Has the MEDA Programme been a force for change in Morocco or does it fall prey to the general...

8/8/2019 Has the MEDA Programme been a force for change in Morocco or does it fall prey to the general criticisms of Europ

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Has the MEDA Programme been a

force for change in Morocco or does it

fall prey to the general criticisms of European Union development

assistance?

Olga Guerrero Horas

Student ID: 261969

Supervisor: Gonzalo Pozo

MA International Studies and Diplomacy

Word Count: 11,000

Submission Date: 15 th September 2010

This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for thedegree of MA International Studies and Diplomacy of the School of Oriental

and African Studies (University of London)


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I have read and understood regulation 17.9 (Regulations for students of

SOAS) concerning plagiarism. I undertake that all material presented for

examination is my own work and has not been written for me, in whole or in

part, by another person(s). I also undertake that any quotation or paraphrase

from the published or unpublished work of another person has been duly

acknowledged in the work which I present for examination. I give permission

for a copy of my dissertation to be held at the Schools discretion, following

final examination, to be made available for reference

Signature: Olga Guerrero Horas

Date: 09.09.2010


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Table of contents

Abstract ...........4

Introduction ....6

I. The donor: The European Union 11

1.1 Structure of EC aid.....121.2 Focus of EC aid......161.3 General criticisms to EC aid.......19

II. The recipient: The Mediterranean Partners ..........23

2.1 The regional context: Economic, Political, Social......242.2 Recipients interests....302.3 Criticisms to Moroccan implementation.....33

III. Case study: MEDA in Morocco... 34

3.1 MEDA: The programme.........353.2 Objectives of MEDA......393.3 Project cycle of MEDA..44

3.4 MEDA initiatives in Morocco....493.4.1 Assessment of Policies.....493.4.2 Assessment of Context.....57

IV. Conclusion .....60

Bibliography ...64


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Abstract

The European Union has devoted much time and resources to establishing newchannels for dialogue and cooperation with neighbouring Mediterraneancountries. The MEDA (msures daccompagnement) programme was the maininstrument for financial cooperation within the Euro-MediterraneanPartnership Framework for ten years. Both the motives driving the programmeand the means used for delivering aid are frowned upon by EU members andrecipients. EU aid is accused of being a power projection tool, too focused onneighbouring middle-income countries and subject to unclear conditionality.

Furthermore, the means are characterized by a tortuous administrative system,resulting in repeated delays. Such criticisms get lost in the complexities of European organization and the different areas covered by its foreign policy.Thus, this dissertation seeks to critically assess the impact of the MEDA

programme in Morocco. This will demonstrate that the caveats of programmeand its implementation are consistent with the criticisms EU aid and result installed and limited achievements. The principles of democracy, human rightsand development that Europe advocates for end up being overshadowed by theEuropean self-interest in maintaining a discriminatory status quo at theexpense of its neighbours. This disposition will not bring us closer to the safe,

just and sustainable Mediterranean region we need and should support.


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Estoy enormemente agradecida por todo el apoyo que he recibido tanto de mimadre como de Daniel a lo largo de mis estudios de master, que concluyencon esta disertacin. Tampoco puedo olvidar la ayuda y nimos de mi supervisor en asuntos acadmicos y otros ms complicados.


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Introduction

Development and development assistance are today one of the main issues of

concern to world leaders and multilateral organizations. This political concern

with helping the poorest nations of the world began in the post World War II

period. The responsibility and need for action towards underdeveloped nations

is reflected in Harry S. Trumans 1949 statement, used to present the Point

Four Programme, the first development aid programme.

We must embark on a bold new program forthe improvement and growth

of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the world are living in

conditions approaching miseryfor the first time in history, humanity

possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these

people. 1

These first efforts of the West to save the Rest resulted in an extraordinary

increase of aid from 1960 to 1992, when aid amounted to $68 billion. 2 Since

then, and still following the same reasoning presented by Truman,

development aid has become one of the key components to international

relations and countries are either aid donors or aid recipients.3

Increasingly

more so in a global and interdependent world, where poverty and

underdevelopment are seen as contributing significantly to terrorism, conflict

1 William Easterly, The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p.21.2 Official Development Assistance 1950-2010 (Current prices) , cited in: Roger C.

Riddell, Does Foreign Aid Really Work?(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.22.3 Roger C. Riddell, Does Foreign Aid Really Work?, p.1.


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and global instability. This explains the aid revival after 9/11 and the new

record of $120 billion of net official development assistance reached in 2008. 4

The extent to which development aid contributes to its ultimate goal of the

eradication of poverty is controversial, and so is the debate about aid. Critics

such as Milton Friedman, Peter Bauer and William Easterly highlight the

cases where aid has enlarged government bureaucracies, perpetuated bad

governments, enriched the elite in poor countries or has just been wasted in

the pursue of utopian goals. 5 Supporters of aid such as Jeffrey Sachs, Joseph

Stiglitz and Nicholas Stern focus on the successful cases of Botswana,

Indonesia and Tanzania. 6 A comprehensive discussion of this debate is beyond

the scope of this dissertation, however some of the controversies of aid will be

examined in the light of the Moroccan case study.

In order to discuss aid and assess an aid programme it is crucial to set the

boundaries of the term aid itself. Aid was formally termed Overseas

Development Assistance (ODA) by the Development Assistance Committee

(DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

(OECD). 7 For the purpose of this dissertation, I will use the term ODA in the

4 OECD, OECD Observer: Development Aid: the funding challenge, April de 2009,http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/2866/Development_aid:_The_funding_challenge.html (accessed 20 de 07 de 2010).5 See for example: William Easterly, The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2006). 6 See for example: Nicholas Stern, Making the Case for Aid, World Bank, A Case for Aid: Building a Consensus for Development Assistance(Washington: The World

Bank, 2002).7 The Development Assistance Committee, DAC in Dates: The History of the Development Assistance Committee, (Paris: OECD Publications, 2006), p.7.


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sense provided by the DAC as development and emergency aid provided by

official donors. I will use the terms foreign aid and aid indistinctively to

describe aid from all sources.

ODA consists of flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions

provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by

their executive agencies, each transaction of which meets the following two

criteria: (1) it is administered with the promotion of the economic

development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective, and

(2) it is concessional in character and contains a grant element of at least 25

per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 20 per cent). 8

Hence, ODA can be provided directly from one country to another (bilateral)

or by an international organization which pools resources from several donors

(multilateral). Theoretically, multilateral aid is less politically driven and

biased, therefore more likely to be channelled to recipients on the basis of

need and with fewer conditions imposed. In practice, multilateral agencies are

also subject to the influence of the largest donors and some funds are granted

only with a particular focus, limiting the decision power of the organization. 9

Furthermore, some donors are difficult to categorise as either multilateral or

bilateral. Such is the case of the European Union. A priori we might think of

8 Helmut Fhrer, The Story of Development Assisstance: A History of the

Development Assisstance Committee and the Development Co-operation in Datesand Figures(Paris: OECD, 1996), p. 24.9 Roger C. Riddell, Does Foreign Aid Really Work?, p.77.


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the European Union as a multilateral donor pooling funds received from its

member states but in fact the EUs aid programmes are by the OECD/DAC

reports under Policies and Efforts of Bilateral Donors. Thus, for the purpose

of this dissertation I will be treating EU aid as bilateral aid.

In fact, the European Union is the second largest bilateral ODA donor after the

United States, channelling over $8 billion in 2004. 10 However, according to

the yearly donor atlas provided by the Commission, the top aid recipients tend

to be neighbouring middle-income countries and not poor countries that need

help the most. 11 This lack of poverty focus, Europes opaque bureaucracy and

the lack of results are some of the main criticisms to the ODA managed by the

European Commission (EC hereafter). Donors and recipients are discontent.

Some members are reluctant to channel more aid through the European

institutions and receiving and partner countries are not satisfied with the speed

and predictability of aid.

But such vague criticisms to European Union aid get lost in the complexities

of its organization and the different areas covered by its foreign policy. Thus, I

want to look at these criticisms in the light of the achievements of the MEDA

programme (Msures daccompagnement financires et techniques la

rforme des structures conomiques et sociales dans le cadre du parternariat

euro-mditerranen, MEDA henceforth). This has been the basic financial

instrument for cooperation between the EU and Mediterranean countries under

10

Open Europe, EU aid: is it effective?, Research Paper (London: Open Europe,2007), p.2.11 European Commission, EU Donor Atlas, (Brussels: European Commission, 2003).


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the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership throughout the period 1995-2006. 12 It is

an important and ambitious project and it serves as an interesting case study

for three reasons. Firstly, because of its size. The programme came to

represent approximately 75% of the EU funds destined to the Middle East and

North Africa region. 13 Secondly, because this made it the most important

project in the increasingly large part of the EUs aid budget to the near

abroad to middle-income countries, focus of the criticisms of many members.

Thirdly, because the official rhetoric and the organisational frameworks

established around it demonstrate it is an example of politicised aid subject to

coherence with European interests and a form of soft power.

This dissertation seeks to critically assess the impact of the MEDA

programme in Morocco and examine whether its flaws conform the already

mentioned criticisms to EU aid. For that, I will begin by analysing the donor

and recipient to understand their relationship. This will bring us to the

discussion of the EU and its complex organization, often the most pointed out

reason for its inefficient performance as a donor, as well as the nature of the

aid provided. Consequently, I will turn to consider the Middle East and North

Africa Region, where the majority of EC ODA is destined. The evaluation of

the challenges to growth the region faces will allow us to understand why

countries seek cooperation with the EU. Finally, the analysis of the case of

Morocco will illustrate the particular challenges to development the country

12 Michal Natorski, The Meda Programme in Morocco 12 Years on, DocumentosCIDOB Mediterrneo, June 2008, p.5.13

Eric Philippart, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Unique Features, First Results and Future Challenges, CEPS Middle East and Euro-Med Project WorkingPapers (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2003), p.4.


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faces, how the EU has attempted to contribute to aid it and whether

development policies through MEDA have had an impact.

To conclude, I will summarise the arguments discussed and link them to

broader notions about international relations and multilateral diplomacy.

I. The donor: The European Union

Defining the European Union as a donor is not an easy task. Undoubtedly, the

EU is first and foremost an economic actor which emerged originally as an

entity with the purpose of preventing member states from engaging in conflict

through the creation of commercial interdependence. However, its interest in

trade and cooperation with third parties have long been present. In fact, the

European Unions development co-operation policies have its roots in the

1958 Treaty of Rome, the founding treaty of the European Economic

Community (EEC). In Part IV of the Treaty, members agreed to associate with

countries in the developing world so as to establish close relations and

promote their social and economic development. 14

Analysing the European Commissions role as a donor and its relationship

with its Mediterranean neighbours first requires to have an overview of the

14 European Union, Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the EuropeanCommunity, Official Journal of the European CommunitiesC83 (2 2002), p.90.Jess Nuez Villaverde, interview by Olga Guerrero Horas, , MEDA programme inMorocco, (22 de 07 de 2010). Jess Nuez Villaverde, Mediterrneo: el viaje a

ninguna parte de la UE, Instituto de Estudios sobre Conflictos y Accin Humanitaria, 14 July 2010, http://www.iecah.org/ver_completo.php?id_articulo=738(accessed 16 de July de 2010).


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internal structure and administration within the EC. I will then look at the

allocation of EU aid and its particular focus on the Middle East and North

Africa region. This will lead me to discuss cooperation with Mediterranean

counties and in particular the Euro Mediterranean Partnership framework

through which aid was channelled. Both the European aid architecture and its

focus on neighbouring countries are the main criticisms to European aid both

from benefiters and member states. I will briefly mention these criticisms.

1.1 Structure of EC aid

When it comes to development policy and funding, Europe follows a complex

and fragmented organizational system. Member states have independent

relationships and their own players, agencies, administrations and institutions

for bilateral relationships with donor countries. There are also civil society

organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations and other non-state actors

that assist developing nations independently.

At the same time, Europe also works together through the European Union

institutions to carry out a common development policy, which has the purpose

of promoting a European approach to development across the EU countries to

influence international debate and work more effectively to combat


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poverty. 15 For this, the European Union receives aid funds from its member

states, which are then managed by the Commission.

The European Commission (henceforth EC) is the third pillar of the

institutional organization of the European Union. It is the executive body with

a right of initiative on policies and legislation. 16 It is also responsible for

setting the agenda for the European development policy and it federates

European policy around the world. The ultimate goal of its development

policy is to eradicate poverty through sustainable development, democracy,

peace and security. 17

The bloated internal structure of the European Commission is often cited as

the reason for the inefficiency of its policies. Development cooperation

policies are no exception and several attempts to improve its institutional

efficiency have resulted in numerous structural changes. It is cumbersome to

provide a detailed analysis of these reforms and also of the impact they have

had on the programming and implementation of development programmes

such as MEDA, which was in place from 1995 to 2006 witnessing two

structural reforms.

The most recent changes introduced since the approval of the Lisbon Treaty in

2010 do not affect my case study so I will not take them into consideration. I

15 European Commission, About us,http://ec.europa.eu/development/about/mission_en.cfm (accessed 24 de August de

2010).16 APRODEV, EU funding for partners, Presentation (Brussels: APRODEV, 2008).17 European Commission, About us.


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will therefore outline the external aid structure since the 2000 reforms, which

coincides with the latest phase of MEDA II. In May 2000 the European

Commission carried out an important reform of its assistance programming

because the existing division of responsibilities was unclear and the use of

resources was inefficient. 18 These changes included the reunification of the

project cycle, the dismantling of the existing eighty Technical Assistance

Offices (TAOs), the creation of a EuropeAid co-operation Office and the

devolution of project/programme management tasks and responsibilities to

Delegations. 19

The arrangements under scrutiny are showed in figure 1 below. Although I

have stated that the European Commission is responsible for the setting of the

development policies, it illustrates how the overall external action

responsibilities of the EU are shared between the Council Secretariat and the

European Commission. On one hand, The Council Secretariat structures

include policy planners, geographic desks, civilian and military European

Security and Defence Policy and special envoys to the UN offices. 20 On the

other hand, the European Commission is divided into four different

Commissioners with different responsibilities of Trade, Enlargement, External

Relations and Development. Each of these separate commissioners is

supported by a Directorate General (DG) of civil servants. It is the

18 ECORYS-NEI, The Mid-Term Evaluation of MEDA II , Final Report (Rotterdam:ECORYS-NEI, 2005), p.32.19 Ibid.20

Mikaela Gavas and Simon Maxwell, Options for architectural reform in EuropeanUnion development Cooperation, ODI Background Notes (London: OverseasDevelopment Institute, 2009), p.2.


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Commission and its role which I will focus on since it is the institution that is

accountable for the MEDA programme which I examine.

Of these Commissionsers, it is the DG External Relations (RELEX) and the

DG Development Commissioner that are in charge of the development and

humanitarian aid. The DG Development manages the aid implementation in

the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group. RELEX is responsible for

the programmes in the geographical regions of Asia, Latin America, the

Middle East, South Africa and Neighbouring countries.

Figure 1. EU external relations structure, 2005.

Source: Options for an architectural reform in European Union developmentcooperation, Overseas Development Institute,

(www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/3610.pdf)

However, the Commissioners are just responsible for policy and

programming. There are separate implementation offices such as EuropeAid,


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created in 2001 after the 2000 reforms, and the Humanitarian Aid department

(ECHO). These are all represented in the figure below, where the financial

instruments for each region are also listed. The MEDA programme focus of

this study is not represented in this chart, since it was only in place until 2006.

Instead, we find the development programme in place for the Mediterranean

region since 2006, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument

(ENPI).

1.2 Focus of EC aid

The geographical scope of EC aid has evolved throughout time and since the

1980s and 1990s the majority of aid recipients can be found in the

Mediterranean and the Middle East regions. 21 We can distinguish four phases

in the co-operation with Mediterranean countries.

Cooperation with the Mediterranean countries started at the beginning of the

1960s, following a case-by-case approach where there was a limited

association with Tunisia and Morocco but aid was very limited up to 1979. 22

The second phase began with the Global Mediterranean Policy adopted in

the 1972 European Council in Paris, which provided a broader policy

framework dealing with aid and trade. 23 The third phase began with the New

Mediterranean Policy initiated in 1989 after the second Community

21 Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Development Cooperations: Efforts and Policies of he members of the Development AssistanceCommittee, (Paris: OECD, Several Years).22 Paul Hoebink, The Coherence of EU Policies: Perspectives from the North and the

South, Commissioned Study: Ref: RO2CS007 (Brussels: Centre for InternationalDevelopment Issues Njimegen, 2005), p. 25-26.23 Ibid, p.26.


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Enlargement, which included Spain, Portugal and Greece. 24 This programme

sought to address challenges to growth and development in the region such as

youth unemployment, growing poverty, market structures through diverse

strategies and increasing aid flows. 25

It is undoubtedly the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

(Barcelona Process) in 1995, which marks the resurgence of cooperation

with Mediterranean countries. It was launched at a time of great optimism

over the future of the southern Mediterranean, largely due to the prospects of

the Oslo Accords. This Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP henceforth) is

the general framework established for relations between the European Union

and the 12 countries situated on the south and eastern shores of the Mare

Nostrum: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco,

Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority. 26 It was the result of the

EUs decision to develop a deeper relationship with the Southern rim. This

was mainly due to geo-political an economic factors and was accentuated by

the growth of Islamic extremism and the numerous internal and external

conflicts in the region which pose a threat to European security. 27

The core document of this partnership is the Barcelona Declaration, a result of

the Barcelona conference in 1995 and which is an executive agreement

24 Ibid.25 Ibid, p.25.26 Eric Philippart, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Unique Features, First Results and Future Challenges, p.1.27 Patrick Holden, The European Union's MEDA Aid Programme: What kind of

development partnership?, European Development Policy Study Group, ed.European Development Policy Study Group, 2003, http://www.edpsg.org/index.pl(accessed 24th August 2010), p.7.


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launching a triple partnership. 28 This triple partnership comprises the so-called

three baskets of cooperation: political and security cooperation so as to

establish a common area of peace and stability; an economic and financial

partnership to create an area of shared prosperity through the establishment

of a free trade area; and a social and cultural partnership dedicated to human

resources development, better understanding between cultures and exchanges

between civil societies. 29

It was with the funds channelled from through the MEDA programme that the

European Commission was set responsible for the implementation of these

strategic objectives.

The focus of European foreign aid on neighbouring middle-income countries

makes it hard to deny that it is at least partly motivated by EU interests in the

region and it seeks to promote its own agenda, albeit the altruistic component

inherent to aid. It is an agenda with neo liberal components and the aid and the

other socioeconomic measures of the programme are used to intervene in the

political economies of the partner countries and serve as a power projection

for the EU. Even the use of a language of partnership has been highly

criticised. 30 This rhetoric has risen as a result of the intense criticisms

development policies from international organizations have received and it

28 Eric Philippart, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Unique Features, First Results and Future Challenges, p.1.29 Patrick Holden, The European Union's MEDA Aid Programme: What kind of development partnership?, p. 8.30 See for example: Patrick Holden, The European Union's MEDA Aid Programme:

What kind of development partnership?, European Development Policy StudyGroup, ed. European Development Policy Study Group, 2003,http://www.edpsg.org/index.pl (accessed 24 August 2010).


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portrays a more cooperative relationship based on the principles of mutuality

and equality. 31 The term partnership indeed entails good intentions of closer

collaboration with the recipients as well as positive connotations. However,

the relationship through the EMP is not one of equality, especially as the

enthusiasm for cooperation stems from the asymmetric relationship between

the EU and its Southern neighbours. The criticisms to contemporary aid

partnerships will not be covered in this paper. 32 Anyhow, the will illustrate the

incoherence of EU policy. These kinds of aid programmes are sold under the

pretext of maintaining an equal status quo which is certainly not equal and

which portrays the asymmetry of dependence and power distribution among

parties. 33

1.3 General Criticisms to EC Aid

It is precisely this type of arguments that have been put forward by some

European member states to criticise both the motives and the means of the aid

channelled through the European Commission. A representative comment was

made by the UK International Development Minister Clare Short in 2000, who

referred to the European Commission as the worst development agency in the

world. 34 Reports since then show that the track record of the EC has

31 Patrick Holden, The European Union's MEDA Aid Programme: What kind of development partnership?, p.1.32 See for example: Nils-Sjard Schulz, Why the EU is not yet a mature development partner , Policy Brief (Madrid: FRIDE, February 2010). 33

George Howard Joff cited in: Eric Philippart, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, p.6.34 Clare Short cited in: Open Europe, EU aid: is it effective?, p. 4.


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improved, especially since the 2000 reforms 35, but the dissatisfaction from

members is still latent. EC aid is still seen as lacking a poverty-focus, having

slow delivery, being highly bureaucratic, too attached to European foreign

policy and in general inferior to aid from Scandinavian, British and Dutch

members. I intend to briefly review the critiques from members to then see if

they coincide with the flaws of MEDA that will become apparent in the

subsequent evaluation of the programme.

The earlier section already discussed the concentration of European Union aid

on the Mediterranean region but it is still worth looking at some numbers to

understand the general claims of lack of poverty focus. The EC Donor Atlas of

2006 shows how, in 2004 three of the five countries that receive most of the

European Commissions aid are middle-income neighbouring countries of the

EU: Serbia and Montenegro, Turkey and Morocco. 36 Although 90.8% of

Nigerian citizens live under the $2 a day poverty line, they receive 18 times

less aid than Jordanians, where 88.3 % of the population live above that

poverty line. 37 It is thus hard to deny that the EU has prioritised regional

security above global poverty reduction with its aid allocation. Furthermore,

European aid is not only not spent on low-income countries, it also does not

seem to be effective in targeting poverty within developing countries. Reports

examining the contribution of the EU to the implementation of the Millennium

Development Goals (MDG) show that allocations to key MDG sectors such as

35 Department for International Development, Eliminating World Poverty: MakingGovernance Work for the Poor, White Paper on Development (London, 2006),

p.115.36

European Commission, EU Donor Atlas, (Brussels: European Commission, 2006), p.27.37 Open Europe, EU aid: is it effective?, p.19.


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hunger, basic health, education, environment and gender equality have

decreased. 38 In general, the EC assistance seemed to have a limited impact on

the poverty alleviation of countries aided. 39

The second problem member states attribute to the EU development policies is

related to its cumbersome bureaucracy. The multiple layers for policy-making,

programming and implementation result in a very slow delivery of its aid.

Despite the 2000 reforms, only 24% of EC aid is delivered according to

schedule. 40 More specifically, 2006 report by Save the Children finds that 40%

of delays in EC aid are due to its own administrative process. 41 Programmes

with a procurement component such as MEDA are more likely to experience

delays. 42 This has given rise to more radical critiques from academics like

Carlos Santiso, who refers to the administration process as the inner

workings of a Byzantine bureaucracy with a procedure-driven ethos. 43

There is a lack of empirical research comparing the performance and quality

of aid provided by the Commission and member states. However, countries

like the Netherlands, the UK and the Scandinavian countries seem to carry out

38 Alliance2015, The EU's Contribution to the Millennium Development Goals: Keeping the Goals Alive, 2015-Watch (Brussels: Alliance2015, 2010), p.22-23.39 Alliance2015, The Millennium Development Goals: A Comparative Performanceof Six EU Member States and the EC Aid Programme, 2015-Watch (Brussels:Alliance2015, 2005), p.36.40 Oxfam International, Paying the Price: Why Rich Countries Must Invest Now in aWar On Poverty, (Oxford, 2005). Oxfam International, Paying the Price: Why RichCountries Must Invest Now in a War On Poverty, (Oxford, 2005).41 Save the Children, The Role of Donors in Creating Aid Volatility and How toReduce it, Final Report with Additional Programme Data (London, 2006), p.29.42 European Court of Auditors, Special Report 5/2006 (Brussels: ECA, 2006).43

Carlos Santiso, Sisyphus in the Castle: Improving European Union Strategies for Democracy Promotion and Governance Conditionality, European Journal of Development Research15, no. 1 (2003): 1-28, p.2.


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development policies which are more poverty-targeted, suffer from fewer

delays and are broadly speaking of better quality. 44 This has resulted in a lack

of credibility of the EU as a donor. Better aid donors are increasingly more

reluctant to allocate aid funds through the EC and this has given rise to a

debate about whether the ECs role should be limited to co-ordination of

member state procedures rather than acting as a 28 th donor. 45

Despite the evidence and criticisms, it is worth noting that it is extremely

difficult to evaluate the impact of a donors aid destined to the development of

a country. Firstly because of the vast amount of donors present in a specific

country, which make it difficult to attribute the successes and failures.

Secondly because of the contextual factors which play a role in a countrys

prosperity, which means that development effectiveness need not be a direct

consequence of effective aid. In the words of the scholar Roger Riddell:

Poverty is influenced by a whole range of factors of which aid is only one. If

a country is stable, if it is afflicted by drought, if the country next door has a

problem with malaria, if the price of exports drops dramatically, these all have

a profound effect. To tease out the effect aid has had is very, very difficult. 46

44 Open Europe, EU aid: is it effective?, p.32.45 For an example of this see: Open Europe, EU aid: is it effective?, Research Ppaer (London: Open Europe, 2007).46

Roger Riddell, cited in: Development Policy Forum, Europe's Aid Architecture:The global financial meltdown crisis and opportunity, Discussion Paper (Friends of Europe, 2009).


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II. The recipient: The Mediterranean Partners

I now turn to the recipients of the majority of collective EU foreign aid: the

Mediterranean partners(MED partners hereafter) of the EMP. 47 With the

exception of now members of the EU Cyprus and Malta and the special cases

of Israel and Turkey, belong to what is called the Middle East and North

Africa Region (MENA hereafter). They are ranked among middle-income to

lower middle-income economies, whose Gross National Income per capita

ranging between $1000 and $2000 in 2001, excluding Lebanon. 48

What is referred to as the MENA region comprises the Arab states in the

Middle East and North Africa region. 49 This is a very economically diverse

region, with differences in revenues, countries at different stages of economic

development and different natural resources endowments. 50 Nevertheless, it is

linked by a common heritage, a common set of challenges, its dependence on

oil and a characteristic central planning. 51

Analysing the MED partners role as a recipient and its relationship with the

donor requires an overview of the economic, social and political context of the

47 The MED countries considered in this background section are the 8 countriesMEDA covers: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia.48 ADE-IBM-EPU-NTUA, Evaluation of Economic Co-operation between the European Commission and Mediterranean Countries, Final Report Volume II(Louvaine-la-neuve: ADE, 2003), p.1.49 According to the IMF reports the classification of MENA includes: Algeria,Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania,Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic,Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen as well as Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan andWest Bank and Gaza.50

George T. Abed and Hamid R. Davoodi, Challenges of Growth and Globalizationin the Middle East and North Africa, (Washington D.C.: IMF, 2003), sec. Preface.51 Ibid.


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region. I will then look at the particular case of Morocco and its

characteristics. This will allow us to understand the challenges to growth and

globalization this country faces as well as the goals of the ODA provided.

From the previous analysis, it seemed clear that the European aid architecture

and its policies have flaws. Nevertheless, it is nave to assume that Morocco is

the perfect partner, so I will briefly examine the specific problems

development programmes encounter in Morocco.

2.1 The Regional Context: Economic, Political and Social

A comprehensive analysis of the economic context of the MENA region is

given by a 2003 study by the International Monetary Fund. 52 It finds that

overall, the MENA region has performed below its potential in the past three

decades. 53 Although the region experienced positive development with the

post 1970s oil price increases it has failed to sustain growth rates and it is a

particularly volatile region. 54 MENAs volatility is reflected upon its unstable

real GDP per capita growth rate, its near zero per cent growth rate and its

weak global integration. 55

In spite of its geopolitical importance, MENAs influence in the global system

remains weak. 56 The region received only one-third of the Foreign Direct

Investment (FDI) expected for a developing country of a comparable size and

52 Ibid.53 Ibid.54

Ibid.55 Ibid.56 Ibid.


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this investment is concentrated in a few countries. 57 This is also influenced by

the high costs of setting up a business in the region, which are five times

higher than in East Asia. 58 Also trade within and outside the region is very

limited. MENAs region share of the world export market has halved between

1980 and 2000. 59 Moreover, the regions dependence on agricultural and oil

exports, which suffer from intensive price fluctuations, add to the regions

vulnerability. 60

The large and inefficient public sectors typical of this region take its toll on

the economy and it fails to provide with quality services such as infrastructure

and an educational system. 61 Moreover it has not succeeded at creating a

properly administered tax and financial systems, so the capacity to channel

savings and consumption into a long-term productive investment has not been

developed. 62

Finally, research has shown that the regions low or often negative growth of

total factor productivity (TFP) has an important impact on the low-growth

performance. 63 TFP is the efficiency with which factors of production such as

physical capital and labour are used to generate growth. Countries that have

achieved positive TFP such as Morocco have achieved relatively high growth

57 Ibid, sec. Global integration.58 Ibid, sec. Large and costly public sectors.59 Ibid, sec. Global integration.60 ADE-IBM-EPU-NTUA, Evaluation of Economic Co-operation between theEuropean Commisson and Mediterranean Countries, Final Report (2003), p.1.61 George T. Abed and Hamid R. Davoodi, Challenges of Growth and Globalization

in the Middle East and North Africa, sec. Large and Costly Public Sectors.62 Ibid, sec. Large and costly public sectors and Financial Market Development.63 Ibid, sec. High Population Growth and Low Productivity


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rates. The requisites for improving TFP are solid and transparent governance,

investment in human capital and a peaceful political environment. 64

Overall the regions poor economic performance shows a set of common

features among MED partners: low productivity, lagging political and

institutional reforms, large and costly public sectors, inefficient and

inequitable educational system, underdeveloped financial system, lack of

competitiveness of small and medium enterprises, high trade restrictiveness

and inappropriate exchange rate policies. 65 These common features were to be

faced by the MEDA programme.

The social context follows a pattern of low growth/ high

unemployment/poverty/migrations. The poor economic performance and the

high population growth worsen the (already chronic) unemployment and

poverty. 66 The unemployed are not only the uneducated citizens, but also well-

qualified workers, which the economy fails to absorb. 67 The situation is

worsened by the stagnation of income, which leads to an increase in poverty

levels, partly due to the ineffective and limited social protection systems. In

turn, this explains the high level of labour migration particularly to Europe

that contributes to the brain drain phenomenon. 68

64 Ibid, sec. Factors Affecting the Regions Performance.65 Ibid, sec. High population growth and low productivity.66 ADE-IBM-EPU-NTUA, Evaluation of Economic Co-operation between the

European Commisson and Mediterranean Countries, Final Report (2003), p.3.67 Ibid.68 Ibid.


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The high population growth of the region and the low dependency ratio also

present an opportunity for growth, which has been termed demographic gift.

The reasoning behind this is that, given that in the majority of countries in the

region over two-thirds of the population is under thirty years of age, ensuring

employment would lead to growth through an increase productivity and

consumption. 69

All in all, the region performs poorly in civil and political freedoms gender

quality and opportunities for the full development of human capabilities and

knowledge. 70

Finally, the political context is dominated by political fragmentation,

recurring conflicts and authoritarian rule. Morocco has been a type of rentier

state in that the economy has been dominated by the economic elites and their

vested interests. 71 Such governance and the instability it entails does not

provide the appropriate environment for the economy to become open and the

government to revitalize the private sector as the EMP calls for. 72 The figure

below illustrates the regions characteristics in terms of governance and

institutions, voice and accountability, regulatory quality and control for

corruption.

69 J. Williamson and T. Yousef, Demographic Transitions and EconomicPerfromance in the Middle East and North Africa, in Human Capital: Population Economics in the Middle East , 16-35 (Cairo: American University of Cairo Press,2002).70 UNDP, Arab Human Development Report: Challenges to Human Security in the Arab Countries, (New York: UNDP, 2009).71

Patrick Holden, Strategic intervention or showcase?, p. 548.72 ADE-IBM-EPU-NTUA, Evaluation of Economic Co-operation between theEuropean Commisson and Mediterranean Countries,, p.5.


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Figure 2. MENA and Comparators: Governance Indicators, 2002

Source: (Davoodi, Challenges of Growth and Globalization in the Middle East and North Africa 2003)

Note: Each entry indicates percent of countries worldwide that rate below selectedcountry or a region for each governance indicator. Higher score for any indicator

shows better governance outcome. Aggregates are simple averages.


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This image is from 2003, towards the last phase of the MEDA programme. It

portrays how the region fares worse than other developing countries and

emerging economies, even if the world governance indicators are slightly

better than before the start of MEDA. 73 Transparency and good governance

are important for high-quality growth. In Moroccos case, reforms were

initiated in the political sphere, making democracy and human rights part of

the legal texts, and participating in initiatives proposed by international

financial institutions to improve monetary and financial policy transparency. 74

Nevertheless, there is still a clear lack of freedom of expression and

association 75 and the most recent constitution still leaves the king with

massive powers. The flaws in institutional arrangements persist, as there has

hardly been any improvement in the institutional quality in the past 13 years 76

and the Islamist movement has hindered on the efforts of democratization. 77

The combination of poor economic performance and social and political

tensions does not provide with the stable climate that the establishment of a

Euro-Mediterranean Partnership needs. It has resulted in Arab countries

suffering from pressures both from within, in the shape of poor economic

performance, social unrest, Arab nationalism and political Islam, and from

73 A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi D. Kauffman, Governance Indicators for 1996-2008,Governance Matters VIII (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2009).74 Ibid.75 Ibid.76

UNDP, Arab Human Development Report: Challenges to Human Security in the Arab Countries, (New York: UNDP, 2009), Annex II.77 Patrick Holden, Strategic intervention or showcase?, p. 549.


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outside, from neoliberal foreign policies pressuring for reforms and

liberalization. This has been described as a clash of globalizations. 78

However, certain characteristics of the region also showed some potential for

MEDA to succeed in the region. The first one is that there existed an

awareness of the social development needed from most countries, which had

already led some government policies to progressive changes in favour of

modernisation of the economy. 79 Other features such as the rents available

from oil exports and other hydrocarbons, the large share of young population

and the geographical closeness to European markets could contribute to a

successful achievement of MEDAs objectives. 80

2.2 Recipients interests

From the previous sections we have come to understand the different interests

the EU has to engage in cooperation agreements with the Southern members. I

have also examined the different factors that hinder on the development of the

region. I will now look at some of Moroccos main motives for engaging in

development programmes with the EU. These are to do with: historical

relations, trade issues, fisheries and migration.

78 Clement Henry, A Clash of Globalizations: Obstacles to Development in theMiddle East, Harvard International Review, Spring 2003: 60-64.79

ADE-IBM-EPU-NTUA, Evaluation of Economic Co-operation between theEuropean Commisson and Mediterranean Countries,, p.3.80 Ibid, p.2.


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The country has first of all, a long history of relations with the EU: Spanish

and French protectorate until 1956, engaged in contractual frameworks with

the European Community through the Cooperation Agreement (1976),

Financial Protocols (1977-1991) and the Association Agreement (1996). 81 It

even tried to apply for membership to the EU in 1987. 82 Morocco is to some,

the country best disposed towards relations with the EU. 83 It is, after all, the

first country in the Southern Mediterranean region that has been granted the

advanced status for relations with the 27 EU members since 2008. 84

Furthermore, with 1181.3 million Euros it has been one of the biggest

beneficiaries of MEDA. 85

Moroccan dependence on the EU is best understood when looking at trade

patterns. The EU is Moroccos biggest trading partner, it buys over 74% of

Moroccan exports and represents 56% of their total imports. 86 Entrepreneurs

find that trade liberalisation so far has boosted the Moroccan economy but

there remains a lot to do to improve the efficiency and competitiveness of

Moroccan economy. 87 The EU has supported through MEDA the so-called

mise niveau to ensure compliance with EU and international standards and

81 Michal Natorski, The Meda Programme in Morocco 12 Years on, DocumentosCIDOB Mediterrneo, June 2008, p. 6.82 Paul Hoebnik, The Coherence of EU policies, p.42.83 Michael Emerson, European Neighbourhood Policy Two Years on: Time indeed for an "ENP Plus" , CEPS Policy Brief (Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies,2007).84 Kristina Kausch, Morocco's 'Advanced Status': Model or Muddle?, Policy Brief (Madrid: FRIDE, March 2010).85 Patrick Holden, Strategic intervention or showcase?, p. 555.

Note that this amount refers to commitments and not actual disbursements, which ismuch lower. 86 Aline Bouzergan, Statistics in Focus: The European Union and its ten

Mediterranean partner countries: growing links, External Trade Manuscript(Luxembourg: EUROSTAT, 2007), p.4.87 Paul Hoebink, The Coherence of EU Policies,p.44.


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stimulate exports and circumvent non-tariffary protections from the EU. 88 At

the same time, Morocco suffers badly from European protectionist policies

initiated by Southern members with similar crops, that impose great tariffs on

Moroccan citrus fruits but also on industrial sectors like textiles, apparel and

footwear. 89 This is worsened by the smuggling of goods to Morocco that

takes place from the zone-franches and Spanish enclaves of Melilla and

Ceuta, which suppose a form of unfair competition that undermines the

Moroccan economy. 90 Also by the non-reciprocal right that European shipping

lines have for loading and unloading in Moroccan harbours on their way to

Europe. 91

Another important dossier in the relationship between Morocco and the EU is

the Fisheries Partnership Agreement. This abusive agreement allows European

(mostly Spanish and Portuguese) vessels to fish in Moroccos territorial waters

in exchange for financial compensation, instead cooperation for the

development of Moroccan vessels. 92 Whilst Morocco lacks the technical

capabilities for large-scale fishing, its waters are subject to overexploitation

and depletion of their stocks. This has given rise to even more political

controversies as European fishing now takes place in Moroccan occupied

Western Sahara waters. 93

88 Ibid, p.45-46.89 Ibid, p.48.90 Ibid, p.48.91 Ibid, p.48-49.92 European Commission, European Commission, 26 de August de 2010,http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/international/agreements/morocco/index_en.htm

(accessed 20th August 2010).93 See: Western Sahara Resource Wtch, Fish Elsewhere: Detn la pesca en el SaharaOccidental ocupado, 30th January 2009,


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Finally, immigration is certainly one of the most important motives behind EU

cooperation. But it is also important to Moroccans. The bettering of economic

and civil rights through MEDA are expected to contribute to halting migration

and particularly illegal migration. 94 However, it also gives the hope to

Moroccans for a facilitation of the process for the migration of qualified

workers. 95Migration is perceived as a vital developmental instrument to

alleviate poverty and unemployment, increasing stability and enabling people

to invest. 96 However, it is hardly a surprise to find that EU policies are highly

incoherent and more concerned with their own border control than with the

positive impact migration might have in Moroccan economy.

The vulnerability of Morocco to EU policies has been stated. It is the hope for

a bettering of the conditions of certain dossiers such as migration, fisheries,

and trade that make Morocco so keen to engage in relationships with the EU.

2.3. Criticisms to Moroccan implementation

Just like the EUs implementation of programmes was subject to criticisms

there are internal obstacles towards development in recipient countries as well

that need to be noted.

http://www.fishelsewhere.eu/index.php?cat=154&art=960 (accessed 25th August2010). 94

Paul Hoebink, The Coherence of EU Policies, p.54.95 Ibid.96 Ibid, p.56.


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In the case of Morocco, Europe is always blamed for its lack of support

towards the development of Moroccan agricultural potential. However, the

lack of a much needed land and general agricultural reform has always

ensured a lack of open competition and hindered on the efficiency of the

agricultural sector. 97 The restrictions that also do not allow foreigners to

purchase land are also a great impediment to learning from more innovative

techniques as well as allowing for a diversification of the wheat predominant

crops. 98 Moreover, the malfunctioning agricultural extension services put in

place do not reach the medium-sized farmers willing to invest in agriculture

and that often suffer from inaccessible and imperfect credit markets. 99

The hidden world of Moroccan politics also explains the stalled

implementation of certain measures to achieve the confusing objectives of

policies set by the EC. First of all they put some pressure on the ruling elites

towards the renovation of civil society. Second of all, they were not seen as

truly addressing their needs. They EU has not sought to address these of

internal problems. It has continued to support ruling elites and oppressive

monarchs, merely acting as a diplomatic sweetener to the government. 100

III. Case study: MEDA in Morocco

97 Ibid, p.47.98

Ibid.99 Ibid. 100 Patrick Holden, Strategic intervention or showcase?, p.546.


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Despite the common features among MED partners similarities, the resulting

achievements in social, economic and political fields vary widely from

country to country. As a result, the implementation of the MEDA programme

differs considerably in each Mediterranean partner. I have therefore decided to

focus on the implementation and success of the programme in the Kingdom of

Morocco. As we have seen, this country is extremely dependent the EU and

also its own economic and political difficulties are seen as having a direct

impact on Europes security.

I will use the following sections seek to explore a range of aspects of the

MEDA programme in Morocco such as: the basic data of the programme, its

objectives and means, the implementation process and the accomplishments of

the projects implemented.

Throughout this overview of the programme, I seek to highlight the imprecise

objectives of MEDA, its slow implementation, the limited achievements of the

policies in Morocco through the aid provided by the MEDA programme and

how opening the dialogue with our Southern neighbours should not be seen as

and end in itself but as the path to achieve a more secure, fair and sustainable

Mediterranean region. A lot is demanded from EMP partners, supposedly for

their own benefit, yet hardly of the economic aid materialises and the

objectives change constantly. Moreover, it is taken for granted that the

incentives provided will be enough to transform a country and defeat the


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resistance of regimes deeply established that often violate human rights and

are a long way from being democratic. 101

3.1 MEDA: The programme

The legal basis of the programme were initially given by the 1996 MEDA

Regulation (EC/1488/1996) which was replaced in 2000 by the regulation

EC/2698/2000. 102 This modification marks the end of the first phase of

MEDA, MEDA I (1994-1999) and the beginning of MEDA II (2000-2006).

For the period of 1994-1999 MEDA was allocated 3,435 million under the

MEDA I Council Regulation. 103 Fore the period 2000-2006 MEDA IIs

budget was of 5,350 million 104 . The table below shows the MEDA

commitments per country, which gives a broad idea of the funds allocated and

will allow us to contrast it to the actual ratio of disbursement of funds in the

implementation section.

The MEDA programme was established to replace the Four Financial

Protocols (1979-1995) which were trade agreements that the EU signed with

poor countries, giving them financial support every year. An extensive

comparison between MEDA and the previous cooperation mechanisms is

101 The concession of the advanced status road map granted to Morocco has beenhighly controversial. Although the country is the most advanced in the region and isthe most keen to EU relations, it is far from being a developed and democraticsociety. Even more problematic is the promise of this concession to Tunisia, acountry that is repressive to its citizens and with high deficiencies in human rights.102 ECORYS-NEI, The Mid-Term Evaluation of MEDA II , Final Report (Rotterdam:ECORYS-NEI, 2005), p.32.103

MEDA Team Infromation, From MEDA I to MEDA II: What's New?, EUROMEDSpecial Feature (Brussels: European Commission, 2001), p.3.104 Ibid.


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beyond the scope of this paper. However, the main difference was that MEDA

marked the end of the system of compulsory commitment and disbursement of

the Financial Protocols and introduced conditionality for the allocation of

funds. 105 In fact, MEDA was modelled on the PHARE and TACIS programme

for Eastern Europe and ex Soviet block, which were aid instruments to support

transition in post-Communist countries or accession to the EU. 106

Figure 3. MEDA commitments per country

Source: (ECORYS-NEI 2005)

The MEDA projects could be of a bilateral or regional nature, although the

majority belonged the former category.Bilateral projects sought to support

different economic sectors towards the creation of a free trade area between

EU and Mediterranean Partners, alleviating the impact of this economic

105 ECORYS-NEI, The Mid-Term Evaluation of MEDA II , p.33.106 Ibid, p.5.


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transition. 107 These were of five kinds: grants, technical assistance

programmes, structured adjustment facility, risk capital and interest rate

subsidies for European Investment Bank Loans. 108 As figure 4 below shows,

European cooperation is focused on promoting economic reform, reforming

institutions and developing the private sector. The social and environmental

support programmes represent EUs commitment to maintaining social

cohesion in partner countries as outlined by the EMP goals. It has been argued

that were it left to the partner governments the pattern of expenditures would

be different and more focused on job creation and infrastructure support

activities. 109

Figure 4. MEDA commitments per sector of intervention in Morocco 1995-2004,

in million Euros

107 European Commission, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and MEDA regionalactivities, Euromed Information Notes (Brussels, June 2005, p14. 108 Michal Natorski, The Meda Programme in Morocco 12 Years on, p. 10.109 Commission Interview, cited in: Patrick Holden, Strategic intervention or

showcase? EU aid as a force for change in Morocco, Vol. V, in The EuropeanMediterranean: The Mediterranean's European Challenges, 541-60 (Malta: EDRC,2004), p.551.


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Source: (Natorski 2008, Appendix II)

The regional projects of MEDA aimed to promote a closer integration between

the 35 partners whilst complementing and reinforcing bilateral programmes. 110

They sought to tackle common problems among Mediterranean countries

whilst using national complementarities and fostering South-South co-

operation. 111

3.2 Objectives of MEDA

Analysing whether MEDA was a success requires us to look at of the

objectives of the programme. This would appear easy, especially as the EC

believes its comparative advantage lies in its capacity to act with a common

110

European Commission, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and MEDA regionalactivities,p.16.111 Ibid.


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purpose. 112 However, the numerous documents that establish the legal

foundations of the MEDA programme, the multilateral and bilateral

agreements and the operational programming documents result in a very low

degree of clarity and congruence on principles, objectives and priorities. 113

The foundations of the MEDA programme are found within various

documents. The main document is the Barcelona Declaration, which governs

the EMP already discussed. However, as it is not a legally binding document,

it is implemented through bilateral Association Agreements with each country.

The Association Agreement with Morocco was signed in 1995 and was in

place since 2000, providing the basic legal foundation for the programme in

Morocco. 114 Nevertheless, the implementation of the MEDA programme also

depended on other multilateral agreements part of the broader European

framework such as the Common Strategy on the Mediterranean 115 and

regional plans within the EMP framework like the Valencia Action Plan. 116 It

was also subject to changes in foreign policy co-operation towards bordering

countries, like the New Neighbourhood Instrument established after the

112 European Commission, Anual Report 2006 on the European Community's Development Policy and the Implementation of External Assistance 2005,Communication from the European Commission to the Council and the EuropeanParliament (Brussels: European Commission, 2006), p.5.113 Michal Natorski, The Meda Programme in Morocco 12 Years on , p.15114 ECORYS-NEI, The Mid-Term Evaluation of MEDA II , p.30.115 Common Strategy of the European Council of 19 June 2000 on the

Mediterranean Region, Official Journal of the European Communities, Vol. L 185(Brussels, 22nd July 2000).116 Michal Natorski, The Meda Programme in Morocco 12 Years on, p.17.


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enlargement of the EU in 2004 and which intended to reinforce the Barcelona

process through national action plans. 117

The MEDA programme had the overall objective of creating an area of shared

prosperity, in line with the priorities enunciated by the EMP. This economic

and financial partnership had three concrete purposes: establishing a free trade

area between the EU and its Mediterranean partners and amongst the partners

themselves, providing EU financial support for economic transition and

support for the social and economic challenges it creates and increasing the

investment flows to the Mediterranean partners as a result of free trade. 118

However these three clear purposes are then undermined by additional

priorities established by other documents and also changed from MEDA I to

MEDA II. During MEDA I, there were a second set of objective established

by the Guidelines for Indicative Programmes. There were also two

additional objectives for the case of Morocco: improving the socioeconomic

balance through rural development, water and social services and support for

the economic transition through budget support and enhancement of the

competitiveness of private sector enterprises. 119

117 Saleh M. Nsouli, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Ten Years On: Reassessing Readiness and Prospects, Statement at Crans-Montana Forum (IMF,2006). 118 Michal Natorski, The Meda Programme in Morocco 12 Years on, p.20.119 Council Deecission of 6 December 1996 concerning the adoption of guideles for the indicative programmes concerning financial and technical measures to

accompany the reform of economic and social structures within the framework of theEuro-Mediterranean partnership (MEDA), Official Journal of the EuropeanCommunities, Vol. L 325 (Brussels, 14 de December de 1996).


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The beginning of MEDA II witnessed a new set of priorities and objectives for

the programme. The Guidelines were replaced by the Country Strategy Paper

(CSP) and National Indicative Programmes (NIPs). The broader CSP made

support for economic employment growth and for the implementation

Association Agreements its basic priorities. 120 CSPs are are highly regarded

within the Commission but their main deficiencies are the lack of an in depth

analysis of their political economy, and the lack of indicators that could serve

to implement conditionality. 121 Parallel to CSPs, the NIPs described the

specific projects to be carried out to achieve the broader CSP objectives. The

first Moroccan NIP (2002-2003) aimed to reform public administration, trade

development, human resources development, migration management and

environmental protection. The following Moroccan NIP (2005-2006) focused

on upgrading the economic environment and trade development, improving

the condition of disadvantaged population groups, fighting poverty and other

projects to protect human rights and the environment. 122

Added to this, the introduction of the European Neighbouring Policy (ENP) in

2004 intended to deepen the partnership parallel to the EMP. This included

alternative approach to coping with the increasing interdependence between

the EU and its Southern neighbours. 123

120 Michal Natorski, The Meda Programme in Morocco 12 Years on, p.19.121 Patrick Holden, Strategic intervention or showcase?, p.558.122 European Commission, Morocco: Euro-Med Partnership National Indicative Programme 2005-2006 , (Brussels: European Commission, 2004).EURO-MED PARTNERSHIP. Morocco. National Indicative Programme2005-2006; Source: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/morocco/

csp/nip_05_06_en.pdf (accessed 25 March 2008).123 European Commission, European Neighbourgood and Partnershio Instrument 2007-2013, Strategy Paper (Brussels: European Commission, 2006), p.5.


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The general conclusion to be drawn from this is that the changing priorities

and the lack of specific indicators for achievements certainly hindered on

Moroccos capacity to succeed in the implementation of the reforms required.

MEDA II projects had an improved determinacy and a stronger link between

projects and objectives in comparison to MEDA I, albeit the coherence of

policies was still weak. The CSP and NIPs were background papers rather

than planning documents and there was no clarity in the parameters for the

implementation of the projects: the objectives, the expected results or

performance indicators. 124 Since the performance criteria were not

communicated to the partners, they failed to understand the rationale behind

the allocations. 125 Furthermore, the MEDA projects were not always

consistent with the general objectives of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

framework. 126

A critique also emerges against the specific issues targeted in each country.

Studies have concluded that there has been no intervention in any MED

country that one could dispute did not address a real problem. 127 Yet crucial

sectors were ignored. In the case of Morocco trade was not guaranteed the

reciprocity for the free access for Moroccan products as there exists for

industrial foods of European origin. 128 Some groups in society such as the

124 ECORYS-NEI, The Mid-Term Evaluation of MEDA II , p.67.125 Ibid, p.68.126 Stephan Stetter, cited in Michal Natorski, The Meda Programme in Morocco 12Years on, p.21 127

ADE-IBM-EPU-NTUA, Evaluation of Economic Co-operation between theEuropean Commisson and Mediterranean Countries, p.61.128 Ibid, p.39.


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female population, those who oppose Islamic fundamentalism and the urban

society saw in the interventions a potential force for development to live like

Europeans. 129 But such expectations were well above the real progress from

the Partnership agreement. 130

Furthermore, these reforms ignore the political reality of Arab countries full of

vested interest and that is in need of deeper reforms than economic

liberalisation. MEDA is after all a neo-liberal intervention to harmonize

regulations and institutional systems of partner countries with the EU

model. 131 It intended to lower the role of the state but only as a consequence

from the fall in revenue from tariffs. The main goal was still to make the

environment more appealing to foreign investors, which European technocrats

thought would lower the saving-investment gaps characteristic of developing

countries. 132 I perceive that the EMP, and thus MEDA, rejects the one-

dimensional and trade liberalisation focused approach of a neo-liberal logic.

Still, the nature of the intervention imposed to some countries and the

limitations on agricultural trade policies (which are widely known as key to

the economic development of the southern Mediterranean countries) leads me

to think of the MEDA as essentially neo-liberal strategy. Even if not be of the

strictest kind, it contributes to the limited role in helping to reform Morocco

and other Arab countries that do not sympathise with this approach. 133

129 Nadia Salah, Global Euro-mediterranean partnership, The Journal of North African Studies3, no. 2 (1998): 39-46, p.42.130 Ibid.131 Patrick Holden, The European Union's MEDA Aid Programme: What kind of

development partnership?,p, 10.132 Ibid. 133 Patrick Holden, Strategic intervention or showcase?, p.562-63.


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3.3 Project Cycle of MEDA

The project cycle is key to understanding the slow and problematic project

implementation. Also, the reforms in the structure of planning and

implementation were one of the main differences between phases I and II of

the MEDA programme. The first phase of the programme encountered several

difficulties during its implementation. It supposed a great change for the

recipient countries, who had had a greater role in setting out their priorities for

funding through the Financial Protocols. The final report on the Evaluation of

the MEDA admits to the difficulties in implementing and taking the lead in

this new form of programming. This is reflected in figure 5 below, which

shows that the total ratio of payments to commitments was below 30%.

Figure 5. MEDA I and II Ratio of Payments to Commitments

Source: (EuroMed Information, EC.)


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Such a weak performance was the reason for the set out of the second phase of

the programme, which intended to streamline the decision making process

thus increasing the efficiency of its implementation. 134 Reports by the

European Commission found that the improved results of this second phase

were a direct consequence of the structural reforms undertaken by the new

Commission from 2000 onwards. 135 The differences in the programming

documents between MEDA I and MEDA II were already outlined in the

subsection of MEDA objectives.

Under MEDA II more projects were actually carried out and the process is

considered to have been more efficient. Still, the project cycle under MEDA II

depicted in figure 6 below shows the extensive consultation process which

involves four entities in the overall management of MEDA projects: local

authorities, the project contractor, the EC Delegation and the EC headquarters

in Brussels.

The local authorities intervened in the design of the projects to ensure that

there is a common view between locals and the EC on the achievements and

how these should happen. 136 Locals were given a very limited role in the

implementation and payments of projects but still depended on the prior

approval of the EC for the annual Work Plan and for the remittance of

134 ECORYS-NEI, The Mid-Term Evaluation of MEDA II , p.32.135 European Commission, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and MEDA regional

activities ,p.17. 136 ADE-IBM-EPU-NTUA, Evaluation of Economic Co-operation between theEuropean Commisson and Mediterranean Countries, p.40.


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payments. 137 This need for constant on authorization is often the most

contentious and delay-causing issue. 138Despite their involvement, local

authorities were sometimes not really interested in achieving the objectives

agreed upon the Financial Agreements, this again suggests the lack of

coherence between local needs and European projects. 139

The second group involved in the project cycle are the contractors, companies

that will ensure the implementation of the projects. Usually small projects

were directly contracted through companies but larger projects implied two

levels of contractors and the establishment of a Project Management Unit. 140

Intermediating between local authorities or project team leaders and EC

headquarters were the EC Delegations in the MED countries. 141 They were an

additional step in the decision chain with a limited role that, nevertheless

contributed to the lengthy decision process.

Figure 6. MEDA Project Cycle

137 Ibid.138 Ibid.139

Ibid.140 Ibid, 41.141 Ibid.


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Source: EuropeAid

Finally, the EC headquarters in Brussels were responsible for the important

decisions regarding management of the projects. This is where the

bureaucratic procedures from the EC structure already covered came into play.

Aside from the procedures and decision levels, the volume of aid managed per

staff member is said to be higher than in other organizations, there is a lack of

information on regional projects and other bilateral projects. When evaluating

the economic cooperation between the EC and MED countries, project

beneficiaries and team leaders complained the most about this sort of


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procedures and the lengthy duration of the decision process. 142

All in all, the estimated project cycle of MEDA was between three and four an

a half years. Such a lengthy procedure and the gradual impact of the reforms

on a country explain why, even 15 years after the beginning of the MEDA

programme it is still too early to evaluate its overall impact. It is however

descriptive enough to understand the limited achievements of the programme

and the reluctance of partners to participate. The process of implementation is

hampered by this slow project cycle but also by the role of Member States in

the MED Committee that attempt to use the programme and the conditionality

imposed as a political tool. The programme was designed to ensure that funds

would flow according to the countrys progress towards structural reforms. 143

Though this is a potentially positive tool, the legal criteria were too vague and

the EUs resources to monitor compliance too scarce. When recipients failed

to understand the logic to the rewards, conditionality failed. This appears to be

the case with MEDA. 144

3.4 MEDA initiatives in Morocco

So far we have seen the description of the MEDA programme, the changing

objectives and priorities of MEDA and the slow process of deliberation and

implementation of the EC. It is thus not surprising that there is a general

agreement that the EMP has failed to meet the objectives enshrined in the

142 ADE-IBM-EPU-NTUA, Evaluation of Economic Co-operation between the

European Commisson and Mediterranean Countries,p.41.143 Patrick Holden, Strategic intervention or showcase?, p.553.144 Ibid, p.556.


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Barcelona Declaration. There is a large empirical gap in the evaluation of the

efficiency of MEDAs financial instruments, partly due to the enormous

difficulties in obtaining reliable data. 145 Thus I turn to illustrating with

concrete examples of policies and their outcomes to finish the assessment of

the programme. 146 I will then look at these outcomes in the contextual

framework of Morocco.

3.4.1 Assessment of Policies

The initiatives through the MEDA programme to achieve the ECs political,

economic and social objectives included three areas of intervention:

strengthening the economic and institutional environment, private sector

development and the facilitation of trade.

Strengthening the economic and institutional environment

The MEDA programme introduced different types of measures from laws and

regulations to public services and infrastructures under the control of the

government. These aimed to favour changes towards a market economy

dominated by private enterprises and open to foreign economic relations.

These sorts of measures were of two kinds: direct financial transfers

145 For more on this see: A. Ma and I. Maestro, Financiacin Euromediterrnea.

Es posible una alternativa?, Documentos CIDOB Dilogos Mediterrneos, 2001.146 MEDA figures, Euro-Mediterranean Information System on knowhow in theWater sector, SEMIDE, 16/01/2006.


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(structural adjustment facilities) and technical assistance projects in support of

government agencies. 147

Structural adjustment facilities (SAF) entail direct payments to the budget

of the partner countries. They were the major instruments used but they

remained conditional on the implementation of reforms negotiated with the

partner country government and coordinated with the Bretton Woods

institutions. 148 Between the years of 1995-1999 Morocco benefited from the

Structural Adjustment Facility I, which had commitments of over 120 million

Euros. The reforms encompassed a large variety of measures related to the

objectives of economic co-operation such as: design of an economic and social

medium-term strategy, improvement of public resources management, reform

of the financial sector and fight against poverty. The evaluation of these

measures in 1999 remarked that there had been significant progress towards

liberalising and regulating the economy, that restoration of balance between

the public and private sectors had been initiated but that redistribution of

sending in favour of targeted populations had encountered the most

difficulties. The SAF was the only project that was fully executed during

MEDA I in Morocco. 149

The external evaluation of the MEDA programme commissioned by the EC

concluded the results had been impressive as it had encouraged the Moroccan

government to focus on its macroeconomic policies and had resulted in great

147 ADE-IBM-EPU-NTUA, Evaluation of Economic Co-operation between the

European Commisson and Mediterranean Countries,p.22.148 The term Bretton Woods refers the International Monetary Fund and the IMF. 149 Michal Natorski, The Meda Programme in Morocco 12 Years on, p. 34.


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changes in the institutional landscape of some economic sectors. 150 Such

positive outcomes meant that 60% of MEDA II funds to Morocco would also

take the form of SAFs, amounting to almost 567 million. 151 In reality, it is

hard to see how the EC came to these conclusions. It is difficult to measure the

actual impact of these funds and there is not much information about how the

funds were used by Moroccan authorities. 152 Other independent evaluations

have remained more sceptical about the real impact of these reforms,

observing that the projects simply bought reforms, that this was not in line

with the Barcelona declaration objectives and the support was not

proportionate to the social costs of the reforms. 153

The technical assistance projects focused on restructuring and privatising

state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or strengthening public administrations.

Morocco was allocated a budget of 10 million Euros for this former. 154 But

privatisation in Morocco suffered from delays. It only began in 2002 and in a

pre-election context that refrained the government from undertaking any major

privatisation operation. 155 This illustrates the sensitivity of privatisation in

these countries where SOEs are dominated by vested interests of the ruling

elites and also have heavy social consequences when they imply lay-offs that

contribute to the chronic unemployment. Major decisions of privatisation were

given to high-level political bodies but the funds are given to the ministerial

150 ADE-IBM-EPU-NTUA, Evaluation of Economic Co-operation between theEuropean Commisson and Mediterranean Countries,Apendix 7, p.17.151 Michal Natorski, The Meda Programme in Morocco 12 Years on, p. 35.152 Ibid.153

Ibid, p.34.154 ADE-IBM-EPU-NTUA, Evaluation of Economic Co-operation,p 26.

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