“arkivex”                                      

HALMSTAD UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SCIENCES

Rethinking Democracy and Development

-A Minor Field Study of the Political Sphere in Rwanda      

 

          Author: Petra Spencer Supervisor: Jonna Johansson Political Science 30 credits Progression: 61-90 Thesis

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Preface & Acknowledgements: Some words of acknowledgment are undoubtedly in place, as I am most grateful to the Swedish International Cooperation and Development Agency (SIDA) for its support to this initiative. Many thanks to Rwanda Civil Society Platform (RCSP) for taking me in as a member in the Civil Society Election Observation Mission (CSEOM) during the Presidential election of 2010, and again for the local elections in 2011, thanks for all your support and guidance, it is a life experience hard to forget. Many thanks go to the Government of Rwanda and especially the National Election Commission (NEC) for having welcomed me twice and accredited me as an election observer. Many thanks also go to my friends in Rwanda- David, Elie and Emmanuel, for without your help my research in Rwanda would have been a struggle. My great appreciation also goes to all the people in Rwanda—this proud and strong people with unique gifts of rebuilding a country. I would like to thank all who supported me in my work, interviewees, the EU delegation to RCSP, Kigali Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) and Kigali Liberal University (ULK). I also would like to thank my family for all your support. Many thanks to the tutors at Halmstad University—you taught me about purpose, goals, and that hard work indeed gets you somewhere in the end. You have made me fulfill my dream! After visiting Rwanda my first time I felt more alive, more myself, and I began to understand why I had hitherto not lived my life to the fullest extent. I dare a huge generalization: in the midst of our profligate prosperity and bustle of life we have lost human values, which is still rich in Rwanda. Murakoze!

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Abbreviations: CDR The Coalition for the Defense of the Republic CoR The Constitution of the republic of Rwanda CPPCG Convention on the Prevention & Punishment of the Crime of Genocide CSEOM Civil Society Election Observation Mission DRC The Democratic Republic of Congo FDLR The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda FFPP Forum for Political Parties GoR Government of Rwanda ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda LP Liberal Party LTO Long Term Observer MDR Democratic Republican Movement MHC Media High Council MFS Minor Field Study MRND National Republican movement for Democracy and Development NEC National Election Commission Parmehutu Party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement PPC Party for Progress and Concord PSD Social Democratic Party PSP Prosperity and Solidarity Party RCSP Rwanda Civil Society Platform RPF Rwanda Patriotic Front RTLM Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines STO Short Term Observer TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission UN United Nations UNAMIR United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda

Glossary: Banyarwanda (Kinyarwanda) “Those who come from Rwanda” Banyamulenge Ethnic group of people in eastern DRC from

Rwanda Divisionism Ethnic divisions ex-FAR Former Rwandan army, supplanted by FDLR Gacaca (Kinyarwanda) grass; name given to system of community-

based courts for prosecuting genocide suspects

Inkotanyi (Kinyarwanda) a tireless warrior; self-referential term for the RPA

Interahamwe (Kinyarwanda) “those who work together”; term given to genocidal militias Inyenzi (Kinyarwanda) cockroach; derogatory term for Tutsi rebels or

Tutsi generally Murakoze (Kinyarwanda) Thank you Muzungu Comes from the Bantu language and means

White person Négationisme (French) denial (e.g. of the genocide) Reseau Zéro (French) zero network (“inner circle” close to the

Habyarimana regime)

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Abstract: Title: Rethinking Democracy and Development -A Minor Field Study of the Political Sphere in Rwanda. Author: Petra Spencer Purpose and Questions: There seem to exist diametrically different views regarding Rwanda’s political sphere, whether the country has made any progress at all since the 90s, and if they have been successful in establishing democracy or not. A field study was therefore carried out, plus additional research to get a more comprehensive view of the political sphere of Rwanda. The purpose of the field study was to experience and analyse the political ambiance and developments by personal experience and interview people on the ground, rather then just rely on books, media and other academics, in order to clarify if the country is progressing or not. These questions guided my research: Has Rwanda been successful in establishing democracy, in terms of fulfilling the criteria’s that constitutes “polyarchy”?

- What are the democracy attitudes of the citizens? Has Rwanda made any progress at all the last decade (not just politically, but socio-economically as well), in other words is the country undergoing a modernization process? Method: This research took its first step in a minor field study (MFS), conducted in Rwanda in the summer of 2010, and later as field research again in February/ March of 2011. In order to fulfil the purpose this research undertook both qualitative and quantitative methods, in a two-part analysis, in which there are a total of one qualitative part and two more quantitative parts. Results and Conclusion: The analysis shows that Rwanda is progressing, not just politically, but socio-economically as well. The qualitative part shows that some political and civic rights seem to be curtailed, but it is important to remember the legacy of a genocide. The survey however shows that over half of the respondents believe (to some extent) that democratic principles are being respected, and that there exist political pluralism and political space in Rwanda. The genocaidaires could come back to power through democratic practices, therefore it is important that things develop carefully and that a strong leadership rules the country. The government has really managed to bring Rwanda back up on its feet and the country is clearly progressing. Rwanda can serve as a model for other countries to follow. Despite the war and ethnic diversity Rwanda has come a long way. The country seem to have established some form of democratic principles, not the same as we have in the West off course, but maybe they can’t and shouldn’t follow the models of the West since they have their own special context they have to live up to. Key words: Democracy, Authoritarian, Development, Modernization, Progress.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS:  Table  and  Figures:  Table  1.  Socio-­‐economic  development.  ..................................................................................................  20  Table  2.  Analytical  guidance  ........................................................................................................................  25  Table  3.  Rwanda's  progress  the  last  decade  ........................................................................................  45  Figure  1.  Democracy  attitudes;  survey  question1……………………………………………………....43  Figure  2.  Democracy  attitudes;  survey  question  2.  ...........................................................................  44  Table  3.  Rwanda's  progress  the  last  decade  ........................................................................................  45  Table  4.  Rwanda  and  polyarchy………………………………………………………………………………...49    Preface  and  Acknowledgement  Abbreviations  and  Glossary  Abstract  

1.  Prelude;  Rwanda  Democracy  and  Development  .............................................................  7  1.1  Purpose  &  Questions  ..................................................................................................................................  9  1.2  Delimitations  ................................................................................................................................................  9  1.3  Disposition  ..................................................................................................................................................  10  

2.  Previous  Research;  The  Academic  debate  on  the  Politics  of  Rwanda  ....................  11  2.1  Filip  Reyntjens;  From  genocide  to  dictatorship…  ......................................................................  12  2.2  Ensign  and  Bertrand;  History  and  Hope  ........................................................................................  14  

3.  Theoretical  framework  ..........................................................................................................  16  3.1  Dahl’s  Polyarchy  .......................................................................................................................................  17  3.2  Modernization  theory    ............................................................................................................................  19  

4.  Methodology  ..............................................................................................................................  21  4.1  Selection  of  Case  and  Sources  .............................................................................................................  22  4.2  Operationalization  ..................................................................................................................................  23  4.3  Criticism  of  Method  and  Sources  .......................................................................................................  25  

5.  The  Context  of  Rwanda  ...........................................................................................................  27  5.1  The  past  is  the  prologue  ........................................................................................................................  27  5.2  The  genocide  ..............................................................................................................................................  29  5.3  Post-­‐war  reconstruction  .......................................................................................................................  30  

6.  Rwanda  and  Democracy  .........................................................................................................  32  6.1  Elected  officials  .........................................................................................................................................  32  6.2  Free  and  fair  elections  ...........................................................................................................................  33  6.3  Universal  suffrage  ....................................................................................................................................  36  6.4  The  right  to  stand  for  election  ............................................................................................................  37  6.6  Alternative  sources  of  information  ..................................................................................................  40  6.7  Freedom  of  association  ..........................................................................................................................  41  6.8  Democracy  Attitudes;  Survey  ..............................................................................................................  42  

7.  Assessing  Rwanda’s  progress  ...............................................................................................  45  7.1  CPI  ...................................................................................................................................................................  46  7.2  HDI  .................................................................................................................................................................  46  7.3  KOF  .................................................................................................................................................................  47  7.4  GNI/Capita  ..................................................................................................................................................  47  

8.  Concluding  discussions;  A  wider  perspective  .................................................................  48  8.1  Rwanda’s  Past  and  Ethnic  Diversity  ................................................................................................  51  8.2  Are  there  any  Lessons  to  be  learnt?  .................................................................................................  53  

   

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Bibliography    Appendices     Appendix  1.  A  Brief  Context  of  Rwanda     Appendix  2.  Campaign  Rally  Report     Appendix  3.  Survey  form      

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1. Prelude; Rwanda Democracy and Development… The image the word Africa evokes in most people represents the dark continent, the heart of darkness, a terrible resident of brutality; inhumanity. Yes, it is true, this is also found in Africa. Hell has taken parts of the continent, and the country that was tormented the worst was probably Rwanda in 1994. 1 Imagine a country with the highest proportion of women legislators in the world, and a country where the president is committed to gender equality and poverty reduction, where both urban and rural schools are being wired to internet, and where the government is committed to becoming a knowledge based economy and middle income country by 2020 (Ensign and Bertrand, 2010:1). Imagine that this country is located in the heart of Sub- Saharan Africa and that this progress comes in the wake of one of the 20th century’s worst nightmares, i.e. the genocide in 1994, a mass genocide that resulted in the deaths of approximately one million people (ibid.). We in the West are accustomed to hearing and accepting negative news, particularly when it refers to Africa, but one can never imagine the horror that ravaged Rwanda, and which are still haunting the country. Often when it comes to the debate on the politics of Rwanda the word authoritarian comes up, and what seems to be lacking in the debate are discussions on the transformation of the country. Surely Rwanda must have made progress since the genocide, but one begin to wonder after having acknowledged what e.g. well-known scholars like Filip Reyntjens (2010) and Gérard Prunier (2011) argue on this matter. 2 According to others academics like Ensign and Bertrand3 (2010), the country seems to have made a huge progress since 1994. Rwanda’s past has to be put into the context when we are discussing their politics and development paths, which is the main purpose of this paper. The actions of the International community (or in this case, the lack of it) during the 100 days in 1994, has to be remembered as well when discussing Rwandan politics, and it is no wonder why they wanted to deal with the offenders after the genocide in their own way, with assistance from abroad only playing a secondary role (Schabas in Clark and Kaufman, 20009:213). There may be some authoritarian tendencies within Rwanda, but the country is coming from such a dark place very few countries have been in recent years. Rwanda today however presents a model of hope, innovation and human development (personal field notes).

                                                                                                               1 In the mid 90s thirty-one countries was tormented by civil wars or serious civil unrest. These wars became fewer after the millennium, but their main cause, the lack of a common national feeling remains. Africa’s nation-states were created by foreigners, with limits drawn by Europeans over areas on maps where they for most part never had set foot (Dowden, 2010:10) 2 Filip Reyntjens is Professor of African Law and Politics and Chair of the Institute of Development Policy and Management, University of Antwerp. Gérard  Prunier  is a French academic and historian specializing in the Horn of Africa and East Africa. 3 Margee M. Ensign is dean of the School of International Studies and associate provost for International Initiatives at the University of the Pacific. William E. Bertrand is the Wisner Professor at Tulane University. Both has spent a decade in Rwanda conducting research for their book “Rwanda- History and Hope”.

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While the gains are impressive, Rwanda still faces challenges in (re)building and consolidating democracy, and concerns have been expressed over reported incidences related to security, governance and growth of democracy. However, what has become particularly ambiguous is the degree of political space in Rwanda. The Hutu diaspora, DRC-based militias and occasionally media and human rights organizations cite the alleged lack of political space in Rwanda (Waugh, 2004:147ff; Bekele, 2011). 4 Reyntjens (2004:177) argue that Rwanda suffers from a genocide but thus since this has fallen in the hands of a new dictatorship. He claims that Rwanda constitutes by being a dictatorship under the guise of a “paper democracy”. Others like Ensign and Bertrand (2010:125), argues that Rwanda has made a tremendous progress since 1994 and now constitutes by being a democracy.5 In my opinion it is very clear that further attention needs to be directed to the political sphere of Rwanda, to justify and to obtain a more comprehensive understanding, since it obviously exist diametrically different views on the subject whether Rwanda have been successful in establish democracy or not, and overall if the country is progressing. Maybe the country still struggle hard with democratization processes, maybe Kagame is ruling the country with an iron fist, but maybe these tendencies are necessary in order to not let extremist into government again. During a visit to Copenhagen (010411) the author of this paper met with both Gérard Prunier and Linda Melvern, both which are well known scholars, and Melvern agreed with the author of this paper, that not enough attention seems to be given to Rwanda’s modernization process, i.e. their development path. 6 The discussion on political and socio-economical transformations of Rwanda is therefore something this study intends to contribute to and extend into the academic debate on Rwanda, especially since many explanations of democratization refers to socio-economic developments. Using a modernization approach, positive correlations between development and democratization are profoundly significant (Allen and Thomas, 2000:370).

 

         

                                                                                                               4 Much of the publications from media and human rights org. involve extremist elements, such as the political party FDU-Inkingi and the Green party. 5  Per se, the author of this study knows that there exists a “paper democracy”, constitution-making analyse since former research and essay. 6  As  mentioned,  Gérard  Prunier   is a French academic and historian specializing in the Horn of Africa and East Africa. Linda Melvern   is   a   British   academic   and   investigative   journalist,   expert   in   the   1994   genocide   in  Rwanda.  Both  have  served  as  consultants  in  issues  related  to  Rwanda.    

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1.1  Purpose  &  Questions   What seems very obvious to me is that there exist diametrically different views regarding Rwanda’s political sphere, whether the country has made any progress at all since the 90s, and whether they have been successful in establishing democracy or not. What’s clear, in my opinion, is also that not enough attention has been given to the Rwandese citizens and their views in this matter. According to the author of this paper the issue whether Rwanda has made any progress has not been adequately addressed and needs further attention, a field study was therefore carried out, plus additional research to get a more comprehensive view of the political sphere of Rwanda. The main purpose of this research and field study, (MFS), which this dissertation is based on, was to experience and analyse the political ambiance and developments by personal experience and interview people on the ground, rather then just rely on books, media and other academics, in order to clarify if the country is progressing or not. It is important to point out that it is not in this study’s interest to find easy syntheses, but rather contribute to the debate on the politics of Rwanda. 7 These questions guided my research: 1.Has Rwanda been successful in establishing democracy, in terms of fulfilling the criteria’s for Dahl’s democracy theory “polyarchy”? 2. What are the democracy attitudes of the citizens? 3. Has Rwanda made any progress at all the last decade (not just politically, but socio-economically as well), in other words is the country undergoing a modernization process?

1.2  Delimitations   Since the area of interest and research is very wide we need to make some delimitations on how much to analyse, and be more specific in our selection of which specific parts are of most interest to analyse. It is of special importance to point out the special conditions under which this field study was carried out, since the author of this paper was in Rwanda conducting research as a student as well as an accredited election observer. 8 The survey, which was carried out by the author in Kigali, is not representative for the whole population since the number of interviewees were limited to 700, end therefore lacks in external validity.                                                                                                                7 These synthesis referred to could probably not be reached anyway without severe distortions of all views considered, remember the legacy of a genocide (and not just only tutsis were killed). It is my opinion that some times a state needs “restrictions” in its constitution in order to hinder new outbreaks of violence etc. 8  The author was both in Rwanda as a student carrying out research, but when accredited as an election observer one is obligated to obey to the “code of ethics” for election observers, which limits one that is interested in politics since you cant really interview anyone you whish to interview. There was also some confusion involved from specific politicians whether the author really was an election observer or media (even do obvious accreditation card was carried).  

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The author is fully aware of this, but this was necessary due to time and resource limitation. The survey is instead intended to function as material that can contribute to the debate on Rwandan politics for a more comprehensive view in order to create a wider understanding. In order to analyse Rwanda’s modernization process we need to limit the time frame, and since the country was in ruins after the genocide in 1994 it seems more appropriate to analyse the country’s development path over the last decade, rather then the years directly after the war. Due to both time limitation, as well as some lack of resources this study fails in a way to fully address the area of interest, but the author intends to follow the country for many years yet to come.

1.3  Disposition   This dissertation is structured according to “classical university disposition”, the so-called logic disposition that is suitable for academic text. This dissertation begins with a preface and acknowledgements (for which the reader can skip if not interested), the reader is then introduced to abbreviations and glossary, in order to understand any difficult terms used. After this the reader can find the dissertation summarized in an abstract. The introductory part in this dissertation consist of a introduction to the problem, purpose and questions, description of methodology used and last but not least the context and the academic debate on the politics of Rwanda. The analysis part consists of a two-part analysis, for which there is a total of one qualitative part and two more quantitative parts. The first analysis chapter puts focus on Rwanda’s political situation, and the second analysis chapter has focus on Rwanda’s modernization process (political, but socio-economic aspects as well). The concluding chapter consist of conclusions and discussions, and there is also a part containing if there are any lessons to be learnt. Finally the reader can scrutinize bibliography and, if interested, go through appendices.  

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2. Previous Research; The Academic debate on the Politics of Rwanda In order to fully understand the politics of Rwanda I emphasise the need to analyse what’s been written before on this ambiguous and opaqueness topic.9 A lot of research projects have been carried out in Rwanda, especially after the genocide in 1994. Much of the focus has been placed on justice and reconciliation processes (Clark and Kaufman, 2009) and not so much has been written about the political sphere with focus on the citizens and their views regarding the politics of Rwanda, neither has much been written about the socio-economic dimensions and transformations of Rwanda. However, the stories about Rwanda are almost entirely one sided and biased, but not everything is either white or black. Nor is it in this papers agenda to analyse unilaterally, but rather to give a more comprehensive and accurate view on the issues regarding Rwandan politics. ‘ What are currently lacking in the growing literature on Rwanda and the genocide are holistic, multi-disciplinary analyses. Standing in the way of holistic analyses, the legal paradigm has become dominant in the study of conflict and post-conflict societies, proffering procedural, academic and institutional “remedies” that too often fail to recognise other important perspectives’ (Clark and Kaufman, 2009:1). According to the well-recognized professor Filip Reyntjens (2004:177) Rwanda is not experiencing democracy and reconciliation, but dictatorship and exclusion. He argues that the international community has been complicit in the rebuilding of a dictatorship under the guise of democracy. Ensign and Bertrand (2010:125) claim however that Rwanda has made a tremendous progress since 1994 in areas such as democracy and governance. People in Rwanda are, according to them, participating and are elected freely at all levels of governments and politics. 10

 

 

     

                                                                                                               9 I wish to emphasise on critical review of different authors, scholars etc. since the context is of special importance, but also with focus on media since they play a crucial role in affecting our minds and have different agendas. One must also remember that Rwanda is a former German colony and later a Belgian trustee ship, protectorate under the League of Nations (later UN). E.g. Academic Filip Reyntjens was close to Habyarimana and his regime (personal notes from discussion with Gérard Prunier in Copenhagen, 110401). 10  Filip Reyntjens is Professor of African Law and Politics at University of Antwerp Belgium and has contributed a lot on what has been written about Rwanda. As mentioned, Reyntjens was very close to the Habyarimana regime, according to Prunier (Interview with Prunier in Copenhagen 1 April 2011). Ensign and Bertrand have spent a decade in Rwanda carrying out research. The book “After Genocide” by Clark and Kaufman collects some of the worlds most leading scholars and practitioners, it constitutes the most comprehensive survey to date of issues related to post-genocide Rwanda and the anthology incorporates chapters from Rwandan practitioners and academics.

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2.1  Filip  Reyntjens;  From  genocide  to  dictatorship…   Reyntjens (2004:177) claims that after the genocide in 1994, Rwanda is experiencing not democracy and reconciliation, but dictatorship and exclusion. Reyntjens argue that despite the fact that the RPF has achieved rapid institutional reconstruction and relatively good bureaucratic governance, it has also concentrated power and wealth in the hands of a very small minority, practiced ethnic discrimination, eliminated every form of dissent, destroyed civil society, conducted a flawed democratization process and massively violated human rights. According to Reyntjens (ibid.) the government of Rwanda succeeded in avoiding condemnation by astutely exploiting the “genocide credit” and by skillful information management. Reyntjens accuse the international community for have being complicit in the rebuilding of a dictatorship under the guise of democracy. Reyntjens (2010:1) argues that post-genocide Rwanda has become a “donor darling”, despite being a dictatorship with a dismal human rights record and a source of regional instability. Reyntjens claims that although donor assessments differ considerably, and despite concerns over political governance domestically and the country’s interference in the DRC, many in the international community have given the post-genocide regime the benefit of the doubt. According to Reyntjens (ibid.) most observers would agree that the regime has achieved impressive results since 1994, and many are ready to support it without asking too many questions. Yet, he claims, there is consensus in the international scholarly community that Rwanda is run by a dictatorship with little respect for human rights, little attention to the fate of the vast majority of its population, and little awareness of the structural violence its ambitious engineering project engenders. Reyntjens (ibid) argues that, although a report by the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative expressed major concerns, and concluded that the state of governance and human rights did not satisfy Commonwealth standards, Rwanda was admitted to the club without much debate in 2009. Reyntjens also (ibid) claims that there is overwhelming evidence of responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity against President Kagame, but despite this he is given red carpet treatment on his frequent international visits. Reyntjens however also states that the Rwandan leadership’s vision is lauded in many respects and Rwanda is often presented as a model11, a perspective Reyntjens clearly doesn’t support.

                                                                                                               11 Kagame’s model for progress, economic growth is the “Singapore model” (Gérard Prunier, Copenhagen 010411). The so-called “Asian tigers”, using strong and capable bureaucracies, developed a deliberate set of programs and policies that focused on mobilizing savings and investment, and integrated these growing economies with the international trading system while at the same time expanding access to education and health (Ensign and Bertrand, 2010:10; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005:18, 47).

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Reyntjens (ibid, 31f) highlights a number of transversal trends that have emerged clearly over the past fifteen years. Prominent among these is the incremental way in which the RPF has monopolized power and eliminated countervailing voices. 12 Referring to opponents Reyntjens claims that Kagame eliminated individual domestic and external troublemakers one at a time. Kagame had neutralized the political opposition, the civil society and the manipulation of elections allowed him to confer a layer of democratic legitimacy on what was in reality the gradual closing off of political space (ibid.). Regarding the lack of condemnation from the international community, Reyntjens (ibid, 32f) claims that the major instrument for achieving this tolerance has been the skillful and cynical use of the genocide credit, which allowed the regime both to capitalize on the guilt feelings of the international community and to present itself as the victim of genocide. According to Reyntjens strong information management is an important element in Rwanda, and monitoring and disseminating information is part of a strategy for both external and internal consumption in order to silence dissent etc. Reyntjens (ibid.) states that in Rwanda, history is a highly political stake of the present and the future rather than a way of analyzing and understanding the past. He further argues that its manipulation contributes to the structural violence so prevalent, yet apparently so invisible to outsiders. “The so-called international community bears overwhelming responsibility in allowing the RPF to deploy its skills successfully. It has been a willing hostage to Kigali’s spin, whether it be on political governance and human rights, on massive violations of international humanitarian law, on the aggression and plunder of the DRC, on its dangerous social and economic engineering exercise, or on the way it has injected structural violence across the country and the region” (Reyntjens, 2010:33).

 

 

 

 

     

                                                                                                               12 Reyntjens (ibid, 187f) refers the hold of power by RPF on the system as “Tutsization”, “RPF-ization”, and the “new akazu” (akazu- ‘little house’ was first used to refer to President Habyarimana’s inner circle). By this he means hegemonic strategies of small tutsi élites.

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2.2  Ensign  and  Bertrand;  History  and  Hope     According to Ensign and Bertrand (2010:62f) the fundamental priority for Rwanda, especially in the transition period 1994-2003, was to establish peace and security. Ensign and Bertrand (ibid.) states that serious challenges continued after 1994, with Ex-FAR, Interahamwe and FDLR, the perpetrators of the genocide, since they continued to operate from Eastern Congo. As a result they couldn’t focus whole-heartedly on democratization processes. 13 In Rwanda today, a constitution is in place that guarantees separation of powers for the first time in the country’s history (ibid, 46). An independent judiciary is in place and Gacaca trials14, representing one of the greatest legal challenges is underway. Ensign and Bertrand (ibid, 66f) argue that the first post-genocide election from 2003 did suffered from numerous complaints from human rights and election monitoring organizations that the process wasn’t transparent, but most agreed that Kagame had won the election, if not at the reported rate of 96%. However, they conclude that it was the only one (as of 2010) who has suffered from such flaws. An Ombudsman and auditor general’s office have been established to ensure accountability and reduce corruption (ibid, 46). According to Ensign and Bertrand, as a result numerous senior political figures have been jailed. They also state that in several international rankings, including a World Bank governance index, Rwanda has ranked as one of the least corrupt countries in the region and most improved in the rule of law. Ensign and Bertrand (ibid.) argues that through processes called Ubudehe and Imihigo, poor people are deeply involved in solving their own problems through representative leaders. 15 The performance contracts, the Imihigos holds leaders accountable, and citizens can dismiss leaders if they don’t perform well. Ubudehe is an inclusive and participatory process and system, it is a way for all, especially for the poor, to have input into decision-making processes that can improve their lives (ibid.). According to Ensign and Bertrand (ibid.) Rwanda today presents a model for success, and a great deal of this success of present day Rwanda is because of decisions made at the conclusion of the genocide. These decisions have focus on reconciliation, policies enacted by the legislature, the development of an independent judiciary and a strong and clear vision that emerged from the President. Ensign and Bertrand (ibid, 10) claims that many, especially those in the human rights community have accused Rwanda, and President Kagame of being authoritarian, of running a one-party state.                                                                                                                13 And as a result of this they had to control the political domain in order to prohibit extremist elements. In Rwanda political parties has to be approved and registered in a forum for political parties (FFPP). 14 Gacaca is based on traditional methods of conflict resolution, where trials are held outside on the “grass”. Gacaca is the Kinyarwanda word for grass. The last Gacaca trials ended in 2010 (personal fieldnotes, Kigali 2010). 15 Remarkable and unique changes in political structures and authority have occurred at the local level in Rwanda. In only fifteen years, central control has evolved into devolution of power and resources to the lowest levels. Exclusion has become inclusion, voices are heard from the weakest. Imihigo was a traditional ritual that occurred when a group of people came together and engaged publicly in activities. Now it is a public declaration of what is valued and needed by individuals and communities and a commitment to achieve a specific sets of goals. The process of determining community needs are called Ubudehe (Ensign and Bertrand, 2010:75f). In 2008, Ubudehe won the prestigious UN Public Service Award (ibid, 79).

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But according to Ensign and Bertrand these people haven’t looked at the evidence, and that many in these communities have allowed themselves to embrace the conventional wisdom that arose soon after the genocide ended. 16 Contrary to public perception and conventional wisdom, Ensign and Bertrand (ibid, 125) argues that Rwanda has made tremendous progress in democracy and governance, in improving basic needs especially in education, health and gender equity, and in pro-poor economic growth. Rwanda has more women in Parliament than any country in the world, and is committed to gender equity in all areas of society. In Rwanda, nine years of schooling are free, and enrolment is high and growing, the health care system is using information technology in a creative way, and the people are participating and are elected freely at all levels of politics (ibid). However, they (ibid, 126) also conclude that a key question related to political development will occur in 2017, when Kagame is suppose to step down from his post as President. They discuss whether Kagame will go the same path as Museveni in Uganda who successfully re-wrote the constitution to serve additional terms. They conclude however that the strength of the grassroots democratization and accountability programs, the political freedoms for the media, the strength of new political leaders, parties and Parliament, and the unique vision of President Kagame and his top leaders that is embedded in the constitution, make this path extremely unlikely (ibid.).                                                                                                                  16 Certainly Rwanda has taken a very hard, principled stand on how it thinks it should deal with the perpetrators after the genocide, and the “culture of impunity” that led in part to the genocide, and has been resistant to calls from the West to follow a traditional model of justice and reconciliation. But the country seems to have succeeded in the best way it could, in my opinion. One must remember the huge number of perpetrators, and the fact that the country was in ruins after the genocide, still the international community focused on the “refugees” in the Eastern DRC instead (Ensign and Bertrand, 2010:48f).

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3. Theoretical framework

The theories used in this paper are intended to form a framework and foundation for the research and are both theory testing (theory in the centre), as well as theory consuming (the case in the centre) (Esaisson et al, 2009:99). The purpose with the theories is to help explain democratization and development processes in Rwanda. The relevance of using these theories depends on their analytical approach and perspective, which can help explain the democratization processes in Rwanda. This study’s relation between theory and empiricism is deductive, in terms of that conclusions are drawn from the theory (ibid.). This study is however also inductive, in terms of a starting point in the empiricism (ibid.p.124). Dahl’s democracy theory “Polyarchy” enhances us with the opportunity to test how well Rwanda complies and live up to the criteria’s for polyarchy, i.e. democracy. The modernization theory help us understand and interpret the development path Rwanda has taken over the last decade, as well as an understanding over their political situation. The intention with these theories is that they put forward a “continuum”, a coherent framework. The theories will in this way help to create an understanding and explain the data collected about the case. It is this study’s intention to try use democracy indicators from a normative to a more empirical theoretical approach for a wider perspective. My discussion and analysis may not always be so empirical, but rather accumulative, i.e. the discussions will be some what built up as this paper progresses. The major theories in this study are what Bryman (2011:23) calls “grand theories”, which is more comprehensive and abstract, on the verge to more intermediate theories. This approach is more suitable here since it can be trivial to measure the political situation and development processes in a country from more of a qualitative angel. Polyarchy will be used in order to measure civic and political rights, from a more qualitative angel in order to create an understanding of the area of interest, but this doesn’t help explain the bigger picture, in which the author therefore emphasise the need for a modernization theory as well. Only with the help of modernization theory can we get a full understanding of the development path and progress of Rwanda. 17

                                                                                                               17 The author of this paper looked how other students had done when using polyarchy, and many used a complimentary approach and theory, an approach this paper will take as well.

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It is not this papers intention to give a full empirical explanation, but rather contribute to the debate and give a more comprehensive and interpretive view on the debate on the Rwandan politics. The theoretical basis in this research is Robert Dahl’s democracy theory “Polyarchy”. We will use this theory order to describe the nature of and measure democracy, civic and political right. This study will also use modernization theory in order to help explain the development path of Rwanda, not just political but socio-economical developments as well i.e. development that often comes hand in hand with democratization processes in order to understand the wider perspective. How can we be quick and rough in our judgements on whether a country constitutes by being a democracy or an authoritarian regime before we have a clear definition on necessary terms that is so often used, and (maybe) before we have all the facts necessary to do this judgment?18 Despite such variations on terms used, liberal democracy, with its limitations, is still the standard model of a democratic regime used in the huge literature on patterns of democratization. Describing actual examples of democratization using these patterns involves making rough judgements regarding various complexities. However, rough judgements are required when trying to assign any country to one of the ideal types of regimes, as done by academics, in the media and elsewhere all the time. 19 This study will however not be limited to assign Rwanda a certain ideal type of regime, rather discuss around it, to describe and explain democracy processes for a more comprehensive view.

3.1  Dahl’s  Polyarchy   Robert Dahl is a famous democracy theorist who has formulated the term “polyarchy”. Dahl (2007:38) claims that democracy in its pure form no longer exists, and that polyarchy is the political order that currently exists in the world. Polyarchy is a simplified, quite limited form of the original meaning of what Dahl refers to as “real” democracy, ideals in which he claims no regime today can fulfill. According to Dahl the best we can do in our quest for democracy is to try to come as close as possible to fulfilling the following criteria’s for polyarchy. 20

                                                                                                               18 I here refer to the media foremost. Academics like Filip Reyntjens have a huge experience of the politics of Rwanda, however, we need to keep in mind his link with the former regime, possible interest etc. Its my opinion that much in the academic world is intersubjective, by this I here refer to the intersubjective meaning within scientific theory that a hypothesis or an argument in principle is judged the same, regardless of who investigates its accuracy. 19  Regarding the concept of authoritarian regimes, Allen and Thomas (2000: 365f) claims that there exist no single model for an authoritarian regime, the closest seems to be Linz & Stephan’s identifications of it. In my opinion this study can contribute more to the academic debate, and more fair, using polyarchy than analyze along authoritarian features.  20 The citizens in a modern state today are a more heterogenic than the Greeks regarded as desirable; we are often diverse in terms of religion, education, culture, ethnicity, race, language and economic positions (Dahl, ibid).

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The polyarchy criteria’s (Dahl, 2007:343f): 1. Elected officials: the control over the authorities political decisions is located according to the Constitution to elected officials; 2. Free and fair elections: the elected officials are appointed in frequent and impartial elections in which coercive elements are far limited; 3. Universal suffrage: Virtually all adults have the right to vote of officials; 4. The right to stand for election: Virtually all adults have the right to candidate for the publicly elected positions, even though the age limit may be higher for holding an elected position than to vote; 5. Freedom of Expression: Citizens have the right to express their opinions regarding political issues in a broad sense without risking serious punishment. This includes criticism of those in power, the state, the government, the socio-economical system and the prevailing ideology; 6. Alternative sources of information: The citizens have the right to seek for alternative information sources. These exist and are legally protected; 7. Freedom of Association: To secure their respective rights, including the aforementioned, citizens also have the right to form relatively independent associations and organizations, including political parties and interest groups. In the public debate on democracy there exist no legal or “right” definition of what democracy is or constitutes by, but there exist definitions that are more or less accepted. Robert Dahl’s definition of polyarchy has come to be widely accepted in the academic debate, although almost every researcher in the field has its own definition of the term. We seem to be stuck with democracy as the catchword of contemporary political discourse. It is de facto that democracy the last century has become an established term and the use of it has increased considerably. How the definition of democracy is formulated seem to no longer matter, just the word itself creates the satisfying legitimacy users wants to achieve. “ …Today democracy /.../ has become a common component in every prevailing ideology, shadow ideals and a justification myth of the rulers. In authoritarian systems /.../ the leaders of these regimes not just only claims that their rule is for the people’s best- so it is been everywhere and at all times /.../ As an ideology, at least not the reign of the people, for the people and by the people has not disappeared from the surface of the earth; it is a principle almost every regime claim to value.” (Authors own translation. Dahl, 2007:360).

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According to Dahl (2007: 19f) the term “democracy theory” is very wide and its use in a specific research area, for analysis, empirical testing and theorizing is rather new. And its still unclear of what reasonably is included in the democracy theory. The term can refer to an “ideal”, and at the same time refer to regimes in the “reality”, many which are far away from this ideal (ibid). This dual meaning can cause great confusion, and it is therefore necessary to limit the meaning of “democracy theory”. There are plenty of indicators, we therefore need to limit us and will use Dahl’s democracy theory polyarchy in order to answer the research question whether Rwanda has been successful or not in establishing democracy. 3.2  Modernization  theory 21 With the help of modernization theory Inglehart and Welzel (2005) claim to have a clear idea of how and why the process of democratization happens. Inglehart and Welzel (2005:15) argue that modernization is a process of human development, in which economic development triggers cultural changes that make individual autonomy, gender equality, and democracy increasingly likely. The authors (ibid, 20ff) argue that democratic institutions tend to emerge only when certain social and cultural conditions exist, and economic development and modernization push those conditions in the right direction and make democracy increasingly likely. Inglehart and Welzel (ibid, 18) argue that in recent years, it has become apparent that export-oriented strategies were more effective in bringing sustained economic growth and even, eventually, democracy. A Western capitalist version of modernization regained credibility. The rapid development of East Asia, and the subsequent democratization of Taiwan and South Korea seemed to confirm Western capitalism claims.22 According to Inglehart and Welzel (ibid.) the conditions conducive to democracy can and do emerge, and the process of "modernization," according to abundant empirical evidence, advances them. Once modernization is set in motion, it tends to penetrate all aspects of life, bringing occupational specialization, urbanization, rising educational levels, rising life expectancy, and rapid economic growth. These create a self-reinforcing process that transforms social life and political institutions, bringing rising mass participation in politics and, in the long run, making the establishment of democratic political institutions increasingly likely (ibid, 22ff).

                                                                                                               21 Modernization theory originated in the Enlightenment era, and Antoine de Condorcet [1795] was among the first to explicitly link economic development and cultural change (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005:16). The most influential version of modernization theory was propounded by Karl Marx in 1858 (ibid.). Competing versions of modernization theory enjoyed a new resurgence after WW2 when the capitalist and communist superpowers espoused opposing ideologies as guidelines of the best way to undergo modernization (ibid, 17). In the 1970s and 1980s modernization theory seemed discredited, and dependency theory came into vogue (ibid, 18). Dependency theory however fell out of favour while the Western capitalist version of modernization regained credibility (ibid). 22 Export of low-cost for the world market initiates economic growth, and reinvesting the returns into human capital qualifies the workforce to produce goods, whose export brings even higher returns and enlarges the educated urban middle-class. Once the middle-classes become large enough its pressure for liberal democracy can no longer be resisted (ibid.).

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The authors (ibid, 25) argue that socio-economic developments have emancipative effects. By this they mean that economic growth and the welfare of the state increase people’s economic resources, people become materially more secure, this leads to rising levels of education, expanding mass communication and increasingly knowledge-intensive work widen people’s intellectual resources. People also become cognitively more autonomous, and constraints on human choices will diminish with growing emphasis on human autonomy. They argue that growing social complexity and diversification of human interactions broaden people’s social resources, and this will result to the fact that people do become socially more independent. See below table from Inglehart and Welzel (ibid.) for visualization over how socio-economic development trigger democratization. Table  1.  Socio-­‐economic  development.  

The Emancipative Effects of Socio-economic Development: à Eco growth and the welfare state increase people’s eco resources à People become materially more secure à Rising levels of education, expanding mass communication, and increasingly knowledge-intensive work widens people’s intellectual resources à People become cognitively more autonomous à Diminishing constraints on human choice à Growing emphasis on human autonomy à Growing social complexity and diversification of human interactions broadens people’s social resources à People become socially more independent à One outcome of this causal primacy of socio-economic development; democracy… The authors (ibid, 23) argue that socio-economic development is crucial because it impacts powerfully on people’s existential conditions and their chances of survival. And this should be particularly true in societies living in scarcity. Survival is such a basic human goal that when it is uncertain, one’s main purpose in life is the struggle for survival. Whether people grow in a society with an annual per capita income of $400 or $40,000 has more direct impact on their daily lives than whether they grow up in a country which is holding free and fair elections or not (ibid.). Therefore, when a society is developing socio-economically survival is no longer precarious and human choices not so restricted, and new trends towards increasing emphasis on individual autonomy and self-expression values tends to emerge (ibid, 25). The world is flourishing of different modernization theories, in order to operationalize and make it concrete, and in order to answer the research question whether Rwanda has made any progress at all the last decade, in other words if the country is undergoing a modernization process we will in this research use below stated indicators to analyze Rwanda’s modernization process. Following indicators will be used; a Corruption Perception Index (CPI), a Human Development Index (HDI), a globalization index (KOF) and GNI/ Capita. This approach seems to be the best one in order to define modernization, and the best evidence about whether Rwanda has made any progress at all the last decade; simply if the quality of life has improved in Rwanda. More about these indicators under “Operationalization”.

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4. Methodology The basis and interpretative perspective for this paper is of hermeneutic character, i.e. interpretation and understanding, science that seeks an interpretative understanding of social action in order to reach a causal explanation of actions processes and effects (Bryman, 2011:32). This research took its first step in a minor field study (MFS), with a scholarship from Sida, conducted in Rwanda in the summer of 2010, and later as field research again in February/ March 2011.23 This case study therefore includes longitudinal components, especially since the author has spent a couple of months as both a short-term observer (STO) and long-term observer (LTO) in the team of the Civil Society Election Observation Mission (CSEOM) in Kigali, Rwanda. In order to fulfil the purpose with the research this paper consist of both qualitative and quantitative methods, in a two-part analysis, in which there are a total of one qualitative part and two quantitative parts. The data collection techniques of the qualitative parts consist of ethnographic methods; participating/ direct observations, in which field notes were taken and sometimes structured observation forms were used, as well as qualitative interviews that were both semi structured and open, as well as text analysis. The first analysis chapter also contain a fully structured survey, which was carried out in Rwanda by the author. The survey questions were inspired from another survey, which was carried out in Rwanda’s pre electoral climate of 2010, for which results are implemented as complimentary evidence. Data collection techniques of the second analysis chapter consist of a (foremost) quantitative part, of an analysis of official statistics in a comparative perspective. The first qualitative part consists of an analysis of democracy (polyarchy) in the country, with a brief comparison between theory (short extracts from the constitution) and practise (foremost material collected by the author as both interviews and observations), as well as an analysis of democracy attitudes of the Rwandese citizens, conducted as a fully structured survey. The second foremost quantitative part analyses the countries modernization processes, in which data is (foremost) collected from official statistics in a comparative perspective with a time frame of ten years. There is no use of analysing the country directly after 1994, since the country was in ruins. Hopefully the part with the modernization theory and perspective can help explain if and how Rwanda is progressing, information which might not appear in the other parts, and if socio-economic developments seem to trigger democratization. Further the intention is to reveal the views of the citizens, their attitudes towards democracy in Rwanda, since they are the ones best to judge the democratic situation in Rwanda, in my opinion.

                                                                                                               23 Organized solely by the author and RCSP.

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The observations made it possible for me to better understand the political situation and developments in Rwanda. Through the field study I could access more information, and sometimes inside information which otherwise might have got lost. It was also critical to do the MFS in order to fully understand whether democratic principles are respected or not, as well as to get a sense of the political ambiance. As Bryman (2011:539) argues a mixed method of research is of relevance if you have both an epistemological and ontological interest24, as this paper emphasises on. See below for the selection of interviewees.

4.1  Selection  of  Case  and  Sources Rwanda was an obvious choice when it came to choose which country to conduct research in since the author had a big passion for the country. 25 The research began as an MFS, which eventually developed to this dissertation. Primary sources consist of data collected during the MFS; observations as well as interviews. Primary sources also consist of interviews from Copenhagen, and short extracts from the constitution. The secondary sources in this paper consist of text analysis, such as scrutinization of existing literature in the area of interest, books, reports and journals, as well as official statistics. In order to asses the socio-economic situation; i.e. the modernization process in Rwanda, the selection of the secondary analysis of official statistics from below organizations seemed to be good indicators for this type of analysis. This analysis relays on a Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from Transparency International, a Human Development Index (HDI) with data collected from United Nations Development Programs (UNDP), a globalization index (KOF) from Dr. Axel Dreher at Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zürich and GNI/ Capita from the World Bank (using the World Banks Atlas method). The selection of people to interview were for the most part strategically planned, but sometimes depending on the mission as an election observer, the interviews were not planned ahead. The interviews were conducted as both open and semi-structured. Sometimes the interviews were conducted as the author being a LTO, and sometimes as a student. Depending on if the author conducted interviews as an LTO, or as a student, different political wings could be accessed.

                                                                                                               24 By this I mean that this paper emphasizes a combination of our perception of reality, and the base and validity of knowledge. 25 However, the summer of 2010 was my first time to visit the country and I can easily say I was positively surprised, it was much better than I ever could imagine.

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Most of the interviewee was people from political parties, but also from the National Election Commission (NEC), former MP, locals, NGO:s and governmental organisations. The observations was conducted as direct and participating since the author was a member in the team of CSEOM (2010/2011), and the author became involved in the social environment of Rwanda, under a total period of three months. The field study offered a greater coverage of the area of interest. The fully structured survey, which was carried out in Kigali, consists of both convenience samples as well as of strategic choice. 26 The survey was distributed to seven hundred Rwandese students at two different universities, Kigali Institute of Science and Technology (KIST), and Kigali Independent University (ULK). It was hard to reach out to a bigger number of students at KIST, therefore only one hundred questionnaires were distributed to them, and ULK the rest. The author had help distributing the questionnaires at KIST. More on this under “Criticism of Method and Sources”.

4.2  Operationalization     In order to operationalize the democratization process of Rwanda this paper will first do an analysis with the help of Dahl’s aforementioned democracy theory, “polyarchy”. Please see theory chapter “Dahl’s Polyarchy” for a wider explanation of these criteria’s. 1. Elected officials; 2. Free and fair elections; 3. Universal suffrage; 4. The right to stand for election; 5. Freedom of Expression; 6. Alternative sources of information; 7. Freedom of Association. This study however likes to emphasize the need to go deeper than this in order to fully understand the development paths of Rwanda, hopefully also to a wider understanding of the politics of Rwanda and due to the fact that socio-economic developments and democracy often comes hand in hand.

                                                                                                               26 This mission was a bit complicated since the author was a member of CSEOM and followed the code of conduct (synonym to code of ethics). It was also a bit of a language barrier, and it was hard to reach out to a bigger number of people to introduce the survey to, who were literate as well. The research was also conducted with a time and resource limit. Hence the choice of conducting the survey in the capital of Rwanda.

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Positive correlations between development and democratization are profoundly significant, hence, the need for the use of a modernization theory and perspective in which we will use a Corruption Perception Index (CPI), a Human Development Index (HDI), a globalization Index (KOF) and GNI/ Capita as indicators. See below explanation of indicators. CPI- In order to measure how well the institutions are functioning, which is a pre-requisite for democracy, I here intend to use a measurement of the opposite, namely corruption. A lack of “good governance”, i.e. poorly functioning institutions, is reflected in high corruption. In order to get a quantitative measurement we will therefor use the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from Transparency International. Corruption as a measurement on institutions well-being captures one side of the large field institutions represents. The CPI puts focus on corruption in the public sector, or corruption that involves public officials, civil servants or politicians (TI, 2011). HDI- is a complex index that measures health in terms of life expectancy at birth, educational level through a combination of literacy among adults and the proportion of school age children who attend school, and living standard through purchasing power adjusted GNP/ Capita. HDI is used here as a measurement of the socio-economic part of the modernization process. HDI data is collected from United Nations Development Programs (UNDP) Human Development Report (UNDP, 2010). KOF- is a globalization index from Dr. Axel Dreher (2010) at Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zürich, which measures three different indicators; economic, social and political globalization. These include actual economic flows, economic restrictions, data on information flows and personal contact, as well as data on cultural proximity, i.e. personal contacts across national boarders. The reason why KOF is of use here is because democracies seem to have more exchange with the outside world than non-democratic or non-free countries. 27 GNI/ Capita- The reason why we will use GNI/ Capita instead of GNP/ Capita is because it enhances us with a better understanding of the economic situation in a country, since BNI also includes primary incomes from abroad, i.e. revenues from direct investments abroad, salaries, certain taxes as well as subsidies and stock dividend (Ekonomifakta, 2011). 28 GNI/ Capita data is collected from the World Bank (The World Bank, 2011).

                                                                                                               27 Rwanda is classified as a “non-free country” by Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org). 28 GNI/ Capita and GNP/Capita do not necessarily have to differ so widely in all countries (www.ekonomifakta.se).

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However, the views of the citizens are of great importance as well, since they are the ones living under the reign of the rulers, and in my opinion, the ones who are the best to judge Rwanda’s democratization process. See below table for clarification.  

Table  2.  Analytical  guidance

Research questions: Democracy theories/ Operationalization:

1. Has Rwanda been successful in establishing Polyarchy; seven criteria. Civic and

Democracy, in terms of polyarchy? Political rights

2. What are the democracy attitudes of the citizens? *Surveys; Democracy attitudes

2. Has Rwanda made any progress the last decade Modernization theory; BNI/ Capita, HDI

(not just politically but socio-economically KOF, CPI

as well) in other words is the country undergoing a

modernization process?

Additional theories are applied in various parts when needed as the research develops.

* Explained with the help of a theoretical perspective, democracy theory in general.

4.3  Criticism  of  Method  and  Sources   When it comes to qualitative research it is hard to fulfil the criteria of external reliability, since it is impossible to freeze an social environment and the social conditions that are applicable at a initial study to make it replicable in the sense we usually mean by the term (Bryman, 2011:352). Some analysis parts consist of subjective judgements that clearly, but as intended, affect the study to some extent. The basis and interpretative perspective for this study is of hermeneutic character, i.e. interpretation and understanding, hence, it is no surprise that subjective values are involved. According to Bryman (ibid.) the internal validity in qualitative research tend to be strong, since the long-term presence and participation in a social environment enables the researcher to ensure a high degree of consistency between concepts and observations. This research is, as intended, limited when it comes to external validity, since it is a case study of Rwanda and the results can’t easily be generalized, and due to the limited selection of sources, especially for the survey. Since the author had to follow the code of conduct as a LTO in CSEOM, the research sometimes became limited when it came to people to interview. At some times it was confusing being both a student and a LTO, since you play out different roles. Regarding the qualitative interviews, the selection of the people to interview was for the most part strategically targeted, with an aim of reaching theoretical saturation.

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The qualitative interviews made it possible to get more “deep information”, which might be lost in a fully structured survey. The survey is not generalizable to the whole population of Rwanda, which the author is fully aware of. The survey is however supported by evidence from another survey, (Institute for security studies; summary report of ISS public seminar series). The analysis of official statistics as a measurement and indicators of Rwanda’s socio-economic situation doesn’t tell us everything, but at least it tells us great deal, so we can have an insight and understanding of their development path. The author of this paper briefly went through how other students had conducted research before when using a democracy theory, and many used another complimentary approach as well, therefore the use of the modernization theory here, even though it is interesting on its own. Since the author had help carrying out the survey at KIST, some might question the reliability of the survey results, the author however fully trust this student and believe he conducted this mission responsibly and in a good manner. 29 According to Djurfelt et al. (2003: 105) we are forced to accept some loss in precision in our research when the selection of method and sources is a compromise. The reason why this research isn’t based on analysis along authoritarian lines á la Linz and Stepan is simply due to the pre-knowledge of Rwanda by the author, and that chosen approach seemed to be the best way in order to assess democracy processes. 30 See conclusions for a wider explanation. At one occasion it was hard being a muzungu (white), but for most time it wasn’t, people tended to be very open and helpful. The author is aware that some might be critical of such an approach as a mixed method of research, but the combination is intended to enhance us with a greater understanding of the democratization process and development path of Rwanda.        

                                                                                                               29 This person was familiar with RSCP. 30 Linz and Stepan (in Thomas and Allen, 2000:366), presents a model for an authoritarian regime, but this model isn’t true for Rwanda (in my opinion); no competitive elections at all, dominant state and government which is not accountable at all through election to citizens, autonomous associations etc. are virtually non-existent and there is severe restrictions on individual civil and political rights.

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5. The Context of Rwanda In order to have a full understanding of the research problem of this paper it is essential for the reader to have some knowledge of the history of Rwanda. Neither among historians or anthropologies is there any consensus of the origin to the divisions in Rwanda and its past, which is so crucial in the history of Rwanda (Melvern, 2003:19). It is possible that the three ethnic groups in Rwanda, hutu, tutsi and twa, all lived side by side in peace and harmony in pre-colonial days, but according to Prunier (seminar Copenhagen, 010411) divisions existed already in pre-colonial days. René Lemarchand (in Clark and Kaufman, 2009:65ff) refers to these different versions of history as the cognitive maps of Rwandans, and it is perhaps no surprise that they are dissimilar. This is important to note since these collective and dissimilar memories have been used to justify violence, and therefore have life and death consequences.  

5.1  The  past  is  the  prologue   Rwanda’s colonial period began in 1885, when Germany claimed the land of Rwanda at the Conference in Berlin (though it did not gain full colonial power until 1910). The Kingdom of Rwanda had been totally cut off from the outside world, even from the African world, until the 4th of May 1894 when the German count Gustav Adolf von Götzen was received by king Rwabugiri (Melvern, 2003:18f). Rwanda had few exploitable resources and was of little interest to the outside world. The first missionaries became aware that the people of Rwanda was divided into three different groups. These groups wasn’t tribes, because the people confessed to the same religion, told the same stories of their ancestors and spoke the same language, Kinyarwanda (ibid). 31 At the conclusion of the First World War Germany lost all their territory, including Rwanda. Though the Belgians had controlled the area since 1916, only after the war did the League of Nations grant them the colonial territory of Ruanda-Urundi, (modern days Rwanda and Burundi). In 1935 the Belgians issued ethnic identity cards and registered the population as hutu, tutsi or twa, depending on their appearances, and to some extent wealth (ibid.). The hutus constitutes of approximately 84%, the tutsis 15% and the twas 1% of the population in Rwanda (CIA, 2011). The Belgians strongly favoured the tutsis, but later well suitable for the forthcoming independency, they switched their sympathies in favour for the hutus (Corey and Joireman, 2004:76f). 32

                                                                                                               31 Long before Rwanda became a state people spoke different versions of the language and lived scattered over a wide area (Melvern, 2003:19). 32 According to Melvern (2003:19f) the idea that hutus and tutsis was distinct ethnic groups appears to have originated from the British colonial agent and explorer John Hanning Speke, which in 1959, the same year as Darwin published “The origin of species”. Speke explored Karagwe and Buganda (a part of todays Uganda on the boarder to Rwanda) and formulated the theory that in this part of Central Africa existed a superior race, which was totally distinct from the other natives (ibid). It became commonly known that the culture in Central Africa was so superior that it must have come from another place, it was impossible to think that “wild niggers” could reach such

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Anti-tutsi terror campaigns started in 1959 after the tutsi monarchy was ousted by politicians in the name of the downtrodden hutu majority (Clark and Kaufman, 2009:23). 33 The monarchy was abolished 1961 and the republic of Rwanda was established (Melvern, 2003:27f).34 A single party system was quickly to emerge. Grégoire Kayibanda leader of the “Hutu Power”, Parmehutu 35 won the first internationally recognized “multiparty election” in Rwanda 1961, still under Belgian trustee ship, which was one significantly step towards the tutsi-phobic one-party regime of MDR. Rwanda was finally granted full independence on the 1st July 1962 (ibid.). The Parmehutu massacred and displaced thousands of tutsis after they took over the country, and successive waves of massacres continued against tutsi groups throughout the 1970s, 1980s (Corey and Joireman, 2004:77). A coup of extremist Hutus in 1973, led by General Juvénal Habyarimana ended in a massacre of killings, including the president Kayibanda. Membership in Habyarimana’s political party National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND) was the only accepted party and obligatory for all Rwandans, (until outlawed in 1994). The constitution of 1978 that came subsequently did not make any changes in terms of democracy. The situation continued until the 90s when both internal and external pressure obliged President Habyarimana to make democratic reforms, recognizing a multi party system. (ibid, 78).

 

 

 

 

 

       

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             a high level of political and religious refinement. The dominant and ruling class of tutsis was believed to have come from Ethiopia, and was therefore closer linked with the “noble Europeans”. The tutsis was taller and their noses thinner, they were intelligent and showed refined emotions, which was considered “unusual among primitive people”. Some missionaries thought the tutsis was descendants to the ancient Egyptians (ibid.). 33 The methods used to slaughter people in 1994 mirrored those used to kill tutsi in 1959 and 1963, where there also had been targeted use of militia and propaganda, roadblocks erected, and massacres under the guise of “civilian defense” (Clark and Kaufman, 2009: 22). Also during the 70s campaigns were driven in order to “clean” the country from tutsis (Melvern, 2003:36). 34 Kigeli V of Rwanda was the last last Monarch in Rwanda. Monarchy in Rwanda was abolished on the 28nd January 1961. 35 Also known as MDR-PARMEHUTU. (Renamed 1960).

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5.2  The  genocide   The year of 1990 marked a start of a four-year civil war in Rwanda, when exiled tutsis, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded from the north (Melvern, 2003:42). Peace talks started in Arusha, Tanzania, and a power sharing in a new transition government were drafted (ibid, 62). 36 On the 5th October 1993 the UN security council formed the peacekeeping mission UNAMIR for Rwanda (ibid, 98). 37 Habyarimana signed the peace agreements, the Arusha Accords in August 1993, but doing so he gained enemies in the process (ibid, 67ff). A split within the ruling party existed. It was not just a two-sided game, it was also a three-sided game, due to the internal opposition who later splitted into opposite sides. 38 Habyarimana’s plane was shut down on the 6th April 1994, on its way home from a summit in Arusha (ibid, 134ff). This was the starting point of the genocide in 1994, which ended in the slaughter of approximately one million people, mostly tutsis (ibid). According to Melvern (2003) there were cases of brutal killings and mutilations before the 6th of April, also during the on going UN-peace mission. The possibility of strengthening UNAMIR in order to act against the escalating violence was something that hardly was discussed (ibid, 162f). Every time talks of enforcements came up, it was only in order to rescue foreigners (ibid.). The UN had received early warning signal of a forthcoming genocide, despite this they decreased their operation in Rwanda substantially (ibid, 101f: 169ff).39 UNAMIR didn’t t have the right mandate, and couldn’t do anything than just stand by and watch people being slaughtered with machetes, spears etc. (Melvern, 2003:13ff). The genocide ended when RPF and its military wing took control over Kigali, on the 4th of July 1994 (ibid, 246). RPF then successively and systematically expanded its political power during a nine-year transitional period.

                                                                                                               36 The logic of power sharing provided for in the Arusha Accord enabled all political parties to take seats in government and parliament, after the genocide the former single party MRND and the extremist hutu party CDR was banned for their leading role in the genocide (Reyntjens, 2004:178). 37 UNAMIR was originally established to help implement the Arusha Peace Agreement signed by the Rwandese parties on the 4th August 1993. UNAMIRs mandate and strength were adjusted on a number of occasions in the face of the tragic events of the genocide and the changing situation in the country. UNAMIRS mandate came to an end on the 8th of March 1996 (Melvern, 2003). 38 According to Melvern (2003:23), some experts believe that, had the Rwandan civil war of 1990 not been fought on ethnic grounds pitting hutu against tutsi, the fatal division in Rwanda might well have been north versus south. In Brussels 1992 reports came of an existing death squad in Rwanda, named Reseau Zéro, who organized the extremist (Melvern in clark and Kaufman, 2009:30). Tutsis (in general) was referred to as “inyenzi” (cockroaches), that had to be killed. 39 Ten Belgian UN-soldiers were killed in the earliest days of the genocide, this led to a decrease in the mission (Melvern, 2003:11). The UN didn’t want to “suffer” from the same fiasco as in Somalia (ibid, 92ff). The UN and UN-soldiers should, in my opinion, be prepared for losses. Not to mention the involvement of France, Egypt and South Africa, which played a significant role in the genocide (ibid, 37ff). There are no hutu or tutsi in Rwanda today, only Banyarwanda (people from Rwanda). There is a ban on pronouncing the ethnic groups in Rwanda (Lemarchand in Clark and Kaufman, 2009:65).

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Unlike during the Holocaust, by no means was there in Rwanda any attempts of hiding what was going on, the slaughter was unfolding in the middle of the day (ibid). Incitement to genocide was broadcasted through the radio and the people were prepared psychologically for months and were ordered and forced to perform the extinction of the tutsis (ibid, 15). The 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG), was created in order to prevent genocide, the UN however closed its door on Rwanda. The International Community, not just failed to prevent the genocide, but contributed to the conditions, which made the genocide possible (Melvern, 2003:15).

5.3  Post-­‐war  reconstruction   After the genocide40 the country was in ruins (ibid, 253f). Schools and hospitals was destroyed or looted. Water pipes didn’t work, the qualified personnel, including most teachers, had been killed or gone into exile. In the whole country there were only six judges and ten lawyers left. The hutu power movement remained a threat and were determined to continue their genocidal policy (ibid). 41 The hutu regime, with support of Congo’s dictator Mobutu, started to organize a recapture of Rwanda, which resulted in a war between Rwanda and the DRC (ibid, 272). 42 There were only about twenty lawyers with genuine legal education left in Rwanda after the genocide (Schabas in Clark and Kaufman, 2009 212f). In September 1995 the government of Rwanda made it clear that justice in Rwanda would be done by Rwandans, and did not want to rely on the West. Faced with the massive arrests that followed the 1994 genocide, and above all the devastation of an already feeble administrative and judicial infrastructure, Rwanda was simply incapable of respecting the provisions of its own criminal law, not to mention international treaties (ibid.). An Organic Law was adopted in August 1996, to deal with the offenders of the genocide (ibid, 214f). 43

                                                                                                               40 We will never know the correct figure of the victims in the genocide. The figure one million dead is supported by some, e.g. ICRC Chief delegate Philippe Gaillard and Charles Petrie, vice coordinator for the UN disasters office in Rwanda 1994, but of still unclear reasons the now common accepted figure states 800 000 dead (Melvern, 2003:254). 41 Kagame’s refugee warriors, “Inkotanyi”, is said to have killed tens of thousand of hutu civilians in “liberated” zones in 1994, and later killings perpetrated by Kagame’s troops in Rwanda and eastern Zaire/DRC (Lemarchand in Clark and Kaufman, 2009:67). 42 According to Helen Hintjens (in Clark and Kaufman, 2009:96) Rwanda’s political leaders literally got away with murder in the DRC for two years without any loss of status or foreign aid. However, it might be worth reminding here that many responsible for the genocide fled over the boarder to Zaire in 1994. Around 2001 in the DRC, allegations were beginning to surface of looting and illegal exports of minerals and other resources by Rwandan elements involved in the military conflict (Waugh, 2004:149). This war has been referred to as “Africa’s world war”, since many countries were involved. To complex to go into details here. 43 The first category of offenders consisted of the organizers and planners of the genocide and persons who committed “odious” (sexual violence, mutilation) and systematic murders; the second category consisted of those not in the first category but those who had committed murder or serious crimes against a person which led to death consequences, the third category comprised other serious crimes against a person and the fourth category was made up of crimes against property (Clark and Kaufman, 2009:214).

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The prisons were however overloaded after the genocide in Rwanda, and in 1999 “gacaca”44 courts were established as alternative method of transitional justice (ibid, 220). These functioned as truth and reconciliation commissions, people who confessed and plead guilty could be pardoned and reintegrated into the society. In order to achieve justice and reconciliation after the genocide the UN established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The location of ICTR was to be established in Arusha, Tanzania, far away from possible Rwandan observers. The government of Rwanda first supported the initiative to ICTR, but then switched their views. The ICTR was plagued with administrative difficulties and even corruption (ibid, 211f). 45 RPF and President Paul Kagame46 still rules the country and has managed to bring the country back up on its feet’s. However, divisions still exist in present day Rwanda. See appendix for a brief context of Rwanda.

                                                                                                               44 Gacaca, (which means “justice on the grass”) was an ancient dispute resolution method used at the local level. Historically it dealt with disputes concerning property matters and family law issues (Clark and Kaufman, 2009:222). 45 At one point, in 1997, the UN had to intervene, firing two of the most senior officials of the Tribunal (Melvern, 2003:211f). The UN also fired the ICTR’s former chief prosecutor Carla Del Ponte, there was also severe problems with unethical defence lawyers (ibid). Peter Erlinder has been banned from appearing before the ICTR. Mr. Erlinder is a big genocide denier (Seminar Copenhagen, Melvern, 010411). 46 Kagame became president in 2000, was officially elected through referendum in 2003.

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6. Rwanda and Democracy In order to answer the research question if Rwanda has been successful in establishing democracy this paper will use polyarchy, the aforementioned democracy theory, as an analysing tool. The seven criteria’s that constitutes polyarchy will be analysed briefly through the constitution47, and thereafter we will analyse how democratization is unfolding on the ground in Rwanda with the help of the field research (observations, interviews and survey), which was conducted in 2010 and 2011. 48 Rwanda is no exception to Dahl’s principle on the popular use of the term “democracy”. 49 “ The Rwandan State is an independent, sovereign, democratic, social and secular Republic; The principle governing the Republic is government of the people, by the people and for the people (Article 1, the Constitution of the republic of Rwanda50).

6.1  Elected  officials   According to Dahl’s polyarchy theory (2007:343) the control over the authorities political decisions should be located according to the Constitution to elected officials. “All the power derives from the people. No group of people or individual can vest in themselves the exercise of power /…/ All Rwandan citizens of both sexes who fulfil the requirements provided for by the law have the right to vote and to be elected…” (Article 2, 8, CoR). According to Mr. Elewa51 there are only two ways for a regime shift to occur in Rwanda. “Either the president dies through a coup or something, or the president gives away power on his own will and go into exile… there is only two ways Kagame can leave from his post; either give others a real chance or by a coup/ revolt /…/ Kagame only has hutus in the government to respond to the International community’s request for democracy, the women and hutus don’t have that much power as it might seem” (Interview with former Member of Parliament, Kigali 210710).

                                                                                                               47 The Constitution of the republic of Rwanda is complimented by Organic Laws, which is more thorough. 48 The reader might be interested in how Freedom House rates Rwanda. Freedom House rates freedom in the world, and in political rights Rwanda score 6, in civil liberties Rwanda score 5 and it is status is “not free” (as of 2010). They conclude that Rwanda is not an electoral democracy (Freedom house, 2010). 49 It is de facto that democracy the last century has become an established term and the use of it has increased considerably. How the definition of democracy is formulated seem to no longer matter, just the word itself creates the satisfying legitimacy users wants to achieve. 50 The Constitution of the republic of Rwanda will here after be referred to as CoR. 51 This is not his real name, Mr. “Elewa” is a fixed name. Mr. Elewa (interview Kigali, 210710) replied to me on the question whether he wanted to be anonymous or not, that it is more democratic and right to use names, since you are suppose to have the right to a free opinion etc. But on some issues I couldn’t quote him, therefore the use of a fixed name, rather safe than sorrow.

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In Rwanda, thirty percent of the seats in parliament are guaranteed for women (Article 9, CoR), and according to Phoebe Kanyange (Kigali, 270710) spokesperson for the Forum for Political Parties (FFPP) and chairperson for Prosperity and Solidarity Party (PSP), these women enjoy real power. She said “don’t you have this in Sweden?!” (ibid.). The well-known scholar and expert on the Great Lakes Gérard Prunier (interview Copenhagen, 010411), claims that Kagame is a dictator and that he will cling on to power as long as he can. “Kagame is a good dictator. He will cling on to power until he is killed /…/ post-genocide regime in Rwanda today is becoming isolated /…/ Kagame and his regime is like enlightened despots /…/ there is radicalization, and Kagame has made it worse /…/ he is exactly like Khadaffi, he’s a dictator” (ibid.). According to Dahl’s polyarchy theory (2007:343) the control over the authorities political decisions should be located according to the Constitution to elected officials, and so they are. In Rwanda, the officials are elected as it is stated in the Constitution. The question seems rather to involve how freely they are elected and how much power they really enjoy, which leads us in to the next criteria.  

6.2  Free  and  fair  elections     According to Dahl (2007:343) the elected officials should be appointed in frequent and impartial elections in which coercive elements are far limited.

“…It ensures that elections are free and fair /…/ Public servants are recruited, posted and promoted in conformity with the principle of equality of citizens, through an objective, impartial and transparent system on the basis of the competence, merit and integrity of applicants of both sexes. The State guarantees the impartiality of the leadership of government departments, the Rwanda Defense Forces, the National Police and the National Security Service. They shall all, at all times, ensure impartiality and serve all citizens without discrimination ” (Article 8, 126, CoR). 52

According to the former MP, Mr. Elewa (interview Kigali, 210710) the National Election Commission (NEC) of Rwanda is one hundred percent RPF.53 And as aforementioned, he says that there is only two ways Kagame can leave from his post, either give others a real chance or a by a coup/ revolt. “…The campaigns are fixed /…/ there is only one candidate, one party in for this election (i.e. the Presidential election of 2010) the three other candidates don’t stand a chance, and they know it” (ibid.).

                                                                                                               52  An Organic Law, electoral law describes the procedure of elections further, in which we will not go into here. 53 Some of NEC:s mandated areas is to announce and publish election results and to ensure that elections are free and fair. They are supposed to be impartial. RPF= Rwanda Patriotic Front, dominant and ruling political party in Rwanda since 1994.

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According to my own observations as a member in the team of CSEOM the Presidential election in 2010 was in general free and fair. There was however some irregularities such as concerns regarding the lack of transparency of the result consolidation and a lack of critical opposition voices and problems faced by some media outlets. However, one must remember that much of the critical voices belong to extremist elements, such as Madame Ingabire from FDU-Inkingi. The polling stations were overrepresented with RPF members, but then again they have more members. There were some tendencies of lack of impartiality as well as lack of interest in the job from national observers (personal field notes). 54

The view that the election was free and fair in general, was also shared by other stakeholders in the election, e.g. the Commonwealth (the Commonwealth Observer group, Rwanda Presidential elections). In my opinion, and many other people I’ve been talking to during the summer of 2010, Kagame had such a big support that cheating was not necessary in order to withhold the highest score in order to be reelected. 55 This view was also shared by Christine Mukabunan (interview Kigali, 020810), party president of a political party in opposition to the RPF, PS-Imberakuri.

Whether the local elections in 2011 was free and fair is hard to answer since these election procedures consist of many different polling procedures and are of both direct and indirect character. There were some areas where polling officers were biased, especially in the western province and they were all arrested (personal field notes). In general, there weren’t much to report on, the elections were again conducted in a calm manner (ibid). However, I’m a bit confused and surprised over the big turnout. When it comes to “free and fair elections”, NEC is suppose to function as a guarantor of this. 56

According to Phoebe Kanyange (interview Kigali, 270710) the spokesperson of FFPP and chairperson of PSP, Rwanda doesn’t constitutes by being a one-party state. RPF has however a bigger budget, she sais. When I asked if she thought the presidential election was conducted, according to international standard, as free and fair she answered “what’s free and fair according to international standards? ...I cant’ complain, there is no problems /…/ Everything is transparent /…/ but we have Rwandan rules”. She also said that FFPP has employed one hundred persons to supervise the election, and they supervise NEC as well (ibid.).

                                                                                                               54 A couple of LTO:s were sacked from CSEOM during the local elections of 2011 (personal field notes). 55 According   to  Mr.   Elewa   (interview  Kigali,   210710),   and   a   study   carried   out   by   researchers   in   Rwanda  2010  with   support  of   Sida,  many   citizens  are  members  of  RPF,   and  according   to  Mr.  Elewa   this   is  due   to  either  status  and/or  fear.  Not  everyone  that  holds  a  membership  in  RPF  is  active.  56 According to one European Union election expert, (informal interview 290710) the EU didn’t send a election observation mission (EU EOM) due to a lack of resources. According to another election expert, also tied to the EU EOM (Kigali, 300710), there was no EU EOM sent to Rwanda in 2010 mainly due to a lack of resources, but also due to the fact that the EU EOM in Rwanda 2008 was a big fiasco. There was supposedly an internal split within that mission.

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She also said that they, like the rest of us interested in the politics of Rwanda, have discussed the matter whether Kagame will make new amendments to the constitution so he can serve another term after 2017. According to Phoebe Kanyange (ibid.) the FFPP have told Kagame he can serve as an adviser if he is not the President, but they are not sure whether he is positive or negative about this. She claims he answered “if I am not President, life goes on”. 57

Deputy President and Campaign manager for Liberal Party (LP), Francois Byabarumwanzi (interview Kigali, 280710) states that the security has improved substantially since the presidential election in 2003, and since the parliament elections of 2008. He says that there is a huge difference from before. “Before we could have mottos following us randomly, people we didn’t know, everywhere. You don’t see that any more. Before there was intimidation, hostility and abuse of language, not now in 2010. The atmosphere is better, almost to calm now”. He says he has not received any intimidation reports what so ever from any of the LP representatives. Mr. Byabarumwanzi claims that bribery was going on before to get more media coverage, but there is no cheating going on any more. Now he says that they are proud in all aspects in relation to this election. They are optimistic about the election, but not stupid, since the majority is RPF. Mr. Byabarumwanzi is optimistic and says that votes for LP will affect seats in parliament eventually (ibid.).

Christine Mukabunan (interview Kigali 020810) party president for PS-Imberakuri, (which is legally registered political party, but only registered party in 2010 who was in “real” opposition), claims they didn’t put forward any candidate in the run for the presidential poll in 2010 because they wanted and needed to sensitize the Rwandese citizens first. She says they saw that the population wasn’t ready for them yet. “The people need to know that we don’t hate the government. They need to see we have ideas, are constructive. After Bernard58 went to prison there were also leader problems. Some people and members supported Bernard. The members and people were not ready, not stable. We are real opposition, that’s why we don’t support Kagame in this election “. So they could have put forward a candidate, but choose not to. She also states that they haven’t been intimidated what so ever, and that good developments are emerging, but that they even so need more political space (ibid.). 59

                                                                                                               57 Phoebe Kanyange (PSP) says she will stand as candidate in the Presidential election of 2017 (interview Kigali, 270710). She would like to emphasize on more family planning and health care centres (ibid). 58 Bernard Ntaganda is founder and former president of PS-Imberakuri. Imprisoned due to divisionism, hate speeches. According to Christine (ibid) Bernard cooperated with FDLR in the DRC. Bernard (ibid) claimed to be friends with Victoire Ingabire as well. Ntaganda still imprisoned as of April 2011. 59 When I asked Christine Mukabunan about the recent killing (summer of 2010) of an Green Party official she argued that she couldn’t see why the murder who be the work of the government, they would have aimed for the Green Party President instead (interview Kigali, 020810).

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Aziz Kamanzi (campaign coordinator) and Stamislav Kamanzi (interview Kigali, 070810) members of the Social Democratic Party (PSD), states that they didn’t suffer from any intimidation or threats during the presidential poll in 2010. According to Aziz Kamanzi they have arranged and paid transport for locals in order for them to attend to the campaigns, but according locals (personal field notes) PSD paid them an additional 2500-5000 Rwandan Franc as well. According to Aziz Kamanzi they have a budget for locals transportation cost, nothing else. He also told me that they had to cancel campaigns when there were clashes between two political parties, and sometimes this happened with RPF (ibid.).

During the months I’ve spent in Rwanda and during all the interviews conducted, no one has ever claimed to suffered from intimidation or threats, only that this has happened in earlier elections, and people claim that the political ambiance has improved substantially. 60 The elections in 2010 and 2011 were conducted in a calm manner, but were they free and fair? In general, I think so. I can’t really answer this since I haven’t observed enough, (but as mentioned, this view is shared by other observers). Rwanda has a long way to go still if they want to live up to and follow Western models of democracy and of what constitutes free and fair elections. In my opinion, there were many irregularities also simply due to badly trained electoral staff.

According to Dahl (2007:343) the elected officials should be appointed in frequent and impartial elections in which coercive elements are far limited. As discussed above, it seems Rwanda are conducting free and fair elections (in general), but still they have a long way to go. They are holding frequent elections, but there have been complaints on impartiality from some electoral staff. When it comes to holding free and fair elections in Rwanda it seems the political climate has improved substantially, and if we are to rely on reports from stakeholders in recent elections Rwanda is performing well.

6.3  Universal  suffrage     Virtually all adults should have the right to vote of officials (Dahl, 2007:344). As aforementioned“ Suffrage is universal and equal for all citizens. Suffrage is direct or indirect and secret, unless the Constitution or another law provides otherwise. All Rwandan citizens of both sexes who fulfil the requirements provided for by the law have the right to vote and to be elected. The law determines the conditions and modalities for the conduct of elections ” (Article 152, CoR).

                                                                                                               60 However,   there  were  a   couple  of   grenade  attacks  during  my   time   in  Kigali,   but  none  directly  before  an  election,   or   in   a   campaign   or   polling   area.  According to Gérard Prunier (interview Copenhagen, 010411) the previous grenade attacks is due to a split within the RPF. This view was also shared by Mr Elewa, as well as many other people I’ve been talking to (personal field notes).

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According to Lucky Gihana at NEC (interview Kigali, 230710) there weren’t any major problem regarding the electoral register or voting cards in the then upcoming presidential election of 2010, but there had been some problems. Ha said he wasn’t fully aware of the extent of these problems. There weren’t any major signs of problems regarding people who weren’t able to vote, and the Rwandan diaspora was also able to vote from abroad. People in prison on the election day in August 2010 were however not able to cast their vote (personal field note). According to Dahl (2007:344), virtually all adults should have the right to vote of officials, and it seems virtually all adults enjoy this right in Rwanda. Virtually all can be interpreted as those people who do not fulfil the requirements provided for by the law, in other words e.g. people who were imprisoned on the election day of the Presidential poll 2010 were not able to vote.

6.4  The  right  to  stand  for  election   Virtually all adults should have the right to candidate for the publicly elected positions, even though the age limit may be higher for holding an elected position than to vote (Dahl, 2007:344).

“…All Rwandan citizens of both sexes who fulfil the requirements provided for by the law have the right to vote and to be elected /…/ a pluralistic democratic government, equality of all Rwandans and between women and men reflected by ensuring that women are granted at least thirty per cent of posts in decision making organs…” (Article 8, 9, CoR).

According to Mr.Elewa (interview Kigali, 210710), as mentioned previously, there was only one candidate, one party for the Presidential election in 2010. According to Mr. Elewa the three other candidates in the run for the Presidential poll didn’t stand a chance, and they knew it. According to Mr. Elewa (ibid) he was kicked out of his political party (due to anonymous reasons this paper won’t state which political party) due to RPF and because he was to independent and to outspoken. He thinks he was kicked out because he could be a potential candidate to make a regime shift.

During an interview with the spokesperson of FFPP and chairperson of PSP, Phoebe Kanyange (Kigali, 270710) I asked why PSP didn’t have a candidate for the presidential election, and according to her they weren’t ready. She says they only started 23rd November 2003, and that they didn’t have a strong leadership. She also mentioned that the party suffered from an internal split due to the fact that their member Safair had to leave when he was accused of genocide ideology, divisionism (ibid.).

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The right to stand for election doesn’t seem to be threatened, according to Phoebe Kanyange. Christine Mukabunan, party president for PS-Imberakuri (interview Kigali, 020810), claims they had an opportunity to put forward a candidate for the presidential poll in 2010, but they choose not to. She claims that their party and the citizens weren’t ready. She says Bernard was removed as president for PS-Imberakuri, but he continued to say he was the party president, and he was apparently against the presidential election (ibid.).

According to Prunier (interview Copenhagen, 010411) the genocide is used as a way to suppress the opposition. “There’s a split within RPF over what’s been going on for the last fifteen years. Genocide can’t be used as an excuse for ever” (ibid.). What he means is that people have been imprisoned, taken into house arrest etc. and been accused of spreading genocide ideology, divisionism, and that this is used as an way to suppress the real opposition candidates (personal field notes).

According to Dahl (2007:344) virtually all adults should have the right to candidate for the publicly elected positions, even though the age limit may be higher for holding an elected position than to vote. It seems as long as you don’t spread genocide ideology etc. the right to candidate for the publicly elected positions don’t seem to be threatened. Obviously it is more complicated than this, but Rwanda is improving on this criteria as well.

6.5  Freedom  of  expression 61

Citizens should have the right to express their opinions regarding political issues in a broad sense without risking serious punishment. This includes criticism of those in power, the state, the government, the socio-economical system and the prevailing ideology (Dahl, 2007:344).

“ Freedom of thought, opinion, conscience, religion, worship and the public manifestation thereof is guaranteed by the State in accordance with conditions determined by law. Propagation of ethnic, regional, racial or discrimination or any other form of division is punishable by law /…/ In the exercise of rights and enjoyment of freedoms, every person shall only be subjected to the limitations set by the law in order to ensure the recognition and respect of others’ rights and freedoms, good morals, public order and social welfare which characterize a democratic society” (Article 33, 43. GoR).

                                                                                                               61  Freedom of speech is the freedom to speak without censorship or limitation. The synonymous term freedom of expression is sometimes used to indicate not only freedom of verbal speech but any act of seeking, receiving and imparting information or ideas, regardless of the medium used. In practice, the right to freedom of speech is not absolute in any country and the right is commonly subject to limitations, such as "hate speeches".  

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According to Mr. Elewa it is hard to say critical things in Rwanda, due to the Kagame regime (interview Kigali, 210710). Mr. Elewa states that “the right to a free opinion” is something he values very high, and says that since he was too independent and outspoken he was kicked out of his political party and hence also parliament. Mr. Elewa mentioned the attempted assassination on a former general to President Kagame, which managed to escape to South Africa, and about newspapers that has been shut down. Mr. Elewa (ibid.) says that one of those closed down newspaper had interviewed him a week earlier. According to a person tied to Internews62 (interview Kigali, 220710) one newspaper had been shut down, and one journalist was under arrest in 2010, all in due time for the presidential election. The same source also stated, when it comes to being critical about the government… “you don’t want to say too much /…/ you have to be careful /…/ you say different things to students and journalist” (ibid.). This seems to be linked to a culture of fearing leaders, leaders in the past, and a culture of impunity. Marcel Museminari, owner and journalist at Business Daily (interview Kigali, 230710) also mentioned newspapers being shut down and suspended. According to Mr. Museminari there were no signs that the media was under pressure, in terms of force, and no pressure from stakeholders in advertising either, but he says that the Media High Council (MHC)63 launched a new media law, and that this happened conveniently enough in due time for the presidential election (i.e. of 2010). The MHC controls the accreditation cards the journalist needs. According to Mr. Museminari its fundamental rights for the media to oversee elections, and he wants the court to look into the matter of how the media law and the constitution comply. On my question whether he has suffered from any intimidation or threats as a journalist, he replied no, not what so ever. I asked Mr. Museminari (ibid.) if Rwanda suffer from self-censorship, and he answered a bit ironically that he didn’t suffer from it at least, that’s why he hasn’t got any money, and that they don’t spread government propaganda. Phoebe Kanyange (spokesperson of FFPP and chairperson of PSP) doesn’t share the views of Mr. Museminari regarding the new media law (interview Kigali, 270710). According to Phoebe Kanyange it is there for security reasons, otherwise they wouldn’t know who is who. She says that the people who don’t get the accreditation card and complain, are the ones who don’t fulfil the requirements. Hamza Ndangiza at Radio Contact FM64 states that they can report freely (interview Kigali, 290710). According to him (ibid.) they have been able to transmit and move freely, if they have the accreditation cards, which they have.                                                                                                                62 Internews is an international media development organization whose mission is to empower local media worldwide to give people the news and information they need, the ability to connect, and the means to make their voices heard. 63 MHC launched a new media law in 2010, with special conditions for issuance and withdrawal of press cards in Rwanda (MHC Regulation concerning issuance of press cards in Rwanda). 64 A private radio station in Rwanda.

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This view was not shared by another media outlet. “…There are some things you can’t publish. You don’t publish things you disagree on, and if you don’t have proof. Off course there are certain things you can’t publish… Self-censorship, yes, but not when you don’t agree, but yes there are certain things you can’t publish…” (private newspaper Dispatch, interview 290710 Kigali). 65 But then again, it is never a question of an “absolute” right to a freedom of speech. According to Christine Mukabunan, party president for PS-Imberakuri (interview Kigali 020810), the former party president was anti the government of Rwanda, and were imprisoned due to hate speeches of the government and due to divisionism. According to Christine Mukabunan (ibid.) Bernard cooperated with the Congolese (FDLR), and they want to destroy the government in Rwanda. In my opinion, especially in Rwanda, it is important to have certain rules so not extremist can grew amongst the citizens. 66

According to Dahl (2007:344), citizens should have the right to express their opinions regarding political issues in a broad sense without risking serious punishment. This includes criticism of those in power, the state, the government, the socio-economical system and the prevailing ideology. As it is stated in the Constitution “…Propagation of ethnic, regional, racial or discrimination or any other form of division is punishable by law… “ (Article 33. GoR). In practice, the right to freedom of speech is not absolute in any country and the right is commonly subject to limitations, such as "hate speeches". The genocide can’t however be used as an excuse to suppress critical voices, if this is what is actually occurring as some academics claim. The Rwandan government has justified a genocide law, which bans ethnic divisionism and denies claims it is used to stifle freedom of speech. In my opinion many countries has similar laws and are necessary in order to prohibit ethnic violence and discrimination.

6.6  Alternative  sources  of  information     The citizens should have the right to seek for alternative information sources. These exist and are legally protected (Dahl, 2007:344). “ Freedom of the press and freedom of information are recognized and guaranteed by the State. Freedom of speech and freedom of information shall not prejudice public order and good morals, the right of every citizen to honour, good reputation and the privacy of personal and family life. It is also guaranteed so long as it does not prejudice the protection of the youth and minors…” (Article 34, CoR).                                                                                                                65 He was a bit confused on how to answer this question. No wonder when a journalist was killed a couple a weeks ago and newspapers have been shut down (personal field notes). 66 On the 29th July 2010 I hade scheduled for a interview in Kigali City, outside UTC- building with presidential candidate Alvera Mukabaramba, of the political party PPC. The media contact person, Mr. Nshimiyimana approached me and we talk for about fifteen minutes. He was confused when he saw I was a muzungo (white), and told me that he didn’t know if he was allowed to talk to me. He called to Alvera and she decided that we had to reschedule. Mr. Nshimiyimana didn’t seem to believe I was a member of the team CSEOM, and asked if I was from the media. I tried to reassure him that I wasn’t, but the presidential candidate Alvera had already made up her mind on leaving. Whether the right to freedom of speech was questioned or not, I’m not sure, but surely they seemed a bit concerned by speaking to “media” from the West.

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As mentioned previously a couple of newspapers in Rwanda has been shut down. According to journalist trainer Mathias Manirakiza at Internews (interview Kigali, 220710), they train journalist so they can cover elections etc. They train journalists for the public’s good, civic education. They also document on the Gacaca courts, on peace and reconciliation processes. However, Mr. Manirakiza (ibid.) also told me about one newspaper being shut down, and one journalist being under arrest. When I asked him if they were allowed to cover all the candidates in the presidential election, he said yes, it is only a matter of lack of resources. Also during my interview with owner and journalist of Business Daily, Marcel Museminari (interview Kigali, 230710) the discussion of the closed down newspaper came up. But he also claimed that Business Daily doesn’t spread government propaganda, and he has never suffered from intimidation or threats of any kind. Alternative sources of information can be questioned according to Mr. Museminari (ibid.), since the MHC controls accreditation cards for the journalist. According to Dahl (2007:344), the citizens should have the right to seek for alternative information sources, these exist and are legally protected. In my opinion, it doesn’t seem like people are suffering from a lack of information, and as stated in the Constitution freedom of information are recognized and guaranteed by the state. The people in Rwanda has access to all websites, there isn’t any censure like in China. Alternative sources of information can therefore easily be accessed. But it is a problem when newspapers are being shut down when they, supposedly, are critical about the government. One major information source in Rwanda is the radio. 67 Many people are not just only poor but also illiterate, i.e. in rural areas mostly, and hence newspapers are more common in the capital (personal field note).

6.7  Freedom  of  association   To secure their respective rights, including the aforementioned, citizens also should have the right to form relatively independent associations and organizations, including political parties and interest groups (Dahl, 2007:344).

“ Freedom of association is guaranteed and shall not require prior authorization. Such freedom shall be exercised under conditions determined by law /…/

Freedom of peaceful assembly without arms is guaranteed if it is not inconsistent with the law. Prior authorization shall only be necessary if the law so requires and solely in the case of assembly in the open air, in a public place or on a public road, to the extent that such is necessary in the interests of public safety, public health or public order /…/ Rwandans are free to join political organizations of their choice or not to join them /…/ Political organizations are prohibited from basing themselves on race, ethnic group, tribe, clan, region, sex, religion or any other division which may give rise to discrimination…” (Article 35, 36, 53, 54. CoR).                                                                                                                67 We need to keep in mind the Rwanda media experience in 1994, the “hate radio”, especially RTLM. The radio was an affective way of ordering slaughters etc.

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According to Mr. Elewa (interview Kigali, 20710) many people are members in RPF due to either status and/ or fear. Gonzaga Muganwa, at private newspaper Dispatch (interview Kigali, 290710) claims that the “real” opposition68 wasn’t contending in the presidential election. When I asked Mr. Muganwa if there were any problems in covering the presidential election he replied that one have to know the Rwandan politics in order to understand. He states that he has met with both Green party and FDU-Inkingi (opposition, not legally reg.) earlier, despite this he has not suffered from any form of intimidation. According to Christine Mukabunan, party president for PS-Imberakuri (interview Kigali, 020810) former party president Bernard Ntaganda was found guilty of endangering national security, divisionism and inciting ethnic divisions. He was also attempting to organize demonstrations without official authorization, and was therefore imprisoned. According to Dahl (2007:344) as mentioned above, to secure their respective rights, including the aforementioned, citizens also should have the right to form relatively independent associations and organizations, including political parties and interest groups. In my opinion, the citizens of Rwanda seems to be able to form relatively independent associations and organizations, and freedom of association is guaranteed by law, but again, the question whether you spread divisionism of any kind seem to matter a great deal if you want to organize your self. The so-called “real” opposition was not contending in 2010 since many of them consist of, or is linked to extremists.  

6.8  Democracy  Attitudes;  Survey   In my opinion no one besides the citizens of Rwanda are the ones best to judge if the country has been successful in establishing democracy or not, therefore below survey was conducted, which was carried out in Kigali at two different universities, Kigali Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) and Kigali Independent University (ULK), addressed to a total of seven hundred Rwandan students. The students were asked to answer in writing to what extent they agreed that in Rwanda, there is political pluralism and political space, and to what extent democratic principles are respected.

                                                                                                               68 Such as the Green Party and FDU-Inkingi, not legally registred in Rwanda.

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Figure  1.  Democracy  attitudes;  survey  question  1.  

 Source: Authors archive. Feld study in Kigali, ULK and KIST March 2011. Note: Response rate 84%. 591/700.For more info please read Delimitations and Criticism of Method and Sources. As you can see over half, 57%, of the respondents agreed to some extent that in Rwanda, there is political pluralism and political space. What’s important to note is that only 10% did not agree with the claim that in Rwanda, there is political pluralism and political space. However, on some of the questionnaires people had drawn warning triangles on the backsides. One student had also written “used by Napoleon in France. Political space= Nepotism. I think not. Not in Rwanda” on the back of one of the questionnaires. Some student asked why this survey was being conducted, and why someone, like myself, wants to interfere in the Rwandan politics, and many simply didn’t want to get involved and therefore didn’t participate in the survey. There’s nothing else to do than just speculate in why 17% of the respondents ticked the box “Don’t know”, but I believe that many of the students simply didn’t want to participate or interfere, rather than they didn’t understand the questions. Off course there might be students who might not be so familiar with the terms “political space” and “political pluralism”, but since the survey was undertaken at two major universities, in the capital, it is possible to presume that the majority is politically enlightened. It would be interesting to do a survey which cover all the provinces of Rwanda in order to see how well the views of the students comply with the rest of the citizens, and one which hence also is representative for the whole population of Rwanda. The students might off course be politically more enlightened than others. To carry out a major survey is left for future research, but we come back to this on the next page when a comparison is made with another survey carried out in Rwanda’s pre-electoral climate of 2010.

Strongly  agree  18%  

Agree  24%  

Partially  agree  15%  

Do  not  agree  10%  

Don't  know  17%  

Blanc,  error  16%  

 In  Rwanda,  there  is  political  pluralism  and  political  space.  

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Figure  2.  Democracy  attitudes;  survey  question  2.  

 Source: Authors archive. Feld study in Kigali, ULK and KIST March 2011. Note: Response rate 82%. 577/700. For more info please read Delimitations and Criticism of Method and Sources. More than half of the respondents, 59%, agreed to some extent that democratic principles are respected in Rwanda. Only 13% answered that democratic principles are not respected. The results of this survey are to some extent supported by another survey (Summary report of ISS, Public Seminar Series), which was carried out in Rwanda’s pre-electoral climate in 2010. The research was commissioned by the Rwandan senate to determine the views of citizens on political space in Rwanda, for which offered an analysis of the public view of pre-electoral Rwanda in 2010. The survey was carried our by independent trained local research assistant, and covered thirty districts with a total of 2560 respondents. 69 On the question whether there exists political pluralism and political space 35% answered they strongly agreed, 45% agreed, 13% partially agreed and 4% answered that they did not agree. The rest answered they didn’t know or didn’t answer (ibid.). Over 50% also replied they regarded democratic principles to be respected. The survey presented the aspect of a culture of fearing leaders (leaders in general) being significant in weakening freedom of speech and political space. This culture of fearing leaders may have influenced the respondents thereby skewing the results. A culture of fearing leaders ranked as the highest identified factor contributing to weakening freedom of speech and political space and therefore a determinant in the growth and establishment of democracy (ibid.). Despite what some academics (such as Reyntjens and Prunier) etc. claims, there seems to be respect for democratic principles in Rwanda.

                                                                                                               69 The fact that local research assistants undertook the survey might have affected the outcome. In my opinion research like this always benefits from a more qualitative angel, complementary research, therefore I felt that this survey, the ISS report, wasn’t enough and conducted my own complimentary research and survey.

Very  much  respected  20%  

Respected  24%  

Partially  respected  15%  

Not  respected  13%  

Don't  know  10%  

Blanc,  error  18%  

To  what  extent  do  you  think  democratic  principles  are  respected  in  Rwanda?  

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7. Assessing Rwanda’s progress During a seminar with Linda Melvern70 (Copenhagen, 010411), the question whether Rwanda has made any progress at all grew, since much of the debates circulating around Rwanda solely involves its regime in a negative perspective, and I therefore became more curious on their modernization process. Melvern (ibid.) says that the poor, not just in urban areas but rural as well, seem to have benefited a lot from community work e.g. 71 The fact that the poor seem to benefit from indigenous programs and processes was something I managed to observe as well during my time in Rwanda. Umuganda is e.g. a process in which people come together every last Saturday in the month to do voluntary community work (personal field notes). According to Gérard Prunier (seminar Copenhagen, 010411) Kagame’s model for progress and hence, economic growth, is supposedly the “Singapore model”, following the examples of East Asia. 72 In order to answer the research question whether Rwanda has made any progress the last decade 73 , below stated indicators were chosen to analyze Rwanda’s modernization process; a Corruption Perception Index (CPI), a Human Development Index (HDI), a globalization index (KOF) and GNI/ Capita. Below analysis stretches of a time frame of ten years, it is not inclusive of all aspects of what constitutes a society undergoing a process of modernization, but at least it gives us an insight and understanding of how the country is developing.

Table  3.  Rwanda's  progress  the  last  decade  

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

CPI - - - - - 3.1 2.5 2.8 3.0 3.3 4

HDI 0.352 0.408 0.456

KOF 27.31 30.13 30.81 31.71 32.7 34.87 35.74 37.0 39.14 37.23 37.79

GNI/Capita$ 250 230 210 210 230 270 310 360 440 490 -

Source: TI, 2011; UNDP, 2010; Dreher, 2010; The World Bank, 2011. Note: There is no data for CPI before 2005. HDI was published with a time span of 5 years in between, there is no lack of data, but we will use the same approach. There’s two methodology approaches in measuring HDI, old and recalculated, in which the “old” is used here. There’s was no data available yet for GNI/Capita in 2010 from this source when this table was constructed.

                                                                                                               70 Well known scholar and investigative journalist. Her sole focus is however the genocide. 71 We were both a bit chocked no one but us mentioned this, maybe it was only a handful of the attendants who had visited the country, so maybe not so many was aware of the whole context of Rwanda. 72  The so-called “Asian tigers”, using strong and capable bureaucracies, developed a deliberate set of programs and policies that focused on mobilizing savings and investment, and integrated these growing economies with the international trading system while at the same time expanding access to education and health (Ensign and Bertrand, 2010:10; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005:18, 47). 73 As mentioned in Methodology, there is no need to integrate the years directly after 1994 since the country was in ruins after the war and we need to limit us to a time frame. Off course these years present bad statistics, although the country benefited from a lot of aid donations from the international community, (in order to satisfy bad consciousness?!).

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7.1  CPI   In spite of the noteworthy improvements (10 -very clean, and 0 -highly corrupt), corruption remains widespread and systemic in the country. Rwanda has performed consistently poorly in the first of TI’s CPI, with scores of 3.1 in 2005 and 2.5 in 2006, indicating that corruption in Rwanda is consistently perceived as rampant by the various CPI sources. The country has since made progress, with a score of 2.8 in 2007 and 4.0 in 2010 (TI, 2011). This score suggests that Rwanda performs relatively better than many other African countries. The improvement of Rwanda’s score between 2007 and 2010 may suggest progress in terms of control of corruption, as perceived by analysts and businessmen. However, the CPI may not be a suitable tool to track progress over time, and some of the variations showed by the CPI’s scores between 2005 and 2007 may also be explained by methodological factors such as the number and nature of the sources used to calculate the score. 74 In recent years, there have been instances of high-ranking officials involved in corrupt practices, in the form of misappropriation of public funds or corrupt procurement practices (ibid.). The World Bank concluded in a report 2002 that Rwanda was one of the world’s least corrupted developing countries, one of the most well governed (The World Bank, 2007). Looking at the period from 1998 to 2006, Rwanda saw sharp improvements in various dimensions of governance; government effectiveness, rule of law, and corruption (ibid.). However, there is corruption and embezzlement going on in the Kagame regime (interview with former MP, Kigali 210710), but President Kagame has fired several top leaders for alleged corruption and embezzlement (TI, 2011). According to Gihana Lucky at NEC (interview Kigali, 230710) there is corruption going on, not so much on local level, but on minister’s level.

7.2  HDI   In human development terms, Rwanda’s has made a clear progress, the ranking of 2010 reflects the actual progress Rwanda has made. While Rwanda has made real progress in various dimensions such as health and education (personal field notes), especially since the war, it might take some time before these huge efforts translate into substantial improvements, in HDI terms the country remains fragile. 75 Furthermore, Rwanda’s progress on the global HDI ranking is partly driven by the fact that several of its peers at the bottom of the HDI ranking have experienced violent conflicts in recent years, which have led to a decrease in their HDI index, and thus a corresponding improvement in relative HDI. Rwanda has however had an average annual increase of about 1.5 per cent (UNDP, 2010). 76                                                                                                                74 The CPI captures perceptions from business people and experts, and this can effect differently since it is based on subjective values. 75 Given the level of indicators that are used to construct this index, adult literacy and life expectancy. 76 Regarding other indexes which might help us assess Rwanda’s progress, the Mo Ibrahim Index (which uses indicators across four main categories: safety and rule of law; participation and human rights; sustainable

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7.3  KOF   This Index of globalization measures the three main dimensions of globalization: economic, social, and political. Rwanda has climb from 27.31 in 2000 to 37.79 in 2010. 77 The country seem to have suffered from a set back between 2008 and 2010, which is hard to explain. However, the score is 37.79 for 2010 (Dreher, 2010). As for 2010 and previous, the lowest level of economic globalization was recorded in Rwanda, among other countries (ibid.). The globalization index however shows us that Rwanda has made progress. Rwanda has e.g. become a member of the Commonwealth (in 2009), has invested a lot in the tourism industry, and Rwanda is installing fiber optic backbone that will allow countrywide connectivity (personal field notes).

7.4  GNI/Capita   GNI/Capita tells us that Rwanda has made progress, but the country remains one of the poorest countries in the world (The World Bank, 2011). Rwanda’s recovery is however remarkable, and Rwanda is one of the most stable countries in the continent today, with plans to transform itself from a subsistence agricultural economy to a knowledge-based economy by 2020. There was a setback in the last years of the transitional period, which ended in 2003, but the country has since then made progress. Challenges remains, more than half of the population lives under the poverty line (ibid.). What’s important is the unique visions of the government, and that the country hopefully will continue to make progress. A small summarize is undoubtedly in place. Rwanda has performed consistently poorly in the first of TI’s CPI, indicating that corruption in Rwanda is consistently perceived as rampant by the various CPI sources. The country has since made progress, with a score of 4.0 in 2010 (TI, 2011). The scores for 2011 is yet not published unfortunately. In human development terms, Rwanda’s has made a clear progress, the ranking of 2010 reflects the actual progress Rwanda has made, but the country however remains fragile (UNDP, 2010). Rwanda has however had an average annual increase of about 1.5 per cent (ibid.). As for 2010 and previous, the lowest level of economic globalization was recorded in Rwanda, among other countries (Dreher, 2010). The globalization index however shows us that Rwanda has made progress. GNI/Capita tells us that Rwanda has made progress, but the country remains one of the poorest countries in the world (The World Bank, 2011). Rwanda’s recovery is however remarkable, and Rwanda is one of the most stable countries in the continent today (ibid.).

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             economic opportunity; and human development as proxies for the quality of the processes and outcomes of governance), Rwanda scored above the East African regional average. However, the statistics weren’t that good, and the government of Rwanda claims the index totally misrepresented what is on the ground in some sub-categories such as national security and rule of law (www.allafrica.com). 77 The first data set showed statistics only to the year of 2008, the rest were down loaded, however from the same source. This set back might depend on methodology.

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8. Concluding discussions; A wider perspective 1. Has Rwanda been successful in establishing democracy, in terms of fulfilling the criteria’s for polyarchy? According to Dahl’s polyarchy theory (2007:343) and criteria 1, the control over the authorities political decisions should be located according to the Constitution to elected officials, and so they are in Rwanda. In Rwanda, the officials are elected as stated in the Constitution. The question seems rather to involve how freely they are elected and how much power they really enjoy, which leads us in to the next criteria. According to Dahl (2007:343) the elected officials should be appointed in frequent and impartial elections in which coercive elements are far limited. As discussed earlier, it seems Rwanda are conducting free and fair elections (in general), but still they have a long way to go. They are holding frequent elections, but there have been complaints on impartiality from some electoral staff. When it comes to holding free and fair elections in Rwanda it seems the political climate has improved substantially, and if we are to rely on reports from stakeholders in recent elections Rwanda is performing well in this criteria. According to Dahl (2007:344) and criteria number 3, virtually all adults should have the right to vote of officials, and it seems virtually all adults enjoy this right in Rwanda. Virtually all can be interpreted as those people who do not fulfil the requirements provided for by the law, in other words e.g. people who were imprisoned on the election day of the Presidential poll 2010, and were due to this not able to vote. According to Dahl’s criteria number 4 (2007:344) virtually all adults should have the right to candidate for the publicly elected positions, even though the age limit may be higher for holding an elected position than to vote. It seems as long as you don’t spread genocide ideology etc. the right to candidate for the publicly elected positions don’t seem to be threatened in Rwanda. According to Dahl (2007:344) and his criteria number 5, citizens should also have the right to express their opinions regarding political issues in a broad sense without risking serious punishment. This includes criticism of those in power, the state, the government, the socio-economical system and the prevailing ideology. In practice, the right to freedom of speech is not absolute in any country and the right is commonly subject to limitations, such as "hate speeches". The genocide can’t however be used as an excuse to suppress critical voices, if this is what is actually occurring as some academics claim. The Rwandan government has justified a genocide law, which bans ethnic divisionism and denies claims it is used to stifle freedom of speech. In my opinion many countries has similar laws and are necessary in order to prohibit ethnic violence and discrimination.

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According to Dahl (2007:344), the citizens should have the right to seek for alternative information sources, these exist and are legally protected. In my opinion, it doesn’t seem like people are suffering from a lack of information, and as stated in the Constitution freedom of information are recognized and guaranteed by the state. The people in Rwanda has access to all websites, there isn’t any censure like in China. Alternative sources of information can therefore easily be accessed. But off course it is a problem when newspapers are being shut down when they, supposedly, are critical about the government. Last but not least, the final criteria. According to Dahl (2007:344), to secure their respective rights, including the aforementioned, citizens also should have the right to form relatively independent associations and organizations, including political parties and interest groups. In my opinion, the citizens of Rwanda seems to be able to form relatively independent associations and organizations, and freedom of association is guaranteed by law, but again, the question whether you spread divisionism of any kind seem to matter a great deal if you want to organize yourself. Please see below table for clarification over how well, I think, Rwanda comply with Dahl’s democracy theory polyarchy. However, it is almost impossible to answer yes or no on this, therefore above analysis is necessary in order to understand. Table  4.  Rwanda  and  polyarchy  

Criteria: Yes Partially No Elected officials X Free and Fair elections Xà X Universal suffrage X Right to stand in elections X Freedom of expression X Alt. sources of info. Xà X Freedom of association Xà X 2. What are the democracy attitudes of the citizens then? As seen in the survey (conducted by the author) over half, 57%, of the respondents agreed to some extent that in Rwanda, there is political pluralism and political space. As for the second survey question, more than half of the respondents, 59%, agreed to some extent that democratic principles are respected in Rwanda. Over 50% also replied they regarded democratic principles to be respected, and that there existed political space in Rwanda, in the ISS Report.

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3. Has Rwanda made any progress at all the last decade (not just politically, but socio-economically as well), in other words is the country undergoing a modernization process? Rwanda has performed consistently poorly in the first of TI’s CPI, with scores of 3.1 in 2005 and 2.5 in 2006, indicating that corruption in Rwanda is consistently perceived as rampant by the various CPI sources. The country has since made progress, with a score of 2.8 in 2007 and 4.0 in 2010 (TI, 2011). As this is under writing the scores for 2011 is yet not published unfortunately. In human development terms, Rwanda’s has made a clear progress, the ranking of 2010 reflects the actual progress Rwanda has made, but the country however remains fragile (UNDP, 2010). Rwanda has however had an average annual increase of about 1.5 per cent (ibid.). As for 2010 and previous, the lowest level of economic globalization was recorded in Rwanda, among other countries (Dreher, 2010). The globalization index however shows us that Rwanda has made progress. GNI/Capita tells us that Rwanda has made progress, but the country remains one of the poorest countries in the world (The World Bank, 2011). Rwanda’s recovery is however remarkable, and Rwanda is one of the most stable countries in the continent today (ibid.). Looking at the socio-economic aspect Rwanda has made a huge progress, and is doing a lot better in the health sector, education and sustainable development than ever before. According to Gérard Prunier, (seminar Copenhagen, 010411) Rwanda is also trying to follow the examples of the “Asian tigers”, especially what he refers to as the Singapore model. Huge socio-economic developments has been successful, such as children’s enrolment to school, water pipes, reconciliation processes etc. (personal field notes). The country has obviously developed for the better, they have made huge socio-economic transformations, and the reader can find more on this under “are there any lessons to be learnt”. The country is suffering from the legacy of not just colonialism and dictatorship, but also of a genocide, and it is no wonder it took time to rebuild the country after 1994. They have yet some way to go in order to go through the modernization process, but in my opinion the development path of Rwanda can be linked to Inglehart and Welzel’s (2005, 25) theory on modernization: Eco growth and the welfare state increase people’s eco resources à People become materially more secure à Rising levels of education, expanding mass communication, and increasingly knowledge-intensive work widens people’s intellectual resources à People become cognitively more autonomous à Diminishing constraints on human choice à Growing emphasis on human autonomy à Growing social complexity and diversification of human interactions broadens people’s social resources à People become socially more independent à One outcome of this causal primacy of socio-economic development; democracy…

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8.1  Rwanda’s  Past  and  Ethnic  Diversity     Despite the war and ethnic diversity Rwanda has come a long way. “Kagame has really developed the country, he has really built up the country. I arrived three months after the genocide ended and you could still smell dead bodies. Before the genocide there was nothing here. After the genocide Kagame has really done a lot, not only for tutsis, but for everyone. He emphasizes national unity, not divisionism like Ingabire78. He has given people, refugees homes, cows, and made them a living. He is a good leader, but not perfect off course. It is not a paradise, but he has really delivered. He kept his promises he made when he became a president… And Rwanda needs a leader like Kagame, there was no one else for the job who could have delivered like he has” (Informal interview, local mid-age woman at a local restaurant in Kigali, 300710,). 79 In my opinion Rwanda has managed to establish some form of partial democracy, but they still have a long way to go. A partial democracy seem to be more true for Rwanda at least than what constitutes an authoritarian regime, at least according to Thomas and Allen’s version (2000:366) which they have based on Linz and Stepan’s model; no competitive elections at all, dominant state and government which is not accountable at all through election to citizens, autonomous associations etc. are virtually non-existent and that there is severe restrictions on individual civil and political rights. 80 One major concern in Rwanda seem to be political space, according to interviewees and reports, people seem to question if there is space for real opposition, and the right to a freedom of expression seem to be curtailed. But it is important to note that opposition politicians, such as Madame Ingabire e.g. represent extremist elements. In my opinion the country suffers from the past and from a culture of impunity and of fearing leaders, and it is no wonder that it will take some time before we see can additional changes. As Francois Byabarumwanzi from Liberal Party argues (interview Kigali, 280710), the security has improved substantially since the presidential election in 2003, there is a huge difference from before. “Before there was intimidation, hostility and abuse of language, not now in 2010” (ibid.).

                                                                                                               78 FDU-Inkingi, consisting of hutu-extremist elements. 79 This woman, which is a hutu by the way, is use to Europe, so she says she first wondered what she was doing back in Rwanda, but that she really loves her country and she see now how the country has developed, and how everything is better than before (ibid). 80 I agree more that Rwanda constitutes by being a partial democracy, rather than a dictatorial regime. According to Allen and Thomas (2000:366) interpretation a “partial democracy” constitutes by that there might be limited accountability of government to citizens through elections, unfree and unfair competitive election, rights to freedom of expression curtailed and associational autonomy more or less compromised.

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Off course Rwanda isn’t perfect, it is not this study’s purpose to give this impression either. What’s most important to notice is the progress that’s been made, and it is not many countries that come from such a dark place that Rwanda comes from. Some human rights organizations (Kagire, 2010) and academics like Filip Reyntjens, claims the Rwandan regime are using accusations of revisionism, negationism and trivialisation of genocide in order to prevent people from being able to register for elections, but this is punishable by law and in accordance with the Constitution (article 8, CoR). The genocaidaires could come back to power through democratic practices, therefore in my opinion, articles like this one is absolutely needed in order to protect the Rwandese citizens and prevent new outbreaks of violence. Linz and Stepan (1996:5) argues that democracy is simply consolidated when it becomes the "only game in town”. 81 What should be clear from the previous analysis, is that in Rwanda still today there are people and groups who are seriously engaged in secession and regime change, most people however seem to accept that democracy is the best form of government and the major organs of the state seem to act accordingly with democratic criteria’s. However, the country is as I have mentioned before, coming from a place few countries have been in before. The “only game in town” keeps getting challenges by Rwanda’s past and by ethnic diversity that exist in the country. Mahmood Mamdani (2002:266) has suggested that Rwanda’s key dilemma is how to build a democracy that can incorporate a guilty majority alongside an aggrieved and fearful minority in a single political community. Despite the genocide and the severe ethnic wounds it seems Rwanda can measure well, compared to other African countries when it comes to democratic development. All this can still go down the drain. Much depends on surrounding countries, especially the DRC, and the surrounding worlds attitudes. 82 Rwanda has since the genocide been ruled under the leadership of Kagame. No one can say what would happen if there would be a sudden regime shift. It was only seventeen years ago since this regime came to power with weapons in hand. A too strong external pressure might stimulate remaining dictatorial tendencies from the past. On the other hand, the genocidaires can come back to power through democratic practices.

                                                                                                               81  They take this to mean three things. Behaviorally; no group is seriously engaged in secession or regime change. Attitudinally; when most people accept that democracy is the best form of government (so not only does nobody try to change the regime, nobody particularly wants to). Constitutionally; democracy is consolidated when all the major organs of the state act according to the democratic institutions.  82 Rwanda has notably been backed by the US and Britain, and several other major European countries, and Kagame has tried to consolidate alliances in his own region, although relations with the DRC continued to be hostile since the war between the two countries (Waugh, 2004:148f). There has been ruptures in Rwanda’s long military alliance with Uganda’s Museveni, although stabilizing after 2002, it was never fully repaired (ibid). Prunier (seminar Copenhagen, 010411) claims that there is rivalry going on between Uganda and Rwanda, and that Museveni never forgave Kagame for killing a person very close to him.

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If Rwanda is successful in its attempt to rise, with all its baggage, there is hope for Africa. But then again, Rwanda can already serve as a role model for other countries. It has already been successful in many matters, such as unique pro-poor growth, school enrolment etc. In my opinion, African countries in their own special context can’t live up to the same form of liberal democracy as the West, nor should they. E.g. Western countries haven’t got the legacy of slave trade, colonialism, nor do they suffer from ethnic diversity as most countries in Africa.

8.2  Are  there  any  Lessons  to  be  learnt?   Rwanda has set an example for other African states, and others, to follow. In my opinion it all goes down to leadership, determination and a willingness to address issues, not to mention the ordinary strength of the Rwandese citizens. In Rwanda, we can see a government who is willing to seize the opportunities for new kinds of jobs, businesses and a different development path. 83 The government has adopted “Vision 2020 Umurenge” (VUP) which has three primary goals to transform Rwanda and help the poor (Ensign and Bertrand, 2010:122f). 84 Five indigenous programs and processes have become important in rebuilding and reconciliation in Rwanda; the community based trials “Gacaca”; Umuganda in which people come together every last Saturday in the month to do voluntary community work; Ubudehe which is a participatory process of needs, assessments, budgeting and planning at the village level; Umusanzu which is a tradition for supporting the poor with educational funds; and Imihigo which is a performance management system of government (ibid, 54; personal field notes). One thing that fascinated me during my time in Rwanda was the unique growth of pro-poor system they have developed in the country. Emmanuel85 (Kigali, summer of 2010 and Feb/ March 2011) told me about what we can call the “cow pro-poor system”. The government in Rwanda donates a cow to poor families, and later they have to give back to the community to help others, with milk, a new cow, almost like the “butterfly-effect”86. Emmanuel talked about positive developments and that Kagame has done a lot for the country, the poor, for hutus as well as for tutsis. While many of these above mentioned practises were present throughout Sub-Saharan Africa in pre-colonial times, the programs in Rwanda are unique in that they draw on the nation’s cultural past, and combined with modern legal concepts to build trust, to reconcile, and especially for the poor and illiterate, to build knowledge and skills necessary in a democratic society.

                                                                                                               83 The government of Rwanda has e.g. successfully banned plastic bags (personal field notes), and Rwanda’s newly amended constitution has the new Organic law on the environment (Article 49, CoR), which stipulates that every person has the right to live under a safe and clean environment. 84  Primary goals: community-based planning approaches, such as Ubudehe; to provide credits to farmers and to provide direct support to landless households (Ensign and Bertrand, 2010:122f).  85 Emmanuel became a dear friend for which I am so grateful. He helped me a lot both during the summer of 2010 and again in Feb/ March 2011. 86 When a small change at one place in a system can result in large differences to a later state.

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Never once during my visits to Rwanda have I been asked to pay a bribe, and this is not true for all Africa. In spite of its past, all the people I have met (foreigners as well as inhabitants), says Kigali is probably the safest capital in Africa. This tells us something about the country, a country which despite its past has managed to come up on its feet. The “democratic ideal” may not be perfect at all times, but surely democracy must be the best way to govern a country… maybe not “liberal democracy” at all times, since different country’s have different backgrounds, and they have different contexts they have to adjust to… “No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time” (Winston Churchill). I will end here with the hope of having widened they eyes of the reader, with the hope of that more people discover Rwanda for themselves, only then can one really get a sense of what it is all about, why so many travellers is struck with the Rwandan strength and beauty…

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Bibliography: Books: Allen, Tim and Thomas, Alan. (2000). Poverty and Development into the 21st Century. New York: Oxford University Press. Bryman, Alan. 2nd edition. (2011). Samhällsvetenskapliga metoder. Malmö: Liber AB. Clark, Phil and Kaufman D. Zachary (eds). (2009). After genocide: Transitional justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond. New York: Colombia University Press. Dahl A. Robert. (2007). Demokratin och dess Antagonister. Stockholm: Ordfront Förlag. Djurfelt, Göran, Larsson, Rolf & Stjärnhagen, Ola. (2003). Statistisk verktygslåda – samhällsvetenskaplig orsaksanalys med kvantitativa metoder. Lund: Studentlitteratur. Dowden, Richard. (2010). Afrika- Framtidens kontinent. Stockholm: Leopard förlag. Ensign M. Margee, Bertrand E. William. (2010). Rwanda: History and Hope. Lanham: University Press of America. Esaisson, Peter, Gilljam, Mikael, Oscarsson, Henrik, Wägnerud, Lena. (2009). Metodpraktikan- Konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad. Stockholm: Nordstedts Juridik AB Inglehart, Ronald, Welzel, Christian. (2005). Modernization, cultural change and Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Linz J. Juan, Stepan, Alfred. (1996). Problems of democratic transition and consolidation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Mamdani, Mahmood. (2002). When victims become killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Melvern, Linda. (2003). Att förråda ett folk: Västmakterna och folkmordet i Rwanda. Stockholm: Ordfront. Waugh M. Colin. (2004). Paul Kagame and Rwanda: power, genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front. North Carolina: McFarland and Company Inc. Journal articles: Corey, Alison and Joireman F. Sandra. (2004). Retributive justice: The Gacaca courts in Rwanda. African Affairs. vol.103 pp.73-89.

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Reyntjens, Filip. (2010). Constructing the truth, dealing with dissent, domesticating the world: governance in post- genocide Rwanda. African Affairs. vol.110. no.438. pp.1-34. Reyntjens, Fillip. (2004). Ten years on: from genocide to dictatorship. African Affairs. vol.103. pp.177-210. Electronic; World Wide Web: Bekele, Daniel. Human Rights Watch. (2011). Rwanda: Prison term for opposition leader. [Online] Available: http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/02/11/rwanda-prison-term-opposition-leader [11 May 2011]. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). (2011). World Fact Book.[Online]. Available: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rw.html [28 April 2011] Commonwealth Secretariat.(2010) The Commonwealth Observer group: Rwanda Presidential election 9 August 2010. [Online] Available: http://www.thecommonwealth.org/files/229333/FileName/RWANDAFINALREPORT-PrintVersion.pdf [02 April 2011]. Dreher, Axel. KOF. (2010). KOF Index of Globalization. Available: http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/. [11 May 2011]. Ekonomifakta. (2011). Fakta och statistik. [Online]. Available: http://www.ekonomifakta.se/sv/Fakta/Ekonomi/Tillvaxt/BNI/ [5 May 2011]. Freedom House. (2010). Freedom in the World. [Online]. Available: http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2010&country=7905 [24 March 2011] Institute for security studies- Summary report of ISS, Nairobi conference. (2010). Rwanda 2010: Analysis of the country’s pre-electoral climate. [Online]. Available:  http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/reliefweb_pdf/node-363581.pdf [15 Feb 2011]. Kagire, Edmund. (2010). Rwanda: Mo Ibrahim Index full of Discrepancies- Official. Available: http://allafrica.com/stories/201010080144.html [07 May 2011]. Ministry of Justice. Codes and Laws of Rwanda. (04 June 2003, amended). Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda. [Online]. Available: http://www.amategeko.net/index.php?Parent_ID=7796&Langue_ID=An [19 May 2011]. The World Bank. (2007). A decade of measuring the quality of governance. [Online]. Available:http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/booklet_decade_of_measuring_governance.pdf [04 April 2011].

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The World Bank. (2011). Data. GNI, Atlas method. [Online]. Available: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.ATLS.CD [14 May 2011]. Transparency International (TI). (2011). Corruption Perceptions Index. [Online]. Available: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi [4 May 2011]. United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948).  [Online].  Available:  http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/r3.htm [20 May 2011]. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2010). Human Development Index. [Online]. Available: http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/RWA.html. [14 May 2011]. Government publications and Reports: Civil Society Election Observation Mission. (2010). Rwanda Presidential elections 2010. Statement on Preliminary findings. Media High Council. (2010). MHC Regulation concerning issuance of press cards in Rwanda. Kigali: Media High Council, Government of Rwanda. Interviewees: BYABARUMWANZI Francois, Deputy President and Campaign for LP. Interview Kigali, 28 July 2010. EU Election experts. Interview Kigali, 29/30 July 2010. GIHANA Lucky, EU Coordinator at NEC. Interview Kigali, 23 July 2010. Journalist trainer at Internews. Interview Kigali, 22 July 2010. KAMANZI Abdel Aziz, member of PSD. Interview Kigali, 7 August 2010. KAMANZI Stamislav, Campaign coordinator for PSD. Interview Kigali, 7 August 2010. KANYANGE Phoebe, Spokesperson for FFPP and President of PSP. Interview Kigali, 27 July 2010. Local mid-age woman at local restaurant. Interview Kigali, 30 July 2010. Melvern, Linda. Academic and Investigative journalist. Interview, seminar in Copenhagen 1 April 2011. Mr. Elewa, former MP. Interview Kigali, 21 July 2010. MUGANWA Gonzaga, at newspaper Dispatch. Interview Kigali 29 July 2010.

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MUKABUNAN Christine, Party President for PS-Imberakuri and Vice-spokesperson for FFPP. Interview Kigali, 02 August 2010. MUSEMINARI Damas Marcel, at newspaper Business Daily. Interview Kigali, 23 July 2010. NDANGIZA Hamza, Radio Contact FM. Interview Kigali, 29 July 2010. NSHIMIYIMANA Leonard, Media contact person for PPC. Interview Kigali, 29 July 2010. Prunier, Gérard. Academic and Historian. Interview, seminar in Copenhagen 1 April 2011.

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Appendices: Appendix 1. A Brief Context of Rwanda. Source: Linda Melvern (2003).

Berlin Conference; Ruanda-Urundi becomes German protectorate (1885); Belgian troops chase out the Germans (1916); Ruanda-Urundi becomes a mandated territory of the League of Nations under the supervision of Belgium (1923); Abolition of the monarchy and establishment of the republic (1961); Independence. Consolidation of the Republic and establishment of a theoretical multiparty system (1962); Coup d’état by Juvenal Habyarimana (1973) Suppression of multiparty party system and establishment of a single party system, second constitution (1978) A four year civil war breaks out (1990); Re-establishment of multiparty system, third constitution (never fully implemented, later amended by Arusha Accords) (1991); Arusha peace talks begin (1992); Genocide (last for approximately 100 days) Transition period & Government under the rule of RPF (1994); Kagame elected as President (2000); Referendum, followed by elections. Paul Kagame off. elected as President.Transitional period ends. (2003);  

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Appendix 2. Campaign Rally Report    

CSEOM   CIVIL  SOCIETY  ELECTION  OBSERVATION  MISSION          Rwanda  Presidential  Election  2010  

 CAMPAIGN  RALLY  REPORT  NO:  …………  

 Approximated  no  of  Participants    %  Approximate  no  of  Female    %  Approximate  participants  under  age  of  25  

 

 Mark  “yes”  or  “no”.  If  there  are  “yes”  answers  give  details  under  the  title  “remarks”.  1.      Are  the  Police/other  Security  behaving  properly?         Yes   No  

2.      Has  there  been:   a.  abuse  of  language?         Yes   No  

      b.  discriminatory  remarks?       Yes   No  

3.      Are  there  participants  who  are  armed?         Yes   No  

4.      Are  there  disturbances  or  disruptive  elements?       Yes   No  

5.      Other  incidents  or  issues  to  report?         Yes   No  

6.      Any  signs  of  participants  attending  the  rally  being  paid    

           in  cash  or  property?             Yes   No  

7.      Any  signs  participants  were  forced  to  attend  rally?       Yes   No  

8.      Any  presence  of  local  administrative  authority  at  the  rally?   Yes   No  

9.  Describe  the  atmosphere  of  the  rally.  Also  note  if,  as  an    

         observer,  you  feel  comfortable,  threatened,  other.  

10.  What  was  the  main  message  of  this  campaign  event?  

11.    Other  remarks  

 

Name  of  Observers    Team  No    Place  of  Assembly    Sector,  District    Province    Candidate/Party    Date/  Time  of  the  Rally    

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Appendix 3. Survey form  What  is  your  opinion  on  the  following  (mark  with  an    x)?          

   

1:  In  Rwanda,  there  is  political  pluralism  and  political  space?  

Strongly  agree  

Agree  

Partially  agree  

Do  not  agree  

Do  not  know  

2:  To  what  extent  do  you  think  democratic  principles  are  respected  in  Rwanda?  

Very  much  respected  

Respected  

Partially  respected  

Not  respected  

Do  not  know