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Harold lasswell's problem orientation

for the policy sciencesNick Turnbull

ab

aSchool of Social Science and Policy , University of New South Wales

bPolitics , The University of Manchester

Published online: 11 Mar 2010.

To cite this article:Nick Turnbull (2008) Harold lasswell's problem orientation for the policysciences, Critical Policy Studies, 2:1, 72-91, DOI: 10.1080/19460171.2008.9518532

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Harold Lasswell's

Problem Orientation for

the Pol icy Sciences

Nick Turnbul l

Schoo l of Social Science and Policy, U niversity of New South W ales and

Politics, The University of M anchester.

Abstract

Harold Lasswell s problem orientation is the keystone in his concept of the policy

sciences . How ever, many critics have since rejected his view of policymaking as a

problem solving science. I explain and critique Lasswell s problem orientation in a new

way, in terms of his scientific conception of problem and solution. Lasswell derived his

vision of the policy sciences from Dew ey s conception of knowledge as problem solving.

Lasswell modified Dewey s pragmatism by proposing a policy sciences composed of

two separate poles, the scientific study of problems and policymaking around these

problems. These were synthesized in a larger scientific perspective, the problem

orientation for the policy sciences. How ever, this synthesis is neither scientific in theory

nor in practice. The link between the two poles is contingent, rather than necessary.

Lasswell suppressed the problematic to cast policy science as a non-political politics.

The relationship between the two poles, and the problem orientation in general, should

be theorized as contingent and political.

7 2 Critical Policy Analysis 2008),vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 72-91.


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Main Articles

The American political scientist Harold Lasswell had a vision for the 'policy sciences' which

would bring togetherthe social sciences and practical policymaking to solve public problems.

1

The concept of the 'problem orientation' was the keystone in this vision which, for many, still

animates the scholarly f ield of policy analysis. Contemporary writers both within and outside

the United States continue to draw on Lasswell's ideas and reiterate his key them es, particularly

his concern for public problems and democracy (Ascher and Hirschfelder-Ascher 2004; de

Leon, 1981;Dryzek, 1989; Dryzek and Torgerson, 1993; Fischer, 2003 ;Hajer and Wagenaar,

2003a; Torgerson, 19 85,1995 ;W eissandW ittrock, 1991). Lasswell explicitly framed his

vision as an adaptation of John Dewey 's general approach to public policy (Lasswell, 1971:

pp.

xiii-xiv).

11

We seeD ew ey's problem solving logic at work in Lassw ell's pragmatic vision

of the policy sciences. Torgerson outlines the strong influenceofDeweyihroughoutLassw ell's

thought, noting that Dew ey's

How We Thinkwas

Lasswell's point of departure forunderstanding

the policy process, his ideas reflecting Dewey's step-wise model of problem solving (Torgerson,

1995:p. 236). Lasswell was important in founding a key journal of the field,

PolicySciences,

and wrote of how the 'problem orientation' should animate the policy sciences as distinctive

from other forms of scholarship.

Lasswell is important to academic policy analysis for several reasons: heis the founder of

the 'po licy sciences' ideal;his work is one manifestation of the largermovement of science

against politics;hetried to formalise the relationship between social science and policymaking;

and he made problem solving the defining characteristic of policy analysis. However, the

problem solving ideal h e espoused has come under considerable criticism. Among the telling

objections are that it presumes an inadequate, univocal definition of social problems (Lindblom

and Woodh ouse, 1993: p. 2 1 ; Ro se, 1977); excludes the symbolic dimension of policy

meanings (Yanow, 1996); pays insufficient attention to problem setting and problem framing

(Rein and Schon, 1977: pp. 236-9); and does not deal with political agenda setting (Kingdon,

1984).

hi general, the problem solving view of policy science has been debunked as a 'myth '

(Rein and W hite, 1977). Since then, interpretative policy analysishas emerged as a broad

alternative to the 'policy sciences' vision (see, for exam ple, Fischer

2003;

G ottweis 2007;

Hajer and Wagenaar 2003a; Yanow 1996).

m

Interpretative researchers hav e drawn on

alternative epistemological perspectives which differ markedly from mainstream political science.

But while different, they also value Lasswell's interest in dem ocracy and carry on his belief

that scholars should be concerned with policymaking in practice rather than in abstract theory.

I think it is worth returning to Lassw ell's problem orientation to see where it went wrong in

constructing itself as

science

while also retaining what is of most value in itthe problem

orientation.

1V

While the specifics of my discussion only apply to Lassw ell, his thought reflects

the broad hope for a science of politics. Through Lasswell w e can consider the question of

how to relate science and politics and what this means for our conception of policy analysis as

a field of scholarly inquiry. This debate is not new, but in examining Lassw ell's conception of

'problem ' we can view the origin of the scientific approach in a new way, and also see how

to retain the problem concept and extract it from its scientific connotations. The advent of this

new journal,

Critical Policy Analysis,

affords us the opportunity to consider Lassw ell in a

Critic al Policy Analysis 73


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Harold Lassw ell's 'Problem Orientation' for the Policy Sciences

new light and reassert the value of his ideas for contemporary interpretative policy analysis.

Firstly, I describe how L asswell extended upon D ew ey's problem solving logic in his

vision of the policy sciences as a m ultidisciplinary approach to problem solving, made up of

two poles of one larger scientific rationality. Secondly, I review some of the critiques of this

construction by examining the literature on the use of scientific knowledge in policymaking.

Thirdly, I discuss the policy sciences vision as an attempt to scientifically solve the problem of

politicsby suppressing problematicity. I concludeby arguing that Lasswell's two poles should

be rethought in political terms, groundedupon a contingent logic of questioning which accounts

for the interpretative and rhetorical relationship between the social scientific study of public

problems and the use of social science in policymaking around these problems. Such a logic

would overturn the problem solving (scientific) assumption and be consistent in posing this

relationship itself in terms of questioning.

1. Harold Lasswell: theorising the policy sciences

The social sciences have always been interwoven with politics and government but the idea to

construct a research programm e specifically oriented towards policy emerged only in the

1940s and 1950s with Lasswell and hisfellow scholars in the United States (Wittrock, Wagner,

and Wollmann, 1991: p.28,31;Lerner and Lassw ell, 1951). Atypically modern idea, Lasswell

had a grand vision that the policy sciences would scientifically address fundamental problems

of employment, peace and equality (Wagner, Weiss, Wittrock and Wollmann, 1991b: p. 7).

While the term 'policy sc iences'is not used universally, Wagner etal . (1991b: p. 4) define it

well as 'the tradition within the social sciences that seeks 'relevance to contemporary affairs'

The development of the policy sciences was itself very much a part of the increasing demand

for social science research as the state took on new functions, such as macroeconomic planning

and redistributing wealth (Gagnon, 1990: p. 1). Th e social sciences at large developed with

the success of the natural sciences in mind, seeking control of the social environment just as

science commanded the natural one (Fay, 1975: p. 19). From the Enlightenment notion of a

world of puzzles to be solved, the policy sciences developed as the desire for knowledgeable

governance (Parsons, 1995: p. 17). Scientific politic s would provide technical arguments to

reach mutually acceptable answers, and disagreements based on values would drop away, as

would rhetoric and concern for power and position (Fay, 1975: p. 22). Wolin describes the

depth and extent of the assumption that social phenomena could be rationally understood and

society advanced by scientific means(1961:pp. 35 8-60). The last two centuries saw a long

termmovem ent against politics and political philosophy in favour of science that even extended

beyond positivists to reactionary theocrats(1961:pp. 358 -60 ). All of them saw facts as

central to questions of policy and government, and all of them utilised 'necess ity' as a bridge

for smuggling facts into the territory of norms

(1961:

p. 360). As such, the social sciences

depicted a model of society which left no room either for politics and the practice of the

political art, orfor a distinctively political theory(1961:p. 360). But even where policymaking

was not explicitly theorised as a science, scientific ideas about policy and politics were

widespread and elements persist in contemporary policy theory (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003b:

p. 18).

74 Critical Policy An alysis


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Main Articles

/.Policy science as problem solving

Lasswell derived his vision of the policy sciences from Dewey's conception of knowledge as

problem solving. Dewey contended that problem solving pertained only to experience, therefore

to the problems of the public, an idea reflected in LassweU's dream of the policy sciences of

democracy (1951a: p. 10). Lasswell shared Dew ey 's rejection of private abstract thought in

the form of metaphysics and theology, citing the philosopher's focus on social institutions as

exemplary of the pragmatist attitude (195 la : p. 12). The 'problem orientation' w as to be the

distinctive outlook of the practical policy sciences (1970,1971). Lasswell adopted Dew ey's

definition of problems and solutions in terms of

experience:

by definition a problem is a perceived

discrepancy between goals and an actual or anticipated stateof affairs

(1971:

p. 56). Lasswell

tried to develop policy science as a distinct field, a 'policy orientation' distinguishable by its

particular focus on problems (195 la). These problems were to be addressed w ith the goal of

realising hum an dignity (Lasswell, 1951a: p. 15; 1951b: p. 5; 1971: p. 41). The problem

orientation of the policy sciences combined the twin questions of knowledge of the world and

the best mo deo f democracy (Lasswell, 1971: p. 4). Th e policy sciences were 'the policy

sciences of democracy' (195 la) because the problem orientation was the regulative criterion

which w ould integrate scientific inquiry with solving the problems of the public. Lassw ell's

support for democracy, scientific inquiry, and practical policymaking are not in dispute: it is

the orm

of this integration that is in question here.

Lasswell and his colleagues favoured a scientific approach to solving policy problems.

Desp iteDew ey's concern to distinguish practical science from abstract science, Lasswell saw

that policy science

v

had much in common w ith the logical positivism of Carnap and that it

could be of great benefit, for example in developing indexes of social attitudes 1951a: p. 12).

It is important to note that early writers in the policy sciences did not propose a sim ple

mechanistic interpretation of social action. In the seminal edited collection

The Policy Sciences

(Lerner and Lassw ell, 1951), Hilgard and Lerne r noted the great changes to social theory

brought about by Darw in, Marx and Freud, all of whom recognised greater social flux and

individual autonomy against perfect predictability

(1951:

pp. 17 -18). Policy science was

both a symptom of, and a response to, the new problem s of social coordination that arrived

with modernity. But while acknowledging the impossibility of predicting human behaviour and

making scientific generalisations about the future, Lasswell said that such projections should

still be appraised in a scientific frame of reference (195 lb : p. 28).

Policy science was to be an interdisciplinary science to address social changeby improving

policymaking (Hilgard and Lerner, 1951: pp. 42 -3). H enc eLerne rand La ssw ell's (1951)

inaugural volume

T he Policy Sciences

not only discussed policymaking but also included

chapters by social scientists such as Margaret Mead and Edward Shils. The five chapters on

research methods in this same volume (notably by Kenneth Arrow and Paul Lazarsfeld) reflect

the methodological bent of policy science 's origins. The idea was not simply to apply scientific

knowledge to policy problems. They supposed that ideal rationality was scientific rationality

and that decision making could also be conducted according to scientific methods and principles.

Th e empirical criterion marked the distinction between science and non-science , and the

Cr itica l Policy Ana lysis 75


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emphasis on decision making marked the difference between policy science and other

disciplines (Lasswell, 1971: p. 1).

Despite his scientific outlook, Lasswell and the positivists differed regarding the question

of values, a position he shared with Dewey. Dewey criticised other forms of empiricism for

separating questions of fact and value (M oore, 1961: p. 266). Hebelieved that philosophy

oriented towards practical action overcame scientific elitism and demanded that inquiry b e

directed towards practical measures in line with fundamental hum an values. Lasswell also

dealt with the problem of values and was keen to indicate how important they w erefor the

policy orientation.

vm

He argued that practical science does involve values because the goals

of policymaking should produce the type of hum an relations we find most desirable

1951

a:

p.

9). He defined value instrumentally as a category of preferred ev en ts,' such as peace

rather than war, high levels of productive employment rather than mass unemployment' and so

forth (195 la: pp. 9 -1 0) . Although values introduce an element of subjectivity to science,

Lasswell argued that this does not totally undermine scientific objectivity since non-objective

values could be considered in advance when determining the goals of policy inquiry, after

which 'the scholar proceeds with maximum objectivity and uses all available methods ' (195 la:

p.

11).

Although Lasswell included values in the choice of problems, he separated them from the

rational process of scientific policymaking, which required 'scrupulous objectivity and maximum

technical ingenuity in executing the projects undertaken' (Lasswell, 1951a: p. 14). Setting

value questions comprises an entirely different process than the scientific procedure that solves

them in experience. We see this division elsewhere in Lasswell's writing when he described

clarifying goal values as a preliminary step to selecting hypotheses (195 lb : p. 5). So, he did

think values important, however in suggesting such a separation in

the process

of thinking,

Lasswell divided rationality and limited the flexibility of reason in order to support a

methodological, staged model of policymaking. The question here is whether we can divide

rationality in such a way. Is it possible to fix social values, or do they change with the very

process of inquiry regardless of the goals w e set? Even if w e could establish clear values,

would policy prescriptions which are consistent with those values automatically follow ?

Lasswell's vision was distinct from the specialist sciences becausehe saw policy science

not as just another new science nor as just another term for social science. All scientific

know ledge is relevant to public problems so the disparate sciences would com e together in

the policy sciences. Thus there is no singular policy science but policy sciences in the plural

(1951a). Lasswell stressed that the policy sciences should investigate the most important,

fundamental problems, and that policy scientists should not becom e distracted from this by

attending o nly to the urgent issues of theday (1951a: p. 8). It is the orientation towards these

important problems that is different about the policy sciences, since they a re a fraction of the

issues wh ich fall und er the purview of a range of sciences (Lassw ell, 1951a: p. 4). This

encompassed both the social and natural sciences since any item of knowledge whether

about social attitudes or the range of weapons was potentially u seful for policy

1951

a: p.

3).

Lasswell identified two m ain forces driving the need for interdisciplinary inquiry. Firstly,



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Main Articles

social problems are complex and a great variety of scientific information is relevant to complex

problems. Understanding such problems required a way to integrate different types of

know ledge for decision making (Lasswell, 1951a: p. 14;seealsoM ertonan dL erner, 1951:

p.

300). Second ly,he understood tha tw eencounter problems and solutions in context. He

sought to overcome the fragmentation characteristic of the sciences through his attention to

context, multi-method inquiry, and practical problem solving

(1971:

pp. xiii, 8,13 -15) . He

argued that this integrative impetus constituted 'a reversal of nineteenth- and early twentieth-

century trends toward specialisation'

(1971:

p. 8).

//.

The two poles of the policy sciences

Lassw ell formalised his vision through the twofold orientation of the policy sciences: 1) 'the

development of a science of policy forming and execu tion' using social and psychological

inquiry, and 2) improving 'the concrete content of the information and the interpretations

available to policy makers' (1951a: p. 3). H ela terrep hrasedth isas 'the policy sciences are

concerned with knowledge

of

and

in

the decision processes of the public and civic ord er'

(1971:

p. 1). Knowledge o /the decision process is achieved by 'systematic, empirical studies

of how policies are made and put into effect', while knowledge

in

the decision process draws

upon the various scientific disciplines to increase the stock of knowledge relevant to public

policy

(1971:

pp. 1-2). Since the policy orientation includes many existing disciplines, he had

to identify for it a distinguishing characteristic; integrating science with the decision process

(1971:

p. 1). That is , synthesising scientific decision making and scientific know ledge via the

common focus on policy problems produces a larger, unique policy orientation. Policy science

advances knowledge 'whenever the methods a re sharpened by which authentic information

and responsible interpretations can be integrated w ith judgment' (Lasswell, 195 la: p. 4). Just

as Dewey wished to redress the denigration of applied knowledge, Lasswell stressed that

while policy sciencehad practical importance it was not simply an applied science, that is, of

less value than pure science (195 la: p. 4; see also, in the same volume, Hilgard and Lerner,

1951:p . 42).

1X

He insisted that focusing on how policy is made and executed 'identifies a

unique frame of reference', w hilealso utilising other pre-existing sciences

(1971:

p. 1). The

orientation towards public problems followed directly from Dewey's pragmatism, but it is the

synthesis

of Lasswell's two poles that establishes the distinct nature and identity of the policy

sciences; science encompasses both in an overall problem orientation.

To digress for a moment to the important, subtle distinction betw een Lassw ell's policy

science and other versions of policy science inspired by logical empiricism, Torgerson has

interpreted Lassw ell'suse of the term 'judgment' as closer to political prudence(phronesis),

than technocratic policy science (1995: pp. 238-9). H e sees Lasswell's work as very different

from positivist policy theory, resonating with the contemporary revival of Aristotelian practice

as a postpositivist alternative (Torgerson, 1995; on

phronesis

see Fischer,

2003:

p. 133; for

an example, seeFlyvbjerg, 2001). Thisinvolves emphasising Lasswell's concern for context

and improving public deliberation, distinct from a purely technocratic policy science (Fischer,

2003:

p. 221). Lassw ell's and Dewey's pragmatism differed from positivism in important



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respects but I do not think it has been established that their approach was logically different;

they both shared an underlying 'scientific' problem solving rationality. Lasswell did say that

the yardsticks for analysis used by the policy scientist and the decision maker must be

distinguished, since decision makers m ighthave tobe satisfied with achieving less (1951b: p.

16).Taking account of political circumstances and other constraints requires some degree of

intuition over pure em piricism. E ven so, Lassw ell's theory is still scientific at its root and

employs scientific method in devising and implementing solutions to problems. His pragmatist

heritage is different from positivismin valuing practical action as the primary goal of knowledge,

how ever this is a normative criterion. The underlying logic of both is to resolve questions by

reference to experience, which is, and only is, what counts as knowledge in the end (on the

primacy of experience, see Dew ey 1938: pp. 105-6 ; 1958: pp. 8,11 ; 1971: p. 236; and on

knowledge as the elimination of questions via experience seeDewey 1938: pp. 104-5; 1958:

p.

7; 1971: p. 100). Authentic interpretation and decision making eliminates questions

apodictically by referring to experience and therefore the most rigorous and sophisticated

policymaking integrates scientific knowledge with a scientific decision making procedure.

Whatever similarities and differences there were between positivism and pragmatism, in

elaborating the policy sciences Lasswell moved qualitatively away from practical reason and

further towards science. Dew ey acknow ledged that inquiry could conclude with a directive

for action rather than definitive prob lem solving action. However, his main idea was that

knowledge

shouldhave

instrumental, practical consequences, and these were not to be

distinguished from the process of inquiry itself (Dewey 1938: pp. 118 ,12 0-1 ,49 9). Rather

than seeing practical reason as necessarily concluding with action, Lasswell formulated the

practical stage as a different but related question, subsuming the two under a larger synthesis

true to Dew ey's 'problem orientation'. Indeed, even apodictic judgem ents about the world

do not necessarily entail only one possible way to achieve our ends in practice (see Hintikka,

1974:

pp. 80-97), so there is always a choice when it comes to the mechanisms for bringing

about policy prescriptions. Therefore w e can say Lasswell correctly divided policymaking

into two dimensions. He acknowledged that scientific inquiry can produce knowledge without

necessarily making directives for action. It can do, and one could suppose that perhaps scientists

should be civic-minded, but it is not necessarily in the nature of inquiry to do so. Lasswell saw

that a synthesis of the two poles of the policy sciences was necessary to bring science together

with an orientation towards solving public problems.

In sum, Lasswell divided what was for pragmatism a singular questioning process into a

dual questioning process. He transformed a holistic procedure that moves us from problem to

solution as practical effect into two inquiries; one into the nature of the problem and another

into how best to effectit. Lasswell's two poles of the policy sciences divided scientific find ings

from the practical methods of bringing them about. He moved beyond the Deweyan model

and established a distinction between science and scientific politics, even though he did not

think that policymaking w as logically different from scientific inquiry. To me, Lassw ell's

approach seems right insofar as he identified a conceptual limitation of Dewey's pragmatism

although arguments about the nature of practical reason are com plex and far from settled.



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Main Articles

Whatever the case, at the same time as Lasswell explicated Dew ey's program in the form of

a policy sciences that would draw science and policymaking together, we see a fragmentation

of

the

theoretical model despite his attempts to establish a unified field. Science still encompassed

the dual questioning process overall but separating these questions made explicit what w as at

stake and allowed us to see the distinction between science and policymaking, a distinction

that becam e the source of later critiques.

The question w e must now ask is this: is Lasswell's synthesis of the two poles of the policy

orientation itself scientific? Without even considering whether policymaking can be conducted

scientifically, for Lassw ell's vision to be consistent the relationship between the two poles

must itself be scientific. However, it is not. A scientific verification would draw on the empirical

as the criterion of judgment but Lasswell made this conclusion theoretically, without reference

to experience. His synthesis of the two poles is not scientific at all. It is based on a norm ative

view that policymaking should be 'rational' (where rationality equals problem solving) and

that science is the most rational logic for researching and practically solving public problems.

Therefore the construction of the policy sciences is not consistent with the criterion for scientific

problem solving h e proposes. We now need to examine the literature to find examples which

will allow us to

ftiitherunravel

Lasswell's theoretical synthesis of social science and policymaking.

Questioning the scientific model

/.

The use of scientific knowledge

Lasswell's formulation of the two poles of the policy sciences raises thequestion of how one

pole relates to the other, how scientific knowledgeis used in policymaking. Why is theuse of

knowledgein policymaking important? The link between scientific theory and practical control

was essential to positivist science (Fay, 1975: pp. 2948) even where it was not theorised in

quite this way. The policy sciences ideal supposes that the two poles of social scientific research

and practical political action can be subsumed under a singular rational process.

I noted above that the theoretical relationship between Lasswell's two poles is not scientific.

Empirical research has also shown the progress of knowledge between the two poles of the

policy sciences to be far from continuous. Scientific information is often used in policymaking

in a manner that is neither objective nor goal-directed (Weiss, 1991). Indeed, in

The Policy

Sciences

Merton and Lerner (1951) pointed to the insidious possibilities for policy makers to

us e scientific research forulterio r purposes. They noted that decision makers som etimes

comm ission scientific studies on problems upon which they do

not

wish to act so as to delay

action and allay criticism against them

(1951:

p. 299). H ence they distinguished between two

types ofknow ledgeused in policymaking. The first type, they argue, conductedb y groups

with self-interest in mind, is more likely to be exploited for propaganda, to justify a

predetermined decision, and the research findings less likely 'to be subjected to the test of

experience'

(1951:

p. 299). The second type of research, research for action, is subjected to

the test of experience by scientists and is therefore a genuine response to a problem

(1951:

p.

299).

W e must admit the possibility that know ledge can beused for other than instrumental



10/21


purposes, no matter how undesirable this m ight be.

What has been the experience in practice? Over the last few decades many scholars hav e

examined th eu se of scientific knowledge in policymaking (see Brooks and Gagnon, 1990;

Wagner et al.,

1991

a; Weiss, 1977). Despite the great volum e of social science developed

for policymaking many researchers have concluded that social sciencehas had mixed or even

little success in influencing policy solutions (Jenkins-Sm ith, 1990: p. 47 ; Rein and Schon,

1977:

p. 235). The idea that analysis is used to solve problems has been debunked as a

'problem solving m yth '(R ein and W hite, 1977: p. 262). Weiss, for exam ple, outlines the

many disappointments of social scientists: research find ings were not as influential on policy as

scholars had hoped; scientists naively failed to appreciatehow important ideology and interests

are in politics; research was more likely to influence how policy makers conceptualised problems

than provide solutions, or it was used to move issues higher or lower on the public agenda;

and policy makers often used research as an argument to advocate for a favoured position

(1991:

pp. 311 -14). T he ways science and the state interact continue to be an important

research area, and the sociology of know ledge is now an established theme of policy studies.

Because scientific know ledgeis notused consistently in the two poles of the policy sciences

Lassw ell's synthesis is not coherent. At the end of the volum e by Wagner et al. (1991a),

Weiss and Wittrock (1991) review the Lassw ellian vision of the policy sciences in light of the

relationship between social science and policy in practice. They emphasise that policy theorists

must move away from a simplistic understanding of theuse of scientific research in policymaking,

stressing how historical forces and institutional structures impact upon the relationship between

social science and the state

(1991:

p. 356). They call for a re-examination of Lassw ell's

programme, saying we should pay particular attention to its historicity, epistemology, and

ontology and that, importantly, we must account for human agency

(1991:

pp. 366-7). They

state that this is not a call 'for abstruse philosophising', but say that social science will only be

relevant to human concerns if it accounts for how social structures condition those concerns,

and how w e can act independently of them

(1991:

p. 367).

Weiss and Wittrock rightly move away from a naive scientific view and locate the source

of the difficulties in understanding policy in fundamental philosophical questions. But their

qualification about philosophy illustrates their keen awareness of how difficult it is to broach

such questions within such a practically-oriented concern as policy analysis. If the problems

underlying the policy sciences concept stem from fundamental questions of knowledge and

human nature then why not return to philosophy to see what it can offerus? Such an inquiry is

beyond the scope of this paper, but for now I would simply note that the use of research for

a variety of purposes other than problem solving in the policy arena confirms th e conceptual

break between social scientific know ledge and problem solving action envisioned by both

Dewey and Lasswell.

Critical Policy Analysis

so


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Main Articles

//. Reconsidering the relationship between science and policy

Understanding the relationship between social science and policy, Wittrock says, 'ultimately

rests on an assumption about the analogy between the operational modes of the realms of

research and of policy'(1991:p. 336). If policymaking deploys scientific knowledge to varying

effect and for non- scientific purposes then w e cannot m aintain that the two poles of the policy

sciences fall under one larger, scientific rationality

3

. Wittrock examines this relationship anew

by considering the logical assumptions behind the various theories of how social scienceand

policy interact(1991:pp. 33 7-9 ). Firstly, theenlightenment modelsees social science as

identifying problems ratherthan solving them, i.e., supplying general orientations and concepts

which filter into public consciousness. Secondly, theengineering modelis utilitarian and

subordinates research to the demands of policy. Third is the technocraticm odel, where

research is primary and to which policy is subordinated. Finally, the classical bureaucratic

modelgives primacy to politics and administration. From these he identifies two separate

logics; the enlightenment model and the classical bureaucratic model suppose that the research

and policymaking/administration domains operate according to distinct logics, whereas the

technocratic and engineering m odels suppose a unitary logic in which the only perceivable

obstacles are practical and organisational(1991:pp. 339,341).

Both these logics are paradoxical. If science and politics operate according to entirely

different logics then it is difficult to see how enlightenment could occur

(1991:

p. 344). That is,

were the two domains distinctly different epistemologies it would b e impossible to translate

know ledge from one to the other. But were we to accept the contrary, that the two realms

operate according to a unitary logic, it would be embarrassing to admit that the planned

interaction rarely happens and that the technical and engineering models rarely seem to apply

(1991:

p. 344). Despite this, Wittrock argues that the domains a re 'roughly analogous and

com patible 'ifnotiden tical(19 91:p . 344). He proposes an alternative theory, describing the

two logics as 'strongly analogous and continuous' and 'weakly analogous and discontinuous'

respectively

(1991:

p. 344). He goes on to exam inehow other policy theorists conceive of

the relationship between the two dom ains, concluding in favour of an interactive depiction

whichhe describes as 'discourse structuration'

(1991:

p. 351). This takes the historical and

institutional context of political activity into account while still allocating an important role to

the agency of the political actors involved

(1991:

pp. 350-1 ). The two processes feed back

upon each other to create policy discourse. W ittrock's final, interactional m odel best

characterises the two-way process in which policy makers utilise scientific knowledge and

how they also influence scientific research; it is not a unified logic but nor is it necessarily an

entirely political process in which evidence plays no part at all.

From this critique, what should we conclude about the relationship between the two poles

of social science for policy and policymaking in practice? Such studies of how scientific

know ledge is used in policy have 'problem atised' the idea of a direct, logical connection

between the two poles of the policy sciences. That is, they questioned the relationship between

social science and policy and showed th e link to be

contingent

rather than necessary. In

logical term s, this link is not scientific but rhetorical and political. Th e two domains interact,



12/21


but know ledge flows between them in variable ways and for variable ends, without being

confined to a singular meaning oru sageby the larger problem solving criterion. Politics cannot

be entirely removed

in

policymaking nor from scientific research /or policy, despite attempts

to quarantine policy science from political contamination. The overall rationality of the policy

sciences has fragmented. Colebatch points out that the scientific model of policymaking is not

so much an accurate theory as an idealistic view of how people think policy

shouldbe

made

(2002:

p. 125). In reality, official versions of the policy process are often only rationalisations,

rhetorical constructions that touch up a chaotic process with a rational gloss (2002: p. 129).

This forces us to reconsider both the nature of politics and its distinctiveness from science in

order to understand th e relationsh ip between the two. If we do not bring po litics into the

frame of rationality then w e allow science to be the standard by default. This entails creating a

space for the problematicity of politics, where p roblem setting is as important as problem

solving and where solutions are only arguments rather than problem dissolving solutions. While

problem solving is the unquestioned standard of rationality w e will not establish a place for

political discourse nor be able to distinguish when it is manipulative from when it is sincere.

This is because politics is a far more problematic realm of rationality which appears inferiorto

science when judged b ythe problem solving standard desired by Lasswell. The real interaction

between science and policy indicates that we need to thematise it as a non-necessary

relationship: thisrequires a logic of contingency.

How are we to

theorise

this difference between social science and a related but qualitatively

different policymaking domain? Given that ideology, interests and power are prevalent in

policymaking, we can say that it is political. How can we m ake sense of the political aspects

of policy and articulate its intricacies within a larger theory? W ittrock's discussion is productive

but weha ve a new question for

policy

theory;how can it provide an overarching conceptual

framework that deals with the problematic relationship between science and politics without

separating them into incommensurate domains? We lack an interpretative schema which can

replace the problem solving model. It remains the standard, in principle, even though w e all

acknowledge it is conditioned by other factors in p ractice. With problem solving science as

thebenchmark, the goal of replacing politics with policy science persists. Without articulating

a space for political rationality on its own terms it will be difficult to understand policymaking

outside the scientific framework.

3. Policy science as a solution to the problem of politics

Considering the extensive discussion of methods in Lerner and Lasswell's

The PolicySciences,

Wagner et al. (1991b: p. 9) are not surprised by th e methodological focus of United States

public policy schools. This methodologismdidnot justreflect the fashion of theday butfollowed

from the idea that rational thought involves the methodological justification of solutions to

problems. The elimination of the problem is what counts as knowledge , an epistemology

which tends to exclude the social construction of problems and political rhetoric around

problems that have equally possible, multiple solutions. In general, Michel Meyernotes that

the scientific view of rationality does not deal with questioning as such but with hypotheses



13/21

Main Articles

(1994:p. 136). Inpolicy science , policy solutionsarehypothetical conclusions whichare

supposedtoresolve social problemsinpractice.

301

Thequestionhasalready been partially

resolved intoahypothetical answer,theempiricalorpractical verificationofwhichis allthat

remains

to

convert the hypothesis into

an

independent result.

For

example, Campbell proposed

a scientific modelofpolicymaking w ithhis'experimenting society'theory, derivedinpart from

Popper's philosophy (Campbell, 1988). Popperians viewed policies ashypothesesandpolicy

implementation

as

correspondent with scientific experiment (Dryzek, 1993:

p.

219). Campbell

argued that testing policy hypotheses empirically,bytrialanderror, leadsto thegrowthof

knowledge (Dunn, 1993:pp.256-7).Ifproblems cannotberesolvedin thefirst instance,the

principleoffalsification permits partial explanationstosufficeassolutions until better onescan

befound (Dunn,1993: p. 257).

This

is not to say

that policymaking does

not

sometimes proceed

by

trial

and

error,

in

incremental steps (Lindblom),butsimply thatfor policy theorythisis alimitation because

suchaconception actually resolves its questionsinadvanceby converting them into hypotheses.

It tells

us

nothing about

the

process required

to

arrive

at

those hypotheses, particularly

the

political dimensionsofconstructing social problemsandarguingforsolutions. The movement

frominitial questiontoanswer-as-hypothesis doesnotappear becausetheproblemisalready

solvedandpresentedas anautonomous judgment (Meyer,1995: p.103).Thedemandfor

problem solving thus shifts the focus

to the

methodological treatment

of

hypothetical solutions,

emphasisingthemethodological validation orfalsificationofhypotheses.Thehypothetico-

deductivemethod thus suppresses the initial questioning and becomes the wholeofthe process.

The initial questioning

is

lost, being either entirely suppressed

or

removed

to a

prior

and

separate stageofdiscovery. Justification becom esthewholeofrationalityandsciencethe

most rigorous

and

technically proficient form

of

justifying results. This

is the

source

of the

methodologismweassociate with science generally,andwiththescientific conceptionof

policymakinginthis particular case.

Policymakingisthen judgedby itsdecision processes,i.e.,whether they w ere scientific,

by how well scientific techniques were appliedtoverifying policy solutionsandaction. Simon's

Administrative Behavior,for

example,

is a

seminal work

in the

application

of

scientific

techniquestogovernance (1976). Policy scienceisaninstrumental rationality that interprets

the world scientificallyandemploys scientific techniquestoeffect change. Even though this

mightbepractical, stipulating thatthecriterionforanswering questionsis themodificationof

existence shifts the focus ontothemethodby whichweverify solutions.Thepragmatic criterion

isaworthyone but thelogic w hereby problemsareassumedto beknowninadvance

emphasises technological rigouras themeasureofrationality even m ore thantheefficacyof

the solution.

We can

point

to

some shortcomings

of

this idealised view

in

practice. Dunn notes

that different stakeholdersin apolicy area can hold conflicting interpretationsat thesame time

andinrealityfewidealsareshared around ill-structuredormessy policy problems

(1993:

pp.

259-60;

see

also Rose, 1977). Furthermo re, Dryzek points

out

that this view requires

normative schemestoremain fixedandclosedtodiscussion, allowingfor animpoverished

conception

of

politics which fails

to

take proper account

of

the context

for

policy implementation

(1993:

p. 220).

Critical Policy Analysis 83


14/21


App lying scientific m ethod to policymaking bracke ts out impo rtant quali t ies of the policy

process, including com plexity and contextually-situated kno wled ge. At a m ore fundamental

level, Lin dblo m and W ood hou se describe this shift to science as 'a deman d that seems to call

for a redu ction of partisan political conflict, of political m ane uv erin g, of pow er, of 'po litic s'

(1993:p. 6). Scientific prob lem solving wou ld succeed in solving problem s wher e po liticshad

failed. P olicy scienc e thu s com prised a general solution to the prob lem s of the pub lic, i. e.,

science wa s prop osed as

ia general

answer to the question of politics.

To reiterate m y discussion abov e, a major

the m e of posit ivist social science was to repla ce subjective po lit ics with rational social

engineering . Lasswell w as clear on the benefits of science in this respect: 'W ha t ha s elud ed

scientific and policy attention is a large num ber of the hum an factors w hich p revent Ihe resolution

of thes e difficultiesby rational me an s' (Lasswell, 1951a: p. 8). H e believed psycholog y, for

exam ple , had grea t potent ia l to change des truc t ive hu m an n a ture for ins t rumen ta l en ds ,

conclud ing that treating policy prob lems scientif ically provide d theb as is ' for a profound

reconstruction of culture by continual s tudy and emen dation , and not by (or certainly no t

alone by) th e traditional mean s of political agitation' (195 la: p. 8). His cautionary parenthetical

remark h ere is just that: the grounding idea is to replace politics with scientific decision m aking.

Polit ical problems in general ar et ob er es ol v ed b y science, using scientific me thods a nd by

recou rse to experience. Scientific rationality wou ld eliminate the hu m an and b y im plication,

irrational practice of political agitation. Lass we ll's scientific theo ry of inquiry terminates in

an instrum ental, scientific rationality w hich ideally seeks to replace politics altogether.

By exc ludin g p olitics from th e field of rationality La sswe ll was also able to d istinguish

betw een pol icy and pol i t ics . H e wro te tha t ' po l icy is f ree of m any of the undes irab le

connotations clustered about the

word political,which

is often believed to imp ly partisansh ip

or corrup t ion ' (1951a: p .5 .

1

Scien ce is 'disinte rested ' , in contrast to self-interested,

partisan po litics, so policy science is a non-political mo de of finding solutions to public problems.

F o r Lass we ll, policy science was firmly o n the side of dispassio nate rationality. T h e ideal of a

problem solving policy science survives for ma ny today (see, for examp le, Johnso n, 20 04;

Lau der, Bro wn and Halsey, 2004 ). Th is is no t to suggest that policy canno t solve prob lem s,

only that unde rstanding policy is m or e comp lex in theory and in practice. In other wo rds, the

difficulty is not that w e consider policym aking to b e scientific in practice bu t that ou r

theoretical

basis for examining policy continues to b e groun ded in a problem solving rationality, of which

science is the m ost soph isticated expression.* Bu t even as an analogy the prob lem solving

framework has fundamental theoretical shortcomings.

In regard to the 'p rob lem o rientatio n, ' w hat is imp ortant her e is that science is a general

answ erwh ich artificially eliminates any constitutive role for questioning and for'prob lem aticity'

in general. I suggest that the incom patibility of sc ience and politics arises from this su ppression

of question ing or m ore particularly, in conceiving of questioning in only a scientific w ay, as

prob lem solving. Th is is exemplified in the wa y Lasswell co nstructed the problem orientation.

De spite the imp ortanc e of questions and prob lems in policy theory, h e located know ledg e in

solutions and the mea ns for obtaining the m , not within the question -answ er link. C ertainly,


4


15/21

Main Articles

solutions are important. But his approach excludes questions over the normative formulation

of problems and the political rhetoric necessary to justify policy in the event of differences of

opinion. ForLasswell, scientific rationality covered both the input of information to policymaking

and the process of decision making based on that information. He made scientific problem

solving encompass both poles of the policy sciences and, even if w e allow for 'satisficing'

solutions (Simon, 1976), the contingencies of budgets, and other institutional and contextual

constraints on perfect decision making, the scientific rationality underlying the policy sciences

tends to marginalise the political by excluding the problematic. Scientific method relates back

to experience, the ultimate determinant of knowledge and that which eliminates questions

a

priorihy

suppressing the problematic. Method guarantees Ihe meaning of policy by constructing

an artificial, instrumental path from problem to solution, where the nature of the problem has

been decided in advance as also residing in experience. In fact, science is the answer to the

very question of politics, eliminating the latter as a mode of resolution because science dissolves

its questions in its answers. Politicsw hich deals with opinion, values and a debatebetween

pro and con where questions remain open and solutions are par tial is excluded from ideal

rationality

a priori.

All that remains is to eliminate the residual problematicity by devising

sufficiently sophisticated research methods and a technico-administrative regime to implement

the scientific program. But can wereally eliminate politics from policy? Attempting to establish

science as the supreme problem solver limits our view of policymaking and fragments our

theory of the policy process.

4.

Conclusion: politicising the problem orientation

Lasswell's 'problem orientation' is a useful construct forthinking about the scholarly analysis

of policymaking as dealing with twin questions: the social scientific study of public problems

and policymaking in response to those problems. However, Lasswell sought to conceive of

both questions and the relationship between them in scientific terms. Instead, wehave theoretical

and empirical reasons to reconceptualisehow we think about these two poles of policy analysis.

Many critics have already pointed out that policymaking is far from a perfectly rational,

scientific enterprise. At the sam e time, social science is still extensively used by policymakers.

By

problematising

the problem orientation I wish to point out that w e should think of the

relationship between these poles as being itself

in question.

We cannot subsume both poles

within a scientific frameof reference because this excludes what is political about policymaking

and theuse of knowledge in policymaking (not to mention the other direction of influence, the

politics of funding social scientific research). Instead, the relationship between science and

policymaking is

contingent,

not necessary (or causal). It poses a question because there is no

seamless logical path from scientific inquiry to policy solution. Knowledge can beu sed for

many different purposes in policymaking, and our theories should reflect this full range of

possibilities; from genuinely informing decisions , to being used to obfuscate and delay, to

justifying decisions already taken for other reasons. In short, by acknowledging tha t this

relationship is always in

question,

we

seethe political

dimension of theu se of knowledge in

politics. This overturns the presupposition that the problem of the two poles canbe solved by



16/21


imposing a scientific framework. Most importantly, it renders the problem orientation consistent

at an epistemological level by conceptualising the relationship between the two poles in terms

of questioning. This opens up a political frame of reference for the entire problem orientation.

Furthermore, the emphasis on questioning shows that what knowledge is and how it is used

depends on

interpretations

of the problem and on the

rhetorical

purposes to which

knowledge is put, i.e., by political actors seeking to legitima te their positions. H ence the

problem orientation can be reconceptualisedinterpretativelyusinghermeneutics and rhetoric.

Important theoretical difficulties result from our inability to thematise problematicity in a

positive light because we ha ve assumed problem solving to be the standard. Dewey rejected

abstract metaphysics and construed know ledge as the dissolution of problems by practical

action, borrowing h is model of resolution from science. Lasswell formalised this logic as the

policy sciences, emphasising the methodological treatmen t of problems for instrumental

outcomes. But the link between research and policy fails to conform to the scientific norm.

Th e general cy nicism held for politics and po liticians is no reason to ignore the reality of

politics, no matter how much we m ight hope for sober and objective policymaking. Even if

only to critici

se

it more effectively, our task should be to understand the politic

s

of policymaking

for what it is and not as what obstructs the imposition of a scientific decision process. We

need to understand what is political about policy in order to reveal the differences between

sincere and manipu lative uses of science. N either science nor practical reason provide a

satisfactory theoretical response to the question of politics: an

alternativeanswer

is required,

one that does not seek to eliminate politic s altogether in answering it, but is rather an answer

which reflects what politics actually is, a mode of questioning defined by the problematic.

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Politics an d Vision: Continuity and Innovation in W estern Political

Thought.

London: George Allen & Unw in.

Yanow, D. (1996).

How D oes a Policy Mean? Interpreting Policy and Organisational

Actions.

Washington, DC : Georgetown University Press.

Notes

i

Thanks to the anonymous referees for their helpful advice on improving the paper and to

Susan Keen for our many stimulating discussions on theuseof knowledge in policymaking.

ii

For a range of perspectives on Lasswell 's work see the edited collection by Rogow (1969).

In this volume, Eulau (1969) argues for the influence of A.

N.

Whitehead on Lasswell's

ideas;

Smith (1969) points out Dewey and GH. M ead's influence on Lasswell along with

that of Whitehead and Merriam; and Janowitz (1969) also points to the influence of Dewey,

Mead and Thomas on Lasswell at the University of Chicago.

iii I do not deal with the UK strand of interpretivism here (for exam ple, Bevir and Rhodes

2003) as Lasswell is not well known in the UK. H owever, it has much in com mon with

continental European and US interpreti vism and these various approaches could fruitfully

be brought together,

iv This a rticle is a preliminary analysis which forms the basis of a reconstructed problem

orientation more appropriate to interpretative policy analysis, a reconstruction I havebegun

elsewhere (Turnbull 2006).

v From here on I will refer interchangeably to 'policy science ' or 'the policy sciences' for

stylistic purposes, while noting that Lasswell used the plural sense to indicate an important

conceptual distinction, which I discuss later in this paper.

vi See Dryzek

(1993:

pp. 217-22) for the distinction between logical empiricism, positivism

and related concepts in policy analysis.

vi i

Lasswell developed a stepwise, linearmodel of decision making consistent with this scientific

view

(1971:

pp. 56-7).

viii For a general discussion of values in policy analysis, see Fischer and Forester (1987); and

for a critique of the positivist separation of fact and value in policy science see Fischer

(1998) and Hawkesworth (1988).

ix Lassw ell also noted that the popular conception of a division between science and its

application produced status problems forthe policy scientist. Th e scholar or scientist

involved in the policy realm may be perceived as a careeristby scientific colleagues and as

a half-hearted participant or as intellectually threatening to those operating primarily in the



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Main Articles

policy field

(1971:

pp. 120-1 ). Such a person appears to be 'a second class man of

knowledge and a second-class man of action'

(1971:

p. 120) or, more colloquially, a 'half

man , half b rain'

(1971:

p. 121).

x

While the policy sciences referred to the natural sciences as well as the social sciences, it

is the latter that occupy m uch of the debate because these are directly relevant to the

question of the science of governing.

xi Although, Lasswell qualified this by noting that these hypotheses are not strictly scientific

because he did not hold a determinist view of social change(1951a: p. 11).

xi i

Parsons (1995: pp. 13-16) provides a good discussion of the varying historical meanings

of the 'policy ' concept. He notes the primarily Anglo-Saxon use of the word, as distinct

from 'politics' in other languages, and the post-Second World War association of policy

as a 'rational' plank upon which the legitimacy of the liberal democratic state is built.

xiii

Wolin (1961) describes a general theme in political theory of the 'sublimation' of politics.

For a broad discussion of the decline of traditional political theory in the face of political

science, see Gunnell (1979).

xiv

On rhetoric in policy analysis, see Gottweis (2006, 2007) and Turnbull (2005-06).

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