Relationship between political orientation and socio economic status in Chilean political culture: a

political psychology approach*

Andrés Haye Héctor Carvacho

Roberto González Jorge Manzi* *

Carolina Segovia* * *

Abstract: Based on a longitudinal study about political culture in Chile, we discuss the paradoxical evidence found in the literature suggesting, on one hand, that the more pro-democratic and anti-authoritarian political attitudes are expected to be observed in higher economic level groups and, on the other hand, more conservative and anti-egalitarian attitudes are expected to be observed in dominant groups. We found that the pattern of political attitudes (authoritarianism, support to democracy, conservatism, and nationalism) is similar among right wingers of high economic status, left wingers of low economic status, and centrists of middle economic status. Instead, individuals whose political standing is incongruent with their socio economic group, show a pattern of political attitudes different from the predominant pattern. We conclude that the paradox can be solved explaining the pattern of political attitudes of a social group as a function of the adjustment of its political identity to its socio economic condition.

Key words: ideology, political attitudes, social class, political identity, Chile.

Relación entre orientación política y condición socioeconómica en la cultura política chilena: una aproximación desde la psicología política

Resumen: A partir de un estudio longitudinal sobre cultura política en chilenos, discutimos la paradojal evidencia

encontrada en la literatura que plantea que, por un lado, las actitudes políticas más pro-democráticas y anti-autoritarias se observarían en sectores sociales acomodados y, por otro lado, las actitudes más pro-conservadoras y anti-igualitaristas se observarían en grupos sociales dominantes. Nuestros datos muestran que el patrón de actitudes políticas (autoritarismo, apoyo a la democracia, conservadurismo y nacionalismo) es similar entre personas de derecha de estrato alto, izquierda de estrato bajo, y centro de estrato medio. En cambio, quienes manifiestan una orientación política incongruente con su condición socioeconómica presentan actitudes políticas diferenciadas del patrón predominante. Concluimos que la paradoja puede resolverse explicando el patrón de actitudes políticas de un grupo en función del (des)ajuste de la orientación política a sus condiciones socioeconómicas.

Palabras clave: ideología, actitudes políticas, clase social, identidad política, Chile. Received: 13.05.2009 Accepted: 10.06.2009

* * *

Introduction Since Marx began to use the ideology notion in the broad sense it has until today, very much has been

written on this topic in diverse social sciences fields. In very general terms, this notion refers to the problem of complex, if not dark relations between ideas and beliefs a community supports and its life social statuses. Sociology, history, philosophy, esthetics, political science, psychoanalysis and social psychology have entered upon multiple ideology problems aspects, without such problems reaching clear theoretical resolution, and they have analyzed different contemporary world ambiences using the ideology notion without being provided up to today with a precise agreed use of the concept. It speaks at the same time how evasive and difficult this concept is, as well as its heuristic power to stimulate the reflection and investigation in these diverse social sciences fields.

In the use Marx gives to the ideology concept, this is understood, in the modern society’s historical

frame, as the conscience social production which psychological compliance allows, under certain circumstances, to keep hidden flaws and proper contradictions of the same social process which generates it, the capitalism (Larraín 2007, Marx and Engels 1845/1974). Among the notion central features, it is necessary to emphasize on one hand that the ideology fulfills the social reality receiving action and, on another, it is anchored in the psychological means of representation and action. This false call conscience function would differ from the clergy trick theories, which were present in the debate before Marx, since in the ideology case the hiding is not a consequence of a deliberate trick but of a production system of the functional conscience to the maintaining and development of the current social order (Lenk 1974). The conscience production system notion remits to the individuals’ socialization in certain ways of perceiving and arranging the world, and in particular values through which judge and hierarchy the experience, as well as to act with sense in the world. This anchoring of the hiding operation in the subjective configuration of individuals would depend on a social organization of socialization practices that remain institutionalized, for example, in the family and school instances (Althusser 1997).

Both ideas, the hiding function and the ideology psychological anchoring, have been discussed

extensively in the last 150 years (see for example Adorno and Horkheimer 1969, Althusser 1997, Jost 2006, Jost et al. 2009, Jost et al. 2008, Knight 2006, Larraín 2008, Lenk 1974); along this article will be themed specially from the evidence we have found in a study on political culture done in Santiago, Chile. On one hand, the ideology hiding function will be entered upon in terms of the relation observed in the study between the positions people take in front of diverse political world aspects and its socio economic existence conditions. In this sense, this article brings the study results with a specific focus in the crossing between political culture and socio economic level.

On the other hand, the psychological ideology anchoring examination will be based on the study object

definition: the psychological individuals’ dispositions. The methodological approach of this investigation involves an approach to the representation forms and the action sense especially in terms of people’s political attitudes. The attitude notion (see Eagly and Chaiken 1993) integrates the cognitive (representation) and motivational (action) dimensions in the form of evaluation position captures of individuals against situations or world elements, in this case, politic (see for example Robinson et al. 1999). Especially, the political attitudes notion refers to individuals widespread psychological tendencies, that is to say, to inclinations towards one or another position attitude against structural or relatively stable aspects of the political world (in contrast with punctual or contingent aspects), as the favorable / unfavorable disposal to authoritarian relations to support order (authoritarianism, see Altemeyer 1998, Feldman 2003), the positive / negative disposition against institutions of the political world (like support, confidence, etc., see Citrin and Muste 1993, Segovia et al. 2008), or the social promotion / resistance disposition to change (conservatism, Jost et al. 2003a). Operationally, attitudes are understood from multiple position attitudes records regarding statements that affirm something about some of the politician world aspects. This way, the present article registers in the tradition of social-political psychology (for example, Adorno et al. 1950, Jost et al. 2009), especially in the perspective to understand the political group culture as the joint of political attitudes of the individuals who compose it (Almond and Verba 1965, Pye and Verba 1965, Jost et al 2009).

In social psychology, the most influential ideology definition is the one presented by Adorno and his

collaborators (1950). For them ideology is an organization of opinions, attitudes and values, a way of thinking about man and society. Several of the most important authors in the area (Billig 1984, Jost 2006, Kerlinger 1984) have based their own works on this definition. We equally follow this perspective, but we will assume the following conceptual distinctions for this article.

Political culture, ideology, political attitudes We will name political culture the organization of beliefs and evaluations as regards the political

world, on which are supported social practices opened in that political world in a certain society, and which is different from the organization of beliefs and evaluations of another society according to its specific social history and its political world characteristics. This way, Chileans political culture will be the way in which

predominantly are organized visions and political preferences between Chileans in a relatively stable way through time. This theoretical definition, therefore, implies that operationally it is important to identify beliefs and relatively deep or permanent evaluations, in contrast with contingent elements. This concept of political culture, therefore, denotes something very similar to the ideology concept earlier quoted: "organization of opinions, attitudes and values». Nevertheless, it is about a level of different description. The political culture notion implies that it is common to group members. Nevertheless, typically the political world is an object of controversies structured in a systematical way concerning particular ideological orientations (Billig et al. 1988). The political culture ideological character takes root exactly in the differentiation of beliefs and evaluations inside the society. Certainly in a political culture typically are a few principles completely shared between society members, but such principles acquire an ideological value (and possibly of false conscience) only from the alternative values point of view which can come from other societies or epochs, as well as being imagined from the denial or reflective modification of the own principles commonly presupposed.

Here we understand ideology as a specific orientation of beliefs and evaluations inside a society

constituted by its difference with other orientations inside the same society. For example, this distinction will be used to identify particular movements of certain groups to the interior of the Chilean political culture which, differing like a majority or, alternatively, differing from the majority, establish particular ways of ideologically manifest, following a specific political attitudes configuration pattern that will be discussed towards the end of the article. The ideological configuration of a group would be, then, the common profile of political attitudes members of such group show. In this sense, an ideology is the attitudes pattern common to a group from the point of view of its difference politically relevant with other patterns. A political culture differentiates ideologically according to dimensions (like for example authoritarianism, liberalism, conservatism, nationalism, etc.) which are relevant for the structure of social practices tied to a certain political world. Hence, between two ideological groups, for example one pro democratic and another anti democratic, the democracy support dimension constitutes a common structural aspect of political culture and at the same time a relevant factor of ideological differentiation.

Finally, at a more concrete level, we will do a distinction between political orientation and ideological

configuration. We understand the first one like the subject position in terms of oppositions as for example left / right, liberal / conservative, democracy / authoritarianism, pro/anti government, etc., that is to say of widespread symbolic polarities. In this study we have operated on the political orientation of people as their self positioning in a left - right dimension, which is more extensively used in the investigation (Jost 2006) and the one that turns out to be more familiar to the language of Chilean political culture (Colomer and Escatel 2005, Navia 2004, 2005, 2007, Ortega 2003). In this sense, the political orientation can be hoped to serve like an abstract summary of ideology, or ideological configuration, as soon as particular way of multiple political attitudes organization, as are the authoritarian dispositions, the democracy support level, the grade of social resistance to change, the confidence towards particular political institutions, etc., that in their set endure a complexity and level multiplicity the political orientation does not have (Jost et to. 2009). If the political orientation is or not a good group ideology summary in a certain political culture, it is an empirical question that has been entered upon in diverse contexts and with multiple means (Colomer and Escatel 2005, Jost 2006, Jost et al. 2009, Knight 1999).1

Ideology and socio economic condition The relation between ideology and economic access level, as well as the position in the economic

structure, has been raised very early in the social sciences discussion. In the Marxist tradition, this relation becomes relevant in Lukács and Althusser´s works. The first one influenced by Lenin's work, raises a neutral ideology concept, differing from Marx's expositions (Larraín, 2008) which do not imply conscience being always and necessarily false or concealing. For Lúkacs, ideology is identified by the concept of class conscience, which can be psychological, when it corresponds to psychologically explicable ideas people have on their life situation; or assigned, when it corresponds to own reactions to a particular position in the process of production (Lukács, 1969). Althusser (1997) proposes that ideology appears like certain world representation which ties men with their existence conditions and to men between themselves; the ideology is present in all man’s activities and it would be only intelligible through its structure, since it would differ in different existing social formations, for example social classes.

In social psychology Adorno et al. (1950) proposed the authoritarian personality was more common in

the hard-working class. This relation has been studied for a long time, being certain consensus on the fact that people from minor income and minor educational level have major authoritarianism levels (Napier and Jost 2008, Schuman et al. 1992). This situation is seen reflected in a major support to the authorities (Carlin 2006). Nevertheless, there is no consensus in the reasons that explain this situation. The influential work of Lipset (Lipset 1960, Lipset and Raab 1978) on the “working class authoritarianism” suggests the intolerance concentrates especially on the economically disadvantageous groups. This work is checked in detail by Napier and Jost (2008) in view of the system justification theory. The system justification theory searches to overcome the previously proposed by the group identity theories (Tajfel and Turner 1986) and of the social domination (Pratto, Sidanius and Levin 2006, Sidanius 1993, Sidanius and Pratto 1999). According to the system justification theory, people not only have favorable attitudes towards their own group, but also towards the existing social system and statu quo (Jost and Hunyady, 2002; 2005; Jost, Banaji, and Nosek, 2004). This would happen, at least partly, because an ideological reason exists to justify the existing social order. This ideological reason would drive to open favor for the exo group, over the own group, and the inferiority internalization of disadvantageous groups, which would be evident principally in a non conscious or implicit level; and that this is stronger into the social order disadvantageous groups (op cit). As hypotheses they argue an explanation for this can be the adaptive aptitudes development to settle, go internally and rationalize the environmental keys, especially those which make change difficult or disable. (Jost, Banaji and Nosek 2004).

Additionally, the same Jost has found a positive interrelation between the right political orientation and

income (Carney et al. 2008), and that income is a right- wing predictor, although weaker than religiosity, authoritarianism (conventionality and moral absolutism), the intolerance and economic conservatism (Napier and Jost 2008); these finds are unstable with the evidence indicated previously.

In other words, the investigation offers us an ambiguous picture. On one hand, the most pro-

democratic and more anti-authoritarian political attitudes would be observed in wealthier social sectors, since they are the product of a more sophisticated process of education, which allows people to develop more elaborated attitudes (Adorno et al. 1950, Jost et al. 2003, Kemmelmeier 2008, Michaud et al. 2009). This thesis, nevertheless, does not sufficiently take into consideration the ideological differences to the interior of the same socio economic sector. On other hand, the most pro-conservative attitudes and more anti-equalitarian would observe in domineering social groups, interested in the maintenance of power and economic access hierarchies( see for example Sidanius and Pratto 1999), while the opposite would happen in oppressed or low social status groups, more favorable to the promotion of social change in pursuit of equality. This second thesis, which prediction is completely opposite to the first one, neither takes into consideration the ideological differences to the interior of the same socio economic sector. In both cases a simple relation is established between ideological and socio economic position. The present article enters upon this relation problem between the ideological position and the economic people’s position, with the hypothesis of which this is a complex relation, which does not allow explaining people’s ideological configuration as linear function of its socio economic condition. In particular, in the article we advocate, with empirical evidence, for a model that centers on ideological differences to the interior of a same socio economic sector and which allows bringing together in a coherent way two theses present in literature, even seeming contradictory. In brief, in this study we have analyzed people’s ideological configuration in terms of those political attitudes which have been especially linked to this discussion on ideological and economic position, namely: authoritarianism, support to democratic systems, conservatism and nationalism.

The investigation Design and sample

To investigate into Chilean’s political culture we have done a longitudinal study with three

measurements for the same subjects, separated by intervals of approximately 14 months. The sample was stratified by age group and level of economic access. We distinguish three socio economic levels characterized by their income and life standard, which might qualify in:

- High level: familiar income higher than $ 2.000.000 (U$3,250) monthly approximately, corresponding to the 10 % superior population (Planning Department, Government of Chile 2006).

- Middle level: familiar income between $ 450.000 (U$750) and $ 2.000.000 (U$3,250) monthly

approximately, corresponding to 50 % of the population (op. cit.). - Low level: familiar income less than $ 450.000 (U$750) monthly approximately, corresponding to 40

% of the population (op. cit.). The design included different age groups because there have been demonstrated ideological

differences associated with cohorts of age (Alwin and Krosnick 1991). There is a well placed perspective on the narrow relation between belonging to an age group socialized under specific conditions and its ideological configuration (Duncan and Agronick 1995, Schuman and Scott 1989, Sears 1990, Steward and Healy 1989). Complementarily, in the political socialization field, as well as in investigations developed from the life cycle theory, it coincides in defining the late adolescence stage or early adulthood as the most decisive period to outline opinions, attitudes and orientations concerning the political matter (Sears and Levy 2003, Steward and Healy 1989). This way for example, there is a high consensus in the association between becoming older and adopting more conservative political attitudes (Glenn 1974, Ross 1989), situation that has already been observed in Chile (Luna 2008).

To distinguish age groups we base on the hypothesis of which political socialization contexts might

form relevant ideological differences between groups (for example in Mcdevitt and Chaffee 2002, also see Dawson and Prewitt 1969, Jennings and Niemi 1981); we define three age groups:

- Older: 53 - 63 years, which were 18 years before the military coup of 1973, having been politically

socialized during the democratic governments before to the military coup (Frei Montalva and Allende´s presidencies).

- Adults: 36 - 43 years, these reached 18 before the return to democracy, and would have actively

taken part in the plebiscite that led to it (Toro 2008). - Young people: 20 - 27 years, which reached 18 around Michelle Bachelet´s 2005 presidential

election and whose political socialization has mainly occur inside a post-dictatorial democratic government. We design a mixed sampling, in which we select randomly a set of Big Santiago’s areas segmented by

socio economic level2. For every area we assigned randomly up to 5 subjects in accordance with quotas by sex and age. We intentionally over represented the high level socio economic group to guarantee sample sizes equivalents for each group, to allow inter group comparability. The contact was done in the subjects domiciles, by poll researchers specially qualified for such effects.

In the first measurement, done the second semester of 2005, we poll 996 valid cases, being 27 % of

them from high socio economic level, 37 % middle, and 36 % low. 52 % of the cases were women and 48 % men. 33 % corresponded to the major age group, 33 % to the adult group and 34 % to the young one. This measurement was done 4 months before the first round of the 2005 presidential election.

The second measurement was done the second semester of 2006. In it we re-contact 695 participants

polled the previous year. Additionally, we contact 146 subjects to replace the sample loss. The sample composition is equivalent in terms of the socio economical, sex and age participants´ level.

The third measurement was done the first semester of 2008 and re-contacted 663 subjects. Of these,

494 were polled in three measurements, 73 in the first and third measurement, and 96 subjects in the second and third measurement; the sample composition also was kept for this measurement.

The sample loss for subjects which took part in all the measurements is 50,4 % between the year 1 and

3. The subjects which took part in at least two measurements correspond to 37,2 %, while 13,2 % of the subjects took part in just one measurement.

In the introduction it was raised that the political culture is a relatively stable organization of attitudes

regarding the political world in a certain society. It is important to consider the relative stability of the relation between such elements through a temporary window, since otherwise it cannot be empirically differentiated the own political culture from those attitudes and contingent opinions, which are more superficial from the ideology notion point of view and are, for the same, more variable in time. This has been, in fact, the main reason of the longitudinal design of the present study, in which we have covered a temporary window of three years and a half. This way, to characterize Chileans political culture we will identify the interrelation pattern of some of these attitudinal elements predominantly through three measurements.

Measures of ideological positioning and political attitudes Political orientation

To estimate the participants´ political orientation we have asked them every measurement year to be

positioned in a scale from 1 to 9, where 1 is left, 5 is center and 9 is right. Jost (2006) and Knight (1999) have showed this is a valid and reliable way of measuring the identification with the left and right political orientations.

Results throw a 5,16 average in the first measurement, 5,07 in the second one, and 5,14 in the third

one, without being significant statistics differences between these measurements (F = 2,768; p <0,05), what shows the self positioning stability in time. This stability, together with the high interrelation between the three political orientation measurements (see Picture 1), testify about the reliability of this measurement.

Picture 1: Interrelations between Political Orientation measurements

Measurement

1 Measurement

2 Measurement 3

Measurement 1

Interrelation de Pearson

1 0,654 *** 0,659 ***

N 922 603 477

Measurement 2

Interrelation de Pearson

1 0,629 ***

N 761 473

Measurement 3

Interrelation de Pearson

1

N 585 *** p < 0,001

Authoritarianism From The Authoritarian Personality publication (Adorno et al. 1950), the authoritarianism has been in

the center of the investigation in political psychology. In this work, is raised that there is a certain personality configuration which collaborates with the political declarations of extreme intolerance and particularly with the fascism. This would be the authoritarian personality, and it would be highly related to the right-wing views and conservatism (Adorno et al. 1950). Adorno´ s expositions have been discussed extensively, for example in Billig (1984, 1986), being until today an object of controversies.3

In our study we understand the authoritarianism as the belief in which the social order is only possible

through the repressive control of citizens by the political authority perceived as legitimate, and consistently through submission to such authority by citizens.

The concept, therefore, contains two aspects. On one hand, the belief in which a strong political

authority must control the social life to be kept in order through repression (prohibition, criminalization, discrimination, etc.) of conducts that imply disobedience or not conformity to the authority or the established norms, if it is necessary by means of open violence. This aspect of political authoritarianism is opposed to democratic equality values of rights and political tolerance. On the other hand is the belief in which the corresponding civic attitude is the unconditional obedience to authority, in opposition to a major personal autonomy. The most popular scales distinguish 3 components: submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionality (Altmeyer 1981, 1998, Funke 2005). We consider only the 2 first ones (which have showed major interrelation and predictive value), since conventionality is also included in the conservatism, which we will discuss further on.

The authoritarianism measurement was done by a scale composed by 5 items, mainly of the

authoritarian aggression component, with which one had to show the grade of agreement or disagreement in a format from 1 to 5 points. It presented a high and stable reliability (α1 = 0,71; α2 = 0,76; α3 = 0,76). The questions are:

- More than parties and political programs, what we need is a leader who solves problems (Latin

barometer). - Governments must use hard hand whenever there are difficulties (Latin barometer). - Instead of so much worry about people’s rights, what this country needs is a firm government (RWA,

Altmeyer, 1998). - In this country judgments delinquents receive are too soft (Radicalism-conservatism Scale, Comrey

and Newmeyer, 1965) - The real keys for a successful society are obedience and discipline (RWA, Altmeyer 1998).

Support to democracy Tironi and Agüero (1999), Mainwaring and Torcal (2003) and Luna (2008) have identified the

authoritarianism- democracy axis as the principal element of political differentiation in Chile, or the adherence or rejection to dictatorship. This situation would be reinforced by the parliamentary election system which encourages the existence of two blocks, the ones who supported Pinochet military dictatorship (right) and those ones who opposed (left). According to Toro (2008), comparing the acceptance levels to democracy at the interior of the continent, Chile would be between the countries at lower support level.

The democracy support was measured by a scale of 3 items, which breaks a question of three

alternatives used in the Latin barometer into three questions of agreement or disagreement from 1 to 5 points. The scale presented an average and stable reliability (α1 = 0,58; α2 = 0,62; α3 = 0,57). The questions used were:

- Democracy is preferable to any other form of government. - In some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one. (Invertid) - To people like me, we do not care whether there is a democratic or a non democratic government.

(Invertid)

Conservatism

From what Jost et al. argues (2003a), the conservatism covers two aspects: the resistance to change and

the acceptance of social differences. Nevertheless, in its own review the conservatism is treated like an ideology, vision or paradigm, in which these two aspects turn out to be articulated in a significant way in terms of a series of attitudes and beliefs, between which six differ: (A) conventionality: high behavioral and attitude conformity to conventions (social norms) that are perceived as supported by society and its authorities (Wilson, 1973); (B) traditionalism: high value of traditions which constitute the historical heredity of society, particularly of religious traditions (Wilson, 1973); (C) fear of disorder: extreme value of mechanisms that assure civic order and calmness in social life (Wilson, 1973); (D) naturalism: belief that society has natural bases which must be recognized and respected, eventually including the belief of certain social differences having a natural substratum (Muller, 2001); (E) system justification: belief that historical survival of institutions or social norms is due to the fact that they satisfy some need or function (Muller, 2001); (F) focus in prevention: preference for the avoidance of risky changes over the promotion of radical ones (Higgins, 1998).

In this study were measured two of the conservatism components: the traditionalism and fear of

disorder. The traditionalism was measured by a scale of 7 questions of 5 points from very disagree to very agree. The scale reliability was high and stable (α1 = 0,63; α2 = 0,72; α3 = 0,72). The items used were

- This country would have lesser problems if family became stronger. (NES) - New ideas and life styles are debilitating our society. (NES) - Our country would be much better if religion were giving more importance. (Radicalism-

conservatism Scale, Comrey and Newmeyer, 1965) - This country has problems because every day they are trying to change something. (Only years 2 and

3) - This country would be better if how things were done in the past was more valued. (Only years 2 and

3) - When things are fine, there is no reason to change them. (Only years 2 and 3) - The one who lives in this country must respect Chilean society’s norms. (Stellmacher and Petzel

2005) Fear of disorder was measured by a scale of 5 questions of 5 points from very disagree to very agree.

Its reliability was α1 = 0,61; α2 = 0,75; y α3 = 0,75. The items used were: - Authorities should worry about making Chile a safe country. - Public safety is the most important thing for the country’s progress. - The only way people do not get into troubles is by respecting society’s norms. (Only years 2 and 3) - While more freedom is given to people, more disorder is in society. (Only years 2 and 3) - Laws give too much protection to criminals. (Radicalism-conservatism Scale, Comrey and

Newmeyer, 1965) (Only years 2 and 3)

Nationalism

It is defined as the non reflexive acceptance of national, state and political authorities, combined with the belief of the own nation superiority (Adorno et al. 1950, Skitk 2005). One hopes that people from the right and people from low socio economic level there should be higher nationalism levels (Adorn et al. 1950, Billig 1995, Billig and Núñez 1998, Skitk 2005). This variable was measured through a scale of 3 questions with high reliability (α1 = 0,73; α2 = 0,73; α3 = 0,77)). The questions, which must be answered in a format of 5 points from very disagree to very agree, were:

- Chile must be an economically domineering country in Latin America. - Neighbor countries would be much better if Chile was influencing them more. - It is very important for me that Chile is number one in everything it does. These five political attitudes measurements have been constructed as scales, that is to say like

constructs based on a multiplicity of observable indicators, which in turn are the positioning of every person in front of items that shape the scale. It grants the measurements major stability. The items scores were equally divided to give the scale score. Hence, the possible values status of the five scales is from 1 to 5. The items were codified so that major scores always mean major levels of the attribute.

Results Chilean political culture general characterization

First of all the averages appear in the political orientation of the socio economic and age groups (see

Table 2). To evaluate the averages differences, we have done a factorial variance analysis with the values of left - right self position as dependent variable. On one hand, it can be evident that the high socio economic levels have a major average than others in every year. This difference, statistically significant (p <0,001), shows high socio economic level people have a more political right orientation than those of other socio economic groups. On the other hand, between the age groups differences do not appear statistically significant (p <0,01) in people’s political orientation. Both remarks are constant through the three measurements.

Table 2: Political orientation average by socio economic level and age group.

Meas. 1 N DS Meas. 2 N DS Meas.3 N DS Socio economic level***

Low 4,901 314

2,151 4,901 26

3 1,78

4 4,847 203 1,778

Middle 4,853 339

1,956 4,882 32

1 1,76

9 4,799 209 1,786

High 5,892 260

1,890 5,684 17

7 1,67

2 5,896 173 1,639

Age group

Youngs 5,164 323

1,955 4,985 27

3 1,66

7 5,014 213 1,755

Adults 4,933 297

2,136 5,182 22

5 1,82

7 5,269 182 1,859

Older 5,377 300

2,073 5,073 26

2 1,86

1 5,138 189 1,793

*** p < 0,001

Note: According to age group there are only statistically significant differences (p <0,05) in the first measurement, between adult and older people.

Table 3 shows the sample average in each of the political attitudes included in the study. From these

averages one can affirm in Chilean’s political culture exists moderately high levels (considering that the scale average point is 3) of authoritarianism, democracy support, traditionalism and nationalism; and high disorder fear values.

To evaluate time stability of these attitudes, it was done for each of them a variance analysis of

repeated measurements. Since it can be appreciated through the significance indexes in the same Table 3 there are statistically significant differences between the measurements of authoritarianism, traditionalism and nationalism; but not in democracy support. All these differences consist on an increase over time, what indicates a certain sample’s "drift towards right", but it does not turn out to be reflected in the measurement of political orientation, as it remains suggested by the absence of significant change through the three measurements of this variable.

Table 3: Political attitudes average in each measurement.

Meas. 1 Meas. 2 Meas. 3 Authoritarianism*** 3,58 3,72 3,85 Support to democracy 3,69 3,68 3,74 Conservatism*** 3,50 3,54 3,69 Fear to disorder 4,12 3,98 4,18 Nationalism*** 3,70 3,79 3,85

*** p < 0,001; *p < 0,05

When comparing these attitudes between age groups, significant statistically differences in variables

related to conservatism (traditionalism and fear of disorder) are found, as it was expected according to literature and other measurements in Chile. There are also differences in the nationalism. All these differences indicate the biggest groups are more "right wingers" than the youngest. Nevertheless, in spite of the differences, the score pattern at the interior of these age groups is similar to that of the whole sample.

Table 4: Political attitudes average by age group.

Youngs Adults Olders Authoritarianism 3,588 3,695 3,709 Support to democracy 3,753 3,709 3,777 Conservatism*** 3,279 3,602 3,742 Fear of disorder*** 3,953 4,044 4,173 Nationalism** 3,610 3,842 3,808 *** p < 0,001; ** p < 0,01

Finally, when comparing by socio economic level, statistically significant differences are obtained (p

<0,001) in all the variables, as it appears in Table 5. Accordingly with what is suggested by literature, low

socio economic level people have higher totals of authoritarianism, traditionalism, nationalism and fear of disorder. On the contrary, the support to democracy increases in the highest socio economic levels. As in the differences case found according to age group, the socio economic level differences neither affect the global tendencies regarding the scores in this set of attitudes. Nevertheless, in contrast to what it happens with the age group factor, which generates differences in some of the attitudes and with sizes of small effects, the socio economic factor produces differences in all the political attitudes and with effect sizes from moderate to big.

Table 5: Political attitudes average by socio economic level.

Low Middle High Authoritarianism*** 3,910 3,637 3,446 Support to democracy***

3,494 3,792 3,954

Conservatism*** 3,734 3,503 3,385 Fear of disorder*** 4,224 4,025 3,921 Nationalism*** 3,927 3,714 3,620

*** p < 0,001

In synthesis, the current Chilean political culture is characterized by a standard nucleus extensively

shared; even inter generational, where coexist a high authoritarianism, support to democracy, traditionalism and nationalism; and fear of disorder’s very high values. The main differences are attributable to socio economic levels, both in the political orientation and in the set of political attitudes. Nevertheless, these differences are paradox, since while in the political orientation the high socio economic level is more from “right“, at the political attitudes level the low socio economic group turns out to be more from “right“. This inconsistency forces us to do a more detailed observation of the relation between these variables.

Relation between political orientation and socio economic level in the Chilean political culture

To explore the relation between socio economic level and political orientation, we have estimated the

averages of each of the political attitudes in nine groups determined by the crossing between these factors. For that we have identified as from left those participants that self positioned between 1 and 3, from center between 4 and 6, and from right between 7 and 9. Figure 1 shows the averages patterns for each of the five studied political attitudes. First of all, it emphasizes certain regularity through the diverse attitudes: in addition to the effect of the already described socio economic level (Table 5), there is a political orientation effect that consists on observing major totals of the above mentioned attitudes in the right wingers groups. The pattern is equivalent but inverse regarding the support to democracy. Secondly, in all the attitudes it is observed that the extreme averages correspond to the right groups from low socio economic level and from left ones of high level status. For example, the group that shows major authoritarianism is that from right of low level, while the minor authoritarianism is in the left of high level. These same groups are those which present extreme support averages to democracy, but in opposite direction. This systematical pattern, observed on having considered the crossing between socio economic level and political orientation, suggests that it is important to analyze the joint effect of such factors to understand the differences in the political attitudes averages.

Figure 1: Marginal averages estimated for political attitudes according to political orientation and socio economic level

 

On having jointly taken into consideration socio economic level and political orientation, it is observed for example that left ¬/low, right / high and center / middle are similar in their traditionalism, fear of disorder and nationalism totals. This attracts attention since it turns out to be unexpected according to literature’s present theses about the relation between ideological and socio economic position. Remarks of this kind allow hypothesizing that a key for understanding these political attitudes patterns takes root in analyzing them according to combinations of political orientation values with economic access levels. In other words, we raise the hypothesis of an interaction between these factors, in the sense that the relation between political orientation and political attitudes is not homogeneous through different socio economic levels. Specially, we will prove the combinations left ¬/low, right / high and center / middle between ideological and socio economic position offer a similar pattern of political attitudes between themselves and different from those that show the combinations left / high and right / low. It must be noticed that this hypothesis does not refer to a standard interaction 4 but to a special interaction which says relation with the congruity grade between the ideological and socio economic position, in terms of what theoretically one would wait according to the majority of literature (Levin et al. 1998, Lukács 1969, Sidaius and Pratto 1999; cf. Adorno et al. 1950 and Jost et al. 2004). For example, in view of the class conscience notion, the most favorable political attitudes to support the statu quo (right) would be observed in domineering sectors and the most inclined to social change (left) attitudes would be observed in dominated groups. This way, to the combinations left ¬/low, right / high and center / middle we will name them operationally coherent, while the combinations left / high and right / low we will call them incongruous. Those groups which show a political orientation that would favor the interests waited for its socio economic group are those we call coherent, while those groups which show a political orientation that would commit an outrage against the interests waited for its socio economic group are those we call incongruous.

Table 6 shows the subjects amount for each of the nine groups derived from the simple crossing

between socio economic level and political position 5. In the diagonal that goes from Left / low to Right / High are the called coherent groups, while those which separate from this diagonal are the incongruous ones. Regarding the subjects amount by cell, it can be appreciated that in all socio economic levels the predominant

group is the center. After the center, in the high level the highest N is the right and in the lowest is the left (although it is not a big difference). That is to say, most of the subjects congregate in the coherent groups.

Table 6: Number of subjects in the political orientation and socio economic level’s crossing.

Left Center Right Low 49 172 42 Middle 56 213 52 High 19 94 64

In Table 7 are shown each of the nine groups in the political attitudes averages. For major clarity, we

have presented the averages for each political attitude in standardized score (z), in such a way that the deviations regarding the zero value can be interpreted as superior (positive) or lower (negative) values to the sample average. One can notice that, in most of the variables the coherent groups have an average near to 0, that is to say, similar to the predominant value in the Chilean political culture.

Table 7: Average z score in political attitudes for each crossing of political orientation at socio economic level.

Authoritaria

nism Support to democracy

Conservatism

Nationalism Fear of disorder

Low/left -0,093 0,507 -0,088 -0,018 -0,172 low/center 0,359 -0,294 0,374 0,294 0,362 low/right 0,684 -0,650 0,677 0,437 0,506 middle/left -0,733 0,685 -0,752 -0,472 -0,547 middle/center -0,054 0,001 -0,094 -0,039 -0,038 middle/right 0,188 -0,502 0,220 0,205 0,189 high/left -1,187 1,150 -1,202 -0,669 -1,120 hight/center -0,643 0,531 -0,424 -0,364 -0,419 high/right 0,161 -0,141 0,159 0,063 0,086

Note: in black letters are the coherent groups´ results.

With the purpose of proving this affirmation we have constructed a congruity index to show in detail

of the joint action the socio economic level and the political orientation would have. This congruity index was constructed with the subtraction of scores in both variables (with the political orientation limited to three values), so each group was assigned a value (socio economic level less political orientation) as Table 8 indicates. The coherent groups have a value of 0 and form a diagonal that crosses three socio economic levels and three political orientations. The negative numbers appear as the incongruity happen towards the right in low socio economic level, while the positive ones as the incongruity occur towards the left in high socio economic level. It can be warned that in this index while higher the incongruity is, the index value is more distant to 0.

Table 8: Congruity values assigned to each crossing of political orientation and socio economic level

Left Center Right Low 0 -1 -2Middle 1 0 -1High 2 1 0

We hypothesized that differences will exist regarding the Chilean political culture (that has an average

of 0 in each of the standardized variables) in those groups presenting major incongruity grade between their socio economic level and political position, while the coherent groups would have levels in the political attitudes that would not differ from those of the Chilean political culture in general. In other words, the levels in the attitudes will be similar to the population average in the coherent groups and different from the population average in the incongruous ones. In Table 9 are shown the tests results of independent samples done for all the congruity index levels in each of the political attitudes. There is compared the groups average presenting certain congruity value with the population average (0) that characterizes the Chilean political culture. As seen highly and partially incongruous groups (for both sides, positive and negative, with values 2, 1,-1 and-2) show statistically significant differences with the population average in all the variables. On the contrary, the coherent groups do not present significant differences with the population average. On having done the analysis disintegrating the coherent groups, this situation persists, that is to say, without caring that between the coherent groups there is one from the left, one from the center and other from right, there are no statistically significant differences between these groups (together or separated) and the sample average. In other words, the coherent groups do not ideologically differ from most of the population; they are aligned with the predominant political culture.

On the contrary, those incongruous groups are those who present extreme values in most political

attitudes. The low socio economic level and from the right groups are those which present major indexes of “right-wing views“ in their political attitudes, while those of high socio economic level from left are those presenting major indexes of “leftism“.

Table 9: Independent samples t tests for each congruity value and sample average (value 0, since z scores are used)

Congruent interaction -2 -1 0 1 2

t gl t gl t gl t gl t gl Authoritarianism

5,02***

41

5,79***

222

-0,38

323

-7,31

***

149

-4,51

***

18

Support to democracy

-4,73***

41

-5,76

***

221

0,97 324

8,20***

148

7,74 ***

18

Conservatism 5,12***

41

5,40***

222

-0,90

323

-7,07

***

149

-6,90

***

18

Nationalism 3,95***

41

4,58***

221

-0,29

323

-4,84

***

149

-2,21

* 18

Fear of disorder

4,33***

41

5,68***

221

-0,67

323

-5,26

***

149

-4,87

***

18

*** p < 0,001; ** p < 0,01; *p < 0,05

To test the interaction way we have described, based on the arithmetical index of the socio economic

level less political orientation, we construct a series of regressions in which we predict the political attitudes

from the income, the political orientation (in the first step) and congruity index (in the second step). That is to say, we evaluate in what extent the congruity index allows explaining the changes in political attitudes, comparing it with the income effects and the political orientation separately.

Table 10 shows these retrogressions coefficients. It is observed for all attitudes the model gains

predictive power on having incorporated the congruity, or, on having incorporated the congruity changes in attitudes can be better explained (see F change in Table 10), and in all of them, except in nationalism, congruity is the best predictor, or, the congruity allows a better explaining than the other two factors separately can explain the differences in the political attitudes levels.

Table 10: Coefficients of the hierarchic retrogression model which incorporates the congruent interaction in the second step.

R2

adjusted F change β standarized

Incomes Political Orientation Congruency

Authoritarianism 0,192 25,326

*** -0,116* 0,142 ** -0,300 ***

Support to democracy

0,451 26,525

*** 0,064 -0,182 *** 0,307 ***

Conservatism 0,158 24,303

*** -0,063 0,123 * -0,300 ***

Nationalism 0,098 4,158* -0,142* 0,179 ** -0,129 * Fear of disorder 0,131 14,78

3*** -0,110* 0,124 * -0,238 ***

*** p < 0,001; ** p < 0,01; *p < 0,05

In conclusion, the position in the social structure itself is not enough to explain the people’s ideological

position. The inconsistency between attitudes and political orientation shows up this situation. The interaction model proposal between the socio economic level and the political orientation based on the congruity between both, presents favorable evidence, appearing like a better ideological configuration predictor than income or political orientation separately. To illustrate such model allows giving the information, in Figure 2 are charted the group authoritarianism averages like congruity levels function, being obtained a homogeneous decrease of this attitude from the end of negative incongruity (low socio economic level and right orientation), passing by more coherent groups, up to the end of positive incongruity (high socio economic level and left orientation). The graphs corresponding to traditionalism averages, fear of disorder and nationalism are very similar, by which has been chosen not to include them in Figure 2. Inversely, and as it was expected, the averages graphs of support to the system shows a homogeneous increase of this attitude as we move from the most negative values to the most positive of the congruity factor. In synthesis, the combination of political orientation and socio economic level in accordance with this congruity model allows identifying a simple linear order in the configuration of political attitudes, granting complexity into the relation between such mentioned factors.

Figure 2: Averages in political attitudes according to congruity levels.

Note: The pattern of traditionalism, fear of disorder and nationalism is equivalent to the one found in authoritarianism.

Discussion The research allows supporting the majority of Big Santiago’s Chileans endures a shared pattern of

political attitudes, as it was described. The levels of authoritarianism, fear of disorder, etc., are very similar in different groups, like the high stratum right, the middle stratum center and low stratum left. Most of the population fits in the above mentioned categories, which we have characterized by the congruity between its ideological and economic position. This attitude configuration massively shared through society constitutes a description, partial but theoretically crucial, of the predominant political culture in our environment. Two questions immediately arise: How do so unlike groups become so similar in their political attitudes? What happens with the so called incongruous groups that, although they represent a minority of the population, we have showed endure important deviations regarding the predominant political culture?

The analyses done to answer these questions have systematically entered upon the relations between

three domains: the political orientation (positioning in the left - right axis), the socio economic condition, and the political attitudes (authoritarianism, support to democracy, etc.). We have shown the relation between political orientation and people’s socio economic level is characterized by the increase of "right-wing views" as the socio economic level is higher, as it has been brought up in literature (Carney and others 2008, Napier and Jost 2008). Also, the relation between the political orientation and the set of political attitudes included in the research has also shown the expected pattern in accordance with literature. That is to say, in people from the right the authoritarianism is major (Adorno et al. 1951, Meloen 1993, Stenner 2005), conservatism (in its fear of disorder and traditionalism dimensions) (Jost et al. 2003a), and nationalism (Adorno et al. 1950, Billig 1995, Billig and Núñez 1998, Skitk 2005), while the support to democracy is bigger in people from left (Tironi and Agüero 1999, Mainwaring and Torcal 2003, Luna 2008). Finally, the relation between political attitudes and the socio economic level showed concordant results with the premises of Adorno et al. (1950), Napier and Jost (2008), Schuman et al. (1992), Lipset (1960) and Lipset and Raab (1978), that is to say, the authoritarianism and attitudes associated with this one are major in the groups of minor income.

In whole, these results show up a paradox that has not been confronted by literature. This paradox

indicates, as is seen in Figure 3, that in high socio economic levels there are major indexes of attitudes associated with the left, but there is major identification with the right, while in the low socio economic level happens the opposite.

Figure 3: Paradox relation between political orientation, socio economic level and political attitudes.

Note: the relation with authoritarianism is equivalent to the one found with conservatism, fear of disorder and nationalism.

The central argument of the present article consists on offering a model that solves this paradox and

the empirical evidence that sustains it. As it was explained, the inconsistencies in the results are dissolved if the political orientation and socio economic conditions are considered jointly, combining their possible values and being rearranged according to the congruity grade between them. This way, the high stratum right, the low stratum left and the middle stratum center would be the groups presenting a coherent political orientation with the interests of its socio economic group. Contrary, between the low stratum right and the high stratum left we describe a maximum incongruity grade between political orientation and interests of its economic group, although this incongruity has an opposite sense. On having rearranged the level combinations of political orientation and economic access by means of this congruity idea, we manage to show the groups differ, from the general population average in the political attitudes, straight from their incongruity level and direction in which it describes such incongruity. Consequently, what allows realizing the political attitudes pattern of a group is not its political orientation per se, even less its social extraction per se, but the adjustment grade of people´ ideological position to their socio economic conditions.

Interpretation about the ideology’s dynamics On having coherent groups the same levels in the political attitudes, in every socio economic level

there is a group which adopts the predominant pattern of the political culture. In turn, in high and low classes appear groups which adopt the extreme levels in these attitudes. In the upper class then coexist a right group presenting the predominant pattern and a left group showing the extreme levels in the pro-democratic sense, and in the low class a left group presenting the predominant pattern and a right group showing the extreme levels in the pro-authoritarian or conservative sense. We suggest interpreting this phenomenon as the state of ideological differentiation operating inside classes: that is to say, the groups that differ from the predominant political culture do it regarding the coherent groups of their own class. In upper class, the differentiation happens towards the left, in reference to the coherent group, the right; while in the low class, the differentiation happens towards the right, in reference to the coherent group, the left.

The previous thing allow supporting the differentiation in the left - right axis (in Jost´ s sense 2006),

loses its paradox character (in accordance with the exhibited in Figure 3) if it assumes operating at the interior of the socio economic group, by reference to the coherent group. And, for the same, left and right political identities must be understood in the context of a socio economic group; for example, it is not the same to be from the left in the low level than in the high one, since in the first case it adheres to the predominant pattern and in the second one it differs.

This way, we must understand the congruity as the adjustment of the political orientation to the economic conditions. The political orientation involves a capture of ideological position in front of values, beliefs and predominant attitudinal in the group of reference, or socio economic group. The position placing can be basically of adherence or distancing to the predominant political culture. The ideological thing, understood this way, arises specially as the internal differentiation of political culture.

The phenomenon of right positions exacerbated in the low class has been an object of literature

attention, particularly by the system justification theory (Jost and Hunyady 2002, 2005, Jost et al. 2004) and by some theoretical of the authoritarianism (Lipset 1960, Lipset and Raab 1978, Napier and Jost 2008, Schuman et al. 1992). Nevertheless, these theories do not realize the opposite phenomenon: the position of the upper class left, which presents the lowest levels in the same variables in which the low class right presents the highest levels. In our interpretation two sides of the phenomenon remain explained

False conscience and psychological anchoring of the ideology The results lead us to speculate the positioning is an answer subjects do according to the place they

occupy into society’s organization. Said otherwise, the ideology concept we propose must be understood like result of the inseparable relation between the place occupied in social hierarchy and the tendency of those who occupy this place to justify or refused the hierarchic relation. For this reason, first of all we propose that it is necessary to enter upon this phenomenon realizing the domination / subordination relations between the groups and the ideological positioning in front of the above mentioned relation, rescuing this way the concept of class used early in the discussion on ideology. Secondly, our results support the understanding of false conscience concept, not like a psychological and cognitive affliction as Jost and Banaji (1994) or Jost et al. (2008) propose, but like a phenomenon founded on the social reality itself, in particular on social classes structure(Augoustinos 1999). This concept describes the fact that the majority of Chileans shares in a very homogeneous way a political culture without caring about differences of political orientation or socio economic condition.

For the same, although the left low class and the right upper class share the same levels in the attitudes,

the function that fulfills their ideological position is founded on their place in social hierarchy, which is very different: the same attitude levels allow them differing on one hand to the interior of their respective class and, on the other, keep the statu quo, whether because it turns out to be favorable to them, in the upper class’s case, or because they need to justify their own position, in the low class’s case (see Jost et al. 2004). This way, even being about the same ideological differentiation mechanism, it is expected that contents or significances of political attitudes be different for these groups.

This phenomenon needs to be studied in major depth, since the mere quantitative observation of the

political attitudes does not realize the underlying ideas joint to the ideological position. Although the attitudes research has showed to be a fruitful way of coming closer the psychological ideology aspects, going so far as even realizing its physiological correlates (for example Amodio et al. 2007), the psychological anchoring of the ideology does not exhaust all the important ideology aspects, in particular the ones anchored in social relations and speech dynamics (Billig et al. 1988). For the same, we suggest to complement the approach presented in this article with studies focused in the construction of the ideological speech, particularly in extreme groups (Billig 2002, Billig et al. 1988; for example Billig 1978).

We also propose, the ideology study must consider being a multilevel approach, as Pettigrew (1998,

2006, 2008) Stellmacher and Petzel (2005) and Wagner et al. (2008) have proposed, which incorporates samples that represent all socio economic strata, as the evidence suggests it concerning the importance of class to understand the ideological position. For the same, the results obtained in studies led with university samples must be observed carefully. Finally, we must rescue the importance of longitudinal designs use that allows incorporating inter group relations´ temporary dynamics, as suggested by several authors (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006, van Laar et al. 2008, Pettigrew 2008).

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Notes * The achievement of this work has been possible thanks to the financing granted to the project FONDECYT N ° 1050887 “Psychosocial Study of the Political Culture of Three Chileans Generations.” ** Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile. Email: ahaye@uc.cl *** Public Studies Center, Santiago, Chile 1 The investigation at the base of the present article included an extensive analysis on this matter, which results show the left - right axis is a valid and informative indicator of relevant ideological differences in the current Chilean political culture: it is a measurement that shows high stability through time, which allows predicting Chileans opinion in controversial topics of public discussion and sum up both the differences between the political parties, and the identification with these ones; also, the differences in the political attitudes between those who qualify in the poles of left and right are consisting with what is shown in literature, being between others the authoritarianism, conservatism and support to democracy aspects that clearly differ the left of the right (Brunner 1990). For space reasons, these results are not brought in this article but in another work in preparation. 2 Although the sample is limited to the Big Santiago, in the present article we allude to the current "Chilean" political culture. We admit that this is an inadequate draft, since it would imply an undue generalization if it was used in strict sense; we use the expression here in broad sense. 3 A detailed review of the relation between authoritarianism and political orientation can be found in Meloen (1993). The relation between authoritarianism and political conservatism is checked in detail in Stenner (2005). 4 The standard interaction between political orientation and socio economic level was evaluated by means of variance analysis with repeated measurements to include the three measurements in the time of each dependent variable. Only with regard to authoritarianism (F = 2,712) and support to democracy (F = 2,957) are obtained statistically significant results (p <0,05). These two interactions, nevertheless, are weak, and in its set the analyses do not offer evidence of a systematically interaction between these factors. These analyses, on the other hand, allow supporting there are systematically two independent main effects, one of political orientation and other of socio economic level. 5 In this section the used information corresponds to the second measurement, which presents an intermediate situation of what happens in measurements 1 and 3, regarding the N and behavior in measurements in which there are differences in time.