite: $20

The Southwest Research Institute (SWRI) is offeringpresentations with selected tours concerning: AerospaceElectronics and Information Technology, Applied Physics,Automation and Data Systems, Chemistry and ChemicalEngineering, Engine, Emissions and Vehicle Research,Fuels and Lubricant Research, Geosciences andEngineering, Mechanical and Materials Engineering,Signal Exploitation and Geolocation, Space Science andEngineering, Training, Simulation, and PerformanceImprovement and Sealed Source Activities. For moreinformation you can look at the SWRI web site athttp://www.swri.org. You must be a US Citizen to take thistour, and you must have a photo id, like a driver’s license,in order to tour the High-Level Radiation Effects Facility(Hot Lab).

t u e s d a y , Fe br u a r y 3r du niversity of t exas h ealth s cience c enter/s an a ntonior esearch imaging c enter2:30-4:30 pm o n s ite: $20

The University of Texas Health Science CenterResearch Imaging Center is home to two Cyclotrons usedfor the advancement of PET imaging research. The facili-ty is the first academic facility to house both an unshield-ed 17 MeV cyclotron as well as a self-shielded 11 MeVcyclotron. The self-shielded 11 MeV cyclotron is part ofthe brand new state-of-the-art imaging facility commis-sioned in 2008. These cyclotrons are used for the produc-tion of F-18 and O-15 radiopharmaceuticals essential tothe complex PET imaging research required to help furtherthe understanding of the human anatomy, metabolic activ-ity, and organ function.

NIGHT OUT/DINNERmo n d a y , Fe br u a r y 2n d

buckhorn s aloon & museum6:30-9:30 pm o n s ite: $55

This San Antonio Night Out tradition will include abuffet dinner of BBQ Poorboy Sandwiches, Hill CountryMarket Sausage, Pecan-Encrusted Fried Chicken Tenders,Salad Wagon, Nacho Station, Fresh Garden Vegetables,Assorted Hill Country Sweets, Coffee and “Beer andMargaritas on the Rocks (sponsored by Canberra).” TheBuckhorn Saloon opened in 1881 with a standing offer toall patrons “Bring in your deer antlers and you can tradethem for a shot of whiskey or a beer.” The BuckhornSaloon collection of horn and trophy mounts grows ascowboys and hunters bring in animals of all kinds for their

free beer. In 1898, Teddy Roosevelt frequented the saloonand recruited Roughriders at the bar. When prohibitionbecame law in 1920, the Buckhorn Saloon became theBuckhorn Curio Museum. As the years passed, the collec-tions increased to include rattlers and other snakes, as wellas birds from all over the world. In 1932, prohibition endedand the Saloon was back in business. The BuckhornMuseum, on the Riverwalk, has been a HPS San AntonioNight Out tradition since the South Texas Chapter hashosted meetings. Join us for a night of Texas style fun,food, and drinks.

RECOMMENDED ON YOUR OWNEXCURSIONS

Family Fun - San Antonio's zoo is home to morethan 3,800 animals representing over 750 species. A fewof the current exhibits are the African Plains, Butterflies!Caterpillar Flight School, Lory Landing, Gibbon Forest,Rift Valley, Cranes of the World, and Kronkosky's Tiny TotNature Spot. The zoo offers educational exhibits alongwith learning resources. The San Antonio Children'sMuseum is located at 305 E. Houston Street, San Antonio,TX and home of the Tooth Booth, Texas Treasure Cave andWild Texas Spring, Kid-powered Elevator, and GoodCents Bank. Brackenridge Park is one of the focal pointsfor outdoor family activities in San Antonio, TX. Thepark is located adjacent to the San Antonio zoo and offerspicturesque views of the San Antonio River while picnick-ing, pedal boating, fishing, birding, bicycling, walking, orhaving the kids play at the playground.

h istoric Fun - San Antonio, TX, is the home of theAlamo that represents nearly 300 years of history. TheAlamo consists of the Shrine, the Long Barrack Museum,and the Gift Museum that exhibits the Texas Revolutionand Texas history. Visitors are welcome to stroll throughthe beautiful Alamo Gardens and take a short walk over tothe River Walk for lunch after the tours. The WitteMuseum is a premier San Antonio museum of South Texashistory, culture, and natural science. The Witte Museumoffers permanent exhibits that include dinosaur skeletons,cave drawings, wildlife dioramas, and even some live ani-mals.

l ocal s porting e vents - The world famous Spursfind their home in San Antonio, TX. Come out and viewsome of our sporting teams including the San AntonioMissions (baseball team), San Antonio Rampage (icehockey) or the San Antonio Spurs (basketball team). TheSan Antonio Spurs have started a dynasty by winning 4NBA basketball championships in the last 10 years.

t he plaza w ax museum - Located in the downtownarea the Plaza Wax Museum is one of the finest wax muse-

Tours...Events...Tours...Events...Tours...Events...Tours...Events...Tours...Events...

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ums anywhere. It is home of the Tinseltown's mostfamous stars, past and present, the Theatre of Horrors, thepageant of Texas History, and the experience of religionhistory. (210) 224-9299

r ipley's believe i t or n ot - Experience the ultimateadventure with Robert Ripley's world-famous collectionfeaturing over 500 exhibits in themed galleries. Some ofthe feature exhibits are the Man with Four Pupils, the Deviland the Damsel, the Lord's Prayer written on a single grainof rice, and the Iron Maiden. (210) 224-9299

n atural bridge c averns - This is a beautiful andhistorical cavern system that offers high energy, education-al, fun and is family oriented. Whether you are a firsttimer, an avid caver or someone in between, NaturalBridge Caverns awaits with a once in a lifetime experienceyou will never forget. You can pan for precious stones,take the ultimate leap of faith from the Watchtower, gocaving on one of the adventure tours or simply experiencenature on the original Discovery Tour.

http://www.naturalbridgecaverns.com

l a Villita - La Villita is located on the south bank ofthe San Antonio River. It was originally a settlement ofprimitive huts for the Spanish soldiers stationed at theAlamo and, after a flood in 1819, was replaced with brick,stone, and adobe houses. La Villita is the site of GeneralSanta Ana's cannon line in the Battle of the Alamo and isnow home to a thriving art community that stands as amonument to San Antonio's past. http://lavillita.com

t ower of a mericas - For more than 35 years, theTower of Americas has offered residents and tourists ofSan Antonio, Texas, the most breathtaking view of AlamoCity. Visitors can dine at the revolving restaurant, ownedby Landry's Restaurants, at the top of the 750-foot-tallTower of Americas, or enjoy the scenery from the observa-tion deck. The Tower of America's is home to a Texas-themed 4-D, multi-sensory theater. (210) 223-3101

s an Jose - This is the second mission of five locatedin San Antonio, TX, and was founded in 1720. The mis-sion Trail Tour includes a tour guide that will cover the fiveSpanish Missions that laid the foundation for the city ofSan Antonio, TX. For more information go to www.mis-siontrailtours.com

s hopping and r estaurantsThe River Walk in San Antonio, Texas is home to

many excellent restaurants a short walking distance fromthe hotel. The main cuisine is Mexican food, but SanAntonio, Texas, is home to other specialty restaurants thatare sure to fulfill your dining needs.

bohanan's (a merican & s eafood) - 219 E. HoustonStreet Bohanan's is located in the heart of historic down-town San Antonio and offers specialty beefs including the

Japanese Akaushi Steaks and Mediterranean Prime AgedCenter Cuts of Midwestern Corn Fed Beef. The menuincludes mouth-watering seafood and flaming table-sidedesserts. www.bohanans.com

boudro's (s outhwestern) - 421 E. Commerce StreetBoudro's is an experience to savor, embracing all the fla-vor of our regional heritage with a distinctive menu ofTexas and Southwestern specialties. Highlighted foodsare the smoked shrimp enchiladas and the blackened primerib to seafood straight from the Gulf. www.boudros.com

c asa r io (mexican) - 430 E. Commerce Street.Casa Rio is one of the first San Antonio businesses to openits doors to the River and is home of a taste of history onthe river. Casa Rio offers a wide variety of Mexican fooddishes that are sure to meet all your expectations.www.casa-rio.com

c ounty l ine (bbQ) - 111 W. Crockett Street CountyLine restaurants have been serving up legendary barbequefor over 25 years. This is located directly on the Riverwalk and offers some down home barbeque taste.www.countyline.com

g uenther h ouse (breakfast & l unch) - 205 EastGuenther StreetThis is the elegant home of the PioneerFlour Mills' founding family. It is located at the foot of theoldest historical district in Texas and is completely restoredfor your pleasure. Guenther House is known for theirexcellent for homemade breakfast foods and offers saladplates for lunch or a lighter side. www.guentherhouse.com

h ard r ock c afé s an a ntonio (a merican) - 111 W.Crockett Street. Hard Rock is a three story restaurant thatis situated along the city's famous Riverwalk area. Therestaurant serves gourmet meals in hefty servings whileoffering a viewing of some rock 'n' roll memorabilia. Besure to visit the gift store for some collectible items beforereturning home. www.hardrock.com

mi t ierra (mexican) - 218 Produce Row. ThisMexican restaurant and bakery is a great tourist attractionand is open 24 hours a day. It features strolling musiciansand a huge selection of classic Tex-Mex meals.www.mitierracafe.com

morton's s teakhouse (a merican) - 300 E. Crockett St. For 30 years, Morton's has served only the finest qualityfood such as USDA prime-aged beef, fresh fish andseafood. www.mortons.com

paesano's r iverwalk (i talian) - 111 W. Crockett StThe guests will enjoy the comfortable contemporary ambi-ence at the Paesano's Riverwalk. It breaks the boundariesof traditional Italian cuisine with modern Mediterraneancuisine. Enjoy the legendary Shrimp Paesano or Oven-Baked Pizzas. www.paesanosriverwalk.com

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r ainforest c afé (a merican) - 110 E. Crockett StThe Rainforest Café has something for everyone fromseafood, beef and chicken to pastas and pizza. Youngerguests can enjoy the new kids menu and everyone is sureto enjoy the rain and the thunderstorms throughout theRainforest. www.rainforestcafe.com

r io r io c antina (mexican) - 421 E. Commerce StThis restaurant serves California Tex-Mex as the specialtyand is one of the best of all that Mexican food has to offerwith a colorful fiesta of freshness and that South-of-the-Border flavor. Try the Enchiladas Suizas, the Fajitas, orthe Queso Flameado. www.riocantina.com

r osarios (mexican) - 910 S. Alamo St. This restau-rant has received national, statewide, and local recognitionwhile being featured in Southern Living Magazine, theNew York Times and San Antonio Express News for beingone of the Top 50 Restaurants for Mexican Food in the US.Be sure to visit this location. www.rosariosa.com

r uth c hris (s teaks/a merican) - 1170 E.Commerce St. This is a great location for atmosphere andoccupies space on three levels. They are known for theirdelicious steaks and superb wines. www.ruthschrissa.com

s chilos (d elicatessen) - 424 E. Commerce St.Schilos is an authentic German Deli serving San Antoniosince 1917. They are known for their delicious root beerand signature cherry cheesecake. www.schilos.com

s paghetti w arehouse (i talian) - 1226 E. Houston StThe Spaghetti Warehouse combines Old World ItalianTraditions with American abundance in hearty, made fromscratch dishes. www.meatballs.com

s ushi Zushi (s ushi & a sian c uisine) - 203 S. SaintMary's. Sushi Zushi is well-known for its sushi but offersa wide variety of Asian Cuisine. To reserve your spotonline go to: http://www.opentable.com/single.aspx?rid=20611& restref=20611

t he palm (s eafood) - 233 E. Houston St. The Palmhas been renowned for its aged USDA prime steaks, JumboNova Scotia lobsters, Italian entrees, and warm smiles withan atmosphere like nowhere else. www.thepalm.com

Zuni g rill (a merican s outhwest) - 223 Losoya St.Breakfast, lunch, and dinner inspired by flavors of theAmerican Southwest. Zuni Grill offers a little somethingfor everyone. Zuni's open, airy spaces and riverside patioseating offer scenic views of the Riverwalk. www.zuni-grill.com

d esserts or s weetsEnjoy some sweets after a long day, or during breaks, atone of the following:

ben & Jerrys - 111 West Crocket Street, Suite 207

h agen daz - 207 Losoya St

This listing is only a few of the wonderful restaurantsyou can taste in the San Antonio area. Please feel free tovisit http://www.alamocity.com/restaurants/ for additionalRiverwalk area restaurants.

n eed c offee?s tarbucks - 111 W Crockett Street (Riverwalk & live

music); 711 E Riverwalk Drive (Marriott Riverwalk)

n ight l ife s cene - d owntownHere are a few of the highlights of the downtown

night life. Everywhere you turn on the Riverwalk there isa place to go for drinks and fun!

c oyote u gly s aloon

Fat t uesday's

h owl at the moon

mad d og's pub

medusa l ounge

pat o 'briens

polly e sther's

s oh o w ine & martini bar

t ower of a mericas

Zenbar u ltralounge

Zinc w ine & c hampagne bar

If you have a car or are willing to pay for a cab rideoutside of downtown, here are some additional places tovisit, shop and eat:

bravo c ucina i taliana (i talian) - 15900 La CanteraParkway. This is a casual eatery offering great Italina foodunder a Roman ruin décor. www.bravoitalian.com

pF c hang's (c hinese) - 255 E. Basse or 15900 LaCantera Parkway. PF Chang's offers a classic blend of Chinesedesign with a modern bistro look. www.pfchangs.com

paloma blanca (mexican) - 5800 Broadway. Well-known for offering San Antonio much more than tradition-al "Tex-Mex" fare. These tempting offers include grilledsnapper, enchiladas verdes, pozole soup, hand-made flau-tas and tacos al pastor. www.palomablanca.net

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t he a lamo Quarry - 255 E. Basse. The AlamoQuarry Market is located just minutes from downtown. Itis nestled in an environment rich with history and has afabulous collection of stores, restaurants and theatres thatwill inspire you to shop all day and play at night. www.the-quarrymarket.com

t he c heesecake Factory (a merican) - 7400 SanPedro Ave. The Cheesecake Factory is known for theirservice and outstanding selection of a variety of foods.Don't forget that before you leave you must try their worldfamous cheesecake.

t he s hops at l a c antera - 15900 La CanteraParkway. This is an open-air marketplace that brings a newvitality and sophistication to shopping in San Antonio.The Shops at La Cantera have a variety of stores andrestaurants to choose from. Visit www.theshopsatlacan-tera.com for more information.

a dditional h ighlights near s an a ntonio, t XHistoric Downtown Fredericksburg, wine vineyards,

and Enchanted Rock: www.fredericksburg-texas.com

New Braunfels, Historic Gruene, www.gruenetexas.com

Prime Outlets - San Marcos was recently ranked the3rd Best Place to Shop in the world as seen on ABC's "TheView." It is a shopper’s haven with over 130 luxury andbrand names such as: Neiman Marcus Last Call ClearanceCenter, Gucci Outlet, Giorgio Armani General Store,Escada Company Store, Polo Ralph Lauren Factory Store,Pottery Barn Outlet, Saks Fifth Avenue OFF 5th, Victoria'sSecret Outlet, Betsey Johnson, Williams-Sonoma Outletand many more! The center features architecture designedafter the Piazza San Marco in Venice, Italy.

Exhibit Hall Floor Plan

2009 Midyear Meeting Exhibitorse xhibits are located in ballroom a (c c )

Exhibit HoursBallroom A (CC)

s unday 4:45-6:15 PM Opening Reception

monday 9:45 AM-4:30 PM Exhibits Open10:00-10:45 AM Refreshment BreaksNoon-1:00 PM Lunch in Exhibit Hall3:15-4:00 PM Refreshment Breaks

t uesday 9:30 AM-Noon Exhibits Open9:35-10:30 AM Refreshment Breaks

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2009 Midyear Meeting Exhibitorse xhibits are located in ballroom a (c c )

2009 a nnual meeting - minneapolis, mn booth: 222 www.hps.org

2010 midyear meeting - a lbuquerque, n m booth: 220 www.hps.org

a a h p/a bh p booth: 406 1313 Dolley Madison Blvd.Suite 402McLean, VA 22101 703-790-1745; Fax: 703-790-2672

bionomics booth: 201 PO Box 817Kingston, TN 37763 865-220-8501; Fax: 865-220-8532www.Bionomics-Inc.com

Bionomics specializes in the management of radioac-tive and mixed wastes including lab and facility decom-missioning.

bladewerx l l c booth: 308 103 Rio Rancho Dr NESuite C4Rio Rancho, NM 87124 505-892-5144; Fax: 505-890-8319www.bladewerx.com

Bladewerx and its subsidairy Shieldwerx provideinstrumentation, custom software, neutron and gammashielding, and neutron activation foils to the radiation pro-tection and measurement industry.

c anberra booth: 302 800 Research ParkwayMeriden, CT 06450 203-639-2148; Fax: 203-235-1347www.canberra.com

Canberra is the world’s leading supplier of analyticalinstruments, systems and services for radiation measure-ment. Applications for Canberra offerings include healthphysics, nuclear power operations, Radiation MonitoringSystems (RMS), nuclear safeguards, nuclear waste man-agement, environmental radiochemistry and other areas.

The new Canberra has the broadest array of HealthPhysics capabilities in the industry. HP related productsinclude a full range of gamma and alpha spectroscopyequipment, personnel contamination monitors, hand heldsurvey instruments for alpha, beta, gamma and neutronmeasurement, whole body counters and area monitors.The company also offers a full range of services includingrepair and maintenance, training and expert data review.

c apintec, inc. booth: 203 6 Arrow RoadRamsey, NJ 07446 201-825-9500; Fax: 201-825-1336www.capintec.com

Absorbed dose alert system for internal contaimina-tion measurements.

c ellular b ioengineering, inc. booth: 303 1946 Young StreetSuite 258Honolulu, HI 96826 808-949-2208; Fax: 808-949-2209www.cellularbioengineering.com

Decon GelTM is a one component, water-based, broadapplication, peelable decontamination hydrogel that lifts,binds and encapsulates contaminants into a rehydratablepolymer matrix. Safe and user friendly, Decon GelTM canbe used for radiological decontamination of radioisotopesas well as particulates, heavy metals, water-soluble andinsoluble organic compounds (including tritiated com-pounds). The product can easily be applied to a wide vari-ety of horizontal, vertical, and inverted surfaces.

c hase e nvironmental g roup inc. booth: 310 3501 Workman RdSuite HKnoxville, TN 37921 865-584-0833; Fax: 865-584-1961www.chaseenv.com

Chase Environmental Group, Inc. is a full-service,decontamination, decommissioning, remediation, andwaste management firm, providing safe, high quality, prac-tical, cost effective solutions to your environmental needs.

c onference of r adiation c ontrol booth: 407 program d irectors (c r c pd )205 Capital AvenueFrankfurt, KY 40601 502-227-4543; Fax: 502-227-7862www.crcpd.org

Conference of Radiation Control Program Directorsis a non-profit, non-governmental professional organiza-tion that promotes consistency in addressing and resolvingradiation protection issues, encourages high standards ofquality in readiation protection programs, and providesleadership in radiation safety and education.

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c rowe and c ompany, l l c booth: 520975 Bacons Bridge RoadSuite 148-252Summerville, SC 29485 800-761-0358; Fax: 888-536-3716www.croweandco.com

Crowe and Company, LLC, a woman-owned, smallbusiness providing Chemical, Biological, Nuclear,Radiological, and High Yield Explosives equipment distribu-tion and consulting, is the exclusive Distributor of JPLaboratories, Inc., for the SIRAD family of products in theUnited States for use by the general population, nuclear powerplants, city, county, state and federal governments.d ade moeller & a ssociates booth: 208 1855 Terminal DriveSuite 200Richland, WA 99354 509-946-0410; Fax: 509-946-4412www.moellerinc.com

Dade Moeller & Associates is a nationally-recognizedconsulting firm specializing in radiological & nuclear safe-ty, public & environmental health protection, occupationalsafety & health, and radiation safety training. We providethe full range of professional and technician services inradiation protection, health physics, and worker safety togovernment and commercial nuclear clients.

d omestic n uclear d etection o ffice (d n d o ) booth: 522 Mail Stop 7100245 Murray Ln, Bldg 410Washington, DC 20528 202-254-7002; Fax: 202-254-7749

e ckert & Ziegler a nalytics booth: 402 1380 Seaboard Industrial Blvd.Atlanta, GA 30318 404-352-8677; Fax: 404-352-2837www.analytics.com

Eckert & Ziegler Analytics provides custom NIST-traceable radioactivity standards for the calibration ofalpha, beta, and gamma-ray counting systems.Radiochemical performance evaluation samples are pro-vided quarterly for effluent and environmental monitoringsystem.

e ckert & Ziegler i sotope products booth: 404 24937 Avenue TibbittsValencia, CA 91355 661-309-1010; Fax: 661-257-8303www.isotopeproducts.com

Eckert & Ziegler Isotope Products, established in1967, supplies quality control standards for nuclear imag-ing, reference and calibration, health physics, and industri-al applications. Featured are solutions, mutinuclide, largevolume and particle standards and sources for researchapplications.

e nergy s olutions l l c booth: 418 423 W. 300 SSuite 200Salt Lake City, UT 84101 865-850-0226; Fax: 801-413-5689www.energysolutions.com

EnergySolutions, LLC is the largest nuclear orientedservices company in the U.S. We provide radiologicalservices and solutions, including surveys, health physicsconsulting, and radioactive waste management, treatment,and disposal to commercial and government organizationsdealing with radioactive material.

F&J s pecialty products, inc. booth: 205 404 Cypress RoadOcala, FL 34472 352-680-1177; Fax: 325-680-1177www.fjspecialty.com

F&J is a manufacturer of traditional and microproces-sor controlled air sampling systems, airflow calibrators,accessories and consumables. Products include HighVolume, Low Volume and PAS air samplers, filter mediaand radioiodine collection cartridges. Most instrumentscomply with ANSI/UL electrical safety standards

Fluke biomedical booth: 2046045 Cochran RoadCleveland, OH 44139800-850-4608; Fax: 440-439-2307www.flukebiomedical.com

Fluke Biomedical provides the latest technology in radi-ation detection meters available with wireless capability. TheVictoreen® ASM 990 Series Survey Meter excels in detect-ing radioactive contamination. The 451P/B Ion ChamberSurvey Meters perform high-sensitivity measurements ofexposure and exposure rate.

Frham s afety products, inc. booth: 322171 Grayson RoadPO Box 36098Rock Hill, SC 29732803-366-5131; Fax: 803-366-2005www.frhamsafety.com

Frham Safety Products, Inc. is the leading supplierNuclear Safety Equipment throughout North America.Serving both commercial and governmental facilities, Frhamoffers innovative radiation and contamination protection, HPsupplies, rad-waste reduction items, and custom manufactur-ing.

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g /o c orporation booth: 215 70161 Highway 59Suite EAbita Springs, LA 70420 985-809-8085; Fax: 985-809-7440www.gocorp.com

G/O Corporation is a supplier of both nuclear andindustrial safety equipment. G/O provides health physicssupplies, rad-waste reduction items, many custom signageand barrier products

g amma products, inc. booth: 221 7730 W. 114th PlacePalos Hills, IL 60465 708-974-4100; Fax: 708-974-0071www.gammaproducts.com

Alpha/Beta counting systems, sample changers andshields.

h i-Q e nvironmental products c ompany booth: 505 7386 Trade StreetSan Diego, CA 92121 858-549-2820; Fax: 858-549-9657www.Hi-Q.net

HI-Q Environmental Products Company has been aleading Manufacturer of Air Sampling Equipment,Systems & Accessories since 1973. Our product lineincludes: Continuous duty high & low volume air sam-plers, air flow calibrators, radioiodine sampling cartridges,collection filter paper, combination filter holders, and com-plete stack/fume hood sampling systems including theShrouded Probe designed per ANSI N13.1 1999.

h opewell d esigns, inc. booth: 301 5940 Gateway DriveAlpharetta, GA 30004 770-667-5770; Fax: 770-667-7539www.hopewelldesigns.com

Founded in 1994, Hopewell Designs, Inc. providessystems and solutions for irradiation applications, instru-ment calibration, and radiation shielding. We offer stan-dard products and custom designs to meet our customers’stringent requirements. Our customers include governmentlaboratories, universities, nuclear power producers andmanufacturing.

i c x r adiation booth: 321100 Midland RoadOak Ridge, TN 37830865-220-8700; Fax: 865-220-7181www.radiation.icxt.com

ICx Radiation (formerly Target Instruments Inc. andTarget Systemelectronic GmbH) is a manufacturer andglobal provider of Nuclear detection and measurementsystems.

i t ech instruments booth: 519Bat C.E.E.I ProvenceDomaine du Petit, Arbois B.P.8813545 Aix en Provence Cedex 4, FranceFax: 908-531-5638www.itech-instruments.com

Itech-instruments is a manufacturer of premium radi-ation measurement instrumentation. Our products includepulse processing spectrometers, multi-channel analyzersand other data acquisition equipment. Our Inter-Winnersoftware is the standard for premium performance quali-tative and quantitative analysis.

J. l . s hepherd & a ssociates booth: 318 1010 Arroyo Ave.San Fernando, CA 91340-1822 818-898-2361; Fax: 818-361-8095www.jlshepherd.com

Biological research, blood component, sterilizationand process irradiators. Gamma, beta and neutron instru-ment calibration facilities. Automated computer controlsand databases. Irradiator/Calibrator IC security upgrades,service, repair, relocations and decommissioning. Hot cellmanipulators, windows and lead glass available

l ab impex s ystems l td. booth: 506 Impex House, 21 Harwell RoadNuffield Industrial EstPoolet, Dorset BH17 OBE United Kingdom BH21 1QU44-120-2684-848; Fax: 44-120-2683-571www.lab-impex-systems.co.uk

Instruments for Alpha-Beta Continuous AirMonitoring (the SmartCAM), Area Gamma Monitoring,Noble Gas Monitoring and Iodine Monitoring. Completesystems for Stack and Duct Monitoring and Facility widenetworks. Applications within Nuclear, Industrial and PET.

l andauer inc. booths: 305, 307 2 Science Rd.Glenwood, IL 60425 708-755-7000; Fax: 708-755-7011www.landauerinc.com

Personnel radiation detection service.

l aurus s ystems, inc. booth: 217 8779 Autum Hill DriveEllicott City, MD 21043 410-465-5558; Fax: 410-465-5257

Laurus Systems specializes in the sales and service ofquality radiation detection instruments to emergencyresponders, the nuclear industry, health physics, militaryand homeland security. Laurus is a private, 100% woman-owned small business concern that also provides MJWsoftware solutions, training and calibration services

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l udlum measurements, inc. booth: 209 501 Oak Street PO Box 810Sweetwater, TX 79556 325-235-5494; Fax: 325-235-4672www.ludlums.com

Ludlum Measurements, Inc. will be displaying instru-mentation used to detect and measure nuclear radiation.

ma c t e c booth: 420 14062 Denver West ParkwaySuite 300Golden, CO 80401 303-273-5071; Fax: 303-273-5000www.mactec.com

MACTEC routinely saves clients time and money byproviding world-class regulatory and nuclear decommis-sioning program support. Using our proprietary processesand advanced technologies, we not only develop cleanupalternatives, we also execute and manage performance tomeet goals and acquire regulatory approvals.

mirion t echnologies booth: 410 5000 Highlands ParkwaySuite 150Smyrna, GA 30082 770-432-2744; Fax: 770-432-9179www.mirion.com

mJw t echnical s ervices inc. booth: 202 243 Root StreetSuite 100Olean, NY 14760 716-372-5300; Fax: 716-372-5307www.mjwts.com

MJW Technical Services, Inc. provides high qualityand timely calibrations for all types of radiation detectionequipment and is a Service Center for the following man-ufacturers: SAIC, Ludlum and W.B. Johnson. With ourstate-of-the-art calibration facility strategically located inthe Northeastern U.S. we can quickly and efficiently serv-ice customers.

n r r pt booth: 219 PO Box 6974Kennewick, WA 99336509-582-3500; Fax: 509-582-3501www.nrrpt.org

o r t e c booth: 501 801 S. Illinios AvenueOak Ridge, TN 37831865-483-2124; Fax: 865-425-1380www.ortec-online.com

ORTEC has over forty years of experience providingsolutions for a wide variety of Nuclear DetectionApplications. Our team of highly qualified scientists andengineers are dedicated to providing measurement systemsolutions for Homeland Security, Waste Management,Personal Monitoring, In-Situ measurements, andRadiochemistry Laboratory Applications. Visit our boothtoday and allow us to assist you with your NuclearDetection needs.

perma-Fix e nvironmental s ervices booth: 515 701 Scarboro RoadSuite 300Oak Ridge, TN 37830 865-813-1300; Fax: 865-813-1301www.perma-fix.com

Perma-Fix Environmental Services provides turnkeyhazardous, low-level radioactive and mixed waste treat-ment services at our fully licensed and permitted facilities.These services offer our customers the most comprehen-sive hazardous, radioactive and mixed waste treatmentservices capabilities in the U.S.

protean instrument c orporation booth: 416 231 Sam Rayburn PkwyLenoir City, TN 37771 865-717-3456; Fax: 865-717-3456www.proteaninstrument.com

Protean Instrument Corporation is a leading supplierin high performance alpha/beta counting systems and theonly company 100% dedicated to the manufacture of thesesystems. We manufacture a wide range of models, includ-ing automatic, manual, single detector, multi-detector,windowed and windowless. We deliver twice the perform-ance.

Qs a g lobal booth: 317 40 North AvenueBurlington, MA 01803781-505-8256; Fax: 781-359-9179www.qsa-global.com

QSA Global’s Isotrak brand manufactures high quali-ty sources for the calibration of radiation measurementinstruments. Isotrak offers a complete range of NIST-trace-able Reference Sources for Homeland Security applica-tions (ANSI N42.35/38) and a range of instruments like theTeletector 6112B/M and RAD60.

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r adiation s afety & c ontrol s ervices inc. booth: 409 91 Portsmouth AvenueStratham, NH 03885 603-778-2871; Fax: 603-778-6879www.radsafety.com

Health Physics consulting, training, decommissioningsupport, survey instrument calibrations & repairs andsales. Radiation safety program audits, license applicationamendments, and custom software.

r adiation s afety a ssociates booth: 512 PO Box 10719 Pendleton DriveHebron, CT 06248 860-228-0487; Fax: 860-228-4402www.radpro.com

Radiation consulting services, radiochemical analy-sis/lab services, instrument calibration & repair, decontam-ination & decommissioning, professional publications(journals & reference books) and software and detectionequipment for HPs.

r adiation s olutions inc. booth: 517160 Matheson Blvd E, Unit 4Mississauga, Ontario, Canada L4Z 1V4905-890-1111; Fax: 905-890-1964www.radiationsolutions.ca

Radiation Solutions Inc. is a manufacturer of airborne,carborne, and other radiation detection systems. These sys-tems are specifically designed for security, emergencyresponse and general de-contamination surveys.

s . e . international, inc. booth: 514PO Box 39Summertown, TN 38483-0039 931-964-3561; Fax: 931-964-3564www.seintl.com

S.E. International, Inc., manufacturer of the RadiationAlert® product line, offers handheld ionizing radiationdetection instruments including Geiger counters, dosime-ters, and multi-channel analyzers for surface and air con-tamination. Proven reliable in emergency response envi-ronmental, industrial, laboratory, research, Health physics,and educational fields. Stop by to see the new Sentryalarming dose/rate meter.

t echnical a ssociates booth: 508 7051 Eton AvenueCanoga Park, CA 91303 818-883-7043; Fax: 818-883-6103

Recent additions to TA’s Health Physics instrumentline include air and area monitors, which are smarter, moresensitive and more rugged than previously available, inaddition to pipe and plume and the latest advances in porta-bles.

t echnical t esting & a nalysis c enter booth: 206 Oak Ridge National LaboratoryPO Box 2008MS 6075Oak Ridge, TN 37831-6075 865-576-4598; Fax: 865-576-8993http://public.ornl.gov/estd/ACTS/

The Technical Testing and Analysis Center (TTAC) ofOak Ridge National Laboratory offers a full range of testsfor product susceptibility to environmental conditions,electromagnetic environments and mechanical shocks.Tests are routinely performed to the requirements of appli-cable ANSI and MIL (810) standards. The TTAC can alsoperform tests and evaluation to customized test plans.

t he c enters for d isease booth: 521 c ontrol and prevention4770 Buford Highway NE, (MS F-58)Atlanta, GA 30341 770-488-3800; Fax: 404-506-9926www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,Radiation Studies Branch, is pleased to announce a brandnew radiation emergency tool kit for Public HealthOfficials. Please stop by Booth 521 to sign up and receivea free kit. For more information email cdcinfo@cdc.gov.

t hermo s cientific booth: 421 1410 Gillingham LaneSugar Land, TX 77478 713-272-0404; Fax: 713-272-4573www.thermo.com

Radiation safety training and nuclear products.

t hermo Fisher s cientific booth: 417 27 Forge ParkwayFranklin, MA 02038 800-274-4212; Fax: 505-428-3535www.thermo.com/rmp

Thermo Fisher Scientific offers a complete line ofdosimetry detectors and readers to ensure high-qualitymeasurements in health physics applications. Our productline ranges from TLD instrumentation to networkableinstruments and portals which allow for remote data mon-itoring, enhanced reporting capabilities and fast scanningability to a portables line that is scalable to fit your person-al monitoring requirements. We set the standard for activeand passive dosimetry. Our products provide unequalledradiologic performance and protection. For more informa-tion and descriptions of our instrumentation lines can befound at www.thermo.com/rmp.

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t homas g ray & a ssociates inc. booth: 319 1205 West Barkley AvenueOrange, CA 92868 714-997-8090; Fax: 714-997-3561www.tgainc.com

Radioactive and hazardous waste brockerage andtrasnportation.

w illiam b. Johnson & a ssoc. inc. booth: 518 200 AEI DriveLewisburg, WV 24901 304-645-6568; Fax: 304-645-2182www.johnsonnuclear.com

Radiation survey meters and portal monitors for HPSand Homeland Security Applications.

Xr F c orporation booth: 320 20M Henshaw StreetWoburn, MA 01801781-933-1600; Fax: 781-933-1606www.xrfcorp.com

Handheld and vehicle mounted radiation detectionequipment.

g . w illiam morgan t rust FundWhen G. William Morgan died in 1984, he

bequeathed a substantial fund to the Health PhysicsSociety. The will requires that the fund's interest be usedto have internationally known experts present papers at theSociety's meetings. Michael C. O'Riordan of the UnitedKingdom's National Radiation Protection Board was thefirst international expert to be supported by the Societythrough the Morgan Fund. O'Riordan's presentation"Radon in Albion" was part of the Indoor Radon Session atthe 1989 Albuquerque meeting.

G. William Morgan was a Charter member of theSociety and during the Society's early years a very activemember. Bill began his health physics career at Oak Ridge

National Laboratory as part of the Manhattan Project. Helater joined the Atomic Energy Commission and wasinstrumental in the development of the initial regulationsthat became part of 10 CFR Part 20. He was a great cham-pion of education and helped establish the AEC HealthPhysics Fellowship Program. Bill later became very suc-cessful in the real estate business, but always retained hisinterest in the health physics profession. The Society'sPresidents Emeritus Committee has responsibility for theselection of the international experts who will be support-ed by the G. William Morgan Trust Fund.

t hank you to the following sponsors:c anberra - n ight o ut d rinks

l andauer - l anyards & meeting bags

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Technical ProgramIf a paper is going to be presented by other than the first author, the presenter's name has an asterik (*)

All sessions take place in the Henry B. Gonzalez Convention Center unless noted otherwises unday, Feb. 1

7:00-8:00 am La Quinta

c e l 1 Fiesta c (l a Quinta)international a tomic e nergy a gency t raining packagesfor First r espondersThomas O’ConnellIAEAc e l 2 Fiesta d (l a Quinta)portable r adiation d etectors, s electing the r ight t ool forthe JobJames T. (Tom) VossVoss Associates

8:15 am- 12:15 pm Mission 103SAM-A Plenary Session

Chair: Dick Toohey8:15 a mo pening c ommentsToohey, R.President, HPS

8:25 a m s a m-a .1a Federal interagency-l evel View of r esponse tor adiation e mergenciesTaylor, T.P.Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office ofthe President9:00 a m s a m-a .2Fd n y r esponse to a r adiological e mergency: d ecisionsof the incident c ommandersIngram, R. (G. William Morgan Lecture)Fire Department, City of New York9:35 a m br e a k

10:05 a m s a m-a .3c ommunicating with the media in the a ftermath of ar adiological e mergency: w ho s hould s peak, and w hats hould t hey s ay?Karam, A. (G. William Morgan Lecture)Karam Consulting LLC10:40 a m s a m-a .4monitoring of people Following a r adiation e mergency:c d c ’s r oleMiller, C.W., Ansari, A.*Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

11:15 a m s a m-a .5e pa ’s r esponse r ole after a r adiological e mergencyCardarelli II, J.Environmental Protection Agency, National DecontaminationTeam11:50 a m Questions and a nswers

1:30 - 3:15 pm Mission 103ASPM-A Medical Response Activities by

Hospital and Emergency Medical Systems Chairs: Eva Lee, Ronald Goans

1:30 pm s pm-a .1r adiological e mergency planning for h ealth c areFacilitiesElder, D.H., Strzelczyk, J.University of Colorado Hospital1:45 pm s pm-a .2c ivilian and military partnering d uring a r egional,multiagency e xercise involving multiple “d irty bombs”Wilson, J.E.U.S. Army2:00 pm s pm-a .3t he a bsolute l ymphocyte t est as a t riage instrument inmass c asualty r adiation e ventsGoans, R.E.MJW Corp and the Radiation Emergency AssistanceCenter/Training Site2:15 pm s pm-a .4t he a a pm w orking g roup on r esponse to r adiationincidentsHendee, E., Fairobent, L.AAPM2:30 pm s pm-a .5r apid internal d ose magnitude e stimation ine mergency s ituations using a nnual l imits on intakec omparisonsSugarman, S.L., Toohey, R.E., Goans, R.E., Christensen,D.M.Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site(REAC/TS), Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU),MJW Corp.2:45 pm s pm-a .7a d ecision t ool for o ptimizing d esign of c ommunityr eception c entersLee, E.K., Ansari, A., Caspary, K., Smalley, HK.., Chen, C.H.Georgia Tech, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

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3:00 pm s pm-a .8o n involvement of h ematological u nits and bone-marrow t ransplantation c entres in d elivery of h ealthc are to Victims of r adiological a ccidentsGrahev, M., Melkova, K., Frolov, G., Pushkareva, S., Davtyan,A., Konchalovsky, M., Bushmanov, A.*Burnasyan Federal Medical Biophysical Centre of FMBA ofRussia, Blohin Cancer Russian Centre

1:30 - 4:45 pm Mission 103BSPM-B Special Session: Nevada Test Site

Contributions to Radiological Emergency Response and

Homeland SecurityChairs: Carson Riland, Craig Marianno

1:30 pm s pm-b.1t he r ole of the n evada t est s ite in h omeland s ecurityand r adiological e mergency r esponseRiland, C.Remote Sensing Laboratory2:00 pm s pm-b.2a s olution for r eal-t ime a cquisition, a nalysis, andd issemination in s upport of n uclear e mergency r esponse Essex, J., Marianno, C.Remote Sensing Laboratory2:15 pm s pm-b.3l ocating illicit r adioactive material: instrumentationd esign c onsiderationsMarianno, C.Remote Sensing Laboratory2:30 pm s pm-b.4a erial n eutron d etection of c osmic-r ay interactions withthe e arth’s s urfaceMaurer, R., Stampahar, T., Smith, E.Remote Sensing Laboratory2:45 pm s pm-b.5a ms n ational r eachback c apability - n ew a erial t oolsfor h elping the e mergency r espondersWasiolek, P., Lyons, C.NNSA/RSL-Nellis3:00 pm br e a k in e Xh ibit h a l l

3:30 pm s pm-b.6d efensible d ata in a Field t est e nvironmentChilton, G.L., Keegan, R.P., Zajac, F.L., Peppard, R.G.NSTec3:45 pm s pm-b.7r adioscopic s creening of c argoes with d ual megavoltage(meV) e nergy barriers for d etecting n uclear materialsZhang, L., Regentova, E.E., Curtis, S.*, Wilson, Z., Chen, G.University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Varian Medical Systems,Security and Inspection, Inc.

4:00 pm s pm-b.8d osimetry of s creening c argo c ontainers: measurementof isodose l inesPatton, P., Boyd, W., Lowe, D., O’Brien, R., Curtis, S.*University of Nevada, Las Vegas4:15 pm s pm-b.9l aminated a morphous s ilicon n eutron d etectorMcHugh, H.NSTEC/GREAT BASIN4:30 pm s pm-b.10multiple-c oincidence a ctive n eutron interrogation ofFissionable materials Tinsley, J.R., Hurley, J.P., Keegan, R.P., Trainham, R.NSTec

3:45 - 4:45 pm Mission 103ASPM-C Military Response to Catastrophic

Domestic IncidentsChairs: Ken Kerns, Stephen Simpson

3:45 pm s pm-c .1t he u nited s tates a rmy r adiological a dvisory medicalt eam and its o ngoing r ole in r esponding to n ationaln uclear and r adiological e mergenciesMelanson, M.A., Scott, A.L., Miallius, A.P.Walter Reed Army Medical Center4:00 pm s pm-c .2u s a ir Force r adation r esponse Miller, V.J.U.S. Air Force4:15 pm s pm-c .3t he u .s . a rmy d osimetry c enter’s d eployabled osimetry l aboratory: providing r apid, a ccurate, anda ccredited measurements to battlefield and incidentc ommanders in modern o perationsThompson, A., Byrd, D., Harris, B.U.S. Army4:30 pm s pm-c .4t raining in preparation for s tate and l ocal r adiologicalr esponseMcDaniel, B.Volpentest Hazardous Material Management and EmergencyResponse (HAMMER) Training Facility

4:45-6:15 pm Ballroom AExhibits Opening Reception

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monday, Feb. 27:15-8:15 am CELs

c e l 3 mission 103abasic d isaster l ife s upport for r adiological and n uclearpreparedness and r esponseJohn C. WhiteSouthwestern Medical Center at Dallasc e l 4 mission 103bpractical r adiation d etection t raining for Firstr esponders: l essons l earned by r s c s durings upported d rills and e xercises, c ommon mistakesEric L. Darois, Fredrick P. StracciaRadiation Safety & Control Services (RSCS), Inc.

8:30 - 10:00 am Mission 103AMAM-A Radiation Hazards from Radiological

Dispersal Devices & INDsChair: Dan Strom

8:30 a m ma m-a .1e mergency intakes of Fission product mixtures ands ingle r adionuclides for t riageBrodsky, A., Reeves, M.D.G.Georgetown University, Northrop Grumman IT8:45 a m ma m-a .2a ssessing internal c ontamination u sing the c anberrainspector 1000 Following an r d d e ventBurgett, E., Hertel, N.Georgia Institute of Technology9:00 a m ma m-a .4t he r elative importance of internal d ose: a n a nalysis ofthe d etonation of a l ow y ield improvised n uclear d evicein an u rban s ettingRaine, D., McClellan, G., Millage, K., Nelson, E.Applied Research Associates, Inc., Defense Threat ReductionAgency9:15 a m ma m-a .5u pdate on plans to e liminate c esium c holorideRushton, R.Hopewell Designs, Inc.9:30 a m ma m-a .6r adiological d ispersion e vents: w hen t here’s n o d eviceand n o bombStrom, D.J.Pacific Northwest National Laboratory9:45 a m ma m-a .7l essons l earned from the First n uclear t est at t rinityShonka, J., Widner, T.Shonka Research Associates, ChemRisk, Inc.10:00 a m br e a k in e Xh ibit h a l l

8:15 am - 12:15 pm Mission 103BMAM-B Special Session: Radiological

Emergency Planning and Public HealthChairs: Ruth McBurney, Charles Miller

8:15 a m ma m-b.1public h ealth r esponse to a n uclear/r adiologicale mergencyLanza, J.J.Florida Department of Health8:35 a m ma m-b.2t he r ole of c d c in a public h ealth e mergencyinvolving r adiation or r adioactive materials Miller, C.W.Centers for Disease Control and Prevention8:55 a m ma m-b.3c hallenges of population monitoring Following ar adiological e mergencyWhitcomb, Jr., R.C.Centers for Disease Control and Prevention9:15 a m ma m-b.4public h ealth o rganizations’ involvement in planningfor r adiological e mergenciesBlumenstock, J.S.Association of State and Territorial Health Officials9:35 a m ma m-b.5c d c -c r c pd r oundtable on c ommunication andt eamwork: k eys to s uccessful r adiological r esponseSalame-Alfie, A.New York State Department of Health9:55 a m panel d iscussion

10:15 a m br e a k in e Xh ibit h a l l

10:45 a m ma m-b.6t he r ole of Volunteer r adiation professionals inimproving r adiological preparednessAnsari, A.Centers for Disease Control and Prevention11:05 a m ma m-b.7e stablishing a r adiation r esponse Volunteer c orpsPassetti, B., Williamson, J., Gilley, D.B.*Florida Bureau of Radiation Control 11:25 a m ma m-b.8pennsylvania’s e xperience in involving h ealth physicsVolunteers in e mergency preparedness and r esponseYusko, J.G.Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection

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11:45 a m ma m-b.9c r c pd ’s r ole in e mergency preparedness:c onsistency, partnerships, and r esourcesSteves, K.Kansas Department of Health and Environment12:05 pm panel d iscussion

10:30 am - Noon Mission 103AMAM-C Cleanup of Areas Affected by Nuclear

Weapons or Dispersal DevicesChairs: Derek Favret, Nick Bates

10:30 a m ma m-c .1a n s i /h ps s tandard n 13.12: s tatus r eport on ther evision to the s urface and Volume c learance s tandardKennedy, Jr., W.E.Dade Moeller & Associates10:45 a m ma m-c .2a pplications of the h istorical e mergency r esponse andmodern-d ay c haracterization and c leanup of a n uclearw eapons a ccident s ite to First r espondersHackett, J.R., Caputo, D., Tepperman, M., Weismann, J.Cabrera Services, Inc. 11:00 a m ma m-c .3c lean-up and s ource r ecovery at a Former w eaponss torage a rea “c ” s tructureFyffe, J.G.U.S. Air Force11:15 a m ma m-c .4u se of g eospatial information s ystems in n uclearw eapons or r adiological d ispersal d evice e mergencyr esponseBahl, C., Favret, D.U.S. Air Force11:30 a m ma m-c .5e nvironmental protection a gency a irborne g ammae mergency mapper projectCardarelli II, J.J., Thomas, M., Curry, T., Faller, S.EPA National Decontaminaiton Team, EPA RadiologicalEmergency Response Team11:45 a m ma m-c .6u se of s wipe s amples in r esponse to a r adiologicald ispersal d evice incidentGogolak, C.V.Consultant

Noon-2:00 pm Ballroom AComplimentary Lunch in Exhibit Hall

1:30 - 2:00 pm Ballroom A FoyerPoster Session

p.1 t omorrow’s g amma-r ay s pectroscopyt echnology: t ransition e dge s ensors with 47 eV e nergyr esolution at 103 keVJohnson, T., Ullom, J., Rabin, M.Colorado State University, NIST, Los Alamos NationalLaboratoryp.2 d etect o n-line, u ltra l ow r adiation u sings tatistical methodsGrof, Y., Akbarzadeh, M., Monk, J.CEMRC Carlsbad, WTS Carlsbadp.3 c ++ c omputer c ode for e xact d ecision l evels ande rrors of t ype i w hen the s ample c ount t ime is aninteger t imes g reater than the background c ount t imePotter, W.E., Strzelczyk, J.Consultant, Sacramento, CA, University of ColoradoHospital

2:00 - 5:15 pm Mission 103AMPM-A Integration of Agencies and

Resources & National Response FrameworkChairs: John Till, Amir Mohagheghi

2:00 pm mpm-a .1d ynamic u se of e nvironmental measurement d ata ford ecision-making and c ommunication in e mergencyr esponse s ituationsGrogan, H.A., Mohler, H.J., Rocco, J. R., Stetar, E. A., Till, J. E.*Risk Assessment Corporation2:15 pm mpm-a .2e nvironmental s ampling d uring public h ealthe mergenciesAntenucci, A., Cirino, N., Costello, C.*, Egan, C., Keenan,R., Pennell, P., Rafferty, R., Virgil, M., Wilson, L.New York State Department of Health2:30 pm mpm-a .3t he biodosimetry program at the biomedical a dvancedr esearch and d evelopment a uthority Grace, M., Moyer, B., Voigt, B., Homer, M., Macaluso, A.,Manning, R.BARDA2:45 pm mpm-a .4t he g r ad e r program for Qualifying r adiationd etection s ystems for h omeland s ecurity a pplicationsBlumenthal, D.J., Johnson, M., Sleeper, C.DHS/DNDO, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

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3:00 pm mpm-a .5l aboratory participation in the d epartment ofh omeland s ecurity d omestic n uclear d etection o fficeprogram for Qualifying r adiation d etection instrumentsfor h omeland s ecurity a pplicationsJohnson, M.Pacific Northwest National Laboratory3:15 pm mpm-a .6u .s . d epartment of e nergy c onsequence managementu nder the n ational r esponse FrameworkVan Etten, D.M., Guss, P.P.National Security Technologies, LLC3:30 pm br e a k in e Xh ibit h a l l

3:45 pm mpm-a .7interaction of c ivilian s upport t eam and r egionalh azmat t eams in a r ural s tateCorti, D.University of Montana4:15 pm mpm-a .8t he r ole of the ia e a in responding to n uclear a ccidentsand r adiation e mergenciesKerns, K.Iowa State University, International Atomic Energy Agency4:30 pm mpm-a .9a n independent e xamination of the n ational plannings cenariosWidner, T.E., Le, M.H., Intrepido, A.J.ChemRisk, Inc.4:45 pm mpm-a .10international c onsequence management: a s urveyMohagheghi, A., Sircy, M.Sandia National Laboratories, US Central Command5:00 pm mpm-a .11w h o r e mpa n n etwork and international s ystem ofmedical and public h ealth a ssistance in r adiatione mergenciesCarr, Z., Perez, M.World Health Organization

2:00 - 5:15 pm Mission 103BMPM-B Advances in Instrumentation

Chairs: Frazier Bronson, James Voss2:00 pm mpm-b.1a r adiation d osimeter for First r espondersPatel, G.N., Crowe, F., Watanabe, Y.JP Laboratories, Inc, Crowe and Company, LLC, MasonicCancer Center

2:15 pm mpm-b.2s tatewide implementation of a n ew personal r adiationd etector for e mergency r espondersLombardo, A.J., Desrosiers, A., Seif, T.Polimatrix, IEMA2:30 pm mpm-b.3u s a ir Force Field d eployable e nvironmental d ataa cquisition and position t ransmission s ystem (e d a pt s )modernizationClark, K., Fyffe, J.U.S. Air Force2:45 pm mpm-b.4e mergency r esponse e fficiency c alibrations for portableg amma s pectroscopy instrumentsBronson, F., Bosko, A.Canberra3:00 pm mpm-b.5portable instruments for r eal-t ime r adiation mappingVoss, J.T.Voss Associates3:15 pm br e a k in e Xh ibit h a l l

3:45 pm mpm-b.6d eploying portable c ontinuous a ir monitors fore mergenciesVoss, J.T.Voss Associates4:00 pm mpm-b.7pennsylvania’s r esponse to r adiological a ccidentsYusko, J., Vyenielo, M.Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection4:15 pm mpm-b.8e valuation of r adiological s creening t echnology anda ppropriate t raining procedures: l essons l earnedLe, M.H., Widner, T.E., Intrepido, A.J.ChemRisk, Inc.4:30 pm mpm-b.9u se of isotopic r atios for the identification of e nrichedu raniumKawabata, K., Beimer, S., Honsa, P.U.S. EPA-Las Vegas4:45 pm mpm-b.10d etection of g amma and n eutron s ources u sing portablee quipment - a c omparison of Fundamental physicalparameters impacting the instrument s election ands earch s trategiesIwatschenko, M. A.Thermo Scientific5:00 pm mpm-b.11e nsuring r eliability of r adiation d etection e quipmentthrough n ational and international s tandardsChiaro, P.J.Oak Ridge National Laboratory

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t uesday, Feb. 38:30 am - 12:15 pm Mission 103A

TAM-A Training and Guidance forProfessionals, First Responders, First

Receivers and Members of the Public inResponse to a Radiological Attack

Chairs: Ray Johnson, Tom O’Connell 8:30 a m t a m-a .1introduction and d emonstration of the “r adiologicale mergency c ommand packet”Crawford, J.University of Missouri-Columbia8:45 a m t a m-a .2international a tomic e nergy a gency e mergencypreparedness and r esponse for First r espondersO’Connell, T.F.IAEA9:00 a m t a m-a .3t o h elp First r esponders - i t’s t ime for u s to becomemyth bustersJohnson, R.Dade Moeller and Associates9:15 a m t a m-a .4e lements of the h istory of poisoning that c an improveour e mergency r esponse r eadinessWidner, T. E., Le, M.H., Intrepido, A.J. ChemRisk, Inc.9:30 a m t a m-a .5w ho’s e mpowered to protect, h ow are they e mpowered,and w hat d o t hey n eed to k now?Strom, D.Pacific Northwest National Laboratory9:45 a m t a m-a .6a c ombined h ardware-s oftware s trategy for t riage ofinternally c ontaminated personsWaller, E., Wilkinson, D.University of Ontario Institute of Technology, DefenceResearch and Development Canada - Ottawa10:00 a m br e a k in e Xh ibit h a l l

10:30 a m t a m-a .7n uclear w eapon a ttack r esponse: s uggestedmethodologies for r educing r adiation FatalitiesAnderson, V.E., Thomas, J.M.California Department of Public Health10:45 a m t a m-a .8planning t ools for o perating c ommunity r eceptionc enters in r esponse to l arge s cale r adiatione mergenciesAnsari, A., Caspary, K.Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Oak RidgeInstitute for Science and Education11:00 a m t a m-a .9r adiological e mergency planning for public h ealthprofessionals and First r espondersSalame-Alfie, A., Costello, C.New York State Department of Health11:15 a m t a m-a .10e mergency r esponder c ourses in r adiological andn uclear preparedness and r esponse: t he n d l s Fc oursesWhite, J.C.U-TX Southwestern Medical Center11:30 a m t a m-a .11h ealth physics s ociety as a t raining r esource for publice ducationCrowe, F.A.Crowe and Company, LLC11:45 a m t a m-a .12a n e xternal d ose r econstruction involving ar adiological d ispersal d eviceHearnsberger, D., Poston, J., Hamilton, I.Kaizen Innovations, Texas A&M University, Baylor Collegeof Medicine12:00 pm t a m-a .13g uidance of interregional r adiation e mergencypractical medical t raining - r ussian e xperience Bushmanov, A.U., Kotenko, K.V., Kretov, A.S.FMBC of FMBA of Russia

n o t e Fo r c h pst he a merican a cademy of h ealth physics has approved the following meeting-related activitiesfor c ontinuing e ducation c redits for c h ps:

• meeting attendance is granted 2 c e c s per half day of attendance, up to 12 c e c s;

• a a h p 8 hour courses are granted 16 c e c s each;

• h ps 2 hour pe p courses are granted 4 c e c s each;

• h ps 1 hour c e l s are granted 2 c e c s each.

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8:15 am - 12:15 pm Mission 103BTAM-B Special Session: Recent

Developments in Radiological IncidentPlanning and Response by Federal Agencies

Chairs: John Crapo, David Bowman8:15 a m t a m-b.1n ational preparedness issues r elated to n uclear orr adiological incidentsKish, J.DHS/FEMA8:35 a m t a m-b.2r egional r esponse s tructure for management ofd omestic incidents Daigler, D.DHS/FEMA8:55 a m t a m-b.3protection a ction g uidelines and r ecommendations - a nu pdateTupin, E.US Environmental Protection Agency Radiation and IndoorAir9:15 a m t a m-b.4t he a dvisory t eam for the e nvironment, Food andh ealth a ctivities and initiativesNoska, M.A. US Food & Drug Administration9:35 a m br e a k in e Xh ibit h a l l

10:05 a m t a m-b.5a dvances in d ata management within the Federalr adiological monitoring and a ssessment c enter(Fr ma c )Clark, H., Allen, R., Essex, J., Pobanz, B.US Department of Energy Office of Emergency Response,Chainbridge Technologies, National Security Technologies,LLC, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories10:25 a m t a m-b.6a dvances in r isk c ommunication t ools for s upport toincident managers and d ecision makersCrapo, J.L.Oak Ridge Institute for Science & Education10:45 a m t a m-b.7e stablishing a w eb-based c onsortium of c ytogeneticl aboratories for r apid t riage and e mergency r adiationd ose a ssessmentLivingston, G.K., Jenkins, M.S., Christensen, D.M., Wiley,A.L., Van Dyke, D.L. Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Mayo Clinic

11:05 a m t a m-b.8d evelopment of a r egionally-based a irborne r adiationmonitoring program Remick, A.L., McCall, K.A.US Department of Energy, National Security Technologies,LLC11:25 a m t a m-b.9n uclear/r adiological incident e xercises - Validation ofe fforts, s ource of o pportunities to improveSmith, C.L., Smith, D.E. Oak Ridge Institute for Science & Education11:45 a m Questions and a nswers

1:30 - 2:45 pm Mission 103ATPM-A Interdiction and Security of

Radiological Materials and Border & PortInitiatives

Chairs: William Rhodes, Birsen Ayaz1:30 pm t pm-a .1a preventative r adiological/n uclear d etection programin the s tate of Florida Lanza, J.J.Florida Department of Health1:45 pm t pm-a .2e mergency r esponse c hallenges for h ealth physicistsRhodes, W., Lasche, G.Sandia National Labs2:00 pm t pm-a .3a r eview of r esponse to implementing increasedirradiator s ecurity c ontrols Princewill, J., Sanza, B.Northwestern University2:15 pm t pm-a .4a lternate t echnique for Field e stimation of u raniume nrichmentFavret, D., Gross, I., Meyers, S., Pugh, D.U.S. Air Force, Oak Ridge National Laboratory2:30 pm t pm-a .5background and minimum d etectable a ctivity (md a ) ofr adiation d etectors for h omeland s ecurity bordersAyaz-Maierhafer, B., DeVol, T.A.Clemson University

1:30 - 2:45 pm Mission 103BTPM-B Population Screening and Monitoring

Chair: Gary Kramer1:30 pm t pm-b.1portal monitoring: a methodology for increasingt hroughputKramer, G.H., Hauck, B.*, Marro, L., Capello, K., Chiang, A.Health Canada

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1:45 pm t pm-b.2a d eployable n on-invasive t echnique for s creeningr adiologically e xposed populationsWilkinson, D., Pace, P.*, Wyatt, H., Bugden, M.Defence R&D Canada, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited2:00 pm t pm-b.3a Fast bioassay method for u ranium and plutoniumisotopes in Faecal s amplesLi, C., Varve, Z., Lariviere, D., Sadi, B., Lai, E., Kramer, G.H.Health Canada, Carleton University2:15 pm t pm-b.4o ptimized s r-90 u rine bioassay method for e mergencyr esponseLi, C., Sadi, B., Jodayree, S., Moodie, G., Daka, J., Kramer, G.H.Health Canada, Carleton University2:30 pm t pm-b.5t he n eed to c ollect individual e xposure-r elated d ataFollowing r adiation a ccidents and e ventsSimon, S., Bouville, A.National Cancer Institute

3:15 - 4:15 pm Mission 103ATPM-C Crisis Risk Communication

Chairs: Robert Emery, Robin Hill3:15 pm t pm-c .1t he psychology of n uclear Fear and l oathing: w hy areu .s ., Japanese, and French a ttitudes d ifferent t owardsr adiationThomas, J.California Department of Public Health3:30 pm t pm-c .2a pplication of the ia e a ’s international n uclear e vents cale in c ommunicating e ventsJones, C.G.U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3:45 pm t pm-c .3r isk c ommunication c onsiderations to Facilitate thes creening of mass populations for potientialc ontamination with r adioactive materialsEmery, R.J., Sprau, D.D., Morecook, R.C.University of Texas School of Public Health, East CarolinaUniversity, Houston Community College System4:00 pm t pm-c .4c alculations in d isaster: c omparative r isk a ssessmentand program e valuation methodologyThomas, J., Anderson, V.California Department of Public Health

3:15 - 4:15 pm Mission 103BTPM-D Special Session: Advancements inEmergency Preparedness Regulations and

GuidanceChair: Patricia Milligan

3:15 pm t pm-d .1protective a ction r ecommendation s tudySullivan R.L., Phillips H.A. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3:30 pm t pm-d .2 e vacuation t ime e stimate s tudy and g uidanceMilligan P.A.U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission3:45 pm t pm-d .3r eviewing e mergency preparedness in n ew r eactora pplicationsPhillips H.A.U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission4:00 pm t pm-d .4s tate-of-the-a rt r eactor c onsequence a nalysisSullivan R.L., Phillips H.A. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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s a m-a .1 Taylor, T.; Office of Science andTechnology Policy, Executive Office of the President; ttay-lor@ostp.oep.gova Federal interagency-l evel View of r esponse tor adiation e mergencies

Congress established OSTP through the NationalScience and Technology Policy, Organization, and PrioritiesAct of 1976 (Public Law 94-282). OSTP has two primarymissions. OSTP staff advises the President and his staff onscientific issues. Staff works closely with counterparts inother offices of the Executive Office of the President toensure that science is adequately represented and well under-stood. Secondly, OSTP coordinates research and develop-ment across the federal government. In areas where it is nec-essary to coordinate research across federal agencies, OSTPprovides these agencies with an opportunity to come togeth-er, discuss their research programs and develop a coordinat-ed approach to ensure that there are no gaps in the research,no repetition in research investments, and that budgets arebeing used wisely.

OSTP is engaged in a number of interagency activitiesto strengthen our national response to radiological emergen-cies, particularly in preparation for managing the catastroph-ic consequences of a terrorist attack using a radiological dis-persal device (RDD) or nuclear device. Activities being con-ducted through the National Science and TechnologyCouncil will be described, including the Nuclear DefenseResearch and Development Roadmap and the recently pub-lished Planning Guidance for Protection and RecoveryFollowing RDD and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND)Incidents.s a m-a .2 Ingram, R. (G. William Morgan Lecture);Fire Department of New YorkFd n y r esponse to a r adiological e mergency: d ecisionsof the incident c ommanders

A look at the pre-incident issues faced by responders intechnology, standards, and training that impact planned post-event tactical operations of Fire/HAZMAT, Law Enforce-ment, and Health and Emergency Medical Service providerswith a specific view of the Fire Department, City of NewYork response. This presentation will include a brief reviewof the current state of equipment, technology, standards andtesting for responders today and how the FDNY incorporatesthese capabilities into its training programs and internal tac-tical response plans to meet the goals of the NYC interagencyplan.

s a m-a .3 Karam, A. (G. William Morgan Lecture);Karam Consulting LLC; paksbi@rit.educ ommunicating with the media in the a ftermath of ar adiological e mergency: w ho s hould s peak, and w hats hould t hey s ay?

Anything associated with radiation and radioactivitysparks concerns and fears among the general public, andinterest among the media. In the event of any radiologicalemergency, it will be necessary to tell the public what hashappened and how to keep themselves and their familiessafe; and the most efficient way to do this is through themedia. Fortunately, the media is likely to be at the scenealmost immediately, although their aims may not coincidewith those of the health physicists, emergency responders,and public officials who are addressing the emergency. Thismay produce multiple tensions, exacerbated by the fact thatthose most willing to talk to the media may not be those bestsuited for this role for any number of reasons (e.g. perceivedcredibility, understanding of the issues, the ability to engen-der public trust and confidence, etc.). These issues will beaddressed, drawing upon a combination of observations andpersonal experience gleaned from a decade of working withthe media on various radiological stories. s a m-a .4 Miller, C.W., Ansari, A.; Centers forDisease Control and Prevention; asa4@cdc.govmonitoring of people Following a r adiation e mergency:c d c ’s r ole

Following a radiation emergency, evacuated, sheltered,or other identified members of the public would requireexternal and/or internal radiological monitoring and, if indi-cated, decontamination. In addition, the potentially-impact-ed population would be identified for dose reconstruction,biodosimetry/bioassay, medical treatment (chelation therapy,cytokine treatment, etc.), and possible entry into long-termhealth and medical monitoring programs and registries. Thecurrent capacity to implement these activities at the State,local, Tribal level is extremely limited.

The Department of Health and Human Services hasdesignated the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention(CDC) as the lead agency to coordinate the Federal supportfor population monitoring activities. Under theNuclear/Radiological Incident Annex of the NationalResponse Framework, HHS/CDC is responsible for support-ing State, local, and tribal governments in (1) monitoringpeople for external contamination; (2) monitoring people forinternal contamination; (3) population decontamination; (4)administering available pharmaceuticals for internal decont-amination, as deemed necessary by State health officials; and(5) establishing a registry of potentially exposed individuals,performing dose reconstruction, and conducting long-termmonitoring of this population for potential long-term healtheffects.

Abstracts

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CDC is undertaking a number of activities to fulfill itsresponsibilities in the area of population monitoring. It pre-pared a planning guide for state and local public health plan-ners highlighting the many challenges in a mass casualtyradiation incident and suggesting ways to address those chal-lenges. CDC is also developing improved laboratory tech-niques for radioanalysis of urine bioassays, and it is studyingthe use of existing hospital equipment as well as hand-heldradiation instruments for rapid screening and prioritization ofindividuals with internal contamination. In addition, CDCrecently developed a training toolkit, specifically tailored topublic health professionals, for planning and responding toradiation emergencies. s a m-a .5 Cardarelli II, J.; Environmental ProtectionAgency, National Decontaminaiton Team;cardarelli.john@epa.gove pa 's r esponse r ole after a r adiological e mergency

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) hasstatutory authority to conduct environmental response activ-ities for hazardous substance emergencies, includingradionuclides. These authorities are reflected in the NationalResponse Framework under Emergency Support Function10 and the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex. TheFramework presents the principles that enable all responsepartners to prepare and provide a unified national response todisasters and emergencies. It establishes a comprehensive,national, all-hazards approach to domestic incidents. As laidout under the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex, EPA hasvarying roles and responsibilities associated with a multi-agency response to radiological emergencies, depending onthe ownership or control of the materials involved in theemergency. Other major players at the Federal level includethe Department of Defense, Department of Energy, NationalAeronautics and Space Administration, Nuclear RegulatoryCommission, and Department of Homeland Security, includ-ing Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Coast Guard. Insome cases EPA may lead Federal environmental responseactivities, while in others it may provide support to anotherFederal agency. Regardless of which Federal agency leadsthe Federal response actions, EPA provides long-term coor-dination of Federal support for environmental monitoringactivities through leadership of the Federal RadiologicalMonitoring and Assessment Center, which transitions fromDOE to EPA during the intermediate phase of a response toa radiological emergency. EPA regional and headquarterresources support local and state authorities via the incidentcommand system throughout the response. Decisions aboutclean-up levels and decontamination technologies will bedetermined through the optimization process outlined in theDepartment of Homeland Security guidance on protectiveactions for response to radiological dispersal device (RDD)and improvised nuclear device (IND) incidents. Theagency's response to the TOPOFF 4 RDD exercise, lessonslearned, and a summary of an internal agency RDD recovery

workshop will demonstrate the agency's current capabilities,capacities, and the considerable task that lies before us toeffectively carry out our response and clean-up responsibili-ties. In addition, the actions the agency is taking to enhanceour current capabilities will be presented. s pm-a .1 Elder, D.H., Strzelczyk, J.; University ofColorado Hospital; Deirdre.Elder@uch.edur adiological e mergency planning for h ealth c areFacilities

While radiation accidents are rare, several recent eventsthat involved dispersal of radioactive materials provided les-sons for emergency response planning. In the period imme-diately following a large scale radiological emergency, suchas an RDD, health care facilities may be faced with a suddeninflux of both injured persons and the “worried well.”Hospital planning must include procedures for separating theinjured from those who are concerned about possible con-tamination and for dealing with radioactive contamination ofpatients, equipment and emergency responders. Hospitalsshould also plan for diagnosis and medical management ofindividuals with radiation-induced health effects and com-munication with emergency response networks and the pub-lic. Hospital policies for treating patients who may be con-taminated need to be developed and communicated clearly toemergency department personnel and emergency respondersprior to any emergency situation. Policies should include theidentification of the emergency coordinator and his/her back-up person, guidelines for controlling the spread of contami-nation and the appropriate personal protective equipment thatshould be used to minimize the radiation doses to healthcareworkers. Policies for protective actions and operational pro-cedures during the first 24 - 48 hours must be established inthe planning stage not in the immediate period after theevent. They must be scientifically founded and based on thelatest available data on the probable effects and realistic haz-ard assessments.s pm-a .2 Wilson, J.; U.S. Army; jim.wilson4@us.army.milc ivilian and military partnering d uring a r egional,multiagency e xercise involving multiple “d irty bombs”

In May, 2008, members of the Moncrief ArmyCommunity Hospital (MACH), Fort Jackson, SouthCarolina, participated in a large scale exercise involvingtreating patients injured by the detonation of radiological dis-persion devices. During this scenario, multiple devices weredetonated in a large American city and casualties were trans-ported throughout the United States under the provisions ofthe National Defense Medical System (NDMS). The localoperation in Greenville, SC integrated state, local and feder-al assets to receive, screen and treat patients transported byrail for continuing on medical care and then to place them ina number of local medical centers. Personnel from severallocal hospitals, state and local law enforcement, emergencyservices, animal control, veterinary services and volunteer

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groups were unified under the Incident Command System toestablish a reception area, decontamination facility, and aninitial treatment center and transportation plan. As a result ofthis exercise local responders, civilian and military, increasedtheir abilities to come together quickly and successfullyrespond to a large scale emergency in a relatively short peri-od of time. This talk highlights the capabilities that exist atMACH and the many lessons learned about integration ofmultiple agencies, the absolute necessity for prior coordina-tion and the need for realistic joint training exercises. s pm-a .3 Goans, R.; MJW Corp and the RadiationEmergency Assistance Center/Training Site;ronald.goans@comcast.nett he a bsolute l ymphocyte t est as a t riage instrument inmass c asualty r adiation e vents

Medical triage of a very large population after a masscasualty weapon event is a challenging and resource-inten-sive task. It is possible to distinguish 2 Gy at 48 hours withacceptable sensitivity and specificity by screening each indi-vidual for an absolute lymphocyte count less than 2000/mm^3 (normal range 1500-3500 /mm11 ^3). A pilot studywas undertaken at the Radiation Emergency AssistanceCenter/Training Site (REAC/TS) to simulate blood screeningat the point of triage. Using well-described criticality eventsin the REAC/TS Radiation Accident Registry, the first bloodsample taken from patients was analyzed. Times of the initialblood draw ranged from 4-12 hours post-incident. Good ini-tial hematology data was available for 15 patients in the mod-erate dose range 2-6 Gy (mean dose of 3.7 + 1.1 Gy).Additional cases (n=5) were available for a high dose range(6-100 Gy), while 10 cases were available for relatively lowdose (0-1 Gy). In the dose range 2-6 Gy, the average absolutelymphocyte count (mean + SD) was 1520 + 460/mm^3.Using a triage cut-point of 2000/mm^3, this will give a sen-sitivity and specificity of approximately 85% and a false neg-ative rate and false positive rate of approximately 15%.Assuming a prevalence of 20% irradiated patients in the pre-senting patient base, the positive predictive value of the testin the 2-6 Gy range is 59% and the negative predictive valueis 96%. In the high dose range, the sensitivity of the testapproaches 100%. Furthermore, in the low dose range (< 1Gy), all lymphocyte values were normal. An increase in theprevalence of actually irradiated patients will increase thepositive predictive value of the test and decrease the negativepredictive value. Furthermore, parallel testing with addition-al parameters (time to emesis, neutrophil/lymphocyte ratio,and various biomarkers) will increase the sensitivity of thelymphocyte triage test.

s pm-a .4 Hendee, E., Fairobent, L.; AAPM;eric.hendee@phci.orgt he a a pm w orking g roup on r esponse to r adiationincidents

The American Association of Physicists in Medicinehas recently formed a Working Group on Response toRadiation Incidents. The members have a wealth of knowl-edge in the Medical Response to Radiation Incidents, as itrelates to first responders and hospital activities. We areactively collaborating with organizations such as the HealthPhysics Society, and would like to take this opportunity tointroduce the HPS to our activities and plans for the future. s pm-a .5 Sugarman, S., Toohey, R., Goans, R.,Christensen, D.; Radiation Emergency AssistanceCenter/Training Site (REAC/TS), Oak Ridge AssociatedUniversities (ORAU), Radiation Emergency AssistanceCenter/Training Site (REAC/TS) and MJW Corp.; steve.sug-arman@orise.orau.govr apid internal d ose magnitude e stimation ine mergency s ituations using a nnual l imits on intakec omparisons

It is crucial to integrate health physics into the medicalmanagement of radiation illness or injury. The key to earlymedical management is not necessarily radiation dose calcu-lation and assignment, but radiation dose magnitude estima-tion. The magnitude of the dose can be used to predict poten-tial biological consequences and the corresponding need formedical intervention. It is, therefore, imperative that physi-cians and health physicists have the necessary tools to helpguide this decision making process. All internal radiationdoses should be assigned using proper dosimetry techniques,but the formal internal dosimetry process often takes timethat may delay treatment, thus reducing the efficacy of somemedical countermeasures. Magnitudes of inhalation or inges-tion intakes, or intakes associated with contaminatedwounds, can be estimated by applying simple rules of thumbto sample results or direct measurements and comparing youranswers to known limits for a projection of dose magnitude.Although a regulatory unit, the annual limit on intake (ALI)is based on committed dose, and can therefore be used as acomparison point. For example, internal dose magnitudesassociated with contaminated wounds can be estimated bycomparing a direct wound measurement taken soon after theinjury to the product of the ingestion ALI and the associatedf1 value (the fractional uptake from the small intestine to theblood). International Commission on Radiation Protection(ICRP) Publication 96, as well as other resources, recom-mends treatment based on ALI determination. Often, treat-ment decisions have to be made without having all of theinformation one would like to have. However, one can stillperform dose magnitude estimations in order to help effec-tively guide the need for medical treatment by properlyassessing the situation and appropriately applying basic rulesof thumb.

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s pm-a .7 Lee, E., Ansari, A., Caspary, K., Smalley,H., Chen, C.; Georgia Tech, CDC; eva.lee@gatech.edua d ecision t ool for o ptimizing d esign of c ommunityr eception c enters

Population monitoring is a process that begins soonafter a radiation incident is reported and continues until allpotentially affected people have been monitored and evaluat-ed for: 1) needed medical treatment, 2) the presence ofradioactive contamination on the body or clothing, 3) theintake of radioactive materials into the body, 4) the removalof external or internal contamination (decontamination), 5)the radiation dose received and the resulting health risk fromthe exposure, and 6) long-term health effects. Populationmonitoring (including people and their pets) is accomplishedlocally and is the responsibility of state, local, and tribal gov-ernments. Many critical components of population monitor-ing should be put in place in the first few hours after the inci-dent, before the arrival of federal assets that might be used toassist in the monitoring efforts. However, the challenges ofpopulation monitoring especially in the first few hours anddays after a radiation incident tend to be overlooked in emer-gency response planning. In this talk, we will discuss practi-cal considerations for operating a community reception cen-ter, and the development of a software that can be used as adecision tool for optimizing design of community receptioncenters, building on the established infrastructure and plan-ning at the state and local public health departments through-out the country. The software allows the determination ofappropriate layout of screening centers, estimates and opti-mizes the necessary staffing needs, and provides an insighton process flows and optimal throughput that the operationscan support. It also allows the users to analyze the risks ofradiation contamination spread and determine mitigationstrategies.s pm-a .8 Grahev, M., Melkova, K., Frolov, G.*,Pushkareva, S., Davtyan, A., Konchalovsky, M.; BurnasyanFederal Medical Biophysical Centre of FMBA of Russia,Blohin Cancer Russian Centr; frolov63@bk.ruo n involvement of h ematological u nits and bone-marrow t ransplantation c entres in d elivery of h ealthc are to Victims of r adiological a ccidents

Anybody cannot quite shut out a probability of a large-scale radiological accident. In this case, some hematologyunits of local medical institutions could be involved in med-ical care delivery to radiation accident victims. The experi-ence of hematology unit’s stuff in the management ofchemotherapy induced bone marrow insufficiency and cyto-static injuries of gastrointestinal tract and skin is very impor-tant in the treatment of patients with Acute RadiationSyndrome (ARS). And usually multi-field hospital besideshematology units include blood transfusion services, inten-sive care unit and hemodialysis, specialists in trauma andburn’s treatment, which help may be useful in cases of com-bined radiation injuries. A unified Program for examination

and treatment patients with the ARS for hematology unitswas developed. Because not every hematological unit is pos-sible to perform the necessary treatment of patients withsevere and very severe ARS, the special attention is paid tothe necessity of immediate clinic understanding of the levelof whole body irradiation. This program specifies the exam-inations, following which solutions regarding possible timeof occurring, depth and duration of forthcoming criticalcytopenia would be made within the first week after expo-sure. In turn, this information will help to make decision onthe reasonability of either hospitalization or out-patient treat-ment; to determine the extent of medical care required: anoption of the infection prophylaxis strategy; need in&amp;ntilde;ytokine therapy; fluid resuscitation and transfu-sion of blood cellular components, reasons for allogeneichemopoietic stem-cell (HSC) transplantations; to identifypatients requiring only symptomatic therapy; and to select ahospital for future treatment of the patient. A patient can beexposed to dose > 4 - 6 Gy must be moved up to the inten-sive hematology unit specializing in HSC transplantation.s pm-b.1 Riland, C.; Remote Sensing Laboratory;rilandca@nv.doe.govt he r ole of the n evada t est s ite in h omeland s ecurityand r adiological e mergency r esponse

One of the Nevada Test Site’s (NTS) primary missionsis National Security. The NTS has supported numerousorganizations Homeland Security and RadiologicalEmergency Response needs before, and after 9/11. The NTShas a long history of training emergency response personneland being a part of the Nation’s radiological emergencyresponse teams. More recently, the NTS’ missions haveexpanded to additional training, equipment testing and a vari-ety of other unique homeland security activities. This paperprovides an overview of homeland security activities con-ducted in connection with the Nevada Test Site.s pm-b.2 Essex, J., Marianno, C.; RSL;Essexjj@nv.doe.gova s olution for r eal-t ime a cquisition, a nalysis, andd issemination in s upport of n uclear e mergencyr esponse

The Real-time Data Acquisition and Dissemination(RDAD) architecture is a suite of standards and protocolsthat allow emergency response assets to provide more fielddata, faster, and greater reliability to decision makers. Thesetechnologies allow mobile data acquisition platforms totransmit data through any IP communication channel to cen-tral command and control assets for review and autonomousQA/QC. The RDAD architecture includes flexible clientcomponents including hardened data collection devices thatprovide low bandwidth data transmission capabilities. Thusfar sensor integration has included aerial, vehicle, and pedes-trian based platforms.

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s pm-b.3 Marianno, C.; RSL; mariancm@nv.doe.govl ocating i llicit r adioactive material: instrumentationd esign c onsiderations

Prior to 9/11, specialized instrumentation for detectingillicit radioactive material was almost exclusively in thehands of highly-trained teams from the federal government.These teams were comprised of experts in radiation andradioactive material. Now Homeland Security has investedmillions of dollars in the development of radiation detectionequipment for use by non-experts such as border patrol, cus-toms, and local law enforcement. Due to this new customerbase, the design parameters for these instruments havechanged. They must be easy to use, easy to interpret and, inmost cases, light weight. To achieve these goals, scientistsand engineers must choose the most appropriate detectionmaterial, electronic components, and software/firmware.This talk will examine design considerations for these sys-tems. A review of current commercial systems will be givenin addition to discussing future trends.s pm-b.4 Maurer, R., Stampahar, T., Smith, E.;Remote Sensing Laboratory; maurerrj@nv.doe.gova erial n eutron d etection of c osmic-r ay interactionswith the e arth’s s urface

We have demonstrated the ability to measure the neu-tron flux produced by the cosmic-ray interaction with nucleiin the ground surface using aerial neutron detection. Highenergy cosmic-rays (primarily muons with GeV energies)interact with the nuclei in the ground surface and produceenergetic neutrons via spallation. At the air-surface interface,the neutrons produced by spallation will either scatter withinthe surface material, become thermalized and reabsorbed, orbe emitted into the air. The mean free path of energetic neu-trons in air can be hundreds of feet as opposed to a few feetin dense materials. As such, the flux of neutrons escapinginto the air provides a measure of the surface nuclei compo-sition. It has been demonstrated that this effect can be meas-ured at long range using neutron detectors on low flying hel-icopters. Radiological survey measurements conducted atGovernment Wash in Las Vegas, Nevada, have shown thatthe neutron background from the cosmic-soil interactions isrepeatable and directly correlated to the geological data.Government Wash has a very unique geology, spanning awide variety of nuclide mixtures and formations. The resultsof the preliminary measurements are presented.s pm-b.5 Wasiolek, P., Lyons, C.; NNSA/RSL-Nellis;WASIOLPT@nv.doe.gova ms n ational r eachback c apability - n ew a erial t oolsfor h elping the e mergency r esponders

One of the U.S. Department of Energy’s NationalNuclear Security Administration (NNSA) emergencyresponse assets is the Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL)Aerial Measuring System (AMS) used to detect, measure,and track radioactive material before and during emergenciesto locate sources or determine contamination levels. Since

September 11, 2001, increasing numbers of local, state, andfederal entities are entering into the AMS arena. NNSA hasrecognized a need by these entities for an AMS ReachbackCenter that would provide training and assistance on allaspects of AMS. The Center will assist local, state, and fed-eral agencies in establishing the skills, resources, and trainingneeded for a successful AMS regional operation. Beginningin January 2008 and continuing through April 2008, a pilotprogram was created in collaboration between NNSA and theU. S. Department of Homeland Security’s Domestic NuclearDetection Office (DNDO). The purpose of this collaborationwas to provide aerial radiological surveillance and equip-ment technique training to local law enforcement offices infour major U.S. cities: Chicago, Washington, DC, New YorkCity, and Los Angeles. The Mobile Aerial RadiologicalSurveillance (MARS) training curriculum was developed bypersonnel from NNSA headquarters and NNSA supportteams. A total of 44 students participated in the trainingevents that were held during this period. The positive reac-tion to this program has led to the establishment of the RSLas the headquarters for the National Aerial MeasuringSystem Reachback (NAMSR) Center. The NAMSR Centerwill provide an AMS Home Team aerial stand-by duty teamfor decision makers, state authorities, scientists, and RAPteams to discuss, plan, and analyze available data for aerialresponses. An additional role of the Center will be to serve asthe SME for the training of newly established aerial radiolog-ical monitoring assets. The purpose of this presentation is toreview the history, success, and future plans of the NationalAMS Reachback Center.s pm-b.6 Chilton, G.L., Keegan, R.P., Zajac, F.L.,Peppard, R.G.; NSTec; chiltogl@nv.doe.govd efensible d ata in a Field t est e nvironment

This paper provides an overview of the instrument test-ing campaigns conducted by NSTec at the Nevada Test Sitewith a focus on data quality control. The focus in the past wasto prove that testing can be done correctly, and that it can bedone according to test design. In recent times there has beenan additional focus on proving that the data collection wasdone according to test design. The process of setting up adatabase system to collect test data with integrated qualitycontrol is described. This includes a discussion of the estab-lishment of protocols to collect data in a verifiable manner,and discusses the process of recording Test ObservationReports and Corrective Action Reports. The importance of astrong quality assurance and quality control program isstressed. This work was done by National SecurityTechnologies, LLC, under Contract No. DE-AC52-06NA25946 with the U.S. Department of Energy.

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s pm-b.7 Zhang, L., Regentova, E.E., Curtis, S.*,Wilson, Z., Chen, G.; University of Nevada, Las Vegas,Varian Medical Systems, Security and Inspection, Inc.;sszjcurtis@att.netr adioscopic s creening of c argoes with d ualmegavoltage (meV) e nergy barriers for d etectingn uclear materials

Radiographic screening of cargo containers is per-formed by switching between 6 and 9 MeV of boundaryenergies as rapidly as 200 times per second and measuringthe attenuation of photons in the matter by a detector. The useof high energy photons allows the imaging of materialsthrough the steel cargo container walls. The interdigitatedimaging X-rays are used to distinguish between differentdensities of objects within the container. The collected data istransformed into intensity levels in two interlaced imageswhich can be analyzed for material identification. Materialsbelonging to a target group are identified through the analy-sis of ratios of the dual energy signals and the signal obtainedat 9 MeV level. The shape analysis is invoked to identifyobjects of interest. The techniques are developed for produc-ing a consolidated high quality image suitable for visualinspection and to alert customs officials of a specific threatmaterial (such as SNM). The experiments show the ability ofpenetration through 17 inches of an iron shield. The tech-niques developed contribute to the overall effort to improvethe efficiency and accuracy of material identification at USCustoms inspection facilities. s pm-b.8 Patton, P., Boyd, W., Lowe, D., O’Brien, R.,Curtis, S.*; University of Nevada, Las Vegas;sszjcurtis@att.netd osimetry of s creening c argo c ontainers: measurementof isodose l ines

Due to the increased threat of terrorists’ activities, secu-rity efforts within the United States and aboard have beengreatly intensified. Recent reports suggest that terroristsmight attempt to smuggle either radiological dispersaldevices or weapons of mass destruction through our ports ofentry. In today’s society, it is imperative that the U.S. govern-ment and private sector are able to detect nuclear weaponsmaterials rather quickly. Dual energy x-ray imaging systemsare capable of measuring the effective atomic number of thecontents of a container and determine if the material in thecontainer has an atomic number high enough to be of con-cern. Dual energy x-ray imaging has been a tool in medicaldiagnosis for several years. Subjecting an object to x-rays ofdifferent energies allows for the determination of the atomiccomposition of the material being x-rayed. This is possiblebecause the x-rays either interact through different mecha-nisms or the probability of interaction through a particularmechanism is greatly different. Due to the fact that civiliansmay be in close proximity to containers requiring x-rayinvestigation, it is necessary to determine what radiologicalrisk various x-ray spectrums present to persons exposed by

the primary and secondary beams. This research measuredthe maximum dose rate at different locations within theimaging area for different x ray energy spectrums and vari-ous cargo configurations and geometries. These resultshelped to determine the exclusion area for unshielded cargoimaging. s pm-b.9 McHugh, H.; NSTEC/GREAT BASIN;mchughhr@nv.doe.govl aminated a morphous s ilicon n eutron d etector

An internal R&D project was conducted at the SpecialTechnologies Laboratory of NSTec to determine the feasibil-ity of developing a multi-layer Boron-10 based thermal neu-tron detector using the amorphous silicon (AS) technologycurrently employed in the manufacture of liquid crystal dis-plays. The Boron-10 neutron reaction produces an alpha thatcan be readily detected. A single layer detector, limited to anapproximately 2 micron thick layer of boron, has a theoreti-cal sensitivity of about 3%; hence a thin multi-layer devicewith high sensitivity can theoretically be manufactured fromsingle layer detectors. Working with NREL (NationalRenewable Energy Laboratory), an AS PiN diode alphadetector was developed and tested. The PiN diode wasdeposited on a Boron-10 coated substrate. Testing confirmedthat the neutron sensitivity was nearly equal to the theoreticalvalue of 3%. However, adhesion problems with the Boron-10coating prevented successful development of a prototypedetector. Future efforts will include boron deposition workand development of integrated AS signal processing circuit-ry.s pm-b.10 Tinsley, J.R., Hurley, J.P., Keegan, R.P.,Trainham, R.; NSTec; tinslejr@nv.doe.govmultiple-c oincidence a ctive n eutron interrogation o fFissionable materials

An extension of the Associated Particle Imaging tech-nique that is used for the detection and imaging of hiddenexplosives, the present measurements use a beam of tagged14.1 MeV neutrons in coincidence with two or more gammasto probe for the presence of fissionable materials. We havemeasured neutron-gamma-gamma coincidences with targetsof depleted uranium, tungsten, lead, iron, and carbon and willpresent results that show the multiple coincidence countingrate for the depleted uranium is substantially above for any ofthe non-fissionable materials. In addition, the presence ofcoincidences involving delayed gammas spectra provides asignature for fissionable materials that is distinct from thatfor non-fissionable ones. Information from the tagged neu-tron involved in the coincidence event is used to compute theposition of the fissionable material in all three dimensions.The result is an imaging probe for fissionable materials thatis compact and portable, and produces relatively low levelsof background radiation. Simultaneous measurements onpackages of interest for both explosives and fissionable mate-rials are now feasible.

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s pm-c .1 Melanson, M., Scott, A., Miallius, A.;Walter Reed Army Medical Center; mark.melanson@us.army.milt he u nited s tates a rmy r adiological a dvisory medicalt eam and its o ngoing r ole in r esponding to n ationaln uclear and r adiological e mergencies

Established in 1961, the United States ArmyRadiological Advisory Medical Team (RAMT) is one of theDepartment of Defense’s premier medical response assets.Originally, the RAMT was established to provide world classexpertise in supporting the medical response to a nuclearweapon accident or incident worldwide. In the aftermath ofSeptember 11th, 2001, the RAMT mission expanded toinclude supporting any national nuclear or radiological disas-ter. With the capability to deploy highly trained and robustlyequipped medical and health physics expertise, RAMT isuniquely qualified to offer a wide spectrum of support in theresponse to emergencies ranging from a radiation mishap, toa nuclear weapon accident or incident, to an act of nuclear orradiological terrorism. RAMT’s special capabilities includedecontamination of contaminated patients, ambulances, andmedical treatment facilities, medical management of inter-nally contaminated patients (to include chelation and decor-poration therapy), and radiation risk assessment and commu-nication expertise. Located at Walter Reed Army MedicalCenter in Washington, D.C., the RAMT is a key componentof the National Capitol Area response to a nuclear or radio-logical incident. Given this critical mission, RAMT has coor-dinated and participated in plans and exercises involvingcivilian hospitals and local civilian agencies within theBaltimore - Washington area. This talk will highlight theRAMT’s unique capabilities, recent collaborative efforts, andhow these open partnerships have been mutually beneficial,greatly enhancing the Country’s overall ability to respondeffectively to a nuclear or radiological incident, whatever thecause. s pm-c .2 Miller, V.; Air Force; vivien.miller@us.af.milu s a ir Force r adation r esponse

The unique aspects of the Air Force’s responsibility ofprotecting its assets at home stations and overseas, along withadditional strategic roles and responsibilities, require a dis-tinctive radiation response framework. Historically, thisframework primarily focused on response to the accidentsregarding nuclear weapons (i.e. broken arrow events).Presently the increase in the variety of radiation threats, par-ticularly the change in focus toward radiological dispersiondevices (RDDs), requires the Air Force to establish a com-prehensive response methodology. This presentation willprovide an up-to-date description of the general radiationresponse framework of the Air Force; specifically in regardsto initial (first) and specialized response teams. Initialresponders to a radiation emergency are established at everyAir Force base and are derived from the civil engineering

corps and the biomedical science corps. The Air Force’s spe-cialized response team, Air Force Radiation AssessmentTeam (AFRAT), provides expert radiation response and sup-port as necessitated by the situation. This presentation willprovide an encompassing overview of the resources utilizedby each team, proficiency development through exercise par-ticipation/training, and the integration of these teams withinthe architecture of the emergency response spectrum. Thecontent of this presentation may be of particular interest tocivil response agencies that are located near Air Force bases.s pm-c .3 Thompson, A., Byrd, D., Harris, B.; HealthPhysics Society; aaron.m.thompson2@us.army.milt he u .s . a rmy d osimetry c enter’s d eployabled osimetry l aboratory: providing r apid, a ccurate, a nda ccredited measurements t o battlefield a nd incidentc ommanders in modern o perations

The U.S. Army Dosimetry Center (ADC) issues,receives, and interprets ionizing radiation dosimetry forDepartment of the Army personnel through a NationalVoluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP)approved process. Currently, during possible homeland ortheater radiological emergency operations, soldiers withoutan active ADC account rely on high dose nuclear operationsdosimetry developed during the Cold War. The detectionrange and accuracy of these high dose dosimeters is insuffi-cient for the modern emergency response and theater scenar-ios. The Thermoluminescent Dosimeter (TLD), used by theADC, has the detection capabilities necessary for such sce-narios. The ADC is effective at providing the dosimetryneeds for fixed facilities and regular accounts. However, theADC has had shipping and tracking issues with accounts indeployed operations and is not adept at handling the highspeed turn around of measured data necessary for command-ers in emergency response or theater operations. In responseto these challenges the ADC developed a self-containeddeployable dosimetry laboratory (DDL) capable of monitor-ing radiation exposure on-site. This mobile facility providesimmediate access to over 10,000 TLDs with accreditedmeasurements for commanders. The DDL thus provides anideal extension to the ADC to provide response for emer-gency operations and rapid results for theater accounts. s pm-c .4 McDaniel, B.; Volpentest HazardousMaterial Management and Emergency Response (HAM-MER) Training Facility; Bobby_A_McDaniel@rl.govt raining in preparation for s tate and l ocal r adiologicalr esponse

The National Guard Bureau’s Weapons of MassDestruction (WMD) Civil Support Teams (CSTs), comprisedof full-time Army National Guard and Air National Guardmembers, were established to rapidly deploy and assist andsupport local and state authorities at domesticWMD/Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical (NBC) incidentsites. Their primary role is determining the nature and extentof an attack or incident; providing technical advice on WMD

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response operations; and event identification and support thearrival of follow-on state and federal military response assets.While CSTs are highly skilled and highly trained in chemicaland biological responses some weaknesses in managingpotential radiological events had been identified. Improvedpractical training and radiological exercises were sought byCST leadership. The presentation focuses on training provid-ed by the Volpentest Hazardous Material Management andEmergency Response (HAMMER) training facility locatedin Richland, WA. HAMMER, with teaming fromWashington Department of Health, is providing this training,using radioactive materials, based on a “crawl, walk, run”progression of knowledge and skills. The training culminateswith a final, day-long exercise that simulates a WMD sce-nario using not only sealed radiological sources, but alsoshort-lived, dispersible radioactive material for maximumtraining realism and hands-on experience.ma m-a .1 Brodsky, A., Reeves, M.D., G.; GeorgetownUniversity, Northrop Grumman IT; AlBrodsky@aol.come mergency intakes of Fission product mixtures ands ingle r adionuclides for t riage

Members of the public will need to know quicklywhether they have inhaled or ingested amounts of radioactivematerial that would be likely to harm them following a radi-ological or nuclear attack. Data on symptoms and effects ofexposures to humans, as well as animals, to fission productsin plumes from underground Soviet tests have been declassi-fied by the Khazakhstan government and recently published.These human data tend to confirm the estimates of one of theauthors that an inhalation of about 11 MBq (300 microcuries)of gross fission products decayed less than 30 days after anuclear detonation could be chosen as an “acceptable” emer-gency intake, comparable in acute and chronic effects to theoriginal standard of 25 R of external gamma irradiation.These observations indicate that, for fission product mixturesas well as most other nuclides potentially useful to terroristsfor dispersion among the public, emergency intake quantitiescan be derived that would allow rapid detection of gammaemission outside the body for initial triage with simpleportable instruments. ma m-a .2 Burgett, E., Hertel, N.; Georgia Institute ofTechnology; eric.burgett@nnrc.gatech.edua ssessing internal c ontamination u sing the c anberrainspector 1000 Following an r d d e vent

The Canberra Inspector 1000 has been investigated asa triage tool following a radiological dispersal device. Thiswidely available handheld spectrometer offers an easy to useinterface and allows for isotope identification. Dual settingsallow the user to record a spectrum for analysis as well asread dose rates. The detector utilizes a gain stabilized 3 inchby 3 inch NaI(Tl) detector. The detector’s response has beenmeasured using a slab phantom. These measurements wereused to validate an MCNP model of the detector. The detec-tor’s response to internal contamination after inhalation as a

function of time after the RDD event has been investigated.Monte Carlo simulations using six phantoms based on thestylized Medical Internal Radiation Dose (MIRD) phantomswere used in the study to determine the count rates for thedetectors placed on four different locations, the front and rearright lungs, left thigh, and neck (thyroid). Isotopes that werechosen for investigation were those most likely to be used inan RDD event. The time dependent distribution of theradioactive material in the body organs was calculated usingDCAL. Results for both photopeak integration as well asdose rate response for the Canberra Inspector 1000 will bepresented. This work was performed under funding providedby the Radiation Studies Branch of the Centers for DiseaseControl and Preventionma m-a .4 Raine, D., McClellan, G., Millage, K.,Nelson, E.; Applied Research Associates, Defense ThreatReduction Agency; dudley.raine@ara.comt he r elative importance of internal d ose: a n a nalysis ofthe d etonation of a l ow y ield improvised n uclear d evicein an u rban s etting

One scenario envisioned by those concerned with apotential terrorist attack involves the detonation of a lowyield (<10 kiloton (kT)) improvised nuclear device (IND) inan urban location in the United States. The fatalities andcasualties from prompt weapon effects must obviously beconsidered in such a scenario, as should potential externalradiation exposure due to fallout. The question of the relativeimportance of potential internal doses to the external dose inthe fallout area is invariably raised; this consideration is ofparticular interest when evaluating evacuation vice shelter-in-place options. Calculations were performed using theDefense Threat Reduction Agency’s Hazard Prediction andAssessment Capability (HPAC) tool, the Fallout Inhalationand Ingestion Dose to Organs (FIIDOS) code, and other post-processing algorithms. The analysis provides estimates of theinternal doses expected to be accrued during the aftermath ofthe detonation of an IND and compares them to the expectedexternal doses. The internal dose pathways consideredinclude inhalation and incidental ingestion of both descend-ing and resuspended fallout. The relative impact of eachexposure pathway for shelter and evacuation scenarios isassessed at various locations downwind from ground zero.The HPAC calculations of expected casualties from prompteffects (radiation, thermal pulse, and blast overpressure) andexternal exposure to fallout are also presented to provide anadditional context for the analysis.ma m-a .5 Rushton, R.; Hopewell Designs, Inc.;rorushton@hopewelldesigns.comu pdate on plans to e liminate c esium c holoride

The elimination of cesium choloride is under review bythe Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Cesium-137 is used inhundreds of irradiators for instrument calibration, blood irra-diators, research, and other uses. A report by the NationalAcademy of Sciences in spring of 2008 recommended that

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cesium chloride be eliminated because of the potential riskand large impact that would result from a dirty bomb madeof cesium chloride. This presentation will review the currentstatus of rulings, hearings, and possible schedule for theelimination of cesium chloride. This program has the poten-tial to cause major disruption to the nuclear and medicalcommunities if it is implemented too quickly. The potentialimpact and costs will be reviewed. Alternative technologiesto cesium chloride will be covered. ma m-a .6 Strom, D.; Pacific Northwest NationalLaboratory; strom@pnl.govr adiological d ispersion e vents: w hen t here’s n o d eviceand n o bomb

This presentation is a plea to “think out of the box” inplanning and preparation for radiological attack. Politiciansand the popular press talk about “dirty bombs.” More techni-cal people talk about “radiological dispersion (or dispersal)devices” or RDDs. The use of these terms excludes radiolog-ical dispersion events (RDEs) in which there is no bomb andno device. Historically, not all chemical and biologicalattacks have involved the use of a bomb or device, and suchattacks may have relied on their victims being unaware of theattack until it was too late to invoke protective actions orcountermeasures. It is evident that no announcement of anRDE, through an explosion or otherwise, is needed from thestandpoint of producing dose. From the standpoint of produc-ing terror or mass disruption, once the event is discovered,these will most likely occur with no help form those respon-sible for the RDE. As a basis for planning and preparedness,it may be prudent to assume that all radioactive sources aredispersible, regardless of their original form. Furthermore,consideration of means of dispersion other than emplacementor airborne release should be considered. Finally, largesources in IAEA Categories 1 and 2 are likely to becomemore dispersible over time due to the fact that they are aboveroom temperature due to decay heat, they may have signifi-cant degradation of source form due to self-irradiation, andthey may have significant transmutation of material.Considering transmutation, in the absence of oxygen,137CsCl becomes BaCl2 and Ba metal over time, and90SrTiO4 becomes Zr(TiO4)2 and Zr metal over time; thesemixtures may be expected to have different chemical proper-ties from the original compounds. Considering self-irradia-tion, large sources over a decade old may experience doses inexcess of 10 billion grays, levels that may change their mate-rial properties. RDEs encompass RDD events and dirtybomb events, but may include other means of dispersion.ma m-a .7 Shonka, J., Widner, T.; jjshonka@shonka.coml essons l earned from the First n uclear t est at t rinity

Trinity was the first test of a nuclear weapon. It wasconducted on July 16, 1945 near Alamogordo, New Mexico.Trinity was a test of an implosion-type plutonium bomb witha nominal yield of 20 kilotons. Aside from the external expo-

sure rate, the impact on a downwind population with no pro-tective actions taken has not previously been considered.Current day lessons can be gleaned for consideration of mod-ern radiation emergencies, including considerations of capa-bilities in tools such as the HOTSPOT code. For the lastdecade, the authors have been part of a team conducting theLos Alamos Historical Document Retrieval and AssessmentProject (LAHDRA) for the Centers for Disease Control andPrevention. As an element of our activity, we have retrievedall of the available information on the Trinity test, and haveattempted to understand the significance of the radiologicalimpact, including internal exposures, to off-site populationsfrom Trinity. It was surprising to us that this study had notpreviously been performed. Trinity is unique among nucleartests in that a population was present as close as 25 kilome-ters downwind from a low altitude (30 m) detonation, withno protective measures taken before or afterwards.Numerous pathways for exposure to man were available. Ourstudies to date will be summarized. As an example of thecomplexities that can be considered, exposure to radioactiveiodine was possible through milk (both from grass consump-tion by the cows or goats as well as by ingestion of contam-inated water from dammed impoundments (ponds) used forwatering livestock that served as large-scale fallout collec-tors), consumption of cistern water derived from rooftop col-lectors, inhalation with significant fallout and resuspensionreported by downwinders for days post-event. Any of thesepathways can provide significant thyroid exposures when noprotective action is taken. Other nuclides that have been con-sidered include fission products, strontium and plutonium.ma m-b.1 Lanza, J.J.; Florida Department of Health;john_lanza@doh.state.fl.uspublic h ealth r esponse to a n uclear/r adiologicale mergency

The new National Response Framework (NRF) utiliz-ing the National Incident Management System (NIMS)stresses the all-hazards approach to domestic incident man-agement including nuclear/radiological emergencies result-ing from accidents as well as man-made intentional inci-dents/events. Secondary to the events of September 11, 2001,the public health infrastructure in the United States has beensignificantly augmented. However, recent surveys conductedby governmental and private public health organizationshave shown that public health workers feel that they areunprepared to deal with radiological terrorism/ emergencies.Federal, State, and local public health agencies are develop-ing awareness training programs for emergency responders(i.e., public health workers, first responders, first receivers)and the general public describing the role of public healthduring nuclear/radiological emergencies. This presentationcovers the role of federal response teams and State and localpublic health service providers prior to, and subsequent of, anuclear/radiological emergency. Special attention is paid tothe emergency response structure at all levels.

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ma m-b.2 Miller, C.W.; Centers for Disease Controland Prvention; cym3@cdc.govt he r ole of c d c in a public h ealth e mergencyinvolving r adiation or r adioactive materials

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)is a Cooperating Agency under the Nuclear/RadiologicalIncident Annex of the National Response Framework. Aspart of HHS, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention(CDC) would be a major public health entity responding to anuclear/radiological incident, whether accidental or inten-tional. CDC expects to support HHS by implementing spe-cific roles and responsibilities that include: • Assisting in thedeployment of the Strategic National Stockpile; • SupportingState, tribal, and local officials in monitoring the potentially-impacted population; • Assessing the health of and medicaleffects of radiological exposures on people in the communi-ty, emergency responders and other workers, and high-riskpopulations; • Providing technical assistance, advice, andconsultation to state and local health departments on medicaltreatment, follow-up, and decontamination of victimsexposed to radioactive materials, and protection of food andwater supplies from radioactive contamination; •Establishing and maintaining a registry for long-term follow-up of people exposed to or contaminated by radioactivematerials; • Communicating with the public, policy makers,and the media. Since September 11, 2001, CDC has beenspending an increasing amount of time and resources prepar-ing to fulfill these responsibilities. Working with a variety offederal, state, tribal, and local public health partners, theseactivities include (1) increased participation in emergencypreparedness exercises through the Advisory Team onEnvironment, Food, and Health; (2) development of commu-nication materials for members of the public, clinicians, andpublic health officials; and (3) development of guidelines forhandling contaminated fatalities and monitoring peoplepotentially exposed to radioactive materials. The current sta-tus of these and other activities being undertaken by CDC isdiscussed. ma m-b.3 Whitcomb, R.C., Jr.; Centers for DiseaseControl and Prevention; RWhitcomb@cdc.govc hallenges of population monitoring Following ar adiological e mergency

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)is supporting the Department of Health and Human Services(HHS) by implementing guidance, training, education, andcommunications materials related to population monitoringcalled for under the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex ofthe National Response Framework. CDC is also workingwith its traditional public health partners and the Conferenceof Radiation Control Program Directors (CRCPD) to devel-op a collaborative effort in addressing many of the popula-tion monitoring challenges facing our nation following anaccidental or intentional nuclear/radiological incident. Thesechallenges include: • Epidemiological surveillance systems

are not fully prepared/designed for radiological emergencies;•  Public Health and Radiation Control Programs are notfully integrated in all states; • Public health workforce andclinicians need training to prepare them to respond to a radi-ological or nuclear emergency; and • Clinical laboratorycapability is insufficient or non-existent. Working with avariety of federal, state, tribal, and local public health part-ners, CDC is addressing these challenges by (1) developingepidemiological training focused on assisting state and localpublic health to identify the at risk population; collect andreport radiation-related data with typical morbidity/mortalityevent reporting; and prioritize individuals for decontamina-tion, medical treatment, registries, and long term monitoringprograms. (2) Co-hosting with CRCPD a “Roundtable onCommunication and Teamwork: Keys to SuccessfulRadiological Response”; (3) developing education, training,and communications material for the public health work-force; and (4) developing new methods for rapid analysis ofsmall biological samples for a variety of radionuclides and isseeking resources to develop a public health LaboratoryResponse Network for radionuclides. The current status ofthese and other activities being undertaken by CDC is dis-cussed. ma m-b.4 Blumenstock, J.S.; Association of State andTerritorial Health Officials; jblumenstock@astho.orgpublic h ealth o rganizations’ involvement in planningfor r adiological e mergencies

State public health agencies play a critical and essentialrole in a jurisdiction’s overall readiness planning to effective-ly detect, respond to, and recover from all hazards emergen-cies, including radiation incidents. This includes havingrobust plans and the requisite capacity and capability toeffectively management the consequences of such events tominimize morbidity and mortality through monitoring,analysis and detection, protective actions determination,decontamination and medical countermeasures distribution,and mass casualty medical care coordination. This sessiondiscusses how our Nation’s state and territorial pubic healthagencies, individually and collectively, are assisted and sup-ported by their national association, the Association of Stateand Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO), in fulfilling thismission. Discussion includes overviews of the Association’sVision, Mission and available resources; key program servic-es designed to provide technical assistance and forge soundnational practice policy; peer group support activities; ongo-ing and planned preparedness-related projects relevant toradiological incident planning and response; and opportuni-ties for future collaborations and partnerships.ma m-b.5 Salame-Alfie, A.; New York StateDepartment of Health; asa01@health.state.ny.usc d c -c r c pd r oundtable on c ommunication andt eamwork: k eys to s uccessful r adiological r esponse

In an effort to help prepare the nation for a public healththreat involving nuclear/radiological incidents, the Centers

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for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and theConference of Radiation Control Program Directors(CRCPD) sponsored the “Roundtable on Communicationand Teamwork: Keys to Successful Radiological Response”on June 2008. The purpose of the roundtable was to bringtogether representatives from state and local public healthagencies and radiation control programs to: increase aware-ness and understanding of our responsibilities for preparingand responding to radiological incidents; strengthen commu-nications and improve working relationships among partici-pating organizations; and share information on availableresources. Participants included experts in the broad fields ofhealth physics, hospital preparedness, epidemiology, publichealth preparedness, risk communication, psychology andemergency medicine. Participants represented federal agen-cies, state and local health departments and professionalorganizations. Short presentations about each organizationwere followed by a scenario discussion designed to elicitideas from the participants regarding the role of public healthduring a radiological emergency. It was followed by a pres-entation on the roles of public health during a radiologicalemergency and examples of successful collaboration.Facilitated discussions were used to 1) identify gaps, capabil-ities and strategies; 2) identify ways to strengthen communi-cation; 3) list challenges to both internal and external coordi-nation relative to radiological response; 4) provide short termsolutions to communication issues, and provide a list oforganizations we could partner with or add to our list of ini-tial contacts; and 5) provide some short- and long-termstrategies to continue the newly developed partnership. Therewas a very positive response from the participants and aninterest from all the parties to continue this initial partnership. ma m-b.6 Ansari, A.; Centers for Disease Control andPrevention; aansari@cdc.govt he r ole of Volunteer r adiation professionals inimproving r adiological preparedness

The need for radiation protection expertise in preparingfor and effectively responding to a nuclear or radiologicalemergency is paramount. In case of a terrorist attack involv-ing a radiological dispersal device or an improvised nucleardevice, the public health, radiation control, and emergencymanagement authorities at all levels of government will facemany challenging issues requiring radiation protectionexpertise. For example, local public health authorities willneed to monitor concerned citizens for radioactive contami-nation, provide them with information, and support opera-tions at evacuation centers or shelters to accommodate thedisplaced population. This is likely to be true even in com-munities which are located at a considerable distance fromthe incident scene. The scarcity of resources under those con-ditions will exacerbate the response at local level where theseservices are most needed. In the United States, there are tensof thousands of radiation professionals working at hospitals,universities, nuclear power industry, and environmental,

engineering, and consulting firms. These include healthphysicists, medical physicists, radiological or nuclear medi-cine technologists, and others. If these radiation profession-als participate in available volunteer organizations in theirown communities, they can provide an invaluable and much-needed resource to their community in the event of a radia-tion emergency. To be effective, the enlisting and appropriatetraining of volunteers need to be done before such emergen-cies occur. Fortunately, mechanisms now exist to enlist andtrain interested radiation volunteers in state-wide registries.These state programs are briefly described in the presenta-tion. For volunteer radiation professionals, the time commit-ment is minimal. Potential rewards are significant.ma m-b.7 Passetti, B., Williamson, J., Gilley, D.B.*;Florida Bureau of Radiation Control;debbie_gilley@doh.state.fl.use stablishing a r adiation r esponse Volunteer c orps

In the event of a radiological emergency, populationmonitoring for large numbers of individuals must be avail-able to assist in identifying citizens who may be contaminat-ed with radioactive material and to reassure those who arenot contaminated. The National Response Frameworkassigns coordination of federal support for population moni-toring to Health and Human Services, Public Health andMedical Services function. This coordination of federal sup-port does not necessarily include resources for the actualmonitoring; this is expected to be provided by the state andlocal government. The National Response Framework sug-gests that states need to be prepared to respond to radiologicincidents with the establishment of population monitoringcenters to assist in identifying citizens who may be contami-nated with radiation and to reassure those who are not con-taminated that they may return to a safe location. In an effortto satisfy this requirement, the State of Florida established aRadiation Response Volunteer Corps (RRVC) as a sub spe-cialty of the federally-established Medical Reserve Corps.Members of the health physics and medical physics commu-nity were identified as potential volunteers. Training wasprovided to the volunteers by the Florida Department ofHealth’s Bureau of Radiation Control with assistance fromthe Florida Health Physics Society, Centers for DiseaseControl, and the Florida Medical Reserve Corps. Attendeeswere encouraged to volunteer for this activity through theirlocal Medical Reserve Corps unit. Tools to establish aRadiation Response Volunteer Corps within the MedicalReserve Corps in other states or regions are discussed.ma m-b.8 Yusko, J.G.; Pennsylvania Department ofEnvironmental Protection; jyusko@state.pa.uspennsylvania’s e xperience in involving h ealth physicsVolunteers in e mergency preparedness and r esponse

Several years ago, the need for professional yet volun-teer assistance in responding to radiological incidents withinPennsylvania was recognized, and the Department ofEnvironmental Protection (PA DEP), in conjunction with the

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Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA)developed the Pennsylvania Radiological AssistanceProgram (PA RAP). This is a mechanism for augmentingexisting radiological technical personnel to advise the on-scene incident commander for radiological incidents. A PARAP qualified individual, complete with the necessary toolsand equipment, requisite skills and techniques would bedeployed by PEMA for the technical support regarding radi-ation hazards at a radiological event or incident. The selec-tion, training, equipment, and responsibilities of the volun-teers is discussed and detailed, which includes some of theprocedures utilized by these individuals when their serviceswould be needed in the response to and mitigation of a radi-ological event or incident. Although volunteers are expectedto have a generally satisfactory working knowledge of ioniz-ing radiation and its effects, this is supplemented by both ini-tial and periodic refresher training, which is mandatory for allvolunteer participants in PA RAP.ma m-b.9 Steves, K.; Kansas Department of Healthand Environment; ksteves@kdhe.state.ks.usc r c pd ’s r ole in e mergency preparedness:c onsistency, partnerships, and r esources

State radiation control programs have the responsibili-ty of assuring the safety of the public from unnecessary radi-ation, including preparation for and response to radiologicalincidents and other emergencies. For states that have nuclearpower plants within their borders or within the 10-mile emer-gency planning zones, states provide teams for offsite emer-gency planning, assessment, detection, and radiologicalassistance to local government. In all states, homeland secu-rity and preparedness for other radiological emergencies hasbecome an important role for radiation control programs. TheConference of Radiation Control Program Directors(CRCPD), an organization whose membership consists pri-marily of directors and staff of state, territorial and local radi-ation control programs, provides many activities to maintainconsistency and minimize guidance development time forstates. In the areas of homeland security and emergencyresponse, CRCPD provides operational guidance, tools andmodels for emergency planning, outreach to and collabora-tion with federal agencies and other organizations to supportemergency preparedness, and responds to changes in federalguidance and to emerging issues. Information on stateresources and mechanisms for obtaining those resources inan emergency are also important functions of the organiza-tion. The ability to include volunteer assistance from otherradiation professionals and partnering with other organiza-tions will improve states’ capability to prepare for andrespond to radiological emergencies. This presentation pro-vides an overview of the support provided by CRCPD to fed-eral, state, and local governmental organizations for theirradiological preparedness efforts, including guidance docu-ments, tools, planning models, outreach, education, and anetwork of partners and volunteers.

ma m-c .1 Kennedy, Jr., W.E.; Dade Moeller &Associates; kennedy@moellerinc.coma n s i /h ps s tandard n 13.12: s tatus r eport on ther evision to the s urface and Volume c learance s tandard

The need for comprehensive, clearance criteria foritems, equipment, and facilities contaminated with radioac-tive materials has been recognized for several decades. Initialattempts to develop American National Standards Institute(ANSI)/Health Physics Society (HPS) N13.12 began in 1964limited to the consideration of surface contamination. In1999, the final version of ANSI/HPS N13.12 was formallyissued with an expanded scope to consider clearance for bothsurface and volume contamination. It provided both the pri-mary dose standard for clearance and derived screening lev-els. However, the 1999 standard was not fully adopted byU.S. Federal or State agencies because, although judgmentand consensus were used in its development, the technicalbasis was not deemed robust enough to warrant broad appli-cation. In Vienna, the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) published Safety Series No. RS-G-1.7 Application ofthe Concepts of Exclusion, Exemption and Clearance, alongwith Safety Report Series No. 44 Derivation of ActivityConcentration Values for Exclusion, Exemption andClearance. Responding to the IAEA recommendations, theU.S. Federal agencies concerned with controlling radiationexposures requested that the writing group for this standardbe reformed to determine if it would be possible to harmo-nize, or bring into accord, the 1999 version of this standardand the IAEA recommendations. The writing group wasreformed in 2005, and the standard, limited only to clearanceand not exemption or exclusion, is being revised as a resultof the harmonization effort. Although not intended for inter-vention criteria, this standard does provide information use-ful to making real-time decisions regarding clearance ofmaterials from contaminated areas. An overview is presentedof the current status of the writing group’s efforts, and thesignificant departures from the 1999 version.ma m-c .2 Hackett, J.R., Caputo, D., Tepperman, M.,Weismann, J.; Cabrera Services, Inc.; jhackett@cabreraser-vices.coma pplications of the h istorical e mergency r esponse andmodern-d ay c haracterization and c leanup of a n uclearw eapons a ccident s ite to First r esponders

An explosion and fire in a BOMARC missile launchingpad in June 1960 resulted in the direct release of weaponsgrade plutonium (WGP) within the confines of an Air Forcesite in central New Jersey. The emergency response, whilefollowing standard practices of the day, resulted in the initialspread of residual contamination throughout the site, whichwas distributed further as a result of routine maintenance andsite operational activities. Lessons applicable to modern-dayemergency response can be learned from the spread of WGPcontamination throughout the site. The spread of contamina-tion reinforces the necessity for site controls during an emer-

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gency situation, the involvement of health physics profes-sionals with planning and first response, and a detailed emer-gency response plan. In 2007, Cabrera Services, Inc. com-pleted field characterization and remediation activities at thesite, and in 2008 issued the final report to recommend siteclosure according to Record of Decision (ROD) require-ments. Cabrera utilized a Multi-Agency Radiation Surveyand Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM) based character-ization methodology to identify locations with contaminationexceeding ROD criteria. In addition, innovative technologiesincorporating driveover gamma scanning, a multi-channelanalyzer system, and integrated Global Positioning Systemunits were used to quickly identify, locate, and map areas ofconcern, which were then correlated with soil concentrationdata obtained from the onsite laboratory. The dynamic andflexible work processes and real-time data collection proce-dures utilized for this project would be invaluable in an emer-gency response situation. ma m-c .3 Fyffe, J.G.; US Air Force; james.fyffe@us.af.milc lean-up and s ource r ecovery at a Former w eaponss torage a rea “c ” s tructure

Since September 11th, 2001 there has been a great dealof concern over the accessibility of radioactive sources thatcould be used for harmful purposes. The United States AirForce has endeavored to secure and dispose of un-used orabandoned radioactive sources to limit potential access tothese sources. Part of this effort involved closing out a spe-cial nuclear material permit for Travis Air Force Base, CA.Travis AFB contains a former WSA (Weapons Storage Area).All buildings and grounds associated with the WSA weresurveyed and remediated as needed for closing out the permitexcluding one structure. Building 903 was a “C” structureused by the AEC (Atomic Energy Corporation) to maintainand repair weapons components. In the process of closing outthe permit the Radiation Safety Officer at Travis AFB deter-mined that source lockers in building 903 were contaminat-ed. Furthermore, one source locker possibly contained anabandoned radiological source of undetermined type and ori-gin. The radiological source was expected to be aRadium/Beryllium neutron source that was typically used inweapons maintenance operations. This presented a uniqueopportunity to test and train the light team concept of AFRAT(Air Force Radiation Assessment Team). AFRAT is a world-wide deployable team of health physicists, bioenvironmentalengineers, and bioenvironmental engineering technicians inthree main elements; field survey, laboratory analysis, anddosimetry. AFRAT deployment, training, event response, andlessons learned are discussed.

ma m-c .4 Bahl, C., Favret, D.; U.S. Air Force;cory.bahl@brooks.af.milu se of g eospatial information s ystems in n uclearw eapons or r adiological d ispersal d evice e mergencyr esponse

Standard nuclear weapon or radiological dispersaldevice emergency response procedures in the past consistedof personnel responding to an event with equipment and sup-plies limited by what they could physically carry.Traditionally, this included pencil, paper, compass or basicGPS devices, in addition to radiation monitoring equipment.Because of the complexities associated with nuclear/radio-logical emergency response activities, data received for sub-sequent health physics analysis was sometimes unusable. Byintegrating current environmental survey techniques andequipment into a field team’s response capabilities, data hasbecome standardized. The use of these techniques hasallowed the data to be easily configurable to the needs of themission and allows for response activities to be more effi-ciently planned on-site. This presentation is designed to illus-trate how Geospatial Information Systems have revolution-ized data management during emergency response activities.ma m-c .5 Cardarelli II, J., Thomas, M., Curry, T.,Faller, S.; US Environmental Protection Agency NationalDecontaminaiton Team, EPA Radiological EmergencyResponse Team; cardarelli.john@epa.gove nvironmental protection a gency a irborne g ammae mergency mapper project

The US Environmental Protection Agency AirborneSpectral Photometric Environmental Collection Technology(ASPECT) program provides assistance to the first responderby providing an aerial tool to collect photographic, chemicaland physical (infrared and gamma radiation) informationquickly and relay this information directly to decision mak-ers in the field. Since 2001, ASPECT has assisted theresponse community in over 72 incidents ranging fromammonia releases to the recent pre-deployment to supportthe National Governors Association Meeting. The aircraft islocated near Dallas, Texas and is “wheels-up” within onehour of activation. EPA recently initiated the ASPECTGamma Emergency Mapper (GEM) project to improve theairborne gamma-screening and mapping capability ofground-based gamma contamination following a wide-arearadiological dispersal device or fallout from an improvisednuclear device attack. The goal is to develop the mostadvanced gamma-radiation detection capability mountablewithin an Air Command 680 FL airframe. The ASPECTGEM committee membership consists of members from theEPA National Decontamination Team, EnvironmentalResponse Team, Radiological Emergency Response Team,academia, and a national laboratory. Up to eight NaI 2x4x16detectors are among the suite of detectors to be mounted inthe aircraft. This presentation provides the current status,expected radiological detection capabilities, and the timelineto achieve a fully operational improved platform.

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ma m-c .6 Gogolak, C.V.; Consultant;carl@gogolak.orgu se of s wipe s amples in r esponse to a r adiologicald ispersal d evice incident

Swipe samples provide useful information aboutremovable surface activity that often cannot be obtained oth-erwise. However, swipe sample results have a very highuncertainty, which is often not adequately evaluated. Toadvance to a more quantitative interpretation of swiperesults, it is necessary to examine the various sources ofuncertainty associated with the measurement. The uncertain-ty components due to variation in input quantities over allpossible contaminants, surfaces, swipe materials, wettingagents, and analysis methods are so large for a genericapproach to interpreting swipes that it is not likely to be pro-ductive to attempt to reduce them, except under explicit con-ditions with known components. In the case of an RDD witha well-characterized source term, sampling protocol andanalysis method, it should be possible to produce an uncer-tainty budget that can identify the dominant sources of uncer-tainty and those that can be easily reduced, minimized oreliminated. Sampling and analysis protocols can be estab-lished for specific scenarios to accomplish this. Closely relat-ed to the evaluation of uncertainty is the interpretation ofnegative swipe results. If the uncertainty is not specified or isinadequately evaluated, it will not be clear whether there isno removable activity, or whether the measurement was notsufficiently sensitive to identify it. To avoid this issuerequires developing measurement quality objectives (MQOs)for the detection of contamination of a specified type on aspecific surface using a particular sampling and analysis pro-tocol. In each case, an action level must be specified for theexposure scenario so that it can be determined that the meth-ods used have the required sensitivity (e.g., minimumdetectable activity [MDA]). Realistic detection limit calcula-tions would allow a quantitative statement indicating that if awipe sample does not show contamination, that it can be con-cluded that the removable contamination present is at lessthen the action level with a specified degree of certainty. p.1 Johnson, T., Ullom, J., Rabin, M.; Colorado StateUniversity, National Institutes of Standards and Technology,Boulder, CO, Los Alamos National Laboratoryt omorrow’s g amma-r ay s pectroscopy t echnology:t ransition e dge s ensors with 47 eV e nergy r esolution at103 keV

Transition edge sensors (TES) are a novel high-energy-resolution gamma-ray spectrometer for nuclear materialsanalysis. Our prototype has demonstrated energy resolutionsof 47 eV at 103 keV as compared to resolutions of ~500 eVusing present state-of-the-art Germanium spectrometers. Theprototype consists of a 14-pixel multiplexed array of transi-tion edge sensor microcalorimeters operated inside a cryo-genic dewer. The TES microcalorimeter consists of a thin-

film bilayer of molybdenum (Mo) and copper (Cu) as asuperconducting thermometer with a tin (Sn) photonabsorber. The TES microcalorimeter functions on the princi-ple that at low temperatures (~0.1 K), the sensor has anextremely small heat capacity. Therefore, heat deposited inthe absorber by interacting gamma-ray photons increases theTES’s temperature and thus, increases the resistance of thesuperconducting Mo/Cu bilayer thermometer. The energy ofthe photon is measured as a pulse-shaped decrease in thecalorimeter’s current. Single-pixel TES microcalorimeters of~1 mm2 provide slow count rates of 50-100 counts/second.The Quantum Devices Group, National Institute of Standardsand Technology, working with Los Alamos NationalLaboratory, successfully demonstrated a 14-pixel array ofTESs to increase the system count rate and collection area.Group research focuses on increasing the array size to 256pixels, which will then provide system count rates and col-lecting areas comparable to Germanium spectrometers butachieve sub-100 eV energy resolutions. Mature evolutions ofthe TES array technology are ideal for non-destructive assayof nuclear materials because the unmatched energy resolu-tion enables separation of spectral peaks in the complicatedplutonium (Pu) gamma-ray spectrum.p.2 Grof, Y., Akbarzadeh, M., Monk, J.; CEMRCCarlsbad, WTS Carlsbad; grof@cemrc.orgd etect o n-line, u ltra l ow r adiation u sing s tatisticalmethods

There is a need for early detection of contamination insites that are processing, shipping or disposed radioactivematerials. We develop a system which can detect very lowconcentration of radioactive isotopes, especially TRU(Trans-Uranium) isotopes. The system is measuring on lineand it can be connected to the air monitoring at the site.Results showed very short response and very low concentra-tion compare to other systems. The system is based on a sta-tistical forecasting method which is learning the environmentbehave and compare the actual results to the forecasting. Themethod eliminates all the natural and regular radiation expo-sure in the environment. Remaining only the clear view ofthe contamination. The first results from the system, using avery simple GM detector, show that the system can detectlevels of Pu-239 contamination smaller then 20 dpm withvery simple analyzing tool. We intend to use a more sophis-ticate detector and a better analyzing tool and the detectionlimit will be lower then 1 dpm. p.3 Potter, W., Strzelczyk, J.; Consultant, Sacramento,CA, University of Colorado Hospital; pspr189729@aol.comc ++ c omputer c ode for e xact d ecision l evels ande rrors of t ype i when the s ample c ount t ime is aninteger t imes g reater than the background c ount t ime

In the past there have been papers where the blank(background) is counted for the same amount of time orlonger than the sample. In emergency and cleanup operationssituations may arise where the sample is counted longer than

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the blank. In particular, it is well known that the optimumratio of blank count time to sample count time equals thesquare root of the ratio of the respective count rates. The pre-sented approach assumes that both the blank count and thesample contribution to the gross count are Poisson distrib-uted. Also it is assumed that the expected blank count isknown. The net count is transformed into an integer. A codein C++ computes the exact probability density function forthe transformed net count when there is no activity in thesample. The validity of the computations is verified bychecking that the sum of probabilities is close to 1.0 and thatthe expected value of the net count is close to zero. The deci-sion level is determined by summation of the right tail of theprobability density function when there is no activity in thesample. Activity is said to have been detected if the observednet count is greater than the decision level. The code runs onthe current Microsoft operating systems. The entire C++code for decision levels is given. This code could be expand-ed to yield codes for detection limits and confidence inter-vals. The computed results are compared with the usualPoisson-normal approximation for the decision level.Minimally the computed results are valid for expected blankcounts in the sample count time <= 300.0, ratios of the sam-ple count time to the blank count time <= 20, and errors oftype I >= 0.001. Uncertainty in the expected blank count canbe readily examined by utilizing confidence intervals for theexpected value of a Poisson distribution in conjunction withthe code. mpm-a .1 Grogan, H. A., Mohler, H.J., Rocco, J. R.,Stetar, E. A., Till, J. E.*; Risk Assessment Corporation; john-till@mindspring.comd ynamic u se of e nvironmental measurement d ata ford ecision-making and c ommunication in e mergencyr esponse s ituations

A key need in response to emergencies with significantenvironmental consequences is the accumulation and effi-cient evaluation of data to allow decision makers to quicklydevelop a sense of what human health risks may be presentand to make sound decisions considering available informa-tion. In addition, anticipating information needs before theyarise and having a tested functional system in place, particu-larly in high-stress situations, will help maximize prepared-ness. RACER (Risk Analysis, Communication, Evaluation,and Reduction) provides a dynamic framework for the col-lection, storage, distillation, and rapid synthesis of data intothe information and knowledge needed to manage environ-mental situations. This integrated approach to guide deci-sion-making and communication is based on five concepts:1) efficient and consistent access, analysis, and processing ofdata for evaluation of human health risk; 2) incorporation ofsocial, political, and economic factors along with humanhealth risk into the decision making process; 3) reevaluationof decisions as new information becomes available; 4) trans-parency in the process that allows decisions to be traced back

to the information upon which they were based; and 5) effec-tive communication of the basis for decisions and confi-dence. The RACER framework allows for clear presentationof needed information to decision-makers in a top-downfashion that focuses on the end result while still providingrapid access to input data and maintaining the flexibility tochange assumptions and incorporate new information as itbecomes available. This paper will provide an overview ofthe RACER framework with examples of its implementa-tion.mpm-a .2 Antenucci, A., Cirino, N., Costello, C.*,Egan, C., Keenan, R., Pennell, P., Rafferty, R., Virgil, M.,Wilson, L.; New York State Department of Health;cac04@health.state.ny.use nvironmental s ampling d uring public h ealthe mergencies

At the request of New York State’s Chemical,Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE)Task Force, staff at the New York State Department ofHealth’s (DOH) Wadsworth Center Laboratories and theCenter for Environmental Health collaborated with the NYSDepartment of Environmental Conservation (DEC) and theNYS Office of Fire Prevention and Control (OFPC) to devel-op procedures for collecting environmental samples in LevelA personal protective equipment (PPE). Staff at DOH andDEC have expertise in sample collecting, but are not quali-fied to use Level A PPE. Staff at OFPC are qualified forLevel A PPE, but have no training in sample collection.Procedures developed include sampling for biological,chemical and radiological contaminants in air, wipe, liquidand solid matrices. These procedures are designed for use inpublic health emergencies in which the type and degree ofhazard is unknown. Staff from OFPC will use these proce-dures to collect samples under the direction of DOH andDEC staff who respond to these types of emergencies asmembers of the Environmental Assessment Group (EAG).OFPC and EAG staff trained on these procedures during foursessions in 2005, four sessions in 2006, and three sessions in2007. At the culmination of each training session, there wasa functional exercise where both EAG and OFPC staffworked together to demonstrate what they had learned.Throughout the training and exercises, the proceduresevolved as a result of comments submitted by both OFPCand EAG staff. As personnel have become more familiarwith sampling procedures, the time devoted to training onthese procedures has been decreased to “just-in-time” train-ing followed by a full-day exercise and technical decontami-nation of personnel in order to more closely simulate whatwould happen during an actual public health emergency. In2009, OFPC and EAG staff will demonstrate their skills dur-ing EMPIRE 2009, a full-scale radiological exercise.

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mpm-a .3 Grace, M., Moyer, B., Voigt, B., Homer, M.,Macaluso, A., Manning, R.; BARDA; marcy.grace@hhs.govt he biodosimetry program at the biomedical a dvancedr esearch and d evelopment a uthority

A large-scale radiological incident would result in animmediate critical need to assess the radiation doses for thou-sands of individuals. Diagnostic and dosimetric devices andtheir capabilities are central for triaging decisions. TheBiomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority(BARDA) is the focal point within the Department of Healthand Human Services (HHS) for the advanced development,acquisition, and manufacturing infrastructure building ofmedical countermeasures to protect the American civilianpopulation against chemical, biological, radiological, andnuclear (CBRN) and naturally occurring threats to publichealth. BARDA and the National Institute of Allergy andInfectious Diseases (NIAID) at National Institutes of Health(NIH), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and theCenters for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) collabo-ratively support research and development of new andimproved medical treatments and diagnostics for radiationcasualties. BARDA coordinates the interagency HHS PublicHealth Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise(PHEMCE) operations for research, development, licensure,acquisition, storage, maintenance, deployment, provision,and guidance for emergency use in a radiation incident. TheBARDA approach utilizes a diverse, balanced portfolio ofmedical radiation countermeasures. HHS and theDepartment of Defense (DoD) are coordinately supportingresearch and development of new and dual use therapeuticproducts to treat the multiple body systems injured duringnuclear and radiological attacks. Most recently BARDAreleased a Request for Information (RFI) to gather informa-tion on technologies and manufacturing capabilities to meetbiodosimetry requirements. HHS anticipates in 2009 theissuance of solicitations (Request for Proposals and/or BroadAgency Announcements) for advanced development of bio-dosimetric devices and new medical countermeasures to treatvarious aspects of Acute Radiation Syndrome.mpm-a .4 Blumenthal, D., Johnson, M., Sleeper, C.;DHS/DNDO, PNNL; daniel.blumenthal@dhs.govt he g r ad e r program for Qualifying r adiationd etection s ystems for h omeland s ecurity a pplications

The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) ofthe U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is man-dated by Congress to set Technical Capability Standards andimplement a Test and Evaluation program to provide infor-mation and related testing on performance, suitability andsurvivability information for preventive radiological/nuclear(rad/nuc) detection systems in the United States. DNDOintends to meet these requirements by establishing theGraduated Rad/Nuc Detection Evaluation and Reporting(GRaDER) program. The GRaDER program provides a con-tinuing means of independently testing and evaluating com-

mercially available rad/nuc detection systems against ANSIN42 performance standards to ensure that only the best radi-ation detector capabilities are funded by government pro-curement and grant programs. GRaDER will provide per-formance and operationally relevant technical information onthese systems to DHS components, and state, local and trib-al governments and first responders. This presentation intro-duces the GRaDER program, identifies the standards onwhich it is based, and explains its potential impact on firstresponders who receive DHS grants. mpm-a .5 Johnson, M.; Pacific Northwest NationalLaboratory; michelle.johnson@pnl.govl aboratory participation in the d epartment ofh omeland s ecurity d omestic n uclear d etection o fficeprogram for Qualifying r adiation d etection instrumentsfor h omeland s ecurity a pplications

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is mandated byCongress to set Technical Capability Standards, and imple-ment a Test and Evaluation program to provide performance,suitability, and survivability information, and related testing,for preventive radiological/nuclear (rad/nuc) detection equip-ment in the United States. DNDO met these requirements byestablishing the Graduated Radiation/Nuclear DetectionEvaluation and Reporting (GRaDER) program. To partici-pate in the GRaDER program as a test and evaluation labo-ratory, laboratories must be accredited by the NationalVoluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) totest radiation detection instruments for homeland securityapplications. DNDO may also accept a test and evaluationlaboratory on the basis of a laboratory’s self-declaration ofconformity to the NVLAP requirements. This presentationdescribes the process employed by one national laboratory toself-declare conformity with the NVLAP requirements andto become accepted by the DNDO as a test and evaluationlaboratory. Additionally, some elements of the quality assur-ance program developed to meet the NVLAP requirementsare discussed. mpm-a .6 Van Etten, D.M., Guss, P.P.; NationalSecurity Technologies, LLC; vanettdm@nv.doe.govu .s . d epartment of e nergy c onsequence managementu nder the n ational r esponse Framework

Under the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex of theNational Response Framework, the U.S. Department ofEnergy (DOE) has specific responsibilities as a coordinatingagency and for leading interagency response elements in theFederal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center(FRMAC). Emergency response planning focuses on rapidlyproviding response elements in stages after being notified ofa nuclear/radiological incident. The use of Home Teams dur-ing the field team deployment period and recent advances incollecting and transmitting data from the field directly toassessment assets has greatly improved incident assessmenttimes for public protection decisions. The DOE’s Remote

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Sensing Laboratory (RSL) based in Las Vegas, Nevada, hassuccessfully deployed technical and logistical support for thismission at national exercises such as Top Officials ExerciseIV (TOPOFF IV). In a unique response situation, DOE willprovide advance contingency support to NASA during thescheduled launch in the fall of 2009 of the Mars ScienceLaboratory (MSL). The MSL rover will carry a radioisotopepower system that generates electricity from the heat of plu-tonium’s radioactive decay. DOE assets and contingencyplanning will provide a pre-incident response posture forrapid early plume phase assessment in the highly unlikelylaunch anomaly. This work was done by National SecurityTechnologies, LLC, under Contract No. DE-AC52-06NA25946 with the U.S. Department of Energy. mpm-a .7 Corti, D.; University of Montana;dan.corti@mso.umt.eduinteraction of c ivilian s upport t eam and r egionalh azmat t eams in a r ural s tate

Hazardous materials response in sparsely populatedstates is inherently different than in urban settings. Post 911,a short term influx of federal funds have allowed rural haz-ardous materials response teams to become better equippedand generally better trained but they may still lack fundamen-tal skills to deal with a radiological emergency.Concurrently, National Guard Civilian Support Teams havebecome operational in rural states and can provide an addi-tional level of training, expertise and equipment to a state orcounty run hazardous materials response. This presentationdescribes the history and evolution of a statewide hazardousmaterials response team in Montana and how that team hascome to interact with the Montana Civilian Support Team.Limitations, opportunities, mobilization requirements andcommand structure during an incident are discussed in detail.Ongoing challenges such as currently reduced federal fund-ing, low number of real events and resulting difficulty inmaintaining interest among team members andcomplexity/diversity of instrumentation relative to availabletraining hours are discussed with recommendations toaddress these issues. mpm-a .8 Kerns, K.; Iowa State University,International Atomic Energy Agency; kckerns@iastate.edut he r ole of the ia e a in responding to n uclear a ccidentsand r adiation e mergencies

Ken Kerns served the past year as a consultant to theInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) working in theIncident and Emergency Centre (IEC). The primary missionof the IAEA is to promote the peaceful use of atomic energy.To fulfil this mission, the IAEA is obligated through twoConventions to assist in managing major radiation eventsthroughout the world. The IEC is the Agency’s focal point forresponding to radiation incidents or emergencies and hasthree main emergency response functions; the internationalexchange of real-time information, providing prompt adviceand assistance to Member States as requested, and finally,

providing relevant, accurate, and coherent information to themedia and the general public. This presentation discusses theroles, procedures, and resources of the IAEA, and specifical-ly, the IEC in response to a radiation emergency. The presen-tation will highlight recent responses to worldwide events.mpm-a .9 Widner, T.E., Le, M.H., Intrepido, A.J.;ChemRisk, Inc.; twidner@chemrisk.coma n independent e xamination of the n ational plannings cenarios

The 15 National Planning Scenarios support formationof a “useful planning resource” within the Department ofHomeland Security’s Capabilities-Based Planning system.The scenarios highlight a plausible range of major events thatpose the greatest risk to the Nation. They include nuclear andradiological attacks, biological attacks and outbreaks, chem-ical attacks and incidents, natural disasters, and informationor control system attacks. The intent was to help the govern-ment allocate terrorism prevention funds on a risk-basedscale. In the described work, the publicly available documen-tation of the National Planning Scenarios was examined andevaluated with regard to 1) the reasonability of approachesand assumptions used in assessing potential impacts of eachscenario; 2) commparison to and learning from real-worldevents; 3) the transferability of the scenarios from the settingsin which they were envisioned to other parts of the country;and 4) influences on risk-based resource allocation that couldresult from widespread application of the planning scenarios.Two notable findings of the review, likely resulting from theanalyses for the scenarios being conducted by different peo-ple or teams of individuals, are that 1) there is significantunevenness in the level of analysis that has been conductedfor the scenarios, or at least in the level of detail that is pro-vided in the summary descriptions of each scenario, and 2)there is a wide variation in the levels of conservatism that areadopted in the assessments of potential impacts of the scenar-ios as outlined. mpm-a .10 Mohagheghi, A., Sircy, M.; Sandia NationalLaboratories, US Central Command; ahmohag@sandia.govinternational c onsequence management: a s urvey

There are certain scenarios for incidents involvingradiological materials that can overwhelm even the vast USresponse resources. The individual response capabilities ofcountries in regions such as Middle East, Levant Caucuses,or Central Asia range from inadequate to non-existent. Evena relatively small event will overwhelm the resources of asingle state. In addition, most events will have regionalimpacts that can involve multiple countries. The US DOEhas a mature consequence management program with a widerange of resources available to it for responding to incidentsinvolving radiological materials. These resources include sci-entific staff, health physics professionals, radiological con-trol technicians, communications and logistics specialists,aerial measuring systems, mobile and fixed laboratories, andatmospheric modeling tools. In addition, the US Central

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Command has an outreach program called the CooperativeDefense Program to build up the capacity of allied countriesto respond effectively to the incidents involving radiologicalmaterials. These activities include consequence manage-ment, medical radiological mass casualty and CBRN-PassiveDefense. We will discuss the status of current efforts toaddress these problems and the proposed approaches toenhance regional capabilities to respond to accidental orintentional releases of radiological materials. mpm-a .11 Carr, Z., PEREZ, M.; World HealthOrganization; carrz@who.intw h o r e mpa n n etwork and international s ystem ofmedical and public h ealth a ssistance in r adiatione mergencies

The WHO network for Radiation Emergency MedicalAssistance was established in 1987, in response to theChernobyl accident and the events which followed. TwoEmergency Conventions were adopted in 2006, and WHO isa full party to both. To fulfill its role under EmergencyConventions, WHO set up a network of several specializedinstitutions, on expertise of which WHO would rely in caseof radiation emergencies. In more than 20 years, the networkexpanded and includes today more than 40 institutionsaround the world with specialization in various fields rele-vant to first response, monitoring, diagnosis and clinicalmanagement of exposed patients, dosimetry, risk communi-cation, long term follow-up etc. Since 2007, the newlyrevised International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005) haveput an additional mandate to WHO, as the IHR now concernspublic health emergencies of any nature, including those ofradio-nuclear nature. This step united various technicaldepartments of the WHO in one platform of public healthrisk assessment, provision of assistance, strengthening thecapacity of the 193 Member States of the WHO through theapplication and implementation of the IHR - a legally bind-ing tool to all countries. Since 2007, two new initiative werelaunched on the basis of the REMPAN network: develop-ment of a global stockpile for radiation emergencies andestablishment of the Global Biodosimetry LaboratoryNetwork - BioDoseNet. In 2008, WHO REMPAN is 21years old. It “came of age,” but it is still expanding and wel-coming new members.mpm-b.1 Patel, G.N., Crowe, F., Watanabe, Y.; JPLaboratories, Inc, Crowe and Company, LLC, MasonicCancer Center; gnpatel@jplabs.coma r adiation d osimeter for First r esponders

A credit card sized radiation dosimeter for monitoringharmful high dose of 10 10,000 mSv is presented. It isdesigned for minimizing the panic and worry in an event ofradiological accident, such as an explosion from a radiologi-cal dispersion device. When exposed to radiation, the sensingstrip develops blue color instantly and the color intensifies asthe dose increases. Thus, it provides the wearer and medicalpersonnel instantaneous information on cumulative radiation

exposure. Radiation exposure can be estimated simply bymatching the colors of the sensing strip with the adjacentcolor reference bars. If false positives or negatives occur dueto abnormal use, the user can monitor them with a multi-pur-pose indicator on the sensor which also indicates when toreplace the dosimeter. Thus, dosimeter can minimize thepanic, worry and triages the information..The dosimeter hasshelf life of one year at room temperature and a red liftablefilter to protect the sensor from sunlight. Effects of sunlight,temperature, annealing, dose, dose rate, temperature of irra-diation, energy and the type of radiation are presented. mpm-b.2 Lombardo, A., Desrosiers, A., Seif, T.;Polimatrix, IEMA; alombardo@sec-tn.coms tatewide implementation of a n ew personal r adiationd etector for e mergency r esponders

The Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System (ILEAS)awarded a state-wide law enforcement and first responderprocurement that would put up to 20,000 portable radiationdetectors model PM1703MO-1 into use over a four-yearplanning cycle. This may be the largest such introduction ofradiation detectors into daily use by first responder personnelin the United States. The procurement process included anindustry-wide competition with detailed technical and fieldtesting including analysis by law enforcement and fire serv-ice personnel, state radiation protection specialists, andArgonne National Laboratory. The energy-compensated radi-ation detector-dosimeter selected (PM1703MO-1) combinesthe functions of a personal radiation detector (PRD) scintilla-tion detector and an electronic personal dosimeter (EPD)Geiger-Muller-tube. The small size of the unit easily fits onthe utility belt or on the vehicle dash board. The State-wideimplementation of a single PRD/EPD over a four year peri-od presents numerous project management challenges. Thekey items include planning performance based training for awide range of users, providing interim response proceduresduring the transition, determining the order of implementa-tion based on key transportation corridors and prioritizedurban areas, and creating a support infrastructure capable ofproviding virtually immediate assistance to PRD usersstatewide on a 24/7 basis. The Illinois EmergencyManagement Agency’s Bureau of Environmental Safety hasbeen tasked with designing, implementing and overseeing allof these components to ensure the success of this effort. Thepaper provides a current status report of the challenges andsuccesses associated with this State-wide rollout.mpm-b.3 Clark, K., Fyffe, J.; USAF; krystyn.clark@us.af.milu s a ir Force Field d eployable e nvironmental d ataa cquisition and position t ransmission s ystem(e d a pt s ) modernization

The US Air Force Radiation Dosimetry Team (RDT)provides radiation dosimetry for the CBRNE ConsequenceManagement Response Force. The RDT leads the way forradiation dosimetry. First, the RDT gained National

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Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program accreditation ofelectronic personal dosimeters (EPDs), used to maintain adose of record when responding to a radiological event. Anupgrade added EDAPTS, a personnel monitoring systemwith the capability of linking GPS to dosimetry via teleme-try. Real-time exposures and physiological data (such asheart rate, breathing rate and body temperature) are trackedfor responders and relayed in real-time to a central location.The latest upgrade overcomes limitations in range and dataentry to allow the RDT to support a larger radiological eventand issue dosimetry and EDAPTS more quickly to respon-ders. Another improvement is the pairing of field instrumen-tation to EDAPTS resulting in real-time data collection. Themodernized EDAPTS adds capabilities for improved deci-sion-making and health threat reduction for responders. TheRDT has the flexibility to deploy EDAPTS with AFRATfield and laboratory teams or can independently augment anycombination of agencies and resources as part of the NationalResponse Framework making it a valuable asset as part of aunified national response.mpm-b.4 Bronson, F., Bosko, A.; Canberra; fbron-son@canberra.come mergency r esponse e fficiency c alibrations forportable g amma s pectroscopy instruments

The past few years have seen the convergence of 3important technologies that can greatly improve the abilitiesto correctly respond to a radiation emergency: small portablegamma spectroscopy instruments, powerful portable com-puters, and mathematical efficiency calibrations. Now,instead of performing screening evaluations and sendingsamples to a laboratory for analysis, the emergency respon-der can identify the nuclide, and determine the activity orconcentration, all in a matter of minutes after arriving at thereal or suspected accident scene. These portable instrumentsinclude NaI scintillators for lowest cost, Ge spectrometers forbest identification and accuracy, and LaBr scintillators withintermediate cost and capability. In order for the instrumentto go beyond simply identifying the nuclide, and to give aquantitative result, an efficiency calibration must be per-formed. Various accident scenarios were reviewed to deter-mine a wide range of likely counting geometries that theemergency worker might encounter. Efficiency calibrationswere generated mathematically for these sample types at sev-eral source-detector distances for each of the 3 instruments.MDAs have been computed for each of the instruments andgeometries.mpm-b.5 Voss, J.; Voss Associates; jtvoss@newmex-ico.comportable instruments for r eal-t ime r adiation mapping

This presentation states the criteria for a useful radia-tion survey instrument with the ability to provide radiologi-cal maps of the surveyed area in real time. Often personneldesire to have nearly complete radiological survey databefore the information collected in the field has been

processed. Using signal processors with higher capacity andsoftware programmed to manipulate that data it is possiblefor the hand-held survey instrument to perform the tasks nor-mally done at the surveyor’s computer, i.e., run statisticalanalysis on the data points, apply efficiency and correctionfactors to the raw numbers, compare the data to previouslycollected data, and generate a final report which may includeboth the tabulated data and a radiological survey map. Thislevel of performance would allow the surveyor to respondmore rapidly to any significant changes or radiological haz-ards in the area being surveyed. A hand-held radiation surveyinstrument with this level of capability would need to becapable of responding to the radiations just as a simplerinstrument would but also would need to apply efficiencyand correction factors to the counts detected. The instrumentwould need to have maps stored in memory that could berecalled by the surveyor for the area under evaluation. Atouch sensitive screen and menu buttons should be used forlogging the specific data points on the appropriate spot on themap displayed on that screen. Each data point would also bestored in a sequential log file along with the date and time ofthe collection of the data point. The instrument should pro-vide for the addition of a barcode reader, GPS, and wirelesstwo-way communications. Such an instrument would great-ly minimize the time required of the surveyor to complete aradiological survey while at the same time provide for agreater level of quality control over the data collected. mpm-b.6 Voss, J. T.; Voss Associates; jtvoss@newmexico.comd eploying portable c ontinuous a ir monitors fore mergencies

This presentation describes a strategy for using portableContinuous Air Monitors (CAMs) in emergency situations.An emergency involving airborne radioactive aerosols canpose a hazard to the public and the environment. PortableCAMs correctly positioned and a method of evaluating windpatterns can provide information to assist the incident com-mand personnel in responding to the hazard. The portableCAMs must provide real-time data and incident commandpersonnel must know the location of those CAMs, personnelat risk, and the previously mentioned air patterns. Ideally, theportable CAMs should be self-powered (battery poweredwith solar power recharging), communicate wirelessly usingencryption, capable of providing useable radionuclide infor-mation, operate at an acceptable air sampling rate, provide itscurrent location, and receive and respond to remote com-mands. A combination of greater signal processing power inthe available portable CAMs, better filter media, and higherefficiency air sampling pumps can lead to a portable air mon-itoring unit with as much capability as a good stationaryCAM. That capability combined with the portability of theCAM provide to incident command personnel the best possi-ble information on the radioactive aerosol concentrations.

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mpm-b.7 Yusko, J., Vyenielo, M.; PA DEP;JYusko@state.pa.uspennsylvania’s r esponse to r adiological a ccidents

As a consequence to the terrorist events of September11, 2001, the Pennsylvania Department of EnvironmentalProtection acquired a number of new rapid response vehiclesand ancillary equipment to improve our detection andresponse capability, not only for use in terrorist incidents, butalso for routine use in and around the fixed nuclear facilitieswithin Pennsylvania. These include three large and fully-equipped “Radiation Rapid Response” vehicles (R3V) andseven modified pick-up trucks, the latter also outfitted withonboard as well as deployable matrix probes for monitoringambient gamma radiation fields. The probes, whendeployed, can transmit both location, functional status, andradiation field data via satellite upload to the R3Vs and othersimilarly-equipped monitoring stations, to allow operatorscontinuous readout of current conditions. Besides the newequipment, our radiological emergency response plan hasbeen reevaluated and consequently upgraded significantly.Descriptions of the equipment and the capabilities are given,along with plans for the continuing evolution of the plans andprocedures for assessing radiological emergencies. The his-tory of their deployment at recent federally-evaluated exer-cises around some of Pennsylvania’s nuclear power plants isalso presented. mpm-b.8 Le, M.H., Widner, T.E., Intrepido, A.J.;ChemRisk, Inc.; mle@chemrisk.come valuation of r adiological s creening t echnology anda ppropriate t raining procedures: l essons l earned

In response to heightened national security resultingfrom the looming threat of potential terrorist attacks that mayuse radiological materials, industry has begun to developmore sophisticated technology in hopes of detecting and cat-egorizing all radioactive materials entering the United Statesvia air, sea, and land. New federal law also mandates that by2012, all cargo entering United States must be scanned forradiological materials before entry. Historically, screeningdevices could only detect the presence of elevated radiationlevels and could not differentiate between radioisotopes;such screening devices lead to false positive or false negativeresponses by security personnel. Recent new technology,however, has provided mobile screening devices that can dif-ferentiate between radioisotopes. Such screening allowssecurity personnel to more accurately assess the possiblerisks form cargo. Misunderstandings of how the deviceswork can, however, still put screeners in potential predica-ments. By examining specific incidences stemming frommisunderstanding of associated technology and imperfec-tions in nuclide analysis software packages, we have consid-ered how to better prepare and train security personnel toproperly implement screening technologies. These case stud-ies involving incidents of false positives and false negativesserve as lessons for evaluating how best to use new screen-ing technology to protect U.S citizens.

mpm-b.9 Kawabata, K., Beimer, S., Honsa, P.; USEnvironmental Protection Agency, Las Vegas;kawabata.ken@epa.govu se of isotopic r atios for the identification of e nrichedu ranium

A NaI(Tl) detector system using a single discriminationwindow is used to identify enriched uranium fragments bythe comparison of isotopic ratios. The uranium enrichmentidentification is facilitated by the measurement of the countsfor a set time period for a particular energy region divided bythe counts produced for the entire measurement energyregion of the detector in the same set time period. This urani-um enrichment method would utilize a quick comparison ofa ratio and a calibration curve from a common field instru-ment measurement instead of using a field multi-channelanalyzer and subsequent calculations. The simplicity of themeasurement makes it possible for less trained individuals touse a common radiation detector to detect enriched uranium.mpm-b.10 Iwatschenko, M.A.; Thermo Scientific;michael.iwatschenko@thermofisher.comd etection of g amma and n eutron s ources u singportable e quipment - a c omparison of Fundamentalphysical parameters impacting the instrument s electionand s earch s trategies

In many respects the detection of hidden neutron emit-ters is different to the detection of gamma sources. These dif-ferences apply especially to the importance of backgroundfluctuations caused by naturally occurring radioactive mate-rial in the case of gamma radiation and the optimum measur-ing time, which is significantly longer for neutron detectionpurposes. Furthermore it is important to take into considera-tion that for both neutron and gamma radiation there is nolinear relationship between dose rate and count rate for typi-cal portable instrumentation. The influence of shielding, scat-tering, moderation and the influence of the source to detectordistance is discussed in several typical scenarios. Takingthese basic physical properties into account, the dedicatedpractical training of users regarding the appropriate searchprocess is of eminent importance and can enhance the detec-tion efficiency of the man-instrument system tremendously.Experimental data with focus on the detection of industrialCs-137 and AmBe sources is given. mpm-b.11 Chiaro, P.J.; Oak Ridge NationalLaboratorye nsuring r eliability of r adiation d etection e quipmentthrough n ational and international s tandards

With the multitude of radiation detection equipmentalready being marketed and even more in the designstages, it is becoming increasingly important that standardsexist to ensure these equipment are ready for their intend-ed purpose. With the advent of reliability standards, theuser community can be assured that the equipment theyintend to use to protect themselves and others against thethreat from illegal radiation materials can be relied upon to

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perform as expected. Existing ANSI and IEC Standards arebeing updated and new standards developed to provide aset of requirements to ensure the reliability of radiationdetection equipment. An update on the current status ofstandards addressing the reliability issues of radiationdetection equipment will be presented.t a m-a .1 Crawford, J.; University of Missouri-Columbia; crawfordw@missouri.eduintroduction and d emonstration of the “r adiologicale mergency c ommand packet”

The Radiological Emergency Command Packet(RECP) is a portable, “no batteries required”, oil, water andweather resistant set of radiological emergency responsecommand guides that can be used in a variety of scenarios.The RECP is not meant to replace the numerous electronicdevices or radiological response tools or aids deployed at anevent, but rather be used in conjunction with them. TheRECP is a compilation of the ICS style of command docu-mentation, with general thumb rules, practical guides, proce-dures, forms and tools for radiological emergency response.It can be a used as an initial response plastic brain or check-list in communicating the status and pertinent data of anactive scene, communicating initial and long term actions,while also using the Incident Command style of forms, toolsand procedures structured specifically for radiation emer-gency response. The RECP is designed to enhance the trans-fer of information during an emergency. One of the trueadvantages of this packet is that it can be stored away in anynormal storage environment, glove compartment, duffel bag,command vehicle, etc. until needed without being plugged-inor needing batteries to be fully charged. The RECP is notdesigned to replace your facility’s Standard OperatingProcedures, Standard Operating Guides, Emergency ActionPlans, etc., but rather act as a companion to them, and if nec-essary, a useful stand alone radiation emergency responsecommand guide for smaller municipalitiesFurthermore, the RECP would be useful for those organiza-tions that simply don’t have access to or funding for wellstocked response libraries, radiological emergency trainedstaff and/or portable electronic response reference equipment(laptops) that need external power sources to use. t a m-a .2 O’Connell, T.F.; IAEA; oconnelltom@netscape.netinternational a tomic e nergy a gency e mergencypreparedness and r esponse for First r esponders

In October of 2006, the International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA) published the MANUAL for FIRSTRESPONDERS to a RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY. Themanual provides practical guidance for first responders toenable them to safely respond in the first few hours of a radi-ological emergency. Since 2006, the manual has proven to bea document that has gained acceptance throughout the inter-national community. The document has since been translatedinto four different languages. In addition to the manual, a

training package has been developed and numerous deliver-ies of the training package have been delivered world wide.In addition, a portable version of the package that can beloaded into a PDA or a smartphone has been developed at therequest of the first responder community. A overview of theIAEA manual and associated training and field applicationtools will be described and explained.t a m-a .3 Johnson, R.; Dade Moeller and Associates;ray.johnson@moellerinc.comt o h elp First r esponders - i ts t ime for u s to becomemyth busters

While we lament the continuing poor public under-standing of radiation, the media continue to report radiationmyths. Thus, first responders and the public alike are oftenreminded about “deadly radiation.” For responders to effec-tively carry out their duties, they have to first overcome theiringrained fears of radiation. Because the media basicallyreports radiation only as bad news, everyone has learned tofear and avoid radiation at all costs. If the first responders areacting out of their fears (running), what is everyone else tothink. While some first responders may have a realisticunderstanding of radiation, many others around them may bein a panic. People tend to be most afraid of what they knowthe least about, and most people do not know much aboutradiation, except the myths perpetuated by the media. Someof the myths to be busted include: 1) radiation is deadly (onlyunder extreme circumstances), 2) the only safe level of radi-ation is zero (there is no zero, we are exposed to radiation allthe time), 3) radon and CT scans are OK, but radiation is not(these are the largest source of most people’s radiation expo-sures), 4) radiation will cause deformities in newborns (veryunlikely except for extreme circumstances), 5) radiationcauses you to glow (never), 6) radiation can be spread bycontact (radioactive material may be spread by contact, butno more so than any biological or chemical hazard and nor-mal sterile procedures should suffice), 7) the effects of radi-ation are immediate and disastrous (not likely), 8) radiationdamage to DNA will result in terrible consequences (a DNAmolecule is incredibly large, only part of it is needed, it isconstantly undergoing damage from many causes, DNAdamage is mostly repairable, and every cell of our body hasa complete DNA molecule), 9) and many more myths thatneed busting to help first responders do their jobs. t a m-a .4 Widner, T.E., Le, M.H., Intrepido, A.J.;ChemRisk, Inc.; twidner@chemrisk.come lements of the h istory of poisoning that c an improveo ur e mergency r esponse r eadiness

Poisons and successful and unsuccessful poisonings ofindividuals and groups have played important roles in histo-ry involving the intelligence communities, world leaders, andterrorist groups. The example that health physicists are like-ly most familiar with is the fatal poisoning of AlexanderLitvinenko with Po-210, but there have been numerous othercases in which radioactive materials were the agents of

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choice. Some basic knowledge of poisoning events could bea useful element in training and guidance for professionals,first responders, and first receivers for radiological and non-radiological incidents. The described work examines: 1) thereasons that poisoning is a popular tool (advantages overother types of weapons); 2) the typical attributes of peoplewho resort to poisoning; 3) types of poisoning targets (spe-cific and random); 4) motivations for poisoning; 5) the char-acteristics of an “ideal poison” (and what makes someradionuclides particularly attractive to poisoners); 6) meth-ods that have been used to deliver poisons; 7) methods ofaction for poisons that have been used; and 8) signs, symp-toms, and detection of poisoning.t a m-a .5 Strom, D.; Pacific Northwest NationalLaboratory; strom@pnl.govw ho’s e mpowered to protect, h ow a re t heye mpowered, and w hat d o t hey n eed to k now?

In 1996, the author published a paper entitled “TenPrinciples and Ten Commandments of Radiation Protection.”That paper recognized that radiation protection consists of farmore than “time, distance, and shielding,” notions that can beacted on by workers to manage external irradiation, but thatare of little use for the prevention of intakes of radioactivematerials. The paper encompassed the entirety of radiationprotection, including actions that may be taken at many lev-els (commandments) and the principles on which they arebased. This paper expands the previous paper by furtherspecifying who can take actions, where their empowermentcomes from, and what knowledge is needed to act appropri-ately. Who is empowered to take radiation protectionactions? Depending on the circumstances, it can be workers,managers, health care professionals, regulators, legislators,law enforcement personnel, and/or individual members ofthe public. How are individuals or groups empowered to takeprotective actions? Their empowerment comes from manysources, including self-preservation; education and training;administrative procedures; posting and labeling; provisionand use of personal protective equipment; design, creation,and maintenance of engineered barriers; medical care;treaties, laws, regulations, recommendations, and guidance.Examples of hitherto unknown radiological hazards beingdiscovered and subsequently managed are provided. Thebasis for radiation protection action is knowledge of the radi-ological situation. What do individuals or groups need toknow to choose the correct course of action? The answers tothis question differ as widely as approaches to managingradiation risks listed in the 1996 paper. This paper ends witha systematic analysis of information needs for radiation pro-tection. *Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is operatedfor the U.S. Department of Energy by Battelle under ContractDE-AC05-76RLO 1830. Strom DJ. 1996. Ten Principles andTen Commandments of Radiation Protection. Health Phys.70(3):388-393.

t a m-a .6 Waller, E., Wilkinson, D.; University ofOntario Institute of Technology, Defence Research andDevelopment Canada - Ottawa; ed.waller@uoit.caa c ombined h ardware-s oftware s trategy for t riage ofinternally c ontaminated persons

In the event of a radiological dispersal device (RDD)event or other non-malignant release of radioactive material,it is possible for radionuclides to enter the human bodythrough inhalation, ingestion, skin and wound absorption.Post-release there is a need to rapidly triage potentiallyexposed persons, to (a) decide on appropriate treatmentstrategies, (b) perform dosimetric assessments, and (c) clearnon-exposed persons from the scene (and alleviate the wor-ried well phenomena). The triage strategy assumes that (i)there exists a field capability to measure the presence of con-tamination, identify the isotope(s) involved, and estimate theactivity order of magnitude inhaled, (ii) once identified, thereis a treatment strategy available, and (iii) there exists suffi-cient decorporation pharmaceuticals to treat affected person-nel. From a medical perspective, removal of radionu-clides leading to dose aversion is of high importance. Theefficacy of medical decorporation strategies is extremelydependant upon the time of treatment delivery after intake.The “golden hour”, or more realistically 3-4 hours, is optimalwhen attempting to increase removal of radionuclides fromextracellular fluids prior to cellular incorporation. To assistfirst response personnel in making timely triage assessments,it is desirable to have a hardware solution for rapid fieldassessment of internal contamination and a software toolwhich compiles existing radionuclide decorporation therapydata and allows a user to perform simple diagnosis leading topotential appropriate decorporation treatment strategies.This talk presents a comprehensive triage and treatment strat-egy using a Radiological Triage Mask

TMand MEDECORTM

medical decorporation software. t a m-a .7 Anderson, V.E., Thomas, J.M.; CaliforniaDepartment of Public Health; victor.anderson@cdph.ca.govn uclear w eapon a ttack r esponse: s uggestedmethodologies For r educing r adiation Fatalities.

The immediate effects of a nuclear weapon attack willcause mass death, shock and confusion. Depending on mete-orological conditions, fallout having radiation levels ofgreater than one Gray/hr can arrive within one hour or lessdownwind from the explosion site. We present a concise,simple approach that we believe will help to minimize radia-tion fatalities from these high levels of fallout and usefulrules of thumb are given. This approach can also serve as theframework for both response planning and public communi-cation. The national scenario of a 10 kiloton improvisednuclear device detonated at ground level was used as thebaseline for effects.

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t a m-a .8 Ansari, A., Caspary, K.; Centers for DiseaseControl and Prevention, Oak Ridge Institute for Science andEducation; asa4@cdc.govplanning t ools for o perating c ommunity r eceptionc enters in r esponse to l arge s cale r adiatione mergencies

Public health response to a radiation emergencyincludes coordination of radiological monitoring of theaffected population. These services include: a) assessmentfor immediate medical needs, b) radiological monitoring forpresence of external and internal contamination, c) externaldecontamination, d) assessing need for bioassays, e) medicalintervention for decorporation, f) establishing a registry, g)assessing the need for and providing counseling, and h)determining need for short-term medical follow up. When alarge population (including concerned citizens) is potentiallyimpacted, community reception centers offer a mechanism toefficiently provide such monitoring services to the affectedpopulation, including their pets. These reception centers aremodeled closely after points of dispensing (POD) whichmany public health communities across the country havealready incorporated in their response plans for biologicalthreats. As a follow on to the publication of PopulationMonitoring in Radiation Emergencies: A Guide for State andLocal Public Health Planners, the Centers for DiseaseControl and Prevention is developing a number of tools forlocal and state public health, emergency management, andradiation control officials who are responsible for populationmonitoring in their jurisdictions. The tools discussed in thispresentation include the community reception center flowdiagrams describing various functional modules, staffing andequipment needs, and a decision tool (software) for optimiz-ing reception center operations. These tools are useful fortraining, exercise development, strategic planning, and real-time optimization of available staff and equipment resources.t a m-a .9 Salame-Alfie, A., Costello, C.; New YorkState Department of Health; asa01@health.state.ny.usr adiological e mergency planning for public h ealthprofessionals and First r esponders

Planning and training for a radiological event was iden-tified as an area needing further attention in New York State(NYS). In September 2007, a very successful two-day train-ing session was conducted at the University of AlbanySchool of Public Health in order to address this need. As aresult of the positive feedback received during the first ses-sion, five additional training sessions were conductedbetween February and July 2008, each in a different regionof NYS. The training was targeted primarily to local healthdepartment staff and their emergency response partners (e.g.Emergency Management, Fire, Emergency Medical Servicesand HAZMAT) who would provide primary response for aRadiological Dispersal Device (RDD) event. Hospitals werealso invited to the training, as they are first receivers. Thepurpose of the additional sessions was to further reach out to

the target audience and to encourage collaboration betweenlocal health departments, state health department radiationcontrol program staff and local emergency response partners.During the training, local and national experts engaged learn-ers on basic radiation emergency response concepts and localemergency planning related to responding to RDDs and otherradiological events. Training included presentations (basicradiation concepts, radiological emergency response con-cepts, population monitoring, risk communication issues andemergency planning basics), a facilitated discussion (publichealth response to a dirty bomb) and small group activities(risk communication and local planning for radiological inci-dents). The training was co-sponsored by the New York StateDepartment of Health, University at Albany School of PublicHealth, and the New York State Association of CountyHealth Officials. Over 400 people participated in these sixtraining sessions.t a m-a .10 White, J.; University of Texas SouthwesternMedical Center; John.White@UTSouthwestern.edue mergency r esponder c ourses in r adiological andn uclear preparedness and r esponse: t he n d l s Fc ourses

Courses have been developed across the country toteach Emergency Responders how to deal with large-scaledisasters, and include response to a radiological environment.The National Disaster Life Support Foundation is a consor-tium composed of academic institutions, the AmericanMedical Association, and the American College ofEmergency Physicians, and is supported by a CongressionalAppropriation through the Centers for Disease Control.Courses presented have been developed by the Foundation’smembers to provide critical capability to EmergencyPhysicians, Nurses, Technologists and Technicians, and otherEmergency Response personnel. The Radiation segments arepresented in short summary, including taught modules ofBasic Radiation Physics, Transportation Accidents,Radiological Dispersal Devices, Radiation ExposureDevices, Nuclear Weapons, and “Three Myths that canParalyze Medical Response.” The last was presented by RuthMcBurney as President-Elect of the Health Physics Society,to the ‘Gathering of Eagles,’ the conference of the MedicalDirectors of the 25 largest Metro areas, and the Myths andcountervailing facts are presented. The goal of overcomingfear of radiation in students is worthwhile, and is shown to bea constant struggle for instructors. Issues regarding under-standing dose in rem vs. Gy are discussed as a significanthurdle, in part due to the large installed base of EmergencyResponse detection equipment. The experience of the major‘Dirty Bomb’ drill at Texas Motor Speedway is summarized,where all responding hospitals closed due to contaminationeven though detected radiological hazards were minimal.These courses have been presented around the country in aface-to-face venue by a number of National and RegionalTraining Centers, and current status of the program is pre-

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sented. HPS involvement has to date been minimal, but isincreasing. An analysis of new and future iterations of thecourse in development is presented, including proposedonline versions. t a m-a .11 Crowe, F.A.; Crowe and Company, LLC;fcrowe@croweandco.comh ealth physics s ociety as a t raining r esource for publice ducation

Massive amounts of federal funding has rightfully beenspent to develop policy and guidance for incident manage-ment, still the guidance, planning and preparation at the locallevel remains inadequate. Much has been and is being doneby the Department of Homeland Security as well as variousfederal and state agencies with regard to detection, preven-tion and preparation for WMD incidents but the vulnerabili-ty of First Responders remains high. These men and womenare “first on the scene” as a natural or man-made disasterunfolds and must take action even though federal responseresources will not be available for hours or even days after anincident. Even with proper training, there will not be enoughresponders such as police, fire, or paramedic teams to helpmost citizens in the critical early time after an incident. Giventhe “invisible” nature of radiation exposure, the average citi-zen needs access to adequate information about proper actionimmediately after an incident. Training and user-friendlyequipment will encourage active citizen participation andpreparedness to provide the needed critical surge capacity tosupplement government efforts during a radiological ornuclear incident. As society at large is not trained in HealthPhysics, the non-radiological (e.g. economic, social and psy-chological) consequences of an event may be worse than theradiological impacts as a result of a lack of pre-establishedresponse guidance and protective measures understandableto the public and officials. The wealth of knowledge andexpertise that exists within the Health Physics Society shouldbe leveraged to develop training for the public to preventunreasoned fear through knowledge, understanding, andtraining. Reassurance, proper guidance and training will keeppanic from overwhelming the public health care system andhopefully avoid unnecessary large scale evacuations. t a m-a .12 Hearnsberger, D., Poston, J., Hamilton, I.;Kaizen Innovations, Texas A&M University, Baylor Collegeof Medicine; dhearnsberger@kaizeninnovations.coma n e xternal d ose r econstruction involving ar adiological d ispersal d evice

The National Council on Radiation Protection andMeasurements (NCRP) Report No. 138 (NCRP 2001) indi-cates that exposures received by first responders will beimportant for a number of reasons, including planning for theappropriate use of key personnel in an extended emergencysituation. This work attempts to provide additional radiolog-ical exposure knowledge so that an Incident Commander(IC) with limited or no information can make more informeddecisions regarding disposition of personnel, members of the

public and other resources. A method to provide such insightbegins with providing a model that describes the physics ofradiation interactions, radiation source and geometry, collec-tion of field measurements, and interpretation of the collect-ed data. A Monte Carlo simulation of the model is performedso that calculated results can be compared to measured val-ues. The results of this investigation indicate that measuredorgan absorbed doses inside a tissue equivalent phantomcompared favorably to the derived organ absorbed dosesmeasured by the Panasonic thermoluminescent dosimeters(TLDs) and with Monte Carlo ‘N’ Particle (MCNP) modeledresults. Additionally, a Victoreen 450P pressurized ion cham-ber measured values of integrated dose and they comparedwell with the Panasonic right lateral (RLAT) TLD. This com-parison indicates that the Victoreen 450P could potentiallyserve as an estimator of real-time effective dose and organabsorbed dose if energy and angular dependence correctionscould be taken into account. Finally, the data presented in thisinvestigation indicate that the MCNP model developed pro-vides a reasonable method to determine organ absorbed doseand effective dose of a simulated Radiological DispersalDevice (RDD) in an Inferior-Superior (IS) geometry withNa99mTcO4 as the source of radioactive material. t a m-a .13 Bushmanov, A., Kotenko, K., Kretov, A.;FMBC of FMBA of Russia; radclin@yandex.rug uidance of interregional radiation emergency practicalmedical training - r ussian experience

One of the most important lines of activity for IAEAduring last years is increasing awareness among medicalcommunity on the possible effects of radiation exposure andrecognition of the radiation injury, they have put a lot ofefforts for this direction. But, unfortunately, training activi-ties of this type did not cover the important area of practicalmedical training (on-job training) using real cases of overex-posure. Majority of countries in the world have no enoughexperience to provide such interregional training (taking intoaccount the number of potential patients per year, nationalexperience, national arrangements, etc.). Burnasian FederalMedical Biophysical Center of Federal Medical BiologicalAgency, Moscow, Russia (earlier Clinical department of theState Research Center - Institute of Biophysics andBurnasyan Clinical hospital 6 of Federal Medical BiologicalAgency) are known for their experience, and high-levelexpertise. From clinical records they have following estima-tion of treated cases per year: acute radiation sickness andpatients with leukaemia exposed up to 12 Gy 5-6 cases, localradiation injury 1- 2 cases. The most important targets of theinterregional fellowship are to provide medical personnelinvolved in a medical response to radiation emergencies withpractical knowledge and experience in treatment and man-agement of acute radiation sickness and local radiationinjuries. Fellowship duration is for 2 weeks with 5 workingdays a week. It is possible to provide three courses per yearwith beginning on according agreement. The main activities

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of the fellowship are as follows: Course of lectures on diag-nostics and treatment of acute radiation injuries, Everydayclinical examination of patients in the department of acuteradiation disease or in the department of local radiationinjuries, Training in applying and understanding the resultsof methods for estimation of radiation doses (cytogenetic,ESR, whole body counter).t a m-b.1 Kish, J.; DHS/FEMAn ational preparedness issues r elated to n uclear orr adiological incidents

Development and implementation of key componentsof the mandated the National Preparedness System provideopportunity as well as risk to existing preparedness practicesof Federal, State, local, tribal, and industry partners. The pro-liferation of policies through numerous related HomelandSecurity Presidential Directives – most notably HSPD 5,HSPD 8; and doctrinal foundations established by theNational Response Framework, National IncidentManagement System present ongoing challenges to longstanding practices in the emergency management profession.One general example that highlights these dynamics is recon-ciling the suite of emergent Homeland Security policies anddoctrine with existing regulation and policy in theRadiological Emergency Preparedness Program. A longstanding program, born from the Kemeny Commission fol-lowing the Three Mile Island accident, the RadiologicalEmergency Preparedness Program provides the structuredmanner in which planning and capabilities for areas sur-rounding operating nuclear power stations are organized,exercised, and evaluated. The advent of significantly reor-ganized structures at the Federal level, coupled with mandat-ed procedural modifications at the local and State levelsaffecting well established procedures require those protocolsbe constantly reviewed and updated. These efforts also haveimplications broader than the governments and industry part-ners at specified sites – they affect and are affected by plan-ning and capabilities across the nation. Accounting for bothnatural and man made hazards impacting nuclear or radiationpreparedness in a terrorism context adds a new and complexdimension. Even when successfully undertaken, the impactsof updated plans, procedures, structures, funding sources,and expected outcomes presents significant challenges forparticipants at all levels of government, and industry, as wellas for affected disciplines can be profound and ongoing. t a m-b.2 Daigler, D.; DHS/FEMAr egional r esponse s tructure for management ofd omestic incidents

In response to a Homeland Security PresidentialDirective, the Department of Homeland Security published acomprehensive, national approach to incident managementthat is applicable at all jurisdictional levels and across func-tional disciplines (the National Incident ManagementSystem, or NIMS). Based on the lessons learned fromresponses to natural disasters, the Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA) has developed IncidentManagement Assistance Teams (IMAT) to bring the mostqualified, experienced emergency management personneland capabilities in response to all-hazard incidents to betterimplement the provisions of NIMS and the NationalResponse Framework. These teams establish a cadre of full-time staff entirely dedicated to exercising, analyzing, andexecuting disaster response. The mission of the IMAT will beto support local governments in all-hazards planning andincident action planning; provide expertise in all emergencymanagement functional areas; support states and otherresponse organizations in an incident by establishing com-mand, coordination, and communications; provide real-timesituational awareness; coordinate other Federal agencies toprovide response/recovery resources; and execute StaffordAct authorities and FEMA missions to direct the support,integration, and coordination of Federal resources in order tomitigate the impacts from the incident. The concept of oper-ations for these teams will be described in further detail inthis presentation.t a m-b.3 Tupin, E.; US Environmental ProtectionAgency Radiation and Indoor Air; DeCair.Sara@epamail.epa.govprotection a ction g uidelines and r ecommendations - a nu pdate

The United States Environmental Protection Agency(EPA) is updating the 1992 “Manual of Protective Actionsand Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents” (PAGsManual). The PAGs are decision levels to help state and localauthorities make radiation protection decisions during emer-gencies. More specifically, they are the projected radiationdoses at which specific action may be warranted in order toreduce or avoid that dose. The proposed revision providesseveral key updates: • It clarifies the use of the 1992 protec-tive action guides and protective actions for incidents otherthan nuclear power plant accidents. • It provides new guid-ance concerning the consumption of drinking water duringand after a radiological emergency. • It updates the dosime-try basis to current international guidance for all derivedresponse levels and dose conversion factors. • And it includesguidance for dealing with long-term site restoration follow-ing a major radiological release, based on Department ofHomeland Security guidance on implementing PAGs after aradiological dispersal device (RDD) or improvised nucleardevice (IND). t a m-b.4 Noska, M.A.; US Food & DrugAdministration; michael.noska@fda.hhs.govt he a dvisory t eam for the e nvironment, Food andh ealth a ctivities and initiatives

The Advisory Team for the Environment, Food andHealth (“Advisory Team” or “A-team”) is a federal intera-gency group of health physicists and other allied health pro-fessionals chartered by the Federal RadiologicalPreparedness Coordinating Committee (FRPCC) to assist

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State, Local and Tribal (S/L/T) authorities in responding toradiological/nuclear emergencies. The mission of theAdvisory Team is to make protective action recommenda-tions to S/L/T officials based on plume dispersion modelsand assessments of radiological data collected in the field.The Advisory Team also provides health physics expertise tothe federal Coordinating Agency and other federal agenciesas outlined in the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex, andoccupies an appropriate position within Unified Command.The Advisory Team is principally composed of representa-tives from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, theEnvironmental Protection Agency and the Department ofHealth and Human Services, including the Centers forDisease Control and Prevention and the Food and DrugAdministration; other departments/agencies may participateas needed. The Advisory Team is prepared to assist from theearly (emergency) phase of an event through the late (recov-ery) phase. Working closely with the DOE-led FederalRadiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC),the Advisory Team utilizes federal guidance documents andother relevant sources to make its recommendations for theprotection of health by limiting exposures through food andenvironmental pathways.t a m-b.5 Clark, H., Allen, R., Essex, J., Pobanz, B.;US Department of Energy Office of Emergency Response,Chainbridge Technologies, National Security Technologies,LLC, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories;harvey.clark@hq.doe.gova dvances in d ata management within the Federalr adiological monitoring and a ssessment c enter(Fr ma c )

Dramatic advances in data management have beenmade as a result of the Paperless FRMAC initiative, spon-sored by the DOE’s Office of Emergency Response (NA-42).The FRMAC is the hub for all radiological monitoring andthe production of data products that interpret those measure-ments in terms of protective action guidelines. As such, verylarge amounts of data must be quickly assimilated fromnumerous sources and then widely distributed as graphicalinterpretations as fast as possible. Paperless FRMAC is abroad initiative to move that data faster, farther and betterthrough telemetry, automation, and networking. This discus-sion reviews for the first time the status of the now two-year-old Paperless FRMAC initiative. Key features of PaperlessFRMAC include multipath telemetry of measurements fromDOE field teams, 24/7 Internet presence, early data entry byfirst responders, support for distance collaborations, and dataexchange with the EPA’s SCRIBE database. The heart of theenterprise is the RAMS database, which provides seamlessinterfacing with GIS, LIMS, and TurboFRMAC for calcula-tions. Paperless FRMAC is presented to users via twoInternet websites. The first, FRMAC Portal website, isrestricted to the emergency responders for data input, analy-sis, and product development. The second, CMweb website,

is the showroom for completed and approved products,which are made much more widely available. In fact,CMweb offers seamless, single log-in access to all data prod-ucts for any IMAAC, NARAC or CMweb user.t a m-b.6 Crapo, J.L.; Oak Ridge Institute for Science& Education; john.crapo@orise.orau.gova dvances in r isk c ommunication t ools for s upport toincident managers and d ecision makers

Effective communication of the consequences of anuclear or radiological incident is essential for key leadersand decision makers to institute measures to provide for thehealth and safety of the responders and the public. Untilrecently, this decision-making process had been limited toareas where a mature radiological emergency response capa-bility existed (i.e. those areas in which a nuclear power gen-erating station was sited). With an emerging threat of nuclearor radiological terrorism, potential targets of such an incidenthave extended to localities with a developing or non-existentradiological response capability. The National NuclearSecurity Agency’s Office of Emergency Response has devel-oped a three-pronged approach, in collaboration with otherFederal agencies and response capabilities, to ensure thatconsequence assessment predictions and products are readilyunderstood by a non-technical audience so that critical deci-sions can be made and implemented in an expeditious mat-ter. This approach has included developing less-technicalconsequence assessment products, revising existing technicalconsequence assessment products, and developing a briefingbook for use by liaisons to local, state, tribal and Federal gov-ernment level to help effectively communicate the conse-quences of the incident. These new products and their intend-ed use are described.t a m-b.7 Livingston, G.K., Jenkins, M.S.,Christensen, D.M., Wiley, A.L., Van Dyke, D.L.; Oak RidgeAssociated Universities, Mayo Clinic; gordon.livingston@orise.orau.gove stablishing a w eb-based c onsortium of c ytogeneticl aboratories for r apid t riage and e mergency r adiationd ose a ssessment

Nuclear terrorism has emerged as a significant threat onthe world stage which could require timely medical counter-measures to minimize radiation-related casualties. Early doseassessments are critical since optimal medical treatment mustbe guided by the dose received by an individual. The dicen-tric chromosome aberration assay is considered the “goldstandard” for assessing radiation dose, but it is time-consum-ing and the relatively few specialized radiation cytogeneticlaboratories worldwide could easily be overwhelmed by alarge number of blood samples associated with a mass casu-alty event. One solution to the problem of surge capacity isto employ the large national resource of expert cytogeneti-cists who work in more than 140 clinical cytogenetic labora-tories associated with major medical centers. This clinicalresource could assist with both remote scoring of chromo-

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some breakage and with the lymphocyte cell culture. Thisclinical expertise allows for remote scoring of dicentric chro-mosomes using electronic image files shared between labo-ratories using the internet. A strategy built around a dedicat-ed/secure website and associated data base could rapidlyincrease scoring capacity while adding redundancy andreducing the turn-a-round time to provide physicians withdose estimates. We have shown that results obtained by scor-ing dicentric chromosomes in metaphase cell images on thecomputer monitor are equivalent to those obtained by scor-ing directly through the microscope over a wide range of Co60 gamma radiation doses. This work has created a largeimage library with tens of thousands of metaphase cellimages which can be used for training and proficiency test-ing. Currently, six laboratories have agreed to participate inthe consortium. An expanding consortium could provide astrong resource for consequence management of radiologi-cal/nuclear incidents in the U.S. and abroad.t a m-b.8 Remick, A.L., McCall, K.; US Departmentof Energy, National Security Technologies, LLC;alan.remick@nnsa.doe.govd evelopment of a r egionally-based a irborne r adiationmonitoring program

Rapid assessment of the scope and magnitude of arelease of radioactivity, particularly one that has the potentialto impact large population and/or agricultural centers, isessential to ensure adequate steps be taken as quickly as pos-sible to provide for the health and safety of the public and theenvironment. U.S. Department of Energy’s National NuclearSecurity Administration (NNSA) has a dedicated group ofscientists, engineers, and technicians who respond to radio-logical accidents/incidents anywhere in the world. Includedwithin this response capability is an aerial radiation measure-ment system that was developed to provide rapid response toa radiological emergency response that employs both heli-copters and fixed-wing aircraft. To ensure prompt response tothreats of a nuclear or radiological incident initiated any-where in the United States additional resources locationshave been identified to allow national assets to respond with-in a reasonable time to an incident location. The federal planfor deployment of a regional capability, coordination ofassets, and acquisition of data from extant systems will bediscussed. The plan will also address how state and localagencies can acquire support and information retaining tofederal regional assets to be used during a radiological emer-gency.t a m-b.9 Smith, C.L., Smith, D.E.; Oak RidgeInstitute for Science & Education; christopher.smith@orise.orau.govn uclear/r adiological incident e xercises - Validation ofe fforts, s ource of o pportunities to improve

Exercises are the primary tool available to the USGovernment for evaluating its nuclear and radiological inci-dent management capability. Prior to 2003, the US

Government conducted nuclear and radiological emergencyexercises with organizations and communities knowledge-able in nuclear power or nuclear weapons. Since 2003, exer-cises like Top Officials 2, Southern Crossing 2006, TopOfficials 4, and Diablo Bravo 2008 reflect the recentincreased emphasis in the US Government on terrorism-related events. These exercises presented complex and real-istic problems involving operations in multiple functionalareas that required critical thinking, rapid problem solving,and effective responses by trained personnel. Most impor-tantly, these exercises introduced nuclear and radiologicalincident management issues to new communities across thecountry. The result not only identified individual agencyshortfalls and procedure changes, but also led to new initia-tives, such as advances in risk communication tools, intend-ed to improve Federal, State, and local operational capabili-ties. An integrated evaluation and analysis of these National-level exercises provides objective feedback on USGovernment-wide capabilities and validates efforts to exposenew communities to nuclear and radiological incidentresponse and recovery activities. t pm-a .1 Lanza, J.; Florida Department of Health;john_lanza@doh.state.fl.usa preventative r adiological/n uclear d etection programin the s tate of Florida

Since radiation exists in our environment from a vari-ety of sources, it is sometimes challenging for law enforce-ment officers and others to distinguish naturally-occurringradiological materials (NORM) and medical sources of radi-ation from threat level radiological materials. The integrationof readings from detection and identification equipment withintelligence and other information must occur to separatethese sources. Since legitimate materials with radiologicalsignatures are transported or medically applied each andevery day, it is imperative to quickly assess the threat poten-tial without a significant disruption to commerce or in health-care situations. Various technologies are being deployed todetect illicit radiological/nuclear materials. The detection ofthese materials requires the use of scientific equipment suchas personal radiation detectors (PRDs), radioisotope identifi-cation devices (RIIDs), and Advanced Spectroscopic Portal(ASP) Monitors. This presentation will describe the imple-mentation of preventative radiological/nuclear detectionmethodologies by Florida agencies in various applicationsincluding commercial vehicles, maritime, and special eventsvenues. t pm-a .2 Rhodes, W., Lasche, G.; Sandia NationalLabs; wgrhode@sandia.gove mergency r esponse c hallenges for h ealth physicists

This presentation will cover three main topics in theemergency response framework. The US government is inthe process of reviewing its policies for radioactive materialsecurity. This review process will be discussed, and prelimi-nary information and conclusions of the review will be pro-

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vided in the context of preparing for emergencies. A recentstudy of photon and neutron background radiation complet-ed by Sandia National Laboratories will also be presented.The final topic will include some interesting examples ofemergency response radiation monitoring issues and resultsthat will include several case studies. t pm-a .3 Princewill, J., Sanza, B.; NorthwesternUniversity, Chicago Illinois, Northwestern University;jpr890@northwestern.edua r eview of r esponse to implementing increasedirradiator s ecurity c ontrols

Introduction: A new GC cell 40 gamma irradiator waspurchased to meet growing research demands and to replacean older version prone to frequent repairs and longer irradia-tion time. Installation coincided with a nationwide securityplan developed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission(NRC). Because these additional security measures will beverified by the State regulatory agency, satisfactory compli-ance was the only goal. Noncompliance is subject to licensemodification, suspension or revocation and/or civil penalties.Background: The regulatory agency determined thatNorthwestern University (NU) radioactive materials licenseneeds to implement increased controls to supplement exist-ing regulatory requirements. This paper describes the imple-mentation of the increased controls and reviews the responseto the security measures. Implementation: Active users ofthe irradiator were identified and classified. A method toshow proof of Trustworthiness and Reliability (T&R) in writ-ing was established for all identified. Training sessions suit-able for each category was established. Specific actions weretaken to reinforce facility or storage housing radioactivematerial quantities of concern. Levels of security modes wereemployed including swipe cards, motion sensors, biometricreaders and sophisticated detector systems. Vendors withinand outside NU were contacted for quotes to implement dif-ferent phases of the job. After meeting university policy andregulatory requirements, fingerprinting was the last hurdlefor granting unescorted access. In Conclusion: What are thelessons to learn while implementing the increased controls?The efforts, the results and the responses will be presented. t pm-a .4 Favret, D., Gross, I., Meyers, S., Pugh, D.;US Air Force, Oak Ridge National Laboratory; derek-favret@hotmail.coma lternate t echnique for Field e stimation of u raniume nrichment

Determination of uranium enrichment in the field istypically accomplished by calculating activity ratios for U-235 and U-238 through use of gamma spectrometry. Due totheir respective abundances, either the 143 keV or 186 keVphoton emission of U-235 and the 1001 keV photon emissionof Pa-234m are typically utilized in calculating nuclide activ-ity. Accurate activity estimates in the field are challengingdue to factors such as source-to-detector geometry, samplematrix, efficiency calibration, etc. Portable gamma spectrom-

eters designed for first responders use an algorithm to com-pare count ratios of these photon emissions to estimate thepresence of enriched uranium. This technique has been foundto identify false positive results when an unknown sampledoes not meet the infinite thickness criterion for the 1001keV photon emission. This presentation illustrates a modifiedtechnique, utilized by DOE and DoD Health Physicists, toestimate uranium enrichment of unknown samples in ship-ping containers.t pm-a .5 Ayaz-Maierhafer, B., DeVol, T.A.; ClemsonUniversity; ayaz@clemson.edubackground and minimum d etectable a ctivity (md a ) ofr adiation d etectors for h omeland s ecurity borders

Using a combination of experiment and Monte Carlomodeling, this research compares and contrasts the absolutedetection efficiency, background count rate and minimumdetectable activity (MDA) of NaI(Tl), HPGe, LaCl3(Ce),LaBr3(Ce), HPXe and CZT radiation detector materials. Anexperimental background measurement for the 7.62 cm x7.62 cm right circular cylinder NaI(Tl) detector was per-formed at 100 cm from the subject soil and used to developthe MCNP5 model of the simulated background spectrum.The following detectors were evaluated: 7.62 cm x 7.62 cmright circular cylinder of NaI(Tl) and HPGe, 40.64 cm x10.16 cm x 5.08 cm rectangular prism of NaI(Tl), 2.54 cmdiameter x 2.54 cm length right circular cylinder ofLaCl3(Ce), 3.81 cm diameter x 3.81 cm length right circularcylinder of LaBr3(Ce), 11.3 cm diameter x 17 cm long cylin-der HPXe (bulk density = 0.25 g/cc), and 1 cm x 1 cm x 1 cmcube of CZT. The absolute detection efficiency was meas-ured or modeled for these detectors for the following pointsources and energies: Ba-133 (0.356 MeV), Cs-137 (0.661MeV), Mn-54 (0.834 MeV) and Co-60 (1.173 and 1.332MeV). MCNP was used to model the background count ratesin the regions of interest of these radionuclides to determinethe MDAs. Based on a 3600 sec count time, the calculatedMDA ranged from 42,000 Bq for the 1 cm^3 CZT down to3,600 Bq for the rectangular prism of NaI(Tl). Details ofthese measurements and calculations are presented.t pm-b.1 Kramer, G., Hauck, B.*, Marro, L., Capello,K., Chiang, A.; Health Canada; gary_h_kramer@hc-sc.gc.caportal monitoring: a methodology for increasingt hroughput

The National Internal Radiation Assessment Section(NIRAS), which operates the Canadian National CalibrationReference Centre for Bioassay and In Vivo Monitoring, hasfield deployable equipment for emergency response. A sub-stantial part of this toolkit is a set of portal monitors that canbe used to quickly screen people into the “uncontaminated”and the “contaminated”. The former term refers to a personwho has less than 60 kBq of activation/fission products andthe latter group are contaminated by that amount or more.Recent field work has shown that one type of the NIRAS’sportal monitors can be alarmed at significant distances if the

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level of contamination is high enough. The other types,which do not initiate a count until either an infra-red beam isbroken or a proximity detector is activated, do not alarm buttheir background will be raised and this causes other prob-lems. This work has uncovered some of the problems thatwill be encountered when dealing with a large crowd thatcontains some contaminated individuals resulting in longertimes to screen concerned individuals. This paper proposes amethod of group monitoring to help speed up the process ofscreening a large number of potentially contaminated per-sons through a series of portal monitors. In short, the groupof potentially contaminated persons will be kept remote fromthe portal stations. Depending on a real-time estimate of thepercentage of contaminated persons in the crowd, groups ofpersons will be selected for screening . The hypergeometricdistribution has been used to decide on the sampling groupsize with an expectation that 90% of the time no contaminat-ed person will be present in the group. Once removed fromthe main waiting area, the group will be pre-screened andthen depending on the result sent to the appropriate portal. Itis anticipated that this will greatly speed up processing as itsubstantially reduces the transit time. Transits times havealso been estimated in addition to the number of personnelrequired to run all of NIRAS’s field deployable equipment.t pm-b.2 Wilkinson, D., Pace, P.*, Wyatt, H.,Bugden, M.; Defence R&D Canada, Atomic Energy ofCanada Limited; diana.wilkinson@drdc-rddc.gc.caa d eployable n on-invasive t echnique for s creeningr adiologically e xposed populations

Present technologies used to identify irradiated individ-uals are too time consuming and expensive to be suitable asa mass casualty screening tool. A rapid, non-invasive tool isneeded to sort the affected population. We investigatedInfraRed (IR) thermal imaging as a rapid screening tool foridentification of individuals who need further medical atten-tion and those who may need counseling. The concept ofusing thermal imaging for medically affected individuals wastested and proved beneficial during the SARS crisis (Ng,Med. Phys. 32 (1), January, 2005). It has also been used inthe past to follow the progress of local radiation exposurecaused by the induction of a regional inflammatory response.At a recent Thermal Engineering Conference (Budapest,2003), Imre Benko and Gyorgy Koteles presented a sentinelpaper on the use of infrared thermogrammetry (IR-TGM) forearly detection and quantification of radiation induced injuryand dermatitis. Based on these findings, we conducted a pilotstudy that used the IR imaging system to acquire images ofradiation induced changes in mice and determine if thermaldifferentials could be diagnostic of radiation exposure.Preliminary studies indicate that whole-body-exposure to2Gy ionizing radiation induces transient thermal-profilechanges in irradiated mice. (CRTI-2646PC015*)

t pm-b.3 Li, C., Varve, Z., Lariviere, D., Sadi, B., Lai,E., Kramer, G.; Health Canada, Carleton University; li_chun-sheng@hc-sc.gc.caa Fast bioassay method for u ranium and plutoniumisotopes in Faecal s amples

Following a radiological or nuclear emergency, bioas-say provides rapid assessment of internally contaminatedindividuals and facilitates timely medical intervention.Scientists have developed a reliable faecal bioassay methodfor uranium and plutonium isotopes that consists of burning,fusion, dissolution, separation, and counting. However, itrequires days to get the final results. In this work, we presenta fast bioassay method for uranium and plutonium isotopesin faecal samples, which consists of fast sample decomposi-tion and measurement steps. Samples are decomposed byrefluxing and microwave digestion and measured by auto-mated SPE separation (solid phase extraction) and ICP-MSmeasurement (inductively coupled plasma mass spectrome-try). The completed experiments on 13.5-gram synthetic fae-cal samples (representing 10% of daily excretion from anICRP Reference Man) spiked with 10-20 mg UO2 (NBS Ref.# 97) and Pu-239 solution showed that this method meets thebioassay criteria for both accuracy and repeatability. Moreimportant, the sample turnaround time has been significantlyshortened (to about 1 day). Experiments on 135-gram sam-ples (representing the daily excretion from an ICRPReference Man) are currently are under way, focusing onaccelerating the sample decomposition process and ensuringsample homogeneity (after refluxing) which allows us to usealiquots of a sample for actinide bioassay. t pm-b.4 Li, C., Sadi, B., Jodayree, S., Moodie, G.,Daka, J., Kramer, G.; Health Canada, Carleton University;li_chunsheng@hc-sc.gc.cao ptimized s r-90 u rine bioassay method for e mergencyr esponse

Strontium-90 (Sr-90) was identified as one of the high-risk radionuclides in the Coordinated Risk Assessment, a col-laborative effort of USA, UK, Canada, Australia and NewZealand. It could be used in a radiological dispersal device(RDD) via an energetic dispersion or a covert dispersion in aterrorist attack. During such an event, the first responders andthe affected public can be internally contaminated with Sr-90via inhalation, ingestion, or wounding. Liquid scintillationcounting (LSC) of urine samples is a convenient and reliablebioassay method for assessing such internal contamination.However, LSC measurement for Sr-90 in urine suffers fromboth Y-90 interference and matrix quenching. In this work,we optimized the LSC bioassay method for Sr-90 in urine bystripping urine colorants and other organics using theEichrom&amp;reg; Pre-filter and removing Y-90 from thesamples using an anion exchange column. Both steps arerapid and robust, making this method ideal for both laborato-ry and field applications. The optimized method will be test-ed on a field deployable instrument, the TRIATHLER

R, in

August and September, 2008.

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t pm-b.5 Simon, S., Bouville, A.; National CancerInstitute, National Institutes of Health; ssimon@mail.nih.govt he n eed to c ollect individual e xposure-r elated d ataFollowing r adiation a ccidents and e vents

The need for collection of data necessary to produceunbiased individual dose assessments should not be over-looked after unplanned radiation accidents or events. Inorder to determine the true health-related consequences ofthe radiation exposure in terrorist events, it will be essen-tial to estimate radiation absorbed organ and whole-bodydoses received by those in the vicinity. While the activitiesof immediate concern will be triage, medical treatment,and decontamination, there will also be an opportunity tocollect individual information useful for retrospective doseassessments. The types of data essential for dose recon-struction can be anticipated by health physicists and wouldinclude, at least for external dose, length of exposure, dis-tance from the source, and degree of shielding. Estimationof internal dose will be more difficult but can rely on meas-urements, e.g., bioassay, obtained later. However, accu-rately documenting the whereabouts of each person at thetime of the event, and the time they spent in the vicinitymay not be easy, particularly when the group includesinjured persons, children, and the elderly. Moreover, thedifficulty in obtaining accurate individual informationgrows substantially with the passage of time since the lim-itations of memory recall often results in inaccurate report-ing. The kinds of information that need to be collectedimmediately and preferably, on-site, include: Who? Howmany? Length of exposure? How can persons be contactedlater? While a few strategies have been envisioned to cap-ture information soon after such events, the chaos that islikely to ensue from a terrorist event will make this kind ofdata collection extremely difficult. But the success or fail-ure to collect such data, and to link it unambiguously withindividuals, will determine to a large degree, the success orfailure of realistically evaluating individual doses, a neces-sary component to determining the radiation-related conse-quences of terrorist events.t pm-c .1 Thomas, J.; California Department ofPublic Health; james.thomas@cdph.ca.govt he psychology of n uclear Fear and l oathing: w hy a reu .s ., Japanese, and French a ttitudes d ifferent t owardsr adiation.

The Japanese and French have embraced nuclearpower generation where the United States remains ambiva-lent. I explore possible explanations for these differencesusing current social psychology and evolutionary psycholo-gy ideas. These include: human behaviors toward things per-ceived as predators versus vermin; attitudes towards magicalversus mundane phenomena; and the perception of experts aswizards versus shaman. I further examine the possible strate-gies to turn around public opinion and the pitfalls we mustavoid.

t pm-c .2 Jones, C.G.; U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission; cynthia.jones@nrc.gova pplication of the ia e a ’s international n uclear e vents cale in c ommunicating e vents

The International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) is aninternational event ranking scale developed by technical sub-ject matter experts in cooperation with the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Energy Agency toprovide fast, flexible and authoritative information on theoccurrence of nuclear and radiological events that are ofinterest to the international community. Just like informationon earthquakes or temperature would be difficult to under-stand without the Richter or Celsius scales, the INES Scaleexplains the significance of events from a range of activities,including industrial and medical use of radiation sources,operations at nuclear facilities and transport of radioactivematerial. Events are classified on the scale at seven levels:Levels 13 are designated as incidents and Levels 47 aretermed accidents. The scale is designed so that the severity ofan event is about ten times greater for each increase in levelon the scale. The INES communications network currentlyreceives and disseminates information on events and theirappropriate INES rating to INES National Officers of morethan 60 countries. Historically, the scale was applied to clas-sify events that occur at nuclear installations, but now arevised INES Users Manual brings together all uses such astransportation, fuel cycle, and radiation exposure events, intoone single document. Since 2004, countries began to reportradiation source-related events involving all materials andtransport events that are classified at INES Level 2 or higher.This paper will present an overiew of the newly revisedINES User’s manual, how the rating scale works, and pres-ent a summary of the worldwide reporting events over thepast several years. t pm-c .3 Emery, R., Sprau, D., Morecook, R.;University of Texas School of Public Health, East CarolinaUniversity, Houston Community College System;Robert.J.Emery@uth.tmc.edur isk c ommunication c onsiderations to Facilitate thes creening of mass populations for potientialc ontamination with r adioactive materials

Experience gained during a field training exercise witha Medical Reserve Corps unit on the screening of largegroups of individuals for possible contamination withradioactive material revealed that while exercise participantswere generally attentive to the proper use of protective equip-ment and detectors, they tended to overlook important basicrisk communications aspects. For example, drill participantsdid not actively communicate with the persons waiting in linefor screening, a step which would provide re-assurance, pos-sibly minimized apprehension, and would clarify expecta-tions. When questioned on this issue of risk communication,drill participants were often able to craft ad hoc messages,but the messages were inconsistent and likely would not have

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significantly helped diminish anxiety and maintain crowdcontrol. Similar difficulties were encountered regarding mes-saging for persons determined to be contaminated, thosedeparting the screening center, and those to be delivered tothe media. Based on these experiences, the need for a sug-gested list of risk communication points was identified. Toaddress this need, a set of risk communications templateswere developed that focused on the issues likely to beencountered in a mass screening event. The points includeissues such as the importance of remaining calm, steps forminimizing possible intake or uptake, considerations forthose exhibiting acute injuries, expected screening waittimes, the process to be followed and the information to becollected, the process to be undertaken for those exhibitingcontamination, and symptoms to watch for after departure.Drill participants indicated in follow-up discussions that suchpre-established risk communication templates would serve toenhance their ability to assist in times of emergency andnoted the potential broader applicably of the approach for usein responses for other disasters types as well.t pm-c .4 Thomas, J., Anderson, V.; CaliforniaDepartment of Public Health; james.thomas@cdph.ca.govc alculations in d isaster: c omparative r isk a ssessmentand program e valuation methodology

It is difficult in the public health arena to evaluate rela-tive risks of unfortunate events as disparate as natural epi-demics (e.g., bird flu) and nuclear terrorism. Where to bestspend limited resources becomes subjective and often fallsprey to political expediency. This is further complicated withthe competing strategies of prevention versus consequencemanagement. We present a method of annualizing risk costof these events in both lives and dollars to allow objectivecomparisons. We illustrate its use by comparing a pandemicflu outbreak with a 10-kiloton nuclear terrorism event in amajor city. A graphical method to optimize program spend-ing using cost avoidance is demonstrated. The method is fur-ther shown to be useful in evaluating which future improve-ments will give the best payoff.t pm-d .1 Sullivan R.L., Phillips H.A.; U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission; holly.phillips@nrc.gov protective a ction r ecommendation s tudy

Emergency preparedness in the areas surroundingnuclear power plants represents some of the most robustemergency planning in the nation. An important componentof these plans is the implementation of protective actions toensure the safety of the public in the event of a general emer-gency condition at the plant. The staff has performed a studyof NRC protective action recommendation (PAR) guidanceas contained in NUREG 0654, Supplement 3 and publishedthe results as NUREG/CR-6953 Vol 1. “Review of NUREG-0654, Supplement 3, “Criteria for Protective ActionRecommendations for Severe Accidents.” An additional taskwas added to the project entitled “Study of Public Views onNuclear Power Plant Emergency Preparedness Protective

Action.” The study utilized focus groups to assess likely pub-lic reaction within nuclear plant emergency planning zones toprotective action direction during an emergency, particularlyconsidering sheltering or staged evacuations. Separate focusgroups also appraised emergency worker response expecta-tions and gained insights into their understanding of publicresponse to emergencies. Using information gleaned fromthe focus groups, a national telephone survey of residents liv-ing within ten miles of a nuclear power plant was conductedto develop an understanding of public tendencies towardsemergency planning. The focus groups were completed byfall 2006, and the telephone survey of emergency planningzone populations was finished by spring 2008. In accordancewith the results of the study and Commission direction, theNRC is revising Supplement 3 of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP1, ACriteria for Preparation and Evaluation ofRadiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparednessin Support of Nuclear Power Plants (NRC, 1980a). This pres-entation shares the results of the Protective ActionRecommendation study and its significance to emergencypreparedness. t pm-d .2 Milligan P.A.; U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission; patricia.milligan@nrc.gov e vacuation t ime e stimate s tudy and g uidance

In recent years, technologies supporting the develop-ment of Evacuation Time Estimates (ETEs) have substantial-ly changed and additional evacuation considerations haveemerged. ETEs are part of the planning basis for each nuclearpower plant, and as such, ETE studies are required to be per-formed by licensees to estimate the time needed to evacuatethe public in the unlikely event of a serious accident. Whilethis presentation focuses on nuclear power plant evacuations,ETEs are crucial when orchestrating any evacuation. Asadvancements in new technologies that support evacuationsand evacuation planning continue, and as new informationon evacuations becomes available, it is important that thesetechnologies and information be considered in developing anETE. The NRC staff revised existing ETE guidance in 2004and is currently developing proposed rulemaking that willupdate the requirements for ETEs. Presently, the regulationsdo not specify when to review and update the ETEs after theplant has been initially licensed. The proposed rulemakingwould require licensees to review and update their ETEsperiodically when the population changes or significantchanges are made to the emergency planning zone infrastruc-ture. To reflect the rulemaking changes in the guidance, theNRC has commissioned Sandia National Laboratories todevelop ETE analysis input parameters that will represent thecurrent state of knowledge in emergency planning.Consistent methods, assumptions, and input parameter val-ues will allow for a more meaningful comparison of ETEvalues among nuclear power plant sites. The ETE guidancewill also include a personal computer-based capability foranalyzing how roadway network changes, evacuation plan

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modifications, and other factors would influence evacuationtimes. This presentation discusses the proposed changes inrulemaking and guidance regarding ETEs. t pm-d .3 Phillips H.A.; U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission; holly.phillips@nrc.gov r eviewing e mergency preparedness in n ew r eactora pplications

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is currentlyaccepting and reviewing applications from companies con-sidering building new nuclear power plants in the UnitedStates. The current fleet of operating nuclear power plantswere licensed under a two-step process described in 10 CFRPart 50 requiring both a construction permit and an operatinglicense. In 1989, the NRC established an alternative licensingprocess in 10 CFR Part 52. The Part 52 process includes pro-visions for design certifications, early site permits (ESP), andcombined license (COL) application. A COL includes a con-struction permit and an operating license with conditions. Foran application submitted under 10 CFR Part 52, the level ofemergency planning review will depend on whether theapplication is for an ESP, design certification, or COL. AnESP review includes, at a minimum, physical characteristicsunique to the proposed site that could significantly impedethe development of emergency plans, and the description ofcontacts and arrangements made with offsite response organ-izations. At this time, the applicant can also submit addition-al information to address either major features of emergencyplans or provide complete and integrated emergency plansfor review. A design certification only addresses those designfeatures, facilities, functions, and equipment that are techni-cally relevant to the design and are not site-specific, andaffect some aspect of emergency planning or the capability ofa licensee to cope with plant emergencies. A COL applicationreview includes an evaluation of all applicable emergencypreparedness requirements. It may incorporate emergencyplans that are approved in connection with the issuance of anESP and/or design features contained in a certified design.The review of the previously approved referenced informa-tion is to confirm it is appropriately incorporated into theemergency plans contained in the COL application. Thispresentation explains the role of emergency planning reviewin each type of application. t pm-d .4 Sullivan R.L., Phillips H.A.; U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission; holly.phillips@nrc.gov s tate-of-the-a rt r eactor c onsequence a nalysis

This presentation discusses the progression and currentfindings of the NRC’s State-of-the-Art Reactor ConsequenceAnalyses (SOARCA) project, part of the ongoing refinementin severe accident and off-site consequence analysis. TheSOARCA project is being performed by the NRC, with assis-tance from Sandia National Laboratories, to: (1) evaluate andupdate, as appropriate, analytical methods and models forrealistic evaluation of severe accident progression and offsiteconsequences; (2) develop state-of-the-art reactor conse-

quence assessments of severe accidents; and (3) identify mit-igative measures that have the potential to significantlyreduce risk of offsite consequences. To conduct the analyses,staff will use an improved understanding of source terms andsevere accident phenomenology, and credit the use of severeaccident mitigation strategies and procedures that were not inplace when previous studies were performed. In addition tobetter understanding of accident phenomenology, the analy-ses will include design, operation, and emergency prepared-ness improvements to more accurately reflect plant perform-ance and emergency response activities. Initial results haveshown that the combined effect of code improvements,plant’s improvements, and realistic consideration of mitiga-tive actions results in substantial decrease in accident conse-quences.

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Saturday, 8:00-10:00 am

pe p 1-a introduction to mc n p/mc n pXEric BurgettGeorgia Institute of Technology

This course provides a short introduction into using theMCNP/MCNPX code packages. During this class, studentswill be shown how to install the code, how to interpret prob-lems and create MCNP models of physical systems, createMCNP/MCNPX input files, visualize their input files, runthe code, and extract the useful data from the output. Thiscourse is designed for health physicists who have little to noexperience in MCNP/MCNPX or who need a short refresheror update on the code usage. Example problems will be pre-sented that are of interest to the health physics communitysuch as dose estimation from complex radiation fields andshielding design/evaluation for various sources. Students areencouraged to bring laptops to the class that already have theMCNP/MCNPX code installed (The instructor will not beable to distribute the code to the attendees). Only one of theMCNP or MCNPX codes is needed. To obtain the software,all users should register with RSICC to obtain copies of thesoftware at www-rsicc.ornl.gov. For students who do notwish to register, or cannot register, several remote computersmay be available with the code pre-installed for their use touse these computers, laptops will be required to login to theseremote computers.

pe p 1-b materials, t ools, and methods for h ealthphysicists to g et e ngaged in c ommunity e mergencys upport (r esponder t rain-the-t rainer s ession 1 of 2)Brooke Buddemeier, Tom ClawsonLawrence Livermore National Laboratory, TechnicalResources Group, Inc.

In addition to certifications in the training programsbelow (3 CDs full movies and training materials), informa-tion will be provided on the how to interface with emergencyresponders and national programs that are available to helpHealth Physicists who are interested in getting engaged inpreparing and responding to radiological and nuclear terror-ism.

Excellent training materials exist for training firstresponders (firefighters, law enforcements, EMT), but youcan't just download all them off the internet. Students whosuccessfully complete PEP 1-B and 2-B sessions will be cer-tified instructors for the TEPP program. Over 20 hours of"Train the Trainer" coursework has been compressed intothis PEP class designed for the radiation safety professional.The Modular Emergency Response RadiologicalTransportation Training (MERRTT) offers over 16 modulesof multimedia rich training material including presentations,student & instructor guides, tests, practical exercises, andregionally available training aids. Additional materials on

response to radiological and nuclear terrorism will be provid-ed as well as suggestions on how to work with the respondercommunity.

pe p 1-c c ancelled

Saturday, 10:30 am-12:30 pm

pe p 2-a intermediate mc n p for h omeland s ecuritya pplicationsEric BurgettGeorgia Institute of Technology

This intermediate course will cover special topics ofinterest to homeland security applications. During thiscourse, the students will be taught more advanced features ofthe code. The topics to be focused on are active interrogationsystems. Here students will create models of active brem-strahlung imaging systems, and pulsed x-ray induced fissionsources. Topics such as time dependence, advanced geome-try and mesh tallies will be covered in this class as they applyto the homeland security setting. This class is designed forusers of the MCNP code that already have an understandingof the code, and can make materials, surfaces and cells.Students who attend the introduction course should be pre-pared and be able to understand the content of this class. Thisclass is taught in an interactive learning mode. Students areencouraged to bring their own laptops with the code alreadyinstalled. For students who do not wish to register, or cannotregister, several remote computers may be available with thecode pre-installed for their use to use these computers, lap-tops will be required to login to these remote computers. Toobtain the software, all users should register with RSICC toobtain copies of the software at www-rsicc.ornl.gov.

pe p 2-b materials, t ools, and methods for h ealthphysicists to g et e ngaged in c ommunity e mergencys upport (c ertification t est and a dditional materials)Brooke Buddemeier, Tom Clawson, John LanzaLawrence Livermore National Laboratory, TechnicalResources Group, Inc., Florida Department of Health

This session is the second half of the training providedin session #1 and the required competency testing for thosewho which to become certified trainers. In addition, partici-pants will learn about the Medical Reserve Corps (MRC),which is a federal DHHS program that provides an existinginfrastructure and an opportunity for health and medicalphysicists and other radiation professionals to assist theirlocal community during an all-hazards disaster but especial-ly after a radiological emergency. Local public health oper-ating as ESF-8 would need radiation specialists to providestaffing at hospitals, triage and reception centers, and otherlocations in a radiation disaster. This PEP component will

Professional Enrichment ProgramSaturday, January 31, 2009 - LaQuinta Hotel

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provide attendees with an introduction to the organization ofthe MRC, how they can join their local MRC, other trainingsthat they will receive as MRC members, and the benefits ofMRC membership. In addition, the concept of the RadiationResponse Volunteer Corps will be discussed and how thismight be implemented in each state as a means of directinghealth and medical physicists to their local MRCs. [This isthe second session, certification requires completion of bothsessions.]

pe p 2-c s kin d osimetry and Varskin 3Jim DurhamCenter for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses, SouthwestResearch Institute

The skin is the primary target organ during personnelcontamination events. Varskin 3 Version 3.0.1 was releasedin October 2006 for use as a tool to model the dose to skinfrom skin contamination. The Windows-based code modelsboth infinitely-thin and particulate sources either directly onthe skin or on a cover material such as protective clothing. Inaddition, a syringe model was added to the geometry options.Adding radionuclides to the Varskin 3 library has been great-ly simplified, and data entry is accomplished on a singlescreen. This presentation will discuss the biological effectsof radiation on skin at both high and low doses and will pro-vide a demonstration of Varskin 3 with hands-on examples.Attendees will receive an instructional version of Varskin 3Version 3.0.1 and electronic copies of the Users Manual andQA documentation.

Saturday, 2:00-4:00 pm

pe p 3-a d ose modeling and s tatistical a ssessment ofh ot s potsE.W. AbelquistOak Ridge Associated Universities

Dose modeling is performed to calculate receptor dosesto demonstrate compliance with the radiological criteria fordecommissioning and license termination. Historically, thehot spot criteria were administratively established as somemultiple of the average guideline (e.g., Regulatory Guide1.86 and DOE 5400.5). More recently, the MultiagencyRadiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual(MARSSIM) introduced the concept of the hot spot area fac-tor. This work discusses a technically defensible approachfor modeling the receptor dose due to smaller “hot spots” ofresidual radioactivity. Nearly 700 combinations of environ-mental pathways, radionuclides and hot spot sizes were eval-uated in this work. The hot spot sizes studied ranged from0.01 m2 to 10 m2, and included both building and land areaexposure pathways. Dose modeling codes RESRAD,RESRAD-BUILD, and MicroShield were used to assess hotspot doses and develop pathway-specific area factors foreleven commonly-encountered radionuclides. The researchidentified pathways that are particularly “hot spot sensi-

tive”—i.e., particularly sensitive to changes in the areal sizeof the contaminated area. The external radiation pathwaywas the most hot spot sensitive for eight of the elevenradionuclides studied. The external radiation pathway wasalso the most sensitive of the building occupancy pathways.A Bayesian statistical approach for assessing the acceptabili-ty of hot spots is proposed. A posterior distribution is gener-ated based on the final status survey data that provides anestimate of the 99th percentile of the contaminant distribu-tion. Hot spot compliance is demonstrated by comparing theupper tolerance limit——defined as the 95% upper confi-dence level on the 99th percentile of the contaminant distri-bution in the survey unit—with the DCGL99th value. TheDCGL99th is the hot spot dose limit developed using thedose modeling research to establish area factors mentionedabove. The proposed approach provides a hot spot assess-ment approach that considers hot spots that may be present,but not found. Examples are provided to illustrate thisapproach.

pe p 3-b materials, t ools, and methods for h ealthphysicists to g et e ngaged in c ommunity e mergencys upport (h ealth physicists and their r ole in d isasterr esponse)Jerrold T. Bushberg, John Lanza, Edwin M. Leidholdt, Jr.University of California, Davis, Florida Department ofHealth, National Health Physics Program, US Departmentof Veterans Affairs

This is the third of three PEP sessions provided toenable health and medical physicists and other radiation spe-cialists to become credentialed as a radiation disaster respon-ders (but not a first responder) in their local community. It isrecommended, although not required, that the student alsotake Session # 1 & #2 as this session will build on those ses-sions.

Health and medical physicists and other radiation spe-cialists could play a valuable role in their local community'sresponse to a radiation disaster. This PEP will introduce theparticipants to the roles that they would fill during a radiolog-ical emergency and will provide them with the informationthey need to assist emergency responders in their communi-ty. Topics covered would include: The Role of PublicHealth in a Radiological Emergency; Hospital Response fol-lowing a Terrorist Event involving Radioactive Material;Emergency Department Management of RadiationCasualties and considerations for mass contaminated causal-ity care.

pe p 3-c integration of r adiation protection ande mergency management program a ssetsDann C. WardSandia National Laboratories

The Sandia National Laboratory EmergencyManagement organization has been working towards fullintegration of Radiation Protection Program assets during an

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emergency response situation. This lecture will identify anddiscuss the necessary organizational, training infrastructure,and radiological equipment needs to address the responsephase of an event.  The regulatory drivers for emergencyresponse situations associated with a DOE facility will bediscussed at length as well as the interface process with DOERadiological Assistance Program (RAP) assets when eventshave off-site implications.

Author Index-A-Akbarzadeh, M. ...........................16, 34Allen, R. .......................................19, 46Anderson, V. .................................20, 51Anderson, V.E. ............................18, 42Ansari, A. ......13, 15, 18, 21, 24, 31, 43Antenucci, A. ...............................16, 35Ayaz-Maierhafer, B. .....................19, 48

-B-Bahl, C. ........................................16, 33Beimer, S. ....................................17, 40Blumenstock, J.S..........................15, 30Blumenthal, D.J. ..........................16, 36Bosko, A. ......................................17, 39Bouville, A.....................................20, 50Boyd, W. ......................................14, 26Brodsky, A. ..................................15, 28Bronson, F. ..................................17, 39Bugden, M. ...................................20, 49Burgett, E. ...................................15, 28Bushmanov, A.U. ...................14, 18, 44Byrd, D. .......................................14, 27

-C-Capello, K. ...................................19, 48Caputo, D. ...................................16, 32Cardarelli II, J. .................13, 16, 22, 33Carr, Z. ........................................17, 38Caspary, K. ......................13, 18, 24, 43Chen, C.H.....................................13, 24Chen, G. .......................................14, 26Chiang, A......................................19, 48Chiaro, P.J. ...................................17, 40Chilton, G.L. ................................14, 25Christensen, D.M. ...........13, 19, 23, 46Cirino, N. .....................................16, 35Clark, H. ......................................19, 46Clark, K. .......................................17, 38Corti, D. ........................................17, 37Costello, C. ......................16, 18, 35, 43Crapo, J.L.....................................19, 46Crawford, J. ..................................18, 41Crowe, F.A. ......................17, 18, 38, 44Curry, T. .......................................16, 33Curtis, S. ......................................14, 26Curtis, S........................................14, 26

-D-Daigler, D......................................19, 45Daka, J. .......................................20, 49Davtyan, A. ..................................14, 24Desrosiers, A. ..............................17, 38DeVol, T.A.....................................19, 48

-E-Egan, C. ......................................16, 35Elder, D.H. ...................................13, 22Emery, R.J. ...................................20,50 Essex, J. ..........................14, 19, 24, 46

-F-Fairobent, L. .................................13, 23

Faller, S. .......................................16, 33Favret, D. ........................16, 19, 33, 48Frolov, G. .....................................14, 24Fyffe, J.G. ........................16, 17, 33, 38

-G-Gilley, D.B.....................................15, 31Goans, R.E...................................13, 23Gogolak, C.V. ...............................16, 34Grace, M. .....................................16, 36Grahev, M. ...................................14, 24Grof, Y. ........................................16, 34Grogan, H.A. ...............................16, 35Gross, I. .......................................19, 48Guss, P.P. .....................................17, 36

-H-Hackett, J.R. ................................16, 32Hamilton, I. ...................................18, 44Harris, B. ......................................14, 27Hauck, B. .....................................19, 48Hearnsberger, D. .........................18, 44Hendee, E. ..................................13, 23Hertel, N. ......................................15, 28Homer, M. ....................................16, 36Honsa, P. ......................................17, 40Hurley, J.P. ..................................14, 26

-I-Ingram, R......................................13, 21Intrepido, A.J. ............17, 18, 37, 40, 41Iwatschenko, M. A. .......................17, 40

-J-Jenkins, M.S. ...............................19, 46Jodayree, S. ................................20, 49Johnson, M. .................................16, 36Johnson, M...................................17, 36Johnson, R. 18, 41Johnson, T. ..................................16, 34Jones, C.G. ..................................20, 50

-K-Karam, A. .....................................13, 21Kawabata, K. ...............................17, 40Keegan, R.P. .........................14, 25, 26Keenan, R. ..................................16, 35Kennedy, Jr., W.E. ........................16, 32Kerns, K. 17, 37Kish, J...........................................19, 45Konchalovsky, M. ........................14, 24Kotenko, K.V. ...............................18, 44Kramer, G.H. ...................19, 20, 48, 49Kretov, A.S....................................18, 44

-L-Lai, E. ..........................................20, 49Lanza, J.J.........................15, 19, 29, 47Lariviere, D. .................................20, 49Lasche, G. ....................................19, 47Le, M.H. ....................17, 18, 37, 40, 41Lee, E.K. ......................................13, 24Li, C. ............................................20, 49

Livingston, G.K. ...........................19, 46Lombardo, A.J. 17, 38Lowe, D. ......................................14, 26Lyons, C. ......................................14, 25

-M-Macaluso, A. ................................16, 36Manning, R. ..................................16, 36Marianno, C............................14, 24, 25Marro, L. ......................................19, 48Maurer, R. ....................................14, 25McCall, K. .....................................19, 47McClellan, G. ...............................15, 28McDaniel, B. .................................14, 27McHugh, H. ..................................14, 26Melanson, M.A. ...........................14, 27Melkova, K. ..................................14, 24Meyers, S. ...................................19, 48Miallius, A.P. .................................14, 27Millage, K. ....................................15, 28Miller, C.W. ......................13, 15, 21, 30Miller, V.J. .....................................14, 27Milligan P.A. ..................................20, 51Mohagheghi, A. ...........................17, 37Mohler, H.J. .................................16, 35Monk, J.........................................16, 34Moodie, G. ...................................20, 49Morecook, R.C. ............................20, 50Moyer, B. .....................................16, 36

-N-Nelson, E......................................15, 28Noska, M.A. .................................19, 45

-O-O’Brien, R. ...................................14, 26O’Connell, T.F. ..............................18, 41

-P-Pace, P. .......................................20, 49Passetti, B. ..................................15, 31Patel, G.N. ...................................17, 38Patton, P. .....................................14, 26Pennell, P. ...................................16, 35Peppard, R.G. 14, 25Perez, M. ......................................17, 38Phillips H.A. ...........................20, 51, 52Pobanz, B.....................................19, 46Poston, J. ....................................18, 44Potter, W.E. .................................16, 34Princewill, J. ................................19, 48Pugh, D. .......................................19, 48Pushkareva, S. ............................14, 24

-R-Rabin, M. ......................................16, 34Rafferty, R. ..................................16, 35Raine, D. .....................................15, 28Reeves, M.D.G.............................15, 28Regentova, E.E. ..........................14, 26Remick, A.L. ................................19, 47Rhodes, W. ..................................19, 47Riland, C.......................................14, 24

Rocco, J. R. .................................16, 35Rushton, R. ..................................15, 28

-S-Sadi, B. ........................................20, 49Salame-Alfie, A. ...............15, 18, 30, 43Sanza, B.......................................19, 48Scott, A.L. ....................................14, 27Seif, T. ..........................................17, 38Shonka, J. ...................................15, 29Simon, S. .....................................20, 50Sircy, M.........................................17, 37Sleeper, C.....................................16, 36Smalley, H.K. ...............................13, 24Smith, C.L. ...................................19, 47Smith, D.E. ..................................19, 47Smith, E........................................14, 25Sprau, D.D. ..................................20, 50Stampahar, T. ..............................14, 25Stetar, E.A. ..................................16, 35Steves, K. .....................................16, 32Strom, D.J. .............................15, 18, 29Strzelczyk, J. ................................13, 16Strzelczyk, J. ................................22, 34Sugarman, S.L. ...........................13, 23Sullivan R.L. ..........................20, 51, 52

-T-Taylor, T.P. ....................................21, 13Tepperman, M. ............................16, 32Thomas, J. ............................20, 50, 51Thomas, J.M.................................18, 42Thomas, M. .................................16, 33Thompson, A. ..............................14, 27Till, J. E.........................................16, 35Tinsley, J.R. .................................14, 26Toohey, R.E. ................................13, 23Trainham, R..................................14, 26Tupin, E. .......................................19, 45

-U-Ullom, J. ......................................16, 34

-V-Van Dyke, D.L. ............................19, 46Van Etten, D.M. ...........................17, 36Varve, Z. ......................................20, 49Virgil, M. ......................................16, 35Voigt, B. .......................................16, 36Voss, J.T. ......................................17, 39Vyenielo, M...................................17, 40

-W-Waller, E. .....................................18, 42Wasiolek, P. .................................14, 25Watanabe, Y. ................................17, 38Weismann, J.................................16, 32Whitcomb, Jr., R.C. ......................15, 30White, J.C.....................................18, 43Widner, T. E. .15, 17, 18, 29, 37, 40, 41Wiley, A.L. ....................................19, 46Wilkinson, D. ...................18, 20, 42, 49Williamson, J. ..............................15, 31Wilson, J.E. ..................................13, 22Wilson, L.......................................16, 35

Wilson, Z. ....................................14, 26Wyatt, H. ......................................20, 49

-Y-Yusko, J. ......................................17, 40Yusko, J.G. ...................................15, 31

-Z-Zajac, F.L. ....................................14, 25Zhang, L. .....................................14, 26

Notes

Notes

l a Quinta Floor plan

h enry b . g onzalez First Floor plan

2009 t opical meeting of:h ealth physics s ociety

(42nd midyear t opical meeting)a merican a cademy of h ealth physics

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