THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

A Critical Reevaluation of the Iraq-Kuwait

Conflict and the Crisis in the Gulf

By

Nausherwan Javed Hafeez

June 2010

A paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

Master of Arts degree in the

Master of Arts Program in the Social Sciences

Faculty Advisor: Dr. Michael Reese

Preceptor: Dr. Avinash Sharma

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Introduction

The Iraq-Kuwait conflict was a major turning point in international politics. It was the

first major conflict in the aftermath of the Cold War and led to a U.S.-sponsored, multinational

coalition against Iraq. The consequences of the conflict have been well documented1 and

illustrate the significance such conflicts can have on world politics. The Iraq-Kuwait conflict was

seen by the U.S. as a direct challenge to the regional balance-of-power and was viewed as a

threat to international security. With a nascent unipolar world order dominated by U.S. interests,

it was up to the America to challenge Iraq. But did the U.S. have to respond the way it did? Was

this conflict both necessary and inevitable? It is the argument of this piece that the answer to all

of these questions is an emphatic no. This piece will attempt to construct a critical reevaluation

of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict, demonstrating both the ways this conflict could have been prevented

and how future conflicts can be preempted.

On the most basic level, this piece is about how to prevent war and resolve international

crises. It does not aim to create a new theory on war prevention, but rather builds on previous

scholarship dealing with the causes of war, while noting its application to the Iraq-Kuwait

conflict.2 In particular, this piece analyzes how signaling errors, misperception, and intentions

interact and become fundamental causes of war.3 If states are to prevent conflict, then clearer

1 For more see: B.N. Ghosh and Nonika Singh, Politics and Economics of the Gulf War (New Delhi: Deep & Deep

Publications, 1991); Ibrahim Ibrahim, The Gulf Crisis: Background and Consequences (Washington D.C.: Center

for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1992); and Walid Khalidi, The Gulf Crisis: Origins and Consequences in Journal of Palestine Studies, Volume 20, No. 2 (Winter 1991), pp. 5-28. 2 I am primarily building off of: Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999). Other

relevant texts are: Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: Free Press, 1973); and Quincy Wright, The

Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1935). 3 I specifically use: James Fearon, Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes in

The American Political Science Review, Volume 88, No. 3 (September 1994): pp. 677-92; Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 41, No. 1 (February 1997), pp. 68-90; Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining

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signaling of intentions must be made. In addition, a realistic assessment of states interests and

intentions must be calculated in order to create a realistic threat-assessment of any given

situation.4 With a realistic assessment of different states interests and projected actions, states

can then develop proper policy responses. If states were to do this on a consistent basis, then

manyif not allconflicts could be prevented.

The Iraq-Kuwait conflict is a classic example of the ways signaling errors, misperception,

and intentions combine to create an unnecessary war. The various actors involvedIraq,

Kuwait, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and O.P.E.C.sent different signals about their

intentions and interests before and during the conflict. These signals shaped other actors

behaviors, which, combined with their competing interests and agendas, created the conditions

necessary for a conflict. Although this piece will consider all of the actors involved in the

conflict, the key actorsthe U.S. and Iraqwill be the primary focus of this piece. This piece

will consider these causes while also pointing out moments in time when alternative choices

could have been made to preempt or deescalate the conflict.

The other issues at the heart of this conflict are economics, oil concerns, and the inability

to negotiate a settlement of grievances. While there has been a great deal of scholarship that has

tried to explain these different causes5, there has been no systematic attempt to tie these causes

into the key moments in time when the conflict could have been averted or deescalated.

Model in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 38, No. 2 (June 1994): pp. 236-69; and Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976). 4 I specifically use: James Fearon, Rationalist Explanations for War in International Organization, Volume 49,

No. 3 (Summer 1995): pp. 379-414. 5 Some of the key pieces on the causes of the conflict are: Shahram Chubin, Regional Politics and the Conflict in

International Perspectives on the Gulf Conflict, 1990-91, ed. Alex Danchev and Dan Keohane, (New York: St.

Martins Press in association with St. Antonys College, Oxford, 1994), pp. 1-22; Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton

University Press, 1993); Walid Khalidi, The Gulf Crisis: Origins and Consequences in Journal of Palestine Studies, Volume 20, No. 2 (Winter 1991), pp. 5-28; and Peter Sluglett, The Resilience of a Frontier: Ottoman and Iraqi Claims to Kuwait, 1871-1990 in The International History Review, Volume 24, No. 4 (December 2002), pp. 783-816.

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Although it may seem like a difficult task given the limited scope of this analysis, this piece will

nevertheless attempt to grapple with these issues and will, at the very least, provide some

tentative answers that could be expanded with future scholarship. Therefore, this piece will

follow the development of different actors actions and intentions before and during the conflict,

and demonstrate how this conflict could have been prevented. Furthermore, this piece will also

consider how the conflict could have been resolved through concerted diplomacy and economic

pressure. To put it another way, this piece will look at how and why the Iraq-Kuwait conflict

happened, the process by which it escalated, and how it could have been avoided.

These issues are discussed in five parts. The first section deals with the theoretical

framework that is at the root of this analysis. It begins by considering some of the key

historiographical workswritten by Walid Khalidi, Efraim Karsh, Lawrence Freedman, Peter

Slugget, and Shahram Chubinthat have informed this piece. It then considers the rationalist

explanations for war as explained by James Fearon. It goes on to explain Fearon and Jessica

Weekss work on signaling, Robert Jerviss work on misperception, and how they relate to

understanding this conflict. It will then consider the role of myths, particularly building off of

Jack Snyders work on mythmaking. Finally, a discussion of how Iraqs actions can be viewed

from both a defensive realistas exemplified by the work of Kenneth Waltzand an offensive

realist perspectiveas exemplified by the work of John Mearsheimerwill be discussed.

The next section deals with the historical background to the conflict. This section outlines

the historical development of both Iraq and Kuwait from Ottoman rule to British control, and

finally independence. It also discusses the United States history in the Middle East from

President Franklin D. Roosevelt to President Ronald Reagan. The section will highlight some of

the key themes of U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East during this period, particularly its

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attempts to contain the Soviet Union, protect Israel, and secure oil resources.6 The goal of this

section will not be to give an exhaustive historical background, but rather to establish the basic

information needed to understand the subsequent analysis.

The next section considers the prelude to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It starts with an

analysis of the period from the end of the Iran-Iraq War to June 1989 and then moves on to look

at the July Crisis. The period before the July Crisis was the gestation period of the conflict. It

was during this time that Iraq began to suffer serious economic problems, while it also failed at

its attempts to air and rectify its grievances towards other Arab states. The July Crisis was the

critical period during which Saddam clearly signaled his intentionsas did the United States

and was a lost moment for a responsible, diplomatic resolution to the Iraq-Kuwait dispute.

The penultimate section considers the immediate series of events after Iraq invaded

Kuwait and how this shaped the crisis. This section considers the initial reaction to the invasion

of Kuwait, the first week of the conflict, American considerations, and the escalation of the

conflict. The initial reaction to the invasion was international condemnation without a set policy

for dealing with Iraqs aggression. The first week after the invasion was the critical formative

period in the conflict. Regional actors were unable to resolve the dispute diplomatically and

increasingly turned to the United States for direction. The U.S. had to consider the international

and regional implications of the Iraqi invasion and quickly developed a hard-line strategy to deal

with Iraqs aggression. This strategy was articulated in President George H.W. Bushs speech to

6 Richard K. Herrmann, US Policy in the Conflict in International Perspectives on the Gulf Conflict, 1990-91, ed.

Alex Danchev and Dan Keohane, (New York: St. Martins Press in association with St. Antonys College, Oxford, 1994), p.107.

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the nation on August 8, 1990, which escalated the conflict to the point where a military

confrontation was made all but inevitable.7

The final section posits an alternative, diplomatic approach to dealing with the crisis.

This section looks at how preventive diplomacy could have preempted an Iraqi invasion of

Kuwait, and then how mixed diplomacy could have been used once the conflict was already

underway. The key aspects of preventive diplomacy that should have been employed were

aggressive diplomatic negotiations over the outstanding issues between Iraq and its neighbors,

and clear signaling from the United States that it would not tolerate an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

Once the conflict was underway, a regional resolution should have been more aggressively

pursued and backdoor diplomacy by the United States should have also been tried. Finally,

sanctions should have been given more time to produce results. Although numerous critics

such as Robert Papehave challenged the efficacy of sanctions, this would have been a

preferable alternative to the use of force to eject Iraq from Kuwait.

To recapitulate, it is the argument of this piece that every major actor is to blame for the

Iraq-Kuwait war and that misperception, signaling errors, and competing intentions caused this

conflict. It is clear that Iraqs invasion of Kuwait was an unjustifiable attempt to resolve an inter-

state dispute through the use of military force. It is also true that both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia

could have more aggressively dealt with their outstanding disputes with Iraq before the conflict

spiraled out of control. More importantly, if the United States had changed its uniform policy of

signaling neutrality towards Iraq before its invasion of Kuwait it could havecoupled with

vigorous diplomacyprevented this conflict. If either the United Statesthrough back channel

7 By taking a hard stand on this issue, I argue that President Bush passed what James Fearon calls a unique event

horizon, i.e. he passed a level of escalation after which the audience costs were too high to back down. This issue will be discussed at length later on in this piece. For more on this issue see Fearons article, Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes.

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diplomacyor regional actors had seriously attempted to limit the extent of the conflict once it

was underway and before policy positions had ossified, then it would have been possible to eject

Iraq from Kuwait without the use of force. This piece aims to both dispel the myths surrounding

the conflict and also show how diplomacy, proper signaling, and a realistic assessment of states

intentions could have solved this conflict peacefully. The more ambitious goal of this piece is to

argue that soft power can not only be a more effective policy of statecraft than hard power, but

that its costs are significantly less, particularly since the unknown blowback of military

intervention can have devastating consequences. The opportunity for a peaceful, diplomatic

resolution to inter-state disputes is an increasingly important task in our unipolar world.

Theoretical Framework

This piece is based on a theoretical framework developed by several different political

scientists and historians. In this section, their arguments will be outlined and relevance to this

piece will be explained. The key historiographical pieces this work builds off of will be

discussed first, followed by a discussion of the rationalist explanations for war. Next, there will

be a discussion of the importance of signaling and misperception in this conflict. Finally, the role

of mythmaking will be considered as well as the realist perspectives on the conflict.

Historiography

There has been considerable debate over why Iraq decided to invade Kuwait. The most

significant cause of the invasion was because of Iraqs debt crisis. On top of that, there were

geopoliticial considerations, the actions of regional and international actors, and the failure of

diplomacy. This section will consider the reasons why Iraq chose to invade Kuwait from the

perspectives of the historian Walid Khalidi, the Middle East experts Efraim Karsh and Lawrence

Freedman, the historian Peter Slugget, and the scholar Shahram Chubin. It will conclude by

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situating this piece with the works of these authors, and explain how this piece develops an

additional framework for understanding this conflict.

On the broadest level, Walid Khalidi takes the A. J. P. Taylor approach to analyzing the

conflict, namely that it has profound and particular causes.8 In his article, The Gulf Crisis:

Origins and Consequences, he lays out four general cause and two particular causes for the

conflict. In terms of the general causes, he lists the failure of democracy in the Arab world, the

failure over the past two decades of the Arab political system, the absence of a moral center of

gravity in the Arab world, and the extreme military imbalance between Iraq and Kuwait. As for

the particular causes, he lists the mood of Saddam after the Iran-Iraq war and the interaction of

his mood with the grievance held by Iraq against Kuwait. His analysis tracks the causes and

alternatives to the conflict and provides the most comprehensiveand succinctanalysis that

has been written on the conflict thus far.

Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh discuss in their book, The Gulf Conflict 1990-91,

the causes, alternatives, and strategies of the conflict. The strongest arguments in this work are

their analysis of the complex signals the U.S. sent to Iraq prior to the conflict and the economic

problems crisis in Iraq. Whereas the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iraq is difficult to

understand given the dearth of public records between the countries, the massive collection of

public documents on U.S.-Iraqi interactions provided excellent data on the relationship between

these two countries. Their central pointand one that is reiterated in this pieceis the strong

economic reasons for why Iraq invaded Kuwait.

Peter Slugget describes the baseless claims on Kuwait made first by the Ottoman Empire

and then Iraq in his article, The Resilience of a Frontier: Ottoman and Iraqi Claims to Kuwait,

8 Khalidi, The Gulf Crisis: Origins and Consequences, p. 5.

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1871-1990. He explains in detail how Kuwait developed as a small port city, became a nominal

sub-district of Basra under Ottoman control from 1871-99, and then became essentially a British

protectorate until independence. He explains how Iraq repeatedly lodged claims on Kuwait in

1938, 1961, and 1990 and how these claims were dubious at best, and represent the porous

nature of Arab nationalism in the post-Ottoman era.

Shahram Chubin analyzes the regional determinants of the war in his article, Regional

Politics and the Conflict. He argues that a regional environment can be seen as permissive,

constraining, or neutral. He ultimately argues that regional politics and the balance-of-power

encouraged Iraq to attack Kuwait.9 He points out that Iraqs goals were regionally based, namely

money and access to the Gulf. He makes a persuasive case that Saddams logic on the regional

level was sound, and that his strategy could have worked had he guaranteed a steady supply of

oil and not threatened Saudi Arabia. He concludes that Iraq could have been successful in its

attack against Kuwait, but that Iraqs bid for regional hegemony was undermined by other

regional actorsnamely Saudi Arabia and Kuwaitthat appealed to outside actors for support.

This piece draws heavily from each of these writings. This work will build off Khalidis

explanation of the causes of the conflict and show how they could have been dealt with

differently, and how a peaceful resolution to the conflict could have been possible. The

importance of economics as described in Freedman and Karshs book is a central argument of

this piece. This work will also demonstrate the illegitimacy of Saddams ex post facto claims on

Kuwait based on Peter Slugetts article. Finally, this piece will develop the arguments from

Chubins piece and demonstrate how this conflict could have been resolved regionally. This

piece will go beyond all of these works by using different international relations theoriesthat

9 Chubin, Regional Politics and the Conflict, p. 2.

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will be discussed in subsequent sectionsto help explain how this conflict happened and how it

could have been prevented or deescalated.

Rationalist Explanation for War

One of the foundational premises of this piece is the rationalist explanation for war as

posited by the political scientist, James Fearon, in his piece, Rationalist Explanations for War.

A basic assumption of that piece is that leaders are rational, and that since it is costly and risky to

wage war, states prefer negotiated settlements to conflicts. Fearon explains that there have

traditionally been five accepted rationalist explanations for war: 1) anarchy; 2) expected benefits

greater than expected costs; 3) rational preventive war; 4) rational miscalculation due to lack of

information; 5) rational miscalculation or disagreement about relative power.10

He argues that

none of these arguments adequately explain the rationalist reasons for war and instead argues

that there are three fundamental mechanisms that do: 1) leaders have private information about

relative capabilities or resolve and incentives to misrepresent such information; 2) commitment

problems where mutually preferable bargains are unattainable because one or more states has an

incentive to renege on the terms of a particular agreement; 3) issue indivisibility, where

compromise on a specific issue is unacceptable. He puts particular emphasis on the first two

causal mechanisms as the central rationalist explanations for war.

The first explanation offered by Fearoni.e. that leaders have private information about

relative capabilities or resolve and incentives to misrepresent such informationis the most

relevant point for this piece. As will be shown, private information shared between the U.S. and

Iraq was critical in Iraqs planning against Kuwait. For example, the June 25th private meeting

between the U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie and Saddam Hussein was viewed by Iraq as a

10

Fearon, Rationalist Explanations for War, p. 381.

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green light to invade Kuwait. This private information was used as a critical component of

Iraqs cost/benefit analysis on whether or not to invade Kuwait.

The foundational assumption that rational actors will not wage war if the risks are too

high is used throughout this analysis. Events like the Glaspie interview made it appear to Iraq

that the costs of waging war against Kuwait were manageable, particularly since the U.S.

appeared to give its tacit approval. However, if the U.S. had made it clear to Iraq that the costs of

invading Kuwait would have been higher than the benefits, then it is highly probable that Iraq

would have preferred a negotiated settlement to the crisis.

Signaling and Misperception

Another key issue is the role that signaling and misperception played in shaping this

conflict. Signaling is a key part of how states project their actions to other states, what states

interests are, and how states are likely to react to others. A variety of factors are involved in

determining how and why states act in a particular way; however, what is important to recognize

are the consequences of signaling. By explaining the costs associated with signaling for both

democracies and autocracies, this section will show the importance it played for the United

States and Iraq. Furthermore, the role of misperception in shaping conflicts will also be

considered.

One way to gauge the significance of signaling is to consider the extensive work done on

this issue by James Fearon.11

In his article, Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of

International Disputes, Fearon discusses how leaders decide to respond to crises. He argues that

leaders have three choices to deal with crisesattack, back down, or escalateand that whoever

11

For more see Fearon: Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes.; Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs.; and Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model.

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backs down suffers audience costs. The audience cost refers to the domestic political cost of

choosing one of these options. If a crisis goes too far, backing down can have serious domestic

political repercussions. One of the key consequences of Fearons argument is that democracies

signal their foreign policy intentions better than autocracies, primarily due to the audience cost of

backing down. His argument directly applies to the way the U.S. reacted to Iraqs invasion. By

the time President Bush delivered his speech on August 8th

, 1990, he signaled that the U.S.

would sustain its pressure against Iraq until it made a full and unconditional withdrawal from

Kuwait. By drawing this line in the sand, President Bush made the audience cost of backing

down from his position too high. Therefore, by this point in time, it was inevitable that the U.S.

would remain involved in the Iraq-Kuwait conflict until Iraq had made a full withdrawal. As

Fearon pointed out, a crisis can only go so far before the horizon costi.e. the level of escalation

after which neither side will back down because the audience costs are too highmakes war

inevitable.12

Signaling also plays an important role in determining the audience costs of autocratic

regimes. In her article, Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve,

Jessica Weeks explains that autocracies also face audience costs, specifically from domestic

elites who function in the same way that voting publics do in democracies.13

Her argument is that

there are strong audience costs for autocratic leaders who back down from publicly declared

positions. This directly applies to the situation in Iraq. Saddam gradually escalated his

confrontation with Kuwait and, once he had publically committed to dealing with Kuwait

through hard power, the domestic audience costs of de-escalation would have been too high to

12

Fearon, Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes, p. 577. 13

Jessica L. Weeks, Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve in International Organization, Volume 62, No. 3 (Winter 2008), p. 36.

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prevent a war. Furthermore, once President Bush delivered the ultimatum for an unconditional

withdrawal, the domestic audience costs for Saddam to withdraw were too high to prevent a

conflict.

The role that misperception of intentions plays in causing conflict is another significant

issue. Misperception of intentions played one of the most important roles in causing this

particular conflict and is best understood by considering Robert Jerviss seminal work on this

issue. In his book, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Jervis explains how

perception shapes politics. On the most basic level, perception consists of images, beliefs and

intentions, and it plays the key role in the decision-making process of states. Perception is

formed based on the information a state has on other states reaction to their actions.

Misperception of other actors intentionsas caused by either purposeful or unintentional

misreading of informationis a central cause for conflict. Saddams interpretation of U.S.

signaling before the invasion of Kuwait appears to be an unintentional misreading of

information, while it is indeterminate whether or not the U.S. interpretation of Saddams

signaling was unintentional or purposeful misreading of information.

Myths

The role that myths play in causing conflict is also discussed in this piece using some of

Jack Snyders arguments in Myths of Empire. Snyder attempts to explain why so many industrial

great powers have attempted to seek security through expansion. He explains that overexpansion

occurs because of the relationship between strategic concepts and their functions as ideologies in

domestic politics. Snyder basically argues that some statesparticularly industrializing great

powersseek security through expansion based on imperial myths. He puts an emphasis on how

domestic politics and affect states actions in the international system. He explains that elites

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have material reasons for imperial expansion and that they manipulate ideology to justify their

expansion. Myths are created to justify expansion and these in turn eventually take on a life of

their own.

The relevance of his work to this piece lies in two areas. First, although Iraq was not a

major power, it still sought security through expansion, and had a material reason for doing so.

Iraq purposefully ignored the countervailing tendencies of balance-of-power politics because of

its desire for security, and its desire for material gain through expansion. Second, mythmaking

played a key role in shaping different actors actions, which served to exacerbate tensions and

escalate the conflict.

A secondary level of analysis running throughout this piece will be to consider and

debunk some of the popular myths that surround this conflict.14

This analysis will pave the way

for a better understanding of each actors perceptions and decision-making processes and the

ways it impacted the development of this crisis. One of the most popular myths propagated by

the U.S. government and mass media was that Saddam Hussein was an irrational tyrant who was

determined to attack Kuwait.15

This piece will show that not only was Saddam a rational actor,

but that his actions toward Kuwait were consistent with his belief that inactionprimarily

because of the economic crisis that Iraq facedwas an existential threat to his regime. A realistic

assessment of Saddams intentions prior to the invasion further buttresses this point and shows

that his behavior and actions are consistent with the offensive realist perspective of a rational,

14

As discussed previously, part of my discussion will be based on: Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics

and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). 15

There are numerous examples that I could cite, but to merely represent this issue see: Flora Lewis, Fruits of Appeasement, The New York Times, August 4, 1990. This is the earliest article that I have found that makes an explicit comparison between Saddam Hussein and Adolph Hitler. For example, here is the quote from the article that

makes the Hitler comparison: That is why [Saddams] invasion of Kuwait, proving his insatiable ambition, has led to so many European commentators to remember Hitler. By portraying Saddam as Hitler, the media and government were attempting to demonstrate that he was an irrational expansionist and that, therefore, it was

important for the United States to forcefully respond to his actions.

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power-maximizing actor. Another myth propagated by the U.S. government and mass media was

that Saddam was a committed expansionist who was either planning an attack on Saudi Arabia,

or could possibly have done so in the future.16

This piece will demonstrate that Saddam had only

limited territorial ambitions and was not a realistic long-term threat to Saudi Arabia. Based on

the documentary evidence that will be provided, it seems highly unlikely that he was planning an

immediate attack on Saudi Arabia or had any future plans to attack the Kingdom. If this myth is

false, then this undermines one of the central reasons for the U.S. response to the invasion of

Kuwait, namely the protection of Saudi Arabia. The corollary to this mythwhich was also

propagated by the U.S. government and media17was that Saddam could not have been

contained.18

It will be shown that Saddam could have been contained and that it is at least

possible that sanctions could have worked to eject Iraq from Kuwait given enough time and

pressure. Another myth that will be dispelled is Saddams ex post facto historical claim on

Kuwait. It will be shown that this claim was an invented anachronism that was a false attempt to

16

As with the pervious myth, there are numerous examples that I could cite to illustrate this point. For a good

example of this, see: Michael R. Gordon, Iraq Bolsters Invasion Force, Adding to Worry on Saudis, The New York Times, August 4, 1990. This description in the piece shows that the U.S. was already playing up fears of the

potential for Iraqi aggression against Saudi Arabia and that this was a major strategic concern for the U.S.

government: There were conflicting reports about the size of the Iraqi military force in Kuwait, but one Pentagon official estimated late today that it was approaching 100,000 troops, far more than Iraq needs to pacify and occupy

Kuwait. The new deployments and other Iraqi moves heightened concern among American officials that the Iraqi

President, Saddam Hussein, might be contemplating an attack on Saudi Arabia, despite an Iraqi announcement today

that it plans to begin withdrawing troops from Kuwait on Sunday. An intelligence estimate reviewed by Pentagon

officials has concluded that the scale of Iraqs attack on Kuwait suggests that it has not ruled out military moves against Saudi Arabia. Another good example can be found in: Richard Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009). In particular, on page 72 he said, If the Iraqis had so chosen, [early August] was their moment for gaining control of some or even all of Saudi Arabia. 17

As with all of these myths, there are numerous examples that could be cited. For a good example, see: Editorial,

Enlisting the Saudis in Their Own Defense, The New York Times, August 7, 1990. The article notes that: No policy to contain Saddam Hussein, let alone force Iraq to resume the status quo ante in Kuwait, can work without

active support from Saudi ArabiaAppeasement may work in the short run. Over the long term, either Iraq or some other ambitious neighbor will kick down a house so weak that it fears to defend itself even with substantial help. The

West could never successfully prop up such an ally, and eventually Saudi Arabia would find itself alone. If the

Saudis want to preserve their independence, they need to stand with their friends, now. 18

This issue was revived in the run-up to the second Gulf War. See: John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, Can Saddam Be Contained? History Says Yes, Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, November 12, 2002. That piece demonstrated systematically how Saddam was a rational actor who constantly weighed the

costs and benefits of any actions before making any decision.

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gain a veneer of legitimacy for his illegal annexation of Kuwait. Finally, this piece will challenge

the myth perpetuated by some U.S. government officials that the United States sent mixed

signals to Iraq before it invaded Kuwait.19

In actuality, the U.S. sent consistent signals to Iraq

that it would stay out of a conflict between Iraq and Kuwait during the run-up to its invasion,

signals that were consistent from every branch of the U.S. government.20

Realist Perspective

The Iraq-Kuwait conflict can fit into several different theoretical frameworks. One of the

most popular frameworks for understanding this conflict has been to describe it in terms of

defensive realism and offensive realism.21

This section will outline the key arguments in this

interpretation of the conflict.

Realism is a theory based on belief that anarchy reigns supreme in international politics.

The defensive realist Kenneth Waltz explains in his book, Theory of International Politics, that

because of the anarchical nature of international politics, states central focus is to survive. War

is a natural feature of this system, particularly since there is no single state that can prevent other

states from going to war. The key to survival is either internal state balancingthrough

economic growth or military buildupor external balancingsuch as through the formation of

alliances. Power is the central influence in the system and states try to increase their power if

19

There was a wide-ranging discussion in the media and U.S. government about this issue. For an example, see

Andrew Rosenthal, Did U.S. Overtures Give Wrong Idea to Hussein, The New York Times, September 18, 1990. 20

This issue will be discussed extensively later on in this piece. In particular, the key focus will be on a few

particular events such as the State Departments statement on July 24, 1990 that the U.S. had no defensive treaty with Kuwait; on the 25

th the U.S. Ambassador April Glaspies meeting with Saddam Hussein; the letter sent by

President Bush on the 28th

calling for strong ties with Iraq; and the C.I.A.s prewar assessment of Iraqi intentions. 21

See: Hamdi A. Hassan The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Religion, Identity and Otherness in the Analysis of War and

Conflict (London; Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press, 1999). In this book, he discusses conflict from a realist,

institutional, and reflective perspective. He explains that the realist framework for interpreting this conflict

extensively in Chapter 2 of the book.

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possible. Weak states are at a disadvantage in this system since the powerful states can affect

them through coercion.

Were Iraqs actions towards Kuwait rational from Waltzs defensive realist perspective?

The answer is no. Waltz bases his perspective on a balance-of-power theory where states first

concern is to maintain their position in the system, not to maximize power.22

The reason for this

is that states can seldom afford to make maximizing power their goal; thus, states attempt to

balance power instead.23

From this perspective, Saddams actions were irrational because he was

purposefully upsetting the balance-of-power in favor of a power maximizing position. When a

state tries to maximize its power, other states balance against it. Therefore, it was natural for the

U.S. to reset the balance-of-power to the status quo ante.

The offensive realist position argues that the structure of the system causes war and

competition. John Mearsheimer explains in his book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, that

the best way for states to achieve survival is to be the dominant state. States are inevitably in

conflict with one another and the ability to possess offensive military capabilities allows for

states to achieve power maximization. Not only do states want to survive, but they also want to

be the dominant state in the system. But since most states cant become the dominant state in the

entire system, they will try to aim for regional hegemony.

Were Iraqs actions towards Kuwait rational from Mearsheimers offensive realist

perspective? The answer is yes. Mearsheimer bases his perspective on a balance-of-power theory

where states would ideally like to be the hegemon in the system.24

States look for opportunities

to alter the balance-of-power by acquiring additional increments of power at the expense of

22

Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979), p.

126. 23

Ibid., p. 127. 24

John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), p. 34.

17

potential rivals through a variety of ways, such as through economic, diplomatic, and military

leverage.25

From this perspective, Saddams actions were rational because he was trying to alter

the balance-of-power in his favor, and the benefits seemed to outweigh the costs. As Hassan

Hamdi describes it:

First, the relationship between Iraq and Kuwait could fit perfectly into a power

preponderance framework, in the sense that Kuwait, as a much weaker and vastly richer

neighbor, seemed at one point to be attractive booty for its resentful, egoistic, power-

maximizing neighbor. Thus, for the Iraqi leadership harsh economic problems are on the

way towards being solved; a geostrategic outlet to the deep water of the Persian Gulf, and

the achievement of the much-longed-for political hegemony in the Gulf region and the

Arab world, seemed to be imminent and forthcoming.26

From this perspective, it would seem that Iraqs actions were the natural objective that any

rational offensive realist would choose to pursue.

Iraqs invasion of Kuwait can be interpreted differently depending on which realist

perspective one takes. From the defensive realist perspective, Iraqs actions could be viewed as a

mistake because it upset the balance-of-power by trying to maximize its power. From the

offensive realist perspective, Iraqs actions were reasonable, particularly since it was trying to

maximize its power and felt the benefits of its actions outweighed its costs. Both perspectives

rely on a self-help interpretation of international relations, but view states actions differently

depending on which theoretical framework they operate under. Ultimately, even if Saddam

believed he was taking a calculated risk in attempting to achieve power maximization, the

consequence was a countervailing coalition against his invasion that reestablished the status quo

ante.

Historical Background

25

Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 34. 26

Hassan, The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Religion, Identity and Otherness in the Analysis of War and Conflict, p. 6.

18

The conflict between Iraq and Kuwait has deep historical roots. Both countries share a

common heritage of being ruled, first by the Ottoman Empire and then by the British Empire.

After World War I, both countries developed into nascent nation-states. Iraq gained its

independence from Britain in 1932 and Kuwait gained its independence in 1961. Iraqi

nationalists, starting in the 1920s, called for the unification of Iraq and Kuwait based on their

shared historical, cultural, ethnic, religious and linguistic heritage. This call for unity was never

realized and was blocked, first by Britain, and later by a U.S.-led multinational coalition.

This section considers the deep historical background to the Iraq-Kuwait conflict. Since

Saddam Husseins ex post facto claim on Kuwait was based on alleged historical ties between

the two countries, it is critical to understand the actual historical link between these two states,

and whether or not there was any merit to his claims. Furthermore, many of the disputed issues

between Iraq and Kuwait derive from this historical period, particularly issues surrounding state

boundaries and territory. This section will first consider the regions development from Ottoman

control through British domination. Next, it will consider Iraq and Kuwaits history from July

1958 to August 1988. Finally, it will briefly analyze the overarching themes of American policy

towards the Middle East in general.

From Ottoman Control to British Domination

The Ottoman Empire ruled the areas that would become Iraq and Kuwait with varying

degrees of control for about four centuries. The key Ottoman administrative cities that would

make up Iraq were Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul. Kuwait, on the other hand, was founded in 1705

and was only nominally under Ottoman control during parts of the nineteenth century. The

territory was a sub-district of Basra towards the end of the nineteenth century, but it gradually

moved away from the Ottomans in favor of a closer relationship with the British.

19

Britains grand strategy towards the Middle East in the decades prior to World War I

focused on considerations towards India and oil. Both Iraq and Kuwait played into these vital

interests. In terms of Iraq, Britains interests lay in its ability to protect the route to India and,

later, its oil resources.27

In terms of Kuwait, Britains primary interest was to maintain control

over the Persian Gulf waterway.28

It is important to emphasize, however, that British oil interests

were quite limited on this point. The first major British oil company in the region, the Anglo-

Persian Oil Company, was formed in 1909 and the discovery and exploitation of oil as a

commercial resource developed very slowly over the next decade.29

The dynamics of the region radically changed due to World War I. Britain invaded Iraq

and fought against the Ottoman Empire across the Middle East. The ruler of Kuwait sided with

Britain and decided Kuwait was to be 'recognized as an independent principality under British

protection.30 In 1916, the British and French agreed in the secret Sykes-Picot agreement to

divide the Middle East between them after the conclusion of the war. Although the British had

made a series of promises to Arab nationalists that they would support their independence after

the war, the reality was that Britain wanted to retain control over the Middle East for as long as

possible in order to buttress its empire. Consequently, Britain was given a mandate after the war

over several Arab countries, including Iraq.

During the 1920s, the boundaries for the states of Iraq and Kuwait were drawn. In 1921,

Iraq was created out of the union of the Baghdad and Basra territories and Mosul was added five

years later. As for Kuwait, the 1922 Treaty of Uqair set Kuwaits border with Saudi Arabia.

27

Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship (3rd

Ed.; New York:

I.B. Tauris, 2001), p. 8. 28

Sluglett, The Resilience of a Frontier: Ottoman and Iraqi Claims to Kuwait, 1871-1990, p. 797. This policy was not just aimed at Kuwait but also other small Persian Gulf states such as Qatar and the U.A.E. 29

Ibid., p. 798. 30

Francis H. Hinsley, British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1977), p. 439.

20

Between February and April of 1923, the northern frontier was created with Iraq and the two

main islands, Bubiyan and Warba, were assigned to Kuwait.31

The nature of British control over Iraq and Kuwait changed in the 1930s. Iraq gained

independence from Britain in 1932 and, at the same time, there was a debate over the future of

Kuwait. Iraq wanted it incorporated into its newly independent state but the rulers of Kuwait

were split on the issue. They eventually decided not to join Iraq and to remain under the

protection of Britain. However, over the next couple of years, Iraq would try to pressure Kuwait

to join it. In September 1938, on a visit to London, the Iraqi foreign minister, Tawfiq al-

Suwaydi, requested that Kuwait be incorporated into Iraq; however, his request was denied.32

This would be the last time Iraq would push for the incorporation of Kuwait into its territory

until 1961.

Iraq and Kuwait from July 1958 to August 1988

The Hashemite monarchy that ruled Iraq was overthrown in a military coup in July of

1958. These popular uprisings brought Brigadier General Abdul Karim Qassim to power and he

remained in control of Iraq until 1963. During this period, Iraq maintained cordial relations with

Kuwait until 1961.

Kuwait had historically preferred a strong relationship towards Great Britain, but during

the worldwide decolonization movement, it too gradually moved towards independence from

Britain. Kuwait was granted independence on June 19, 1961, which was a turning point in its

relations with Iraq. By June 25, 1961, Iraq had decided to annex Kuwait and did so based on an

alleged historical claim. However, these claims were extremely weak as the Ottoman historian

Frederick F. Anscombe notes:

31

Sluglett, The Resilience of a Frontier: Ottoman and Iraqi Claims to Kuwait, 1871-1990, p. 800. 32

Ibid., p. 805.

21

[O]n the fundamental issue of political status, Kuwait was indeed Ottoman but was neither integrated into, nor dependent upon, Ottoman Iraq. Kuwait did have social and

economic links to southern Iraq - but they were just part of a wider network of relations

that also tied Iraq to much of the Arabian Peninsula, the rest of the Gulf, and India.33

It is important to note that these same claims would be reiterated by Saddam Hussein in August

of 1990 when he tried to annex Kuwait. In 1961, Britain sent troops to defend the territorial

integrity of Kuwait and later Arab League troops came for support. Because of British and Arab

support for Kuwait, Iraq was forced to renounce its claims on Kuwait. By 1963, Iraq had

formally recognized Kuwait and established full diplomatic relations with it.

In 1963, a nationalist coup in Iraq overthrew the Qassim regime and the Baath Party

come to power. In 1968, Saddam Hussein participated in a coup that overthrew the government

and installed Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr as the President of Iraq, with Saddam as his deputy.

Saddam was the key power broker in Iraq and eventually became President in July 1979. Upon

gaining full control of the country, he launched a purge of the Baath party and established a

highly authoritarian regime based on a cult of personality. At the same time, the Iranian

revolution was seen as a destabilizing factor for his regime, particularly since revolutionary

Shiite Iran was thought to be supporting radical Shiite elements in Iraq. The perceived threat of

Iran led Saddam to launch a preventive war against it on September 22, 1980.

The Iran-Iraq War provides excellent insight into the psychology of Saddam Hussein.

Saddam was extremely reluctant to go to war with Iran, but felt that the only way to contain it

was to exploit Irans temporary weakness following the Iranian revolution.34 Saddam took a

calculated risk with limited political goalsnamely to capture the Shatt al-Arab and a small

portion of Khuzistanbecause he believed that Iran was both an existential threat to Iraq and

33

Frederick F. Anscombe, The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar (New York:

Columbia University Press, 1997), p. x. 34

Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography (New York: Grove Press), p. 147.

22

vulnerable because of the revolution. He perceived that his political survival lie in the balance

and looked at the immediate threat as he saw it.35

From Saddams perspective, he was acting as a

rational actor as the political psychologist Jerold M. Post notes:

When [Saddam] pursues a course of action he pursues it fully, and if he meets initial resistance he struggles all the harder, convinced of the correctness of his judgments. But

if circumstances demonstrate that he miscalculatedwhich he often hashe is capable of reversing course.36

With the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam realized early on that he had grossly miscalculated. On

September 28, 1980, less than a week after the outbreak of hostilities, he offered peace talks with

Iran.37

He did so in response to UN Security Council Resolution 479 that called for an immediate

cease fire, which Saddam accepted and Iran rejected.38

By 1982, he actively tried to sue for

peace with the Iranians and had withdrawn his forces to the internationally recognized border

between the two countries. By that point, however, things spiraled beyond his control and the

Iran-Iraq War would continue on for another six long, devastating years.

During the expensive conflict, Kuwait and other Arab states provided loans to Iraq.

Kuwait had been the key provider and loaned it $35 billion over the course of the war.39

In

comparison, Saudi Arabia had loaned Iraq $27 billion.40

By the end of the war, Iraq had incurred

an enormous amount of debt and was in severe financial difficulties. In total, Iraq had compiled

an estimated $80 billion dollars in foreign debt.41

35

Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography, p. 149. 36

Jerrold M. Post, The Defining Moment of Saddams Life: A Political Psychology Perspective on the Leadership and Decision Making of Saddam Hussein During the Gulf Crisis in The Political Psychology of the Gulf War: Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict, ed. Stanley A. Renshon, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,

1993), p. 52. 37

Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography, p. 157. 38

Nasser I. Rashid and Esber I. Shaheen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf War (Joplin, Missouri: International Institute of

Technology), p. 120. 39

Chubin, Regional Politics and the Conflict, p. 9. 40

Rashid and Shaheen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf War, p. 121. 41

Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (2nd

Ed.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 248.

23

American Policy in the Middle East

The United States has a long history in the Middle East and its primary interest in the

region has historically been oil. At the beginning of the twentieth century, several U.S. firms

such as Standard Oil of California (SoCal)signed agreements with different oil producing

states in the Middle East. The major firm that acted as the successor to SoCal, the Arabian-

American Oil Company (Aramco), established a series of important oil agreements with Saudi

Arabia. These agreements bound American oil interests with the Saudi Arabian regime. The

House of Saud was explicitly supported by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and oil became the

backbone of the nascent Saudi-U.S. strategic relationship.42

After World War II, the Middle East

gained a new prominence for U.S. policy makers.

The three key objectives that determined U.S. policy in the Cold War era were oil,

protecting Israels security, and containing Soviet influence.43 There has been much debate over

which of these issues was most important for U.S. policy makers. At different points in time, one

issue or another gained prominence, but each played an important role in shaping U.S. policy

towards the region.

As for oil, it became the vital export that fundamentally shaped U.S. policy in the region.

The Middle East went from providing only 10 percent of the worlds oil production in 1945 to 25

percent by the 1960s.44

Oil was of such vital strategic concern that the C.I.A. even sponsored a

1953 coup in Iran against the democratically elected government leader, Mohammed

42

For more see: Robert Vitalis, Americas Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). 43

Herrmann, US Policy in the Conflict, p. 107. 44

Peter R. Odell, The Significance of Oil in Journal of Contemporary History, Special Middle East Issue, Volume 3, No. 3, (July 1968), p. 96.

24

Mossadegh, because he had threatened to nationalize Irans oil resources.45 By 1970, President

Richard Nixon developed a new strategic policy toward the Middle East in his National Security

Study Memorandum 66 entitled, Future U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf.46 This memorandum

established a twin pillars policy in which the U.S. would provide arms and support to both

Saudi Arabia and Iran in order to keep stability in the region. After the Iranian revolution,

President Carters administration promulgated a new doctrine in his State of the Union address:

Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United

States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including

military force.47

The Carter Doctrine was used in part to justify the United States use of force against Iraq in the

first Gulf War.

The U.S. also actively tried to curb Soviet influence in the region. The U.S. defined some

regional regimes as moderate and others as radical, depending on their level of support for

U.S. or Soviet interests.48

The U.S. worked to support the moderate regimes and undermine the

radical regimes. In order to support moderate regimessuch as pre-revolutionary Iranthe

U.S. sent arms, aid and advisers to those countries. To counter radical regimessuch as Nassers

Egyptthe U.S. aimed to contain their influence and actively supported opposition groups

within those countries. The United States held primary supremacy over the Soviet Union in the

region throughout the Cold War, a fact that was particularly evident after the 1973 Arab-Israeli

War.

45

For more see: Mark J. Gasiorowski, The 1953 Coup Detat in Iran in International Journal of Middle East Studies, Volume 19, No. 3 (August 1987), pp.261-268; Stephen Kinzer, All the Shahs Men (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2003). 46

Future U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf, Secret Report NSSM 66, February 5, 1970, 36 pp. 47

Jimmy Carter, State of the Union Address 1980, January 23, 1980. 48

Herrmann, US Policy in the Conflict, p. 107.

25

Support for Israel has always been a fundamental policy objective for the United States.

The U.S. supported the creation of Israel and has consistently supported Israeli policies,

particularly since the 1960s. The U.S. has provided extensive diplomatic support for Israel and

has vetoed dozens of UN Security Council resolutions against it.49

Furthermore, the U.S. has

provided billions of dollars of military and economic aid. As Henry Kissinger noted:

The survival and security of Israel are unequivocal and permanent moral commitments of the United States. Israel is a loyal friend and a fellow democracy, whose very

existence represents the commitment of all free peoplesWe will never abandon Israeleither by failing to provide crucial assistance or by misconceived or separate negotiations or by irresolution when challenged to meet our own responsibility to

maintain the global balance of power."50

This open declaration of unequivocal support has been sustained and strengthened since then. As

John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt note in their book, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign

Policy, support for Israel in American politics is sacrosanct. They note that the powerful Israel

Lobby has made unconditional support for Israel a fundamental component of U.S. foreign

policy. They explain that:

Since the Six-Day War of 1967, a salient featureand arguably the central focusof Americas Middle East policy has been its relationship with Israel. For the past four decades, in fact, the United States has provided Israel with a level of material and

diplomatic support that dwarfs what it provides to other countries. That aid is largely

unconditional: no matter what Israel does, the level of support remains for the most part

unchanged.51

Israel has long been viewed as Americas most strategic ally in the region and has received

consistent American support.

49

Saliba Sarsar, The Question of Palestine and United States Behavior at the United Nations in International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, Volume 17, No. 3 (Spring 2004), p. 466. 50

Henry Kissinger, Israel and the United States, address before the American Jewish Congress, April 4, 1976, in The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Readings and Documents, ed. John Norton Moore, (Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 1977), pp. 871-872. 51

John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus and

Giroux, 2007), p. 7.

26

Prelude to War

By the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraqs economy was shattered and in desperate need of

rebuilding. Saddam began to argue that he had contained the Persian threat for the other Arab

states and was now turning to them for help. Although the historical record suggests his claims

were dubious at best, he made this argument to elicit both moral and financial support from other

Arab states. The desperate economic situation was viewed as an existential threat to Saddams

regime and he moved aggressively to counter this threat, with the most belligerent steps being

taken against Kuwait.

This section aims to consider the prelude to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. This was the

critical period when the push for war was made and numerous opportunities for peace were

missed. Understanding how and why Iraq decided to go to war against Kuwait is fundamental to

understanding how easily this war could have been avoided. This section will first look at the

period from August 1988 to June 1989. It will then analyze the numerous missteps during the

July Crisis, with a particular emphasis on Iraqi considerations for invading Kuwait and signaling

errors made by the U.S.

August 1988-June 1989

Upon the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq began to rebuild its devastated economy.

Economic considerations dominated Iraqs political posturing and its actions were consistent

with an effort to revive its beleaguered economy. This picture can best be seen when considering

the state of Iraqs economy, its political reengagement with other Middle Eastern countries, and

growing tensions with some Arab states during this period.

The state of Iraqs economy in 1988 was deplorable. As the Middle East experts Karsh

and Rautsi describe it:

27

The Iraqi economy was wrecked. Economic estimates put the cost of reconstruction at $230 billion. Even if one adopted the most optimistic (and highly unrealistic) assumption

that every dollar of oil revenues would be directed to the reconstruction effort, it would

require nearly two decades to repair the total damage. As things stood a year after the

termination of hostilities, Iraqs oil revenues of $13 billion did not even suffice to cover ongoing expenditures: with civilian imports approximating $12 billion (of which $3

billion was for foodstuffs), military imports exceeding $5 billion, debt repayments

totaling $5 billion, and transfers by foreign workers topping $1 billion, the regime needed

an extra $10 billion per annum to balance its current deficit, before it could embark on

the Sisyphean task of reconstruction.52

The economic devastation of Iraq cannot be underestimated. As these figures show, Iraqs

budget deficit was high, oil revenues were insufficient to pay its ongoing expenditures, and it

faced a crippling debt crisis. Furthermore, during the war, Iraq had gone through a period of

economic liberalization that led to high levels of inflation, unemployment, shortages in basic

foods, growing and highly visible economic inequality, and the emergence of a brisk black

market in foreign currencies.53 The liberalization of the economy was coupled with illegal

borrowing strategies that led to a drying up of foreign credit after the conclusion of the war.54

Without the ability to get credit from other states or international institutions like the

International Monetary Fund, Saddam felt the acute economic pressure that threatened his rule.

The economic crisis was seen as an existential threat that could lead to a revolution or coup

against the regime and thus pushed Saddam into a corner. He had no choice but to turn to

regional allies for support.

Saddam re-engaged many Arab states after the end of its war with Iran, but opposed

others. Saddam moved towards a strong engagement with the Arab League and even received

52

Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography, pp. 201-202. 53

Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, "On the Way to Market: Economic Liberalization and Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait," in Middle

East Report, No. 170 (May-June 1991), p. 17. 54

Ibid., p. 23.

28

their support to block a UN inquiry into the use of chemical weapons by Iraq.55

Iraq moved

towards greater economic integration with local states such as Egypt, Jordan and Yemen by

forming the Arab Cooperation Council.56

This was formed in opposition to the Gulf Cooperation

Council, which was led by Saudi Arabia.

Iraq had strained ties with other regional statesparticularly Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and

the United Arab Emiratesover two primary issues: debt and oil pricing. Iraq wanted these

stateswho held the vast majority of Iraqi debtto forgive its debt and raise the price of oil.

Saddam calculated that if this happened, Iraq would be able to avert financial collapse and bring

in more revenue to the state coffers. In order to achieve these goals, Iraq dealt with each of these

states in different ways. Iraq essentially neutralized any military threat from Saudi Arabia by

signing a non-aggression pact with it. This allowed Iraq to turn its attention towards the UAE

and Kuwait, smaller states that were more vulnerable to coercion. By May of 1990, Iraq was

strongly pressuring both Kuwait and the UAE on the issue of oil overproduction, and was

ratcheting up its rhetoric and demands against these countries.

July Crisis

Tensions between Iraq and Kuwait reached a boiling point by July 1990. Iraq was facing

severe economic privations and was loudly proclaiming that Kuwait was the central cause. The

July Crisis began as a war of words that eventually spun out of control. The major issues that

destabilized this crisis were oil, Iraqi demands, the Arab and Kuwaiti response to these demands,

U.S. signaling, and Iraqi intentions.

55

Clyde Haberman, Iraqs Right to Chemical Arms Upheld by Official, The New York Times, September 16, 1988. 56

Alan Cowell, Arabs are Forming 2 Economic Blocs, The New York Times, February 17, 1989.

29

The price of oil had been fluctuating wildly during 1990. In a June 1989 meeting of the

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Kuwait declared that it wanted to

increase its production output and would not be constrained by a quota.57

As Geoff Simons

notes:

The other OPEC members, including Iraq, were incensed at the Kuwaiti attitude, and

over the following months used argument and threat in a vain attempt to bring Kuwait

back in line. The overproduction continued and in early 1990 the price dropped to below

$18 for the first time since the previous summer. Following further efforts by Saddam

Hussein to stabilize oil prices, the Kuwaiti oil minister declared that OPEC quotas should

be scrapped as soon as possible. Both Saddam and King Hussein of Jordan continued to

lobby other OPEC members, but to no avail. Kuwait and the UAE continued to produce

as they wished, to the point that the price per barrel sank to $11 in June 1990. At this

level, Iraqi revenues were such that they could scarcely service current expenses, much

less repay foreign loans or fund the required national reconstruction.58

Saddam tried to resolve the dispute with Kuwait over oil production by diplomatic means.

Although Kuwait was fully within its rights to produce unlimited amounts of oil, it defeated the

fundamental premise behind OPEC to take that stance. OPEC was founded as an oil cartel to

regulate the price of oil in the market by regulating the production quotas of each of its member

states. That way, the price and amount of oil on the market would remain stable and benefit all

members of the cartel. With Kuwait and the UAE disregarding this quota, the price of oil

naturally dropped. Iraq, however, badly needed oil prices to rise so that it could continue to meet

its basic financial obligations, to say nothing of its need to rebuild its economy. With no

resolution to this issue by July, the possibility of Iraq defaulting on its loan obligations became a

distinct possibility. Saddams economic desperation led to the development of a hard-line

approach towards Kuwait.

57

Geoff Simons, Iraq: From Sumer to Saddam (New York: St. Martins Press, 1994), p. 340. 58

Ibid., p. 341.

30

Iraq decided to formally articulate its problems with Kuwait, the UAE, and other Arab

states. On July 15th, Iraqs Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, declared Iraqs four central demands:

1) An increase in the price of oil to $25 a barrel.

2) Repayment of $2.4 billion dollars worth of oil stolen from the Rumaila oil field by

Kuwait.

3) Reduction of Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates oil production quotas.

4) An Arab version of the Marshall plan for Iraq.59

In addition to these far reaching demands, Iraq requested that all Arab states forgive Iraqs war

debt. Iraq took a particularly hard-line approach towards Kuwait. Saddam declared that Kuwaits

actions amounted to an economic war against his country. Saddam backed up his rhetoric by

sending thousands of troops to the Iraq-Kuwait border. Iraq was sending a strong signal to

Kuwaitand its neighborsthat if the dispute could not be resolved peacefully, then Saddam

would be willing to resort to the use of force.

The Arab and Kuwaiti response to these statements was mixed. On July 24th

, Egyptian

President Hosni Mubarak launched a round of surprise shuttle diplomacy to both Iraq and

Kuwait to ease tensions between the two countries.60

OPEC responded by agreeing to raise the

target price of oil from $18 to $21 at a meeting in Geneva on July 26th

.61

Most importantly, both

Kuwait and the UAE agreed to abide by OPEC oil quotas.62

Kuwait, on the other hand, took a

stand against Iraq on other issues and refused to forgive its debt, address the Rumaila oilfield

dispute, or resolve its other outstanding disputes with Iraq. These signals and the inability to

resolve the key issues in this conflict were a missed opportunity for preventive diplomacy.

59

Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography, p. 212. 60

Caryle Murphy, Mubarak Tries to Ease Crisis in Gulf, The Washington Post, July 25, 1990. 61

Patrick Cockburn, Threats of Conflict in Gulf Grows as Talks Collapse, The Independent (London), August 3, 1990. 62The Associated Press, Iraqi Invasion, Step by Step, The New York Times, August 3, 1990.

31

The inconsistent response by Arab states was in stark contrast to U.S. actions. The United

States, through a series of actions and statements, clearly signaled to Iraq that it would not

intervene in a conflict between Iraq and Kuwait. This signaling can be seen in State Department

comments on the dispute, the meeting between the U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie and Saddam

Hussein, the CIA assessment of Iraq before its attack on Kuwait, and the letter sent by President

Bush to Iraq four days before its invasion.

On July 24, when Margaret D. Tutwiler, the State Department spokeswoman, was asked

whether the United States had any commitment to defend Kuwait, she said, ''We do not have any

defense treaties with Kuwait, and there are no special defense or security commitments to

Kuwait.''63

This statement is important to note because, at the time, the U.S. already knew that

Iraq had massed thousands of troops on its border with Kuwait. Although the official was noting

the simple fact that the U.S. had no special security commitment to Kuwait, this statement could

be perceived by the Iraqi government as an indication that the U.S. would not intervene on behalf

of Kuwait if Iraq attacked it.

The next day, the U.S. Ambassador was summoned to a meeting with Saddam Hussein.

Saddam went on a lengthy tirade against Kuwait, delivered a message to President Bush, gave

his version of the history of the region, and sent strong signals that Iraq was planning on

attacking Kuwait. Saddam was searching for indirect assurances from Glaspie that the U.S.

would not intervene in the case of war between Iraq and Kuwait. Glaspie responded by saying

"We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait."64

Some people like Richard Haass have read this statement as an indication that the U.S. wanted to

63

Elaine Sciolino with Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Gave Iraq Little Reason Not to Mount Kuwait Assault, The New York Times, September 23, 1990. 64

The Glaspie Transcript: Saddam Meets the U.S. Ambassador, July 25, 1990, in The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions, ed. Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, (New York: Times Books, 1991), p. 130.

32

remain outside of a border dispute with Kuwait. However, if this was the case, then Glaspie

would have avoided giving other signals to Saddam that the U.S. would not intervene. When

Saddam indirectly inquired about whether or not the U.S. was likely to respond with economic

sanctions in the event of war, Glaspie responded by saying:

Mr. President, not only do I want to say that President Bush wanted better and deeper relations with Iraq, but he also wants an Iraqi contribution to peace and prosperity in the

Middle East. President Bush is an intelligent man, he is not going to declare an economic

war against Iraq.65

It seemed to Saddam that the Ambassador was strongly signaling that the U.S. would not

intervene in a conflict between Iraq and Kuwait. This was the best diplomatic response he could

have hoped for and believed that Iraq had received a green light to invade.

While Glaspie met with Saddam, the CIA was evaluating whether or not war was going

to break out. The CIA issued a warning on July 25th

that war was possible.66

The assessment was

that if Iraq invaded, it would only seek small territorial gains, rather than try to capture all of

Kuwait.67

The intelligence community misread Saddams intentions and thus the U.S. continued

to ignore the real possibility of war.

Was Glaspie signaling that the U.S. wouldnt intervene based on the assumption that Iraq

would only seek small territorial gains? From the complete transcript of the discussion, the

answer seems to be a clear no. The transcript makes clear the U.S. was signaling that it would

not get involved in the conflict regardless of Saddams actions. So, for example, Glaspie noted

that we see the Iraqi point of view that the measures taken by the U.A.E. and Kuwait [are], in

65

The Glaspie Transcript: Saddam Meets the U.S. Ambassador, p. 129. 66

Haass, War of Necessity War of Choice, p. 57. 67

John Diamond, The CIA and the Culture of Failure: U.S. Intelligence from the end of the Cold War to the

Invasion of Iraq (Stanford: Stanford Security Series, 2008), p. 113.

33

the final analysis, parallel to military aggression against Iraq68 She followed this statement by

asking what Saddam was planning on doing in regards to Kuwait. He responded by saying that

he would pursue diplomatic venues first, but if diplomacy failed, then he would resort to war. If

the U.S. thought that it was merely signaling a green light for a border adjustmentwhich, in

itself, is an incredibly irresponsible thing to dothat was definitely not what Saddam perceived.

On July 28th

, President Bush sent a personal letter to Saddam Hussein stating the United

States desire for an improved relationship with Iraq. He sent this letterwhich reinforced

Glaspies statementsin spite of the fact that the intelligence community thought an invasion

was possible. In the letter, President Bush stated:

I also welcome your statement that Iraq desires friendship rather than confrontation with the United States. Let me reassure you, as my ambassador, Senator Dole, and others

have done, that my administration continues to desire better relations with Iraq. We will

also continue to support our friends in the region with whom we have had long-standing

ties. We see no necessary inconsistency between these two objectives.69

For President Bush to be signaling this kind of support for Iraq shows the consistency of support

that Saddam received prior to the invasion. Although Bush did note that the U.S. would continue

to support regional friends, he did not specify which countries he was talking about, nor did he

specify what that support would actually entail. Given Americas historical relationship to both

Israel and Saudi Arabia, it seems likely that President Bush was referring to these states in

particular, especially since the U.S. had no formal defense treaty with Kuwait. All of this made it

appear as though the U.S. was sending a fairly strong message to Saddam that if he invaded

Kuwait, the U.S. would not intervene.

So how important was signaling to this crisis? Signaling errors were central to the

escalation of this conflict and was a majorperhaps the majorreason for an escalation of the

68

The Glaspie Transcript: Saddam Meets the U.S. Ambassador, p. 130. 69

Haass, War of Necessity War of Choice, p. 58.

34

conflict. Iraq interpreted U.S. actions as the green light for an invasion of Kuwait. In addition to

these signals, Saddam felt that the U.S. had a credibility gap. He felt America suffered from what

President Bush would later term the Vietnam Syndromewhich is the perception that while

American military power remained formidable, military authority had collapsed.70

He felt the

U.S. would not be willing to risk losing soldiers in a fight against Iraq on behalf of Kuwait, a

relatively minor state. Furthermore, since the U.S. had provided covert intelligence to Iraq during

the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam believed the U.S. would remain uninvolved at an overt level, just as it

had done then.

In terms of this crisis, were the perceptions of the actors correct given the information

they had? In retrospect, the answer is clearly no. But in context, each state looked at the

information it had about the intentions of the other states in order to formulate a responsible

policy. Iraq thought the U.S. had signaled it would remain neutral in a conflict between Iraq and

Kuwait. The U.S. did not think Iraq would take over all of Kuwait, but might take some of the

disputed border areas, and hence signaled what appeared to be neutrality towards an Iraq-Kuwait

border dispute. Kuwait did not think Iraq would actually invade, so it did not try to aggressively

resolve its problems with Iraq through diplomacy.

Saddam Hussein took what he perceived to be a calculated risk against Kuwait. Since he

had a non-aggression pact with Saudi Arabia, he felt that there would be no regional power that

could force him out of Kuwait. Since the U.S. had strongly signaled it would not militarily

respond to an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Americas willingness to wage war was significantly

diminished due to Vietnam Syndrome, Iraq felt as though it could get away with attacking

Kuwait. Saddam felt that he had enough legitimate reasons to invade Kuwait, and that the

70

Harry G. Summers, On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War (New York: Dell Publishers, 1992), p. 7.

35

economic crisis in Iraq was an existential threat to his regime. He therefore decided to take a risk

and attack Kuwait.

War

On August 2, 1990 at 2:00 local time, Iraq launched its invasion of Kuwait.71

Saddam had

made good on his threats to attack Kuwait and punish it for its economic warfare against Iraq.

Saddam believed that his actions would not receive too harsh of an international response and

that he had to take action because of Iraqs dire economic situation. While the initial reaction to

the invasion seemed to confirm Saddams projections, a rapid succession of events led to an

internationalization of the conflict.

This section aims to consider the reaction to the Iraqi invasion and how the conflict was

internationalized. Just as there were a series of events in July that could have prevented the war,

there were another series of events that could have diffused the conflict. This section will first

look at the initial reaction to the invasion of Kuwait. It will then analyze the series of events that

escalated the conflict from August 2nd

to August 7th

. It will then move on to look at American

considerations during this period. Finally, it will consider how the conflict escalated past the

point of a diplomatic solution.

Initial Reaction to the Invasion of Kuwait

The initial reaction to the invasion of Kuwait was firm, but not dramatic. While Kuwait

was quickly over-run by Iraq, the response to the invasion varied from the regional to the

international level. The most important responses to the invasion came from regional actors, the

international community, the United States, and Iraq.

71

Reuters, In Two Arab Capitals, Gunfire and Fear, Victory and Cheers, The New York Times, August 3, 1990.

36

The regional reaction to the invasion was divided. The Organization of Islamic

Conference was holding a meeting in Cairo at the time and the Arab Foreign Ministers met on

the sidelines to discuss a response. Most Arab capitals ignored Kuwait's appeal for support in the

wake of Iraqs massive attack and instead urged foreign powers to avoid involvement so as to

provide time for an Arab diplomatic settlement to the crisis.72

Saudi Arabia issued a

condemnation of the invasion, but refrained from offering any military support to Kuwait, in

spite of its security agreement with Kuwait based on its membership in the six-nation Gulf

Cooperation Council. Israel called for immediate diplomatic and economic sanctions and the

Defense Minister, Moshe Arens, said, Iraq will be looking around for other targets, not just

Israel[and Iraq is] a danger to the entire world."73 Overall, however, the regional diplomatic

response was uneven, and there was no consensus on the best response to Iraqs aggression.

The international reaction was considerably harsher. The U.N. Security Council held an

emergency session and passed Resolution 660 against Iraq which condemned the Iraqi

invasion and called for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal.74 This resolution passed

14-0-1 (with Yemen abstaining) and was a distinct indication of the new multilateral post-Cold

War order. With both the Soviet Union and China supporting this resolution, this show of

international solidarity against the Iraqi invasion left Iraq diplomatically isolated. Due to their

support for this resolution, it became impossible for Iraq to play off the old Cold War great

power rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

It is important to note that in spite of a U.N. Security Council resolution that condemned

Iraqs invasion, this didnt necessarily mean that the conflict would be a major international

72

William Drozdiak, Arab Voices Are Muted as World Reacts, The Washington Post, August 3, 1990. 73

Jackson Diehl, Israel Calls For Sanctions Against Iraq, The Washington Post, August 3, 1990. 74

The U.N. Resolutions: The Complete Text, in The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions, ed. Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, (New York: Times Books, 1991), p. 137.

37

issue. The U.N. Security Council has historically passed numerous resolutions against states

such as Israel, Indian, Pakistan, Burma, etc.which have routinely been ignored. More often

than not, these toothless resolutions are not backed up by concerted international pressure to

implement them. On security issues, it is only when the United States has put its full political

clout behind that U.N. that these resolutions have been implemented. For example, the U.S. used

U.N. Security Council resolutions to gain international support for the South Korean government

during the Korean War (1950-53). In contrast, after the 1967 Arab-Israel War, the U.S. did not

push for the implementation of U.N. Security Resolution 242, which called upon Israel to

withdraw from the occupied territories.75

As has historically been seen, it is only when the U.S.

decides to put it political clout behind U.N. Security Council that its actions become

internationally relevant.

The U.S. reaction was less severe. Although the U.S. took action against Iraq in the U.N.,

President Bush, in his first public statement on the invasion said, Were not discussing

intervention.76 In Richard Haasss memoir on the two Gulf Wars, War of Necessity War of

Choice, he describes how the immediate internal meetings at the White House on the invasion

were focused on containing Saddam, not on intervention. He explained that at the first National

Security Council meeting on the morning of August 2nd

, the general mood was there was

nothing we could do about [the invasion] and that instead the focus of U.S. policy ought to be on

making sure Saddam did not go any farther and do to Sa