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The War in the Woods: Post-Fordist Restructuring,Globalization, and the Contested Remapping of

British Columbias Forest Economy

Roger Hayter

Department of Geography, Simon Fraser University

Resource peripheries that are geographically remote from core economies are also peripheral to contemporarytheorizing in economic geography, and requires higher profile within economic geographys research agenda. Therestructuring qua remapping of resource peripheries is collectively shaped by institutional forces unleashed by post-Fordism and globalization that are fundamentally different from the restructuring of cores. As industrial regions,resource peripheries must negotiate the imperatives of flexibility and neoliberalism from vulnerable, dependentpositions on geographic margins. For many resource peripheries, neoliberalism has been perversely associated withtrade protectionism. As resource regions, the restructuring of resource peripheries has been further complicated byresource-cycle dynamics and radically new social attitudes toward the exploitation of resources that have helped

spawn the politicsof environmentalism and aboriginalism. Trade, environmental, and aboriginal politics have clashedaround the world to contest vested industrial interests and remap resource peripheries in terms of their valuesystems. British Columbias forest economy illustrates this contested remapping. For two decades, the powerfulforces of neoliberalism, environmentalism, and aboriginalism have institutionalized a war in the woods of BritishColumbia that is sustained by shared criticism of provincial policy and disagreement over how remapping shouldproceed. The authority of the provincial government, which controls British Columbias forests, has beenundermined, but it remains vital to socially acceptable remapping. Meanwhile, the enduring war in the woodstestifies that geography matters on the periphery. Key Words: British Columbia contested space, forest economy,globalization, remapping, resource peripheries.

F

or almost twenty years, British Columbias (BCs)forest economy has been widely characterized in

terms of the war in the woods. The metaphorrefers to three distinct disputes involving trade, theenvironment,and aboriginal peoples. The trade war beganin 1981, when the Coalition for Fair Canadian LumberImports (CFCLI), a powerful U.S.-based lumber lobby,claimed that BCs forest-management system subsidizesindustry and effectively sought restrictions on Canadiansoftwood lumber imports (Hayter 1992). The latest salvoin this war came in May 2002, when the United Statesimposed a punitive duty of 27 percent on Canadianexporters, threatening the basis of BCs lumber industry,long reliant on American markets. As of May 2003, thisduty remained in effect. The environmental battles begansimilarly in the early 1980s, featuring disruptive opposi-tion by environmental nongovernmental organizations(ENGOs) (Wilson 1998). ENGOs also became allies ofthe CFCLI. Finally, long-standing aboriginal discontent,partly in association with the ENGOs, became invigoratedin civil disobedience and legal action, disputing the forestindustrys access to timber (Tennant 1990). These warshave occurred when the forest industry has beenthreatened by technological changes that deepen global

competition and demand more flexible production andemployment. BCs forests define a deeply troubled

economy, and the provincial governmentthe custodianof most forests in BChas found peace in thewoods an elusive idea (Barnes and Hayter 1997; Hayter2000b).

BC is not a singular case of a contested resourceperiphery. Globally, among many developing and devel-oped countries, export-based resource exploitation facesconflict with environmental, cultural, and political im-peratives (e.g. Anderson and Huber 1988; Soyez 1995,2002; Dauvergne 1997; Stevens 1997; Zerner 2000). Yetresource peripheries are peripheral as places, and periph-eral to contemporary theorizing in economic geography(Barnes, Hayter, and Hay 2001; Walker 2001; Hayter,Barnes and Bradshaw 2003). The formulation of ideasabout such themes as industrial restructuring, flexiblespecialization, and globalization is rooted in the experi-ence of industrial cores, old and new. To use, with license,Ann Markusens (1996) terms, cores are sticky placesthat are interesting and diverse and that require explana-tion. The implied contrast is that resource peripheries areslippery spaces, here today and gone tomorrow, scarcelyworthy of economic geographys attention.1

Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 93(3), 2003, pp. 706729r 2003 by Association of American GeographersPublished by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, U.K.

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This article challenges such blinkered thinking to arguethat analyses of resource peripheries deserve a higherprofile within economic geographys research agenda.After all, industrialization depends on resources asmuch as on markets, and resource peripheries are vitalto the geography of the global economy. For inhabitants,

peripheries are home- as well as workplaces, and theirindustrialization reveals great diversity (Baldwin 1956;Auty 1995; Gibson 2000). In economic geography, recentstudies have explained the distinctiveness of resource-based production systems as alternatives to dominantmodels of core-based industrialization. In a North Amer-ican context, Walkers (2001) analysis of Californiasevolution prior to 1940 is a noteworthy exemplar. InCanada,the Innisian approach to economic development,especially as formalized by Watkins (1963, 1977), hasstimulated assessments of the contemporary restructuringof BCs forest-based economy in terms of principles

formulated from particular (organizational, technological,and geographical) Canadian experience (Hayter andBarnes 1990; Barnes and Hayter 1992; Barnes, Hayter,and Hay 2001).2 Innis (1956) claimed that economicorthodoxy originated in metropolitan powers and thatthe Canadian resource periphery required its own localmodels (Barnes 1993, 357). This articles general goal isto elaborate on the distinctiveness of resource peripheriesby highlighting their contested nature during the con-temporary phase of globalrestructuring,often expressed asa transformation from Fordism to post-Fordism and asglobalization (Castells 1996). The articles specific goalis to understand BCs war in the woods and the (potential)remapping it entails.

The conceptual springboard for this discussion isrecognition that the restructuring qua remapping ofresource peripheries is collectively shaped by forcesunleashed by post-Fordism and globalization that arefundamentally different from the restructuring of cores.Resource peripheries, as industrial regions, have beendeeply affected by the paradigmatic industrial (techno-logical and regulatory) dynamics of post-Fordism that arespearheaded by the imperatives of flexibility and neoli-beralism. Resource peripheries must confront and negoti-ate these imperatives, however, from vulnerable spaces ongeographic margins, spaces rooted in remoteness, highlevels of export-dependence, specialization, and externalcontrol. Simultaneously, resource peripheries are resourceregions, deeply affected by the peculiar characteristicsof resource-cycle dynamics (Freudenburg 1992; Clapp1998b; Prudham 2002). Resources are also culturallydefined, valued both as factor inputs for industrializationand for wide-ranging ecological and culturalincludingaesthetic and spiritual (nonindustrial)benefits

(Zimmerman 1956; Hanink 2000). Moreover, as theresource-cycle hypothesis argues, in the context orenewable as well as nonrenewable resources, exploita-tion means that as resources deplete, they become morecostly to industry, while their nonindustrial values arethreat-ened or destroyed (Clapp 1998b). During

post-Fordism, however, public attitudes have fundamentally changed in favor of the nonindustrial values oresources, even as industrial operations have facedincreasing resource-cost disadvantages (ORiordan1976; Paehlke 1992). Indeed, environmentalismbroadly conceived as professionally organized sociamovements that seek to reduce human impacts on thenatural environmentis a defining feature of postFordism and has especially profound consequences forresource peripheries (Buttel 1992). Resource peripheriesare also the sites of mounting aboriginal resistance toindustrial exploitation, broadly motivated by a sense o

aboriginalism founded on self-identity within tradition-al cultures, aboriginal rights, and self-control over development (Stevens 1997).

In resource peripheries, the post-Fordist transformation has featured complex interactions betweenindustrial and resource dynamics in which powerful imperatives of flexibility, neoliberalism, environmentalism, and aboriginalism have clashed to contestindustrial development and restructuring. This clashis not coincidental, but is driven by the scale and inten-sity of Fordisms resource cycles. Moreover, the radicainnovations in information and communication technologies that have enabled a deepened global integration of capital have also empowered ENGOsand aboriginal groups to influence public opinion (andpolicy) and resist this deepening. ENGOs, in particular, are quintessential examples of post-Fordisminformation-based network societies the politics owhich have a powerful global reach (Soyez 2002). Theimperatives of flexibility, neoliberalism,environmentalismand aboriginalism have created highly politicizeddifferentiated forms of globalization among resourceperipheries.

The contested restructuring among resource periph-eries is not much appreciated within economic geographys debate over globalization, especially within thespace-society tradition (Hanson 1999). This debate hasbeen preoccupied with the implications of mobile (in-dustrial and financial) capital for cores, their deindustria-lization, and their continued significance across theeconomic spectrum (e.g. Florida and Smith 1993; Cox1997; Cooke 1999; Martin 1999). These studies rightlyemphasize the importance of local institutions in provid-ing the glue to keep cores sticky. The sticky-place

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metaphor, however, comes dangerously close to conflatingeconomic geographys rationale with the viability of cores.Industrial dispersaland its contested natureconfirmsthat geography matters on the periphery. For resourceperipheries, global qua exogenous forces have always beenpowerful, and globalization as a parallel trend with post-

Fordism has heralded new, powerful global influences. Butglobal-local dynamics are not zero-sum games betweenabstract, independent entities. Rather, local-global pro-cesses are implemented by various institutions that, inthought and action, interdependently engage local andglobal perspectives. On the periphery, where resources areimmobile and geographically extensive, even exploitationof Baldwins (1956) hypothetical empty lands that haveno prior local actors requires that resource rights aredefined and allocated (mapped) as a basis for localsettlement and the accumulation of institutionalized(vested) interests. Subsequent restructuring implies re-

mapping among old and new institutions; the con-tested nature of this remapping further underlineslocal influence.

This article proceeds in two main parts. First, itdiscusses the implications of post-Fordism and its asso-ciated contested global-local dynamics for resourceperipheries. Second, it explains BCs war in the woodsas a contest between vested interests and rival (wan-nabe) remappers. A peculiarity of this contest is that itslocal referee, the provincial government, has lost influ-ence, and the future map of BCs forests is uncertain.Methodologically, the discussion is synthetic and inte-grates themes that are normally analyzed in separate cate-gories, connecting economic geographys space-societyand environment-society traditions, as Hanson (1999)advocates. I seek to achieve this synthesis by privilegingthe role of institutions, generally conceived as systems ofrules, procedures, and conventions, both of a formal andinformal nature (Martin 2000, 79).3 Institutions implymany different, overlapping forms, including (businessand nonbusiness) organizations and coalitions, localcultures, and general belief systems, such as industrialism,environmentalism and aboriginalism, that are themselveshighly differentiated. Crucially, global-local processes aresocially instituted and interdependent and comprisedifferent value systems and behaviors that, whethercomplementary or in conflict, are organized by regions(Holmen 1995). I do not wish to reify the crude core-periphery dichotomy as a summary of regional differen-tiation created by global-local processes. Rather, giventhe theoretical peripheralization of peripheries, thisarticle seeks a better understanding of this differentia-tion than is possible from a preoccupation with (selec-ted) cores.

The Globalization of Resource

Peripheries during Post-Fordism

The global-local (exogenous-endogenous) dichotomydefines a wayof thinking about local variability that relatesto traditional distinctions between site and situation

(or relative location) and between endogenous andexogenous factors as a basis for theories of regionaland urban differentiation and development (Armstrongand Taylor 1978). Global-local distinctions also corre-spond to space-place distinctions thatrecognizethatpeoplework within competitive (global) divisions of labor whiledeveloping multifaceted attachments in particular terri-tories (places) (Bluestone and Harrison 1982, 20). Simplystated, the global-local dichotomy represents a crudeclassification of factors that interact and modify each otherin various ways to define places that are unique but notsingular ( Johnston 1984; Holmen 1995). In Holmens

(1995) metaphorical terms, regionsare meeting places forthese interactions, and the global simply means beyondthe local, however the latter is defined (Figure 1).

As instituted processes, however, global-local dynamicsreflect particular geographical and historical conditions.Indeed, the idea of globalization is a contemporary debateabout these dynamicsspecifically, how they have chang-ed during the post-Fordist transformation. As integralparts of this transformation, the globalization of resourceperipheries reflects distinctive geographical circumstan-ces and the peculiar characteristics of resource exploita-tion. Brief reference to the global-local dynamics ofresource peripheries during Fordismespecially duringitsboom decades, from the late 1940s to the1970sprovidesthe base from which to understand their globalizationduring post-Fordism (Freeman 1987).4

After 1945, Fordism among capitalist countries isgenerally characterized as comprising stable and struc-tured national and international systems of governanceand production. In leading nations, (Big) Government,Business, and Labor collaborated over some form ofKeynesian macroeconomic planning, internationally an-chored by Pax Americana within the Cold War context,fixed exchange rates, and growing commitments to freetrade and investment as organized by the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Economically,Fordism featured a mass-production model that power-fully affected resource exploitation. Between 1918 and1948, the United States alone consumed more mineralsthan had the rest of the world in recorded history, andresource consumption expanded even faster during Ford-isms boom decades (Warren 1973, xv). The GATT andthe security concerns of the Cold War facilitated thedispersal of resource expansion around the globe to

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feed the rapidly growing demands of the industrial cores.While organizational options were frequently available,in practice, expansions across the resource spectrumincreasingly corresponded to the Fordist template ofdomination by horizontally and vertically integratedmultinational corporations (MNCs), mass productionand standardization, specialized union labor, specializedrigid capital equipment, and the celebration of econo-mies of scale and size, and of (relative) stability (Baldwin1956; Hayter 2000c). Resource production typicallyfeatured continuous-flow processes, rather than theassembly-type operations of classic Fordism. Fordismsdistinctiveness in resource peripheries, however, primarilyderives from their remoteness and inherently strongglobal influences. In many remote regions, localorganization, labor, and equipment had to be importedand new towns and economic infrastructure created aspreconditions for exploitation. Indeed, Jensens (1989)characterization of the Canadian case as permeableFordism because of its dependence on exports, foreignownership, and foreign technology has wider relevance.The possibility of resource exhaustion also added localvulnerability to resource peripheries.

In the 1970s, recessions, energy crises, and stagflationsignaled long-term problems with the structured stabilityof Fordism, notably falling productivity growth at a time ofrising international competition and changing marketdynamics. In response, stimulated by radical technologicalchanges, led by microelectronics, that have had pervasiveeffects across the industrial spectrum, post-Fordismhas emphasized flexibility with respect to internationalregulations and production systems (Piore and Sabel1984; Freeman 1987). Flexibility imperatives have en-

couraged neoliberalism and deregulation, beginning withthe demise of the fixed currency exchange system in 1973while virtually enveloping the entire globe as a result ofthe end of the Cold War. Simultaneously, leading-edgeproduction systems have featured flexible firms andnetworks deploying various kinds of flexible labor.

The Fordist boom also created an environmental crisisThe intensity and scope of resource cycles had rapidlydepleted resources, and it threatened the nonindustriavalues of resources everywhere. In late Fordism, warningsof global environmental catastrophe, metaphorically ex-pressed as silent spring (Carson 1962) and SpaceshipEarth (Boulding 1966), evoked widespread public alarmover the extent of environmental destruction, the loss ofecological (and cultural) diversity, and resource scarcity(Meadows et al. 1972). This alarm was further provokedby the energy crises of the 1970s. During post-Fordism, theemerging global nature of environmental problems stimulated fundamental changes in public attitudes toward theenvironment and resource exploitation (ORiordan 1976Paehlke 1992; Garner 1996; Jamison 1996; Soyez 2002)These changes are rooted in support for the nonindus-trial benefits or values of resources and triggered the riseof environmentalism and proliferation of ENGOs. Intandem, environmental policies mushroomed, and thegreening of business became a powerful trend that nowengages increasingly proactive corporate behavior (Eden1996; Florida 1996; Richards and Forsch 1997). Yetas the leitmotiv of post-Fordism, the implications oflexibility for environmentalism are ambiguous (Freeman1992; Hayter and Le Heron 2002). Indeed, accordingto Freeman (1992), post-Fordism needs to be replacedby a green paradigm in which innovation driven by

Local models:

regions as meeting places

S

Figure 1. Local models in global-local perspective.

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ecological imperatives will supersede innovation basedon flexibility.

Post-Fordism has heralded new forms of global-localdynamics, generally summarized as globalization, that takeon different forms in different places. In industrial cores,debates over deindustrialization and reindustrialization

have focused on the meaning of flexibility imperatives forcapital and labor, occasionally linked to the greening ofcorporate behavior, largely as a complementary trend(Florida 1996). On many resource peripheries, flexibilityand environmental imperatives have combined to createdifferent forms of contested restructuring. Thus, as indus-trial regions, resource peripheries have to cope with thechallenge of flexible production systems and neoliberaltrade regimes from already vulnerable positions on theperiphery. Additionally, environmental imperatives havedefined special problems for peripheries as resource regionsdue to the distinctive characteristics of resource exploita-

tion. Resource depletion means that costs rise as themost accessible, highest-quality resources are used first(Freudenburg 1992; Clapp 1998b). Moreover, resource-based industrialization not only generates pollutionproblems, which often can be reduced, but also directlydepletes the nonindustrial values of resources. Old-growth forests are a principal case in point, as theirexploitation destroys ecological values along with relatedextant aboriginal cultures. From this perspective, the ideaof sustainability is problematic and large-scale industrial-ization an inherently objectionable idea. Although not anew phenomenon, environmental and aboriginal resis-tance to resource exploitation has become widespreadpossibly systemicduring post-Fordism, intimately con-nected to the challenges of flexibility and neoliberalism.

Neoliberalism, Environmentalism, and

Aboriginalism

Contested searches for employment and organizationalflexibility have occurred in resource peripheries, some-times strongly so, as in BCs forest economy (Hayter andBarnes 1992; Hayter 1997; Rees and Hayter 1996). Inhighly capital-intensive, rigid mining industries, suchas Arizonas copper mines, opportunities for labor andproduct-market flexibilities are less evident (OhUalla-chain and Mathews 1994). Yet mining-based MNCs haveplayed off regions in conflicts with labor as part of theirrestructuring efforts (Bradbury 1985). Further, the devel-opment of flying in labor forces to remote mining sitesis a quintessential post-Fordist expression of flexibility,designed to minimize fixed costs in infrastructure, facil-itate adjustment of labor costs to operating levels, and

reduce future problems associated with embedded laborand social-exit costs (Storey 2001).

Labor costs rarely dominate resource industries, andlabor conflicts over flexibility are not the primary motivefor the globalization of resource peripheries. Trade con-flicts, however, are a different matter. Neoliberalism, and

its commitment to market forces andthe freeingof tradeand investment from political barriers, implies a fur-ther extension of the free-trade principles graduallyextended by the GATT during Fordism. Moreover,resource peripheries, always critically concerned aboutmarket access, have generally supported the free-tradeagenda. The expectations raised by neoliberalism in thisregard, however, have been frequently and deeply con-founded, as is attested by both long-simmering and newtrade conflicts between industrial powers and resourceperipheries. The reasons are broadly twofold. First, bluntlystated, more free trade has not meant laissez-faire (Hayter

1992). Rather, governments have introduced a myriad ofpolicies to shape global trading roles, and trade liberal-ization has required the establishment of rules, regulatoryagencies, and an array of adjudication agencies andprocesses. The United States, Japan, and the EuropeanCommunity (EC) dominate this rule-setting. Second,these countries have powerful resource lobbies that haveinsisted on protectionism in return for domestic politicalsupport. Increasingly, such protectionism is rationalizedbylinking free trade with the notion of fair trade basedon equivalent conditions of employment, taxation, orenvironmental regulations. Such linking of trade withnontrade issues has become an important feature ofneoliberalism, with extraordinary implications for re-source peripheries.

During post-Fordism, competition among resourceperipheries has intensified, especially as low-priced re-sources of former centrally planned economies have beenincorporated into the world system. Yet neoliberalism hasnot automatically opened up the markets of core countriesfor resource products; sometimes it has been perverse.The continued high level of subsidies allocated to theagriculture sectors of the United States,Japan, and the ECthat, combined with tariff barriers, seriously impede theagricultural exports from poor countries are particularlydepressing in this context. Such protectionism is justifiedby claims that poor countries have unfair cost advantages.As BCs softwood lumber war with the U.S. illustrates,charges of unfairness are also directed at resourceperipheries with high wages, taxes, and strong environ-mental regulations. Moreover, powerful countries havereinforced these charges with measures that protecttheir own resource sectors, including subsidies, tariffs,and quota systems that have threatened or distorted

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production in many resource peripheries elsewhere.Typically, these conflicts have featured heated politicaland legal debates involving local, national, and interna-tional government agencies, courts, and adjudicationcommittees, a significant irony of which is the sustainedsupport by resource peripheries for free-trade principles

and the globalization agenda of dominant countries.Peripheries such as BCs forest economy that are export-dependent on these dominant countries, however, haveless leverage in deciding what is fair trade (Hayter 1992).

Resource-cycle dynamics and social reinterpretationsof resources have further profoundly complicated theglobalization of resource peripheries. Just when manyresource industries have faced the cost disadvantages ofmature resource cycles, burgeoning environmental legis-lation has demanded reductions in environmental pollu-tion and the preservation of environmental values, whileenvironmental-impact studies and environmental mon-

itoring have added further costs. Moreover, environ-mental and aboriginal resistance toward industry differsfundamentally from labor and trade conflicts that arepredominantly economic in nature and do not questionresources as factors of production. Rather, environmentaland aboriginal politics are rooted in alternate ways ofthinking about resources that give priority to nonindus-trial values.

During post-Fordism, the global politics of environ-mentalism have been spearheaded by ENGOs that pursuedistinctive strategies and select specific place-basedenvironmental conflicts as targets. Resource peripherieshave particular priority as sites of resource depletion andthe destruction of biodiversity, which have global signifi-cance in both real and symbolic terms. Indeed, high-profile, belligerent ENGO campaigns have featuredantimining, antifishing (including antiwhaling and anti-sealing), and antilogging activities in resource peripheries.These campaigns of resistance to resource exploitationhave been frequently linked to aboriginal activities thatare embedded in resource peripheries and claimed byENGOs to represent appropriate environmental behavior.Even if this assumption is accepted, aboriginal peo-ples have fundamentally different motives from environ-mentalism, variously based on maintaining or regainingestablished and new aboriginal rights, empowerment, andfacilitating self-realization, including highly diverse formsof economic development. Aboriginal resistance alsooccurs in vastly different socioeconomic contexts. Thereare aboriginal peoples within poor countries who aredesperately defending their traditions on surviving rem-nants of territory (Nietschmann 1997). In contrast, acrossNorth America, Australia, and New Zealand, aboriginalpeoples are trying to maintain aboriginal rights and power

within capitalist landscapes that have already fundamentally changed their societies (Barker and Soyez 1994Willems-Braun 1997).

ENGOs are self-appointed, independent activisgroups that promote environmentalism among govern-ments, business, and the public (ORiordan 1976; Paehlke

1992). ENGOs vary considerably in size and scopethelargest have become professionalized, structured, andmultinational organizations that deal with many environmental issuesand in beliefs and tactics. Radical environmentalism, for example, promotes deep ecology andbiocentrism, while conventional anthropocentric viewsemphasize human needs and ideas related to sustainabledevelopment. Tactics vary from sundry kinds of cividisobedience (sometimes even criminal activities), theuse of the court system to prosecute violators, and variouskinds of lobbying and advertising, to participation indecision-making bodies concerned with environmenta

matters. Although connected to green parties in variouscountries, ENGOs are not usually democratically electedand their activities depend on volunteers and professionastaffs funded by individuals and, increasingly, by foundations. The tactical strengths of ENGOs are based on theirabilities to communicate and use information in shapingpublic opinion, lobbying governments, pressuring corporations, agenda-setting, and organizing campaignagainst industrialization in the worlds most remote placesThe technics of the information age, so compromising toterritorial governance, have proven ideally suited to theproliferation of boundary-spanning ENGOs and to theidevelopment of cascading networks (Rosenau 1990301) and space-producing lobbies (Soyez 2002, 204)that criss-cross political boundaries in bewildering fashionat high speed (Ekins 1992; Princen 1994). They areexemplars of the network society (Castells 1996). Thebiggest ENGOs scarcely think of national laws aconstraints and are more mobile than their principaopponents, industrial MNCs.5

In resource peripheries, ENGOs are global and locainstitutions (Hayter and Soyez 1996). As local institu-tions, ENGOs are democratic voices, urging greater locacontrol over resources, greater transparency in resourceallocation, and wider (stakeholder) participation inresource use. Indeed, ENGOs began as local oppositionto the global force of industrial destruction. For Paehlke(1996), enlightened environmentalism is fundamentallydemocratic in that it depends on societies that celebrateindividual initiative and because it deliberately seeksto engage the public in the environmental agenda. Asglobal institutions, Princen (1994) argues, ENGOprovide countervailing power to MNCs (and irresponsible governments) to ensure transparency in informing

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the public of all the implications of industrialization andthat action is taken at appropriate biogeographicalscales. He also emphasizes that ENGOs gain sociallegitimacy by their sole focus on environmental issues.

As global institutions, however, ENGOs seek to imposevalues on resource peripheries, regardless of local priorities

or preferences. Three criticisms can be briefly identified.First, as Taylor (1996) argues, ENGOs are prone toauthoritarian thought, empowered by their single-issuefocus and global scope. He further notes that the scientificbasis for resource-scarcity issues is rarely straightforward(even among scientists) and that ENGOs can commu-nicate misleading and ambiguousmessages to further theirgoals. Moreover, to justify operations (and funding),ENGOs may target resource regions where success is morelikely, rather than necessarily most appropriate. Second,ENGO targeting of specific regions, firms, and projectsmay fail to take into account wider implications, generat-

ing unintended negative impacts on the environment. Forexample, Moore (2000), a founder of Greenpeace, arguesthat unrelenting ENGO attacks on forestry are misin-formed and increase environmental problems, as theecological benefits of young, growing forests are lost andswitches are made to more environmentally damagingsubstitute products. Third, ENGOs express urban elitism.According to Arnold (1999), ENGO agendas are increas-ingly controlled by urban-based endowment funds that aremotivated by the values of rich urbanites. Indeed, in aPacific Northwest context, Lee (1994, 228) argues thatENGOs using guilt, shame and ridicule to controlpeople, often supported by federal bureaucracies andtrust funds, are creating a cultural upheaval in theregion as they seek to monopolize policy in federal forestlands. The recent tactic employed by ENGOs of renamingand claiming resource regions as conservation areasgraphically reflects the dissonance between urban andrural values.

ENGOs have often sought alliances with aboriginalpeoples in opposing resource exploitation. Indeed, post-Fordism has involved a reawakening of aboriginalconsciousness and identity that has fueled increasingresistance to large-scale industrialization in resource areasacross developing countries (Anderson and Huber 1988;Hecht and Cockburn 1989; Clapp 1998a, c) and the richcountries of the new world (Barker and Soyez 1994).This reawakening is perhaps surprising. During Fordism,resource exploitation pushed industrialization to allcorners of the globe, constantly threatening indigenouspopulations that then were commonly regarded as vestigesof dying ways of life, soon to be pushed off the mapaltogether. As Moores (1963, 89) empathetic lamentindicates, the rapid incorporation of virtually every part

of the world into the international and political com-munity marks the end, or the beginning of the end,for isolated and exotic tribal communities and also forcomplex and archaic civilizations. In this sense . . . theunification of the world is complete.

Instead, Barker and Soyez (1994, 32) explain, abori-

ginal peoples in northern Canadastimulated by chang-ed public opinion, links with ENGOs, and the newinformation technologies think locally but act glob-ally as they seek support in the international arena fortheir (local) rights and culture. To use Soyezs (2002, 195)phrase, aboriginal peoples have joined ENGOs as pre-viously marginal actors in shaping the restructuring ofresource peripheries. Moreover, aboriginal networks thatcriss-cross political boundaries are developing rapidlysometimes in tandem with ENGO networks, sometimes inconflict with them. In the context of the Kayapo tribe inPara, in the Brazilian Amazon, Posey (1996, 1999)

revealed the unique aboriginal knowledge of ecologicalrelationships. Indeed, he suggested that Amazon tribeshad helped create the regions great plant variety, andhe argued against the industrialization of the rainforeston ecological and cultural grounds. In 1987, Poseyhelped Kayapo chiefs protest at the World Bank inWashington the flooding of their land for dams. In1989, with the foundation of the International Societyfor Ethnobiology, he urged the protection of the ecologicalknowledge of tribal peoples as intellectual propertyrights agreements. These rights were subsequentlyincorporated in the Biodiversity Convention at the 1992Rio Summit, at which Posey organized an Earth Parlia-ment as an aboriginal forum to express concern forattacks on their culture. In parallel empirically basedadvocacy work, Nietschmann (1997) recorded theconnections of the Miskito to their (sea) environmentin the North Atlantic autonomous region of Nicaragua.He helped the Miskito gain international support fortheir way of life as they defended their contested coralagainst an array of external threats that have included notonly foreign fishing fleets, drug traffickers, Nicaraguangovernments, and antigovernment insurgency move-ments, but also ENGOs funded by the U.S. govern-ment. Indeed, for Nietschmann (1997, 197), ENGOswere predatory conservationists, part of a colonialattempt to divide (remap) Miskito territory into abiosphere reserve and commercial areas for Nicaraguanfisherman.

On resource peripheries, global forces have long beenpowerful and have become extraordinarily complex inpost-Fordism, even in remote, sparsely populated places.As the Miskitos defense of their contested coral confirms,however, local institutions cannot be ignored. Despite

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vulnerability to external forces, resource peripheriesare still meeting places where locally based institutions areconnected globally and globally based institutionsare connected locally (Figure 1). There is a significantintellectual challenge in tracing the geopolitics underlyingthese interactions, which show little respect for spatial

boundaries as they span, jump, and criss-cross scales(Soyez 1995; see also Swyngedouw 1997). Yet thesespatially unbounded politics are also engaged in attemptsto restructure and remap instituted rights within resourceperipheries. The intellectual and policy challenge raisedby the remapping of resource peripheries lies in drawingthe contours between the remapping of scalar politics andremapping in place. These connections are problematic:they must be synthesized locally, and this synthesis isinherently normative, requiring adjudication of alterna-tive values, social legitimacies, and responsibilities. In-deed, to an increasing degree, resource peripheries have

become meeting places where this remapping and newsynthesis have become contested, even prone to violence.Such conflicts underline the importance of geography onthe periphery and the imperative of cooperative relationsin truly socially progressive remapping.

British Columbias Forest Wars

BCs forest economy provides a remarkable example ofa contested resource periphery.6 The province comprisesa vast area of 95 million hectares, and exploitation ofresource wealthespecially forest resourceshas keyedits incorporation into the global economy over the past120 years. Traditionally, the provincial government hasequated forest policy with industrial policy. In the decadesafter 1945, it undertook a Fordist strategy involving theliquidation (and commodification) of BCs old-growthforests, which were leased to large corporations in returnfor large-scale investments in export-oriented industria-lization (Hayter 2000b). Since the 1970s, however, theorganizational, technological, environmental, and cultur-al assumptions underlying this strategy have been under-mined. Since 1980, sustained protectionist attacksdirected against BCs lumber industry by the CFCLI havedeveloped into demands for the privatization of BCsforests, ENGOs have emerged as powerful agents de-manding greater commitment to conservation, andaboriginal peoples have vigorously resurrected theirlargely unresolved treaty claims. BC has become acontested space in which rival groups are seeking toremap forest resources according to their values. Theintensity and duration of this war in the woods reflectsthe engrained nature of vested interests and because the

remappers, while they condemn the status quo, differ onthe contours of a new map.

Historically, BCs war in the woods is a legacy of aregulated (permeable) Fordist strategy formulated by theForest Act of 1947 and the more or less simultaneousestablishment of powerful unions. In Wilsons (1987, 7)

terms, the provincial government, big business, andunions became the principal vested interests that formeda (wood) exploitation alliance that dominated BCsforest policy. From BCs entry into Confederation in 1872until 1947, forest tenures and some private lands wereallocated with few rules, as if the forests were an emptyland, scarcely inhibited by a sparse aboriginal populationnumbering around 26,000 in the 1880s (Fisher 1977210). Highly speculative booms soon established a vibranforest industry focused on Vancouver, but forests wereravaged, especially on the accessible coast. The govern-ment stopped granting leases in 1913. The instabilities o

world wars and the depression of the 1930s, when smallercompanies were perceived as especially vulnerable, pro-vided further backdrops to rethinking the Forest Act o1947.7

Under the terms of this act, for reasons that remainunclear, the provincial government retained public own-ership of BCs forests. The government also anticipatedthat large corporations, especially MNCs, would providerapid growth with stability by combining productionexpertise with access to export markets and sources offinance. Indeed, the governments forest-tenure policywas predicated on commitments by individual firms toinvesting in large-scale facilities in return for extensivelong-term timber leasessuch as tree-farm license(TFLs), granted for twenty-five years and renewableand a regime of lowstumpage, essentially a taxon timbeharvested from public, provincially controlled lands. Theact also equated stable economic growth with sustainedyield forestry. The key to this link lay in the annuaallowable cut (AAC) established for each lease by thegovernment to ensure that renewal would occur in timefor a second cut, while requiring that firms must eitheruse their AAC or forfeit it. In practice, estimating AACswas judgmental, and forest renewal relied almost com-pletely on natural regeneration. Moreover, the prevailinglogging philosophy advised that BCs vast natural, mature(old-growth) forests should be cut before they becamedecadent, thereby losing further (economic) valuethrough fire, disease, and pests, while new, faster-growingforests would be ecologically beneficial (Percy 1986). Thegovernment also endorsed log-harvesting by clear-cut-tingin which all trees are logged within cut-blocksonthe basis of economics, worker safety, and environmentDespite claims to sustained yield principles, forest policy

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explicitly meant the liquidationby clear-cuttingofold growth (Wilson 1998). By the 1970s, however, thewood-exploitation axis itself recognized fall-down ef-fects in harvested volumes and species, as old-growthdepletion in quantity or quality could not be synchronizedwith new growth.

In its own terms of reference, permeable Fordismworked well for BCs forest economy. Economic growthbetween 1950 and 1970, as indicated by production,profits, and employment, was impressive and dispersedthroughout the province, further enabled by the vigorouspolicies of the provincial government in providing energy,transportation, and social infrastructure, including newtown legislation (Hayter 1976; Bradbury 1978). Al-though aboriginal peoples remained marginalized, BCsforest towns were prosperous, relatively stable, andculturally diverse communities. Moreover, collectivebargaining by tough-minded industrial unions, with

locals dispersed throughout the province, had placedthem among the highest-income communities in Cana-da.8 In addition, within the constraints imposed by thepre-eminence of industrial values, Crown control overBCs forests was deemed inherently virtuous because of itsimplications for public accessibility and multiple use,notably recreational uses.

Fordisms inheritance, however, has proven deeplyproblematical. Since 1970, BCs forest economy hasbecome a highly volatile space (Figure 2). Two sharprecessions in the 1970s preceded record high levels ofproduction and profit in 1979 that, in turn, were followedby a devastating recession in the early 1980s. A subse-quent sharp boom in the late 1980s was followed by deeprecessions in the early and late 1990s, the latter occurringwhile the rest of Canadas forest industries were expand-ing. Permeable Fordism emphasized commodity standar-dization and did not provide industry with the innovativeculture required to cope with the dynamics and uncer-tainties of post-Fordism.Indeed,harvest levelsrelentlesslyincreased, specifically in the interior, where, by 1996,

logging production was over twice that of the coast(Figure 3). In the cool temperate rainforests of the coast,balsam, hemlock, western red cedar, and Douglas firdominate the harvest, while the predominant interiorspecies include lodgepole pine, spruce, and true firs. In1996, BCs log harvest of over 75,000 cubic meters42

percent of the Canadian totalmostly supplied large-scale production in support of a forest sector, comprising100,000 direct jobs and manufactured shipments worthCan$16.5 billion. The sector continues to define BCsglobal role. Remarkably, the export orientation ofBCs forest economy increased in the 1990s (Table 1).

Since1980,thetransitiontoacontestedspacehasbeendramatic. In 1980, the map of BCs forest landscape wasclearly demarcated, dominated by a well-defined set ofcorporate tenures that were underwritten by unques-tionedprovincialauthority over resource usea supposedbedrock of the Canadian Federation. By 2001, however,

provincial government autonomy was in dispute withinand beyond the province: the CFCLI, ENGOs, andaboriginal peoples undermined BCs vested interests aseach group sought to remap the forest landscape accord-ing to their priorities. These wannabe remappers haveprofoundly politicized forest policy in BC, and the debateshave criss-crossed the globe. Moreover, since trade andaboriginal matters are federal responsibilities, the Cana-dian government and the Supreme Court of Canada havebecome significant global (external) forces in BCs foresteconomy in ways they never were traditionally. The 1980srecession provided the catalyst to the transition tocontested space.

The 1980s Recession: The Trigger for

Contesting BCs Forest Space

If the profound troubles of BCs forest economywere driven by the onset of neoliberalism, aboriginalism,and environmentalism (Barnes and Hayter 1997; Hayter2000b), it was during the recessionary crisis of 19811985that these industrial and resource dynamics collided andexploded. The severity of this recession is well documen-ted. BCs forest economy lost 20,000 jobs among bothprofessionals and hourly workers; profits of $500 million in1979 became losses of $500 million in 1982; debt-equityratios increased; and 1980 output levels were notrecovered until 1986 (Grass and Hayter 1989; Hayterand Barnes 1992). The recessions role as a turning pointin the forest economys evolution remains unappreciated.Yet, for industry, the recession stimulated calls to diversifyfrom reliance on standardized commodities that were inthe secular price-cost squeeze created by constantly rising

1973 1980 19951985

Equity

1975 1990-25%

-20%

-15%

20%

0%

5%

25%

-10%

-5%

10%

15%

1997-1,000

-500

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

Earningsaftertax

(millions

ofdollars)

Earnings

Returnonshareholders

equity

Figure 2. Earnings after tax on shareholders equity for British

Columbia forest companies. Source: Hayter 2000b: 78.

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costs and declining real prices (Woodbridge, Reed, andAssociates 1984). Since then, a flexible work culture hasbeen a battleground between management and unions(Barnes and Hayter 1992), and flexible mass productionand flexible specialization have been discernible trends(Rees and Hayter 1996; Edgington and Hayter 1997).

The 1980s recession also excited the wannabe remap-pers, and, unlike labor relations, their battles could not be

resolved through established institutional mechanismssuch as collective bargaining. The CFCLI began to lobbythe U.S. federal government to restrict Canadian lumberimports, principally by arguing that BCs lumber industrywhich accounts for 66 percent of Canadas exports to theU.S., was unfairly subsidized by low stumpage. InitiallyCanadian arguments, led by a BC-based forestry associa-tion, convinced U.S.trade and related courts, in a decision

0 100 200 300

kilometers

Coastal region

British Columbia75,213,000 cubic meters

11%

14.4%

8.7%

14.2%18.9%

Other softwoods 2.4%

Hardwoods 3.3%

Douglas fir

Hemlock

Cedar

BalsamSpruce

Lodgepole pine27.2%

Coastal region22,926,000 cubic meters

17.6%

34.722.1

16%

3%5%

1.4%

8.1% 5.6%

2.8%

13.4%

26%

39%

1.2%4.1%

Interior52,287,000 cubic meters

Figure 3. Log production in British Columbia by specie and region, 1996.

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made in 1983, to reject the CFCLIs countervail andrecognize that stumpage payments did not incorporatesubsidies, but reflected the local species mix, higher costsof production, and greater distances to markets. ThisCanadian victory, however, was not to last. In 1985, theCFCLI implicated the lumber dispute in the free-tradetalks beginning between Canada and the United States.Indeed, as a precondition for a general free-trade agree-ment (FTA), the CFCLI insisted on a memorandum of

understanding (MOU) between Canada and the UnitedStates that would penalize Canadian lumber exports totheUnited States.This dispute alsostimulatedthe incorpo-ration of a trade-dispute mechanism within the FTAand subsequently NAFTA, an initiative that was widelytouted in Canada as a way of preempting trade disputes inthe future but that has provided little consolation for BC.

Simultaneously, the 1980s recession stimulated ENGOand aboriginal opposition to BCs forestry practices. Thisopposition was part of a series of broad (left-wing)solidarity protests against the restraint policies intro-duced by the provincial government (Allen and Rosen-bluth 1986). ENGOs were empowered by the seemingdemise of the forest industries, which they portrayed as adecliningsunset sector, a view supported by theMinistry ofForestrys first public recognition in 1980 of fall-downeffects in harvesting levels. ENGOs were further inflamedon discovering that in 1981, the provincial governmenthad introduced the concept of sympathetic administra-tion by relaxing rules governing forestry in an attempt toaid the crisis-torn industry. In 1983, the Green Party wasofficiallycreated in BC. Aboriginal peoples, many of whomhad been trying to negotiate treaties for one hundredyears, also became alarmed about loss of the resource base.From 1979 to 1985, ENGO and aboriginal protests oflogging jointly emerged in the coastal region, especiallyaround Meares Island, Clayoquot Sound, and SouthMoresby in the Queen Charlottes (Wilson 1998; Stans-bury 2000). In 19851986, aboriginal frustrations explo-ded in a campaign of blockades around BC (Blomley1996), while ENGOs pursued valley-by-valley protestsagainst logging, especially in the coastal region.

The wannabe remappers are complex, internallydiverse institutions. Though the CFCLI is secretive about

its members, it is known to comprise both small and giantforest companies, based especially in the Pacific North-west and the South but from other regions as well, and itshighly public campaigns have been led by politicians,notably Senators Max Baccus (Montana) and Bob Pack-wood(Oregon).Bythemid-1980s,inBCaselsewhere,the

ENGO system involved professional organizations suchas Greenpeace that were international in scope, as well asmany small organizations that represented a range ofbeliefs and tactics.9 With about 200 separate bands,ranging in size from a few people to a few thousand,reserves located in all regions of BC in rural and urbanareas, and half of their populations living off-reserve,aboriginal peoples are highly varied. Although all of thesewannabe remappers have united to oppose the wood-exploitation alliance, differences among and within themrender agreement over an overall remapping processextremely difficult. The contest between the wannabe

remappers and vested interests needs, first and foremost,to be resolved at the provincial scale.The remainder of this discussion explores the contested

remapping of BCs forest economy, revealing how thedemands of the wannabe remappers on BCs forest policyhave escalated. The main hypothesis guiding this discus-sion is that the wannabe remappers have formed a tacitalliance that has effectively disempowered the provincialgovernment, a hypothesis depicted in cartoon form inFigure 4. With respect to the cartoons implied politicaleconomy, I focus particularly on the nature and evolutionof the motives of the wannabe remappers, and whysubstantialpolicy initiatives to appeasethem on the part ofthe provincial government have failed. A related hypoth-esis is that while the wannabe remappers have agreed tooppose provincial policies, their different motives implythat the future map of BC is highly uncertain. Thediscussion notes the possibility that this uncertainty mayundermine socially desirable forms of restructuring. It alsonotes the fragmentation of the old wood-exploitationalliance, as multinational forest corporations (MFC inFigure 4) became critics of government policy.

The Escalating Demands of theWannabe Remappers

By the mid-1980s, the provincial government of BCwas under enormous pressure to make fundamentalchanges in forest policy to help the restructuring of theforest industry while also meeting the diverse concerns ofthe CFCLI, ENGOs, and aboriginal peoples. Indeed, thelatter two groups disputed the traditional equation offorest policy with industrial policy. Some tentative steps

Table 1. Total and Export Values of British Columbia ForestProducts, 1952, 1966, 1987, and 1996

1952 1966 1987 1996

Net value of shipments

(Can$m)

483.9 1,037.0 11,602 16,466

Export share (%) 60.2 80.6 80.3 90.3

Source: Hayter (2000a, 73)

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toward resolving the forestry crisis were taken in the dyingdays of the (right-wing) Social Credit (Socred) govern-ment. It was, however, the (left-wing) New Democraticparty (NDP)well connected to the solidarity movementmentioned abovethat won a convincing provincialmandate in 1991, in large measure to bring peace to thewoods. Indeed, the NDP introduced a remarkable batteryof policies designed to appease the remappers and promoteindustrial restructuring toward higher-value activities(Table 2; Cashore et al. 2001). Significant, escalatingincreases in stumpagethe tax on timber cut onprovincially owned landswere at the core of thisreregulation (Hayter 2000b), making BCs timber costsamong the highest in North America. Increased stum-page, which promised higher revenues for the provincialgovernment, was meant to appease the CFCLI and wasconsistent with ENGO assertions that BCs timberwas undervalued.

To further appease the ENGOs, the new (1995) ForestPractices Code drastically changed logging regulations tomeet environmental concernsfor example, by reducingthe permitted size of clear-cuts, disallowing loggingnear streams and the practice of discontinuous clear-cutting,10 and making logging proposals an entirelytransparent process requiring public input. The parksystem was also expanded to 12 percent of the provincial

land-base; a special decision-making process for Clayo-quot Sound was introduced; timber-supply reviews wereconducted; new pollution laws were passed; and newregional planning procedures were developed along thelines urged by environmentalists (MGonigle and Parfit1994). To appease aboriginal demands, the NDP recog-

nized the inherent rights of aboriginal peoples and urgedthe federal government to cooperate in a new treatyprocess. The government further believedalbeit on thebasis of questionable assumptionsthat the higher direcand indirect costs imposed by its reregulation wouldstimulate industry to add value (Hayter 2000b, 8997)Unfortunately, attempts by provincial governments tobring peace to the woods have only met with increasedfutility.

Uncle Sams Giant and Lengthening Shadow

With the onset of free-trade talks between Canada andthe United States, the CFCLI gained leverage to demandprotection for their industry to be a precondition for theFTA. In 1985, a leading suggestion by the CFCLI was for a10-percent tariff on Canadian lumber imports for threeyears (Hayter 1992). In 1986, the MOU established a 15-percent export tax that could be reduced by equivalentincreases in Canadian stumpage, and this agreemenwas incorporated in the FTA of 1989. Given substantiaincreases in BCs stumpage, the imminent signing oNAFTA, and a trade-dispute mechanism already in placein 1991 the Canadian Federal government withdrew fromthe MOU, claiming the intent of the MOU had beenfulfilled and was no longer necessary. The Canadiangovernment also claimed a legal right to withdraw fromthe MOU. The CFCLI disagreed with Canadas withdrawal from the MOU and mounted another intensecampaign against BCs lumber industry, now arguing thatlogs from Crown land were subsidized because they werenot sold on open markets but were allocated to long-termlicenseesand were subject to exportrestrictions. Thispressure resulted in the Softwood Lumber Agreement(SLA) of 1996, which imposed a quota system, moredisruptive of free trade than tariffs or export taxes, on fouCanadian provincesOntario, Quebec, Alberta, and BC(Hayter 2000a, 232). The SLA expired in April 2001In May 2002, following unusually acrimonious politicadebate on both sides of the border, the United Statesconfirmed countervailing and antidumping duties thataveragedto a 27-percent dutyon CanadianlumberimportsThe CFCLI-inspired U.S. position is that Canadaspecifically BCmust conduct market auctions for logsfully permitting their export, if market access to the

Figure 4. The wannabe remappers disempower British Columbias

provincial government: Forest ownership is not control! This

cartoon, commissioned (without my knowledge) for an opinion piece

I wrote (Hayter 2000a), is published with the permission of

Bill Schuss.

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United States is to be forthcoming. A related demand isthat forests be privatized.

To caricature this long, convoluted trade dispute, UncleSamhas cast a giant,threatening, and lengthening shadowover BCs forest economy (Figure 5). The shadowis deeplyironic, not least because BCs forest economy hasfundamentally developed according to the strictures offree trade, and the central conclusion of Shearer andcolleagues (1973) was that a continental free-tradeagreement would have little impact on BC! In the presentdispute, in various U.S. and international courts and tradehearings, the argument that BCs forest policies constitutea subsidy has been consistently rejected. In contrast, manyother forest regions across North America have receiveddirect grants and tax breaks, while in the United States,despite much rhetoric to the contrary, only a small amountof the timber harvest (14 percent) is subject to marketauction (Reed 2002). Canada,however, has little leverageto place U.S. policies on the table.

These ironies notwithstanding, BCs predicament inthe softwood lumber dispute is not simply due to thepolitical power or bullying by the CFCLI. Canadianhandling of the trade dispute has been inept andfragmented (Hayter 2000a, 23240). The basic error

Table 2. Forest Policy Reregulation in British Columbia: Key Initiatives

Policy Comment

Revised stumpage formula, 1988 Shift from market-based system to waterbed system (introduced 1988, retained by new provincial

government).

Parks, 1990 2.5 millionhectaresaddedtotheprovincialprotected-areasystem between 1990and 1995,withgoalto have

12 percent of provincial land base in parks to conserve environmental values. 108 new parks in 1995.

Commission on Resources andEnvironment (CORE), 1992 CORE established to develop regional land-user plans for entire province.

Pulp-mill effluent standards,1992 New targets for all pollutants; AOX levels to be reduced to zero by 2001.

Stumpage level ratchets, 1992 Ratcheting up of stumpage on yearly basis after 1992.

Timber supply reviews, 1992 Reassessmentof allowable annualcut (AAC)for industry, to assessfall-downeffect andeffects of provincial

policies.

Clayoquot Sound Compromise,

1993

Committees representing numerous interest groups proposed (first) Land Use Plan, in 1993; scientific

advisory panel established.

Treaty process, 1993 Canada-BC Memorandum of Understanding creates a five-stage treaty process to resolve aboriginal land

claims that cover entire province.

Forest Renewal BC, 1994 New agency, funded from super stumpage, with broad mandate to invest in silviculture, help forest

communities, workers, firms, and other interest groups, and fund research projects and organizations.

NewFo established in 1997 to redirect laid-off union workers to silviculture.

Forest Practices Code, 1995 Reform forestry to meet environmental values: size of clear-cuts reduced; continuous clear-cutting

eliminated; wildlife, biotic, and aesthetic values incorporated in forest plans.Jobs Accord, 1997 Agreement in principle with industry to promote jobs, especially by small firms and in value-added.

Subsidies for new jobs provided.

Small firms, 1998 In 1998, 5 percent of wood fiber of tree-farm licenses diverted to small firms; more wood fiber diverted in

1990s. Industry association activity funded.

Community forests Proposals requested in 1997, with three to be awarded.

Tenure reform? Devolution? Market-driven timber pricing?

Source: Hayter (2000a, 90).

If you want free trade, raise stumpage! (1983)

If you want free trade, privatize your forests (2000)

Figure 5. British Columbias contestedspace: In the longshadow of

Uncle Sam. This cartoon was drawn at my request by Bill Schuss.

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made by the Canadian federal government, which hashaunted them since, was to link an export tax withstumpage in the 1986 MOU. Canadian negotiatorsproclaimed the MOU a triumph since an export taxretained revenues within Canada that would have beenotherwise lost to the United States if a tariff had been

imposed. Increased stumpage to reduce the export tax hadsimilar implications. The Canadian government, however,failed to appreciate the MOUs implications for Canadiansovereignty. As Percy and Yoder (1987, xxvi) note, theMOU is historic with enormous implications for Cana-dian resource industries in general because it marked thefirst time American governments had directly challengedthe resource-management policy of another country andhad done so based on legal-political argumentsrather thaneconomic grounds. This view proved prescient, as theMOU provided a loophole for the CFCLI to influencedomestic forest policies and it has fully exploited the

opportunity. Moreover, since 1983, the Canadian side hasnot effectively used sympathetic support within theUnited Statesspecifically, interest groups linked toU.S. consumersnor has it presented a united front.The views of the BC government have often differed fromthose of other provinces and the federal government, andthe allocation of quotas has led to unprecedented publicbickering among corporate leaders. In the late 1980s andearly 1990s, the Socreds and NDP sometimes publiclysupported the CFCLIs subsidy arguments, in the naivebelief that by simply increasing stumpage, the tradedispute could be resolved (and that the forest industrycould adjust to higher-value production). Such supportfor the CFCLIs views has undermined the coherenceof Canadas bargaining position and the implications ofrulings by international and U.S. trade adjudicationbodiesthat have concluded that Canadian stumpage policies arenot subsidies. Further, the BC government continuedto welcome foreign ownership, most controversially the1999 acquisition of BCs corporate champion, MacMillanBloedel (MB), by Tacoma, Washington-based giantWeyerhaeuser. Weyerhaeuser is now BCs biggest firm; itcontrols substantial timberlands on either side of theborder, and its flexibility in integrating its cross-borderoperations would clearly benefit fromprivatization and logauctions in BC.

ENGOs: Claiming the Great Bear

Rainforest for the Globe

Like the CFCLI, ENGOs have increased their demandson BCs forest space, unappeased by forest reregulation.As illustrated by the formation of the Friends of Clayoquot

Sound in 1979 to protest logging on Meares Island, ENGOopposition to the forest industry began as localized loggingblockades, transparently organized by local people, whooften sought legal support to preserve locally prized forestsBy the mid-1980s, the scale of valley-by-valley conflictshad expanded, court injunctions were ignored if unfavor

able, nonlocal ENGOs had becomeinvolved,and criminabehavior such as tree-spikingwas occurring. By the time othe Clayoquot Sound protests of 19901993, when over1,000 people were arrested, ENGO opposition to theforest industry was being orchestrated internationallyorganized principally by Greenpeace International and itsaffiliates, along with the U.S.-based Rainforest ActionNetwork (RAN) and Natural Resources Defense Counci(NRDC). Localized logging blockades were complemented by globally based market boycott campaigns, sources ofinancing had shifted toward trust funds based in theworlds leading cities, and protests were publicized by

skilled, even manipulative use of the media across NorthAmerica and Europe. Indeed, Greenpeace Internationahad decided to target BC forest policy as a strategicpriority, shifting its forestry organization from Amsterdamto Vancouver in 1996, while Greenpeace Canada movedits forest head office from Toronto to Vancouver in 1993

Greenpeace, RAN, and NRDC justified their campaigns on the basis of the globally unique and significantecological values of BCs old-growth forests, especially thecoastal temperate rainforests, symbolized by the whitekermode bear of the central coast. In 1993, theseorganizations began an ambitious global campaign topreserve old growth in BCs coastal region, includingmuch of Vancouver Island, which they would like torename the Great Bear Rainforest (Figure 6). ENGOshave also proposed preservation of a vast swath of interiorBC known as the Y2Y (Yellowstone to Yukon corridor)Publicity campaigns, requests for donations, researchreports, blockades, support from the rich and famous,and consumer boycotts, however, have featured the GreaBear Rainforest (McAllister and McAllister 1997; Wilson1998; Stansbury 2000).11 ENGOs have clearly becomemore than wannabe remappers. The extensive impacts oENGO activity on corporate and government policy isymbolized by victories for remapping BC, most notably in1999, when the Clayoquot Sound became a UnitedNations Educational,Scientific, and Cultural (UNESCO)biosphere region in which logging has been almoseliminated.

Further, in 2001, ENGOs engineered an agreementinvolving sixty-five separate parties that has been pro-claimed as a landmark deal to protect a vast swath of thecentral coast dubbed the Great Bear Rainforest and torepair the provinces tarnished international image

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(Hamilton and Kines 2001, A6). Indeed, a spokespersonfor Greenpeace Europe claims that BC has moved fromglobal pariah to ecohero in one day (Hamilton andKines 2001, A6) and that Greenpeace will immediatelystop its market boycotts, as well as logging blockadesplanned for the summer. The core of this Great BearPact protects 600,000 hectares of old growth (seen as alegacy for the world), anticipates creation of communityforests, and compensates firmsthat have lost logging rights(Kines 2001, A5). In this region and elsewhere, ENGOsare also demanding that any logging of old growth must beecocertified according to the Forest Steward Council, athird-party ENGO based in Mexico, rather than byother organizations deemed to have links to industry. Sucha development would considerably deepen ENGO controlover BCs forest economy.

Even though differences between ENGOs in strategiesand tactics are evident, they have collectively resisted thewood-exploitation alliance without much public criticismof one another. Few provincial government initiativeshave satisfied the ENGOs, an attitude justified by theirperceived global mandates. ENGOs rejected the ForestCodethe environmental centerpiece of the reregula-tionbecause for some groups, such as the Sierra LegalDefense Fund, it is not enforced properly, while for others,such as Greenpeace, it is inappropriate because it still

permits the clear-cutting of old growth. Similarly, thegovernments achievement in doubling the size of pro-tectedparklandto12percentofBCslandbaseaUnitedNations (UN) target for the globeis dismissed byENGOs as a minimum level. ENGOs were also incensedby the governments initial Clayoquot Sound Compro-

mise: those protests only ended with the UNESCObiosphere decision. ENGO disdain for the provincialgovernment was underlined in 1999, when an announce-ment of a (secret) agreement between Greenpeace andWeyerhaeuser regarding the Great Bear proved prematurebecause they had not gained support from local commu-nities such as aboriginal peoples or, indeed, even botheredto mention their plan to the government, the owner of thepublic forest.

The Clayoquot protests of 1993 also marked a sig-nificant split between ENGOs and unionized labor,as jobs were threatened and subsequently lost in the

UNESCO biosphere decision. In fact, the ENGO protestswere smaller than the labor-organized counterdemonstra-tion, butthe former has becomelegendary and the latterforgotten, symbolic of shifting power between the institu-tions. Indeed, the Great Bear Pact of 2001 was basicallynegotiated between ENGOs and corporations, littleinfluenced by unions (and local communities), who lost500 jobs in the deal. Whether this pact will mark the endto the war in the woods, as some claim, remains to be seen(Hamilton and Kines 2001, A1). While ENGOs see it as afirst step (Kines 2001, A5), compensation levels havenot been agreed upon and unions and communities areunhappy, ENGOs and the CFCLI are cooperating to fightBCs forest policies, and differences between urban andrural values remain evident. Land claims also have tobe resolved.

Aboriginal (First Nations) Land Claims

Long-simmering aboriginal discontent over failures tosign treaties in BC flared up in the early 1980s and wasgiven significant impetus by two major political initiatives,one national and one provincial. Nationally, the federalgovernment repatriated the constitution from the UnitedKingdom in 1982 and created a Charter of Rights andFreedoms that enshrine aboriginal rights while enhanc-ing the powers of the court system. Provincially, BCsgovernments had traditionally denied responsibility fortreaty-making, pointing to federal responsibility in thisregard (Tennant 1990). This attitude changed in 1991,when the new NDP government committed itself toredressing aboriginal grievances and helping to bringpeace in the woods. In 1993, the provincial and federal

0 100 200 km

0 50 100 mi

Queen

Charlotte

Islands

Greater Great BearRainforest

Clayoquot Sound

Meares Island

Yellowstone

White horse

Great Bear Rainforest

Y2Y Corridor

Stein Valley

Walbran Park

ElahoValley

Figure 6. British Columbias contested space: Environmental

imperatives.

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governments, in cooperation with native groups, agreed toa new treaty process that, as a general principle, soughtto empower aboriginal peoples by recognizing theirinherent rights to self-government and control overresources. Their growing characterization as First Na-tions connotes respect for tradition and empowerment

beyond the powers of municipal governments, to includeexclusive nation-state discretion. The treaty processassumed that ab-original self-government would redresspolitical grievances, initiate sustaining forms of localdevelopment, and reduce the uncertainty facing invest-ments in BCs forest economy arising from land claims andassociated protests. The new process, however, has notevolved as intended. While it immediately led to over-lapping treaty claims covering the entire province (mapn.d.), including four claims on the central coast over-lapping the Great Bear Rainforest proposal and existingTFLs (Figure 7), none had been concluded by the end of

2002. The only recently completed treaty, agreed uponwith the Nisgaa in 1999, was conducted outside of thenew process.12

Several factors have frustrated the process. First, theprocess only identified steps in the planning processwithout specifying principles that defined inherent rights

limits to claims, or forms of compensation. Secondaboriginal appeals to the court system have taken timeand legal decisions have not been political solutions. Inparticular, in the split decision in Delgamuukw in1997,theSupreme Court of Canada overturned a Supreme Court oBC decision to confirm aboriginal rights and use of oratraditions in support of these rights (Bell 1998). Yet theimplications are ambiguous, and even supporters othe aboriginal movement argue that Delgamuukw subjects aboriginal rights to broad and vague restrictions(Flanagan 1998, 279). Fourth, while Delgamuukw advisedthat land claims should be resolved politically, aborigina

Figure 7. British Columbias contested space: Aboriginal land claims on the central coast.

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leaders differ on whether the courts or political negotia-tions provide the most appropriate route to advanceland claims. Possibly, Canadian politicians had alsohoped for unequivocal legal solutions to land claimsdilemmas.

Finally, the treaty process has been divisive in both

aboriginal and nonaboriginal communities. Several nativebands have refused to join the treaty process or havewithdrawn, while the Nisgaa Treaty was (temporarily)challenged by rival bands and a few Nisgaa women.Recently, a judge in the Supreme Court of BC permitted alegal challenge from a dissident Nisgaa community(Mulgrew 2002). While the judge dismissed the dissi-dents concern that the Nisgaa Tribal Council had toomuch power over them, he accepted that the NisgaaTreaty may have undermined federal and provincialpowers and associated individual Canadian rights. Froma nonaboriginal perspective, provincial and federal

governments inevitably debate over forms of resourcetransfers to aboriginal peoples in terms of the mix of landand money, since land must come fromthe province. Morefundamentally, there is no social consensus that aboriginalpeoples should have exclusive entitlements and inherentrights,even if this is the legal and governmental view. Thecritics underline the vast potential costs of treaties andexpress beliefs that place-based treatiesincluding theallocation of forest resources specifically to aboriginalpeoplesconfound relationships between economicdevelopment, specialization, and integration and, atworst, are a form of apartheid that will prolong marginality(Estey 1999).

Since 1980, aboriginal land claimsin BC have escalatedin a way that has fueled rather than assuaged uncertaintyfacing forest-sector restructuring. Treaties have not beencompleted, but aboriginal peoples are no longer marginalactors in the forest economy. Brief reference to the Haidapeople, who number about 2,500 in their traditionalterritory of the Queen Charlotte Islands (Haida Gwaii), isinstructive in this regard. After their designation as TFL39 in 1961, the Queen Charlottes became a major logsupply area for MBs timber-processing facilities to thesouth (Hayter 1976). The Haida were not consulted. Inthe 1980s, the Haida joined with ENGOs to blockadelogging, and in 1987, South Moresby became a nationalpark, excluding logging. When Weyerhaeuser acquiredMB in 1999, the Haida began legal action opposing thetransfer of TFL 39, because they had not been consulted(Lee 2002). While, as of May 2003, this case had yet to beheard, in 2002 the Haida filed a land claim to the entirearchipelago, noting that all Crown land is subject toaboriginal title, and they have circulateda draft protocolestablishing Haida interests. Incidentally, these interests

extend to resources beneath the sea, a new developmentin treaty claims. In the meantime, as Weyerhaeuser hasscaled back logging plans and engaged an Indian-ownedlogging contractor, the Haida have become adept atwielding influence on issues ranging from where a newhospital should go to how the Gwaii Haanas national park

on South Moresby is operated. Theyve mastered the art ofusing observer status to subtly influence . . . communitymeetings, where people defer to them out of not wantingto exclude or offend (Lee 2002, D3). For aboriginalpeoples, if the courts have not prescribed solutions to themeaning of aboriginal title, they have clearly indicatedthat native interests must be heard and accommodated(Palmer 2002). The implications of this accommodation,along with aboriginal threats to shut BC, are casting anuncertain shadow over the restructuring of the foresteconomy (Hunter 2002).

Evolving Alliances

In BC, since the Friends of Clayoquot Sound co-operated with the Nuu-cha-nulth Tribal Council to obtaininjunctions to stop the logging of Meares Island in theearly 1980s, ENGOs and aboriginal peoples have formednatural alliances against the wood-exploitationalliance.Admittedly, aboriginal peoples have clashed with ENGOs.For example, on arrival in Tofino Harbour in 1993 on hisconverted warship, Sea Shepherd, Paul Watson ofGreenpeace faced vociferous opposition from local nativeleaders to his proposed tree-spiking strategy as a way ofdemonstrating land claims (Bohn 1993). In anotherpublicized clash, Chief Watts of the Nuu-cha-nulth was afeatured participant in an NDP-organized tour of Europethat defended BCs forest policies against spiraling ENGOcriticisms. Nevertheless, ENGOs have diligently main-tained contact and redressed concerns with aboriginalpeoples, whom they portray as models of local control inharmony with nature (MGonigle and Parfit 1994). Inturn, ENGO protests and networks have invigoratedaboriginalism. As Larry Baird of the Ucluelet band warnedthe next premier of BC, should he think about derailingthe treaty process, We will go to the markets of the worldand tell them what you are doing. We are well connected. . . and we will use these relationships to harm thisprovince if you are going to harm us . . . I have someinfluential friends who would dearly love to tackle youhead on (Bula 2001, A6). One of the friendsmentioned is Robert Kennedy, Jr., leader of the NRDCand promoter of the Great Bear Rain Forest.

As the war in the woods has deepened, unusualalliances between rival groups have evolved. Most

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notably, ENGOs have openly supported the CFCLI inopposing BCs forest policies. Even though it is a stridentopponent of logging interests in the United States, theNRDC has become a highly vocal supporterof the CFCLI.Thus, at a Washington news conference, the NRDC andother leading environmental groups announced that

they were joining forces with the U.S. timber industry torestrict Canadian imports (Hamilton and ONeil 2001,D7). In turn, at this conference, Max Baccus, on behalf ofthe CFCLI, widened the scope of its accusation that BCsforest policy subsidized the forest industry to include laxenvironmental protection, citing the absence of anendangered species act in Canada (Hamilton and ONeil2001, D7). In BC, ENGOs, led bythe Sierra Legal DefenceFund, have timed publication of reports highly critical ofBCs forest practices to occur prior to crucial tradenegotiations. Indeed, in a tirade against BCs forestpolicies that linked subsidies not only to low stumpage but

also to high wages, the coordinator of the BC Environ-mentalNetwork supported theidea of timber auctions andthe export of raw logs and urged British Columbiansto collaborate with American critics (Cooperman2002, A11).

There are also growing connections between corpora-tionsand even laborand aboriginal peoples andENGOs. Forest corporations, in particular, have increas-ingly hired aboriginal people, established contractingrelations, and entered into joint business ventures (JBVs)with aboriginal peoples (Hayter 2000b, 339). Existingreserve areas contain timber, usually not well managed,and corporationsclearly sense that treaty-making will shiftfurther resources to aboriginal control. JBVs and con-tracting out to aboriginal companies also deflect conflictswith ENGOs. Recently, some (union) loggers and millworkers, both laid-off and working, have opined a need towork with ENGOs and especially aboriginal peoples. Onthe Queen Charlottes, for example, Weyerhaeusersloggers took a day off work to consult with the Haida.Indeed, one worker claimed that he would rather workfor the Haida and get rid of thecompany altogether, whilesuggesting that ex-loggers and the environmentalistswill unite in another war in the woods against theprovincial government if it cannot resolve land claims andproblems of overcutting (Peters 2002, 102). This view iscertainly not the union positionENGOs and unionsremain strongly antagonisticand JBVs and contractingout to aboriginal companies have been slow to provethemselves operationally. Nevertheless, these develop-ments underline the uncertain winds of change blowingthrough BCs forest economy while exposingthe decline ofability of the provincial governmentwhether right-wingor left-wingto lead its remapping.

Ironically, as the remappers have collectively disem-poweredthe provincial government,the latter hasbecomeless capable of resolving the issues they raise. Thegovernment has limited room to maneuver. Indeed, in1998, its modifications of the Forest Practices Code(Hayter 2000a, 15152) and modest stumpage reduction

tohelptheforestindustryregainprofitabilityinBCwhileitwas booming in the rest of Canada further alienatedENGOs and the CFCLI. The privatization debate furtherunderscores provincialdisempowerment. The CFCLI, theBC forest industry, and other observers favor privatizationof Crown forests, in part because private ownership isexpected to provide incentives to invest in sustainableresource management (Drushka 1993). In 1999, theexasperated Minister of Forests, himself a former unionleader, agreed with this view, perhaps also wishing tosimply devolve responsibility away from the governmentWhatever his motives, ENGOs stridently oppose privati

zation, as do aboriginal peoples until their land claims aresettled, and the Ministers suggestion was immediately(effectively) criticized by ENGOs (Burda 1999).

Remapping British Columbia

Since Confederation, the forest economy has played adefining role in the economy and culture of BC. Followinglarge-scale industrialization in the 1880s, the first capitalist mapping of BCs forest economy reflected the spiritof an entrepreneurial model. In the 1940s, BCs foresteconomy was remapped according to Fordist principlesand the wood-exploitation alliance of government, bigbusiness, and union labor overwhelmed this first, entre-preneurial map without entirely replacing it. The Fordistmap, now subject to so much criticism, neverthelesexhibited growth, stability, significant income and sociaequality, andmultipleuses,albeit at theexpenseof aboriginaand environmental values. With gathering force after the1970s, but especially since the deep recession of the early1980s, a third remapping of BC is evolving. This map isproving much harder to draw. The difficulties arise becauseof the institutionalized strengths of vested interests, becausethe institutions representing the wannabe remappers canonly agree on their opposition to the vested interests but noon solutions, and because the provincial government is lessautonomousthanitwasinthe1880sor1940s.How will BCsfuture map be drawn? BC is on the knife-edge of unrulinessin which maps with widely differing social implications arepossible. Two polar typesone democratic, the otheauthoritarianillustrate some possibilities.

The North Cowichan community forest is small (5,000hectares), privately owned by the municipality, and anelected council, which cannot alienate forest land withou

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a referendum, is responsible for forest policy. Its uniqueorigins lie in the 1930s, when forest owners who could notpay their debts lost their land to the municipality(Figure 8). The forest is managed by two forestersappointed by the council and advised by a seventeen-member (voluntary)Forest Advisory Board. The councils

policy is governed by severalimportantprinciples,notably:that local buyers receive a three-percent discount; thatforest activitiesmust pay for themselves; that the export oflogs is forbidden; that forestry follows multiple-useprinciples; and by the new Forest Practices Code. Inpractice, the forest generates surpluses for the munici-pality in supplying a range of products to various buyers.This community forest is a model of local democratic

control and planning: it caters to multiple stakeholders,providing a range of economic, environmental, aesthetic,and recreational functions, and is based on all kinds offormal and informal interactions and participation. Ingeneral, support for some form of community forests isgrowing in BC, while the plethora of JBVs, ecocertifica-

tion, various partnership arrangements between old andnew institutional actors, and (occasional) expressions ofmutual understanding between vested interests and thewannabe remappers all suggest possibilities for strongerregional cooperation. Admittedly, there are serious ques-tions about its practicality.

In an alternate and more threatening scenario, theprincipal remappers have made a deal to divide BC into

Duncan

CroftonA

BC

D

E

F

trait

ofGeorg

ia

0 5 km

1

Chemainus

Figure 8. The North Cowichan Community Forest.

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kingdoms over which they maintain control; industryover privatized forests, ENGOs over parks, and aboriginalpeoples over treaty areas (Figure 9). This map reveals theface of authoritarianismeven imperialismbased onstrategic cooperation among the principal remappers.Fundamentally, this map is about control and exclusive

rather than inclusive use. Given its hypothetical nature,the map reveals real tendencies away from a multiple-usemodel toward broad zones shaped by the demands of themost powerful remappers. These tendencies are illustratedby demands for privatization and industry working circles,ENGO attempts to create and control the Great BearRainforest, and the insistence that the treaty processcreate race-based enclaves controlled by leaders who mayor may not represent their members. Any interactionamong such zones would be formal and political,enforced by (corporate, aboriginal, and ENGO) gate-keepers. Such a map is authoritarian, possibly socially

regressive, and less egalitarian than the landscape domi-nated by the old wood-exploitationalliance. This is no idlethreat. Major bastions of democratic practice underlyingthe Fordist landscapeespecially elected provincial gov-ernments, labor unions, and community governmentshave lost power during post-Fordism. Meanwhile, ENGOs

and aboriginal peoples, who are less committed todemocratic traditions, have more power, while largebusiness organizations, which are inherently hierarchicain nature, remain influential.13

For economic geography, BCs contested forest economy is a reminder that rethinking regions (Allen

Massey, and Cochrane 1998) needs to incorporate alkinds of places, including resource peripheries, not juscores. In BC, for example, the restructuring of the foresteconomy demands a synthesis of cultural, economicenvironmental, and political institutionalisms that aredriven by fundamentally different motives and haveclashed in ways not evident in cores. During post-Fordismas places have become increasingly globally integratedthey have remained unique and the local vitally impor-tant. In BCs case, global forces have been intense andcomplex; globalization must be seen as a multidimensiona(environmental, cultural, economic, and political) phe-

nomenon. Yet globalization in BC cannot be understoodwithout reference to the local. BC is a contested spaceprecisely because remapping its territory is important. Thefailure of government to resolve BCs war in the woodsfurther testifies to this importance. Contested placehave distinct forms of stickiness. In BC, peace in thewoods proposes a preferred geographybut not theonly one.

Acknowledgments

I am especially grateful for the advice offered by Trevor

Barnes, Alex Clapp, Jerry Patchell, and Dietrich Soyezvitall