HAZOP WORKSHEETeia.onep.go.th/images/monitor/1535867288.pdf1. PSV-5802801/5802802. 2....

HAZOP WORKSHEET

Review Date: 2013-05-22

P/E/A/C

Unit: Ethylene Recovery Unit (58)

Node Title: Demethanizer Feed Pretreatment System 58-006-1 (Rev. 0), 58-015-1 (Rev. 0), 58-020-1 (Rev. 0), 58-021-1 (Rev. 0), 58-023-1 (Rev. 0), 58-024-1 (Rev. 0), 58-025-1 (Rev. 0), 58-027-1 (Rev. 0), 58-049-1 (Rev. 0)Node: 58-07

Ref.No.

Deviation CausesPossible

ConsequencesExisting Safeguards S Remark

ActionStatus

L RAction

No.Action Required /

RecommendationsAction By Action Taken

1 No/Less Flow 1.5. Flow control loopfailure (FV-5802301)malfunctions closed ormismanaged closed.

1. Increased level in58D102 leading to potentialcarryover of liquid C2 to58E105 and all the way tothe compressor/expander(58K101).Potentialcompressor/expanderdamage.

1. 58D102 demister.2. 58D103 withdemister.3. 58D104 withdemister.4. LAH-5802301. A 4 1 2

1.6. Flow control loopfailure (FV-5802401)malfunctions closed ormismanaged closed.

1. Increased level in58D103 leading to potentialcarryover of liquid C2 to58D104 and all the way tothe compressor/expander(58K101).Potentialcompressor/expanderdamage.

1. 58D103 demister.2. 58D104 withdemister.

A 4 1 2

58-07.02 Consider providing level alarmhigh on LT-5802401.

EPC

1.7. Strainer (STR-5815)plugging.

1. Less feed todemethanizer leading toless production of C2.Loss of profit.

1. Strainer (STR-5810/5811) areprovided upstream.2. Strainer (STR-5815)is designed for 400%opening area.

A 3 1 2


1. Less residue flowratedownstream leading toincreased temperature offeed.Less profit due to less C2production.

1. Strainer (STR-5816)is designed for 400%opening area.2. PAH-5802802. A 2 1 1

58-07.03 Consider providing pressurelow alarm on PI-5802401.

EPC


1. Less residue flowratedownstream leading toincreased temperature offeed.Less profit due to less C2production.

1. Strainer (STR-5817)is designed for 400%opening area.

A 2 1 1

58-07.04 Consider providing pressurelow alarm on PI-5802404.

EPC

1.10. XV-5800601malfunctions closed ormismanaged closed.

1. Potentialoverpressurization ofupstream piping andequipment leading topotential rupture andrelease of C2/C3.Potential fire and explosionleading to potentialoperator injury.

1. PIC-5800601opening 2. PV-5800601to flare.3. PSV-5800601/5800602.

P 4 1 2

Sheet: 53 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



1 No/Less Flow 1.10. XV-5800601malfunctions closed ormismanaged closed.

2. Potential increased levelin 58D105. No significantconsequence.

1. Increased level in58D105 leading to potentialoverfilling of the drum.Potential carryover ofresidue liquid to residuegas line to cold box.No significantconsequence.

2. Loss of expander liquidflow to the cold box heatexchangers leading tohigher temperature oftreated offgas.Less profit due to less C2recovery.

1. None.

A 2 1 1

Refer to action 58-07.04.

2 More Flow 2.1. Flow control loopfailure (FV-5802101)malfunctions open ormismanaged open.

1. Decreased level in58D101 leading to potentialtreated offgas blowby todemethanizer (58C101).Potential loss of C2 to thedemethanizer overheadstream leading to less C2recovery.Loss of profit.

1. Demethanizer OVHDcondenser (58E106).

A 2 1 1

2.2. Flow control loopfailure (FV-5802301)malfunctions open ormismanaged open.



A 2 1 1

1.11. Manual valveupstream of strainer(STR-5817)inadvertently closed.

Sheet: 54 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction






A 2 1 1

2.4. More methanolinjection at 58E101A/B.

1. Potential methanolcontamination leading topotential ethylene productoffspec.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. Periodic sampling(SC-5821).

A 2 1 1

3 Reverse Flow No cause identified.

4 Misdirected Flow 4.1. Manual valve onethylene vent line to58E004 mismanagedopen.

1. Reduced pressure in58D404 leading to potentialoperational upset.

1. Upstream PIC-5804702.

A 2 1 1

5 Higher Pressure 5.1. PIC-5802002malfunctions closing PV-5802002 when needed.

1. Potential highercompressor/expander(58K101) suction pressure.Potential compressordischarge piping damage.

1. PSV-5802801/5802802.2. PSV-5802001/5802002. A 4 1 2

58-07.05 Consider providing highpressure alarm on PI-5802806.

EPC

1. Increased pressureupstream leading topotential overpressurizationand damage of upstreampiping and equipment.Potential release of HCs toATM leading to potentialfire.Potential operator injury.

1. PIC-5801501 withalarm high.

P 4 1 2

2. Less feed to theexpander (58K101) leadingto loss of fuel gas.Main furnaces in HYVAHL,TGTU, HMU, and Prime Gshutdown.

1. Backup fuel gas fromDCC Unit 53.2. Backup natural gasfrom existing plant. A 4 1 2

5.2. 58D101 demisterplugging.

Sheet: 55 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



5 Higher Pressure 1. Increased pressureupstream leading topotential overpressurizationand damage of upstreampiping and equipment.Potential release of HCs toATM leading to potentialfire.Potential operator injury.


P 4 1 2


1. Backup fuel gas fromDCC Unit 53.2. Backup natural gasfrom existing plant.

A 4 1 2

1. Increased pressureupstream leading topotential overpressurizationand damage of upstreampiping and equipment.Potential release of HCs toATM leading to potentialfire.Potential operator injury.


P 4 1 2


1. Backup fuel gas fromDCC Unit 53.2. Backup natural gasfrom existing plant. A 4 1 2

5.5. PIC-5802403malfunctions closing PV-5802402.

1. High back pressure toexpander discharge leadingto potentialoverpressurization andrupture of upstream pipingand equipment.Potential release of HCs toATM leading to potentialfire.Potential operator injury.

1. PSV-5802702/5802703.2. PAH-5802802.

P 4 1 2



Sheet: 56 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



5 Higher Pressure 5.5. PIC-5802403malfunctions closing PV-5802402.

2. Loss of cooling media fordownstream heatexchangers potentiallyleading to increasedtemperature of treatedoffgas feed todemethanizer (58C101).Potential reduced efficiencyof the demethanizerleading to less C2recovery.Loss of profit.


A 2 1 1

3. Due to blocked outlet ofthe expander, there is nodriving force for theexpander whichconsequently stops thecompressor (via commonshaft). No significantconsequence on thecompressor.

5.6. PIC-5800601malfunctions closing PV-5800601 when needed.

1. Potentialoverpressurization ofupstream piping andequipment leading topotential rupture andrelease of C2/C3.Potential fire and explosionleading to potentialoperator injury.

1. PSV-5800601/5800602.

P 4 1 2

58-07.06 Consider high pressure alarmon PI-5802102.

EPC

6 Lower Pressure 1. Loss of residue gas toflare leading to loss of fuelgas.Main furnaces in HYVAHL,TGTU, HMU, and Prime Gshutdown.

1. FAL-5802802.2. Backup fuel gas fromDCC Unit 53.3. Backup natural gasfrom existing plant.

A 4 1 2


2. Less regeneration gasleading to potentialincomplete regeneration of58R001A/B and58R004A/B and PRUdryers.

1. FAL-5802802.

A 4 1 2


6.2. PIC-5800601malfunctions openingPV-5800601 when notneeded.

1. Loss of HCs to flareleading to less flow ofinternal recycles 58C002.No significantconsequence.

6.1. PIC-5802002malfunctions openingPV-5802002 when notneeded.

Sheet: 57 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



6 Lower Pressure 1. More flow of residue gasto 58E105 leading toexcessive cooling oftreated offgas.Potential blue ice (NOx)formation in 58D102leading to potential lineplugging or lineembrittlement.Potential explosion.Potential operator injury.

1. TIC-5802403.

P 3 1 2

58-07.07 Consider low temperaturealarm on TI-5802403.

EPC

2. Less pressure inupstream. No significantconsequence.

7 Higher Temperature 1. Higher temperature ofinternal recycle to 58C002potentially leading toincreased temperature oftreated offgas to dryer(58R001A/B).No significantconsequence.

2. More flow back to58D503.No significantconsequence.

1. Higher temperature oftreated offgas tocompressor (58K101)suction leading to highercompressor dischargetemperature.No significantconsequence.

2. Lower temperature ofdry treated offgas from58E101A/B (shell side) toexpander (58K101).Potential blue ice (NOx)formation in the expanderdischarge potentiallyleading to potentialexplosion.Potential operator injury.

1. TIC-5802403.

P 3 1 2


6.3. PIC-5802403malfunctions fullyopening PV-5802402.

7.1. TIC-5800601malfunctions openingTV-5800601.

7.2. TIC-5802807 fullyclosing TV-5802807B.

Sheet: 58 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



7 Higher Temperature 1. Higher temperature (-80C) of treated offgas toexpander (58K101).No significantconsequence.

2. Lower residue gastemperature to 58E104 andto downstream equipmentup to compressor (58K101)inlet.No significantconsequence.

8 Lower Temperature No additional causeidentified (refer toconsequence in highertemperature).

9 Higher Level 9.1. LIC-5802001D49malfunctionsopening LV-5802001.

1. Potential 2-phase flow inC3R vapor line (6% liquid)leading to potential higherthan normal vibration in theline.No significantconsequence.

9.2. LIC-5802101malfunctions closing FV-5802101 .


1. 58D101 demister.2. 58D102 withdemister.3. 58D103 withdemister.4. 58D104 withdemister.5. FAL-5802101.

A 4 1 2

9.3. LIC-5802301malfunctions closing FV-5802301 .


1. 58D102 demister.2. 58D103 withdemister.3. 58D104 withdemister.4. FAL-5802301. A 4 1 2

7.3. TIC-5802403 fullyopening TV-5802403.

Sheet: 59 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



9 Higher Level 9.4. LIC-5802401malfunctions closing FV-5802401 .

1. Increased level in58D103 leading to potentialcarryover of liquid C2 to58D104 and all the way tothe compressor/expander(58K101).Potentialcompressor/expanderdamage.

1. 58D103 demister.2. 58D104 withdemister.3. FAL-5802401.

A 4 1 2

10.1. LIC-5802001malfunctions closing LV-5802001.

1. Reduced level in 58E102leading to loss of heatexchange.Higher temperature of drytreated offgas to expander.No significantconsequence.

10.2. LIC-5802101malfunctions openingFV-5802101 .


1. Demethanizer OVHDcondenser (58E106).2. FAH-5802101.

A 2 1 1




A 2 1 1




A 2 1 1

Lower Level10

Sheet: 60 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



11 Composition changed No cause identified.

12 More Contamination 12.1. Trace amounts ofNOx in the treatedoffgas.

1. Potential blue iceformation at the cold boxexchanger (at temperatureof approximately -125C at36barg).Potential line plugging.Potential explosion leadingto operator injury.

1. TIC-5802403.

P 4 1 2

13 Relief No cause identified.

14 Sampling No cause identified.

15 Abnormal Operation No cause identified.

16 Corrosion/Erosion No cause identified.

17 Human Errors No cause identified.

18 Power Failure N/A

19 Steam Failure N/A

20 Cooling Water Failure N/A

21 Nitrogen Failure 21.1. Loss of N2 supplyto the cold box.

1. Loss of purging leadingto potential ingress of airinside the cold boxexchanger leading topotential icing inside thecold box.

58-07.08 Discuss with cold box vendorthe consequence of losing N2blanket.

EPC/Vendor

22 IA/PA Failure No cause identified.

23 Maintenance No cause identified.

24 Start-up/Shutdown No cause identified.

25 Leakage/Rupture 25.1. Tube pinhole leakin 58E101A/B.

1. Dry treated offgas leaksto residue gas stream andto the fuel gas system.Less C2 recovery leadingto less profit.

1. None.

A 1 1 1

Sheet: 61 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



25 Leakage/Rupture 25.2. Tube pinhole leakin 58E102.

1. Dry treated offgas leaksinto C3R stream leading topotential overpressurizationof the refrigerant system.Potential piping andequipment damage leadingto release of C3R andleaked treated offgas toATM.Potential fire.Potential operator injury.


P 4 1 2

25.3. Tube pinhole leakin 58E004.

1. C3R leaks into theexpander recycle stream to58C002.No significantconsequence.

26 Static Electricity No cause identified.

27 Spare Equipment No cause identified.

28 Others No cause identified.

Sheet: 62 of 196

Node Title: Reviewed Date: 23-May-13

Node Number: 58-08 Node Color Time: 9:00 - 18:00

58-024-1 (Rev. 0) 58-025-1 (Rev. 0) 58-027-1 (Rev. 0) 58-028-1 (Rev. 0) 58-032-1 (Rev. 0) 58-059-1 (Rev. 0)

58-060-1 (Rev. 0)

HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET

Project Title: UHV Project

Demethanizer System

ORANGE

Number of Recommended Actions in this node: 9

Number of Recommended Actions completed in this node:

Drawing No.

Design Intent: To remove methane and H2, and recover C2+ through the demethanizer (58C101).

Notes:

Operation andDesignConditions:

Demethanizer Reflux Drum (58D106):Operating(P/T): 28.2barg/-98.5CDesign(P/T): -0.5barg@-115&11barg/-165&65CDemethanizer (58C101):Operating(P/T): 28.3barg/-94C (Top);28.8barg/-9C (Bottom)Design(P/T): 42barg(Top),42.5barg(Bottom)/-165&65C

Demethanizer OVHD Condenser (58E106):Operating(P/T): 28.3barg/-94.2CDesign(P/T): 42barg/-165&65C(1st pass); -0.5barg@-155&11barg/-165&65C(2nd pass)

Demethanizer Reboiler (58E107):Operating(P/T): 28.9barg/-8.7C (Shell)Design(P/T): 43barg/-105&65C (Shell);33.1barg/-46&90C (Tube)

Expander Suction Drum (58D104):Operating(P/T): 28.1barg/-108CDesign(P/T): 42barg/-165&65CExpander Discharge Drum (58D105):Operating(P/T): 13.7barg/-126CDesign(P/T): 17.1barg/-165&65C

Residue Gas Expander/Comp (58K101):Operating(P/T): 28.0/-108.3C (EXP);6.3barg/18C (COMP)Design Capacity@SuctionCondition(Nm3/hr): 16734 (EXP) / 18308(COMP)

HAZOP WORKSHEET


1 No/Less Flow 1. Increased level in thedemethanizer (58C101)bottoms leading topotential tray flooding.Potential tray damage.

1. LAH-5802501.2. PDAH-5802509.3. TIC-5802509 withalarm high.

A 4 1 2

2. Reduced level in thedeethanizer (58C201).No C2 recovery.Loss of profit.

1. LIC-5803201 willcontrol FV-5803201 toregulate level in thedeethanizer.

A 3 1 2

1.2. N2 line manualvalve inadvertentlyclosed.

1. Potential air ingress intothe demethanizer (58C101)leading to potential iceformation.Potential corrosion (longterm).

1. Operator training andprocedures.

A 2 1 1

1. Less flow to 58E106 andhigher pressure at 58C101.Potential loss of C2+ to thefuel gas system.Loss of profit.

1. Daily monitoring (AI-5802501).2. Periodic sampling(SC-5810/5811). A 2 1 1

2. Potentialoverpressurization of58C101 due to loss ofreflux or loss of condenser.Potential piping and columndamage leading to releaseof HCs to ATM.Potential fire.Potential operator injury.

1. PT-5802501 (2oo3)will trigger I-5808 to tripdemethanizer reboiler(58E107).2. PSV-5802501/5802502. P 4 1 2

58-08.01 Consider low flow alarm on FI-5802501.

EPC

1.4. XV-5802601 (tubeside of the reboiler)malfunctions closed ormismanaged closed.

1. Loss of C3R flow to the58E107 leading to loss ofreboiler duty.Reduced temperature inthe demethanizer(58C101).Reduced demethanizerefficiency leading to moremethane to the C2+stream.Potential offspec C2product.Loss of profit.

1. TAL-5802510.2. AAH-5802502B.3. Periodic sampling(SC-5812).

A 3 1 2



P/E/A/C


Node Title: Demethanizer System 58-024-1 (Rev. 0), 58-025-1 (Rev. 0), 58-027-1 (Rev. 0), 58-028-1 (Rev. 0), 58-032-1 (Rev. 0), 58-059-1 (Rev. 0), 58-060-1 (Rev. 0)Node: 58-08

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



Sheet: 65 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



1 No/Less Flow 1.4. XV-5802601 (tubeside of the reboiler)malfunctions closed ormismanaged closed.

2. Potentialoverpressurization of58C201 due to moremethane content in theC2+ feed.Potential equipmentdamage leading to releaseof HCs to ATM.Potential fire.Potential operator injury.

1. PIC-5803205 withhigh alarm, opening PV-5803205.2. PT-5803204 (2oo3)will trigger I-5831 willtrip deethanizer reboiler(58E202).3. PSV-5803201/5803202.

P 4 1 2

1. Loss of process sidereboiler recirculation.Reduced temperature inthe demethanizer(58C101).Reduced demethanizerefficiency leading to moremethane to the C2+stream.Potential offspec C2product.Loss of profit.


A 3 1 2

2. Potentialoverpressurization of58C201 due to moremethane content in theC2+ feed.Potential equipmentdamage leading to releaseof HCs to ATM.Potential fire.Potential operator injury.

1. PIC-5803205 withhigh alarm, opening PV-5803205.2. PT-5803204 (2oo3)will trigger I-5831 willtrip deethanizer reboiler(58E202).3. PSV-5803201/5803202.

P 4 1 2

1.6. Compressor inletstrainer (STR-5819)plugging.

1. Less flow to compressor(58K101) suction leadingheat buildup and highvibration.Potential compressordamage.

1. PDAH-5802805.2. FAL-5802802.

A 4 1 2


1.7. Compressor(58K101) suctionmanual valveinadvertently closed.

1. Less flow to compressor(58K101) suction leadingheat buildup and highvibration.Potential compressordamage.

1. FAL-5802802.

A 4 1 2


1.5. 58E107 inletmanual valve (shell side)inadvertently closed.

Sheet: 66 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



1 No/Less Flow 1. Blocked compressor(58K101) discharge leadingto surge and highdischarge temperature.Potential compressordamage potentially leadingto release of light end gasto ATM.Potential fire and explosion.Potential operator injury.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. PSV-5802801/5802802.3. SAH-5802801.

P 4 1 2


2. Loss of residue gassupply to fuel gas systempotentially leading to lossof fuel gas supply to users.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. Backup fuel gas fromnatural gas header.

A 4 1 2

1.9. Compressor anti-surge valve (UV-5802801) malfunctionsclosed or mismanagedclosed when needed.

1. Compressor (58K101)high vibration and damage.

1. PSV-5802801/5802802.

A 4 1 2

58-08.02 Confirm this scenario withcompressor vendor.Refer to action 58-07.05.

EPC

1. Loss of motive force tooperate the expanderleading tocompressor/expander stop.PV-5802801 will eventuallyopen to continue operationfor the process side.However, demethanizer willoperate at lower efficiencyleading to less recovery ofC2.Loss of profit.Loss of residue gas to fuelgas system.

1. Common fault alarm.2. Backup fuel gas fromnatural gas header.

A 4 1 2

2. Potential 58C101upstreamoverpressurization leadingto potential equipmentdamage.Potential release of lightend gas to ATM.Potential fire and explosionleading to operator injury.

1. PIC-5802801 willopen PV-5802801.2. PSV-5802501/5802502.

P 4 1 2

58-08.03 Consider high pressure alarmon PT-5802801.

EPC

1.8. Compressor(58K101) dischargemanual valveinadvertently closed.

1.10. Expander inletvalve (XV-5802801) orsuction manual valvemalfunctions closed ormismanaged closed.

Sheet: 67 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



1 No/Less Flow 1. Increased pressure atthe expander (58K101)discharge and suctionpotentially leading topotential expanderdamage.Potential release of lightend gas to ATM.Potential fire and explosion.Potential operator injury.

1. PAH-5802802.2. PIC-5802801 willopen PV-5802801.

P 4 1 2


2. Loss of cooling mediumfor the cold box leading tohigher temperature oftreated offgas.Reduced fractionationefficiency at the cold boxleading to loss of product.Loss of profit.

1. PIC-5802801 willopen PV-5802801.

A 3 1 2

3. Higher pressure at thecompressor suction leadingto potentialoverpressurization ofupstream piping andequipment.Potential release of lightend gas to ATM.Potential fire and explosion.Potential operator injury.

1. Bypass line (8"-CG-58028011-H126) fromsuction to discharge ofcompressor is provided.

P 4 1 2

1.12. Residue gas to57K001A/B manualvalve inadvertentlyclosed.

1. Loss of residue gas (forregeneration) to PRUdryers leading toincomplete regeneration.Potential PRU productoffspec.Loss of profit.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. N2 gas is providedfor backup regenerationgas.

A 3 1 2


1. Reduced level in thedemethanizer (58C101)bottom leading to potentialgas blowby to deethanizer(58C201).Increased pressure in thecolumn to operationalupset leading to offspecproduct.Loss of profit.

1. LAL-5802501.2. LALL-5802501 (alarmonly).3. LIC-5803201 to openFV-5803201.

A 3 1 2

1.11. Expander(58K101) dischargemanual valveinadvertently closed.

Sheet: 68 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



3 Reverse Flow 3.1. Check valve (SSV-5805) on bypass line(8"-CG-58028011-H126)leaking.

1. Potential reverse flow ofcompressor discharge tosuction through the leakingcheck valve leading to highsuction pressure.Potential compressoroperation upset.

1. FAL-5802802.

A 3 1 2

58-08.04 Consider providing an isolationblock valve downstream ofcheck valve (SSV-5805) withCSO device. Alternatively,consider providing an additionalcheck valve (different type toprevent common cause failure)in series.

EPC

4 Misdirected Flow 4.1. XV-5802501malfunctions open ormismanaged open.

1. Loss of methane to flare.Potential big flaring leadingto community complain.Loss of profit.

1. LAL-5802501.2. LALL-5802501 (alarmonly).3. CCTV (flare stackmonitoring).4. CSR program.

C 2 1 1

5 Higher Pressure 1. Increased flow andpressure to 58D104leading to potentialethylene loss to fuel gassystem.Loss of profit.

1. Daily monitoring (AI-5802701).2. Periodic sampling(SC-5813). A 2 1 1

2. Potential increasedsuction pressure of theexpander (58K101) leadingto higher discharge flowand pressure.Potentialoverpressurization of thecold box exchangersleading to potentialequipment damage.Potential release of residuegas to ATM.Potential fire and explosion.Potential operator injury.

1. PIC-5802801 willopen PV-5802801.

P 4 1 2


5.1. PDV-5802701malfunctions open ormismanaged open.

Sheet: 69 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



5 Higher Pressure 1. Pressure buildup at theexpander suction leading topotential overpressurizationof upstream piping andequipment.Potential expander andupstream piping/equipmentdamage.Potential release of residuegas to ATM.Potential fire and explosion.Potential operator injury.

1. SAH-5802801.2. Upstream piping andequipment are designedbased on expanderdesign pressure.3. PSV-5800801/5800802.

P 4 1 2

2. Potential increasedpressure downstream ofthe expander leading tooverpressurization ofupstream piping andequipment.Potential expander anddownstreampiping/equipment damage.Potential release of residuegas to ATM.Potential fire and explosion.Potential operator injury.

1. PSV-5802702/5802703.

P 4 1 2

5.2. Demethanizer(58C101) reflux manualvalve inadvertentlyclosed.

1. Potentialoverpressurization of58C101 due to loss ofreflux or loss of condenser.Potential piping and columndamage leading to releaseof HCs to ATM.Potential fire and explosion.Potential operator injury.

1. PT-5802501 (2oo3)will trigger I-5808 to tripdemethanizer reboiler(58E107).2. PSV-5802501/5802502.

P 4 1 2

6 Lower Pressure 6.1. PDV-5802701malfunctions closed ormismanaged closed

1. Less flow and pressureto expander suction leadingto less motive force to runthe expander.Potential reduction ofcompressor speed.Operational upset leadingto potential big flaring.Potential communitycomplain.

1. PIC-5802801 willopen PV-5802801.2. Bypass line (8"-CG-58028011-H126) fromsuction to discharge ofcompressor. C 3 1 2

5.2. PV-5802801 or XV-5802802 malfunctionsclosed or mismanagedclosed when needed.

Sheet: 70 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



6 Lower Pressure 6.2. PV-5802801malfunctions open ormismanaged open whennot needed.

1. Lower suction pressureleading to lower expanderspeed.Potential reduction ofcompressor speed.Potential less recovery ofC2 leading to less profit.

1. Bypass line (8"-CG-58028011-H126) fromsuction to discharge ofcompressor.2. PDIC-5802701.

A 3 1 2


1. Increased temperatureand pressure in thedemethanizer (58C101)leading to potential lessrecovery of C2.Loss of profit.

1. PT-5802501 (2oo3)will trigger I-5808 to tripdemethanizer reboiler(58E107).2. Daily monitoring (AI-5802501).3. Periodic sampling(SC-5812).

A 3 1 2

58-08.05 Consider high pressure alarmon PI-5802502.

EPC

7.2. TIC-5802807malfunctions closing TV-5802807B or opening ofTV-5802807A.

1. Higher temperature ofresidue gas to compressor(58K101) suction leading tohigher compressordischarge temperature.No significantconsequence.

8.1. TIC-5802509malfunctions closing TV-5802509.

1. Reduced temperature inthe demethanizer(58C101).Reduced demethanizerefficiency leading to moremethane to the C2+stream.Potential offspec C2product.Loss of profit.


A 3 1 2

58-08.06 Provide the low-lowtemperature set point for TT-5802002 (2oo3) (LL) which willtrigger I-5807 to close XV-5802001 and trip thecompressor.

Licensor

58-08.07 Consider providing mechanicalstopper for TV-5802807A toprevent it from fully closing.

EPC

4 1 2

8

Higher Temperature7

Lower Temperature

8.2. TIC-5802807malfunctions closing TV-5802807A or opening ofTV-5802807B.

1. Lower residue gastemperature to 58E101 andto downstream equipmentup to compressor (58K101)inlet.Potential damage todownstream piping (withH126 line spec) andcompressor.

1. TT-5802002 (2oo3)(LL) will trigger I-5807to close XV-5802001and trip thecompressor.

A

Sheet: 71 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



9.1. LIC-5802503malfunctions fullyopening LV-5802503.

1. Increased level in thedemethanizer OVDHcondenser leading topotential carryover of liquidC2R to C2R vapor line (2-phase flow).No significantconsequence.

1. Increased level in thedemethanizer (58C101)bottoms leading topotential tray flooding.Potential tray damage.

1. FAL-5802502.2. PDAH-5802509.3. TIC-5802509 withalarm high.

A 4 1 2

2. Reduced level in thedeethanizer (58C201).No C2 recovery.Loss of profit.

1. LIC-5803201 willcontrol FV-5803201 toregulate level in thedeethanizer.

A 3 1 2

1. Increased level in58D104 leading to potentialliquid carryover toexpander (58K101).Potential damage to theexpander.

1. LT-5802702 (2oo3)(HH) will trigger I-5809to trip the expander.

A 4 1 2

2. Less expander liquidflow to cold box heatexchangers leading highertemperature of dry treatedoffgas.Less recovery of C2leading to less profit.

1. Daily monitoring (AI-5802501).2. Periodic sampling(SC-5810).

A 3 1 2

1. Increased level in58D105 leading to potentialliquid carryover to cold boxexchangers.No significantconsequence.

2. Less expander liquidflow to cold box heatexchangers leading highertemperature of dry treatedoffgas.Less recovery of C2leading to less profit.


A 3 1 2

9

9.2. LIC-5802501malfunctions closing FV-5802501.



Higher Level

Sheet: 72 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



10 Lower Level 1. Decreased level in thedemethanizer OVDHcondenser (58E106)leading to loss ofcondensation leading toloss of C2.Potential product offspec.Less profit.


A 3 1 2

2. Loss of reflux to 58C101leading to potentialincreased temperature andpressure in the column.Potentialoverpressurization leadingto equipment damage.Potential release of HCs toATM leading to potentialfire and explosion.Potential operator injury.

1. PT-5802501 (2oo3)will trigger I-5808 to tripdemethanizer reboiler(58E107).2. PSV-5802501/5802502.

P 4 1 2


10.2. LIC-5802501malfunctions openingFV-5802501.

1. Reduced level in thedemethanizer (58C101)bottom leading to potentialgas blowby to deethanizer(58C201).Increased pressure in thecolumn to operationalupset leading to offspecproduct.Loss of profit.

1. FAH-5802502.

A 3 1 2

10.3. LIC-5802701malfunctions openingLV-5802701.

1. Loss of level in 58D104leading to gas blowby to58D105.Potentialoverpressurization anddamage of 58D105.Potential release of HCs toATM.Potential fire and explosionleading to operator injury.

1. PSV-5802702/5802703.

P 4 1 2

58-08.08 Confirm if PSV-5802702/5802703 can handlegas blowby case from 58D104.

EPC


Sheet: 73 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



10 Lower Level 10.4. LIC-5802703malfunctions openingLV-5802703.

1. Loss of level in 58D105leading to gas blowby toexpander liquid line to coldbox exchangers.Potential operational upsetin the cold box heatexchangers.Potential less C2 recovery.Loss of profit.


A 3 1 2


12 More Contamination No cause identified.

13.1. External fire. 1. Potentialoverpressurization anddamage of 58D104.Release of HCs to ATMleading to potential fireescalation.Potential operator injury.

1. PSV-5802701.

P 4 1 2

13.2. External fire. 1. Potentialoverpressurization anddamage of 58E107.Release of HCs to ATMleading to potential vaporcloud explosion and fireescalation.Potential operator injury.

1. PSV-5802601.

P 4 1 2

58-08.09 Check and review if thelocation of PSV-5802601 is onthe top point of 58E107.

EPC

13.3. External fire. 1. Potentialoverpressurization ofexpander (58K101)discharge leading toexpander and downstreampiping/equipment damage.Release of HCs to ATMleading to potential fireescalation.Potential operator injury.

1. PSV-5802803.

P 4 1 2






Relief13

Sheet: 74 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction





21 Nitrogen Failure No additional causeidentified.

22 IA/PA Failure 22.1. No supply to XV-5802802.

1. Potential loss of residuegas to cold box leading toincreased treated offgastemperature.Loss of profit due to lessC2 recovery.

1. Daily monitoring (AI-5802501).2. Periodic sampling(SC-5810). A 3 1 2

Refer to Action No.58-08.05.

23 Maintenance No additional causeidentified.


25 Leakage/Rupture 25.1. Tube pinhole leakat 58E107.

1. Dry demethanizer(58C101) bottoms leaksinto C3R stream leading topotential overpressurizationof the refrigerant system.Potential piping andequipment damage leadingto release of C3R andleaked treated offgas toATM.Potential fire and explosion.Potential operator injury.


P 4 1 2




Sheet: 75 of 196



58-006-1 (Rev. 0) 58-032-1 (Rev. 0) 58-034-1 (Rev. 0) 58-035-1 (Rev. 0) 58-050-1 (Rev. 0)



Deethanizer System

LIGHT BLUE



Drawing No.

Design Intent: To remove C3+ and send to DCC unit 53 and in the process recovering C2 as product.

Notes:


Deeethanizer Reboiler Condensate Pot(58D202):Operating(P/T): 4.5barg/156CDesign(P/T): FV@185&23C/11&185CDesuperheater for 58E202 (58Z001):Operating(P/T):Design(P/T): 85barg/11&150C

Deeethanizer (58C201):Operating(P/T): 24.7barg/-14C (Top);24.9barg/68C (Bottom)Design(P/T): 29barg(Top), 29.3(Bottom)/-105&180CDeeethanizer Reboiler (58E202):Operating(P/T): 25.0barg/59.7C (Shell)Design(P/T): 29.8barg/-105&180C (Shell);FV@100&23C/11&185C (Tube)

Deeethanizer Condenser (58E201):Operating(P/T): 25.0barg/-13.6C (Tube)Design(P/T): 22.4barg/-46&65C (Shell);29barg/-105&65C (Tube)Deeethanizer Reflux Drum (58D201):Operating(P/T): 24.5barg/-16.1CDesign(P/T): 29barg/-105&65C

HAZOP WORKSHEET


1 No/Less Flow 1. Increased level in thedeethanizer (58C201)bottoms leading topotential tray flooding.Potential tray damage.

1. PDAH-5803209.2. TAL-5803204.3. Daily monitoring (AI-5803201).

A 4 1 2

58-09.01 Consider high level alarm onLT-5803201.

EPC

2. Loss of deethanizerbottoms flow to unit 53.No significantconsequence.


1. Loss of SL flow toreboiler (58E202) leadingto low temperature in thedeethanizer (58C202).Loss of C2 to deethanizerbottoms leading to less C2recovery.Loss of profit.

1. Daily monitoring (AI-5803201).2. Periodic sampling(DC5815).3. TAL-5803204. A 2 1 1

1.3. BFW strainer (STR-5841) plugging.

1. Less BFW flow leadingto higher temperature of SLto reboiler (58E202).No significantconsequence.

Desuperheatersystem for thereboiler will beremoved in thefuture.

1.4. Manual valve (shellside) on reboiler(58E202) inlet lineinadvertently closed.

1. Loss of reboiler(58E202) recirculationleading to low temperaturein the deethanizer(58C202).Loss of C2 to deethanizerbottoms leading to less C2recovery.Loss of profit.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. Daily monitoring (AI-5803201).3. Periodic sampling(DC5815).4. TAL-5803204.

A 2 1 1


1. Potential pump(58P291A/B) running belowminimum flow requirementleading to pump damage.

1. Pump fault alarm.2. Pump is seallesstype.3. FAL-5803402.

A 4 1 2

Refer to action 58-G3.


P/E/A/C


Node Title: Deethanizer System 58-006-1 (Rev. 0), 58-032-1 (Rev. 0), 58-034-1 (Rev. 0), 58-035-1 (Rev. 0), 58-060-1 (Rev. 0)

Node: 58-09

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



Sheet: 77 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Node: 58-09

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction




1. Loss of reflux to 58C201leading to highertemperature and pressurein the column.Potentialoverpressurization of thecolumn leading to releaseof HCs to ATM.Potential fire and explosionleading to operator injury.

1. PIC-5803205 withalarm high.2. PT-5803204 (2oo3)(HH) will trigger I-5831to trip reboiler(58E202).3. Daily monitoring (AI-5803401C).4. PSV-5803201/5803202.

P 4 1 2

1. Loss of C2 flow to C2splitter (58C301) leading toloss of C2 recovery.Loss of profit.

1. LAL-5803501.

A 3 1 2

2. Increased level indeethanizer reflux drum(58D201) leading topotential overfilling andcarryover (2-phase flow) ofliquid C2 to 58E004.Potential high vibration inthe line and potential pipedamage.Release of HCs to ATM.Potential fire and explosionleading to operator injury.

1. PIC-5803404 willopen PV-5803404 andliquid C2 will be flashedto vapor phase.2. LAH-5803402.

P 4 1 2

1. Increased level indeethanizer reflux drum(58D201) leading topotential overfilling andcarryover (2-phase flow) ofliquid C2 to 58E004.Potential high vibration inthe line and potential pipedamage.Release of HCs to ATM.Potential fire and explosion.Potential operator injury.

1. PIC-5803404 willopen PV-5803404 andliquid C2 will be flashedto vapor phase.

P 4 1 2

2. Loss of pump suctionleading to pump(58P201A/B) cavitation anddamage.

1. Pump fault alarm.2. Pump is seallesstype.3. FAL-5803402.

A 4 1 2

Refer to action 58-G4.


1.8. Pump (58P201A/B)inlet block valve (XV-5803401) malfunctionsclosed or mismanagedclosed.

Sheet: 78 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Node: 58-09

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



1 No/Less Flow 1.9. Pump (58P201A/B)suction strainer (STR-5821/5822) plugging.

1. Less flow to pumpsuction leading to pump(58P201A/B) cavitation anddamage.

1. Pump fault alarm.2. Pump is seallesstype.3. FAL-5803402.4. Standby pump.

A 4 1 2

1.10. Deethanizer refluxpump (58P201A/B) trips.

1. Loss of reflux to 58C201leading to highertemperature and pressurein the column.Potentialoverpressurization of thecolumn leading to releaseof HCs to ATM.Potential fire and explosion.Potential operator injury.

1. PIC-5803205 withalarm high.2. PT-5803204 (2oo3)(HH) will trigger I-5831to trip reboiler(58E202).3. Daily monitoring (AI-5803401C).4. PSV-5803201/5803202.5. Pump fault alarm.6. Standby pump.

P 4 1 2


1. LAL-5803501.

A 3 1 2


1. PIC-5803404 willopen PV-5803404 andliquid C2 will be flashedto vapor phase.2. LAH-5803402.

P 4 1 2


1. Reduced level indeethanizer (58C201)leading to potential gasblowby to DCC unit 53.No significantconsequence.


Sheet: 79 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Node: 58-09

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



2 More Flow 2.2. Flow control loopfailure (FV-5803401)malfunctions fully openor mismanaged fullyopen.

1. Less reflux flow to58C201 leading to highertemperature and pressurein the column.Potentialoverpressurization of thecolumn leading to releaseof HCs to ATM.Potential fire and explosion.Potential operator injury.

1. FAL-5803402.2. PIC-5803205 withalarm high.3. PT-5803204 (2oo3)(HH) will trigger I-5831to trip reboiler(58E202).4. Daily monitoring (AI-5803401C).5. PSV-5803201/5803202.

P 4 1 2


1. More reflux leading topotential decreasedtemperature in thedeethanizer (58C202).Potential loss of C2 todeethanizer bottomsleading to reduced C2recovery.Loss of profit.

1. TIC-5803204 willcontrol reboiler duty tomaintain temperature.

A 3 1 2

1. More flow of C2 to C2splitter (58C301) leading tohigher level in the C2splitter.Potential flooding leading totray damage.

1. LIC-5803501 withalarm high will controlFV-5803503.2. PDAH-5803507. A 3 1 2

2. Reduced level indeethanizer reflux drum(58D201) leading topotential pump(58P201A/B) damage dueto cavitation.

1. LAL-5803402.2. Pump fault alarm.3. FAL-5803402.4. Sealless pump. A 4 1 2

3. Potential gas blowby toC2 splitter (58C301).Potentialoverpressurization in C2splitter (58C301) leading toequipment damage.Release of HCs to ATM.Potential fire and explosion.Potential operator injury.

1. PT-5803503 (2oo3)(HH) will trigger I-5843to XV-5803501.2. PSV-5803501/5803503.

P 4 1 2

2.5. Both deethanizerreflux pump(58P201A/B) runningsimultaneously.

1. Potential pump(58P201A/B) running belowminimum flow requirementleading to pump damage.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. Pump minimum flowline (via FV-5803401).

A 4 1 2


Sheet: 80 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Node: 58-09

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction




4 Misdirected Flow XV-5803202malfunctions open ormismanaged open.

Loss of C2 to flare.Loss of profit.Potential big flaring leadingto community complain.Reduced pressure indeethanizer (58C201).

PAL-5803205.CCTV (flare stackmonitoring).CSR program. C 3 1 2

5 Higher Pressure 5.1. PV-5803205Bmalfunctions closed ormismanaged closed.

No significantconsequence.

5.2. PV-5803205Amalfunctions closed ormismanaged closed.

1. Loss of C3R flow todeethanizer condenser(58E201) leading to loss ofcondensation.Potential loss of refluxleading to increasedtemperature and pressurein 58C201.Potentialoverpressurization indeethanizer (58C201)leading to equipmentdamage.Release of HCs to ATM.Potential fire and explosion.Potential operator injury.

1 .FAL-5803402.2. PT-5803204 (2oo3)(HH) will trigger I-5831to trip reboiler(58E202).3. PSV-5803201/5803202.

P 4 1 2

5.3. PV-5803404malfunctions closed ormismanaged closed.

1. Increased pressure in58D201 leading to potentialoverpressurization anddamage.Potentialoverpressurization indeethanizer (58C201)leading to equipmentdamage.Release of HCs to ATM.Potential fire and explosion.Potential operator injury.

1. PT-5803204 (2oo3)(HH) will trigger I-5831to trip reboiler(58E202).2. PSV-5803201/5803202.

P 4 1 2

Sheet: 81 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Node: 58-09

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



5 Higher Pressure 5.4. PV-5803501malfunctions closed ormismanaged closedwhen needed (not openon demand)

1. Pressure buildup at C2splitter (58C301) leading topotential overpressurizationin C2 splitter (58C301)leading to equipmentdamage.Potential fire and explosion.Potential operator injury.

1. PT-5803503 (2oo3)(HH) will trigger I-5843to XV-5803501.2. PSV-5803501/5803503.

P 4 1 2

6.1. PV-5803205Bmalfunctions open ormismanaged open.

1. Loss of deethanizerOVHD to flare.Potential big flaring leadingto potential communitycomplain.Reduced C2 recovery.Loss of profit.

1. CCTV (flare stackmonitoring).2. CSR program.3. LAL-5803402.4. FAL-5803402.

C 3 1 2

6.2. PV-5803205Amalfunctions open ormismanaged open.

1. More flow of C3R tocondenser (58E201)leading to more C2 in thedeethanizer bottom.Reduced C2 recovery.Loss of profit.

1 .Daily monitoring (AI-5803201).2. Periodic sampling(SC-5815).3. TIC-5803204.

A 3 1 2

6.3. PV-5803404malfunctions open ormismanaged open.

1. Reduced pressure in58D201 and consequentlylower pressure in 58C201.Potential vaporization of C3to deethanizer OVHDleading to potential C2product offspec.Loss of profit.

1. Daily monitoring (AI-5803401C).2. Periodic sampling(SC-5816).3. PAL-5803205. A 3 1 2

6.4. PV-5803501malfunctions open ormismanaged open.

1. Reduced pressure in58C301.Loss of C2 to CBD.Less C2 recovery.Loss of profit.

1. PAL-5803504A.

A 3 1 2

7 Higher Temperature 7.1. TIC-5803205malfunctions closing TV-5803205.

1. Less BFW flow leadingto higher temperature of SLto reboiler (58E202).No significantconsequence.

A 3 1 2

Desuperheatersystem for thereboiler will beremoved in thefuture.

Lower Pressure6

Sheet: 82 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Node: 58-09

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



7 Higher Temperature 7.2. TIC-5803204malfunctions openingLV-5803202.

1. Decreased level in58D202 leading to hightemperature todeethanizer.More C3 to overheadsection.Potential offspec of C2.Loss of profit.

1. Daily monitoring (AI-5803401C).2. Periodic sampling(SC-5816).3. PAH-5803205. A 3 1 2

58-09.02 Consider high alarm on TI-5803202.

EPC

1. Low temperature in thedeethanizer (58C202).Loss of C2 to deethanizerbottoms leading to less C2recovery.Loss of profit.

1. Daily monitoring (AI-5803201).2. Periodic sampling(SC-5815).3. TAL-5803204.

A 3 1 2

2. Potentialoverpressurization in58E202 and 58D202leading to damageequipment.Potential personnel injury.

1. PSV-5803203/5803204.

P 4 1 2

8.2. TIC-5803204malfunctions closing LV-5803202.

1. Increased level in58D202 leading to lowtemperature.Loss of C2 to deethanizerbottoms leading to less C2recovery.Loss of profit.


A 3 1 2

9 Higher Level 9.1. LIC-5803202malfunctions closing LV-5803202.

1. Increased level in58D202 leading to lowtemperature.Loss of C2 to deethanizerbottoms leading to less C2recovery.Loss of profit.

1. Daily monitoring (AI-5803201).2. Periodic sampling(SC-5815).3. TAL-5803204.

A 3 1 2



1. LAL-5803501.

A 3 1 2

Lower Temperature8 8.1. TIC-5803205malfunctions openingTV-5803205.

Sheet: 83 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Node: 58-09

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



9 Higher Level 9.2. LIC-5803402malfunctions closing FV-5803403.


1. PIC-5803404 willopen PV-5803404 andliquid C2 will be flashedto vapor phase.

P 4 1 2

1. Increased level in thedeethanizer (58C201)bottoms leading topotential tray flooding.Potential tray damage.

1. PDAH-5803209.2. TAL-5803204.3. Daily monitoring (AI-5803201).

A 4 1 2

2. Loss of deethanizerbottoms flow to unit 53.No significantconsequence.

9.4. LIC-5803401malfunctions openingPV-5803205A.

1. Increase level in E201.More flow of C3R tocondenser (58E201)leading to more C2 in thedeethanizer bottom.Reduced C2 recovery.Loss of profit.

1. Daily monitoring (AI-5803201).2. Periodic sampling(SC-5815).3. TIC-5803204.

A 3 1 2

10 Lower Level 10.1. LIC-5803202malfunctions openingLV-5803202.

1. Decreased level in58D202 leading to steamentering condensate pipe.Potential damage to pipe.Potential pipe rupture.Release of hot water toATM.Potential personnel injury.

1. Condensate line(150#) is designedsame as steam designpressure.

A 3 1 2


1. More flow of C2 to C2splitter (58C301) leading tohigher level in the C2splitter.Potential flooding leading totray damage.

1. LIC-5803501 withalarm high will controlFV-5803503.2. PDAH-5803507. A 3 1 2


Sheet: 84 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Node: 58-09

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



10 Lower Level 10.2. LIC-5803402malfunctions openingFV-5803403.

2. Reduced level indeethanizer reflux drum(58D201) leading topotential pump(58P201A/B) damage dueto cavitation.

1. Pump fault alarm.2. FAL-5803402.3. Sealless pump.

A 4 1 2


1. Reduced level indeethanizer (58C201)leading to potential gasblowby to DCC unit 53.No significantconsequence.








18 Power Failure 18.1. Deethanizer Refluxpump (58P201A/B)power supply failure.

1. Loss of reflux to 58C201leading to highertemperature and pressurein the column.Potentialoverpressurization of thecolumn leading to releaseof HCs to ATM.Potential fire and explosion.Potential operator injury.

1. PIC-5803205 withalarm high.2. PT-5803204 (2oo3)(HH) will trigger I-5831to trip reboiler(58E202).3. Daily monitoring (AI-5803401C).4. PSV-5803201/5803202.5. Pump fault alarm.6. Standby pump withdifferent power feederline.

P 4 1 2

19 Steam Failure No cause identified.

20 Cooling Water Failure No cause identified.

21 Nitrogen Failure No cause identified.



Sheet: 85 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Node: 58-09

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction




25.1. Tube pinhole leakat 58E202.

1. C2+ is leaked to thecondensate system.Potential light HCcontamination ofcondensate system andpotential release to ATM atdeaerator.

1. TOC analyzer at thecondensate system.Condensate treatingpackage (74X001).

A 2 1 1

25.2. Tube pinhole leakat 58E201.

1. C2 is leaked to the C3Rsystem.potential increasedpressure and potentialreduced efficiency of C2recovery in the ERUrefrigeration system.

1. PIC-5805801 withhigh alarm.

A 3 1 2




Leakage/Rupture25

Sheet: 86 of 196






C2 Splitter System

LIGHT RED



Drawing No.

Design Intent: To fractionate ethane and ethylene.

Notes:


C2 Splitter (58C301):Operating(P/T): 6.6barg/-60C (Top);7.3barg/-38C (Bottom)Design(P/T): 10.5barg(Top), 11.2(Bottom)/-110&65C

C2 Splitter Bottoms Reboiler (58E301):Operating(P/T): 18.2barg/-16.2CDesign(P/T): 11.7barg/-110&65C (1st pass);22.5barg/-110&65C (2nd pass)

C2 Splitter Bottoms Reboiler EthyleneLiquid Pot (58D301):Operating(P/T): 18.1barg/-31.8CDesign(P/T): 22.5barg/-110&65C

HAZOP WORKSHEET


1 No/Less Flow 1. Increased level in C2splitter (58C301) bottomsleading to potential trayflooding.Potential tray damage.

1. LAH-5803501.2. PDAH-5803507.

A 3 1 2

2. (short term - reboiler stillworking) Loss of C2 flow to58E301 leading toincreased temperature in58C301.Potential more ethanecontamination in ethylene.Potential ethylene offspec.Loss of profit.

1. AAH-5803501D.2. TAH-5803501.

A 3 1 2

3. (long term - reboiler notworking) Decreasedtemperature in C2 splitter.Potential more ethylene inethane.Loss of profit.

1. Daily monitoring (AI-5803502A).2. Periodic sampling(SC-5817).3. TAL-5803505.

A 3 1 2

4. Higher temperature andpressure C2R to C2Rsurge drum (58D404).Potential pressure buildupin 58D404.No significantconsequence.

1. Increased level in C2splitter (58C301) bottomsleading to potential trayflooding.Potential tray damage.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. LAH-5803501.3. PDAH-5803507.4. PDAH-5803601.5. Standby train.

A 3 1 2

2. (long term - reboiler notworking) Decreasedtemperature in C2 splitter.Potential more ethylene inethane.Loss of profit.


A 3 1 2

1.3. Flow control failure(FV-5803601)malfunctions closed ormismanaged closed.

1. Decreased temperaturein C2 splitter (58C301)leading to more ethylene inethane.Loss of profit.


A 3 1 2

1.1. Flow control failure(FV-5803503)malfunctions closed ormismanaged closed.

1.2. Strainer (STR-5823/5824) plugging.

P/E/A/C


Node Title: C2 Splitter System 58-035-1 (Rev. 0), 58-036-1 (Rev. 0), 58-045-1 (Rev. 0), 58-046-1 (Rev. 0), 58-047-1 (Rev. 0), 58-060-1 (Rev. 0)Node: 58-10

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



Sheet: 88 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



1 No/Less Flow 1.4. Manual valve on58E404 shell sidemismanaged closed.

1. Potential pressurebuildup and higher level inC2 splitter (58C301)bottoms leading topotential tray flooding.Potential tray damage.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. LAH-5803501.3. PDAH-5803507. A 3 1 2

58-10.01 Consider low flow alarm onFIC-5803503.

EPC

2.1. Flow control failure(FV-5803503)malfunctions fully openor mismanaged fullyopen.

1. Decreased level in C2splitter (58C301).Loss of 58E301 return.Loss of profit due toethylene.

1. LAL-5803501.2. PAL-5803504A.3. TAL-5803505.

A 3 1 2

2.2. Flow control failure(FV-5803601)malfunctions open ormismanaged open.

1. More circulation to thereboiler leading toincreased temperature in58C301.More ethane to ethylene.Loss of profit.

1. PIC-5803504 withhigh alarm.2. TAH-5803501.3. AAH-5803501D. A 3 1 2


4 Misdirected Flow 4.1. 4" manual valvefrom 58E404 to OSBLleft open accidentally.

1. Low temperature ofethane (-36 C)to fuel gassystem leading to potentialdamage to equipment59D001 and piping (H126).Potential release of HC toATM.Potential fire.Potential personnel injury.

1. TT-5806006 (2oo3)(LL) will trigger I-5856to close XV-5806001.

P 4 1 2

5 Higher Pressure No cause identified.

6 Lower Pressure No cause identified.

7 Higher Temperature 7.1. TIC-5803505malfunctions openingFV-5803601.



8 Lower Temperature 8.1. TIC-5803505malfunctions closing FV-5803601.


1. Daily monitoring (AI-5803502A).2. Periodic sampling(SC-5817).

A 3 1 2

More Flow2

Sheet: 89 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction




1. Increased level in C2splitter (58C301) bottomsleading to potential trayflooding.Potential tray damage.

1. PDAH-5803507.

A 3 1 2




A 3 1 2

1. Increased level in58E404 leading to reducedethane vapor to fuel gassystem.Potential 2-phase from58E404 carryover to58K101.Potential damage to58K401.

1. None.

A 3 1 2

58-10.02 Consider high alarm on LIC-5804602.

EPC

2. Potential lowtemperature ethane (-36C)to 58K101 leading topotential damage 58K101and suction line (H126).


A 3 1 2





1. Decreased level in C2splitter (58C301).Loss of 58E301 return.Loss of profit due toethylene.

1. PAL-5803504A.2. TAL-5803505.

A 3 1 2


1. Decreased level in58E404 leading to loss ofefficiency.Potential pressure buildupC2R surge drum (58D404).

1. LIC-58034602.2. PIC-5804702.

A 3 1 2




Lower Level

Higher Level9


10

Sheet: 90 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction







18 Power Failure N/A.

19 Steam Failure N/A.

20 Cooling Water Failure N/A.

21 Nitrogen Failure N/A.




25 Leakage/Rupture No cause identified.




Sheet: 91 of 196





58-047-1 (Rev. 0) 58-050-1 (Rev. 0)



C2R Compressor System

YELLOW



Drawing No.

Design Intent: To compress ethylene. Ethylene sending to C2 refrigeration system.

Notes:


Demethanizer Core HX No. 2 (58E104):Operating(P/T): 31.3barg/-57.1CDesign(P/T): 42barg/-155&65C(1st pass);17.1barg/-155&65C(2nd pass);42barg/-155&65C(3rd pass); 11barg/-155&65C(4thpass)Demethanizer Core HX No. 3 (58E105):Operating(P/T): 31.1barg/-80CDesign(P/T): 42barg/-165&65C(1st pass);17.1barg/-165&65C(2nd pass);42barg/-165&65C(3rd pass); 0.5barg@-155&11C/-155&65C(4th pass)

C2R Compressor 1st Stage Suction Drum(58D401):Operating(P/T): 0.2barg/-101CDesign(P/T): 10.5barg/-115&65CC2R Compressor 2nd Stage Suction Drum(58D402):Operating(P/T): 6.6barg/-60CDesign(P/T): 10.5barg/-110&65C

C2R Compressor 3rd Stage Suction Drum(58D403):Operating(P/T): 17.7barg/-31.9CDesign(P/T): 10.5barg/-110&65CC2 Heat Pump/Refrig Compressor 1st and2nd Stage (58K401):Operating(P/T): 8.3barg/-52.1CDesign Capacity@SuctionCondition(Nm3/hr): 2307(1st); 6825(2nd);45625(3rd)

C2 Heat Pump/Refrig Compressor 3rdStage (58K401):Operating(P/T): 8.3barg/-52.1CDesign Capacity@SuctionCondition(Nm3/hr): 2307(1st); 6825(2nd);45625(3rd)C2R Desuperheater No. 1 (58E401):Operating(P/T): 18.6barg/17.7CDesign(P/T): 22.5barg/-46&65C(1st pass);17barg/-46&65C(2nd pass)

C2R Desuperheater No. 2 (58E402):Operating(P/T): 18.4barg/13CDesign(P/T): 22.5barg/-46&65C(1st pass);17barg/-46&65C(2nd pass)C2R Condenser (58E403):Operating(P/T): 18.2barg/-16.2CDesign(P/T): 22.5barg/-110&65C(1st pass); -0.5barg@-46&17C/-110&65C(2nd pass)

Ethane Vaporizer (58E404):Operating(P/T): 7.2barg/-36.5C (Shell);18.2barg/16.2C (Tube)Design(P/T): 17.4barg/-90&65C (Shell);22.5barg/-110&75C (Tube)C2R Condenser Ethylene Liquid Pot(58D405):Operating(P/T): 18.1barg/-31.9CDesign(P/T): 22.5barg/-110&65CEthane Vaporizer Ethylene Liquid Pot(58D406):Operating(P/T): 18.1barg/-31.9CDesign(P/T): 22.5barg/-110&65C

HAZOP WORKSHEET




1. PAH-5803504.2. TAH-5803501.3. PT-5803503A/B/C(2oo3) (HH) will triggerI-5843 to close XV-5803501.4. PSV-5803501/5803503.

P 4 1 2

1. Less flow of C2 to58K401 3rd stage suctionleading to potentialdamage to compressor.Potential HCs release toATM.Potential fire and explosion.Potential operator injury.

1. FAL-5804103.2. Anti surge valve (UV-5803901).3. PAL-5804103.

P 4 1 2

2. Higher pressure in theC2 splitter (58C301).Potentialoverpressurization of thecolumn leading to releaseof HCs to ATM.Potential fire and explosion.Potential operator injury.

1. PAH-5803504.2. PT-5803503A/B/C(2oo3) (HH) will triggerI-5843 to close XV-5803501.3. PSV-5803501/5803503.

P 4 1 2

1.3. MOV-5804001malfunctions closed ormismanaged closed.

1. Loss of flow tocompressor (58K401) 1stsuction leading to heatbuildup and high vibration.Potential compressordamage.

1. Interlock (I-5841) toprevent MOV-5804001to be closed whencompressor is running(refer to note 7 onP&ID# 58-040).2. PAL-5804001.

A 4 1 2

58-11.01 Consider low alarm on FI-5804001.

EPC


1. Loss of flow tocompressor (58K401) 2ndsuction leading to heatbuildup and high vibration.Potential compressordamage.

1. Interlock (I-5841) toprevent MOV-5804001to be closed whencompressor is running(refer to note 7 onP&ID# 58-040).2. PAL-5804002.

A 4 1 2

58-11.02 Consider low alarm on FI-5804002.

EPC

Action By


P/E/A/CCauses


Node Title: C2R Compressor SystemNode: 58-11

Ref.No.

Deviation Action TakenPossible

ConsequencesExisting Safeguards S

58-021-1 (Rev. 0), 58-023-1 (Rev. 0), 58-024-1 (Rev. 0), 58-035-1 (Rev. 0), 58-036-1 (Rev. 0), 58-037-1 (Rev. 0), 58-038-1 (Rev. 0), 58-039-1 (Rev. 0), 58-040-1 (Rev. 0), 58-041-1 (Rev. 0), 58-045-

1 (Rev. 0), 58-046-1 (Rev. 0), 58-047-1 (Rev. 0), 58-050-1 (Rev. 0)

RemarkActionStatus

L RAction


Recommendations

Sheet: 94 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


Action ByP/E/A/CCauses



Ref.No.




1 (Rev. 0), 58-046-1 (Rev. 0), 58-047-1 (Rev. 0), 58-050-1 (Rev. 0)

RemarkActionStatus

L RAction


Recommendations

1 No/Less Flow 1.5. MOV-5804101malfunctions closed ormismanaged closed.

1. Loss of flow tocompressor (58K401) 3rdsuction leading to heatbuildup and high vibration.Potential compressordamage.

1. Interlock (I-5841) toprevent MOV-5804001to be closed whencompressor is running(refer to note 6 onP&ID# 58-041).2. FAL-5804103.3. PAL-5804103.

A 4 1 2


1. Blocked compressor(58K401) discharge leadingto surge and highdischarge pressure andtemperature.Potential compressordamage potentially leadingto release of light end gasto ATM.Potential fire and explosion.Potential operator injury.

1. PAH-5804104.2. PSV-5804101/5804102.3. PT-5804105 (2oo3)(HH) will trigger I-5841to trip compressor(58K401).4. TAH-5804104.

P 4 1 2


1. Loss of flow tocompressor (58K401) 1stsuction leading to heatbuildup and high vibration.Potential compressordamage.

1. PAL-5804001.2. PDAH-5804003.

A 4 1 2



1. PAL-5804002.2. PDAH-5804004.

A 4 1 2

1.9. Strainer (STR-5827)partially plugging.

1. Loss of flow tocompressor (58K401) 3rdsuction leading to heatbuildup and high vibration.Potential compressordamage.

1. PAL-5804103.2. PDAH-5804105.

A 4 1 2


1. Loss of C2R to58E404/58E403/58E301/58D404 leading to ethyleneunit shutdown.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. LIC-5804701 controlFV-5804702.3. FAL-5804801.

A 3 1 2

Sheet: 95 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET





Ref.No.




1 (Rev. 0), 58-046-1 (Rev. 0), 58-047-1 (Rev. 0), 58-050-1 (Rev. 0)

RemarkActionStatus

L RAction


Recommendations

1 No/Less Flow 1.11. Strainer (STR-5814) partially plugging.

1. Less flow of C2R to58E104 pass #4 leading toless vapor to compressor2nd stage.Potential surge 58K401and potential prematurefailure to 58K401.

1. Anti surge linecontrol (UV-5803801).2. Strainer is designedfor 400 % opening area.

A 3 1 2

1.12. Strainer (STR-5814) inlet or outletmanual valvemismanaged closed.

1. No flow of C2R to58E104 pass #4 leading toless vapor to compressor2nd stage.Potential surge 58K401and potential damage to58K401.

1. Anti surge linecontrol (UV-5803801).2. Operator training andprocedures.3. PAL-5804002.

A 4 1 2

Refer to Action No. 58-N11.02

1.13. Strainer (STR-5818) partially plugging.

1. Less flow of C2R to58E105 pass #4 leading toless vapor to compressor1st stage.Potential surge 58K401and potential prematurefailure to 58K401.


A 3 1 2


1. No flow of C2R to58E105 pass #4 leading toless vapor to compressor1st stage.Potential surge 58K401and potential damage to58K401.

1. Anti surge linecontrol (UV-5803701).2. Operator training andprocedures.3, PAL-5804001.

A 4 1 2

Refer to Action No. 58-N11.01


1. Less flow of C2R to58E103 pass #4 leading toless vapor to compressor3rd stage.Potential surge 58K401and potential prematurefailure to 58K401.


A 3 1 2


1. No flow of C2R to58E103 pass #4 leading toless vapor to compressor3rd stage.Potential surge 58K401and potential damage to58K401.

1. Anti surge linecontrol (UV-5803901).2. Operator training andprocedures.3. PAL-5804103.4. FAL-5804103.

A 4 1 2

Sheet: 96 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET





Ref.No.




1 (Rev. 0), 58-046-1 (Rev. 0), 58-047-1 (Rev. 0), 58-050-1 (Rev. 0)

RemarkActionStatus

L RAction


Recommendations

1 No/Less Flow 1. Increased pressure andtemperature in 58K401discharge leading loss ofC2 recovery efficiency.Less profit.

1. PAH-5804104.2. TAH-5804104.3. PDAH-5804501.4. Standby strainer.5. Strainer is designedfor 400 % opening area.

A 3 1 2

2. No significantconsequence in C3Rsystem due to level control(LIC-5805101) in 58D503.


1. Overpressurization indischarge 58K401 leadingto potential damage to58K401.Potential release of HC toATM.Potential personnel injury.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. PAH-5804104.3. TAH-5804104.4. PT-5804105A/B/C(2oo3) (HH) will triggerI-5841 to trip 58K401.5. PSV-5804101/5804102.

P 4 1 2

1.19. UV-5803701/5803801/5803901 not open whenrequired.

1. Potential damage to58K401.Potential release of HC toATM.Potential personnel injury.Potential unit shutdown.

1. None.

P 4 1 2

58-11.03 To be confirmed cause,consequence and safeguard forthis scenario with vendorduring compressor packageHAZOP.

EPC/Vendor

1.20. Compressor(58K401) trip.

1. Potential hightemperature andoverpressure in ERU.Potential release HC toATM leading to potentialfire and explosion.Potential personnel injury.

1. Depressurizationsystem (manual).

P 4 1 2

58-11.04 Consider providing one push-button in the control room forERU shutdown.

EPC


1. More reflux leading topotential decreasedtemperature in the 58C301.Potential loss of C2 to C2splitter bottoms leading toreduced C2 recovery.Loss of profit.

1. TIC-5803505 withlow alarm.2. PDAH-5803505.3. PDAH-5803507.

A 3 1 2

3 Reverse Flow No cause identified.4 Misdirected Flow 4.1. XV-5804102

malfunctions open ormismanaged open whennot needed.

1. Loss of ethylene productto flare.Loss of profit and highflaring leading to potentialcommunity complain.

1. CCTV (flare stackmonitoring).2. CSR program.

C 2 1 1


Sheet: 97 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET





Ref.No.




1 (Rev. 0), 58-046-1 (Rev. 0), 58-047-1 (Rev. 0), 58-050-1 (Rev. 0)

RemarkActionStatus

L RAction


Recommendations

4 Misdirected Flow 4.2. 2" manual valvefrom 58E404 to coldflare mismanaged open.

1. Loss of C2R vapor tocold flare.Loss of profit.


A 3 1 2

58-11.05 To develop operatingprocedure using of 2" manualvalve when heat exchangeefficiency is not good due tonon condensable vapor in C2Rsystem.

EPC

5.1. PIC-5803504malfunctions not openPV-5803504 whenrequired.

1. Increased pressure in58C301.Potentialoverpressurization of thecolumn leading to potentialdamage to piping andequipment.Potential release of HCs toATM.Potential fire and explosion.Potential operator injury.

1. PT-5803403A/B/C(2oo3) (HH) will triggerI-5843 to close XV-5803501.2. PSV-5803501/5803503.

P 4 1 2


1. Increased pressure in58K401 discharge leadingto potential damage to58K401.Potential release of HCs toATM.Potential fire and explosion.Potential operator injury.

1. PT-5804105A/B/C(2oo3) (HH) will triggerI-5841 to trip 58K401.2. PSV-5804101/5804102.3. PAH-5804104.

P 4 1 2

5.3. PIC-5804003malfunctions decreasedspeed (SC-5804003).

1. Increased pressure of1st and 2nd suction.No significantconsequence.

6 Lower Pressure 1. Loss of C2 splitterOVHD to flare.Potential big flaring leadingto potential communitycomplain.Reduced C2 recovery.Loss of profit.


C 3 1 2

2. Potential 58K401 lowsuction leading to potentialdamage to 58K401.

1. PAL-5804103.2. UV-5803901.3. FAL-5804103.

A 4 1 2

6.2. PIC-5804106malfunctions openingPV-5804106.

1. More flow of C2R to58D404 leading tounbalance of C2R to58E301/ 58E403/ 58E404.No significantconsequence.

Higher Pressure5


Sheet: 98 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET





Ref.No.




1 (Rev. 0), 58-046-1 (Rev. 0), 58-047-1 (Rev. 0), 58-050-1 (Rev. 0)

RemarkActionStatus

L RAction


Recommendations

6 Lower Pressure 6.3. PIC-5804003malfunctions increasedspeed (SC-5804003).

1. Potential surge and highvibration leading topremature failure.

1. Anti surge valve (UV-5803701/3801/3901).2. SAH-5804003.

A 4 1 2

7 Higher Temperature No cause identified.

8 Lower Temperature No cause identified.


1. Increased level in58D401 leading to potentialC2R liquid carryover to58K401.Potential 58K401 damage.

1. LT-5803702 (2oo3)(HH) will trigger I-5841to trip 58K401.

A 4 1 2




A 4 1 2




A 4 1 2

1. Increased level in58E404 leading to reducedethane vapor to fuel gassystem.Potential 2-phase from58E404 carryover to58K101.Potential damage to58K401.

1. None.

A 3 1 2

58-11.06. Consider high level alarm onLIC-5804603.

EPC

2. Potential lowtemperature ethane (-36C)to 58K101 leading topotential damage 58K101and suction line (H126).


A 3 1 2

9.5. LIC-5804601malfunctions closing PV-5804106.

1. Increased pressure in58K401 discharge leadingto potential damage to58K401.Potential release of HCs toATM.Potential fire and explosion.Potential operator injury.

1. PT-5804105A/B/C(2oo3) (HH) will triggerI-5841 to trip 58K401.2. PSV-5804101/5804102.3. PAH-5804104.

P 4 1 2

Higher Level9


Sheet: 99 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET





Ref.No.




1 (Rev. 0), 58-046-1 (Rev. 0), 58-047-1 (Rev. 0), 58-050-1 (Rev. 0)

RemarkActionStatus

L RAction


Recommendations

1. Decreased level in58D401 leading to less flowto 58K401.Potential damage to58K401.

1. Anti surge valve (UV-5803701).

A 4 1 2

2. Increased temperatureof treated off gas leading toloss of C2 to fuel gas.Loss of profit.

1. TAH-5802509.

A 2 1 1



A 4 1 2


1. TAH-5802509.

A 2 1 1



A 4 1 2


1. TAH-5802509.

A 2 1 1


1. Decreased level in58E404 leading to loss ofefficiency.Potential pressure buildupC2R surge drum (58D404).

1. LIC-5804603.2. PIC-5804702.

A 3 1 2

10.5. LIC-5804601malfunctions openingPV-5804106.

1. More flow of C2R to58D404 leading tounbalance of C2R to58E301/ 58E403/ 58E404.No significantconsequence.






Lower Level10



Sheet: 100 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET





Ref.No.




1 (Rev. 0), 58-046-1 (Rev. 0), 58-047-1 (Rev. 0), 58-050-1 (Rev. 0)

RemarkActionStatus

L RAction


Recommendations




1. No ethylene todownstream process andusers leading to potentialunit 58 (ERU) shutdown.Potential loss of productleading to loss of profit.

1. Compressor faultalarm.2. Emergency shutdownprocedure. A 4 1 2

2. Potentialoverpressurization ofupstream unit leading toequipment damage andrelease of HC to ATM.Potential fire and explosion.Potential operator injury.

1. PIC-5803504 withalarm high.2. PT-5803503A/B/C(2oo3) (HH) will triggerI-5843 to close XV-5803501.3. PSV-5803501/5803503.

P 4 1 2





23 Maintenance 23.1. No isolation C3Rto coil.

1. Deviation of isolationphilosophy.

1. None.

A 2 2 2

58-11.06 Consider provide additionalisolation valve on upstreamglove valve (C3R vapor from58K501 line).

EPC






Power Failure 18.1. Compressor(58K401) power supplyfailure.

18

Sheet: 101 of 196






Ethylene Product Stream to Exsting Header

PATTERNED BROWN



Drawing No.

Design Intent: To Send Ethylene Product to Exsting Header as Vapor and C2R System

Notes:


C2R Surge Drum (58D404):Operating(P/T): 17.6barg/-31.9CDesign(P/T): 22.5barg/-110&75CEthylene Product Pumps (58P401A/B):Operating(P/T): 17.6barg/-31.9CDesign: 21.64m3/hr

Ethylene Product Vaporizer (58E502):Operating(P/T): 6.0barg/29.4C (Tube)Design(P/T): 47barg/-110&65C (Shell);36.5barg/-46&65C (Tube)

Ethylene Product Heater (58E503):Operating(P/T): 17barg/19.9C (Shell)Design(P/T): 36.5barg/-46&90C (Shell);47barg/-110&65C (Tube)

Ethylene Product Vaporizer Liquid Pot(58D505):Operating(P/T): 5.9barg/5.3CDesign(P/T): 16.5barg/-46&65C

HAZOP WORKSHEET


1 No/Less Flow 1. No flow to pump leadingto loss pump suctionpressure.Potential damage to pump.Potential release ofethylene to ATM leading topotential fire and explosion.Potential personnel injury.

1. Pump fault alarm.2. Gas detector.

P 4 1 2

Refer to Action No. 58-G4 and58-G5

2. Increased level in58D404 leading to potentialcarryover to vapor line.Increased pressure in58D404.Operational upset in58D404.

1. LAH-5804702.2. PIC-5804702.3. Alternative outletlines to 58D403/58C301. A 2 1 1



1. PAH-5803504.2. TAH-5803501.3. PT-5803503A/B/C(2oo3) (HH) will triggerI-5843 to close XV-5803501.4. PSV-5803501/5803503.

P 4 1 2

1.3. Ethylene productpumps suction strainer(STR-5836/5837)plugging.

1. Less flow to pumpleading to loss pumpsuction pressure.Potential damage to pump.Potential release ofethylene to ATM leading topotential fire and explosion.Potential personnel injury.

1. Pump fault alarm.2. Standby pump.

P 3 1 2


EPC

1.4. Ethylene productpumps (58P401A/B)trips.

1. Increased level in58D404 leading to potentialcarryover to vapor line.Increased pressure in58D404.Operational upset in58D404.

1. LAH-5804702.2. PIC-5804702.3. Alternative outletlines to 58D403/58C301.4. Pump fault alarm.5. Standby pump.

A 2 1 1


P/E/A/C


Node Title: Ethylene Product Stream to Storage 58-006-1 (Rev. 0), 58-035-1 (Rev. 0), 58-045-1 (Rev. 0), 58-047-1 (Rev. 0), 58-048-1 (Rev. 0)Node: 58-12

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



Sheet: 103 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



1 No/Less Flow 1.4. Ethylene productpumps (58P401A/B)trips.

2. Potential reverse flow ofethylene from existingheader to 58D404.Increased level in 58D404leading to operationalupset in 58D404.

1. PAL-5804801A.2. Check valve oncommon discharge lineof 58P401A/B. A 2 1 1


1. No flow to existingheader.Loss of profit.

1. Minimum flow line.2. FAL-5804801.

A 3 1 2


EPC

1.6. Flow control loopfailure (FV-5804701)malfunctions closed ormismanaged closedwhen required.

1. Potential damage topump.Potential release ofethylene to ATM leading topotential fire and explosion.Potential personnel injury.

1. Gas detector.

P 4 1 2

Refer to Action No. 58-G3


1. FAL-5804801.

A 2 1 1

2. Potential overpressure of58E502 and pipingupstream.Potential release ofethylene to ATM leading topotential fire and explosion.Potential personnel injury.

1. PIC-5804801B withhigh alarm.2. 58E502 and piping israted to 600#, same as58P401 shutoffpressure.

P 3 1 2

2 More Flow 1. More flow of ethylene toexisting header leading todecreased level in 58D404.Potential less reflux to58C301.Potential offspec ofethylene.Loss of profit.

1. LIC-5804701 tocontrol FV-5804702.

A 4 1 2

2. Potential low NPSHa andcavitation leading topotential damage to pump.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. NPSHa is calculatedbased on bottom of58D404.

A 4 1 2

1.7. Battery limit manualvalve mismanagedclosed.

2.1. Both Ethyleneproduct pumps(58P401A/B) runningsimultaneously.

Sheet: 104 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



2 More Flow 1. More flow of ethylene toexisting header leading todecreased level in 58D404.Potential less reflux to58C301.Potential offspec ofethylene.Loss of profit.

1. LAL-5804701.

A 4 1 2

2. Potential level buildup in58E502 leading to liquidcarryover to downstreamequipment and existingheader.Potential damage toexisting piping (carbonsteel).

1. LIC-5804801.58E503 is designed forpump maximumcapacity.

A 4 1 2

1. Less flow of ethylene toexisting header leading toloss of profit.

1. FAL-5804801.

A 3 1 2

2. Potential pump overloadleading to premature failureof pump.

1. Overload trip isprovided.2. Standby pump.

A 3 1 2


3 Reverse Flow No additional causeidentified.

4.1. 2" manual valvefrom 58E502 to coldflare mismanaged open.

1. Loss of C2R vapor tocold flare.Loss of profit.


A 3 1 2

58-12.03 To develop operatingprocedure using of 2" manualvalve when heat exchangeefficiency is not good due tonon condensable vapor in C2Rsystem.

EPC

4.2. XV-5804702malfunctions open ormismanaged open whennot required.



C 2 1 1


5 Higher Pressure 5.1. PIC-5804702malfunctions closing PV-5804702 when required.

1. Increased pressure in58D404.No significantconsequence.

Misdirected Flow4


2.3. Flow control loopfailure (FV-5804701)malfunctions open ormismanaged open whennot required.

Sheet: 105 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



5 Higher Pressure 5.2. PIC-5804801Amalfunctions closing PV-5804801A.

1. Potential overpressure of58E502 and pipingupstream.Potential release ofethylene to ATM leading topotential fire and explosion.Potential personnel injury.

1. PIC-5804801B withhigh alarm.2. 58E502 and piping israted to 600#, same as58P401 shutoffpressure.

P 3 1 2

5.3. PIC-5804801Bmalfunctions closing PV-5804801B whenrequired.

1. Increased pressure in58E503.No significantconsequence.

6.1. PIC-5804702malfunctions openingPV-5804702 when notrequired.



C 2 1 1

6.2. PIC-5804801Amalfunctions openingPV-5804801A.

1. More flow of ethylene toexisting header leading todecreased level in 58D404.Potential less reflux to58C301.Potential offspec ofethylene.Loss of profit.

1. LAL-5804701.2. FIC-5804702 tocontrol FV-5804702.

A 4 1 2

6.3. PIC-5804801Bmalfunctions openingPV-5804801B when notrequired.



C 2 1 1

7 Higher Temperature 7.1. TIC-5804801malfunctions openingTV-5804801.

1. Increased temperatureof ethylene.No significantconsequence.

8 Lower Temperature 8.1. TIC-5804801malfunctions closing TV-5804801.

1. Decreased temperatureof ethylene (approximately-13 C) leading to potentialdamage to existing headerpiping (carbon steel).

None.

A 3 1 2

58-12.04 To confirm MDMT of existingcarbon steel header.

IRPC

9 Higher Level 9.1. LIC-5804701malfunctions closing FV-5804702.


1. Minimum flow line.2. FAL-5804801.

A 3 1 2

Lower Pressure6

Sheet: 106 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



9 Higher Level 9.2. LIC-5804801malfunctions closing LV-5804801.

1. Increased shell sidelevel leading to potentialcarryover to 58E503.potential temperature lowerthan MDMT of existingheader (carbon steel).Potential damage to piping.

1. TIC-5804801 withlow alarm.

A 3 1 2


1. Increased shell sidelevel leading to potentialcarryover to 58E503.potential temperature lowerthan MDMT of existingheader (carbon steel).Potential damage to piping.


A 3 1 2

1. More flow of ethylene toexisting header leading todecreased level in 58D404.Potential less reflux to58C301.Potential offspec ofethylene.Loss of profit.

1. PIC-5804801A.

A 4 1 2

2. Potential level buildup in58E502 leading to liquidcarryover to downstreamequipment and existingheader.Potential damage toexisting piping (carbonsteel).

1. LIC-5804801.2. 58E503 is designedfor pump maximumcapacity.

A 4 1 2


1. Decreased level in58E502.Increased temperature ofethylene.No significantconsequence.


1. Decreased level in58E502.Increased temperature ofethylene.No significantconsequence.



10.1. Lower Level10

Sheet: 107 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction




13 Relief 13.1. External fire. 1. Potentialoverpressurization of58E502 discharge leadingto downstreampiping/equipment damage.Release of HCs to ATMleading to potential fireescalation.Potential operator injury.

1. PSV-5804801 fortube side.

P 4 1 2

58-12.05 Consider providing relief valveat 58E502 shell side in case ofexternal fire.

EPC

14 Sampling No cause identified.15 Abnormal Operation No cause identified.16 Corrosion/Erosion No cause identified.17 Human Errors No cause identified.18 Power Failure Ethylene Product pump

(58P401A/B) powersupply failure.

No flow of ethylene leadingto higher level andpressure in the 58D404.Potentialoverpressurization of thecolumn leading to releaseof HCs to ATM.Potential fire and explosion.Potential operator injury.

PIC-5804702 to controlPV-5804702.Pump fault alarm.Standby pump withdifferent power feederline. P 4 1 2








1. Ethylene is leaked to theC3R system.Potential increasedpressure and potentialreduced efficiency of C2recovery in the ERUrefrigeration system.

1. PIC-5805801 withhigh alarm.

A 3 1 2




Sheet: 108 of 196




58-050-1 (Rev. 0) 58-051-1 (Rev. 0) 58-058-1 (Rev. 0)



C3R Compressor Suction Drum System

PATTERNED LIGHT BLUE



Drawing No.

Design Intent: To provide C3R to compressor (58K501)

Notes:PSV-5804503/5804504 set pressure is 17.0 barg, piping design pressure is 16.9 barg.


C2R Desuperheater No. 1 (58E401):Operating(P/T): 18.6barg/17.7CDesign(P/T): 22.5barg/-46&65C(1st pass);17barg/-46&65C(2nd pass)

HAZOP WORKSHEET


1 No/Less Flow 1.1. Strainer (STR-5830/5831) plugging.

1. Less flow of C3R to58D503 leading toincreased temperature ofdischarge of compressor.Higher pressure at58D404.Loss of ethylene to flare.Loss of profit.

1. PDAH-5804502.2. Standby strainer.3. Strainer is designedfor 400 % opening area.

A 3 1 2

2 More Flow No cause identified.


1. Loss of propylene tocool down compressor58K401 discharge.Loss of ethylene to flare.Loss of profit and highflaring leading to potentialcommunity complain.


C 3 1 2

1. Loss of C3R to flare.Loss of profit.

1. None.C 3 1 2


5.1. PIC-5805101malfunctions openingPV-5805101A.

1. Potentialoverpressurization in58D503 leading to potentialdamage to 58D503.Potential release of HC toATM leading to fire andexplosion.Potential personnel injury.

1. PSV-5805101/5805102.

P 4 1 2

5.2. PIC-5805101malfunctions closing PV-5805101B whenrequired.

1. Potentialoverpressurization in58D503 leading to potentialdamage to 58D503.Potential release of HC toATM leading to fire andexplosion.Potential personnel injury.

1. PSV-5805101/5805102.

P 4 1 2

6 Lower Pressure 6.1. PIC-5805101malfunctions closing PV-5805101A.

1. Potential increasedpressure of compressor(58K501) discharge leadingto potential operationalupset.

1. PIC-5805801B.

A 2 1 1

4.1. XV-5805101malfunctions open ormismanaged open whennot required.

Higher Pressure5

Causes RemarkAction ByP/E/A/C

Misdirected Flow4

ActionStatus

L RAction


Recommendations


Node Title: C3R Compressor Suction Drum System 58-006-1 (Rev. 0), 58-012-1 (Rev. 0), 58-026-1 (Rev. 0), 58-034-1 (Rev. 0), 58-045-1 (Rev. 0), 58-048-1 (Rev. 0), 58-050-1 (Rev. 0), 58-051-1 (Rev. 0), 58-058-1 (Rev. 0)Node: 58-13

Ref.No.



Sheet: 110 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


Causes RemarkAction ByP/E/A/CActionStatus

L RAction


Recommendations



Ref.No.



6 Lower Pressure 6.1. PIC-5805101malfunctions closing PV-5805101A.

2. Decreased pressure in58D503 leading to potentiallower temperature in58E401.No significantconsequence.

1. Potential increasedpressure of compressor(58K501) discharge leadingto potential operationalupset.

1. PIC-5805801B.

A 2 1 1

2. Decreased pressure in58D503 leading to potentiallower temperature in58E401.No significantconsequence.



9 Higher Level 9.1. LIC-5805101malfunctions openingLV-5805101.

1. Increased level in58D503.No significantconsequence.

1. Decreased level in58D503 leading to loss ofsuction of 58K501.Potential damage tocompressor.

1. FAL-5805301.2. PAL-5805201.3. PAL-5805301.

A 4 1 2

2. No heat exchangeleading to decreasedethylene producttemperature.Potential damage toexisting header (carbonsteel).


A 3 1 2

3. Higher temperature andpressure in discharge ofcompressor (58K401) andhigher pressure in 58D404.Potential big flaring leadingto community complain.Loss of profit.

1. PIC-5804106 tocontrol PV-5804106.2. CCTV (flare stackmonitoring).3. CSR program.

C 2 1 1


6.2. PIC-5805101malfunctions openingPV-5805101B when notrequired.


Lower Level10

Sheet: 111 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


Causes RemarkAction ByP/E/A/CActionStatus

L RAction


Recommendations



Ref.No.




















Sheet: 112 of 196







C3R Compressor 2nd Stage System (including final discharge downstreamsystems)

PATTERNED PINK



Drawing No.

Design Intent:To compress C3R by 58K501 and send it to condense ethylene refrigerator system and cooldown treated offgasfrom 58K001

Notes:


C2R Desuperheater No. 2 (58E402):Operating(P/T): 18.4barg/13CDesign(P/T): 22.5barg/-46&65C(1st pass);17barg/-46&65C(2nd pass)

C3R Compressor 2nd Stage Suction Drum(58D502):Operating(P/T): 2barg/-20CDesign(P/T): 16.5barg/-46&65C

C3 Refrigeration Compressor (58D501):Operating(P/T): 0.23barg/-41.9CDesign Capacity@SuctionCondition(Nm3/hr): 13612(1st); 27910(2nd)

C3R Condenser (58E501):Operating(P/T): 17.7barg/86C (Shell)Design(P/T): 21barg/-46&140C(Shell);16.2barg/11&100C(Tube)

C3R Surge Drum (58D504):Operating(P/T): 17barg/42CDesign(P/T): 21barg/-46&140C

HAZOP WORKSHEET



1. Less flow of C3R to58E502 leading toincreased temperature ofdischarge of compressor.Higher pressure at58D404.Loss of ethylene to flare.Loss of profit.

1. PDAH-5804503.2. Standby strainer.3. Strainer is designedfor 400 % opening area.

A 3 1 2

1.2. Strainer (STR-5832/5833) Inlet/ outletmanual valvemismanaged closed.

1. No flow of C3R to58E502 leading toincreased temperature ofdischarge of compressor.Higher pressure at58D404.Loss of ethylene to flare.Loss of profit.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. PDAH-5804503.3. Standby strainer.4. Strainer is designedfor 400 % opening area.

A 4 1 2

1.3. UV-5804901/5805001 notopen when required.

1. Potential damage to58K501.Potential release of HC toATM.Potential personnel injury.Potential unit shutdown.

1. None.

P 4 1 2

58-14.01 To be confirmed cause,consequence and safeguard forthis scenario with vendorduring compressor packageHAZOP.

EPC



1. Interlock (I-5851) toprevent MOV-5805301to be closed whencompressor is running(refer to note 6 onP&ID# 58-053).2. PAL-5805301.3. FAL-5805301.

A 4 1 2


1. Less of flow tocompressor (58K501) 2ndsuction leading to heatbuildup and high vibration.Potential compressordamage.

1. PDAH-5805304.2. PAL-5805301.3. FAL-5805301.

A 3 1 2

1.6. Compressor(58K501) trip.

1. Potential hightemperature andoverpressure in ERU.Potential release HC toATM leading to potentialfire and explosion.Potential personnel injury.

1. Depressurizationsystem (manual).

P 4 1 2

Refer to Action No.58-11.04(Consider providing one push-button in the control room forERU shutdown)


1 (Rev. 0)


Node Title: C3R Compressor 2nd Stage System (including final discharge downstream systems)Node: 58-14

Ref.No.

Deviation Causes RemarkActionStatus

S L RAction


RecommendationsAction By

PossibleConsequences

Existing Safeguards P/E/A/C Action Taken

Sheet: 114 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET

Review Date: 2013-05-2858-020-1 (Rev. 0), 58-026-1 (Rev. 0), 58-037-1 (Rev. 0), 58-045-1 (Rev. 0), 58-048-1 (Rev. 0), 58-

049-1 (Rev. 0), 58-050-1 (Rev. 0), 58-051-1 (Rev. 0), 58-053-1 (Rev. 0), 58-057-1 (Rev. 0), 58-058-1 (Rev. 0)



Ref.No.


S L RAction





1 No/Less Flow 1. Blocked compressor(58K501) discharge leadingto surge and highdischarge pressure andtemperature.Potential compressordamage potentially leadingto release of light end gasto ATM.Potential fire and explosion.Potential personnel injury.

1. PAH-5805302.2. PSV-5805201/5805302.3. PT-5805303A/B/C(2oo3) (HH) will triggerI-5851 to tripcompressor (58K501).4. TAH-5805302.

P 4 1 2

2. Big flaring leading topotential communitycomplain.


C 3 1 2

1. Blocked compressor(58K501) discharge leadingto surge and highdischarge pressure andtemperature.Potential compressordamage potentially leadingto release of light end gasto ATM.Potential fire and explosion.Potential personnel injury.

1. PAH-5805302.2. PSV-5805201/5805302.3. PT-5805303A/B/C(2oo3) (HH) will triggerI-5851 to tripcompressor (58K501).4. TAH-5805302.

P 4 1 2



C 3 1 2

1. Blocked compressor(58K501) discharge leadingto surge and highdischarge pressure andtemperature.Potential compressordamage potentially leadingto release of light end gasto ATM.Potential fire and explosion.Potential personnel injury.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. PAH-5805302.3. PSV-5805201/5805302.4. PT-5805303A/B/C(2oo3) (HH) will triggerI-5851 to tripcompressor (58K501).5. TAH-5805302.

P 4 1 2



C 3 1 2



1.9. Inlet/ outlet manualvalve on 58E501mismanaged closed.

Sheet: 115 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET





Ref.No.


S L RAction





1 No/Less Flow 1. No flow of C3R to58E503/58E004/58E017leading to increasedtemperature of discharge ofcompressor (58K501).Higher pressure at58D404.Loss of C2/ C3 to flare.Loss of profit.

1. TAH-5805302.2. PAH-5805302.3. PT-5805303A/B/C(2oo3) (HH) will triggerI-5851 to tripcompressor (58K501).

A 4 1 2

2. Potential overfill of58D504 leading tooverpressurization ondischarge compressor(58K501).Potential release of C3Rleading to fire andexplosion.Potential personnel injury.

1. PAH-5805302.2. PT-5805303A/B/C(2oo3) (HH) will triggerI-5851 to tripcompressor (58K501).3. PSV-5805301/5805302.4. PIC-5805801 withhigh alarm.5. LAH-5805801.

P 4 1 2

3. Increased level in58D504 leading to potentialC3R liquid carryover toCFA.Big flaring leading topotential communitycomplain.

1. LAH-5805801.2. CCTV (flare stackmonitoring).3. CSR program.

C 3 1 2

2 More Flow 2.1. UV-5804901/5805001 openwhen not required.

1. Less flow of C3R tousers leading to less ofheat exchanger efficiency.Less profit.

1. TIC-5804801 withlow alarm.2. TAL-5802510.3. TIC-5800601 withlow alarm.

A 3 1 2


4.1. XV-5805801malfunctions open ormismanaged open whennot needed.

1. Loss of C3R to flare.Loss of profit and highflaring leading to potentialcommunity complain.

1. CCTV (flare stackmonitoring).2. CSR program. C 2 1 1

4.2. Inert gas manualvalve mismanaged openinadvertently.

1. Loss of C3R vapor to58D504 leading to higherpressure in 58D504.Potential loss of C3R toflare.Loss of profit.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. PAH-5805801.3. RO-5805701. A 3 1 2

Misdirected Flow4


Sheet: 116 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET





Ref.No.


S L RAction






1. Increased pressure andtemperature in 58D504leading to potentialoverpressurization in58D504.Potential release of C3R toATM leading to fire andexplosion.Potential personnel injury.

1. PAH-5805302.2. PT-5805303A/B/C(2oo3) (HH) will triggerI-5851 to tripcompressor (58K501).3. PSV-5805301/5805302.

P 4 1 2

5.2. PIC-5805801Bmalfunctions closing PV-5805801B.

1. Increased pressure andtemperature in 58D504leading to potentialoverpressurization in58D504.Potential release of C3R toATM leading to fire andexplosion.Potential personnel injury.


P 4 1 2

5.3. PDIC-5805802malfunctions closingPDV-5805802.

1. Increased level in58D504 leading to reducedlevel in 58D503.Potential loss of heatexchange efficiency at58E003.Less profit.

1. LAH-5805801.2. TAH-5801202.

A 3 1 2

6.1. PIC-5805801Amalfunctions closing PV-5805801A.

1. Low temperature andpressure in 58D504.No significantconsequence.

1. Loss of C3R to flare.Loss of profit and highflaring leading to potentialcommunity complain.


2. Decreased level in58D504 leading to less flowof C3R to 58D503.Potential loss of heatexchange efficiency at58E003.Less profit.

1. TAH-5801202.2. PDIC-5805802.

A 3 1 2

6.3. PDIC-5805802malfunctions openingPDV-5805802.

1. Decreased level in58D504 leading toincreased level in 58D503.No significantconsequence.

6.2. PIC-5805801Bmalfunctions openingPV-5805801B.

Higher Pressure5

Lower Pressure6

Sheet: 117 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET





Ref.No.


S L RAction





1. Increased temperatureof C3R leading tooverpressurization in58D504 and pipingdownstream.Potential release of C3R toATM leading to fire andexplosion.Potential personnel injury.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. TAH-5805703.3. PIC-5805801B withhigh alarm.4. PSV-5805301/5805302.

P 4 1 2

2. Potential hot C3R vaporto 58D503 leading tohigher temperature andpressure in 58D503 andloss of C3R liquid torefrigerant system leadingto overpressure incompressor (58K501)downstream section.Potential release of C3R toATM leading to fire andexplosion.Potential personnel injury.

1. TAH-5801202.2. PDIC-5805802.3. XV-5805801.

P 4 1 2

Refer to Action No.58-11.04(Consider providing one push-button in the control room forERU shutdown)

3. Potential to thermalexpansion 58E501 tubeside leading to potentialtube rupture.

1. PSV-5805703.

A 3 1 2




1. LT-5805002A/B/C(2oo3) (HH) will triggerI-5851 to trip 58K501.

A 4 1 2

10 Lower Level 10.1. LIC-5805001malfunctions closing LV-5805001.

1. Decreased level in58D502 leading to lessC3R liquid to users andless C3R vapor flow to58K501 2nd stage.Potential damage to58K501.Loss of profit due to lessheat exchange efficiency.

1. Anti surge valve (UV-5805001).2. TIC-5804801 withlow alarm.3. LAH-5805101.

A 4 1 2



Higher Temperature7 7.1. Cooling waterinlet/outlet manual valveat 58E501 mismanagedclosed.

Sheet: 118 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET





Ref.No.


S L RAction





13.1. External fire. 1. Potentialoverpressurization of58D504 discharge leadingto downstreampiping/equipment damage.Release of steam to ATM.Potential operator injury.

1. PSV-5805801.

P 4 1 2

13.2. External fire. 1. Potentialoverpressurization of58E501 discharge leadingto downstreampiping/equipment damage.Release of steam to ATM.Potential operator injury.

1. PSV-5805701.

P 4 1 2

13.3. External fire. 1. Potentialoverpressurization of58D502 discharge leadingto downstreampiping/equipment damage.Release of steam to ATM.Potential operator injury.

1. PSV-5805001/5805002.

P 4 1 2





1. No propylene todownstream process andusers leading to potentialunit 58 (ERU) shutdown.Potential loss of productleading to loss of profit.

1. Compressor faultalarm.2. Emergency shutdownprocedure. A 4 1 2

2. Potentialoverpressurization ofupstream unit leading toequipment damage andrelease of C3R to ATM.Potential fire and explosion.Potential personnel injury.


P 4 1 2



21 Nitrogen Failure N/A

18.1. Compressor(58K501) power supplyfailure.

Power Failure18

Relief13

Sheet: 119 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET





Ref.No.


S L RAction






23 Maintenance 23.1. One manholeprovided for 58D504.

1. Confined space.Not adequate ventilation.Potential personnel injury.

1. Confined spacepermit to work system.2. Vessel is designedas per UHV Projectspecification.

P 4 1 2



1. C3R leaks into coolingwater system leading torelease of VOCs in thecooling water basin.Potential environmentalimpacts.

1. 'AAH-7500102 (HC).

E 2 1 1




Sheet: 120 of 196



58-046-1 (Rev. 0) 58-049-1 (Rev. 0) 58-052-1 (Rev. 0)



C3R Compressor 1st Stage System

PATTERNED PURPLE



Drawing No.

Design Intent: To compress C3R vapour in the 1st stage C3R refrigerant compressor (58K501) and send it to users.

Notes:


C2R Condenser (58E403):Operating(P/T): 18.2barg/-16.2CDesign(P/T): 22.5barg/-110&65C(1st pass); -0.5barg@-46C&17barg/-110&65C(2nd pass)

C3R Compressor 1st Stage Suction Drum(58D501):Operating(P/T): 0.23barg/-41.9CDesign(P/T): -0.5barg@-46C&16.5barg/-46&65C

C3 Refrigeration Compressor (58K501):Operating(P/T): 4barg/-10.4CDesign Capacity@SuctionCondition(Nm3/hr): 13612(1st); 27910(2nd)

HAZOP WORKSHEET



1. Less flow back to58D501.Less flow to compressor(58K501) suction leading toheat buildup and highvibration.Potential compressordamage.

1. PDAH-5804602.2. PAL-5805201.3. Spare strainer.

A 4 1 2


1. Loss of flow to thecompressor (58K501)suction leading to heatbuildup and high vibration.Potential compressor (1ststage) damage.

1. PAL-5805201.I-5851 (permissive toclose MOV-5805201only after compressorshutdown).

A 4 1 2

1. Less flow to thecompressor (58K501)suction leading to heatbuildup and high vibration.Potential compressordamage.

1. PDAH-5805204.2. PAL-5805201.3. PIC-5805203 toreduce compressor(58K501) speed.

A 4 1 2

58-N15.01

Consider providing low flowalarm on FI-5805201.

EPC

2. Less compressor(58K501) discharge flowand pressure leading toless cooling efficiency atthe users.Potential operational upsetin the cold box exchangers.Potential offspec ethyleneproduct.Potential loss of C2 to thefuel gas system leading toless profit.

1. PDAH-5805204.2. PAL-5805301.

A 3 1 2

1. Potential unit shutdown. 1. Compressor faultalarm2. FAL-5805301.

A 3 1 2

Refer to 58-N15.01.

2. Potential upstreamoverpressure leading to bigflaring.Potential communitycomplaint.


C 2 1 1



4 Misdirected Flow No cause identified.

1.3. Compressor(58K501) 1st stagesuction strainer (STR-5838) plugging.

1.4. 1st stage C3refrigeration compressor(58K501) trips.


Node Title: C3R Compressor 1st Stage System 58-046-1 (Rev. 0), 58-049-1 (Rev. 0), 58-052-1 (Rev. 0)

Node: 58-15

Ref.No.


ConsequencesExisting Safeguards SP/E/A/C Remark

ActionStatus

L RAction



Sheet: 122 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET

Review Date: 2013-05-22Unit: Ethylene Recovery Unit (58)


Node: 58-15

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



1. Less flow to thecompressor (58K501)suction leading to heatbuildup and high vibration.Potential compressor (1ststage) damage.

1. PAL-5805201.

A 4 1 2

2. Potentialoverpressurization of58D501 and upstreampiping.Potential piping andequipment damage leadingto release of C3R to ATM.Potential fire and explosion.Potential personnel injury.

1. Upstream piping andequipment are designedwith the same or higherconditions with 58D501.

P 4 1 2

5.2. PIC-5805203malfunctions(underspeeding)

1. High suction pressure.No significantconsequence.

6 Lower Pressure 6.1. PIC-5805203malfunctions(overspeeding)

1. Potential vacuumconditions at thecompressor (58K501)suction leading to potentialcompressor and pipingdamage.

1. PAL-5805201.2. SAH-5805203.3. Compressor faultalarm. A 4 1 2

58-N15.02

Confirm with vendor whetherPT-5805203 can cover thevacuum condition andoverpressurization condition.

EPC


8 Lower Temperature No cause identified. 3. Increased level in58D504 leading to potentialC3R liquid carryover toCFA.Big flaring leading topotential communitycomplain.


1. Increased level in58D501 leading to potentialcarryover of liquid C3R tocompressor suction.Potential compressordamage.

1. LT-5804902 (2oo3)will trigger I-5851 to tripthe compressor(58K501).

A 4 1 2


5 Higher Pressure

Sheet: 123 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET



Node: 58-15

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



10 Lower Level 10.1. LIC-5804901malfunctions closing LV-5804901.

1. Reduced level in58D501 leading to potentialloss of condensation in the58E403.Potential highertemperature of ethyleneliquid leading to less C2recovery.Loss of profit.

1. LAL-5804701.2. PAL-5805201.

A 3 1 2

58-N15.03

Consider low level alarm on LT-5804601.

EPC




14 Sampling 14.1. No sampling pointfor C3R liquidcirculation.

1. Not possible to detectany light HC leak into therefrigeration loop leading topotential increasedpressure and potentialreduced efficiency of C2recovery in the ERUrefrigeration system.


A 3 1 2

58-N15.04

Consider relocating samplingpoint (SC-5820) to inlet of theC3R surge drum (58D504).

EPC




1. Compressor trips.Potential unit shutdown.

1. Compressor faultalarm2. FAL-5805301.

A 3 1 2

2. Potential upstreamoverpressure leading to bigflaring.Potential communitycomplaint.

1. CCTV (flare stackmonitoring).2. CSR program.3. PSVs provided forpower failure scenario.

C 2 1 1






18 Power Failure 18.1. Compressor(58K501) power supplyfailure.

Sheet: 124 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET



Node: 58-15

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



24 Start-up/Shutdown 24.1. HV-5804901malfunctions closed ormismanaged closed.

1. Delayed startup.Loss of profit.


A 2 1 1





Sheet: 125 of 196

Node Title: Reviewed Date:




Number of Recommended Actions in this node:


Drawing No.

Design Intent:

Notes:


C2R Condenser (58E403):Operating(P/T):Design(P/T): 22.5barg/-110&65C(1st pass); -0.5barg@-46&17C/-110&65C(2nd pass)

C3R Compressor 1st Stage Suction Drum(58D501):Operating(P/T):Design(P/T): -0.5barg@-46&16.5C/-46&65C

C3 Refrigeration Compressor (58D501):Operating(P/T):Design Capacity@SuctionCondition(Nm3/hr): 13612(1st); 27910(2nd)

HAZOP WORKSHEET

Review Date:

No/Less Flow

More Flow

Reverse Flow

Misdirected Flow

Higher Pressure

Lower Pressure

Higher Temperature

Lower Temperature

Higher Level

Lower Level

Composition changed

More Contamination

Relief

Sampling

Abnormal Operation

Corrosion/Erosion

Human Errors

Power Failure

Steam Failure

Cooling Water Failure

Nitrogen Failure

IA/PA Failure

Maintenance

Start-up/Shutdown

Leakage/Rupture

Static Electricity

Spare Equipment

Others

Cat.


Node Title:

Node: 58-16

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



Sheet: 127 of 196



58-013-1 (Rev. 0) 58-059-1 (Rev. 0) 58-060-1 (Rev. 0)



Regeneration Mode of Treated Offgas Dryers

PATTERNED LIGHT PURPLE



Drawing No.

Design Intent: To regenerate treated offgas dryer (58R001A/B) using residue gas from demethanizer section

Notes:


Treated Offgas Dryers (58R001B):Operating(P/T): 35barg/15CDesign(P/T): 42barg/-10&70C

Regen Gas Feed Heater (58E013):Operating(P/T): 7.4barg/32.7C (Tube)Design(P/T): FV@100&50C/11&423C(Shell); 38.5barg/11&290C (Tube)

Regen Gas Feed Heater Condensate Pot(58D004):Operating(P/T): 44.9barg/259CDesign(P/T): FV@423&50C/11&423C

Regen Gas Cooler (58E014):Operating(P/T): 6.3barg/227C (Shell)Design(P/T): FV@100&10.2C/11&290C(Shell); 10barg/11&100C (Tube)

Regen Gas KO Drum (58D002):Operating(P/T): 6.1barg/40CDesign(P/T): FV@100&10.2C/11&80C

HAZOP WORKSHEET


1 1.1. XV-5801306Bmalfunctions closed ormismanaged closed.

1. Not successregeneration leadingregeneration sequencestop.Delayed regeneration ofdryer (58R001B).


A 2 2 2

1.2. XV-5801308Bmalfunctions closed ormismanaged closed.



A 2 2 2




A 2 2 2

No/Less Flow(Heating)


1. No flow of regen gas todryer (58R001B) forheating.Not success regenerationleading regenerationsequence stop.Delayed regeneration ofdryer (58R001B).

1. TAL-5805902.

A 2 2 2

No/Less Flow(Cooling)


1. No flow of regen gas todryer (58R001B) forcooling.Not success regenerationleading regenerationsequence stop.Delayed regeneration ofdryer (58R001B).

1. TAH-5805902.2. TAH-5801301B.

A 2 2 2

No/Less Flow(Depressurization)




A 2 2 2

No/Less Flow 1.7. Manual valve at thedryer vent linemismanaged closed.



A 2 2 2

No/Less Flow

P/E/A/C


Node Title: Regeneration Mode of Treated Offgas Dryers 58-013-1 (Rev. 0), 58-059-1 (Rev. 0), 58-060-1 (Rev. 0)Node: 58-17

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



Sheet: 129 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



1 No/Less Flow 1.8. Manual valve inletof 58E013 mismanagedclosed.

1. No flow of regen gas.Not success regenerationleading regenerationsequence stop.Delayed regeneration ofdryer (58R001B).

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. FAL-5805904.3. FAL-5805902. A 2 2 2

1. More flow of regen gasto dryer (58R001A/B).Potential bed lift leading toloss of adsorbent.

1. TAH-5806001.2. RO-5806001.

A 3 1 2

2. Higher temperatureleading to short life time ofdesiccant.

1. TAH-5805902.

A 3 1 2

More Flow(Cooling)

2.2. Flow control loopfailure (FV-5805903)malfunctions fully openor mismanaged fullyopen.


1. RO-5806001.

A 3 1 2


4.1. XV-5801302Bmalfunction open ormismanaged open when58R001A in operation.

1. Treated offgas is sent to58E014 and 58D002leading to potentialoverpressurization andequipment damage.

1. RO-5806001.2. PSV-5806004/5806005/5806006.

A 3 1 2


1. Potential treat offgasback to 58R001B leadingto failure of regeneration.potential overpressurizationand equipment (58E014/58D002) damage.

1. RO-5806001.2. PSV-5806004/5806005/5806006.

A 3 1 2



1. RO-5806001.2. PSV-5806004/5806005/5806006.

A 3 1 2

5 Higher Pressure 5.1. PIC-5806006Amalfunctions closing PV-5806006A.

1. Potential pressurebuildup in 58D002 leadingto loss of fuel gas.

1. PSV-5806004/5806005/5806006.2. Back up natural gas.

A 3 1 2

Misdirected Flow4

2 More Flow(Heating)

2.1. Flow control loopfailure (FV-5805904)malfunctions fully openor fully mismanagedopen.

Sheet: 130 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



5 Higher Pressure 5.2. PIC-5806006Bmalfunctions closing PV-5806006B whenrequired.

1. Potential pressurebuildup in 58D002 leadingto loss of fuel gas.

1. PSV-5806004/5806005/5806006. A 3 1 2

1. Less regeneration gas todryer (58R001B).Not success regenerationleading regenerationsequence stop.Delayed regeneration ofdryer (58R001B).

1. FAL-5805904.

A 2 2 2

2. Loss of fuel gas to flaresystem leading to highflaring leading to potentialcommunity complain.



1. Loss of fuel gas to flaresystem leading to highflaring leading to potentialcommunity complain.


6.2. PDIC-5806004malfunctions closingPDV-5806004.

1. Lower pressure to fuelgas.Instability of fuel gasheader.No significantconsequence.

7.1. TIC-5805902malfunctions openingFV-5805904.

1. Higher temperature andmore flow of regen gas todryer (58R001A/B).Potential bed lift leading toloss of adsorbent.

1. TAH-5801301B.2. RO-5806001.

A 3 1 2

1. Increased temperatureof fuel gas leading to overdesign temperature of58D002 and pipingdownstream.Potential release of HC toATM leading to fire andexplosion.Potential personnel injury.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. TAH-5806001.

A 3 1 2

58-17.01 To confirm Regen Gas KODrum (58D002) and pipingdownstream can handle at 240C.

EPC

2. Potential too moreexpansion 58E014 tubeside leading to potentialtube rupture.

1. PSV-5806003.

A 3 1 2

Higher Temperature7

7.2. Manual valve oncooling water inlet/outlet line from 58E014mismanaged closed.

5.3. PDIC-5806004malfunctions openingPDV-5806004.

6 Lower Pressure

Sheet: 131 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



8.1. TIC-5805902malfunctions openingFV-5805903.

1. Lower temperatureleading to not successregeneration (cooling step).Regeneration sequencestop.Delayed regeneration ofdryer (58R001B).

1. FAL-5805904.

A 3 1 2

8.2. Manual valve onsteam supply line to58E013 mismanagedclosed.

1. No supply of steam to58E013 leading to noheating of regen gas.Not success regenerationleading regenerationsequence stop.Delayed regeneration ofdryer (58R001B).

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. TAL-5805902.

A 3 1 2


1. Decreased temperatureof regen gas.Not success regenerationleading regenerationsequence stop.Delayed regeneration ofdryer (58R001B).

1. TAL-5805902.

A 3 1 2


1. Increased level in58D002 leading to potentialwater carryover to fuel gassystem.Potential damage toburner.

1. Demister.2. Fuel gas KO drum(59D001).

A 3 1 2


1. Loss of water level in58D004 leading to lowtemperature of regen gas.Not success regenerationleading regenerationsequence stop.Delayed regeneration ofdryer (58R001B).

1. TAL-5805902.

A 3 1 2


1. Decreased level in58D002 leading to gasblowby to 53D103.Potential rupture 53D103leading to release offlammable and H2S gas.Potential personnel injury.

1. PSV-5305201/5305202.

P 4 1 2

58-17.02 To confirm PSV-5305201/5305202 is adequatefor gas blowby from Regen GasKO Drum (58D002).

EPC



Lower Level10

Lower Temperature8

Higher Level9

Sheet: 132 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/E/A/C



Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



13 Relief 13.1. External fire. 1. Potentialoverpressurization of58E013 discharge leadingto downstreampiping/equipment damage.Release of steam to ATMleading to operator injury.

1. PSV-5805901.

P 4 1 2



16 Corrosion/Erosion 16.1. Corrosion underinsulation.

1. Potential pipeline leak.Release of HC to ATMleading to fire andexplosion.Potential personnel injury.

1. Material selection issuitable for not to makea corrosion.

P 4 1 2










1. SSH steam leak intoregen gas.Failure of regeneration.

1. TAH-5805902.2. Secondary dryer(58R004A/B).

A 3 1 2




Sheet: 133 of 196



58-017-1 (Rev. 0) 58-059-1 (Rev. 0) 58-060-1 (Rev. 0)



Regeneration Mode of Secondary Dryers

PATTERNED ORANGE



Drawing No.

Design Intent: To regenerate secondary dryer (58R004A/B) using residue gas from demethanizer section

Notes:


Secondary Dryer (58R004B):Operating(P/T): 32.6barg/40CDesign(P/T): 42barg/11&180C

HAZOP WORKSHEET





A 2 2 2




A 2 2 2




A 2 2 2

No/Less Flow(Heating)


1. No flow of regen gas todryer (58R004B) forheating.Not success regenerationleading regenerationsequence stop.Delayed regeneration ofdryer (58R004B).

1. TAL-5805901.

A 2 2 2

No/Less Flow(Cooling)


1. No flow of regen gas todryer (58R004B) forcooling.Not success regenerationleading regenerationsequence stop.Delayed regeneration ofdryer (58R004B).

1. TAH-5805901.2. TAH-5801701B.

A 2 2 2

No/Less Flow(Depressurization)




A 2 2 2

No/Less Flow 1.7. Manual valve at thedryer vent linemismanaged closed.



A 2 2 2

1 No/Less Flow

Action Taken RemarkActionStatus

S L RAction





Ref.No.


ConsequencesExisting Safeguards P/E/A/C

Sheet: 135 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET



S L RAction





Ref.No.




1. TAH-5806001.2. RO-5806002.

A 3 1 2

2. Higher temperatureleading to short life time ofdesiccant.

1. TAH-5805901.

A 3 1 2

More Flow(Cooling)

2.2. Flow control loopfailure (FV-5805901)malfunctions fully openor mismanaged fullyopen.


2. RO-5806002.

A 3 1 2



1. Treated offgas is sent to58E014 and 58D002leading to potentialoverpressurization andequipment damage.

1. RO-5806002.2. PSV-5806004/5806005/5806006.

A 3 1 2



1. RO-5806002.2. PSV-5806004/5806005/5806006.

A 3 1 2



1. RO-5806002.2. PSV-5806004/5806005/5806006.

A 3 1 2




A 2 2 2



2 More Flow(Heating)

2.1. Flow control loopfailure (FV-5805902)malfunctions fully openor fully mismanagedopen.

4 Misdirected Flow

Sheet: 136 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET



S L RAction





Ref.No.



7 Higher Temperature 7.1. TIC-5805901malfunctions openingFV-5805902.

1. Higher temperature andmore flow of regen gas todryer (58R004A/B).Potential bed lift leading toloss of adsorbent.

1. TAH-5801701B.2. RO-5806002.

A 3 1 2

8 Lower Temperature 8.1. TIC-5805901malfunctions openingFV-5805901.

1. Lower temperatureleading to not successregeneration (cooling step).Regeneration sequencestop.Delayed regeneration ofdryer (58R004B).

1. FAL-5805902.

A 3 1 2

9 Higher Level N/A.

10 Lower Level N/A.






16 Corrosion/Erosion 16.1. Corrosion underinsulation.

1. Potential pipeline leak.Release of HC to ATMleading to fire andexplosion.Potential personnel injury.

1. Material selection issuitable for not to makea corrosion.

P 4 1 2










Sheet: 137 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET



S L RAction





Ref.No.






Sheet: 138 of 196



58-061-1 (Rev. 0)



Methanol Injection System

PATTERNED YELLOW-GREEN



Drawing No.

Design Intent:

Notes:This node is excluded from HAZOP due to inadequate vendor information provided.


Methanol Injection Unit (58X001):Operating(P/T): 31barg/23CDesign: 232kg/hr



58-526-1 (Rev. 0)



Anti-Fouling Injection System

PATTERNED GREEN-ORANGE



Drawing No.

Design Intent:





58-527-1 (Rev. 0)



Anti-Foam Injection System

PATTERNED ORANGE-PINK



Drawing No.

Design Intent:



Anti-Foam Injection Unit (58X003):Operating(P/T): 19.2barg/42CDesign: 0.43kg/hr



78-003-1 (Rev. 0)



ERU Oily Water Sump System

PATTERNED BROWN



Drawing No.

Design Intent: To receive oily water from ERU unit, PRU unit and Prime G+ Unit and pump out to WWT system

Notes:To develop interlock numbering and specify in the drawing as per specification


ERU Oily Water Sump (78T011):Operating(P/T): 0.03barg/42CDesign(P/T): ATM/70C

ERU Oily Water Pumps (78P009A/B):Operating(P/T): 0.03barg/42CDesign: 26.4m3/hr

HAZOP WORKSHEET



1. Oily water divert to78T002/API separatorleading to overload APIseparator capacity leadingto potential release of highoil in storm water to publicreservoir.

1. None.

E 3 1 2

58-22.01 Review and check with SKE&C on the impact of sendingHC to API separator (78T002)to assess further safeguardsneeded.

EPC

1.2. ERU Oily WaterPump (78P009A) trips.

1. Overfilling in sump(78T011).2. Unable to drain oilywater from process.Potential oil spill to ATM.Environmental impact.

1. Spare pump(78P009B).2. LAH-7800301 willclose MOV-7800301.API separator.

E 3 1 2

1.3. Pump dischargeblock valve mismanagedclosed.

1. Potential pump(78P009A) and pipingdamage due to deadhead.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. Piping is rated to150# higher than pumpshutoff pressure.

A 3 1 2

1.4. Inlet/ outlet manualvalves at Canister(78F011A) mismanagedclosed.

1. Potential VOCaccumulate in 78T011leading to potential VOCleaks into ATM leading toenvironmental impact.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. Gas detector.

E 3 1 2

1.5 ERU Oily WaterPump (78P009A)suction screen plugging.

1.Potential loss of suctionleading to damage to78P009AB.

1. Pump fault alarm.2. Standby pump isprovided. A 3 1 2

2.1. Both pumps(78P009A/B) running.

1. Increased level incommon oily water basin(78T001).No significant consequence(78T001 capacity is1500m3).

1. Decreased level in sump(78T011) leading topotential pump(78P009A/B) loss suctionand damage.

LAL-7800301.LALL-7800301 will trip78P009A/B.

A 2 1 1

2.2. MOV-7800301malfunctions openlonger than 15minsduring raining.

1. Potential overfilling insump (78T011).Potential release of oilywater.Environmental impact.

1. LAH-7800201.2. LAH-7800701 willstop the pumps(78P008A/B).3. Overflow line connectto API separator.

E 2 1 1

P/C/E/ACauses

No/Less Flow

Action Required /Recommendations

Action ByR

1

2 More Flow

S LConsequences Existing Safeguards


Node Title: ERU Oily Water Sump System 78-003-1 (Rev. 0)

Node: 58-22

Ref.No.

Deviation Action Taken RemarkActionStatus

ActionNo.

Sheet: 143 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/C/E/ACausesAction Required /

RecommendationsAction ByRS LConsequences Existing Safeguards



Node: 58-22

Ref.No.


ActionNo.



5.1. External fire. 1. Potential damage tosump (78T011).

1. Fire fighting system.A 4 1 2

5.2. Ignition source fromhot work activity.

1. Potential internal fireleading to damage to sump(78T011).

1. Hot work permit.2. Snuffing steam.

A 4 1 2


1. Higher temperatureinside 78T011 leading toHC vaporization andrelease of VOC to ATM.Environmental impact.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. Canister is provided.

E 3 1 2

2. Higher temperature ofHC and steam leading todamage to polymer seal for78T011 cover plate.

None.

A 2 1 1

58-22.02 Review with SK E&C on theseal material for 78T011 coverplate shall be withstand fortemperature of 100C.

EPC


9 Higher Level No cause identified.

10 Lower Level No cause identified.

11 Composition changed 11.1. Misoperation ondraining HC to OWSinstead of HBD.

1. HC contamination toOWS header and sump.2. Potential environmentalimpact.

1. Oil skimming nozzleand pump.2. 24" MH to monitordepth of oilcompartment orconnect vacuum truck.3. 10" sample hatch forvisual inspection ofsump level and HC.

E 3 1 2

58-22.03 Consider provided spectacleblind at OWS connection.

EPC







5 Higher Pressure

7 Higher Temperature 7.1. SL line block valvemismanaged open.

Sheet: 144 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/C/E/ACausesAction Required /

RecommendationsAction ByRS LConsequences Existing Safeguards



Node: 58-22

Ref.No.


ActionNo.




21 Nitrogen Failure N/A

22 IA/PA Failure N/A







Sheet: 145 of 196



58-301-1 (Rev. 0) 58-311-1 (Rev. 0)



Steam Condensate System (SSH/CPS)

PATTERNED PINK



Drawing No.

Design Intent: To supply super high pressure steam to 58E013 and return to condensate heater

Notes:1) No equipment in this node.


HAZOP WORKSHEET


1.1. Manual valve onsuper high pressuresteam supply linemismanaged closed.

1. No supply of steam to58E013 leading to noheating of regen gas.Potential regenerationdryer failure.Potential product offspec.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. Operating cycle ofone vessel for58R001A/B is 48 hr.3. Operating cycle ofone vessel for58R004A/B is 7 days.4. Sequence controlalarm.

A 2 1 1

1. No condensate out from58E013 leading to delayheating step of dryer.No heating of regen gas.Potential regenerationdryer failure.Potential product offspec.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. Operating cycle ofone vessel for58R001A/B is 48 hr.3. Operating cycle ofone vessel for58R004A/B is 7 days.4. Sequence controlalarm.

A 2 1 1

2. Potential pressurebuildup in condensate pipeleading to potentialdamage to pipe.Potential release ofcondensate to ATM.Potential personnel injury.

1. Condensate pipe israted to H43 pipe specsame as steam pipeline.

P 3 1 2





7 Lower Pressure 7.1. Lower pressurefrom main header,

1. Longer heating step fordryer.No significantconsequence.


9 Lower Temperature 9.1. Lower temperaturefrom main header.

1. Longer heating step fordryer.No significantconsequence.

10 Higher Level N/A.

1

1.2. Manual valve onsuper high pressurecondensate return linemismanaged closed.

No/Less Flow

P/C/E/A


Node Title: Steam Condensate System (SSH/CPS)

L

Node: 58-23

Ref.No.


ConsequencesExisting Safeguards S R

ActionNo.


Action By Action Taken

58-301-1 (Rev. 0), 58-311-1 (Rev. 0)

RemarkActionStatus

Sheet: 147 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/C/E/A


Node Title: Steam Condensate System (SSH/CPS)

L

Node: 58-23

Ref.No.



ActionNo.



58-301-1 (Rev. 0), 58-311-1 (Rev. 0)

RemarkActionStatus

11 Lower Level N/A.






17 Corrosion/Erosion 17.1. Stagnant area atend of header piping.

1. Potential corrosion inpiping.Potential damage to piping.

None.

A 2 1 1

58-23.01 To minimize the pipe line fromequipment to protect pipingcorrosion.

EPC






23 IA/PA Failure N/A.

24 Maintenance 24.1. No bleed valvebetween manual valves.

1. Not possible to swingspectacle blind with safe.Potential personnel injury.

None.

P 3 1 2

58-23.02 Provide bleed valve forbetween double block valves atthe steam condensate batterylimit.

EPC






Sheet: 148 of 196



58-311-1 (Rev. 0)



Steam Condensate System (SM/CPM)

PATTERNED PINK



Drawing No.

Design Intent: To supply medium pressure steam to 58E011 and return to condensate heater



HAZOP WORKSHEET


1.1. Manual valve onmedium pressure steamsupply line mismanagedclosed.

1. No supply of steam to58E011 leading todecreased temperature ofacetylene polisher(58R003).Potential ethylene productoffspec.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. Daily monitoring (AI-5801501A).3. TAL-5801501.

A 2 1 1

1. No condensate out from58E011 leading todecreased temperature ofacetylene polisher(58R003).Potential ethylene productoffspec.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. Daily monitoring (AI-5801501A).3. TAL-5801501.

A 2 1 1



P 3 1 2





6 Lower Pressure 6.1. Lower pressurefrom main header.

1. Decreased temperatureof acetylene polisher(58R003).Potential ethylene productoffspec.

1. Daily monitoring (AI-5801501A).2. TAL-5801501.

A 2 1 1



1. Decreased temperatureof acetylene polisher(58R003).Potential ethylene productoffspec.

1. Daily monitoring (AI-5801501A).2. TIC-5801501 withlow alarm.

A 2 1 1

9 Higher Level N/A.

10 Lower Level N/A.


No/Less Flow1

1.2. Manual valve onmedium pressurecondensate return linemismanaged closed.


Existing Safeguards P/C/E/A Action Taken RemarkDeviation CausesAction Required /


ActionStatus

S L RAction

No.


Node Title: Steam Condensate System (SM/CPM) 58-311-1 (Rev. 0)

Node: 58-23A

Ref.No.

Sheet: 150 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET



Existing Safeguards P/C/E/A Action Taken RemarkDeviation CausesAction Required /


ActionStatus

S L RAction

No.


Node Title: Steam Condensate System (SM/CPM) 58-311-1 (Rev. 0)

Node: 58-23A

Ref.No.







None.

A 2 1 1

58-23A.01

To minimize the pipe line fromequipment to protect pipingcorrosion.

EPC







23 Maintenance 23.1. No bleed valvebetween isolationmanual valves.


None.

P 3 1 2

58-23A.02

Consider providing bleed valvefor between double blockvalves at the steam batterylimit.

EPC






Sheet: 151 of 196



58-311-1 (Rev. 0)



Steam Condensate System (SL/CPL)

PATTERNED BLUE



Drawing No.

Design Intent: To supply low pressure steam to 58E202/58E001/78T011 and utility station and return to condensate heater



HAZOP WORKSHEET


1 No/Less Flow 1. No supply of steam to58E202 leading todecreased temperature ofdeethanizer (58C201).Loss of profit.


A 2 1 1

2. No supply of steam to59E001 (during natural gasbackup mode) leading todecreased temperature offuel gas to furnace.Potential condensation andcorrosionPotential lower temperaturein pipe leading to pipingrupture.Potential release of HC toATM leading to potentialfire and explosion.Potential personnel injury.


P 4 1 2

58-24.01. Consider managing batterylimit valves to CSO.

EPC

3.No supply of steam to78T011.No significantconsequence.

1.2. Manual valve on lowpressure condensatereturn line mismanagedclosed.

1. No condensate out from58E202 leading todecreased temperature ofdeethanizer (58C201).Loss of profit.


A 2 1 1



P 3 1 2

1.1. Manual valve on lowpressure steam supplyline mismanaged closed.


Node Title: Steam Condensate System (SL/CPL) 58-311-1 (Rev. 0)

Node: 58-24

Ref.No.


ConsequencesExisting Safeguards P/C/E/A Action Taken Remark

ActionStatus

S L RAction



Sheet: 153 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET



Node: 58-24

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

S L RAction



1 No/Less Flow 1.2. Manual valve on lowpressure condensatereturn line mismanagedclosed.

3. No condensate out from59E001 (during natural gasbackup mode) leading todecreased temperature offuel gas to furnace.Potential condensation andcorrosionPotential lower temperaturein pipe leading to pipingrupture.Potential release of HC toATM leading to potentialfire and explosion.Potential personnel injury.


A 2 1 1

Refer to Action No. 58-24.01.



P 3 1 2





1. Decreased temperatureof deethanizer (58C201).Loss of profit.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. TAL-5803204. A 2 1 1

2. (during natural gasbackup mode) Decreasedtemperature of fuel gasfrom 59E001 to furnace.Potential loss of heatefficiency.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. TIC-5900105.

A 2 1 1



1. Decreased temperatureof deethanizer (58C201).Loss of profit.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. TAL-5803204. A 2 1 1


Sheet: 154 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET



Node: 58-24

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

S L RAction




2. (during natural gasbackup mode) Decreasedtemperature of fuel gasfrom 59E001 to furnace.Potential loss of heatefficiency.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. TIC-5900105.

A 2 1 1

3. Potential steamcondensation in pipingleading to potentialhammering.Potential damage to piping.

1. Steam trap providedalong steam header.

A 2 1 1

9 Higher Level N/A.

10 Lower Level N/A.








None.

A 2 1 1

58-24.02 To minimize the pipe line fromequipment to protect pipingcorrosion.

EPC







23 Maintenance 23.1. No bleed valvebetween isolationmanual valves.


None.

P 3 1 2

58-24.03 Consider providing bleed valvefor between double blockvalves at the steam batterylimit.

EPC


Sheet: 155 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET



Node: 58-24

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

S L RAction







Sheet: 156 of 196



58-321-1 (Rev. 0)



Water Distribution System

PATTERNED BLUE



Drawing No.

Design Intent:To supply BFW to 58E001/58E202/59E001.To supply portable water to utilities.



HAZOP WORKSHEET


1.1. Manual valve onBFW supply linemismanaged closed.

1. Loss of BFW watermake-up leading topotential increased causticconcentration in the washwater circulation.Reduced wash water towerefficiency leading tocarryover of causticdownstream.Potential condensation ofcaustic with C3 leading topotential corrosion ofequipment and pipingdownstream.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. Daily monitoring (AI-5800401A/B).3. AAH-5801712A(CO2).

A 2 1 1

1.2. Manual valve onpotable water supplyline mismanaged closed.

1. No supply of potablewater to eye washer.Potential personnel injury.


P 4 1 2

58-25.01. Provide battery limit valves toCSO.

EPC






1. Less supply of potablewater to eye washer.Potential personnel injury.

None.

P 4 1 2

58-25.02 To check low pressure alarmprovided on potable water mainheader in UHV and out ofheader.

EPCIRPC

7 Higher Temperature 7.1. Solar radiation. 1. Potential increasedtemperature of potablewater.Potential personnel injury.

None.

P 3 1 2

58-25.03 To provide insulation aboveground piping to ensurepotable water for eye washerand safety shower is lukewarm.

EPC


9 Higher Level N/A.

10 Lower Level N/A.


12 More Contamination 12.1. Biological growthin pipe line.

1. Potential contaminationof potable water.Potential personnel injury.


P 3 1 2


Action ByActionStatus

L Action TakenDeviationPossible

ConsequencesS


Node Title: Water Distribution System 58-321-1 (Rev. 0)

Node: 58-25

Ref.No.

Remark

No/Less Flow1

P/C/E/A RAction


RecommendationsExisting SafeguardsCauses

Sheet: 158 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


Action ByActionStatus

L Action TakenDeviationPossible

ConsequencesS


Node Title: Water Distribution System 58-321-1 (Rev. 0)

Node: 58-25

Ref.No.

Remark P/C/E/A RAction


RecommendationsExisting SafeguardsCauses
















Sheet: 159 of 196



58-331-1 (Rev. 0)



Cooling Water Distribution System

PATTERNED LIGHT BLUE



Drawing No.

Design Intent: To supply cooling water to users and return to cooling water tower.



HAZOP WORKSHEET


1. No cooling water supplyto ERU leading to potentialoverpressurization in ERU.Potential ERU shutdown.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. PSVs on eachequipment.

A 4 1 2

2. Potential communitycomplain due to big flaring.

1. CCTV.2. CSR program. C 3 1 2



4 Misdirected Flow 4.1. 8" bypass valveopen in advertently.

1. Less cooling watersupply to users leading toless efficiency.Potential product offspec.Less profit.


A 3 1 2



7 Higher Temperature 7.1. High temperature ofcooling water supplyduring summer season.

1. Less efficiency.Potential product offspec.Less profit.

1. Cooling water toweris designed for ambienttemperature (42 C).

A 3 1 2


9 Higher Level N/A.

10 Lower Level N/A.











No/Less Flow1 1.1. Manual valve oncooling water supply/return line mismanagedclosed.

P/C/E/A


Node Title: Cooling Water Distribution System

L

Node: 58-26

Ref.No.



ActionNo.



58-331-1 (Rev. 0)

RemarkActionStatus

Sheet: 161 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/C/E/A


Node Title: Cooling Water Distribution System

L

Node: 58-26

Ref.No.



ActionNo.



58-331-1 (Rev. 0)

RemarkActionStatus









Sheet: 162 of 196



58-341-1 (Rev. 0)



Fuel Gas Distribution System

PATTERNED LIGHT RED



Drawing No.

Design Intent: To supply fuel gas for purging CFA and HFA headers.



HAZOP WORKSHEET

Review Date:

1 No/Less Flow 1.1. Manual valve onfuel gas supply linemismanaged closed.

1. No supply of purge gasleading to air ingress.Potential fire and explosion.Potential personnel injury.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. N2 back up system.3. Other units purgesystem.4. Operatorsurveillance.

P 4 1 2

2 More Flow No cause indentified.

3 Reverse Flow No cause indentified.

4 Misdirected Flow No cause indentified.

5 Higher Pressure No cause indentified.

6 Lower Pressure No cause indentified.

7 Higher Temperature No cause indentified.

8 Lower Temperature No cause indentified.

9 Higher Level N/A.

10 Lower Level N/A.

11 Composition changed No cause indentified.

12 More Contamination No cause indentified.

13 Relief No cause indentified.

14 Sampling No cause indentified.

15 Abnormal Operation No cause indentified.

16 Corrosion/Erosion No cause indentified.

17 Human Errors No cause indentified.






23 Maintenance No cause indentified.

P/C/E/A


Node Title: Fuel Gas Distribution System 58-341-1 (Rev. 0)

Node: 58-27

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



Sheet: 164 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET

Review Date:

P/C/E/A


Node Title: Fuel Gas Distribution System 58-341-1 (Rev. 0)

Node: 58-27

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



24 Start-up/Shutdown No cause indentified.

25 Leakage/Rupture No cause indentified.

26 Static Electricity No cause indentified.

27 Spare Equipment No cause indentified.

28 Others No cause indentified.

Sheet: 165 of 196


Node Number: 58-27A Node Color Time: 9:00 - 18:00

58-341-1 (Rev. 0)



Natural Gas Distribution System

PATTERNED LIGHT RED



Drawing No.

Design Intent: To supply natural gas to 58K401 and 58K501.



HAZOP WORKSHEET


1 No/Less Flow 1.1. Manual valve onnatural gas supply linemismanaged closed.

1. No supply of natural gasleading to potential delaystartup of 58K401/58K501.


A 3 1 2

58-27A.01

To confirm additionalsafeguards for this scenarioduring vendor packageHAZOP.

EPC

2 More Flow No cause indentified.

3 Reverse Flow No cause indentified.

4 Misdirected Flow No cause indentified.

5 Higher Pressure No cause indentified.

6 Lower Pressure No cause indentified.

7 Higher Temperature No cause indentified.

8 Lower Temperature No cause indentified.

9 Higher Level N/A.

10 Lower Level N/A.

11 Composition changed No cause indentified.

12 More Contamination No cause indentified.

13 Relief No cause indentified.

14 Sampling No cause indentified.

15 Abnormal Operation No cause indentified.

16 Corrosion/Erosion No cause indentified.

17 Human Errors No cause indentified.






23 Maintenance No cause indentified.

24 Start-up/Shutdown No cause indentified.

25 Leakage/Rupture No cause indentified.


Node Title: Natural Gas Distribution System 58-341-1 (Rev. 0)

Node: 58-27A

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

S L RAction



Sheet: 167 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


Node Title: Natural Gas Distribution System 58-341-1 (Rev. 0)

Node: 58-27A

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

S L RAction



26 Static Electricity No cause indentified.

27 Spare Equipment No cause indentified.

28 Others No cause indentified.

Sheet: 168 of 196



58-351-1 (Rev. 0)



Instrument Air (AII) Distribution System

PATTERNED ORANGE



Drawing No.

Design Intent: To supply IA to 58K401 and 58K501.



HAZOP WORKSHEET


1 No/Less Flow 1.1. Manual valve on AIIsupply line mismanagedclosed.

1. No supply of AII todepressurization valveleading to potential highflaring.Community complain.Unit shutdown.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. Air reservoir fordepressurization valve.3. CCTV.4. CSR Program.

C 3 1 2





6 Lower Pressure 6.1. Upstream userconsume higher AII.

1. Potential low pressureleading to potential unitshutdown.Loss of profit.

1. AII header is sized tocover maximumconsumption atminimum AII supplypressure.

A 3 1 2

58-28.01 To check low pressure alarmprovided on AII main header inUHV and out of unit.

EPCIRPC



9 Higher Level N/A.

10 Lower Level N/A.













P/C/E/A


Node Title: Instrument Air Distribution System 58-351-1 (Rev. 0)

Node: 58-28

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



Sheet: 170 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/C/E/A


Node Title: Instrument Air Distribution System 58-351-1 (Rev. 0)

Node: 58-28

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction








28 Others N/A.

Sheet: 171 of 196


Node Number: 58-28A Node Color Time: 9:00 - 18:00

58-361-1 (Rev. 0)



Plant Air (AIP) Distribution System

PATTERNED ORANGE



Drawing No.

Design Intent: To supply PA to utility station.



HAZOP WORKSHEET


1 No/Less Flow 1.1. Manual valve onAIP supply linemismanaged closed.

1. No supply of AIP toutility station.No significantconsequence.








9 Higher Level N/A.

10 Lower Level N/A.

















Node Title: Plant Air Distribution System 58-361-1 (Rev. 0)

Node: 58-28A

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

S L RAction



Sheet: 173 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


Node Title: Plant Air Distribution System 58-361-1 (Rev. 0)

Node: 58-28A

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

S L RAction






Sheet: 174 of 196



58-371-1 (Rev. 0)



Nitrogen Distribution System

PATTERNED PURPLE



Drawing No.

Design Intent: To supply of nitrogen to users.



HAZOP WORKSHEET


1. Potential air ingress intothe demethanizer (58C101)leading to potential iceformation.Potential corrosion (longterm).


A 2 1 1

2. Loss of N2 blanketingleading to potential causticday tank (58T001)collapse.Potential release of freshcaustic (7%) tosurroundings.Potential operator exposureleading to operator injury.

1. Dike.2. PVSV-5800301.3. PPE.

P 4 1 2

Refer to Action No.58-02.02

3. No secondary seal gasof 58K401/58K501.

None. Refer to Action No.58-27A.01








9 Higher Level N/A.

10 Lower Level N/A.








No/Less Flow1 1.1. Manual valve onnitrogen supply linemismanaged closed.

P/C/E/A


Node Title: Nitrogen Distribution System

L

Node: 58-29

Ref.No.



ActionNo.



58-371-1 (Rev. 0)

RemarkActionStatus

Sheet: 176 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/C/E/A


Node Title: Nitrogen Distribution System

L

Node: 58-29

Ref.No.



ActionNo.



58-371-1 (Rev. 0)

RemarkActionStatus












Sheet: 177 of 196



58-701-1 (Rev. 0)



Flare Distribution System (HFA)

PATTERNED LIGHT PURPLE



Drawing No.

Design Intent: To collect and send HFA gas to flare stack.



HAZOP WORKSHEET


1 No/Less Flow 1.1. Manual valve onpurge gas linemismanaged closed.



P 4 1 2








9 Higher Level N/A.

10 Lower Level N/A.



13 Relief N/A.










P/C/E/A


Node Title: Flare Distribution System (HFA) 58-701-1 (Rev. 0)

Node: 58-30

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



Sheet: 179 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/C/E/A


Node Title: Flare Distribution System (HFA) 58-701-1 (Rev. 0)

Node: 58-30

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



23 Maintenance 23.1. No spareconnection for future tie-in.

1. Difficulty for isolationand modification work.Not possible to tie-in duringunit operation.

None.

A 3 1 2

58-30.01 Consider providing block valveand blind flange for spareconnection.

EPC






Sheet: 180 of 196



58-711-1 (Rev. 0) 58-712-1 (Rev. 0)



Flare Distribution System (CFA/CBD)

PATTERNED YELLOW



Drawing No.

Design Intent: To collect cold vent vapor and cold blow down drain to cold flare stack.



HAZOP WORKSHEET


1 No/Less Flow 1.1. Manual valve onpurge gas linemismanaged closed.



P 4 1 2








9 Higher Level N/A.

10 Lower Level N/A.



13 Relief N/A.










P/C/E/A


Node Title: Flare Distribution System (CFA/CBD) 58-711-1 (Rev. 0), 58-712-1 (Rev. 0)

Node: 58-31

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



Sheet: 182 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/C/E/A


Node Title: Flare Distribution System (CFA/CBD) 58-711-1 (Rev. 0), 58-712-1 (Rev. 0)

Node: 58-31

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



23 Maintenance No spare connection forfuture tie-in.

Difficulty for isolation andmodification work.Not possible to tie-in duringunit operation.

None.

A 3 1 2

58-31.01 Consider relocating 6" blockvalve and blind flange fromCBD header to CFA for spareconnection.

EPC

Maintenance Lower temperaturecontact.

Potential personnel injury. None.

P 3 2 2

58-31.02 To provide personnel protectionat accessible cold blowdownsystem.

EPC






Sheet: 183 of 196



58-831-1 (Rev. 0)



Closed Drain Distribution System (SHBD)

PATTERNED ORANGE



Drawing No.

Design Intent: To collect SHBD and send to caustic blowdown.



HAZOP WORKSHEET


1 No/Less Flow No cause identified.








9 Higher Level N/A.

10 Lower Level N/A.

















P/C/E/A


Node Title: Closed Drain Distribution System (SHBD) 58-831-1 (Rev. 0)

Node: 58-32

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



Sheet: 185 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


P/C/E/A


Node Title: Closed Drain Distribution System (SHBD) 58-831-1 (Rev. 0)

Node: 58-32

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction





Sheet: 186 of 196



58-841-1 (Rev. 0)



Closed Drain Distribution System (HBD)

PATTERNED ORANGE



Drawing No.

Design Intent: To collect HBD and send to hot blowdown.



HAZOP WORKSHEET


1 No/Less Flow Manual valve on batterylimit mismanagedclosed.

1.1. Not possible to drainfrom equipment.Not possible to emptyequipment andmaintenance.Potential startup/shutdowndelay.


A 3 1 2








9 Higher Level N/A.

10 Lower Level N/A.















Node Title: Closed Drain Distribution System (HBD) 58-841-1 (Rev. 0)

Node: 58-32A

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

S L RAction



Sheet: 188 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET


Node Title: Closed Drain Distribution System (HBD) 58-841-1 (Rev. 0)

Node: 58-32A

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

S L RAction








Sheet: 189 of 196



59-001-1 (Rev. 0)



Fuel Gas Mixing System

YELLOW



Drawing No.

Design Intent:To mix fuel gas from header and send it userTo import natural gas as back-up for UHV project

Notes:


Fuel Gas Mixing Drum (58D001):Operating(P/T): 5.5barg/42CDesign(P/T): FV@100&8C/11&80C

Desuperheater for 59E001 (58Z001):Operating(P/T):Design(P/T): 85barg/11&150C

Natural Gas Heater (58E001):Operating(P/T): 50barg/40&60.2C (Shell);4.5barg/155.6C (Tube)Design(P/T): FV@100&69.3C/11&185C(Shell); 90barg/11&76C (Tube)

HAZOP WORKSHEET


1 No/Less Flow 1. No flow of fuel gas fromheader to 59D001 leadingto loss fuel gas flow tousers.Potential unit shutdown.Loss of profit.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. Backup natural gas.3. PIC-5900101A. A 4 1 2

2. Potentialoverpressurization in fuelgas header from unit 52/53.

1. Overpressureprotection on fuel gasheader. P 4 1 2

59-01.01 To confirm overpressureprotection at unit 52/53 isprovided.

EPC

1. No flow of fuel gas fromheader to 59D001 leadingto loss fuel gas flow tousers.Potential unit shutdown.Loss of profit.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. Backup natural gasand treated offgas fromunit 53.3. PIC-5900101A.

A 4 1 2

2. Potentialoverpressurization in ERU.Potential release of fuelgas to ATM leading to fireand explosion.Potential personnel injury.

1. PIC-5806006B withhigh alarm.2. PSV-5806007/5806008. P 4 1 2

1.3. XV-5900101 orbattery limit valvemalfunctions closed ormismanaged closedwhen required.

1. No backup of naturalgas leading to less flow offuel gas to uses leading toreduced productioncapacity of UHV project.Loss of profit.

1. PAL-5900101A.

A 4 1 2

59-01.02 Consider adding componentpoint alarm for XV-5900101 toindicate abnormal position ofthe valve.

EPC

P 4 1 259-01.03 Consider low temperature

alarm on TIC-5900105.EPC

A 4 1 2

59-01.04 To confirm the minimumtemperature of natural gas afterpressure letdown.

EPC

1.5. Manual valve onfuel gas supply line touser mismanagedclosed.

1. No flow of fuel gas tousers leading to potentialunit shutdown.Loss of profit.

1. Operator training andprocedures.2. PIC-5900101B withhigh alarm.

A 4 1 2

None.

1.1. Manual valve onfuel gas headermismanaged closedwhen ERU shutdown.

1.2. Manual valve fromERU mismanagedclosed.

1.4. Manual valve onsteam line mismanagedclosed when natural gasbackup mode.

1. No flow of steam to59E001 leading to noheating of natural gas.Lower temperature ofnatural gas than MDMT of59E001 and piping.Potential damage to piping.

Unit: Fuel Gas Supply Unit (59)

Node Title: Fuel Gas Mixing System 59-001-1 (Rev. 0)

Node: 59-1

Ref.No.


ConsequencesExisting Safeguards SP/C/E/A Remark

ActionStatus

L RAction



Sheet: 191 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET

Review Date: 2013-05-29Unit: Fuel Gas Supply Unit (59)


Node: 59-1

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction



1 No/Less Flow 1.5. Manual valve onfuel gas supply line touser mismanagedclosed.

2. Potentialoverpressurization in Unit59.Potential release of fuelgas to ATM leading to fireand explosion.Potential personnel injury.

1. PIC-5900101B withhigh alarm.2. PSV-5900101/5900102.

P 4 1 2

1.6. Manual valve onnatural gas supply lineto HMU and SRUmismanaged closedwhen required.

1. No supply of natural gasto HMU and SRU leadingto potential delayedstartup.


A 3 1 2

59-01.05 To confirm existing safeguardin HMU and SRU.

EPC


1. Less flow of BFW to59E001 leading highertemperature of natural gas.No significantconsequence.

1.8. Steam trap valvemismanaged closed.

1. Potential wateraccumulation in 59E001over times.Less heat exchangeleading to lowertemperature of natural gas.


A 3 1 2

Refer to Action No. 59-01.03.

1.9. Steam trap stuckclosed.

1. Potential wateraccumulation in 59E001over times.Less heat exchangeleading to lowertemperature of natural gas.


A 3 1 2

59-01.07 To ensure proper type of steamtrap downstream of 59E001.

EPC

1.10. Manual valveinlet/outlet 59D001mismanaged closed.

1. No flow of fuel gas fromheader to 59D001 leadingto loss fuel gas flow tousers.Potential unit shutdown.Loss of profit.


A 4 1 2

59-01.08 Consider providing CSO formanual valves inlet/outlet59D001.

EPC




Sheet: 192 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET



Node: 59-1

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction




1. Potentialoverpressurization in pipingdownstream and damage.potential release of naturalgas to ATM leading to fireand explosionPotential personnel injury.

1. PSV-5900103/5900104.

P 4 1 2


1. More flow of natural gasto 59D001 leading tooverpressurization in59D001 and pipingdownstream and damage.Potential release of fuelgas to ATM leading to fireand explosionPotential personnel injury.

1. PSV-5900101/5900102.

P 4 1 2

5.3. PIC-5900101Bmalfunctions closing PV-5900101B.

1. Overpressurization in59D001 and damage.Potential release of fuelgas to ATM leading to fireand explosionPotential personnel injury.

1. PSV-5900101/5900102.

P 4 1 2

5.4. PIC-5900104Amalfunctions notopening PV-5900104A.

1. No export of fuel gasleading tooverpressurization in59D001 and damage.Potential release of fuelgas to ATM leading to fireand explosionPotential personnel injury.


P 4 1 2

5.5. PIC-5900104Bmalfunctions notopening PV-5900104B.

1. No export of fuel gasleading tooverpressurization in59D001 and damage.Potential release of fuelgas to ATM leading to fireand explosionPotential personnel injury.


P 4 1 2

5 Higher Pressure

Sheet: 193 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET



Node: 59-1

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction




1. No natural gas backupleading to loss of DCCcompressor seal gas.Potential damage tocompressor leading torelease HCs to ATM.Potential fire and explosionleading to personnel injury.

1. Compressorsafeguard system toavoid damage.

P 4 1 2

6.2. PIC-5900101Amalfunctions notopening PV-5900101Awhen required.

1. No backup of naturalgas leading to less flow offuel gas to uses leading toreduced productioncapacity of UHV project.Loss of profit.

None.

A 4 1 2

59-01.06 Consider low pressure alarmon PIC-5900104.

EPC


1. Less pressure in59D001 leading to loss offuel gas to flare.Big flaring leading tocommunity complain.

1. CCTV.2. CSR Program.

C 3 1 2

6.4. PIC-5900104Amalfunctions fullyopening PV-5900104A.

1. Less pressure in59D001 leading to less flowof fuel gas to uses leadingto reduced productioncapacity of UHV project.Loss of profit.

1. PIC-5900101A withlow alarm.

A 4 1 2

6.5. PIC-5900104Bmalfunctions fullyopening PV-5900104B.

1. Less pressure in59D001 leading to less flowof fuel gas to uses leadingto reduced productioncapacity of UHV project.Loss of profit.

1. PIC-5900101A withlow alarm.

A 4 1 2


1. More flow of steam to59E001 leading to highertemperature (max. up to 70C).No significantconsequence.


1. No flow of BFW to59E001 leading highertemperature of natural gas.No significantconsequence.

7 Higher Temperature

Lower Pressure6

Sheet: 194 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET



Node: 59-1

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction




1. No flow of steam to59E001 leading to noheating of natural gas.Lower temperature ofnatural gas than MDMT of59E001 and piping.Potential damage to piping,

None.

P 4 1 2

Refer to Action No. 59-01.04


1. More flow of BFW to59E001 leading to lowersteam temperature.Possible free waterentering to 59E001.Less heat exchangeleading to potentialhammering in steam lineand damage to tube of59E001.

1. Steam trap isprovided.

A 3 1 2

Refer to Action No. 59-01.03

9 Higher Level 9.1. Liquid carryover. 1. Potential liquid carryoverto burner and damage.Potential fire outside thefurnace leading topersonnel injury.

1. LAH-5900101.2. Operator training andprocedures.

P 4 1 2

10 Lower Level No cause identified.









19 Steam Failure No additional causeidentified.



Lower Temperature8

Sheet: 195 of 196

HAZOP WORKSHEET



Node: 59-1

Ref.No.



ActionStatus

L RAction






25 Leakage/Rupture 25.1. Pinhole leak at59E001.

1. Natural gas leaks intocondensate system.Potential release of HCs toATM leading to VOC.Environmental impact.

1. PPE.

E 2 1 1




Sheet: 196 of 196

Appendix 3 : Scaned Attendance List

J

E & C

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Typewriter

NODE 01

gs

Typewriter

NODE 04

gs

Typewriter

NODE 02

gs

Typewriter

NODE 01

J

E & C

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Typewriter

NODE 01

gs

Typewriter

NODE 03

gs

Typewriter

NODE 01

J

E & C

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Typewriter

NODE 02

gs

Typewriter

NODE 02

J

E & C

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Typewriter

NODE 03

gs

Typewriter

NODE 03

gs

Typewriter

NODE 01

J

E & C

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Polygonal Line

gs

Typewriter

NODE 03

เอกสารแนบที่ 1 �䍟十E�� 3

ฐานข�อม8ลส9ขภาพิจารณของพิจารณน กงาน


การที่ 1 �䍟十Eบที่ 1 �䍟十Eวิเคราะห์ผลกระทบสิ่นเห์ผลกระทบสิ่งแวดล้อมหนังสตัวอย่างกรณีที่เกิดผลกระทบสูงสุดพร้อม9การณ�อ9บ ตัวอย่างกรณีที่เกิดผลกระทบสูงสุดพร้อม�ภ ย/อ9บ ตัวอย่างกรณีที่เกิดผลกระทบสูงสุดพร้อม�เห์ผลกระทบสิ่งแวดล้อมหนังสตัวอย่างกรณีที่เกิดผลกระทบสูงสุดพร้อม9ที่ 1 �䍟十E��เก�ดจากการประกอบก�จการอ9ตัวอย่างกรณีที่เกิดผลกระทบสูงสุดพร้อมสาห์ผลกระทบสิ่งแวดล้อมหนังสกรรมที่ 1 �䍟十E��ม�การผล�ตัวอย่างกรณีที่เกิดผลกระทบสูงสุดพร้อมล กษณะเด�ยวิเคราะห์ผลกระทบสิ่ก นที่ 1 �䍟十E Aงในประเที่ 1 �䍟十Eศึกษา และ

ตัวอย่างกรณีที่เกิดผลกระทบสูงสุดพร้อม7างประเที่ 1 �䍟十Eศึกษา

เหตกุารณ์ : รถกระเช้าชนพนักงาน Flag man ได้รบับาดเจบ็ สรปุรายละเอียดของเหตุการณ์ : พนกังานผูร้บัเหมา เขา้ประกอบตดิตัง้ท่อ WF และตดิตัง้หวั Sprinkler ในอาคารคลงัเกบ็สนิคา้ หลงัจากงานแลว้เสรจ็ จะน ารถกระเชา้ออกไปนอกโรงงานเพื่อขึน้รถเทรลเลอรส์่งคนื โดยม ีFlag man ป ัน่จกัรยานน าหน้า เมือ่มาถงึบรเิวณทีเ่กดิเหตุ มรีถกระบะของผูร้บัเหมาอกีบรษิทั ถอยออกมากะทนัหนั Flag man จงึให้สญัญาณรถกระเชา้เพื่อหยดุ จากนัน้ Flag man จงึขยบัรถออกทางซา้ย(หลบรถกระบะทีก่ าลงัถอย) จงึท าให้คนขบัรถกระเชา้ มองไมเ่หน็ Flag man เมือ่รถกระบะขบัเดนิหน้าออก พนกังานขบัรถกระเชา้คดิว่า Flag man ป ัน่รถจกัรยานไปแลว้ (มองไมเ่หน็) จงึเลื่อนรถกระเชา้ออกไปเพื่อเดนิทางต่อ ท าใหช้นรถ Flag man ลม้ลงและไดร้บับาดเจบ็เลก็น้อยบรเิวณขอ้เทา้ซา้ยจากนัน้ เจา้หน้าที ่รปภ. ทีพ่บเหน็เหตุการณ์ ไดป้ระสานงานเรยีกรถพยาบาลน าส่งโรงพยาบาลระยอง ซึง่โรงพยาบาลฯ ไดต้รวจอาการและใหก้ลบับา้นได ้ซึง่วนัถดัมาไดก้ลบัเขา้ท างานตามปกติ

การวิเคราะหส์าเหต ุ: • สาเหตขุณะนัน้ : - พนักงานขบัรถกระเช้ามองไม่เหน็ Flag man - ขาดการส่ือสารและการให้สญัญาณ ระหว่าง Flag man กบั พนักงานขบัรถกระเช้าในขณะท่ีรถก าลงัเคลื่อนท่ีออก • สาเหตพืุ้นฐาน : - Human error การละเมิดกฏด้านความปลอดภยั การส่ือสารและการให้สญัญาณ

01/2018

ภาพจ าลองลกัษณะรถกระเช้า และการควบคมุรถขณะเกิดเหต ุ

Lay out พื้นท่ีเกิดเหต ุ

หมายเหต:ุ รถกระเช้าในภาพใช้จ าลองอบุติัเหตเุท่านัน้ ไม่เก่ียวข้องกบัอบุติัเหตท่ีุเกิดขึน้และมีขนาดเลก็ แต่รถท่ีเกิดเหตจุะใหญ่และมีความสงูมากกว่า

ข้อเสนอแนะ : 1. ช้ีแจงกฎระเบียบซ า้(Retrain) ก าชบัข้อปฏิบติั ดงัน้ี 1.1วิธีการให้สญัญาณระหว่าง Flag man กบั พนักงานขบัรถและผูเ้ก่ียวข้องอย่างถกูต้องและให้ปฏิบติัอยา่งเครง่ครดั 1.2 เน้นเรือ่งระยะห่างในการน ารถของ Flag man กบั รถกระเช้า ให้ชดัเจน คือ 10 – 15 เมตร ตามกฎระเบียบของทาง IRPC 2.ก าหนดให้รถเทเลอรเ์ข้ามา รบั – ส่ง รถกระเช้าท่ีหน้างานเท่านัน้ 3. Safety จดัท าส่ือ ประชาสมัพนัธ ์ Lesson Learned เพื่อการป้องกนั มิให้เกิดอบุติัเหตซุ า้

http://www.google.co.th/url?url=http://www.dreamstime.com/royalty-free-stock-photography-safety-first-image28474927&rct=j&frm=1&q=&esrc=s&sa=U&ei=cDS0U-GIA9L18QXH8IKoBw&ved=0CCMQ9QEwBg&usg=AFQjCNFKffcwYs3oL1sxrY8zLPDnhOoWXQ

เหตกุารณ์ : พนักงานถกูเคร่ืองจกัรบาดเฉือนน้ิวมือได้รบับาดเจบ็ สรปุรายละเอียดของเหตุการณ์ : ขณะพนกังานควบคุมการผลติ ก าลงัปฏบิตังิานบรเิวณ Roller of Palletizer machine ไดย้นิเสยีงดงัผดิปกตขิองเครือ่งจกัร จงึเขา้ไปสงัเกตดโูดยไมไ่ดปิ้ดสวติชเ์ครือ่งจกัร ขณะนัง่ฟงัเสยีงและสงัเกตดทูี่เครือ่งจกัร ปลายนิ้วชีม้อืขวาไดย้ืน่ชดิเขา้ในร ูFrame ของเครือ่ง ซึง่จดุดงักล่าวมกีารเคลื่อนทีข่ ึน้-ลง ของชุดเรยีง Product จงึเฉีอนทบับรเิวณปลายน้ิวมอืขวาไดร้บับาดเจบ็ จากนัน้ เพื่อนรว่มงานไดน้ าผูบ้าดเจบ็ส่งหอ้งพยาบาลและส่งรกัษาต่อโรงพยาบาลกรงุเทพ-ระยอง ซึง่ผลการ X-Ray พบว่ากระดกูปลายนิ้วชีม้อืขวาแตกเลก็น้อย

การวิเคราะหส์าเหต ุ: • สาเหตขุณะนัน้ : - พนักงานเข้าไปอยู่ในจดุท่ีเครือ่งจกัรก าลงัท างาน • สาเหตพืุ้นฐาน : - Human error ของพนักงาน ท่ีไม่ปฏิบติัตามขัน้ตอนการท างาน เรง่รีบท่ีจะแก้ปัญหาจนลืมถึงอนัตรายท่ีจะเกิดขึน้

02/2018

ข้อเสนอแนะ : 1.อบรมขัน้ตอนการท างานและจิตส านึกในเรือ่งความปลอดภยัให้กบัพนักงานอีกครัง้ พรอ้มทัง้ให้พนักงานท่ีเกิดอบุติัเหตแุชรป์ระสบการณ์ให้กบัพนักงานทุกกะ 2.จดัท าป้าย Safety sign ระวงัเครือ่งจกัรหนีบติดไว ้ท่ีเครือ่ง Palletizer ทุก Line 3.ผูจ้ดัการแผนกและหวัหน้ากะทุกกะ ไป Coaching ในเรือ่งความปลอดภยัให้กบัพนักงานท่ีหน้างานทกุกะ 4.จดัท า Lesson learned 5. จดัท าพืน้ขาว-แดง บริเวณประตทูางเข้าใกล้เครือ่งจกัร เพื่อให้ผูเ้ข้าปฏิบติังานเกิดความตระหนักถึงอนัตรายท่ีอาจเกิดขึน้

ชุด slide

การขึน้-ลง ของชุดเรยีงProduct

ลกัษณะหน้าสมัผสัชดุ Slide เมื่อน้ิวยื่นเขา้ในชอ่ง จงึท าใหเ้กดิการบาดเจบ็

การแก้ปัญหาทนัทีท่ีเกิดเหต ุ1. หวัหน้ากะจดัท า Safety talk, Tool box เน้นเรือ่ง สาเหตุและผลของอบุติัเหตใุห้พนักงานในหน่วยงานทราบโดยด่วน เพื่อให้เกิดความตระหนักถึงความปลอดภยัในการท างาน 2.ท าป้ายห้าม Bypass Safe guard ติดท่ีหน้าเครือ่ง Palletizer ทุก Line

http://www.google.co.th/url?url=http://www.dreamstime.com/royalty-free-stock-photography-safety-first-image28474927&rct=j&frm=1&q=&esrc=s&sa=U&ei=cDS0U-GIA9L18QXH8IKoBw&ved=0CCMQ9QEwBg&usg=AFQjCNFKffcwYs3oL1sxrY8zLPDnhOoWXQ


ห์ผลกระทบสิ่งแวดล้อมหนังสน งส!อแจ�งการปร บลดอ ตัวอย่างกรณีที่เกิดผลกระทบสูงสุดพร้อมราการระบายมลพิจารณ�ษ ของโครงการโรงกล �นนA5าม น (Refinery Plant)

และผลการตัวอย่างกรณีที่เกิดผลกระทบสูงสุดพร้อมรวิเคราะห์ผลกระทบสิ่จวิเคราะห์ผลกระทบสิ่ ดค9ณภาพิจารณอากาศึกษา จากปล7อง


ส5าเนาห์ผลกระทบสิ่งแวดล้อมหนังสน งส!ออน9ญาตัวอย่างกรณีที่เกิดผลกระทบสูงสุดพร้อมให์ผลกระทบสิ่งแวดล้อมหนังส�โรงงานม�บ9คลากรด�านส��งแวิเคราะห์ผลกระทบสิ่ดล�อมประจ5าโรงงาน

HAZOP WORKSHEETeia.onep.go.th/images/monitor/1535867288.pdf1. PSV-5802801/5802802. 2....

Documents

Transcript of HAZOP WORKSHEETeia.onep.go.th/images/monitor/1535867288.pdf1. PSV-5802801/5802802. 2....