Hajj Without Spice: Akbar and the Portuguese

8/14/2019 Hajj Without Spice: Akbar and the Portuguese

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AKBAR

AND

HIS AGE

EditorIqtidar Alam Khan

NORTHERN BOOK CENTRENEW DELHI

1991


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NINE Hajj Without Spice?Politics of Religion betweenAkbar and the Portuguese

TEOTONIO R DE SOUZA

T

HErecent writings of M.N. Pearson

have roused historians' interest in the

themes relating to the economic and

political aspects ofhallunder Akbarl. One looks forward to his

promised follow-up attempting more concentrated treatment of

the economic aspects of the problem, namely, the aspect of so-

calledha]]market. In this brief essay, an attempt is made to tbuch

on this economic aspect with an aim to highlight what appears tobe Akbar's counterpart to Vasco da Gama's "Christians and

Spices".

"Christians and Spices" hardly explains why the Portuguese

came to India in the late fifteenth century, yet at the least both strands

were there and were important. Nor is it entirely correct to see religionas merely providing a sacral coating on the hard and more basic

economic motivations. Most Portuguese were God-fearing, did try to

follow their religion as they saw it, and could be swayed by appeals

from their priests. So also for most of the Muslim pilgrims trade was

not the main motive for performing kV, even though Muhammadhimself came from a trading town and had been a trader in his youth.

Ifmany pilgrims carried some goods for sale on the way or in Mecca,

that was meant for meeting the expenses of the journey and stay. If

some merchants travelled with the hpjj caravan, that was largely totake advantage of safety in company. In the case of Akbar, he was

not initiating the custom ofIlajjpilgrimage. It was already a realitybefore his appearance on the scene. By ensuring the safety of the

pilgrims through his territory and territorial waters he could assert

his political sovereignty and win the goodwill of his Muslim sub-

jects. At least till 1581, he officially sponsored the annual hai l and


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Hajj W ithout Spice 107

had even a mir hajj to organize and lead the pilgrimage withimperial gift offerings for the holy cities. 2 Akbar also found hajj

useful for banishing from his presence some unwanted elementsfrom close imperial circles, like the two 'ulama, Makhdum-ul Mulkand Sheikh Abdul Nabi, who had been quarreling violently at hiscourt. Also a noble opposed to his confidant Abu'l Fazl wasremoved in the same way. Much earlier, when Akbar wanted totake charge of the empire and do without the oppressive advice ofBairam Khan, Akbar allowed him to go on hail." But the promotionofhajj was also important for Akbar in the context of the expan-sionist moves of the Ottoman empire which had taken over theMamaluke control of the pilgrimage centres after 1517 and was

engaged in checking the Portuguese depredations affecting theIndian Ocean trade and the hall traffic. For a rationalist Akbarwho was bent on accomodating religions (including Islam) to hisimperial objectives, his interest in the hajj surely had its spicycontent as well. Hence the present attempt to bring out this elementfrom some of the contemporary or quasi-contemporary Por-tuguese documentation and to corroborate it from some of theavailable published studies, including Pearson's, whose debt hasalready been acknowledged above.5

In order to clarify further the use of the term "spice" in the title,

it is suggested to be understood as a generic term covering all impor-tant market commodities on the hajj route. The foreign trade of theIndian Ocean was generally known as the "spice trade", a namewhich in fact covered a variety of goods. The spices may have beenthe dominant export item in the sixteenth century, but the textileswere always there as the outstanding contribution of the Gujaratitrade even before the North Europeans made it a staple of theirs fora long time. However, despite the Portuguese attempts to control thespice exports in the Indian Ocean, the sultanate of Acheh in NorthSumatra and the Dutch from Batavia continued exporting spices,

specially cloves, via the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. The failure ofthe Portuguese to gain control of Aden, or to hold Hormuz made itimpossible for them to enforce their exclusive control over the "spiceroute".6

The monsoons made the west coast of India, and particularly theports of Gujarat, an indispensable stopover on the spice route. TheGujarati businessmen had succeeded by the end of the fifteenthcentury in making Gujarat the greatest economic power of the IndianOcean, and perhaps of the whole world? The heartland of the Indus-Ganges plains could be tapped effectively from west coast ports in

Gujarat, especially Cambay. Tome Pires, the early sixteenth century


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108 TEOTONIO R. DE SOUZA

Portuguese visitor, wrote that "Cambay stretches out two arms, with

her right arm she reaches towards Aden and with the other towardsMalacca, as the most important places to sail to".8 In the fifteenthcentury, Gujarat was the chief beneficiary of Northern India's rise toprosperity, becoming the heartland of the most important single tradediaspora of the Indian Ocean, a position it held to the late seventeenthcentury, inspite of European competition. 9 Surat was connected byimportant land routes with the major centres of production in India.One such road led to Baroda and Ahmedabad via Broach; other roadtook the travellers through Rajasthan or Malwa to Agra and Delhiand to Gwalior, where the Gujarati merchants had their agents.1

Greater stability and prosperity brought by Akbar's rule to the com-mercial hinterland of Gujarat must have added to its importance inthe trade network of the Indian Ocean, including its implications forthe hajj pilgrimage. About twenty Gujarati ships sailed every yearfrom Surat to Mocha and fedda carrying pilgrims for the liajj as wellas the annual trade of much of Northem and Western India. Andbecause of attacks made by European and other pirates on the RedSea fleet at the close of the seventeenth century, the Mughal govern-ment ordered the Dutch East India Company lodge at Surat to provide

escort vessels for the Gujarati ships on the Mocha run. These includedthe imperial ships, which were meant to be primarily pilgrim vesselsbut were much favoured by the Surat merchants for carrying freight.They were also considered "safer" and enjoyed certain privileges atMocha and jedda.11

It is important for the theme of this essay to raise the questionabout the economic importance of the Ocean trade for Akbar. Somehistorians have asserted that it was minimal, and that only aboutfive per cent of his total revenue came from the sea customs,although some of the land-based revenues were related to sea-

trade, such as crops grown for export in the hinterland and payingtaxes, or some transit taxes on goods destined for export.' ` How-ever, a more recent statistical study of the subject by ShireenMoosvi reveals that urban taxation in Surat was extraordinarilyhigh (18.73% ofjam' ), compared even with Agra (15.7%) which wasthe biggest city of the empire and its largest commercial centre. Alsothe overall higherjam'incidence in Gujarat is explained as possiblydue to the fact that prices in Gujarat were higher than in theinterior. Gujarat was a large importer of foodstuffs, thereby ac-counting for higher food prices. Gujarat also had a superior crop-

.

ping-pattern, and as m the case of Baroda it had very fertile tractsutilised for extensive cotton cultivation.

13And ifkhlisa under

Akbar accounted to between 24 and 33% of thejam', while aliena-


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Hajj W ithout Spice

tion by sayarghill as recorded for Gujarat is one of the lowest in the

empire,1

it is quite obvious that Akbar had greater interest in therevenues of Gujarat, including the opportunities of adding to hispersonal hoard from the bullion entering via Surat. 1 5 Interest insea-trade and control over coastal Gujarat were also of vital inter-est for Akbar to ensure regular and easy supplies of Turlci andPersian horses for the imperial stables and to meet the needs of the

zaminchirs. It is estimated that nearly 1,00 0 Persian and 21 ,000 T urkihorse were brought every year to supply the needs of Akbar'sempire.

16From all these facts, it is not difficult to conclude that

the importance of coastal Gujarat for Akbar was far more than the5%-of its customs revenue. It would not be of interest to him to letthe powerful Ottomans extend their sway over the Indian Oceantrade. It was strategically advantageous to let the Portuguese withtheir land bases within his reach maintain an effective presence inthe Indian Ocean, without getting seriously in the way of hisimperial interests. In 1573, Akbar had performed an extraordinaryfeat of covering about 60 0 m iles in eleven days, from Fatehpur Sikrito Ahmadabad. But that was not =mai, and the difficult terrainof much of Gujarat, as well as its complex social composition,

simply made close control from the centre over much of the statea physical and moral impossibility. 17 One can certainly presumethat Akbar was sufficiently well informed about the Portugueseexploits in the Indian Ocean and their participation in the politicsof coastal India. He does not seem to have regarded the Portugueseas a serious menace. The Portuguese too had a very effectivenetwork of informants as one can gather from the contemporaryPortuguese documentation. Men like Khwaja Safar, the mer-chant-governor of Surat in the early sixteenth century,

15or

Khawaja Shams-ud-din Gilani, 1 9 or even the Portuguese renegades

or captives in the service of the Muslim kingdoms, including someinside and around the Mughal court, were some of the channels ofPortuguese information. It is curious to notice how fast the Por-tuguese were reacting to information regarding the presence of"pirates", or to Muslim nobles or merchants seeking to brass theircartaz system, or to developments in the native courts.

The first know n direct contact between A kbar and the Po rtuguesetook place when A lcbar took over G ujarat and was being egged on bysome of his informants and advisers to extend his jurisdiction to the

Portuguese-controlled Daman and Bassein. He met 50 or 60 Por-tuguese merchants residing in Cam bay c ity. They presented themsel-ves before A kbar impressively dressed. They w ere well received andAkbar assured them that their trade would not suffer as a result of

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his take-over. He even promised to grant them any other favour they

would care to ask. They quickly requested that the Portuguese mer-chants dealing at the port be exempted from paying customs duties.Akbar conceded their request, but no action was taken on his promisebecause a noble adviser immediately intervened and explained tohim that such a concession would imply a loss of 300,000 cruzados tohis treasury every year.21

The Portuguese authorities in Goa were alarmed with thedevelopments in Gujarat and looked upon the Mughals as adangerous neighbour. One hearing that a Mughal force of ten

thousand horses was dispatched to capture Daman, and that anenvoy had been sent to the Portuguese captain of Daman asking himto vacate the city, the Portuguese Viceroy in Goa sent quick reinfor-cements to the North on 17 August 1572, with instructions to avoidany provocation of the Mughal, but to keep a close watch over thecoast of Daman and to prevent secretly any provisions from reach-ing Cambay. In the meantime, the captain of Daman was trying toconvince the Mughal envoy that he was awaiting the reply of theViceroy before taking any decision of handing over the city to the

Mughals as demanded. By December, the authorities in Goa triedto gather as much force as possible and under the most ex-perienced available captains. It turned out to be an impressive fleetof over three thousand Portuguese soldiers, besides native com-plement. When the force arrived in Bassein, news arrived that theMughal force was less than two leagues away from Daman. Follow-ing an emergency meeting of his council, some suggested that theViceroy should stay behind in Bassein, and the rest of the forceshould proceed to Daman. This was meant to give an impressionto the Mughals that the Vicerory was staying behind with moreback-up force. However, the Viceroy himself and most otherspreferred the opinion that the arrival of the Viceroy personally atDaman would have a better effect. This strategy seems to have hadits desired effect. After the impressive size of the fleet entering theriver at Daman with loud sounds of gunshots were heard by theMughal troopers and reported to the Emperor, who was at Bharochat the time, he moved to Surat in order to be closer to Daman. Inthe meantime, the Viceroy had c,hecked the defences of the for-tified settlement and had further protected the walls with a thickcover of some succulent creepers (ervas leiteiras) which could notbe easily cut without preventing their juice from getting into one'seyes and blinding the person.22

Even before seeing such a display of naval force, Akbar wouldhave known about the high nuisance value of the Portuguese in the


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Indian Ocean waters and about their successes against the Otton Lai Esin the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. He preferred not to proceed withthe hostilities, but on the contrary to win the Portuguese friendshipwhich could assist his interest in sending ships to Mecca, carrying hismother and some women of the court for hajj, and also with muchbullion that he wanted to send. 23 The Mughal ambassador wasreceived by the Portuguese Viceroy with a great display of pompand power, so much so that the smoke created by naval guns thatwere fired for almost two hours continuously did not permit theambassador to see where he was being taken in his vessel. Thesame happened after the interview was over. The courtesy wasresponded to by sending Antonio Cabral as Portuguese envoy to

Akbar in the company of his ambassador. They were accompaniedby Cristovao de Couto, a Portuguese interpreter. The Portugueseambassador carried instructions for concluding a peace agree-ment, and also an order of the Viceroy allowing the Emperor tosend a ship from Surat to Mecca every year without paying anyduties to the Portuguese. 24 Akbar welcomed the embassy, but thePortuguese do not seem to have liked the pompous style in whichAkbar drafted afarnuin (dated 18 March 1573) that he issued tothem, stating the need expressed by the Portuguese of his

friendship and their desire to serve him, and guaranteeing thempeaceful possession of Daman and lands under its jurisdiction. ThePortuguese had to swallow their pride and admit the limitsbeyond which they could not push the Mughal might. 25 It wouldnot be very different for the other Europeans. Neither did theIndian merchants concede superiority in trade to the Europeansuntil the Mughal power declined. As the authors of the Cambridge

Economic History of India have rightly put it, "the Indian merchantlost when the Mughal lost".26

I wish to state by way of conclusion that the politics of religionbetween Akbar and the Portuguese need to be understood in thecontext ofhaj j,just as much as in the traditional and much studiedcontext of Jesuit missions to Akbar's court from 1580 onwards. BothAkbar and the Portuguese officials were circumventing the moreradical and orthodox attitudes of their respective religious leadersin order to accorrunodate their economic and political interests. BothAkbar and the Portuguese benefitted concretely from this approach.The Jesuit presence in the Mughal court perhaps left behind someartistic legacy and some records of historical value, but from theirreligious teachings Akbar seems to have learnt very little, and in-cluded nothing in his "Din-i ilhi." This great pioneer of inter-religious dialogue and a sincere believer in universal toleration,


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seems to have been impressed more by Hinduism, Jainism andZoroastrianism than by the theological intolerance of Islam and

Christianity in defence of their "God-revealed" mysteries of faith. Butwhether in the context ofkijj or in the context of inter-religiousdialogue, Akbar succeeded in having his way and showing the otherparties their place in his imperial construct.47

REFERENCES

1. M.N. Pearson, "TheHail (Pilgrimage) from Mughal India: Some PreliminaryObservations",Indica, (March-September, 1986), pp. 143458; "The Estado daIndia and the klajj", Indica, (March-September 1989), pp. 103418; "'Piouspassengers' motivations for the hajj from early modern India", Studies in M aritim e

History, ed. KS. Mathew, (Pondicherry, 1990), pp. 112-126.

2. M.N. Pearson, '"Pious passengers' motivation for the hall from early modemIndia", Stud ies in M aritime History, op. cit , pp. 116, 119-20. Some recent studies onthe basis of Ottoman records suggest that Akbar may have stopped sponsoringthe hall pilgrims because of deportation of the pilgrims back to India withcomplaints that these Indian pilgrims were engaged in unwanted activites,including easing in public places, bringing dogs into s tudy, etc.

3. Ibid., pp. 121-22.

4. Salih Ozbaran, "The Ottoman Turks and the Portuguese in the Persian Gulf,1534-1581", journal of A sian History, ed., Danis Sinor, Harrassowitz Verlag, VI, I,1972, pp. 45-87.

5. M.N. Pearson, "TheEstado da India and theHajj", Indica, Vol. 26, Nos. 1 &2 (1989), pp. 103-118, already provides much groundwork on this subject.Also K.S. Mathew has done a good service of introducing much relevantpublished Portuguese documentation on Gujarat in his Portuguese and theSultanate of Gujarat(Delhi, 1986), although the Documentary Appendicesdo not always provide translations of the text.

6. Emporia, Commodities and Entrepreneurship in Asian Maritime Trade c.1400-1750. ed.Rederich Ptak and Dietmar Rothermund (Stuttgart, 1991), p. 114.

7. India and the Indian Ocean, 1500 - 1800, ed. Ashin Dasgupta and M.N. Pearson(Calcutta, 1987), pp. 53-63.

8. The Sum a Oriental of Tom e Pires (Reprint: New Delhi, 1990), Vol. I, p. 42.

9. Tapan Raychaudhuri and Irfan Habib, The C am bridge Eco nom ic History of India(Delhi, 1984), Vol. I. pp. 432-3; Pearson, Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat(Delhi,1976 ), pp. 92-117.

10. Trade and Politics in the Indian Ocean, ed. Giorgio Borsa (Delhi, 1990), pp. 6-7.

11. T he A ge of Partership: Eu ropeans in A sia befo re Dom inion, ed. Blair B. Kling andM.N. Pearson (Honolulu, 1977), p. 124.

12. India and the Ind ian O cean, p. 79.

13. Shireen Moosvi, The Econo m y of the Mu ghal Empire, c. 75 95 (Delhi, 1987 ), pp. 112,127-128 , 141, 149, 315.

14. Shireen Moosvi, op. cit., pp. 159, 197.


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15. Ibid., p. 198: Qazwini, the first official historian of Shah Jahan, while criticisingthe extravagance of Jahangir, says that Akbar had left behind seven crores ofrupees (apparently besides what he had left in gold). This is regarded as amore conservative figure, and- Moosvi puts it at ten crores of rupees ofsilver-coin hoard, Cf. Ibid., pp. 375-76 for details about bullion influx. Quite alarge part of this influx went into hoards, p. 391.

16. Shireen Moosvi, op cit., p. 378.

17. Pearson,Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat, p.150; Diogo de Couto, Decadas, IX(Lisboa, 1786 ), p. 65.

18. K.S. Mathew, "Khwaja Saffar, the merchant-governor of Surat and the Indo-Por-tugeuse trade in the early sixteenth century", V ice-A lmirante A . Teixeira de Mota:

In Mem orian (Lisboa, 1987), pp. 319-328.

19. K.S. Mathew, "Khwaja Shams-ud-din Gilani: A Sixteenth Century Entrepreneurin Portuguese India", Emporia, Comm odities and Entrepreneurs in A sian Maritime

Trade, pp. 363-371.20. Chronica do R eyno de Gusarate, ed. S.C. Misra and K.S. Mathew (Baroda, 1981)

contains the account of Cambay by a Portugese named Diogo de MesquitaPimentel who had spent many years in Chatnpaner as a captive and took part inthe Portuguese assault that killed Sultan Bahadur Shah of Gujarat. According tothe Portuguese chronicler, Diogo de Couto Pimentel, dealt the fatal blow. Cf. Da

A sia: Decada Quinta (Parte Primeria) (Lisboa, 1779 ), p. 101; Pearson, Merchant andRulers in Gujarat, p. 57-58 .

21 . Diogo De Couto,Decadas, IX , (reprint, Lisbon, 1974-75 ) pp. 65-67 .

22. Ibid., IX, pp. 67-75.

23. Ibid., IX, p. 75. Much bullion was sent regularly for purchase of-horses, and attimes also as gift to the holy cities.

24. Ibid., IX, pp. 75-81, 86: It was calculated by the Portuguese customs authoritiesat Diu that a duty-free ship would mean a loss of 18,000 pardaus to State revenueevery year. The loss was greater still because many other merchants of Cambaywho were sending 12 to 15 ships to Mecca started loading their valuable mer-chandise on the concession ship of the Emperor. This loss was tolerated becauseit was believed that double or triple that amount would be spent in defendingDaman and its jurisdiction against the Mughals. In 1583, the Portuguese inter-cepted a ship of Akbar that was returning from Mecca. It was of 500 tonnage.

25. In 1581-85, there was pressure on Daman by the Mughal forces, but this wascaused by a challenge thrown by a favourite of Akbar, Muhammed Quill Khan, who boasted in the presence of Akbar, that he would send a ship to the Red Seawithout Portuguese pass.. The Portuguese blocked effectively his attempts. Inretaliation, he ordered hostilities against Daman. The Portguese resorted to anoffensive against the Mughal shipping, and in thelarocess a ship of Akbar wasalso captured, but it was released for fear of irritating so powerful a ruler.

26. Tapan Raychauduri & Iran Habib, op. cit., p. 429.

27. A.L. Srivastava, The Mughal Empire (Agra, 1966), pp. 170-17 6; John C orreia-Afon-so ,Letters from the M ughal Court(Anand, 1980), p. 127: The author quotes another

Jesuit writer to praise the Jesuits at Akbar's court for engaging in a religiousdialogue. But were the Jesuits really dialoguing or getting impatient and eventactless in the midst of their failure-to impose their views?

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Hajj Without Spice: Akbar and the Portuguese

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