Hacienda Primera Development Corporation v Villegas
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Transcript of Hacienda Primera Development Corporation v Villegas
Republic of the PhilippinesSupreme Court
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION
HACIENDA PRIMERA DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION and ANNA KATRINA E.HERNANDEZ,
Petitioners,
- versus - MICHAEL S. VILLEGAS,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 186243 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson,NACHURA,PERALTA,ABAD, andMENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: April 11, 2011
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1]
dated November 27, 2008 and
Resolution[2]
dated February 3, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 104847.
G.R. No. 186243 http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/186243.htm
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The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Hacienda Primera Development Corporation (petitioner Hacienda) hired
respondent Michael S. Villegas as General Manager of Amorita Resort. He was hired as a
probationary employee for three (3) months. The employment contract contained the following
terms and conditions:
1. Salary of P60,000.00 net per month for the first three (3) months and upon his
regularization, P70,000.00 net per month.2. Six (6) round trip tickets (TAG-MLA-TAG) per annum.3. P2,500.00 cell phone bill allowance.4. Fifteen (15) days vacation leave and fifteen (15) days sick leave upon permanency.
5. Pro-rated 13th month pay starting December 2006.6. A 3-month probationary period starting January 200[7].7. Board and lodging in the resort.
8. Medical Insurance.[3]
Respondent started working for petitioner on January 1, 2007. On March 14, 2007, he
received a call from Paramount Consultancy and Management telling him to report back to
Manila. There, he learned that his services were terminated. He, thus, asked for a written notice
of termination, but did not receive any.[4]
Hence, the complaint for illegal dismissal.
Petitioner Hacienda, on the other hand, stated that respondent was hired as probationary
employee. It explained that respondent’s services were terminated because he failed to qualify
for regular employment. Specifically, it claimed that respondent failed to conceptualize and
complete financial budgets, sales projection, room rates, website development, and marketing
plan in coordination with the Sales and Marketing Manager.[5]
On November 22, 2007, Labor Arbiter (LA) Herminio V. Suelo rendered a decision[6]
in
favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding complainantillegally dismissed. Accordingly, respondents are hereby ordered as follows:
1. To reinstate complainant to his former position without loss of seniority rights and
other benefits;
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2. To pay complainant his backwages from the time he was dismissed on March 15,2007, until his actual reinstatement either physically or by payroll;
3. To pay complainant moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00), and exemplary damages also in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos(P50,000.00);
4. To pay complainant attorney’s fees equivalent to ten (10) percent of the total
monetary award.
The reinstatement aspect of this Decision is immediately executory pursuant to Article223 of the Labor Code, as amended. Respondents are therefore directed to submit a report ofcompliance thereof before this Office within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of thisDecision.
The Fiscal Examiner or the computation and examination unit of this Office is directedto compute the monetary aspect of the above-judgment awards which shall form part of thisDecision.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Aggrieved, petitioner Hacienda elevated the case to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), which partially granted[8]
the appeal, worded in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The charge of illegal dismissal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.Accordingly, the Decision is MODIFIED to order the respondents-appellants to pay
his salary corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract of employment (March16-31, 2007) in the amount of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[9]
In a Decision[10]
dated November 27, 2008, the CA set aside the above NLRC decision
and reinstated that of the LA. The dispositive portion of the assailed CA Decision is quoted
below for easy reference:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the
NLRC is hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter isREINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that since reinstatement is no longer possible dueto strained relations between the parties, a separation pay of one month for every year ofservice is hereby decreed. In this connection, the instant case is hereby remanded to the LaborArbiter for the computation of the said monetary award.
SO ORDERED.[11]
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Petitioner Hacienda’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution[12]
dated
February 3, 2009. Hence, the instant petition with the following assigned errors:
(A) THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR OF
JUDGMENT WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED; (B) THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR OF
JUDGMENT IN REINSTATING THE DECISION OF THE LABOR ARBITER AWARDINGUNLIMITED BACKWAGES BEYOND THE RESPONDENT’S PROBATIONARYEMPLOYMENT;
(C) THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR OF
JUDGMENT WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO MORAL ANDEXEMPLARY DAMAGES;
(D) THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR OF
JUDGMENT WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’SFEES;
(E) THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR OF
JUDGMENT WHEN IT ORDERED THE PAYMENT OF SEPARATION PAY; AND (F) THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR OF
JUDGMENT WHEN IT DECIDED THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT ALTHOUGH THENLRC’S RSOLUTION DATED 22 APRIL 2008 IS ALREADY FINAL AND EXECUTORYSINCE RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, CONTRARY TO THE
RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE NLRC, IS UNVERIFIED.[13]
The petition is unmeritorious.
The Labor Code and its Implementing Rules govern probationary employment.[14]
LABOR CODE
Art. 281. Probationary Employment.—Probationary employment shall not exceed six(6) months from the date the employee started working, unless it is covered by anapprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services of an employee who hasbeen engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails toqualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by theemployer to the employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed to workafter a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee.
LABOR CODE, Implementing Rules of Book VI, Rule I, Section 6 Sec. 6. Probationary employment. There is probationary employment where the
employee, upon his engagement, is made to undergo a trial period during which the employerdetermines his fitness to qualify for regular employment, based on reasonable standards madeknown to him at the time of engagement.
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Probationary employment shall be governed by the following rules: x x x x (c) The services of an employee who has been engaged on probationary basis may be
terminated only for a just or authorized cause, when he fails to qualify as a regular employeein accordance with the reasonable standards prescribed by the employer.
(d) In all cases of probationary employment, the employer shall make known to the
employee the standards under which he will qualify as a regular employee at the time of hisengagement. Where no standards are made known to the employee at that time, he shall bedeemed a regular employee.
In Magis Young Achievers’ Learning Center v. Manalo,[15]
the Court described
probationary employment in this wise:
A probationary employee or probationer is one who is on trial for an employer, during
which the latter determines whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment. Theprobationary employment is intended to afford the employer an opportunity to observe thefitness of a probationary employee while at work, and to ascertain whether he will become anefficient and productive employee. While the employer observes the fitness, propriety andefficiency of a probationer to ascertain whether he is qualified for permanent employment, theprobationer, on the other hand, seeks to prove to the employer that he has the qualifications tomeet the reasonable standards for permanent employment. Thus, the word probationary, asused to describe the period of employment, implies the purpose of the term or period, not its
length.[16]
It can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions of law and jurisprudential
pronouncement that there are two grounds to legally terminate a probationary employee. It may
be done either: a) for a just cause; or b) when the employee fails to qualify as a regular
employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the
employee at the start of the employment.[17]
In this case, petitioner Hacienda fails to specify the reasonable standards by which
respondent’s alleged poor performance was evaluated, much less to prove that such standards
were made known to him at the start of his employment.[18]
Thus, he is deemed to have been
hired from day one as a regular employee.[19]
Due process dictates that an employee be
apprised beforehand of the condition of his employment and of the terms of advancement
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therein.[20]
We quote with approval the CA’s observation in this wise:
Verily, a cursory examination of the employment contract readily shows the absence ofany standard to which [respondent] should comply. Neither was there any indicia that[respondent] was ever informed of the said standards if there [were] any. What [petitioners]merely claim, as mentioned above, is that [respondent] was presumed to know the standard
required of him as General Manager in charge [of] the pre-opening of the resort.[21]
In Secon Philippines, Ltd. v. NLRC,[22]
Orient Express Placement Phils. v. NLRC,[23]
and Davao Contractors Development Cooperative (DACODECO) v. Pasawa,[24]
we did not
sustain the employees’ dismissal for failure of the employer to apprise them of the reasonable
standards they needed to comply with for their continued employment.
We find no reason to depart from the above conclusion.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated November 27, 2008 and Resolution dated February 3, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 104847 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABADAssociate Justice
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JOSE CATRAL MENDOZAAssociate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultationbefore the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson'sAttestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached inconsultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal, with Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Jose C. Reyes, Jr.,
concurring; rollo, pp. 44-57.[2]
Id. at 59.[3]
Supra note 1, at 45.[4]
Id. at 45-46.[5]
Id. at 158.[6]
Id. at 124-132.[7]
Id. at 131-132.[8]
Id. at 154-159.[9]
Id. at 159.[10]
Supra note 1.[11]
Id. at 56-57.[12]
Supra note 2.[13]
Rollo, p. 21.
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[14] Ramos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170116, December 23, 2008, 575 SCRA 160, 167.
[15] G.R. No. 178835, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 421.
[16] Id. at 431-432.
[17] Aberdeen Court, Inc. v. Agustin, Jr., 495 Phil. 706, 715 (2005).
[18] Orient Express Placement Phils. v. NLRC, 339 Phil. 449, 452 (1997).
[19] Clarion Printing House, Inc. v. NLRC, 500 Phil. 61, 82 (2005).
[20] Orient Express Placement Phils. v. NLRC, supra, at 453.
[21] Supra note 1, at 51.
[22] 377 Phil. 711 (1999).
[23] Supra.
[24] G.R. No. 172174, July 9, 2009, 592 SCRA 334.
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