Protasis and Problema in the "Topics"Author(s): Demetrius J. HadgopoulosSource: Phronesis, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1976), pp. 266-276Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4181996 .Accessed: 19/03/2011 17:55

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Protasis and Problema in the Topics

DEMETRIUS J. HADGOPOULOS

The purpose of this discussion is to show that Mrs Martha Kneale has misunderstood Aristotle's distinction between protasis and problema in the Topics.

She writes that, according to Aristotle, protasis and problema are "both questions and the difference between them ... is merely one of form, ..."'t Then, she goes on to state what, according to her, this distinction may amount to:

the distinction is perhaps that between the thesis proposed for discussion, i.e. the starting-point of the argument, and a question put later to keep it going. We may suppose that the question for discussion is 'Is animal the genus of man?' This is the protasis, the starting-point. In the course of the argument, the questioner asks 'Is it or is it not a property of animals to be self-moving?' This would be a problema.2

After this, she contrasts the use of thse words in the Topics with that found in the Prior Analytics. She writes that there the word 'protasis' "always means a statement and in chapters 26 to 28 of the first book of that work ... problemna also seems to mean a statement."3 Kneale thinks that Aristotle has changed his point of view. In the Prior Analytics he

is concerned to find out how a given proposition can be proved rather than how a given question can be answered either in the affirmative or negative. In the Topics he has always the two disputants in mind.4

Then, she brings etymological considerations in support of her view that the two words have undergone changes in meaning:

Protasis is from 7pOw?tvw ('to hold forth or offer') and is therefore something offered for consideration at the beginning of the dispute, while problema is from 7pop3&XXo ('to throw forward or down')

I W. C. Kneale and M. Kneale, The Development of Logic. Oxford, at the Claren- don Press, 1962. p. 34. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid., pp. 34-35. 4 Ibid., p. 35.

266

and is rather something thrown down or out in the middle of the argument, i.e. a suggestion. What is proffered or thrown out may well take the form of either a question or a statement.5

Kneale writes, as we have just seen, that in the Prior Analytics "protasis always means a statement". This claim may be construed in two ways: (i) There is no passage in the Prior Analytics where protasis means a question as it is always the case in the Topics. (ii) Protasis always means a statement in the Prior Analytics, while in the Topics it is sometimes used to mean a statement, sometimes to mean a question. Her claim concerning problema can also be construed in the above two ways.

I believe that the second way of construing the above claim is not what Kneale intends, since the general import of what she writes about changes in the meaning of the two words militates against it. So, I shall take it that Kneale claims that in the Topics the words protasis and problema never mean a statement. I shall argue that this view is false.

Let us now see how Aristotle draws the distinction. We shall find that Aristotle draws the distinction in more than one ways. In chapter iv of Topics I he writes:

101 b 16 yLvovr& [v yocp ox ?oyoL ex T&V npo-roaeco 7MpL WV 8 OL

auxXOyLapOt Tr spo5X0X&a r..

Here the expression ex 'bv sTpo-&asoev is an answer to the question Ex -tLVV` OL Xoyot yuvovrou; while O' 7poPX raX eCarL is an answer to the question npoq 7toix o' X6yOL; or Tepir 'tvv ox au),Xoyta[oL; It is clear that protases are those things which a logos consists of, while problemata are those things about which logoi or syllogismoi are constructed. In other words, Aristotle here distinguishes between protasis and problema in terms of their function in reasoning. A problem is that about which we reason, and a protasis is that by means of which we reason. Thus, the protases function as premisses and a problema functions as that which is to be destroyed or defended.

Although this is what Aristotle intends at the beginning of the chapter, he goes on to draw the distinction between protasis and problema as follows: 101 b 29 3taEppL ag TO 'WpO%m5 Xzc 7 7cp6,am, '& ?pO7n. out` t?v yxp

5 Ibid.

267

p7*6VTOC, &poic ye'o )O 40% OV 07tO7uV OpLU06q ?'lv av6pc1tou;

xXL yp'4 yejr 4ov ykvo4 a'or' 'ro5 'vt&pc'rrou; n;p6rocartL y'VrX.

?av s, 7ro'epov c6 %OV =7tO'V 8'L7OUV OpLtaF6q b7tLV &v&pc1tou r

We see that, according to this passage, both protasis and problema are

questions and the difference between them is one of form, as Kneale

writes. The two forms are: &pX ye ...; Form of protasis.

lto,mpov ... ou; Form of problema.

This formal distinction is not adhered to by Aristotle. Later on, when

he draws the distinction between a dialectical protasis and a dialectical

problema, he forgets the formal distinction, and he distinguishes be-

tween them in other ways. We find examples of dialectical protaseis

expressed in the form that had been earlier appropriated for the ex-

pression of problemata. For example, when he divides the protaseis

and problemata into ethical, physical and logical, he gives the following

examples of protaseis: 105 b 24 7to6'rpov xxv & vav'oVsL n Oin EA7rt=r ;

105 b 25 7t6tgpov o xOa,uoq &L8Ls n ou; The above mentioned distinction "appears to be not very important"

as Kneale writes, but the way the questioner was asking questions

and the way the respondent answered them in a dialectical situation,

seems to have been of some importance in ancient times. Aristotle

defines 8Lanx?Lxr-? ?p(coYnl'aL in the De Interpretatione as follows:

20 b 23 El o)v I' ?C' L 8'lOXtLX r &OXplCOGE s?CaTLV 'nSaLrrI, r

'g 7tpO't4aCrX'o wt(X7&po OU Op[LOU Ti% O(V tpMU(, I ? 7rp6'rafTC

&v'cPM&aEG)q =LL IzOpLOV, OUX aV ?L7) XtQxpcOLaq [LLOX, oUg' ?Xv

&CX-n&4. etpjtyai ed ?G 4t TOmtXo-q 7-epL ocu,rcv. 6aLx 8e 8iArov O6n

0U18C rtl 9Ca?v ?pwrI'ak ?'C aCM?Xn. asZ yap 486a4aL ?X

rq7 Epco'Ca7&c rwrEXCac 7rN6'Tepov PO0XVTOC -

&Vtpocaegw

[L6pLov OVMO pVVCL. a)X&x 8EZ 'TOv ?pUTWOC

30 CpOG8LOp[aGL 7rt6'pov 'r6E ?CFtLV O &Vtpo7OC, '

OV To6TO.

This quotation also suggests to us that Aristotle had obliterated the

distinction between the form of questions concerning protasis and

problema. Protaseis as questions could be expressed in either of the forms

mentioned earlier. Now, although Aristotle is concerned with how the

questioner should form his questions and how the answerer should

answer them, it does not mean that this is all that is involved in a

dialectical situation. According to Aristotle, the dialectician, besides

being a questioner, is also a auUoyLG6[Levoq, as we shall later see.

268

Even if Aristotle had adhered to his formal distinction, this by itself would not be helpful in determining the function of protasis and problema in the course of a discussion. I believe that Aristotle realized this, and this is why he distinguished between protasis and problema not in terms of their form but in terms of their content as well as their position in the dialectical syllogism. I have already suggested that the difference between them is that a protasis occurs among the premisses of a dialectical syllogism, while a problema is that which is to be re- futed or defended. I will now support this by citing further passages from the Topics.

Aristotle starts the Topics with a statement of his purpose:

100 a 18 'H p&w npo'aec r5q 7pxyVovTsxq [A-okov eupeLv, p' is 8vvao- ,LCiN CUXoyL'eabOL 7MpL 7rxv-og ?ol 8'VT 7rpopxntaov &.e ev86oRv, ...

We should notice here the expressions '7MpL ... 7rpo,-n,uaxOq and 'e rv8o6rv'. The expression 'Tcrp'. npopXntoroq' answers to the question 7tept 'Tlvoq [o &asX'Lx6k] aunXoyLt~aL; while the expression 'C, 'vsa'ov' answers to the question 'ex r'vv o' XoyoL [aCFUXoyLaG?Lo] ylvovtau; it is

clear that the expression '' e"vFo Wv' refers to the premisses of the dia- lectical syllogism, and, as we have seen, Aristotle had answered the question ?x 'r[VV O'L X6yoL ytvov'rL; by ix tFv rpo'rXQ aewv. At 100 a 30 he writes: &aXxrLx6q ... nxOyLGk &o 6i vsao,v aUXoyL4Ot6Svo .

So, he now tells us that the dialectical syllogism consists of protaseis which are ev8ooc. But a dialectical problema is not uniquely character- ized as an endoxon: 104 b 1 fIpO6P)Th.oc 8e ?rr 86tXexnLXOv &V p7c0C ... 7t pL o u

, O&Tepe4

aO0ZKOUGLV 1J ?VMCtV'(W A' 7orX?oI 'roz; ao(poz; oI ao9o' toZ(

7r0XXOZq I' &X%repOL CUTOI ?OW'vOLz.

Later on, Aristotle writes: 104 b 13 gart a npopXtaro xOat Jv e"CVOLt etaL a UXoyUT,LOL (&CtOpf(V

ymp et 7r6'Tpov oUrWq 9yet O oUX 06o@w a& so ipI &o'sIrQpv

Lvcat ?O6youc, 7CbLvoio) xoi 7repL 3v X6yov Xpu' goepv 6,vTwv tyci-

XGV, YLXXtOV OLO' SOL eVOCL s6o at &7Coao5vxL, olov 7r6-pov O

%6atoc aXH&Oq rl O?U' XOat yo'p r' OLOMTa CraeV XX"V -TtL4.

The last quotation states that problemata may be both answers - expressed as statements - to the question:

7IOTCpOV (T )4 -Y) UX OVur-;

if there are strong arguments in support of them. Thus, it is clear that either part of an antiphasis may occur as the conclusion of a dialectical

269

syllogism. Aristotle does call these conclusions 'problemata'. Later on, Aristotle defines what he calls 'thesis' as follows: 104 b 19 E6aLq 8a eia-nv t6X4&lq 7aploZoq 'rcv y XpL&WV 'tvO xo'r&

CPLXOaOczV, . . .

24 N 7rep'l Tv koyou x'.(o0"v 6mvcLov torZq aO0L, ...

Then, he goes on: 105 a 3 Ou 8ac 8ae6 7V npo5 a ou8& 7&aaOv $cfLv trCFXO7tLV, MXX'i v

X7COpa?GSLeV av TsL4 tCv X6you 8CO[v&v xacl v xoXxasCu iq aLas&5?-Ot AeV yXp 7OpOiOUVTEq TOTepOv 8sz 't&o Dok 'Cnav

*t 9 - - tA t f At

xOCt TuO yOVeO(c OCaya7 V tf OU XOXaCe(,)4 akovToct, O? 8S lro'TpoV 7v

XLUV XeUX1J I' OU aOiai c. Thus, a dialectical problema or thesis is sometlhing about which one has an &itopca, it is subject of entaxo7tv or 4TreZv, it is something proposed for discussion, it is a ?wp%x or a i.e. that about which one inquires or investigates. It is, in other words, the starting-point of a dispute, it is that which is offered for consideration at the begin- ning of a dispute. Aristotle writes that a problema or thesis may be 8uaeMZCEpIog (158 b 16). The "questioner always tries to draw the conclusion which is contradictory to the answerer's thesis." (159 b 2-3). Here 84'atq does not mean a question but a statement. There is also another passage where Aristotle clearly distinguishes between p5rotasis and thesis or problema as far as their position in a dialectical logos is concerned: 159 a 3 Oxouv 8& Xav1kveLv, 5'rav aenX,Cp7nro; f n E O-n 7rtOV

'r TCOV CLp.tlv&V. 6'a.v 8' s 7tp6o 7' a&,L(Ou XUOCL 'v 7tpoTXaLv

t0 spyov 8!'O&6ynVocL f tfv TYaLv, 8Ls7topGeLC=v xv TnC 7o'Mpov &C'rov '& '7tOLU k ou. ?C y&p p L X oL6a?L X%L 7p04 T05TO 'rXoSyeat&OCL, pL.ZLOV 7rpOartx'L TU0 cV Cp' XEe'VOU CL

e ae L, 7rL CT?96 U0 aCLE-TTOV MaTW@V. EL rEM aeX o'UV X?zO0Cr,-

T?pOV 'r TO itM 7OLZZV, r'OV, 86 atL yV(p1L4p )pWv aX?xoyt,rCaaL, OU ? 06ov' r 'cp pv 4avtvov'C o7 ?sTE'V, wV LY

yVwpyt.()pOV h, 'Tj 86 yupvao6vx 'e'rov, (v (Xb6g i6vov CLVynXLO. Ware YCAVSpOOV 'r ?X UZ 040 ePW@VX'L TL XO%L 8LCXOVatL

MH,LGYQOV 'rL?VVOL.

In this passage rO 6v 4pj xeripevov is the thesis or problem of the respondent considered as a statement. The function of the questioner is to destroy this thesis or problema by using protaseis which will be accepted by the answerer. But the answerer might demand a discussion (8Lmksynvat) of some of the jrotaseis too. If le does so, Aristotle writes: JL?SOV [9pYov] ZpOQ&iL 705 ?V ipyn XCLflvo'J. But .o ?V &pXn xBtlVQV

270

[`pyov] is to attack the thesis or problema. So, a problema or thesis (a thesis is a problema but not every problema is a thesis) cannot be "a question put later [than a protasis] to keep the argument going" or "something thrown down or out in the middle of the argument, i.e. a suggestion" as Kneale writes. It is not necessary to quote other pas- sages in order to show how Aristotle undeistands the distinction be- tween protasis and problema. I believe that it is clear by now that a problema is ro' v Okp X xztpvov or 7poPX-n'v for discussion, while a protasis is that which occurs in the premisses of a dialectical syllogism, which premisses are brought in support of the contradictory oi the position of the answerer in a dialectical situation.

I shall now try to show in more detail that Kneale's claim that Aristotle never uses the words protasis and problema in the Topics in the sense of 'statement' is false.

Aristotle defines &xXrxTx-ct nrp&roaCc, as follows: 104 a 8 ?CaTL 8' nporxcar 8LaXzx-rLXY e'po)-CaLq evaoRoq 7&(v 'I tO

'roz5TO tOL4 VCOPOL4, [OCt TOVXOLP (X 7OO LV eitat a, 7LToLG T ToZ5 F.XLat yvpLpCtOC waaoo ... CL6 8 Tpo'asLg

8LOOSXTtLXaL XOcL tOa rOZ4 ev8oRoLc q .LOLM, xaXL ravoctVLL XOvt

avtrLpTaLv toz aOx6OoaLV E Va,OGC ZIvoct -porev4stvoev, xaOL OOL

15 80;CML 7-.ep'L TOl4 trrEJVCX eC t lac, 'Up Lvacc.

Much later, he discusses the form in which the dialectical protases as questions are expressed: 158 a 14 Ou aoxel a? Tv TO xoxt*6Xou 3alMXtsX7 TcpOTaCrL tIVOL otov rL

&ctv &vt4p,7roq, n 7rcaXx, xeyvtou &yroCM6v; E'at yap 7tpo6zaCL

8LOCXeXTL*X 7rpO' -V e7TLV OCt7OXpLv'atGxL VIL ot 0 7hpO4 Oe TMS

eLpU%Vteva OuX E'Co-V. &LO OV) erx(X Ea- t 'r TOL-oWtr t&)V

t7rL,uCt()V, av ,u ocAros LOpL'aoc7 acXo, 4.orV e otoV cc ye -r&yabo~v o&rxc i oucoc, X'ryeocL; tpbo4 yap Ta TOL ?TOC 'PM,8LO

t~~~~~~ 'k I t ff I &UrOXPLaC -q XOTMT7)CYOVTL -q OUCoXp~aOCv-r. &L6 TCeLpoCTeOV O&ro

7rpOTreLvFLv tOCg TOLUTOC4; TtO)V 7rpOTOaeGv.

This passage accords with that from the De Interpretatione, quoted above, where Aristotle defines aXo%rLx-x epcl-FyTL;. Here he tells us how one should express the LOCxteX& CpOtra-a. Earlier, at 155 b 10, he has said that

I0 17tePrrjPaOC 'etv '&Lov ro5 8tczXex-r%. So, it is important for Aristotle how the dialectician should form his questions. But although asking questions is peculiar to the dialectician, he has also something in common with the philosopher or demonstrator, and this is that both of them cuXXoy'L?ovrtox. Both of them employ

271

reasoning but the dialectician reasons from protaseis which are given by the respondent, since the dialectidal situation involves asking questions to another party, while 155 b 11 Txx 8i pLXOc6TC) XxcL M'rouvTL xC41'EuT06v ou8rv tXL, ?&V &TX'

LiV j XOL yvGc)PLL 8tL at, 0Jv oa axxoytac L, O j u 8' o& o

.7tOXpLVO6tSVO4 9LX Tr6 (ats v5yyu4 evao T0o es ipX xOc 7tpOOpaV T6 au a6 P vov &? X'ia&c x&v cOu8C ev IL&TOC L 'VO 1 pL La xac

MveygWu4 eLVoXL To QgL6Ta eX TOUGTV y&p O(. e7tLc`T)9LOVLXOL

16 otu?oyLatLoL. Thus, in contrast to the philosopher or the independent inquirer the dialectician does two different things: he asks a question of a certain form and of a certain epistemological content. When he gets an answer he goes on to ask another question and so on until he has enough answers from which to draw a conclusion which is the contradictory of that which the respondent admitted at the beginning of the discussion.

In the Prior Analytics Aristotle draws once more the distinction between a dialectical protasis and a demonstrative protasis. Martha Kneale quotes the passage in which this distinction is found at the beginning of her book. The passage is: 24 a 22 Xta?pet 8U

' 0o8eLX7'X7 7rpOTpC6- 4 'T-7 SL CXEXTXJ4, <tC 4v

M7O83LwXT?LX' 9V Vorpou s.LOpLOU 7% 0CtLTpLYa ,)W eorLv (oU, y&p

&poa &?'c XaCukCvt 'o 4&7to8EtXVUWV), T 8? &LOCXSXTLXnX CpCOTTaLM

&VTvpcaEc? alV. OU8?v 8i 8LOal L 7tpO 'TO yCVae TOV rXwIpOU

AXOyLa[LOV XQi yap 'o L7O8aCLXVU)V. XVL 0o ?pCi))v axoyL4CLat

)PA,)v tL XOCTOa 'TLVOq U70CXPXZLV n 0LY UrCspSLv. e raL tBo- ytaxr l?v 7rp6rxacq aMc xYo&) oc 'octL, n 0nmoyca[Lc rrnvoq xra ,nVOg -rOv dpi?Vxvov Tp67ov, &Uro8eXmrtxi 8& ?av &X3 Xffi xLLal

,rCo ?4~ O'pX; 67rolk'ccv elkt[LeCv-n, &0CxXnx' Kt 7ruv&(vO0LCv

0&v EpWTYCK 0vTL(aC?1, cuUoyt otv 8? iC4Ou 9c LVOCd&VOU

24 b 12 xocxt CvO8ou, xocI&Mbrep ev ToK To7rLxoZq tLp7qL. We see from this passage that both the demonstrator and the ques- tioner argue syllogistically by assuming that some predicate applies or does not apply to some subject. The difference between them lies in the nature of the premisses that each one Xaoq3xvet, as well as in the fact that the demonstrator (the philosopher in the Topics) does not ask a question as to which side of an antiphasis is to be accepted by the interlocutor if there is any; he simply Xcxu,paveL one or the other side of a contradiction whether the student (in case he is teaching) likes it or not. But the dialectician cannot proceed in this fashion.

272

He has to accept the answer of the respondent, and then use it in drawing his conclusion. Thus, dialectical reasoning consists of two activities, as we have noticed earlier: (i) ?pcotxv: which consists of dialectical protaseis in the sense of 'ques-

tions', and (ii) auEoylaCw.: which consists in drawing a conclusion from protaseis

in the sense of 'statements'. The dialectical syllogism then consists of protaseis which are gvgoiou, which protaseis are answers given by the respondent to the specific kind of questions put forward by the questioner. This is also the way G. E. L. Owen understands the passage at 24 b 10-13. He writes:

The passage is designed ... to mark off two senses of 'protasis', both of which occur in Aristotle's account of dialectical exercises though only one was formally introduced at Top. 101 b 29-32. Briefly, the dialectician does ask his yes-or-no questions, called protaseis; he asks until he gets the conces- sions he needs, concessions which must, if the argument is to be dialectical, be endoxa. These too, recast in the foim of propositions not questions, are called protaseis, and he must 'secure' them and not 'assume' them: ...6

Thus, Aristotle does use the word 'protasis' in the sense of 'statement' in the Topics. The tool of the dialectician is the dialectical syllogism, and the dialectical syllogism is a syllogism, and a syllogism is defined in the Topics as follows: 100 a 25 'EatL 8 aXXOyLtaL64 X6yoq RV 4 ',}eVV6CV TLvCav eP6v -T vr&)v

XeLttV&vV ?e VcVLy(XTc G3UgOLVEL L%c 'sGv x74 eLiVWV.

What in the case of the dialectical syllogism 't,&v'uL are the protases which are endoxa, and which are in the form of statements secured from the answers of the respondent.

I think that the word problema is also used by Aristotle in two senses parallel to the ones concerning protasis: (i) it is a qaestion or an invitation to choose one of a pair of contra-

dictories at the beginning of the discussion. (ii) it is one of these contradictories which the answerer has chosen to

defend, and sometimes each one of a pair of contradictories are called problemata by Aristotle, as we have seen earlier.

We can also find passages in the Topics where the words protasis and

; G. E. L. Owen, ed., Aristotle on Dialectic. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1968. p. 106.

273

problema are used in the sense of 'statement' only. For example, Aristotle writes in illustration of his statement that 104 a 13 eCa: 8e 7rpo'r&aLacns 8LaSXto ... xxc 'ocvav XL x' &VrL(Pa.tV rot

aoxoiaLv eV6OLVo4O s ViCv 7pOT? 6V6pEVv,

the following: 104 a 22 E'L yap C`v3o,ov &n 8L OeZ ro' U ?Couq itOLFZV, xxi 6'T oU 8?z xMxcq

7rOLCV eV8oOOV. 'ea'L VcXV7nOV ?L'V Ont aL XOCX&)4 7rOLCLV rOUg D'lq x0r "Vr at v 6' *,7 O' Cev x cp o', xoc' &vLpov or on ou x xiOi 7rtoLv.

So, according to Aristotle, the following statements are dialectical protaseis:

aeL '76q (pXOUq eU 7rOLSV.

OU 'tO?o4 ?pLXOUq XM-XG4 7rOLeLV.

We also find the following statements called problemata at 108 b 34 by Aristotle:

7triac 8ov' 'yOCf-6v. oije,Lor r;Bov &yao&,Yv.

ecra' -T 0V-J M yx4oCv. sa-T aq aovj OUX ayalo(V.

Now, Martha Kneale's comments on the passage at 24 a 22-24 b 12 make it obvious that she understands there the dialectical protasis to be a dialectical premiss.7 This might be brought as an objection against my construing her statement "the word protasis (in the Prior A alytics) always means a statement" as "there is no passage in the Prior Analytics where protasis means a question as it is always the case in the Topics", and as supporting the second way of construing her statement, which is "Protasis always means a statement in het Prior Analytics, while in the Topics it is sometimes used to mean a statement, sometimes to mean a question." Even if this objection is a telling one. I still believe that her view that the woi d protasis in the Prior A nalytics is always used in the sense of 'statement' is false. At 24 a 22-24 b 12, where Aristotle distinguishes between syllogistic, demonstrative, and dialectical protasis, he does use the word protasis in the sense of 'question':

8& 8 Cx?X6nx [7tp6'OTMa] ?pc' aLs ocV?L9p&a? ?a'nV.

&caBkXTMx 8i [7rpo6MaLq] 7ruv,vop.&v(O ,uV SpCOYlGL4 avTLcpOaso)d ... There are also some passages in the second book of the Prior Analytics, where, although not explicitly stated, Aristotle does use protasis in the sense of 'question'. We read:

64 a 33 AeV 8di xxTSOrvoeLIv osc CvOeeTOCL SL?v o{U-ro 'T0C OcwXEtL,U0C X,-

VCLV, (,nep eL O,UV txaXv ?7'rf VfBV UaOU,MCOV .LVOCL XOCL TOCLV

7 Kneale, p. 2.

274

.e<Ucocv n 'cv& ,iS ouaoCV (67rZp oCx COAY X EavLvsL), 9=L

aE 8L' Mxwv a PCq TFCav auxoyEamatML a&'Tpov, W e ?V

Tom:xoZcv ?xzrn ?Xa4ev*

Part of what Aristotle says here is that it is possible to infer one of a pair of contradictories by means of further questions (ipwr?-Ta). Since he talks here in the manner of the Topics, and since it is not pos- sible to infer anything by merely asking questions without getting any answers, ?piiotcx is used in the sense of a dialectical protasis in both senses given earlier. Thus, Aristotle not only uses the word protasis in the sense of 'question', but he also uses the word spcrra (in the Prior Analytics) in the sense of protasis.

In chapter xix of the second book of the Prior Analytics Aristotle discusses how to escape and employ counter-arguments, and this discussion is also in the manner of the Topics. Concerning how to escape counter-arguments he writes:

66 a 25 Hpo 8s To PY'6 xnau;Akoy[,eaAa= napwr7nTpeov, 6sav avru 76v auvmepqcaaL rcv epcra tov ?O6yov, orcU sun 8on aL TMUTOV eV

TMOLq 7CpOT0'CaeaV, &CeLaf7rp taOLeV 6&tL aVeU [AaOU aUXXOyLaC ou YLVsTCL, ZLOV 7 rXTO VOV&XLq Xey6'jevov.

It is clear that in the above passage protaseis are the answers given in the form of statements. But Aristotle uses protasis here in the sense of 'statement' because he has in mind the opponent as being a otUo- yL6o6uvoq, one who has to infer a certain conclusion from a set of answers. The oroyLGO,6svoq is not interested in proving the conclusion in Kneale's sense of 'proof': "to prove a proposition is to infer it validly from true premisses". Aristotle's use of the word protasis here is in line with his understanding of the word as having two senses. When the opponent ?p(ri -TO6v Xoyov, what he is doing is asking questions which are dialectical protaseis in the first sense of the word. Thus, I believe, Aristotle has not changed his point of view. He still uses the word protasis, whenever the occasion calls for it, in the two senses found in the Topics, and explicitly stated at the beginning of the Prior Analytics. It is also false to say, as Kneale says, that in the Prior Analytics Aristotle "is concerned to find out how a given proposition can be proved". Aristotle is interested in the Prior Analytic to find out what forms of statements follow from other forms of statements, rather than in the proof of statements. His interest in the proof of statements or rather in the demonstration of statements as found in the Posterior A nalytics.

Before I conclude, I will say a few things more about protasis.

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Ammonius writes that the distinction between the 7trQ VTLx0q ?,6yoq (in the De Interpretatione) and protasis, is the following: 13, 24 86X9Xpel y'p 7p60xLCC &oP0v'rtxoG5 X6yow 7a( eV yap 7tp6-

Tocat. 70XVTCa X(XL OXV0CPVrLX6; XOyO, oGu 7ra 8e &7rGopoVrtvLx6

Xoyo; np6OcaLg ka'tv. X*' eu'V &LV y&p OC t OMcTVTLY.O ?6yoq OUX'eKlV 7Cp6tXaL t6 8O yLVeTML pTO'aL4, otav 6epog mao-

ytLapLu5 Yeivra .8

Later on, he also writes: 13, 36 VSL8 ouv ?v tiv TX fp. Ep'.zpwlqeoc; Xo?you4 &Cocp0vLUxou

xesyev xad4'0U"ok, evT6cia 8e rodg X6youcq Fspin cauXXoyLautv 14, 1 7rcpovXoctPCwe, eIX6Tg iX?e 0&v oU'atvpmv [Ltv-V STpOTCaCWV

7rOLiVaoXTO, VTUX 8t OpLtet 't 7o're EaLV np6OaTC ... So, according to Ammonius, o &Cro av-x0q ?6yoq - that logos which can be true or false - when it stands by itself is not a protasis. 'A7tocL- VTLX64 Xoyog becomes a protasis when it is understood as part of a syllogism, when it becomes part of a syllogism. A protasis cannot stand by itself, a protasis is &ot avTLx0q X6yoq viewed in the context of an inferential proces, its character is relational. In view of Ammonius' remark, we may give an explanation as to why Aristotle uses the word protasis in the sense of 'question'. If a questoin is asked simply for the sake of getting some information only, then it would not be aprotasis, but when questions are asked for the purpose of securing answers, which will be used for drawing conclusions, then they become protaseis.

In conclusion, I may say, that my claim that Martha Kneale has misunderstood Aristotle's distinction between protasis and problema could have been made by Alexander of Aphrodisias, Ammonius, Grote, Ernst Kapp, G. E. L. Owen, and others, since I believe that they have understood Aristotle correctly concerning the points discussed above.

University of Oklahoma

8 Ammonius, In Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum Librum I Contnzentarium. Ed. M. Wallies. (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, iv (vi).) Berlin, 1899. p. 13 9 Ibid., pp. 13-14.

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